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Defend, Deny, Distance, and Dismantle: A New Measure of Advantaged Identity Management

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Abstract

The experience of privilege can trigger psychological conflict among advantaged group members. Nonetheless, little work has explored strategies that advantaged group members use to manage their identities as privileged actors. Building on Knowles et al.'s framework and theories of intergroup relations, we address the conceptualization and measurement of advantaged group identity-management strategies. We aim to refine theorizing and validate a measure of these strategies across three contexts (U.S.'s White-Black relations, Israel's Jewish-Arab/Palestinian relations, and U.S.'s gender relations). This process yielded two novel conceptual and empirical contributions. First, we add a strategy—*defend*—in which advantaged-group members overtly justify inequality. Second, we discover that *distancing* has two facets (*distancing from inequality* and *from identity*). Across six studies, we find support for our proposed factor structure, measurement invariance, and construct validity. We discuss how advantaged groups contend with privilege and offer a tool for studying these strategies across domains and contexts.

Keywords

identity, advantaged group, identity management, social change

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America was, until this last generation, a White country designed for ourselves and our posterity. It is our creation, it is our inheritance, and it belongs to us.

—Richard Spencer¹

I don't think that the law enforcement system is systemically racist.

—Attorney General William Barr²

It's hard out there for everyone . . . no matter what race or sex or religion or however else you people categori[ze] individuals. It will be based upon our character and merit . . . that is unless this "diversity" stuff keeps holding all of us back.

—Anonymous, Ask the White Guy Blog³

Because we're White, we have had privilege . . . We need to recognize that, and we have to understand what . . . keeps racism in place—the policies, redlining, banking policies, mortgage policies. The policies have to be changed, and then White people . . . have to try to change within ourselves.

—Jane Fonda⁴

The quotations above reflect different ways in which members of a historically advantaged group (White Americans) react to their group's privileged position in society. Indeed, a number of changes in modern democratic societies have forced members of privileged groups to grapple with their group identity more directly in recent years. As demographic changes make their identity more salient, and as social movements calling for greater equality (e.g., #BlackLivesMatter, #MeToo) make their historically advantaged position clearer, advantaged-group members must come to terms with the privileges they enjoy—a process that can trigger psychological conflict, threat, and defensiveness

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among advantaged groups in societies that ostensibly value meritocracy and equality (Knowles et al., 2014).

As the quotations in the epigraph suggest, members of advantaged groups have different means at their disposal to make sense of their membership in a historically advantaged group. Some, like Richard Spencer and the other protestors at the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally, seek to *defend* and preserve their privileged status by attempting to justify and legitimize it. Others, such as former Attorney General William Barr, simply *deny* that any group-based inequality (and thus ingroup privilege) exists. Still, others, such as the anonymous writer, *distance* themselves from their advantaged group identity—resisting being categorized into the advantaged group and insisting on being treated purely as an individual. A final option, exemplified by actress Jane Fonda, is to advance equality by acknowledging in-group dominance and working to *dismantle* the systems that reproduce it.

These different modes of advantaged-group identity management are important to understand but have not yet been integrated into one conceptual model and corresponding measures. This may be because much work assumes that members of advantaged groups simply and straightforwardly seek to maintain their high status (Jost & Hunyady, 2003; Pratto et al., 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), thus neglecting the possibility of more differentiated responses. This is important because these different modes of advantaged identity management have important real-world consequences. Referring once more to the quotations above, overt attempts to defend the racial hierarchy led to the death of a counterprotester in Charlottesville and mainstreamed racial hate in a manner unprecedented in recent years (Burch & Vander Ploeg, 2022). Former Attorney General William Barr’s denial of the existence of racial inequality in policing led him to direct the Justice Department to dial back its efforts to combat police abuses. The anonymous writer who conveys his desire to distance himself from racial thinking also cites his discomfort around minority group members as part of his reason for expressing this sentiment. On the other extreme, support from whites wishing to combat systemic racism helped make #BlackLivesMatter one of the largest social movements in U.S. history. Hence, advantaged group members’ approach to identity management is both complex and highly consequential, but there is not yet an integrated and empirically based theoretical account of these processes.

Despite its importance, advantaged-group identity management is understudied within social psychology. One exception (for others, see Haslam, 2001; Leach et al., 2002, and others discussed below) is Knowles and colleagues’ (2014) *Deny–Distance–Dismantle* framework, which proposed that White Americans could manage their privilege, by denying its existence, distancing themselves from their White identity or seeking to dismantle racial inequality. However, this approach was restricted in scope to U.S. race relations and lacked a dedicated instrument to assist in testing and refining the model. Thus, in the present work, we

first conceptually and theoretically expand this framework to make it more broadly relevant to advantaged groups and then develop a new measure to assess advantaged group identity management strategies in multiple contexts. Building on past work on responses to status threats and hierarchy maintenance, we conceptually expand the model with an additional identity management strategy (*Defend*). Furthermore, this process of scale development and validation afforded us a unique opportunity to test, extend, and refine the original theory (which led us to divide the *Distance* strategy into two facets: distancing from identity and from inequality).

Why Advantaged Group Identity Management Has Received Insufficient Attention

Psychological research on intergroup relations has also tended to neglect advantaged group members’ identity management needs (for discussion see, Knowles & Peng, 2005; Phinney, 1996; Wong & Cho, 2005). In large part, this lacuna reflects the fact that prominent social-psychological theories of identity and intergroup relations (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Pratto et al., 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) regard advantaged group membership as intrapsychically straightforward and thus not necessarily in need of management. From the perspective of Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), being in a socially valued group reflects positively on one’s own self-image, and thus there is no necessary tension between one’s group membership and the need for a positive social identity (as there might be for members of historically disadvantaged groups).

Other psychological perspectives similarly seem to deemphasize advantaged group members’ identity management needs. According to system justification theory (Jost et al., 2003), membership in an advantaged group brings the need to view one’s group positively (group justification) into alignment with the need to view the system as just (system justification). Intrapsychic conflict is instead experienced by members of *disadvantaged* groups, for whom group- and system-justification needs collide. By contrast, social dominance theory (Pratto et al., 2006) eschews questions of intrapsychic conflict among the advantaged, although it does still highlight the role of hierarchy-legitimizing myths has helping advantaged group members justify their privileged status. In addition, empirical findings within the social dominance tradition indicate that privilege fuels a positive social identity for many members of the advantaged group. Specifically, for members of advantaged groups, preference for intergroup hierarchy (i.e., social dominance orientation) is positively correlated with levels of in-group identification (Levin & Sidanius, 1999). In sum, extant theories of intergroup inequality suggest that members of advantaged groups are able to derive positive psychological value from ingroup membership, relatively untroubled by competing needs or threats compared with members of disadvantaged groups.

Toward a Better Understanding of Advantaged Group Identity Management

The theories just reviewed suggest that, for members of privileged social groups, in-group advantage is a boon to the development of a positive social identity but not something that necessarily needs to be coped with or managed. However, we argue that the maintenance of a positive privileged identity has become more fraught in recent decades than these theories imply. Because we emphasize the need for advantaged group members (e.g., Whites, men, heterosexuals, and cis people) to build positive subjective attachments to their in-groups, our perspective draws heavily on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

According to social identity theory, members of both disadvantaged and advantaged groups seek to maintain positive in-group identities (and thus, ultimately, positive self-esteem). This is a psychologically complex process for members of devalued groups. Theorists have identified three means by which subordinate group members can manage a disadvantaged identity depending on socio-structural barriers or affordances: (a) individual mobility, in which group members attempt to leave the devalued ingroup and move into another group enjoying higher social value; (b) social creativity, in which disadvantaged group members identify specific group characteristics that can serve as bases for positive intergroup comparisons; or (c) social competition, in which the disadvantaged attempt to enhance their group's position within the hierarchy (Blanz et al., 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For their part, advantaged group members are seen as facing few impediments to positive social identity and thus little need for identity management; they belong to a socially valued group, membership which feeds directly into positive group esteem.

However, we argue that advantaged group members experience threats to their positive social identity that require identity management. Scholars have increasingly acknowledged that advantaged group members in fact face complex impediments to the development of positive social identity. For example, some work has noted that perceived instability of the intergroup status differential can offer threats to positive group identity for the advantaged group (Scheepers et al., 2009). Additional research has found that advantaged group members may engage in identity management when their privileged status is called into question. This work has documented that advantaged group members often respond to such status threats by justifying their superiority over, and engaging in direct social competition with, out-groups (Douglas et al., 2005; Haslam, 2001).

Another body of research has documented the effects group-critical emotions, which were theorized to develop as a reaction to perceiving one's group as having violated a moral standard, thus threatening one's positive moral identity. Perceiving one's in-group as unfairly advantaged can

drive feelings of shame (Lickel et al., 2005), guilt (Swim & Miller, 1999), and anger (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Leach et al., 2006) over the in-group's actions, which can in turn shape willingness to act for redressing social inequality. In a review of this literature, Leach et al. (2002) explicitly discussed these reactions as the result of different understandings of the advantages one's group holds. Building on existing work on advantaged group members responses to identity threats, Knowles et al. (2014) introduced a formal theoretical model of White identity management based on managing moral image threat (based in part on the literature on group-critical emotions) and threats to one's merit because of benefiting from unearned group advantages.

Integrating these lines of theorizing and research which each focused on and introduced different kinds of threat, we contend that there are at least three types of threat to positive ingroup identity among advantaged groups. First, the recent large-scale collective action in support of equality (e.g., #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo) represents a challenge to group dominance—as a *status threat* that, for advantaged group members, undermining their advantaged social position as a source of positive social identity. Second, based on the work of Knowles et al. (2014), we suggest advantaged group members are increasingly likely to worry their life experiences run afoul of cherished values of meritocracy and self-reliance (Arts & Halman, 2004; Weber, 2001) as narratives highlighting systemic injustice achieve new prominence in popular culture, education, and government systemic injustice. The resulting sense of *meritocratic threat* embodies the fear that one's achievements are the result of group privilege rather than hard work and talent (Knowles et al., 2014). Finally, the recent prominence of egalitarian collective action and information about systemic inequity highlight ways in which the advantaged group has violated ideals of equal treatment and fairness (Schildkraut, 2007; Schwartz, 2012). Some advantaged group members may thus experience *moral image threat*—or the sense that belonging to a group that benefits from unfair advantages and an unequal system could threaten the group's (and by extension the self's) positive image. We argue that these threats, which advantaged group members may experience in varying intensities as a function of socio-structural, situational, or dispositional factors, represent obstacles to positive identity that advantaged group members must actively manage using a number of strategies that we outline below.

