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Cooperation and social control

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Stellingen

Propositions to accompany the dissertation

Cooperation and Social Control Effects of Preferences, Institutions, and Social Structure

Dieko Bakker

1. Investigating cooperative behavior with experiments can tell us under which conditions self-interested behavior is sufficient for successful cooperation, and under which conditions self-interested behavior must be regulated to make cooperation possible. (Chapter 1)
2. Differences in individuals' cooperative tendencies should be measured on a continuous scale, using instruments which are not too sensitive to random deviations. (Chapter 2)
3. The effectiveness of peer punishment institutions can be maintained in the face of retaliation, but this depends on the strength of punishment and the composition of the social group. (Chapter 3)
4. The negative impact of retaliation on sanctioning institutions is greater for peer punishment systems than for institutional punishment systems. (Chapter 4)
5. Multiple group membership affects behavior in a social dilemma, as other groups restrict possible actions and place pressure on their members. (Chapter 5)
6. Small groups faced with social dilemmas provide a promising environment where interventions can be expected to successfully promote cooperation, given their relatively low complexity and clear structure. (Chapter 1)
7. Solving cooperation problems in real social groups is the most effective way to determine the relative importance of the many factors which influence cooperative behavior.
8. Cooperation is best achieved by those researching cooperation.