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Macro-economic determinants of international migration in Europe

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Chapter 5 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ERA: SOME STYLISED FACTS

5.1 Introduction

Net international migration figures are composed of many immigration and emigration flows, which almost always comprise different migration types. Since the eighties, a new type of international migration emerged, which may be labelled post-industrial migration. It consists of a mixture of high-skilled labour, clandestine and asylum migration (White, 1993). International migration of ethnic minorities between and from the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe may also be regarded as post-industrial migration. The emergence of this diffuse post-industrial migration did not mean that the more traditional migration types disappeared from the scene. Migration types like low-skilled labour migration or family migration still took place in the 1980s and 1990s.

Different migration types created a cluttered aggregate of international migration flows from, to and within the EU/EFTA region. The extent to which different migration types set their seal on the overall picture in the various parts of Europe is different and varies over time. Thus, variation in three dimensions (migration type, time and space, see also figure 1.1) has produced a complex pattern of migration flows in Europe in the post-industrial era. This chapter aims to disentangle this complex pattern somewhat by presenting some stylised facts on the three aforementioned dimensions. In addition, possible future trends concerning certain migration types will be discussed.

Stylised facts on labour migration (section 5.2), return migration (5.3), chain migration[38] (5.4) and asylum migration (5.5) in Western Europe will be distinguished. The subject of section 5.6 is the space dimension of international migration flows in Western Europe. In this section differences between the former labour-importing and labour-exporting countries will be discussed. Ethnic migration flows were, by far, the most important international migration flows to and within former communist Europe. These migration flows, which often have their origin in specific historical events, will be discussed extensively in section 5.7. The chapter ends with a concluding section.

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[38] This section mainly deals with family migration following labour migration (and to a lesser degree following asylum migration), but also with the importance of migration networks which have existed because of a country's colonial past.

5.2 Labour migration

1. *Most foreign workers that have entered the EU have utilised channels of entry other than labour.*

Labour migration from outside the EU is only allowed if an employer can demonstrate that no EU citizen is eligible for the job. Therefore, labour migrants from outside the EU are mainly low-skilled seasonal workers and high-skilled professionals, often from other developed countries (Loobuyck, 2001). However, in section 1.6, a migrant was defined as a person who has the intention to stay in another country than his or her current sojourn for a period longer than one year. Hence, seasonal workers are not considered as migrants. As a consequence, (legal) labour migration from outside the EU to the EU involved mainly high-skilled labour migration. Labour immigration data suggest that the number of labour migrants that entered the EU was modest in the period 1985-1999 (OECD, 1999). This, however, does not necessary imply that the inflow of foreign labour was also small as people who used another channel of entry (e.g. family, asylum or ethnic migration) may enter the labour market as well. Data on the stock of foreign labour[39] in eight EU countries in 1990 and 1996 are presented in *Table 5.1*.

Table 5.1. Foreign(-born) labour force (percentage of the total labour force) in eight EU countries in 1990 and 1996, in thousands

	1990		1996	
Denmark	69	(2%)	88	(3%)
France	1550	(6%)	1605	(6%)
West Germany[i, ii]	2025	(7%)	2559	(9%)
Irish Republic	34	(3%)	52	(4%)
Netherlands[ii, iii]	197	(3%)	218	(3%)
Portugal	52	(1%)	87	(2%)
Sweden	246	(5%)	218	(5%)
UK	882	(3%)	878	(3%)
Total	**5055**	**(5%)**	**5705**	**(6%)**

Source: OECD (1999).

i number of work permits

ii cross-border workers are included

iii self-employed, family workers and the unemployed are excluded.

[39] Here foreign labour is defined as those on the labour market with a nationality other than that of the country of residence plus those on the labour market with the nationality of the country of residence who are born abroad.

The amount of foreign(-born) labour increased in six out of eight of the selected EU countries[40]. The total increase in foreign labour in these countries was about 650,000. Germany was responsible for by far the largest share of this increase (82%). In fact, the increase in foreign(-born) labour in Germany is even larger as more than 1.5 million *Aussiedler*, who do not need a work permit, migrated to Germany in the period 1990-1995. A major proportion entered the West German labour market. The amount of foreign EU labour in EU member states has been fairly stable in the 1990s. The policy of free movement after 1992 led to a slight increase at the beginning. However, figures decreased hereafter to a stable level that remained until the end of the 1990s (United Nations, 1998a). This implies that the stock of non-EU foreign labour increased considerably. Therefore, we may conclude that a large share of the observed increase in foreign workers is caused by non-EU migration with channels of entry other than labour.

2. EU enlargements and the removal of barriers to international (labour) migration between the member states exerted only small impacts on the volume and composition of international labour migration within, to and from the EU.

The (new) EU membership of former labour-exporting countries is an important reason why welfare differences between the former labour-importing and former labour-exporting countries in Europe declined (Crespo-Cuaresma *et al*., 2002). In all likelihood, this led to a decrease in low-skilled labour migration within the EU, in spite of the removal of barriers to international labour migration. Other factors which obstructed large-scale low-skilled labour migration within the EU after the opening of international borders are high unemployment rates in former labour-importing countries and a large inflow of low-skilled workers from outside the EU to the richer, former labour-importing countries. Especially Germany, by far Europe’s most important destination of (labour) migrants, experienced a large inflow of predominantly ethnic and asylum migrants. Sooner or later many of these people entered the German labour market (see also the previous stylised fact). Furthermore, the reunification of Germany caused large internal (labour) flows from the former East Germany to the western part of the country.