Advantaged Group Identity Management Strategies

While our thinking is based most heavily on Knowles et al.'s (2014) framework, which was developed with White Americans in mind, we argue the theory can readily be extended to other advantaged groups. Provided that a culture largely embraces meritocratic and egalitarian ideals and/or is experiencing efforts for social change by the disadvantaged,

we argue that unearned privilege can create impediments to positive social identity among the advantaged. The increasing frequency and prominence of collective action efforts on behalf of disadvantaged groups (Brannen et al., 2020), along with the rapid globalization of democratic-egalitarian value systems (Schildkraut, 2007; Schwartz, 2012; Weber, 2001), serves to heighten the contradictions between prevailing societal values and group privilege and accentuate threats to advantaged social identities. One goal of the present research is to extend the advantaged group identity management framework beyond race to other contexts and dimensions of advantage. That being said, we would not expect this framework to be relevant to all advantaged groups everywhere but rather only to contexts where there are ongoing social change efforts and some acceptance of the values of meritocracy and egalitarianism.

Knowles et al. (2014) proposed three strategies by which advantaged group members (i.e., White Americans) cope with the meritocratic and moral image threats associated with in-group privilege: deny (the existence of inequality), distance (the self from advantaged group identity) and dismantle (systems of privilege). As elaborated above and below, the present work refines the theory by addressing a third type of threat not originally included in Knowles et al. (2014 framework): threat to the status of the advantaged group. This threat, in turn, requires the addition of another identity management strategy: defend (the group's dominance). We review each of these strategies in turn.

Deny

When faced with the threats of privilege, advantaged group members may simply opt to *deny* the very existence of intergroup inequality (Lowery et al., 2007). For example, privileged people might acknowledge that inequality existed in the past but assert that it has now been successfully eradicated. In some cases, extreme denial may shade into a belief in *reverse* discrimination, such that traditional forms of inequality have been replaced by systems that disadvantage advantaged group members (Norton & Sommers, 2011). Denial is well suited to coping with meritocratic threat: If inequality and privilege are real, then one's personal achievements (e.g., professional successes and academic accomplishments) cannot be taken as unambiguous evidence of individual merit; if, however, advantaged group members deny inequality and privilege, then personal achievements once again indicate personal worth (Knowles & Lowery, 2012). Denial may also help address status threats, because successfully denying inequality and privilege obviates attempts to promote equality (Unzueta et al., 2014).

Our claim is not that opposition to redistributive policies (e.g., affirmative action) is always rooted in the denial of inequality. Indeed, opposition to such policies can reflect individualized notions of procedural fairness (Bobocel et al., 2002; Son Hing et al., 2002). Nonetheless, if an advantaged

group member is highly motivated either to maintain status or to preserve a meritorious self-image, then the denial of inequality offers an effective coping strategy. We would therefore expect denial to be most common among advantaged group members who embrace ideologies that reflect an investment in group-based status (e.g., social dominance orientation) or meritocracy (e.g., system justification and colorblindness)—or in situations that make status threat or meritocratic threat particularly salient.

Distance

When faced with the threats of privilege, advantaged group members may *distance* themselves from their identity and its association with inequality (Branscombe et al., 2007; Chow et al., 2008). Members of advantaged groups may attempt to separate their self-concept from the ingroup by construing themselves in strictly individualistic terms or by downplaying the influence of group membership on their personal outcomes. In this way, advantaged group members inoculate themselves from the threats of privilege without summarily denying its existence.

Distancing is primarily effective in addressing meritocratic threat, as it separates group privilege from one's personal experiences, thus eliminating group-based advantages as a potential alternative explanation for one's successes. Distancing may also help to alleviate moral image threat by reducing the salience of one's association with a morally questionable ingroup. We would therefore expect this strategy to co-occur with ideologies that value meritocracy (e.g., meritocratic values, colorblindness) and perhaps to a lesser extent egalitarian ideologies (e.g., universalism)—or in situations that make either meritocratic or group image threat salient.

Dismantle

Advantaged group members may also choose to attack the threats of privilege at their source: inequality itself (Lowery et al., 2012). When privileged people *dismantle*, they work to reduce inequality by supporting policies and actions that cede the ingroup's privileges. Supporting social change allows privileged actors to characterize themselves as positive group exemplars who are aware of past and present injustices and seek to remedy them. Why would advantaged group members being willing to give up their material privilege? Some advantaged group members are likely more invested in egalitarian principles than in the material status of their group, leading them to fixate primarily on the moral dimensions of ingroup identity. If advantaged group members are concerned with how their group actions or the systems it benefits from conflict with their moral principles (thus threatening their positive moral identity), denial and distancing may not be effective at addressing these concerns.

As positive social identity is to some extent based on the evaluations of others, denial and distancing are ultimately

cognitive changes that do not affect how one is judged by others as a group member. Thus, advantaged group members may engage in dismantling to signal their egalitarian intentions as members of the advantaged group and reduce the conflicts between their moral commitment to equality and their advantaged status by promoting a more equal society, thereby helping to restore a positive group image. This strategy resembles pro-egalitarian conceptualizations of national identification, such as constructive patriotism (Staub, 1997) and “attachment without glorification” (Roccas et al., 2006), in which in-group identification motivates individuals to accept responsibility for and correct in-group wrongdoings. We would expect dismantling to be most common among those opposed to hierarchy (i.e., low in social dominance orientation) and committed to egalitarian and universalist ideologies—or in situations that make moral image threat salient.

An Additional Identity Management Strategy: Defend

While Knowles et al. (2014) identified three advantaged group identity management strategies (i.e., deny, distance, and dismantle), we argue that a fourth strategy deserves co-equal status within the framework. Namely, some advantaged group members *defend* the intergroup hierarchy, and thus their in-group’s privileges, by justifying or legitimizing them as natural, inevitable, and deserved. Social dominance theory suggests that defending should be a common strategy among members of advantaged groups, who routinely seek to preserve the power and status conferred by ingroup membership (Pratto et al., 2006). The defend strategy accords well with social identity theory, according to which higher group status yields psychological dividends by fueling positive social identity. In addition, some of the past work on in-group wrongdoing suggests evidence for this strategy. This research has documented that when confronted with evidence of injustice committed by their group, people often avoid taking responsibility and feeling negative emotions by justifying or legitimizing the wrongdoing (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Roccas et al., 2006). In sum, past scholarship suggests that advantaged group members sometimes defend their advantaged position—rather than denying, distancing from, or seeking to dismantle inequality—to preserve and enhance the subjective value of in-group membership.

We argue that the defend strategy is a means of dispelling a type of threat not addressed in Knowles et al.’s (2014) original framework yet which is central to SIT: status threat. For some members of advantaged groups, reduction of the intergroup hierarchy—and thus the positive social identity that their advantaged group status provides them—lurks as an ever-present concern (Blumer, 1958). In hierarchies contingent on the acquiescence of subordinate groups, such as the racial and gender systems in the United States, the status threat is an unavoidable consequence of group privilege itself (Chow et al., 2013; Jun et al., 2017). For Americans

disposed to value their position in hierarchy, the looming “majority-minority” crossover and recent social movements for greater equality have likely only accentuated this sense of status threat (Brown et al., 2021; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Knowles et al., 2022).

The defend strategy alleviates status threat by persuading the self (and potentially others) that in-group privilege is a normal, legitimate, and durable fact of life (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Defending should be most common among advantaged group members who value intergroup hierarchy and in-group superiority—and are thus most susceptible to status threat (e.g., those high in social dominance orientation).

Knowles et al.’s (2014) 3D framework omitted the defend strategy owing to the model’s focus on race relations in the United States. In the decades following the Civil Right Movement, overt justification of the racial hierarchy and assertions of White racial superiority were considered normatively unacceptable—the stuff of unalloyed White supremacy (Bonilla-Silva, 2001, 2010; Pearson et al., 2009). Echoing a shift within social psychology to focus on more subtle forms of racism such as modern racism (McConahay, 1986) and implicit bias (Payne et al., 2017), the 3D model focused on more “mainstream” means by which White people manage the threats associated with in-group racial privilege.

The present work expands the original advantaged group identity management framework to include the defend strategy. First, we sought to broaden the theory to other, nonracial dimensions of group privilege (i.e., gender relations in the United States and Jewish-Arab/Palestinian relations in Israel), and there is no guarantee that the same normative proscriptions against the overt defense of ingroup advantage apply as strongly in these contexts. Second, even in the case of U.S. race relations, normative proscriptions against the overt defense of privilege may be decaying. As Angela Saini (2019) argues, notions of White racial superiority are once again gaining cultural traction—even if they carry antiseptic-sounding labels, such as “race realism.” Moreover, recent years have seen an increase in White racial solidarity, suspicion of racial minorities, and willingness to engage in explicitly in-group-serving identity politics (Jardina, 2019; Knowles et al., 2022).

The Current Research

The present work reports the conceptualization, development, and validation of a novel measure of certain advantaged group identity management strategies. In doing so, we expand on social identity theory to demonstrate how the notion of identity management can also be relevant to advantaged groups not just disadvantaged groups and integrate past work on status threat and group-critical emotions. Furthermore, by supplementing *deny*, *distance*, and *dismantle* with *defend*, we sought to expand Knowles et al.’s (2014) framework to better capture the range of

strategies advantaged group members use to maintain a positive ingroup identity. We term this expanded model the *Defend–Deny–Distance–Dismantle* (4D) framework.

In addition, we also sought to transform the model from an analysis of White privilege into a more general account of *advantaged identity* management. Scale construction and validation were therefore conducted across multiple intergroup contexts. To maintain continuity with previous research, psychometric development was conducted in the context of White privilege in the United States. In addition, we investigated the measure in the contexts of Jewish-Arab/Palestinian relations in Israel and gender relations in the United States. If our measure is to prove useful in comparative research on advantaged identity management, it should be capable of detecting theoretically intelligible similarities and differences across domains and cultures.

As with race relations in the United States, the Jewish-Arab/Palestinian context is characterized by a long-standing system of structural inequality, increasingly frequent challenges by the disadvantaged group, and dissonance between group-based advantage and competing value systems—in particular, tension stemming from the dual Jewish and democratic nature of the Israeli state. At the same time, the Israeli Jewish-Arab/Palestinian context differs from American race relations: Unlike race relations in the United States, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is embedded in an intractable conflict and involves a religious identity explicitly tied to the founding of the nation itself (see Bar-Tal, 2007). These considerations led us to expect points of similarity and difference vis-à-vis the identity management strategies in the two contexts.

We also tested our measure in the context of gender relations between men and women in the United States. This context is both similar to and different from the racial context of the theory's original development. As with race, gender relations are marked by long-standing structural inequality. However, gender is more readily essentialized than race (Prentice & Miller, 2007): People are more willing to endorse the existence of deep and defining biological differences between men and women than between racial groups. We suspect that this difference in essentialization may affect the prevalence of different identity management strategies among the relevant advantaged groups (White people and men).

Table 1 provides an overview of the research phases, their aims, and how they map onto our studies. Although we collected six independent datasets, the steps involved in scale development (e.g., item selection, confirmation of factor structure, and construct validation) did not map cleanly onto the particular studies. At various points in the research, different studies served the same goal, the same study furthered multiple goals, and conclusions were drawn based on integrative data analyses of multiple studies. Therefore, following the procedures of Costello et al. (2020), we organize our report around psychometric goals rather than individual studies, and reserve the details of each study—including how

sample sizes were determined, how the data were cleaned, and which measures were administered—for the supplementary materials. All data, code, materials, and ethics approvals are available at <https://zenodo.org/records/8190714>.

In Phase 1 of the research, we created an initial set of scale items through brainstorming and a brief pilot among relevant scholars. The goal of Phase 2 was to select and refine the items for the final version of the scale and explore its factor structure. This phase was conducted over the course of three studies (one in Israel and two in the United States) that yielded iterative changes to the scale items. Phase 3 aimed to validate the proposed factor structure and was based on the data from three large studies in Israel and the United States.

In Phase 4, we sought to establish the construct validity of the scale by examining convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. As the 4D framework was developed in the United States, our strongest expectations concerning the scale's place within its nomological network pertained to this context—thus, this phase was conducted using only the American data. Because measures relevant to convergent and discriminant validity were collected across Studies 2, 3, and 5, we conducted an integrative data analysis (IDA; Curran & Hussong, 2009) of these studies to make the most efficient use of all available data. Finally, Phase 5 of the research was focused on examining the cross-contextual relevance of the scale. Thus, we first establish measurement invariance between the three contexts and then explore differences and similarities between the contexts.

Phase 1: Item Generation and Pilot Study

Drawing on the theoretical considerations reviewed earlier, we sought to create items that capture key themes of each identity management strategy. To this end, we first outlined a clear definition of each strategy based on Knowles et al. (2014). Using these definitions, the authors identified three to four key themes and then generated items to capture each. We aimed for the final scale to contain 20 items—5 items for each identity management strategy. This length meets the recommended minimum of three items per subscale (Marsh et al., 1998) while yielding an instrument concise enough to be broadly useful to researchers. As such, we generated an initial list of 8 to 12 items per subscale, allowing us to cut any items that did not function as expected.

The initial item list, along with definitions of the strategies, were presented in lab meetings for discussion with other researchers and revised based on their feedback. We then sent the items to eight other scholars working in the area of advantaged identity and intergroup relations to evaluate the items and provide open-ended feedback. The scholars were presented with a definition of each identity management strategy (see supplementary materials for full definitions) and asked to rate how well the relevant items captured that construct. Most of the items were rated as strongly

Table 1 Overview of the Current Research.

Research phase	Goals	Studies					
		Study	Scale version	Context	Sample Size	Source	Demographics
Phase 1: Initial Item Generation	Develop the initial items for the scale	Pilot	NA	NA	8	Other scholars	NA
Phase 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis	Explore the factor structure of the scale Select the final items for the final scale	1	1	Israel: Jewish— Arab/Palestinian Relations	253	Midgam Panel	68% women, $M_{age} = 42.1$, 14.3% leftist
		2	2	US: Race Relations	203	MTurk	55% women, $M_{age} = 41.1$, 41.6% liberal
		3	3	US: Race Relations	299	MTurk	63% women, $M_{age} = 41.$, 43.8% liberal
Phase 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis	Validate proposed scale structure Establish measurement invariance across contexts	4 ^a	4	Israel: Jewish— Arab/Palestinian Relations	2418	iPanal	59% women, $M_{age} = 43.9$, 32% leftist
		5	4	US: Race Relations	526	MTurk	55.7% women, $M_{age} = 40.3$, 43.5% liberal
		6	4	US: Gender Relations	924	Prolific	100% men, $M_{age} = 41.5$, 42.8% liberal
Phase 4: Construct Validity	Test the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale Test the predictive validity of the scale Predictive validity in moderating experimental manipulation	Integrative Data Analysis of US Studies	4	US: Race & Gender Relations	1022	MTurk	51.4% women, $M_{age} = 40.8$, 42.3% liberal
		5	4	US: Race Relations	520 ^b	MTurk	56.2% women, $M_{age} = 40.2$, 43.3% liberal
		6	4	US: Gender Relations	900	Prolific	100% men, $M_{age} = 41.5$, 42.8% liberal
Phase 5: Cross-Context Comparisons	Compare and contrast the identity management strategies across contexts	Integrative Data Analysis of All Studies	4	Cross Contexts	4617	All sources above	45.1% women, $M_{age} = 42.6$, 37% liberal/ leftist

^aA preliminary version of this study was conducted (also a part of another project under a grant to the last author) that also included the 4D scale. However, one item did not load properly in the CFA analysis and so it was replaced for this study and Study 5. This preliminary study is reported in the supplementary materials.

^bThe sample size is smaller here because six participants dropped out before reaching the part of the survey containing the measures of predictive validity, so they could not be included in these analyses.

capturing their construct (83% were rated 5 or higher on a 1 to 7 scale); the other items were revised based on the outside scholars' feedback and discussion among the present authors. This process yielded 40 items (see Table 2) measuring the four identity management strategies.

Phase 2: Exploratory Factor Analyses

Our next goal was to select 20 items to comprise the final version of the 4D scale. To this end, we conducted exploratory factor analyses (EFAs) to determine which of the 40

provisional items loaded most strongly on the four theorized factors. We ran the first EFA study in Israel, as we were less confident about our items loading as expected in this context—and thus wanted to test and modify them there before moving to the U.S. context. Given that this study hinted at the existence of an additional Distancing factor (see details below), we ran two additional studies in the United States to validate the existence of this new component and develop more items to measure it. Below, we describe the iterative process by which we arrived at the final set of items (shown in Table 3).

Table 2 Scale Version 1.

Scale	Item
Defend	1. The inequalities that exist between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens] are a justified outcome of the real differences between the groups.
	2. Because of the fundamental cultural differences between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens], it is not unfair that there are inequalities between the groups.
	3. Any inequalities between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens] simply reflect that fact that [America/Israel/ society] was built by [White Americans/Jewish Israelis].
	4. In order for [America/Israel] to function well, some inequality between [Black Americans/Arab citizens] and [White Americans/ Jewish citizens] is necessary.
	5. The fact that [White Americans/Jewish citizens] have more political power than [Black Americans/Arab citizens] makes our society safer.
	6. In order to protect [American/Israeli] values, [White Americans/Jewish citizens] must maintain their [majority status].
	7. The inequality that exists between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens] simply reflects the natural order of things.
	8. The gaps between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens] reflect natural differences between the groups.
Deny	1. The amount of discrimination that [Black Americans/Arab citizens/Women] face is often exaggerated.
	2. People who complain about inequality between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens/women and men] often overstate the problem.
	3. The amount of inequality between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens] is actually quite small.
	4. [Black Americans/Arab citizens] in [US /Israel] used to be treated unequally, but they don't face much discrimination anymore.
	5. [White Americans and Black Americans/Jewish and Arab Israelis] are generally treated equally in society nowadays.
	6. If [Black Americans/Arab citizens] were truly discriminated against, there would not be so many successful [Black Americans/Arab citizens].
	7. Nowadays, both [black and White/ Jewish and Arab] individuals have the same opportunities to succeed in life.
	8. The disadvantages faced by [White Americans/Jews] are often ignored.
	9. I think that [Black Americans/Arab citizens] get preferential treatment because of their race/ethnicity, and as a result some [White Americans/Jews] get unfairly left behind.
	10. [White Americans/Jews/Men] face similar obstacles to [Black Americans/Arab citizens], but they don't get the same special assistance.
Distance	1. I don't like to think of myself in terms of my [racial/ethnic] identity.
	2. There are many parts of my identity besides my [racial/ethnic] identity.
	3. I prefer to define myself by my individual characteristics rather by than the fact that I am a [White American /Jewish citizen].
	4. Being a [White American /Jewish citizen] is just something I was born into, but is not how I define myself.
	5. [Whites/Jews] are still generally privileged in society today, but I personally haven't benefited from such privilege.
	6. While being [White/Jewish] usually gives one real advantages in life, I haven't enjoyed many of these advantages.
	7. It's unfair when people say that I benefit from my [White/Jewish] identity.
	8. It bothers me when people focus on my [racial/ethnic] identity rather than on the things that define me as an individual.
	9. I don't think my [racial/ethnic] identity says anything important about me or my life.
	10. Discrimination against [Black Americans/Arab citizens] is still a problem, but it's not something I contribute to personally in any way.
	11. While there is still inequality between [Black Americans/Arab citizens] and [White Americans /Jewish citizens], I personally don't contribute to it.
	12. While the inequality between [Black Americans/Arab citizens] and [White Americans /Jewish citizens] is unjust, it is not something I am responsible for.
Dismantle	1. To solve issues of [racism/discrimination], the government must implement policies directly aimed at closing [racial/ethnic] gaps.
	2. Reducing inequalities between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens] should be one of our most important policy goals.
	3. I believe not enough is being done to decrease inequality between [White Americans/Jewish Israelis] and [black Americans/Arab citizens].
	4. [White Americans/Jewish Israelis/Men] have a moral responsibility to address historical wrongdoings against [certain minorities].
	5. To achieve equality for [black Americans/Arab citizens], [White Americans/Jewish Israelis] should be willing to give up of the advantages they enjoy.
	6. We as [White Americans/Jewish Israelis] should use our privilege to promote greater equality between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens].
	7. I think [White Americans/Jewish Israelis] need to give up some of the privileges have they in order to create a more equal society.
	8. When I think of my privileges as a [White American/Jewish Israeli], I feel I must do something in order to address the inequality faced by [black Americans/Arab citizens].
	9. I feel I have a moral responsibility to work to reduce the inequality faced by [black Americans/Arab citizens], because of my privileges as a [White American/Jewish Israeli].

Table 3 Final Version of the Scale (Version 4).

Defend	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The inequalities that exist between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens/men and women] are a justified outcome of the real differences between the groups. 2. Because of the fundamental [cultural/biological] differences between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens/men and women], it is fair that there are inequalities between the groups. 3. The inequality that exists between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens/men and women] simply reflects the natural order of things. 4. The gaps between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens/men and women] reflect natural differences between the groups.
Deny	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The amount of discrimination that [Black Americans/Arab citizens/women] face is often exaggerated. 2. The amount of inequality between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens/men and women] is actually quite small. 3. [Black Americans/Arab citizens/women] in the [the United States/Israel] used to be treated unequally, but they don't face much discrimination anymore. 4. [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens/men and women] are generally treated equally in society nowadays.
Distancing from Inequality	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I have never personally benefited from the inequality that exists between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens/men and women], although others might have.^a 2. While being [White/Jewish Israeli/a man] usually gives one real advantages in life, I haven't enjoyed many of these advantages. 3. Only some [White Americans/Jewish Israelis/men] enjoy privileges as a result of racial inequality. 4. The current inequalities that exist between [Black and White Americans/Arab and Jewish citizens/men and women] only have benefits for a few [White Americans/Jewish Israelis/men].
Distancing from Identity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I prefer to define myself by my individual characteristics rather than by the fact that I am a [White American/Jewish Israeli/man]. 2. It bothers me when people focus on my racial [racial identity/gender] rather than on the things that define me as an individual. 3. I wish that when people interact with me, they wouldn't emphasize my [racial identity/gender]. 4. It bothers me when other people highlight my [racial identity/gender].
Dismantle	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To achieve equality for [Black Americans/Arab citizens/women], [White Americans/Jewish Israelis/men] should be willing to give up some of the advantages they enjoy. 2. I think [White Americans/Jewish Israelis/men] need to give up some of the privileges have they in order to create a more equal society. 3. When I think of my privileges as a [White American/Jewish Israeli/man], I feel I must do something in order to address the inequality faced by [Black Americans/Arab citizens/women]. 4. I would give up some of my privileges as a [White American/Jewish Israeli/man] in order to reduce inequality.