In the previous paragraphs I stated that the volume of low-skilled labour migration within the EU decreased moderately and that the number of EU workers in other EU states was fairly stable. This implies that the volume of high-skilled labour migration increased a little. An important determinant of the volume of high-skilled labour migration is the level of international diploma recognition in the EU. Further recognition of diplomas in the EU may cause a further increase in high-skilled labour migration between the countries of the EU.

[40] The only two exceptions are Sweden and the UK. Many former labour migrants returned from these countries to Finland and the Irish Republic, respectively.

Similar to low-skilled labour migration, high-skilled labour migration between EU countries is also negatively influenced by high unemployment rates and a large inflow of ethnic and asylum migrants. A large brain drain occurred from Eastern Europe to the United States, Israel and Western Europe, with Germany as the most important destination country (Straubhaar, 2000).

In addition to high-skilled labour migration between EU countries and from developing and Eastern European countries to the EU, this migration type also occurred between all EU countries and other developed countries (e.g. United States, Canada or Australia). In contrast with low-skilled labour migration flows and high-skilled labour migration flows from developing to developed countries, the latter flows between developed countries often have about the same size as their counterflows, although English-speaking countries often have an inflow surplus. The aforementioned increase in high-skilled international labour migration within the EU might have been at the expense of high-skilled labour migration from the rest of the world to the EU.

Data on international labour flows to the EU are rare. Data for three selected EU countries in the period 1988-1997 are presented in *Table 5.2*.

Table 5.2. Inflow of foreign non-EU workers (thousands) into Denmark, Belgium and the Irish Republic

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Belgium[i]	2.8	3.7	–	5.1	4.4	4.3	4.1	3.0	2.2	2.5
Denmark[ii]	3.1	2.7	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.8	3.1
Irish R.[iii]	–	1.2	1.4	3.8	3.6	4.3	4.3	4.3	3.8	4.5

Source: OECD (1999).

i Workers from Spain and Portugal are included until 1992.

ii In addition to EU workers, workers from Nordic countries are also not included.

iii Work permits issued.

The three countries in table 5.2 are selected, as the data for these countries do not include seasonal workers and entry of migrants who used channels of entry other than labour. A slight decrease took place in Belgium and Denmark after 1992. This decrease may be explained by the fact that free movement of persons within the EU became possible after 1992. Instead of contracting (high-skilled) workers from outside the EU, it became easier and cheaper for employers to contract EU citizens in Belgium and Denmark. EU countries became more attractive for high-skilled and low-skilled labour migrants from the EU. Favourable economic developments are probably the reason for the increase in work permits issued in the Irish Republic.

5.3 Return migration

3. Return migration to former labour-exporting countries has been declining since the 1980s because of significant changes in the present migrant population originating from these countries.

Many labour migrants returned to their country of origin after the economic recession of 1973/1974. Although return migration was not as important as in the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, it still took place on a considerable scale in the period 1985-1999. *Figure 5.1* shows the number of Finnish emigrants from Sweden and the number of Italian emigrants from Switzerland. We may consider these two migration trends as trends of return migration from former labour-importing countries to former labour-exporting countries[41].

Figure 5.1. Emigration of Finnish nationals from Sweden and Italian nationals from Switzerland



Source: Eurostat (2002).

As can be seen from figure 5.1, both curves gradually decrease. This is a strong indication that return migration within Western Europe from former labour-importing countries to former labour-exporting countries has further decreased after 1985. Italian emigration from Switzerland peaked in 1992. At first glance, emigration of Italians to other

[41] Actual return migration may be lower as the Finnish and Italian nationals who emigrated did not necessarily go to Finland and Italy, respectively. On the other hand, actual return migration may be higher because of under-registration.

EU countries is a possible reason for this peak, as it has become very easy to migrate and work in other Western European countries since 1992. However, a more obvious reason is rising unemployment in Switzerland: unemployment in Switzerland in 1992 was more than double as compared to 1991 (Gärtner, 2000).

Family migration to the EU/EFTA region was very popular among migrants from Turkey and the Maghreb area. Nevertheless, some migrants from these areas returned, similar to the majority of Southern European labour migrants, to their country of origin. *Figure 5.2* illustrates the emigration of Moroccan nationals from the Netherlands in the period 1985-1999[42]. Again I assume that this is a reliable indicator for the level of return migration[43].

Figure 5.2. Emigration of Moroccan nationals from the Netherlands



Source: Eurostat (2002).

In tandem with return migration from Sweden to Finland and from Switzerland to Italy, we observe a decreasing trend of return migration of (second-generation) Moroccans from the Netherlands as well. Return migration of Turkish nationals from Switzerland and Germany is not decreasing, but follows an irregular pattern without a clear trend. A possible cause of this irregular pattern in the period 1985-1999 is that many Turkish nationals

[42] Unfortunately, emigration data from France, which has been the most important migration country for Moroccans in Europe, are not available. Emigration data of Moroccans from Belgium, another important destination of Moroccan labour migration, are not reliable as two different sources (Eurostat and the Council of Europe) provide substantially different figures.

[43] The problems of under-registration and migration to third countries are also relevant here (see footnote 41). Furthermore, return migration may be subject to a small but increasing underestimation because of naturalisation. Migration data of Eurostat (2000) substantiate this since the difference between the total number of people who migrated from the Netherlands to Morocco and the number of Moroccans who emigrated from the Netherlands increased in the 1990s. This difference hardly existed in the 1980s.

submitted an asylum application in Germany and Switzerland. The inflow of Turkish asylum seekers is more recent. Hence, the return of Turkish nationals might increase again. Recent Moroccan immigration, mostly family migration, still takes place. It is likely that family migrants are less inclined to undertake return migration. Moreover, the intention of labour immigrants to return decreases dramatically if family members come over. Haug (2000) provides confirming evidence as she found a negative effect of the number of household members on return migration of Italian migrants from Germany.

The remarks on the differences between the level of Moroccan and Turkish return migration provides two reasons why return migration in general has declined: the average length of stay of migrants from former labour-exporting countries has increased, and more family members have joined the original labour migrants. Other factors that caused declining return migration figures are the declining number of original labour migrants and the increasing share of second-generation migrants. Studies by Mehrländer (1983 in Abadan-Unat, 1993) and Haug (2001) confirm that return migration (intentions) is (are) considerably lower among second-generation migrants. In addition, similar to the number of family migrants who came over, the number of second-generation migrants has a decreasing influence on intentions of the original migrants to return as the number of young second-generation migrants also increases the number of household members (i.e. the number of children of a migrant).

4. The number of potential return migrants from outside the EU to the former labour-exporting countries in Southern Europe is still very large, because of the many Southern European nationals who live on other continents.

Return migration to the former labour-exporting countries in Southern Europe is not necessarily of Northern and Western European origin. Many Spanish and Portuguese nationals have returned from Latin America. Although historical linkages between Italy and Latin America are less strong, this also refers to Italians[44]. Albeit to a much smaller degree than from South America, migrants also returned to Southern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s from North America, Africa (mainly Portuguese) and Australia (mainly Italians and Greeks). The number of potential return migrants to Spain is very large. More than 1.6 million Spanish nationals lived abroad in 1992 (about 770,000 in other European countries and about 700,000 in Latin America) (Dirección General de Migraciones, 1993 in Mansvelt Beck, 1993). Over 220,000 Spaniards returned in the period from 1980 to 1992. A fifth of the return migrants came from Latin America in the period 1981-1986. This share increased to a third in the period 1987-1991 (Dirección General de Migraciones, 1993 in Mansvelt Beck, 1993). It is

[44]Five million Italians migrated to South America between 1876 and 1976, primarily to Argentina (Vecoli, 1995).

most likely that return migration from Latin America decreased in the 1990s, because of more rapid economic growth in Latin America in the 1990s vis-à-vis the 1980s. In more recent years the unstable economic situation in Latin America has given cause for concern. The slump in the Argentine economy, for instance, started to hit the higher socio-economic strata of society, to which most of the Spanish and Italian nationals belong, as well. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that large numbers of Spanish, Italian and Portuguese nationals will leave Latin America and return to their motherland in the near future. The economic and political situation in Africa is even more volatile than in Latin America. Nevertheless, return migration of Southern European nationals from Africa will not be sizeable, as the number of Southern European nationals in Africa is modest. Significant return migration from North America and Australia to Southern Europe will also not occur within the foreseeable future as the economic and political situation in these regions is very stable.

5. Favourable economic developments and a more stable political situation in countries of origin are a trigger for return migration.

Dustmann (1996) argues that differences in economic development in the original sending country may be responsible for differences in the extent of return migration of different nationalities. This is a reason why return migration to European former labour-exporting countries occurred on a larger scale than return migration to the Maghreb area and Turkey. Dustmann also states that political factors in the original sending countries may be important. The political situation in Italy has been stable since the Second World War. The political situation in the other former labour-exporting countries in Southern Europe which are current EU members has been very stable since the end of dictatorship in Greece (1974), Portugal (1974) and Spain (1975). The political situation in the former Yugoslavia took a turn for the worse in 1990. Hence, virtually no former Yugoslavian labour migrants returned in the 1990s. The political situation in the Maghreb countries (especially in Algeria) and in Turkey was also quite turbulent in the period after the recruitment stops in Northern and Western European countries after the recession of 1973/1974. This is very likely one of the main reasons why labour migrants from these countries preferred to get their family to come over instead of returning to native soil.

5.4 Chain migration

6. Family migration has remained an important immigration type in former labour-importing countries as family formation has replaced family reunification as the main channel of entry for those who migrated from the Maghreb area and Turkey.

There are two types of family migration: family reunification and family formation migration. Family reunification is migration of a family member of a former migrant whose family ties with this former migrant existed before the migration of this former migrant. Usually, family reunification following labour migration comes to a halt after about two decades after a recruitment stop is enforced. Family formation is migration for the purpose of marriage or cohabitation with a (second-generation) migrant (Sprangers, 1995). The latter form of family migration has superceded the importance of family reunification in the 1980s. We may state that family formation migration has replaced family reunification migration as the main channel of entry as the volume of (family) migration from Morocco to the former labour-importing countries is not declining. In the Netherlands, for instance, family formation migration of Turks exceeded family reunification from 1989 onward. Family formation of Moroccans became dominant in 1991 (De Beer and Noordam, 1992 in Schoorl *et al*., 1994).

Family migration was very popular among migrants from Turkey and the Maghreb area after the recession of 1973/1974. It remained an important migration type in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to asylum migration, it was virtually the only legal way to migrate from Turkey and the Maghreb area to Western Europe after the recruitment stops in the mid-1970s. Immigration of Moroccan nationals to Northern and Western Europe almost always takes the form of family migration. Migration of Moroccans to Southern Europe (especially Spain and Italy) may also be labour migration, albeit undocumented in numerous instances. An overview of Moroccan migration to seven selected Northern and Western European countries is presented in *Table 5.3*.