Note. In the Hebrew version, we use the term "Arab citizen" as this is the term most commonly used by Jewish Israelis (who were the participants completing our scale, despite the fact that most Arab citizens of Israel identify as Palestinian. For the full Hebrew version, see the supplementary materials. ^aThis item was originally "In general, White Americans enjoy significant privileges in society today, but I personally haven't benefited from such privilege" in the Israeli CFA study but after it showed a low factor loading it was replaced with the current item.

In the three Phase 2 studies, participants first completed the 4D scale, followed by scales useful in assessing convergent and discriminant validity (discussed in Phase 4) and a brief demographics questionnaire. We used the same methods for item selection and EFA in all three studies. Specifically, following the procedures outlined in Howard (2016), we entered all the provisional scale items into a maximum likelihood EFA with direct oblimin rotation, as we expected the factors to be correlated to some degree (Costello & Osborne, 2005). We then excluded cross-loaded items that failed to pass the ".40-.30-.20 rule" (see Howard, 2016)—that is, that did not (a) load onto their primary factor above 0.40, (b) load onto alternative factors below 0.30, and (c) demonstrate a difference of at least 0.20 between their primary and secondary factor loadings. We iteratively excluded all such items and

reran the analysis until all items passed the .40-.30-.20 rule.⁵ To identify the number of factors, we relied on a combination of the MAP test, scree analysis, and parallel analysis.

In Study 1, all criteria indicated a four-factor solution (see Figure 1A), corresponding to our typology of Defend, Deny, Distance, and Dismantle. In the Defend, Deny, and Dismantle subscales, most items loaded on their appropriate factors, except for one Deny item and two Defend items (see Supplemental Table S2). We therefore replaced the two problematic Defend items in the next study and dropped the Deny item, which still left enough items for the latter subscale. However, eight of the Distance items did not load reliably on any single factor, leaving us with only four viable items for that subscale. This led us to suspect that the items might conflate two distinct components of distancing. Indeed, we




Figure 1 Exploratory Factor Analysis Results: (A) Study 1; (B) Study 2; and (C) Study 3. MAP = minimum average partial.

observed that items assessing one's connection to inequality and its potential benefits (e.g., "While being Jewish usually gives one real advantages in life, I haven't enjoyed many of these advantages") initially loaded on one factor, whereas items pertinent to social identification (e.g., "It bothers me when people focus on my ethnic identity rather than on the things that define me as an individual") initially loaded on a second factor.

Our Distance items appeared to tap two senses of distancing that, although noted by Knowles et al. (2014) and used to inform item development, were not expected to emerge empirically. The original Knowles et al. (2014) definition of distancing contains two facets. First, advantaged group members can distance themselves from inequality by "reassur[ing] themselves that White privilege, if it exists, does not affect them" (p. 601). Alternatively, advantaged group members can distance their self-concepts from group identity by "reducing the salience of the self's association with a morally questionable ingroup" (p. 601). Such distancing from identity can be accomplished by thinking of oneself as an individual or member of a broader superordinate group, rather than as a member of the advantaged group.

For Study 2, we developed additional items to better capture the two distancing facets, allowing us to confirm whether there are two empirically distinguishable types of distancing. In Study 2, all criteria indicated a five-factor solution (see Figure 1B): The Defend, Deny, and Dismantle items loaded on the appropriate factors, and the Distancing items loaded

on two factors—one reflecting Distancing from Inequality and one reflecting Distancing from Identity (see Supplemental Table S2). However, because many of these distancing items still loaded relatively weakly on these two factors, we focused the next study on expanding and refining these two item sets. To that end, we replaced the poorly loaded items with new questions intended to be simpler and clearer (shown in bold in Supplemental Table S3). In addition, we winnowed the Defend, Deny, and Dismantle scales to their final five items by retaining those with the highest factor loadings; if there was little difference in the factor loadings, we chose the item that we thought best captured the construct. We then ran Study 3 to assist us in selecting the best items for the final scale.

In Study 3, the MAP test indicated a five-factor solution, but the scree plot and parallel analysis indicated a four-factor solution (see Figure 1C). In light of the results of Studies 1 and 2—and because we had reduced the number of items for all subscales except Distancing, thus limiting our power to distinguish factors in EFA—we preferred the five-factor solution. The five items for Defend, Deny, and Dismantle all loaded on their respective factors. In addition, we identified seven candidate items for each Distancing subscale, most of which had loadings over .60. Because we now had five factors and wanted the scale to contain no more than 20 items, we reduced each subscale to a final four items based on their factor loadings in the EFA or, if the difference in loadings was minimal, our judgment of their fit with the relevant

Table 4 Fit Indices for Alternative Models of the 4D Scale in Study 4 (Jewish Advantage in Israel).

Model	χ^2	df	SRMR	RMSEA	TLI	CFI	AIC	$\Delta\chi^2(df)$
One factor model	9,459.8	170	.13	.15	.53	.58	173,391.5	
Two factor model	6,701.2	169	.12	.13	.67	.70	170,634.9	2,758.6 (1)***
Three factor model	6,628.5	167	.16	.13	.77	.71	170,566.2	72.7 (2)***
Five factor model (Hypothesized)	1,081.6	160	.05	.05	.95	.96	165,033.3	5,546.9 (7)***

Note. SRMR = standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index; CFI = Comparative fit index; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.

*** $p < .001$.

construct. Then, having arrived at the final version of the 4D scale, we shifted from exploratory analyses and item selection to confirmatory analyses (see Table 3).

Phase 3: Confirmatory Factor Analyses

The goal of Phase 3 was to confirm the factor structure of the final scale in each of the three intergroup contexts (White/Black, Jewish/Arab-Palestinian, men/women) and establish measurement invariance between them. To this end, we conducted a large study in each context that provided adequate power to conduct confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) and test measurement invariance. We also planned to use these data to assess construct validity; thus, as detailed in Phase 4, a number of other measures were also measured in each study. All analyses were pre-registered (see <https://osf.io/qvheg/>) and any deviations from the pre-registered analysis plan are noted.

In all three studies, we entered the 20-item identity management scale into a maximum-likelihood CFA with robust standard errors using *lavaan* R package. The structural fit of the models was judged using root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), normed fit index (NFI), Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). We compared the hypothesized model, a five-factor solution with all items loading on their respective identity management strategy, to three alternative models: (a) a single factor (all items loading on one factor), (b) two factors (reflecting support for and opposition to equality, respectively),⁶ and (c) three factors (Knowles et al., 2014, original model, with one factor for Distance, one factor for Dismantle, and a third factor combining Defend and Deny). The three-factor model allowed us to assess whether our expansion of the identity management framework is necessary to optimally capture the data.⁷ After conducting CFAs in each sample separately, we combined them to test measurement invariance.

Factor Structure

Jewish Advantage in Israel. Results for the data collected in Israel (Study 4) are displayed in Table 4. The hypothesized model fit the data better than both alternative models

and displayed excellent fit on all indices. Examining items' loadings on their respective factors (Figure 2), all items displayed acceptable loadings of $>.5$ on their factors.

White Advantage in the United States. Results for the data on White advantage in the United States (Study 5) are displayed in Table 5. The hypothesized model fit the data better than both alternative models and displayed excellent fit on all indices. Examining items' loadings on their respective factors (Figure 3), all items displayed acceptable loadings of greater than $.5$ on their factors.

Male Advantage in the United States. Results for the data on male advantage in the United States (Study 6) are displayed in Table 6. The hypothesized model fit the data better than both alternatives and displayed excellent fit on all indices. Turning to the item loadings (Figure 4), all items but one (Distancing from Identity 1) displayed good loadings on their factors ($>.5$).

Together, these results provided confirmatory evidence for our proposed factor structure in each of the intergroup contexts under study (Jewish-Arab/Palestinian relations in Israel, race relations in the United States, and gender relations in the United States). This model specifies five distinct advantaged group identity management strategies: Defend, Deny, Distance from Inequality, Distance from Identity, and Dismantle. Having validated our expected factor structure across the three contexts, we proceeded to test measurement invariance.

Measurement Invariance. To establish measurement invariance we, followed the steps recommended by Fischer and Karl (2019) for conducting tests of invariance and used the *lavaan* R package. To this end, we first combined the data from all intergroup contexts. We then ran a series of three multigroup CFAs, incrementally adding equality constraints to the model. To test for *configural invariance*, no equality constraints were imposed. If this CFA demonstrates a good fit to the data, then the same factor structure is seen to hold across all intergroup contexts. Next, to test for *metric invariance*, we constrained factor loadings to equality across contexts. If this added constraint does not significantly reduce model fit relative to the configural model, then we are freed to compare correlation




Figure 2 Factor Loadings in Study 4 (Jewish Advantage in Israel). Note. Factors were allowed to correlate in this model. For clarity, and because we discuss these relationships in Phase 4 (construct validity), these correlations are not displayed in the figure.

Table 5 Fit Indices for the Alternative Models of the 4D Scale in Study 5 (White Advantage in the United States).

Model	χ^2	df	SRMR	RMSEA	TLI	CFI	AIC	$\Delta\chi^2(df)$
One factor model	3,065.7	170	.13	.18	.62	.66	36,014.0	
Two factor model	2,205.8	169	.12	.15	.73	.75	35,156.0	859.9 (1)***
Three factor model	1,666.2	167	.10	.13	.80	.82	34,620.4	539.6 (2)***
Five factor model (Hypothesized)	518.24	160	.05	.07	.95	.96	33,486.5	1,148.0 (7)***

Note. SRMR = standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; TLI =Tucker–Lewis index; CFI = Comparative fit index; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. ***p < .001.

and regression coefficients across contexts. Finally, to test for *scalar invariance*, we constrained all item intercepts to equality across contexts. If the addition of this constraint does not worsen fit relative to the metric invariance model, then we can compare means (as well as correlations and regression coefficients) across contexts.

In our case, there is the additional challenge of widely varying sample sizes ($n = 2,418$ in Israel, $n = 526$ in the U.S. racial context, and $n = 924$ in the U.S. gender context). Large imbalances in sample size can lead to incorrect conclusions regarding invariance, as the fit function in multi-group CFA weights by group size (Yoon & Lai, 2018). To address this issue, Yoon and Lai (2018) proposed and validated a multiple subsampling method (see description on p. 204), which we used to contend with the fact that our samples differed greatly in size.

To compare models and assess invariance, scholars recommend using multiple fit indices—and to focus on alternative fit indices when analyzing large samples, for which chi-square is overly sensitive (Kline, 2015; Putnick & Bornstein, 2016). Invariance is determined by examining changes in model fit when moving from configural to metric and from metric to scalar models. However, there is no consensus about the best-fit indices or cutoff values for alternative fit indices. For example, Chen (2007) suggests a criterion of a -.01 change in CFI, .015 change in RMSEA, and .030 change in SRMR (for metric invariance) or .015 (for scalar invariance). In contrast, Rutkowski and Svetina (2014) argue that changes in CFI of -.02 and RMSEA of .03 were more appropriate for large sample sizes. Given this diversity of opinions, we do not rely on any one statistic or standard but rather take a holistic look at all the indices (following Kline, 2015).




Figure 3 Factor Loadings.

Note. Factors were allowed to correlate in this model. For clarity, and because we discuss these relationships in Phase 4 (construct validity), these correlations are not displayed in the figure.

Table 6 Fit Indices for the alternative Models of the 4D Scale in Study 6.

Model	χ^2	df	SRMR	RMSEA	TLI	CFI	AIC	$\Delta\chi^2(df)$
One factor model	4,486.0	170	.12	.17	.61	.65	64,258.6	
Two factor model	2,883.2	169	.11	.13	.75	.78	62,657.7	1,602.8 (1)***
Three factor model	2,344.5	167	.11	.12	.80	.82	62,123.1	538.7 (2)***
Five factor model (Hypothesized)	611.5	160	.06	.06	.96	.96	60,404.1	1,693.0 (7)***

Note. SRMR = standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; TLI =Tucker–Lewis index; CFI = Comparative fit index; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.

*** $p < .001$.

Turning to the results, our configural invariance model indicated good fit (see Table 7), with CFI greater than .95 and RMSEA and SRMR less than .06. We then tested for metric invariance and found that our indices indicated an acceptable change in fit ($\Delta CFI = -.01$, $\Delta RMSEA < .01$, $\Delta SRMR < .02$). Testing for scalar invariance, two of our indices suggested an acceptable change in fit ($\Delta RMSEA < .01$ and $\Delta SRMR < .01$) while the third fell near the border of what is generally deemed acceptable ($\Delta CFI < .02$). Given the debate over fit guidelines, and the fact that two of the three indices met generally accepted criteria, we took our findings as evidence of scalar invariance.

In sum, invariance testing established statistical measurement invariance (configural, metric, and scalar) across all three intergroup contexts. This should not, however, be regarded as indicating that the constructs measured in the 4D scale are psychologically identical or behave the same

way in all contexts. Rather, measurement invariance gives us statistical justification for interpreting cross-context similarities and differences between subscales’ means and correlations with other constructs. Such similarities and differences in identity management strategies are discussed in Phase 5.

Phase 4: Construct Validity

Having verified the five-factor structure of the 4D scale and established its measurement invariance across three intergroup contexts, we proceeded to assess the construct validity of the scale. For two reasons, we examined construct validity only in the U.S. data. First, as the relevant theory was developed in the American racial context, we had stronger theoretical expectations regarding the scale’s correlates in the United States. Second, the only large study




Figure 4 Factor Loadings.

Note. Factors were allowed to correlate in this model. For clarity, and because we discuss these relationships in Phase 4 (construct validity), these correlations are not displayed in the figure.

Table 7 Fit Indices for Measurement Invariance Models.

Model	$\chi^2(df)$	$\Delta\chi^2(df)$	CFI	Δ CFI	RMSEA	Δ RMSEA	SRMR	Δ SRMR
Configural Invariance Model	1,205.2 (426)		.959		.059		.050	
Metric Invariance Model	1,382.6 (454)	177.4 (28)***	.951	.008	.062	.003	.068	.018
Scalar Invariance Model	1,701.6 (482)	319.0 (28)***	.936	.015	.069	.007	.075	.007

Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. *** $p < .001$.

conducted with the final scale in Israel (Study 4) was part of a larger research project; thus, we were unable to administer a full set of validity measures in this context (nonetheless, relevant analyses are reported in the supplementary materials).

Our first step was to assess the 4D scale’s place within its nomological network of conceptually related constructs—that is, convergent and discriminant validity. Relevant validity measures were collected in the three studies pertaining to White racial advantage in the United States (Studies 2, 3, and 5). We conducted an integrative data analysis (IDA; Curran & Hussong, 2009) of these datasets. The gender dataset (Study 6) also contained measures enabling us to assess convergent and discriminant validity in the context of male advantage. We then turned to predictive validity. In the context of White advantage (Study 5), predictive validity was assessed by examining correlations between the 4D scale and relevant outcomes, including policy preferences and political judgments. In the gender context (Study 6), we tested whether the 4D scale moderated relevant effects in a survey experiment.

Convergent and Discriminant Validity

In all of our convergent and discriminant validity studies, participants first completed the 4D scale, then scales were chosen to elucidate its nomological network, and finally a brief demographic questionnaire.

Measures

4D Scale. To render this scale equivalent across studies, our IDA of the three White advantage studies included only those items retained in the final version of the scale.⁸

Validity Scales. Across studies, we measured 11 constructs located within the 4D scale’s nomological network (see Table 8). The validity scales differed somewhat by study; the full text of all scale items in each study can be found in the supplementary materials. While we do not review the hypothesized correlations between every identity management subscale and validity scale here (see <https://osf.io/qvheg/> for detailed predictions), we briefly explain the rationale for each scales’ inclusion:

Table 8. Scales for Convergent and Discriminant Validity.

Scale Name	Study 2 (N = 200)	Study 3 (N = 297)	Study 5 (N = 525)	Study 6 (N = 924)
Social Dominance Orientation	16-Item Version (Ho et al., 2015)	7-tem Version (Ho et al., 2015)	4-Item Version (Pratto et al., 2013)	4-Item Version (Pratto et al., 2013)
System Justification	8-Item Version (Kay & Jost, 2003)	8-Item Version (Kay & Jost, 2003)	Shortened Version (Kay & Jost, 2003)	Gender System Justification (Jost & Kay, 2005)
Colorblindness	Knowles et al. (2009)	Knowles et al. (2009)	Knowles et al. (2009)	Knowles et al. (2009)
Support for Meritocracy	Major et al. (2007)		Major et al. (2007)	Major et al. (2007)
Power	Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990)		Short Schwartz Value Survey (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005)	Short Schwartz Value Survey (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005)
Achievement	Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990)		Short Schwartz Value Survey (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005)	Short Schwartz Value Survey (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005)
Universalism	Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990)		Short Schwartz Value Survey (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005)	Short Schwartz Value Survey (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005)
Identification with Advantaged	3 Items based on van Zomeren et al. (2011)		3 Items based on van Zomeren et al. (2011)	3 Items based on van Zomeren et al. (2011)
Identification with Disadvantaged	3 Items based on van Zomeren et al. (2011)		3 Items based on van Zomeren et al. (2011)	3 Items based on van Zomeren et al. (2011)
Common (Superordinate) Identification	3 Items based on van Zomeren et al. (2011)		3 Items based on van Zomeren et al. (2011)	
Social Desirability			Shortened Version of (Nießen et al., 2012)	

1. Social dominance orientation (SDO; A. K. Ho et al., 2017) measures an investment in intergroup hierarchy, and thus should be most strongly correlated with identity management strategies mitigating status threat (i.e., Defend and Deny).
2. System justification (Kay & Jost, 2003) measures both investment in one's current status and the belief that this status is fair and thus should be most strongly correlated with strategies mitigating status and meritocratic threats (i.e., Deny and Distancing).
3. Support for meritocracy (Major et al., 2007) represents the belief that people's positive and negative outcomes are deserved. This scale should be most strongly correlated with strategies mitigating meritocratic threat (e.g., Deny, Distance from Inequality, and Distance from Identity).
4. Colorblindness (Knowles et al., 2009) expresses a desire to avoid group-based categorizations and should therefore be most strongly correlated with Distancing from Identity.
5. Power, achievement, and universalism values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) are conceptually related to status, meritocratic, and moral image threats, respectively. These values should therefore correlate most strongly with identity management strategies mitigating the matching type of threat: power with Defend and Deny (status threat), achievement with Deny, Distance from Inequality and Distance from Identity (meritocratic threat), and universalism with Distance from Identity and Dismantle (moral image threat).
6. Three types of identification were measured: identification with the advantaged group, the disadvantaged group, and a common or superordinate identity (van Zomeren et al., 2011). See the supplemental materials for predicted correlations between these dimensions of identification and the 4D strategies.
7. Social desirability (Nießen et al., 2019) assesses participants' tendency to provide answers the cast them in a flattering light. Inclusion of this measure allowed us to ensure that self-presentational concerns do not drive endorsement of any strategy.

Results. We first examined how well the observed correlations between the 4D subscales accorded with our predictions. Figure 5 compares the hypothesized and observed correlation matrices in the contexts of race and gender.

In the race context, all correlations were as hypothesized. While the correlation of $-.74$ between Deny and Dismantle might be regarded as evidence of multicollinearity, the fact that these subscales' items consistently loaded on separate factors in exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (Phases 2 and 3) allays such concerns. Moreover, an inspection of a scatterplot depicting the Deny–Dismantle




Figure 5 Hypothesized and Observed Correlations Between the Scales.

relationship (see supplementary materials Figure S3) reveals that this association is driven primarily by people at the extremes of the two scales (i.e., a score of 1 on one scale and 7 on the other). This makes conceptual sense, as a person who dismantles is unlikely to deny the existence of the very inequality they seek to eliminate.

In the gender context, correlations between 4D subscales were generally as hypothesized. However, the two distancing scales were slightly less correlated than expected, and distancing from identity was unexpected unrelated to dismantling. Although the correlation of .72 between Defend and Deny was quite strong, the fact that these items loaded on separate factors in Phases 2 and 3 helps temper any multicollinearity concerns.

To evaluate the 4D scale's convergent and discriminant validity, we adopted Westen and Rosenthal's (2003) method of quantifying construct validity. This approach involves calculating the $r_{altering-CV}$ statistic, or the correlation between the predicted and observed associations among the measure of interest and other constructs in its nomological network. $R_{altering-CV}$ thus summarizes both convergent and discriminant validity, holistically measuring the degree to which a construct occupies its expected position within the relevant conceptual space (see Furr & Heuckeroth, 2019). Westen and Rosenthal (2003) do not provide formal guidelines for interpretation of $r_{altering-CV}$, but regard values greater than .70 as indicating "substantial correspondence between [one's] theory of the construct and its empirical correlates" (p. 612).