Table 5.3. Migration of Moroccan nationals to five selected Northern and Western European countries

	Country of destination					
Year	Belgium	Germany	France	Netherlands	Switzerland	**Total**
1985	1856	3047	9020	5827	250	**20,000**
1986	1775	4005	8183	6751	262	**20,976**
1987	2063	3961	8516	7180	268	**21,988**
1988	2027	4613	10,696	8412	475	**26,223**
1989	2324	4816	17,614	8671	397	**33,822**
1990	2645	5617	17,651	9761	516	**36,190**
1991	3443	6077	17,774	9255	618	**37,167**
1992	3307	6542	4096	7476	719	**22,140**
1993	3358	5306	14,218	6160	690	**29,732**
1994	4768	4014	7883	3152	667	**20,484**
1995	3596	3790	6600	3100	657	**17,743**
1996	4007	4302	6600	4477	667	**20,053**
1997	3880	4132	8811	4750	649	**22,222**
1998	4327	4532	13,871	5310	678	**28,718**
1999	4936	5003	9249	4427	726	**24,341**
Total	**48,312**	**69,757**	**160,782**	**94,709**	**8239**	**381,799**

Source: Eurostat (2002).[45]

As can be seen from table 5.3, the erratic pattern of (the data on) Moroccan migration to France largely affects the total amount of Moroccan migration to these Northern and Western European countries. In 1993 the Dutch authorities tightened the income requirement, with which former migrants have to comply, before they may invite their family members (Sprangers, 1995; De Beer, 1998). This might be the reason why Moroccan migration to the Netherlands decreased after 1993. However, after this initial decrease we observe an upturn in Moroccan immigration at the end of the 1990s. Moroccan immigration to Belgium (next to France and the Netherlands a third "classical" Moroccan immigration country) went up in the period 1985-1999. In general, immigration also increased in the less classical Moroccan immigration countries (Germany and Switzerland). Overall, we may state that family migration of Moroccan nationals is not declining. There is no reason to believe that this is different for the level of family migration of other nationalities that follows low-skilled labour migration from outside the contemporary EU/EFTA region.

7. Family migration following asylum migration has taken place on a smaller scale than family migration that follows labour migration.

[45] Belgium 1998: Council of Europe (1999); France 1995 and 1996: OECD (1999). The data for France 1995 and 1996 are rounded to the nearest hundred.

The average number of family migrants following a labour migrant is hard to estimate. Family reunification and family formation of a particular group of labour migrants will eventually come to an end. However, family formation by marriage of children of former labour migrants may continue for a very long time. In 1975 (after the recruitment stop of foreign labour) 55,000 Moroccans lived in the Netherlands (Obdeijn, 1993). In 1999 about 150,000 first-generation Moroccans lived in the Netherlands (De Valk *et al.*, 2001). This means that every Moroccan labour migrant who lived in the Netherlands in 1975 was followed on average by at least two family migrants. Actual Moroccan family migration following permanent settlement of a labour migrant is larger, because no account is taken of return migration and mortality of Moroccan migrants between 1975 and 1999 in this estimate. Family migration may also follow other migration types than labour migration. Den Dulk and Nicolaas (1998) made an estimate of family migration following asylum migration in the Netherlands in the period 1992-1996. They found that only one family migrant per three or four asylum migrants migrated to the Netherlands in this period. So, as yet, family migration following asylum migration occurs on a smaller scale than family migration that follows low-skilled labour migration from outside the EU/EFTA region. Two causes of the smaller extent of family migration after asylum migration may be distinguished. Firstly, asylum seekers migrate more often in families than labour migrants. Secondly, the countries of which asylum seekers come from have higher exit thresholds. It is, for instance, much easier for a family member of an initial migrant to emigrate from Morocco than from the north of Afghanistan.

8. The colonial past of some European countries still exerts a large impact on the migration flows into these countries.

European colonisation had become a thing of the past in the post-industrial era. European countries only still governed a few small territories (mostly small islands) in the 1980s. The return migration of settlers, public servants and military personnel (the first wave of postcolonial migration distinguished by Van de Kaa (1996a) (see also section 2.1.1)) had also came to an end. So did the second wave, which consisted of natives of the former colonial possession. However, the third wave of chain migration still exists. The migrant networks of people from the former colonial possessions appeared to be strong magnets for chain migration in many cases. The most important nationalities of migrants who entered the European countries with a (recent) colonial past from outside Europe are listed in *Table 5.4* to illustrate the importance of the colonial past in the compilation of the total migration flows to these countries.

Table 5.4. The most important nationalities of intercontinental migrants who migrated to former European colonial powers in the period 1985-1999[i]

	Former colonial power						
	Belgium	France	Italy	Netherl.	Portugal	Spain	UK
1	Morocco	**Morocco**[iii]	Morocco	Turkey	**Brazil**	**Morocco**[iii]	USA
2	Turkey	**Algeria**	Tunisia	Morocco	**Cape Verde**	**Colombia**	**Australia**
3	USA	Turkey	Brazil	**Surinam**	**Angola**	**Peru**	**New Zealand**
4	**Zaire**[ii]	**Tunisia**	USA	USA	**Guinea Bis.**	**Argentina**	**India**
5	Japan	USA	Philippines[iv]	Somalia	USA	**Ecuador**	Japan

Source: Eurostat (2002).

i Former colonies are indicated with boldface. No data for Belgium 1998, France 1995 and 1996, Italy 1993, 1998 and 1999, Portugal 1985-1991, and Spain 1985-1987.

ii Democratic Republic of the Congo since May 1997.

iii The largest part of Morocco became French in 1912. Spain obtained two zones of contemporary Morocco: an about 80 km broad strip of land along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea and a small area in the south around the city of Sidi Ifni (Wesseling, 1991).

iv Only data for the period 1995-1997.