Conducting these analyses requires exact hypotheses regarding the correlations between each 4D subscale and the scales in its nomological network (e.g., "the correlation between Defend and system justification will be .45"). However, because we were unaware of the Westen and Rosenthal (2003) approach when we pre-registered our hypotheses, we made only coarse predictions regarding these correlations: strong-negative ($r \leq -.50$), moderate-negative ($-.50 < r \leq -.30$), weak-negative ($-.30 < r \leq -.15$), null ($-.15 < r < .15$), weak-positive ($.15 \geq r > .30$), moderate-positive ($.30 \geq r > .50$), and strong-positive ($r \geq .50$). Thus,

we ran 5,000 simulations to generate precise correlation predictions. In each simulation, the algorithm selected random numbers within the hypothesized ranges to represent the predicted correlations between a given 4D subscale and its validity criteria. For example, if the hypothesized correlation between the Defend system and justification was $.30 \geq r > .50$ (moderate-positive), any number in this range had an equal chance of being selected as the precise prediction in each simulation. After precise predictions were generated for a 4D subscale and its validity measures, these associations were correlated with the observed associations to yield an interim value of $r_{altering-CV}$. After all simulations were complete, the interim $r_{altering-CV}$ values were averaged to reach a final $r_{altering-CV}$ value for each 4D subscale.

Figure 6 displays the hypothesized and observed correlations for the 4D subscales in the context of White advantage. All subscales had an $r_{altering-CV}$ of greater than .7, indicating good convergent and discriminant validity.⁹ Figure 7 depicts the hypothesized and observed correlations between the 4D subscales in the gender context. With the exception of Distance from Identity in the gender context, whose $r_{altering-CV}$ fell just below .7, all gender subscales demonstrated good convergent and discriminant validity.

Predictive Validity

We took two broad approaches to assessing the predictive validity of the 4D scale. First, in the racial context (Study 5), we tested hypothesized relationships between the 4D subscales and measures of participants' race-related behavioral intentions. Then, in the gender context (Study 6), we tested predictions concerning how the subscales would moderate causal effects within a survey experiment.

Race Context (Study 5)

Procedure and Measures. In Study 5, after completing the 4D scale and convergent and discriminant validity measures, participants completed scales designed to assess behavioral intentions in the domain of race. The validity scales tapped a




Figure 6 Hypothesized and Observed Correlations Between the Scales in the Race Context and Their Nomological Network. Note. SDO = Social dominance orientation; SJ = system justification; ID = identification.




Figure 7 Hypothesized and Observed Correlations Between the Scales in the Gender Context and Their Nomological Network. Note. SDO = Social dominance orientation; SJ = system justification; ID = identification.

number of important intergroup behaviors: social distancing ($\alpha = .89$, Weaver, 2008), confronting prejudiced responses (CPR; Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2008), the principle-implementation gap ($\alpha = .87, .91$, Tuch & Hughes, 1996), support for affirmative action ($\alpha = .85$, Kteily et al., 2017), willingness to engage in solidarity-based action on racial issues ($\alpha = .94$, Selvanathan et al., 2018), and support for voting

restrictions ($\alpha = .89$). For full text of these items, see the supplementary materials. To assess relationship between the 4D subscales and political intentions, we developed a series of five statements ostensibly made by politicians. Each of these statements was designed to exemplify different identity management strategies; see the supplementary materials for full text of the statements. After reading each statement,




Figure 8 Predictive Validity Model.
 Note. Nonsignificant paths are not displayed, key paths are bolded.
 * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

participants were asked to “imagine you heard a politician make the following statements during their campaign for office” and rated their support for the politician on a scale seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (*not at all likely*) to 7 (*very likely*).

Results. We first examined the ability of the 4D scale to predict measures of behavioral intentions—such as social distancing, confronting prejudice, and willingness to engage in solidarity-based action. To assess the subscales’ overall predictive validity, we adapted the method used to assess convergent and discriminant validity in the previous section (Westen & Rosenthal, 2003). In this case, however, rather than calculating $r_{altering-CV}$ for each 4D subscale, we calculated $r_{altering-CV}$ for each *criterion variable*—yielding a holistic assessment whether the five 4D subscales predict a given outcome in the manner hypothesized. For example, calculating $r_{altering-CV}$ for solidarity-based action allows us to test the prediction that Dismantle is the strongest predictor of this outcome, Distancing from Identity is unrelated, Distancing from Inequality is a weak negative predictor, and Deny and Defend are strong negative predictors. All hypothesized and observed correlations, along with $r_{altering-CV}$ for each criterion scale, are presented in supplementary Figure S5. Overall, the $r_{altering-CV}$ for all criterion variables ranged from .70 to .96, indicating good predictive validity.

We next examined the degree to which the 4D scale explains additional variance in our predictive validity criteria after adjusting for political ideology, SDO, system

justification, and group identification. This analysis enabled us to assess the new scale’s incremental validity—or ability to explain outcomes above and beyond political orientation and measures derived from other major theories of intergroup relations. To this end, we regressed each criterion variable onto two blocks of predictors, the first containing SDO, system justification, group identification, and political ideology and the second containing the 4D subscales. We then tested whether our measures significantly increased the r -squared of the model, indicating that they account for variance unexplained by the first block of predictors. Indeed, our new measures explained significant additional variance for all of the criterion variables, ranging from a change in r -squared of .05 to .22 (see the supplementary materials for full results). Taken together, these findings indicate that our measures are not redundant with existing measures, but rather have explanatory power above and beyond other constructs.

In a third test of the 4D scale’s predictive validity in the racial domain, we estimated a structural equation model in which each 4D subscale predicted participants’ support for the politicians whose statements they read (Figure 8). This model fit the data well, $\chi^2(df) = 573.75 (235)$, $CFI = .96$, $TLI = .95$, $RMSEA = .05$, $SRMR = .05$. In addition, each identity management strategy strongly predicted support for a politician making a statement evoking that strategy (see bolded paths). In most cases, in fact, the matching 4D subscale was the strongest predictor of support for a politician, providing additional support for the predictive validity of the 4D scale.

Gender Context (Study 6). We used a different approach to examine the predictive validity of the 4D scale in the domain of male advantage (Study 6). Specifically, we developed hypotheses concerning the ways in which different 4D subscales would moderate the effects of manipulation in a survey experiment. This experiment drew on work by Lowery et al. (2012), which found that White Americans reacted differently to redistributive policies depending both on how the outcomes of the policy and the nature of preexisting inequality were framed. Specifically, White participants led to think about inequality as disadvantaging Black people tended to prefer policies framed as helping Black people to those framed as harming White people. However, this preference for outgroup-benefiting policies was reduced—and in some cases reversed—for participants led to think about inequality as favoring White people.

Different identity management strategies also tap into advantaged group members' conceptions of inequality (e.g., as ingroup advantage versus outgroup disadvantage). Specifically, we expect that those high on dismantling will view inequality primarily through the lens of dominant group privilege and advantage (i.e., as a moral burden), whereas those high on distancing (who reject ingroup categorization and being implicated in inequality) will regard inequality as a matter of the outgroup's disadvantage. Deniers, for their part, do not believe in either disadvantage or privilege, and defenders recognize both privilege and disadvantage—but see it as something good and legitimate. Thus, our identity management strategies may capture individual differences analogous to the inequality framing manipulations used by Lowery et al. (2012).

In light of this reasoning, we surmised that advantaged group identity management strategies might moderate the effect of the policy framing manipulation on advantaged group members' support for these policies. Based on Lowery et al.'s (2012) findings, we predicted that people high on dismantling, who tend to frame inequality as ingroup advantage, will be more supportive of policies framed as harming (i.e., decreasing the status of) the advantaged group than of policies framed helping (i.e., increasing the status of) the disadvantaged group. In contrast, those high on distancing—who tend to frame inequality as outgroup disadvantage—should be prefer policies framed as helping the disadvantaged to those framed as harming the advantaged ingroup. Lowery et al.'s (2012) findings offer less guidance about the reactions of people high on deny or defend. We nonetheless reasoned that deniers, who downplay the existence of inequality, should tend to reject any redistributive policy as unnecessary—while perhaps slightly preferring outgroup-helping policies. Defenders, who explicitly value the hierarchy, and so any attempt to change it (whether by helping the outgroup or harming the ingroup) will likely be met with strong resistance.

In Study 6, we set out to test these hypotheses in a brief survey experiment. In this experiment, members of the advantaged gender (males) were randomly assigned to rate their

support for public policies framed either as helping the disadvantaged group (i.e., increasing women's status) or harming the advantaged group (i.e., decreasing men's status).

Method and Procedure. After completing the 4D scale and the convergent and discriminant validity items, participants read one of two descriptions of the effects of extant policies aimed at increasing gender equality. In the *outgroup help* condition, participants read a passage focusing on policies' benefits to women:

These policies have narrowed the gender wage gap by increasing the amount women earn relative to men. In addition, these policies have helped to address the gender gap in promotions from entry level positions to manager: between 2015 and 2020, the percent of women promoted relative to men increased by 5%. Similarly, the percentage of women in high level corporate managerial positions has increased by 4.6% from 1991 to 2020.

In the *ingroup harm* condition, the passage was modified to highlight the reduction in the advantaged group's (men's) status:

These policies have narrowed the gender wage gap by decreasing the amount men earn relative to women. In addition, these policies have helped to address the gender gap in promotions from entry level positions to manager: between 2015 and 2020, the percent of men promoted relative to women decreased by 5%. Similarly, the percentage of men in high level corporate managerial positions has decreased by 4.6% from 1991 to 2020.

Following this manipulation, participants were asked “Based on the information given above, how much do you support such policies to reduce gender inequality?” Participants made their ratings on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale. For full text of the measures and manipulations, as well as preregistered hypotheses, see <https://osf.io/qvheg/>.

Results. To examine the interactive effects of our identity management strategies and the framing manipulation on policy support, we regressed policy support on framing condition (outgroup help vs. ingroup harm), each 4D subscale, and all two-way interactions between the subscales and condition.¹⁰ In this model, we observed significant interactions between framing condition and both Distance from Identity and Dismantle (see Table 9).

To decompose the interactions between the condition framing and Distance from Identity and Dismantle, we first calculated the simple slopes for these two-way interactions. This analysis revealed that for men low (-1 *SD*) on Distance from Identity, there was no effect of condition on support ($p = .17$), whereas men high ($+1$ *SD*) on Distance from Identity were more supportive of policies designed to address gender inequality in the outgroup help condition ($b = -0.50$, $SE = .12$, $t = -4.29$, $p < .01$). On the other hand, men low (-1 *SD*)

Table 9 Effects of 4D Subscale and Framing Condition on Policy Support.