From table 5.4 it can be seen that nationals of former colonies frequently rank among the top five of the most important non-European nationalities that entered the European countries with a recent colonial past. Only in Italy are none of the nationalities of the former colonies (Eritrea, Somalia and Libya) among the top five.

5.5 Asylum migration

9. Large numbers of asylum seekers have applied for asylum in Northern and Western Europe; the number of asylum seekers is erratic and unpredictable due to the political situation in sending countries and policy measures in receiving countries.

Asylum seekers from all corners of the world sought refuge in mainly Northern and Western Europe. The number of asylum seekers that a particular country receives is partly dependent on the most important nationalities among the total volume of asylum seekers who applied for asylum in Northern and Western Europe. For instance, asylum seekers from Turkey prefer to seek asylum in Germany, while Sri Lankan asylum seekers prefer the UK. Therefore, the political situation in particular sending countries largely affects the number of asylum applications in particular European countries. Another important factor is policy measures in the receiving country and the neighbouring countries. The aforementioned factors make the trend of asylum applications in European countries somewhat erratic and unpredictable. The number of asylum applications in Northern and Western Europe had increased sharply in the post-industrial era until 1992. Policy measures in many Northern and Western European countries, which became effective in the early 1990s, caused a decrease in the number of

asylum applications after 1992. However, after a few years the number of asylum applications started to increase again[46].

5.6 A comparison of immigration types in Western Europe

10. Family and asylum migration have been the most important international migration types to Northern and Western Europe, while (the regularisation of illegal) labour migration has played an important part in immigration to Southern Europe.

The most important immigration types are labour, family and asylum migration. *Table 5.5* shows the proportion of each of these migration types for three selected EU countries.

Table 5.5. The main channels of entry for three selected EU countries (percentages)

	Labour	Family	Asylum	Other
France 1996	21	55	8	16
Italy 1999	50	39	3	8
Sweden 1997	2	55	21	22

Sources: Italy and Sweden: McCormick *et al*. (2002); France: OECD (1999).

As can be derived from table 5.5, the main channels of entry may differ significantly between countries. The main channel of entry in Italy is labour migration while family migration is the main channel of entry in France and Sweden. Labour migration is the main entry in Italy as this country did not experience large (labour) immigration in the 1960s and 1970s. So, family migration on a large scale has not taken place as yet. Moreover, Italy needs low-skilled workers in sectors such as tourism, agriculture, construction, domestic services and homecare (OECD, 1999). In addition to cross-national differences, there may be differences in time as well: the proportion of asylum migrants was larger in the beginning of the 1990s.

There are no reliable figures on clandestine migration. Nevertheless, we may assume that it occurred on a considerable scale in the period 1985-1999, especially in the former labour-exporting countries in Southern Europe (Huntoon, 1998; Sarris and Zografakis, 1999; Venturini, 1999). The extensive hidden economy in Southern Europe provides fair job opportunities for clandestines. Southern European governments regularly confer legal status to clandestines who stay in the country for a long time. *Table 5.6* gives an overview of the main regularisation programmes in Southern Europe in the period 1985-1998. The number of regularisations may give an idea about the extent of illegal migration to Southern Europe.

[46] For a detailed overview of asylum migration in Northern and Western Europe, see section 6.3.

Table 5.6. Main regularisation programmes in Southern Europe, 1985-1998

Country	Year	People involved	Main nationalities
Greece	1997-1998	374,000	Albanians[i]
Italy	1987-1988	118,700	Moroccans, Sri Lankans, Filipinos and Tunisians
	1990	217,700	Moroccans, Tunisians and Senegalese
	1996	227,300	Moroccans, Albanians and Filipinos
	1998	350,000	Moroccans, Albanians and Filipinos[ii]
Portugal	1992-1996	39,200	Angolans, Guineans (Bissau) and Cape Verdeans
	1996	21,800	Angolans, Guineans (Bissau) and Cape Verdeans
Spain	1985-1986	43,800	Moroccans, Portuguese and Senegalese[ii]
	1991	110,100	Moroccans
	1996	21,300	Moroccans
Total		**1,523,900**	

Source: OECD (1999).
i people who had been granted a white card (first stage of the regularisation)
ii number of applications received

Table 5.6 shows that more than 1.5 million persons were involved in regularisation programmes in Southern Europe in the period 1985-1998. International migration researchers often presume that illegal migration in Southern Europe is the equivalent of asylum migration in Northern and Western Europe. They argue that potential asylum migrants in Southern Europe prefer clandestine sojourn rather than the regular asylum procedure. The Sri Lankans involved in the regularisation programme in Italy in 1987-1988 and possibly also the Albanians in Greece and Italy and the Angolans in Portugal can be seen as potential asylum migrants.

5.7 Ethnic migration from and within Central and Eastern Europe

11. The dominant place of origin of Aussiedler, who have formed a large share of total migration to Germany after the Second World War, shifted more and more eastwards.

Overpopulation in the German states and labour shortages in several Central and Eastern European countries induced many Germans to migrate eastwards. This so-called *Ostkolonisation* started in the twelfth century and lasted up to the nineteenth century. Large groups of Germans settled in the Baltic area, the Sudeten area, Bohemia-Moravia, Poland and Hungary in the first three centuries of the *Ostkolonisation*. Wars and turmoil in Central and Eastern Europe caused a decline in the number of Germans who migrated eastwards in the fifteenth century. Subsequently, the Turkish expansion in Southeastern Europe virtually ended

the migration of Germans in southeastern direction until the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683. After withstanding this siege the Habsburg emperors sponsored Germans to settle near the frontier as a buffer against the Ottomans. In this period many Germans migrated to Transylvania, Vojvodina and Slavonia. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century Russia conquered expansive sparsely populated fertile territories around the Black and Caspian Sea. From 1763 Catherine II and her successors encouraged (German) farmers to inhabit these areas. Hence, many ethnic Germans lived in the Volga steppes, the Ukraine, the Crimea and in the Caucasian provinces (Schoenberg, 1970). In the 1930s many Germans were deported to Siberia and Central Asia as part of the collectivisation of agriculture. The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union provided Stalin a charter to abolish the Autonomous Socialistic Republic of the Volga Germans and to deport Germans, who were considered as Hitler's fifth column, to the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union (Long, 1992; Sinner, 2000).

In addition to the 8.3 million Germans who lived outside Germany because of historical migration to the east, millions of Germans lived outside the territory of the contemporary reunited Germany because of border changes after the First and Second World Wars. Germany lost large parts of the provinces of West Prussia and Posen and the eastern part of Upper Silesia to Poland, the Memel region to Lithuania, and the Hultschin region (an area in the south of Upper Silesia) to Czechoslovakia as stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Moreover, the city of Danzig became a 'free city' governed by the League of Nations (Schoenberg, 1970; Hunt Tooley, 1997). Germany reoccupied these territories in the first years of the Second World War, but lost them again to the advancing Red Army at the end of this war. The loss of the Second World War had even more far-reaching territorial consequences for the eastern part of Germany: the provinces of East Pomerania, East Brandenburg, Silesia and the southern part of East Prussia were allocated to Poland, while the northern part of East Prussia was placed under Soviet administration. About 9.5 million Germans lived in the German provinces that lay east of the Oder-Neisse line[47] at the start of the Second World War. Many Germans from the lost eastern provinces and ethnic Germans from central and eastern European states fled or were expelled to the four military occupation zones after the war. Almost two million ethnic Germans and Germans from the eastern provinces were assassinated during the last months of the war. In 1950 about 11 million German expellees lived in the two German states (about 8 million in West Germany and about 3 million in East Germany). Furthermore, Austria and other Western countries received about 500,000 German expellees. At this time about 4.2 million Germans still lived in other central and eastern European states: 1.7 million in Poland, 1.4 million in the Soviet Union, 300,000 in Czechoslovakia, and 750,000 in southeastern European countries (Schoenberg, 1970; Fleischer and Proebsting, 1989; Münz and Ohliger, 2001).

[47] The contemporary border between the reunified Germany and Poland.

Table 5.7 presents the number of *Aussiedler* who migrated to Germany in the period 1950-1999 and their country of origin.

Table 5.7. The number of Aussiedler by country of origin, 1950-1999

	1950-1984	1985-1999	Total
(former) Soviet Union	93,901	1,860,030	1,953,931
Poland	750,062	692,317	1,442,379
Romania	163,987	268,102	432,089
Remaining countries	252,741	20,520	273,261
Total	**1,260,691**	**2,840,969**	**4,101,660**

Sources: Mammey and Schiener (1998) and Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge (2002).

In the period 1950-1984 more than 1.25 million *Aussiedler* arrived in West Germany. In this period the most important country of origin was Poland (60.5%), followed by Romania (13.0%), Czechoslovakia (7.6%), the Soviet Union (7.0%) and Yugoslavia (6.9%) (Fleischer and Proebsting, 1989). Ethnic migration to East Germany was very small after 1950, because the East German authorities did not want to upset the relationships with the other East Bloc states (Bade, 2000). Despite more than 1.25 million ethnic Germans migrated to West Germany in the period 1950-1984, the number of ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe and in Central Asia was still very large in 1985.

Most *Aussiedler* came from the (former) Soviet Union (65.5%), followed by Poland (24.4%) and Romania (9.4%) in the period 1985-1999. The number of *Aussiedler* from the remaining countries was quite small, as the number of ethnic Germans in these countries had already significantly decreased in the former decades. For instance, the borders of Yugoslavia have always been relatively open after the Second World War. Therefore, the number of ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia was already quite small after the 1950s. The number of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia was also already small towards the end of the 1960s, since large numbers of ethnic Germans emigrated from Czechoslovakia in the 1960s (Fleischer and Proebsting, 1989). Most of them probably emigrated in the years of the “Prague Spring” (1967 and 1968).

Figure 5.3 depicts the number of *Aussiedler* from Poland, the (former) Soviet Union and remaining countries in the period 1985-1999.

Figure 5.3. Number of Aussiedler (thousands) from Poland and the (former) Soviet Union, 1985-1999



Sources: Mammey and Schiener (1998) and Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge (2002).