Predictors	Policy support			
	Estimates	SE	CI	<i>p</i>
(Intercept)	4.90	0.06	[4.79, 5.01]	<.001
Framing Condition (Help Women = 0, Harm Men =1)	-0.33	0.08	[-0.49, -0.17]	<.001
Defend	-0.19	0.05	[-0.30, -0.09]	<.001
Deny	-0.21	0.06	[-0.33, -0.10]	<.001
Distance from Inequality	0.02	0.06	[-0.09, 0.14]	.700
Distance from Identity	0.07	0.05	[-0.03, 0.17]	.143
Dismantle	0.51	0.05	[0.41, 0.61]	<.001
Condition × Defend	0.09	0.08	[-0.05, 0.24]	.218
Condition × Deny	0.02	0.08	[-0.15, 0.18]	.854
Condition × Distance from Inequality	0.07	0.08	[-0.09, 0.23]	.418
Condition × Distance from Identity	-0.14	0.07	[-0.28, -0.00]	.044
Condition × Dismantle	0.16	0.07	[0.03, 0.30]	.020
Observations	924			
<i>R</i> ² / <i>R</i> ² adjusted	.561 / .556			

Note. CI = confidence interval.

For Bold Significance for *p* < .05

on Dismantle were more supportive of policies aimed at addressing gender inequality in the outgroup help condition ($b = -0.60$, $SE = .14$, $t = -4.27$, $p < .01$), whereas participants high (+1 *SD*) on Dismantle were very supportive of policies to address inequality in both conditions ($p = .64$).

However, given that there were five two-way interactions in the model (one between condition and each advantaged identity management strategy) it makes interpreting effects when participants are low difficult. In addition, our hypotheses were articulated in terms of the effects of outcome framing when each 4D strategy was high and the others low. Therefore, for a more complete picture, we used the regression equation to calculate the simple effects of condition when participants were high (+1*SD*) on one—and only one—identity management strategy (see Figure 9). As predicted, when (only) Defend was high, we observed no effect of the framing condition (but generally low level of policy support regardless of framing). When Deny was uniquely high, participants reduced their already low support in the ingroup harm condition, corroborating our predictions. Also as hypothesized, those high on each form of distancing expressed generally higher levels of support for gender policy than deniers and defenders; however, when the policy was framed as harming men, support fell marginally for those high on Distancing from Inequality and significantly for those high on Distancing from Identity. We predicted that when Dismantle was high, participants would support the policy more strongly in the ingroup harm (vs. outgroup help) condition. However, we found that the framing condition had no effect on these participants uniquely high in Dismantle. We suspect that this reflects a ceiling effect, as almost all participants high on dismantling scored above 6 on

the policy support scale (see Supplementary Materials for a scatterplot). It is telling, however, that dismantlers showed the smallest framing effect of any group.

Thus far, the present work has yielded strong evidence for the convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity of our proposed measure of advantaged group identity management strategies (the 4D scale). The pattern of correlations of each scale with other scales in its nomological network generally aligned with our predictions, supporting its convergent and discriminant validity. In addition, the scales predicted other important outcomes in intergroup relations such as social distancing, willingness to confront discrimination, and willingness to participate in collective action. Finally, the scales moderated a theoretically relevant manipulation (see Lowery et al., 2012) as predicted—with one exception of a null effect that we suspect is a methodological artifact.

In light of the 4D scale's positive psychometric attributes, we felt confident enough in the instrument's construct validity to use it to gain new empirical insights into real-world inequalities. In Study 5, we examined cross-contextual differences in advantaged group identity management strategies (as measured with the 4D scale) to illuminate similarities and differences in identity management strategies across disparate intergroup contexts.

Phase 5: Cross Context Comparisons

A major goal of the present research was to extend Knowles' et al. (2014) Deny–Distance–Dismantle framework, originally developed as an account of White privilege, to two other dimensions of advantage: Jewish privilege in Israel and male privilege in the United States. Having validated




Figure 9 Interaction Between Advantaged Identity Management and Framing Condition.

the 4D scale—and, critically, found it to exhibit measurement invariance—we sought to use the scale to illuminate similarities and differences in identity management across the three intergroup contexts. In discussing these cross-context differences, we use American race relations as a reference point.

As we observed at the outset, the Jewish-Arab/Palestinian context in Israel is similar to and different from the context of racial relations in the United States. Both are characterized by a long-standing system of structural inequality that has come under challenge by disadvantaged groups. Both contexts also display a critical tension between group-based advantage and competing democratic-egalitarian value systems. Unlike the American context, Jewish-Arab/Palestinian relations in Israel are embedded in a larger intractable conflict, and Jewish identity is unique in being explicitly linked to Israeli nationhood. We expected that such differences might make certain strategies, such as distancing from identity, less common in the Israeli context.

The U.S. gender context bears similarities to the U.S. racial context while also exhibiting important differences. Like the racial context, the gender system is one of long-standing inequality that has recently been the focus of increased social protest (e.g., #MeToo and the Time's Up movement). Moreover, like White privilege, male privilege exists in tension with sacrosanct American ideals of meritocratic and egalitarianism. However, we suspect that the relative ease with which people essentialize gender (Prentice & Miller, 2007)—that is, attribute to men and women deep-seated and consequential biological differences—will make “naturalizing” identity management strategies (e.g., Defend) especially appealing to men.

Given the similarities between contexts, we expected that all of the 4D strategies would be relevant in each (i.e., we

would observe no floor effects). At the same time, we sought to document any differences in strategy use that might be traceable to unique features of the contexts. Our goal in Phase 5 was not to test strong *a priori* hypotheses, but to gather descriptive evidence to guide future research. To conduct our cross-contextual comparisons, we conducted an integrative data analysis of all the studies conducted in the present research.

Having established the measurement invariance of the 4D scale, we examined mean differences in each identity management strategy between the three intergroup context (see Figure 10). Defend was lowest in the U.S. racial context, but equal in the U.S. gender context and in Israel. Deny was highest in the gender context and equal in the U.S. racial context and Israel. In general, Distancing from Inequality was similar between contexts. Distancing from Identity was extremely different between the contexts, being much higher in the racial context than in the gender context or Israel. White Americans employed frequently distanced from identity in the context of ingroup privilege, while Jewish Israelis and American men used this strategy to a much lesser extent. Finally, Dismantling was significantly higher in the two American contexts of race and gender than in the Israeli context. In light of the absence of floor effects, none of the 4D strategies showed signs of being irrelevant in any context.

We next examined the correlations between 4D subscales, testing whether they were moderated by context. All were significantly moderated ($p < .001$). As this is likely due in part to our large sample size, we display the correlations within each context in Figure 11 and discuss them in terms of size and direction rather than statistical significance.

We see that the relationships between Defend, Deny, and Dismantle were similar across contexts despite some




Figure 10 Mean Differences Between the Contexts: (A) Defend; (B) Deny; (C) Distancing From Inequality; Distancing From Identity; (E) Dismantle.

differences in effect size. However, the two distancing subscales seemed to carry different connotations between the American racial context and Israel. In Israel, Distancing from Identity appeared much more aligned with Dismantling, and Distancing from Inequality seemed to play the role that Distancing from Identity played in the United States.¹¹ We suggest this may be due to the differences in the meaning of identification with the ingroup in the American racial context versus Israel. As a result of many factors (e.g., Israel's founding in the wake of the Holocaust, the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, etc.), Jewish identity is typically highly salient in Israel. Thus, the act of distancing oneself from Jewishness is relatively uncommon (see Figure 10) and likely to indicate a more pronounced commitment changing the status quo in Jewish-Arab/Palestinian relations (hence the higher correlation with Dismantle). In sum, we conclude that this evidence suggests that the 4D scale is relevant in all three contexts but can also pick up real differences between the contexts, thus making it a useful tool for cross-contextual research.

General Discussion

According to traditional social psychological perspectives, members of advantaged groups—like members of all groups—are motivated to feel positively about their ingroup. Due to their advantaged status, such positive ingroup regard ought to be easy and straightforward to achieve and generally result in a tendency to protect that advantage. However, recent theoretical and empirical work (Ho & Unzueta, 2015; Knowles et al., 2014, 2009; Knowles & Peng, 2005; Lowery et al., 2012) has questioned these assumptions. The present research demonstrates that group identity management

among advantaged groups can be much more complex and multifaceted than traditional approaches would suggest.

In this article, we drew on prior theoretical work to construct a theoretical framework and measure of advantaged group members' various identity management strategies. In the process, we both expanded the notion of identity management to encompass the advantaged group and demonstrated the diversity of potential responses at their disposal. We then established our measure's validity in three contexts—U.S. racial and gender relations, and ethnic relations in Israel. Thus, in validating this new measure, we demonstrated the wide applicability of the scale and the theory of advantaged group identity management that undergirded its development. The studies presented here provide strong empirical evidence for the validity of this new measure by supporting its hypothesized factor structure, providing evidence for its construct validity, and demonstrating its measurement invariance across contexts as well as its sensitivity to contextual differences.

Indeed, the results of all six studies generally supported 4D measure's predicted factor structure. We began by adding the additional identity management strategy of Defend to the original three proposed by Knowles and colleagues (2014; i.e., Deny, Distance, and Dismantle). However, the results of exploratory analyses indicated that Distancing was in fact made up of two distinct components: Distancing from Inequality (e.g., "I have never personally benefited from the inequality that exists between Black and White Americans") and Distancing from Identity (e.g., "It bothers me when other people highlight my one's racial identity"). This final five-factor model of advantaged group identity management was subsequently supported in confirmatory analyses in both the United States and Israel. In addition, all five scales displayed




Figure 11 Correlations Among Scales by Context.

good construct validity, in that they correlated in the predicted ways with scales in their nomological networks.

Moreover, we also aimed to demonstrate that the 4D framework could be applied to understanding advantaged group identity management beyond White Americans, and therefore we also conducted research in two other contexts—namely, Jewish-Arab/Palestinian relations in Israel and gender relations in the United States. Our scale demonstrated measurement invariance across the three contexts, indicating that it is relevant to each context. While there were differences between the contexts in terms of mean levels of each identity management strategy and some of the correlations between them, we consider this a strength rather than a weakness of the measure. Given the significant historical and cultural differences between these contexts, some differences between these them should be expected. Thus, the fact that our measure displays measurement invariance but is also sensitive to these differences can makes it a valuable tool for further studying these identity management processes among a potentially wide range of advantaged groups in the future.

Theoretical Implications

This research expands on and enriches literature on group identity—particularly on identity processes among historically advantaged groups. First, our findings support and expand the Deny–Distance–Dismantle model proposed by Knowles et al. (2014). Our work was inspired by and grounded in this model, and thus the data provide support for it as a model of White identity management and advantaged group identity management more broadly. In addition, our findings suggest two important refinements to this model. First, we add the strategy of Defend, which involves the overt defense of the hierarchy between the two groups by justifying or legitimizing inequality. While this strategy may have been left out of the Knowles et al. (2014) paper because many social psychologists thought that overt defense of the racial hierarchy had faded, we suggest that there is evidence

that this strategy is still relevant in present-day racial dynamics. For example, the election of Donald Trump made the expression of overt prejudice toward certain groups more legitimate (Crandall et al., 2018; Ruisch & Ferguson, 2022), and the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville indicated that there are some white Americans willing to publicly defend the racial hierarchy. These events have indicated that there is still a portion of the population who is willing to overtly defend the racial hierarchy, highlighting the importance of accounting for such processes in models of advantaged identity management. In addition, while it was originally developed in the context of race relations in the United States, if this framework is to be relevant for other contexts of advantaged/disadvantaged relations, it must take into account this kind of overt justification of inequality—which may be more common and accepted in other contexts.

Our results also expanded the notion of Distancing to two types: Distancing from Inequality and Distancing from Identity. These two forms of distancing, although alluded to in Knowles et al. (2014), were not originally deemed distinct enough to warrant measurement as separate strategies. Distancing from Inequality seems to align with research showing that, when presented with evidence of privilege, White people will often claim personal hardship to argue that they personally don't benefit from group-based privilege (Phillips & Lowery, 2015). Considering the relatively weak correlation between the two forms of distancing, it would seem that Distancing from Inequality does not require distancing from the overall group identity: Rather, one can still think of oneself as a member of the group while simply denying the self-relevance of the aspects of group membership related to privilege and inequality. At the same time, Distancing from Identity appears to be a quite common strategy, and one that can often coexist with Dismantling (particularly in Israel). This suggests that dismantling alone may not always be enough to cope with moral image threat, requiring people who Dismantle to also use Distancing from Identity as an additional strategy.

At a broader level, our findings regarding advantaged group identity management help expand on social identity theory by shedding light on the ways in which privilege itself can constitute a threat to positive social identity. In traditional formulations of social identity theory, only disadvantaged groups need to engage in multiple types of identity management. This stems from the fundamental conflict between disadvantaged individuals' desire for positive self-worth, and their membership in a socially devalued group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Disadvantaged groups, then, are thought to manage this threat to their positive social identity in one of three ways: individual mobility, social creativity, and social competition (i.e., collective action), depending on the permeability, stability, and legitimacy of the intergroup hierarchy.

In social identity theory, advantaged group members—whose identities come ready with positive social value—were not theorized to engage in identity management strategies aside from attempting to preserve their high status. Our research, however, suggests that the egalitarian and meritocratic ideologies prominent within many modern societies can give rise to more complex threats to advantaged group identity. These threats include group esteem and meritocracy threats (Knowles et al., 2014), which then drive a plethora of identity management strategies among the advantaged groups as well. Thus, while we do not deny social identity theory's emphasis on the ways in which individuals strive for positive social value through their group memberships, we expand the notion of *threats* to such value to include those that uniquely impinge on advantaged individuals' self-regard. As a result of this multiplicity of threats, advantaged groups employ a wide range of strategies to manage the psychological implications of group-based advantage.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Despite the strong evidence for the validity of the new 4D scale and the theoretical framework it rests on, this research has a number of limitations and highlights numerous directions for future research. First, while in some ways a strength of our current approach, our strong basis in existing theory and research also has inherent limitations. Namely, it is possible that there are additional identity management strategies not identified by our theoretical model that were thus not included in the scale (even with the addition of Defend and division of Distance into two facets). In addition, given the value- and threat-based theory that underlines this model, it is possible that as social values shift, different values will produce different threats to a positive social identity among the advantaged and that these new threats will lead to different identity management strategies. Therefore, we do not see this scale as a comprehensive measure of all advantaged group identity management strategies, but rather as a first step that measures of many of the most common ways in which advantaged group members manage their identity.

Thus, we encourage future research to continue to investigate advantaged identity management, and if new strategies are identified to add them to the scale. In particular, we think there could be value in conducting qualitative research to better understand the lived experiences of advantaged group members in terms of identity management.

Second, while we feel that testing the 4D scale in three different intergroup contexts provides good evidence that it can be used to study advantaged groups generally (and not just White Americans), research in additional contexts is needed to further support the relevance of this framework to advantaged group membership *per se*. That being said, our model is based on a theory in which values (or attempts at social change) create threats to advantaged group members' positive social identity, and thus our model will likely be limited to contexts where these values and social change efforts are present. Thus, future research should continue to examine the cross-contextual applicability of the 4D scale. In particular, future work should examine intergroup relations with power relations based on different identity dimensions (e.g., sexuality, social class, and ideology) to examine whether the framework remains relevant.

For example, all the contexts studied in the present research were ones in which liberals/leftists favor social change on behalf of the disadvantaged. Thus, it may also be important to examine contexts in which liberals themselves are the advantaged group, and to test whether they also engage in advantaged identity management strategies which maintain the advantaged position. Research finding that liberals are motivated to ignore evidence of bias by their own group against conservatives (Conway et al., 2021), which resembled our denial strategy, suggests that the strategies may also be relevant in such contexts. In addition, while we examined and discussed the cross-contextual differences observed in advantaged identity management between the U.S. racial context, U.S. gender context, and Israeli ethnic context (e.g., Distancing from Identity was much more similar to Dismantling in the United States than in Israel), we did not have strong a priori hypotheses about these differences, nor did we empirically test potential explanations for them. Thus, future research should further examine these differences and the contextual elements that explain them.

Third, while we developed a valid measure of the various advantaged group identity management strategies and examined it as a moderator of experimental manipulations, we have not yet directly attempted to manipulate these strategies. As a result, it is not clear if these strategies reflect more disposition-like traits, or situationally deployed coping mechanisms, or some combination of the two. The strong correlations observed between the strategies and more stable ideologies (e.g., SDO, system justification, meritocracy, and egalitarianism) would suggest that they are at least partly dispositional. However, this does not rule out the possibility that these strategies exhibit state-like variance as well. The 4D strategies are theorized to constitute means of coping with

various threats that the advantaged group faces (status threat, meritocratic threat, moral image threat). Because these threats have a chronic component rooted in privilege itself, and a situational component such that events can transpire that increase them, we expect that the 4D mechanisms, too, have both dispositional and situational facets. Future research should attempt to test these possibilities by manipulating the various threats and examining their impact on the strategies, which could help elucidate the extent which the strategies reflect stable dispositions or flexible coping mechanisms.

Finally, while the present work has focused on specific advantaged identities (e.g., White identity), many people hold multifaceted identities, some of which are societally advantaged and some of which are societally disadvantaged. Future research should therefore explore advantaged (and disadvantaged) identity management in intersectional contexts (Bowleg, 2017). It may be that certain advantaged identity management strategies are employed more differently by people who also hold disadvantaged identities. In certain contexts, Distancing may involve highlighting disadvantages people have experienced based on non-advantaged group identities, or more strongly identifying with disadvantaged identity when confronted with evidence of privilege on another dimension—and thus may be psychologically different from distancing employed by advantaged group members who do not hold other disadvantaged identities (Brown & Craig, 2020). In addition, there is something qualitatively different about discussing the disadvantages brought by a certain identity (e.g., social class or sexual orientation) in general, and highlighting these disadvantages as a way to avoid psychological threats of privilege on another identity dimension (e.g., race). Future research should explore these more complex dynamics of identity management in intersectional contexts.

Conclusion

In *The Devil Finds Work*, James Baldwin writes, “An identity is questioned only when it is menaced, as when the mighty begin to fall, or when the wretched begin to rise, or when the stranger enters the gates, never, thereafter, to be a stranger: the stranger’s presence making you the stranger, less to the stranger than to yourself.” We believe that our research provides ample corroboration of Baldwin’s insight: Social change has proceeded rapidly over the past half century, leading to more diverse and egalitarian societies in much of the Western world. Accordingly, historically advantaged groups have been forced to reckon with their identity as disadvantaged rise up and those they could previously dismiss as strangers become a larger and more vocal part of their society. As a result, advantaged group members have developed identity management strategies to help them cope with the threats raised by these changes and the contradictions between their advantaged status and other socially shared ideologies. In this article, we validate a measure of these strategies that can be used for further research into how the

advantaged understand their privilege and react to efforts aimed at social change.

Data Availability

All data and code are available at <https://zenodo.org/record/6532273#.Ynk2JhNBxR0>. Studies 4 to 6 were pre-registered and the registrations can be found at <https://osf.io/qvheg/>; Studies 1 to 3 were exploratory and were not pre-registered.

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Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

Notes

1. See “The Fight for the White Race” (2017).
2. See Benner (2020).
3. See Visconti (2019).
4. See Blistein (2020).
5. In other words, we ran the analysis with all 40 items, removed those that did not pass the .40–.30–.20 rule, and reran the EFA. If, in this next analysis, additional items failed the .40–.30–.20 rule, they were removed and the analysis was repeated. This process continued until all items passed the .40–.30–.20 rule.
6. This model was not pre-registered, but added at the suggestion of another researcher who gave feedback on the project.
7. In Study 4, we originally pre-registered a model in which the two distancing scales loaded on a second-order factor of “overall distancing.” However, specifying a solution in which only some latent factors load onto second-order factors caused statistical and computational issues that preventing us from testing this model. Therefore, we used the original 3D model as an alternative comparison; this was not pre-registered in Study 4, but was in Study 5.
8. After Study 2, we added items to better capture the distinction between distancing from inequality and distancing from identity. Therefore, in Study 2, the Distance from Inequality and Distance from Identity subscales contained just two of the four final items used. In the IDA, we calculated the mean of these two items to represent the distancing facets from Study 2, but used the mean of all four items from the final scale to represent the facets from Studies 3 and 5. This approach is analogous to computing the mean of non-missing scale items when participants have left certain items blank (see Newman, 2014). To ensure this analytic decision did not bias our results, we tested

whether study moderated correlations between the distance scales and other scales in their nomological network. Using a Bonferroni correction for multiple tests, only three interactions were significant, and in these cases the correlation coefficient in the IDA was closer to the coefficient in the studies that used the full scale. Thus, we felt that including Study 2 in the IDA did not bias our results and benefited the analysis by maximizing statistical power.

9. Given that we only pre-registered these hypotheses before Study 5 we also conducted these analyses only using the data from Study 5 and the results are generally the same (see supplementary materials).
10. We obtain the same pattern of results if we conduct five separate regressions, each testing only one identity-management strategy and its interaction with condition. We nonetheless report a larger model that includes all 4D subscales and their interactions, as this provides a more precise estimate of the unique effect of each identity-management strategy.
11. While we did not have the same measures of construct validity in the US and Israel, some measures relevant to construct validity were included in Study 4. These analyses are presented in detail in the supplementary materials. Using the Westen and Rosenthal (2003) approach, we found good support the construct validity of Defend ($r_{\text{altering-CV}} = .98$), Deny ($r_{\text{altering-CV}} = .97$), Distance from Identity ($r_{\text{altering-CV}} = .96$), and Dismantle ($r_{\text{altering-CV}} = .93$). However, Distance from Inequality's construct validity was more ambiguous ($r_{\text{altering-CV}} = .53$). This may reflect the fact that the primary criterion variables for this subscale were several single-item measures of Schwartz values. These items, however, failed to correlate strongly with any other measure in the study, potentially driving down the validity estimate for Distance from Inequality.

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