As is shown in figure 5.3, the number of *Aussiedler* from the (former) Soviet Union exceeds the number of *Aussiedler* from Poland since 1990. Before 1990 the number of *Aussiedler* from Poland, which peaked in 1989, was by far the largest. Figure 5.3 also shows a large number of *Aussiedler* from countries other than Poland and the Soviet Union in 1990. About 111,000 ethnic Germans from Romania migrated to Germany in this year (Mammey and Schiener, 1998). This was more than half of the total ethnic German population in Romania in 1990. *Aussiedler* intending to migrate to Germany have to complete a 50-page application form in German in their country of residence since July 1990 (Heinelt and Lohmann, 1992 in Groenendijk, 1997; Thränhardt, 1995 in Groenendijk, 1997). This might be a reason why the number of *Aussiedler* decreased after 1990. Since December 1992 *Aussiedler* have to prove that their wish to migrate to Germany is based on ill treatment related to the Second World War, with the exception of those who live in the former Soviet Union (Groenendijk, 1997). This has meant in practice that hardly any ethnic German from countries outside the former Soviet Union has qualified for *Aussiedler* status. Kazakhstan and (the Siberian part of) the Russian Federation were the most important sending countries of *Aussiedler* from the former Soviet Union: in 1998, for instance, 50.4% of all *Aussiedler* from the former Soviet Union came from Kazakhstan, 40.4% from the Russian Federation, 3.2% from Kyrgyzstan, 2.8% from Ukraine, 1.5% from Uzbekistan, and 1.6% from the remaining successor states of the Soviet Union (Waffenschmidt, 1999). As we can see in figure 5.3, the number of *Aussiedler* from the former Soviet Union has been decreasing since 1996. The introduction of a German language test in July 1996 was an important cause of this decrease

(Dietz, 2002). Ethnic migration from the former communist European and Central Asian countries to Germany is bound to end, as people born after 1992 cannot apply for *Aussiedler* status (Groenendijk, 1997). Given the current speed of the process, we may expect that the number of *Aussiedler* will decrease to a few thousand annually after 2010.

12. The rise and fall of the Habsburg Empire in Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire in Southeastern Europe was the underlying cause of many ethnic migration flows in Central and Eastern Europe in the post-communist era.

At the dawn of the First World War the Habsburg Empire (Austria-Hungary) comprised contemporary Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the contemporary Czech and Slovak republics, Vojvodina, Transylvania, Trentino, and parts of contemporary Southern Poland and Western Ukraine (see *Figure 5.4*). In contrast to the Western European states, the Habsburg Empire was a multiethnic state, in which people of different ethnic descent (Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Romanians, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovenes and Italians), lived together (Sked, 1989).

Figure 5.4. Europe in 1914



The Habsburg Empire was dissolved after the First World War. Hungary lost large parts of its historical territory, as a consequence of the treaty of Trianon, which came into effect in 1920. Hence, many ethnic Hungarians have lived in Romania (Transylvania), Czechoslovakia (southern Slovakia) and Yugoslavia (Vojvodina) (Courbadge, 1998). Many

ethnic Hungarians harboured the wish to migrate to Hungary. With the end of communism the chance to do so finally came for many of them. Yugoslavia was established out of the southern Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro. In turn, the disintegration of Yugoslavia caused many ethnic migration flows in the 1990s.

Similar to the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire was a multiethnic state too. It dominated (parts of) the contemporary Southeastern European states of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, Albania and Romania for more than 200 years (Quataert, 2000) (see also *Figure 5.5*).

Figure 5.5. The northern part of the Ottoman Empire in 1740



Examples of ethnic migration flows in the post-communist era which can be attributed to the multiethnic character of the Ottoman Empire are the Turks, who emigrated from Bulgaria, and the Greeks, who emigrated from Albania. The Ottoman domination of Southeastern Europe brought Islam to this region but despite that, the sultans tolerated the various forms of Christianity to which the original population adhered. The Muslims in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Pomaks in Bulgaria are examples of population groups who voluntarily converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. The different coexisting religions in former Yugoslavia led to a strong sense of nationhood among Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims, although these groups have a common Slavic ancestry (Ingrao, 1996). Conflicts between these groups caused large ethnic migration flows in the post-communist era.

The Ottoman and Habsburg empires constantly lived on a war footing with each other. The changing frontier between the two empires and other border changes were also the root cause of many ethnic migration flows in the post-communist era. Examples are the Serbs who emigrated from Krajina (Croatia), the Albanians who emigrated from Kosovo (Yugoslavia) and the Hungarians who emigrated from Transylvania (Romania). Ingrao (1996) provides the explanations of the first two examples. He states that the Habsburgs resettled 600,000 Serbs near their southern military border (the so-called *Vojne Krajina*). Many Serbs had to flee from this area after the Croatian army conquered this area in 1995. He also states that the Ottomans replaced Serbs, who fled *en masse* from Kosovo at the end of the fourteenth century, with loyal Albanian Muslims. Many Albanians were forced to flee from Kosovo in 1999. Many Romanians (Vlachs) migrated to Transylvania[48] after the Ottomans were driven away from this area, because of heavy burdens on Romanian peasants in Wallachia and Moldavia, which were still under Ottoman rule. Eventually, Romanians constituted the majority in Transylvania in the eighteenth century (Péter, 1992). Transylvania became Romanian territory when the treaty of Trianon was signed in 1920. Many ethnic Hungarians and Germans emigrated from Transylvania after the fall of communism.

13. Despite decreasing return migration of Slavs since 1994, the number of potential return migrants to the former Slavic Republics of the Soviet Union remains very large.

International migration occurred on a very modest scale in the former Soviet Union until the end of the 1980s. However, within the Soviet Union many people were involved in interstate migration. As mentioned in section 2.2.4, labour shortages and Sovietisation politics (accompanied by Russification) induced many Slavs to migrate to other non-Slavic regions of the Soviet Union. Öberg and Boubnova (1993) provide a comprehensive description of these migration flows. After the Second World War many Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians migrated to the newly acquired territories in the west of the Soviet Union (the Baltic states, Kaliningrad and parts of Poland). Another very large group of migrants was the group of forced migrants during the Stalin era. Many of these migrants were involved in intrastate migration (mainly from Western Russia to Siberia). On the other hand, many inhabitants of mainly Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, but also of other republics, were forced to migrate to other states. After Stalin's death in 1953, the 'spring period' set in. Substantial restructuring activities characterised this period. Vast amounts of resources were invested to develop new land, mainly in Central Asia. Again many people migrated to other states, especially from the

[48] Both Hungarians and Romanians claim that Transylvania is part of their historical homeland. Hungarians claim that Slavonic tribes were the only inhabitants of the Danube basin when they conquered it. According to Romanian historiography, Romanians, who are seen as Romanised Dacians, had lived in Transylvania for centuries before the Hungarians arrived (Deletant, 1992).

Slavic states to Central Asia. This time migration had a less coercive character. Most emigrants from Russia, who went to Central Asia, were relatively higher educated labour migrants, who were attracted to the rapidly industrialising and modernising urban areas (Lewis and Rowland, 1977).

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union many Slavs were forced to return to their homeland. Therefore, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus experienced net immigration from other non-Slavic former Soviet states. *Figure 5.6* plots the trend of migration to the Slavic former Soviet states from the non-Slavic former Soviet states from the dissolution of the Soviet Union to 1998. This figure provides a good indication of the volume and trend of Slavic return migration in the post-communist era, although not all migrants are necessarily Russians, Ukrainians or Belarussians. Hence, figure 5.6 may overestimate Slavic return migration somewhat. On the other hand, figure 5.6 does not capture Slavic return migration from the autonomous areas of the Russian Federation.

Figure 5.6. Migration (in thousands) to the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus from non-Slavic former Soviet republics, 1992-1998



Source: United Nations (2001).

Migration from non-Slavic to Slavic former Soviet states was very large in the 1990s (see figure 5.6). In 1994 a record number of more than 900,000 emigrants from non-Slavic former Soviet republics entered the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus. After 1994, migration from non-Slavic to Slavic republics decreased as the pool of Slavs who were exposed to considerable pressure to return had shrunk.

Although return migration of Slavs reached enormous proportions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it started earlier. Much south to north migration also occurred in the

Soviet Union in the 1980s. About 300,000 immigrants from Central Asia entered Russia yearly (Goskomstat, 1997). This migration was a result of the emerging labour surpluses among the rapidly growing (due to high fertility) Muslim population groups in the less developed southern regions and of chronic labour shortages in low-fertility more developed Russia. Most migrants were probably Russian nationals (Rowland, 1993). In addition, the educational level of the indigenous population in the south of the Soviet Union had increased significantly in the post-war period (Lewis and Rowland, 1977). According to Lewis and Rowland, this educational expansion would reduce the need for high-skilled Russians in the modern sector in southern regions. So, pressure to return may be not the only cause of the Slavic return migration in the former Soviet Union. The changing supply on the labour market in both the southern (Central Asian and Transcaucasian) and the Slavic Soviet states may also have played an important role.

The size of the Slavic population in non-Slavic former Soviet states is still very large, despite much return migration. About 6.5 million ethnic Russians, for instance, still lived in Central Asia in 1999 (Zhalimbetova and Gleason, 2001). The number of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians in the Baltic states was about 1.8 million in 1997 (OECD, 2000). Developments in the non-Slavic republics will have a large impact on the extent of future return migration to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics and Moldova are politically unstable. Moreover, some autonomous regions in the Russian Federation (e.g. Chechnya) are politically very unstable as well. Explosions of (ethnic) violence in these states and autonomous regions, which are difficult to predict, may lead to large Slavic return flows in the former Soviet Union. Economic developments in both Slavic and non-Slavic former Soviet states may also influence this return migration. Slavic return migration from the Baltic states will decrease further, in view of the expectation that the EU membership of these states will have a positive effect on their economic development and political stability.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter described the historical setting and (changes concerning) the magnitude of different migration types in different parts of Europe in the post-industrial era. Thus, it described variation in type, time and space of international migration in Europe in this era.

International migration in the post-industrial era consists of labour, return, family, ethnic and asylum migration. Labour, return and ethnic migration, in turn, can be divided into different subtypes[49]: we may distinguish high-skilled and low-skilled labour migration; return migration within and from the EU/EFTA region; and ethnic migration of Germans, Slavs in

[49] Actually, family migration can also be divided into two subtypes (family reunification and family formation). However, I will not examine these subtypes separately in the next analytical chapter of this dissertation.

the former Soviet Union, and of other ethnic minorities who migrated between non-Soviet former communist countries.

The time dimension may be summarised as follows. Low-skilled labour migration, return migration and ethnic migration have decreased towards the end of the 1990s. However, the number of potential return migrants to Southern Europe and the Slavic former Soviet states remains very large. Asylum migration, on the other hand, has become more important. The extent of high-skilled labour migration and family migration has remained quite constant in the post-industrial era.

The last dimension distinguished in this chapter is space. The most sizeable migration flows in the different parts of Europe in the post-industrial era have been: family migration (together with asylum migration) to Northern and Western Europe; labour migration (after regularisation) to Southern Europe; ethnic migration from the former East Bloc to Western Europe (especially Germany); and ethnic migration from non-Slavic to Slavic successor states of the Soviet Union.

In the next two chapters I will estimate socio-economic determinants of the migration subtypes distinguished in this chapter. Coalescence of the results of these exercises and the description of the time and space dimensions presented in this chapter enable the formulation of statements about future international migration in Europe, which will be presented in the final chapter.