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Mason, Steve

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Steve Mason

# Five Speeches in the Fourth Book of Josephus' *Judaean War*

## 1 Introduction

This contribution is a sort of ground survey – not an excavation – of five linked speeches in the fourth and central book of Josephus' *Judaean War*, those given by: Vespasian at Gamala, the former high priests Ananus II and Jesus in Jerusalem, the Idumaeen commander Simon in response to the latter, and the unnamed rogue Zealot (or Disciple) who later persuades the Idumaeans to leave. My propositions are: in general, that the speeches reveal Josephus to be a capable craftsman writing for an educated elite, who share his concerns with *polis* affairs; in particular, that these speeches are integral parts of the *War* 4 narrative.

Before proceeding, I would like to dislodge any impression that this exercise might be purely literary, caring nothing for what really happened. On the contrary, I write as a historian. My questions are about what happened and how we can know it. Making a case for that, however, depends on understanding the evidence we are using. Obviously, if we wish to understand what happened at Gamala or Masada, we must first understand what has survived from those sites, which we can now see and study: including, for example, the wartime coins and Masada's ramp. In just the same way, there is no point in trying to reconstruct what happened behind Josephus' *War* Book 4 unless we first have some understanding of the text that narrates those events. This essay is an effort to enhance that understanding, which will never be perfect of course, to prepare for imagining the real events.

This question of method is all the more important because *War* 4 has been curiously neglected in popular as in academic portraits of the war. Consider four planks of a standard picture: (1) Judaea, regarded as a province, united in rebellion against an oppressive Roman empire in 66 CE; (2) Jerusalem led this revolt and created an independent state from 67 until its merciless destruction in 70; (3) the war was long, bitter, and bloody, lasting from 66 to 73/74; and (4) the only historian whose accounts have survived, Josephus, was a mouthpiece of the victorious Flavians who programmatically obscured what had happened, to exculpate himself, his patrons, and his priestly class.<sup>1</sup> The middle volume of *War* would, however,

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<sup>1</sup> E.g., Graetz, *History of the Jews*; Farmer, *Maccabees, Zealots, and Josephus*; Hengel, *Die Zeloten*; Goodman, *The Ruling Class of Judea*; Price, *Jerusalem under Siege*; Gambash, "Foreign Enemies of the Empire"; Rudich, *Religious Dissent in the Roman Empire*; Rogers, *For the Freedom of Zion*.

preclude all of these impressions. It describes the flight of native leaders and upper classes from Jerusalem to Vespasian as well as a counter-flow into the city from Judaea's, Peraea's, and Galilee's villages. This last current brings John son of Leius from Gischala to a crucial role in Jerusalem's fate, very much in opposition to Jerusalem's leaders. Then comes a large force of armed Idumaeans, who murder those native leaders, and finally Simon bar Giora (from Gerasa), who entrenches the lethal internal conflict that endures to the holy city's destruction. As for the Flavians' campaign: Vespasian has Galilee in hand within three months of arriving (mid-67: Book 3), and Judaea all but settled by the following spring, after a winter in quarters, when the civil war following Nero's death halts military activity for nearly two years. The siege of Jerusalem, thus postponed to half of the year 70 and left in young Titus' hands, will be the main scene of conflict in the Judaeian War (Books 5–6). *War 4's* account of the Flavians, finally, and especially of Vespasian's rise to power, knocks out the foundations of the Flavian narrative.

It is conceivable that Josephus' account is a fantasy constructed with exquisite care, its characters and their interactions the products of fervid imagination. But how and to what purpose? Granted his thematic choices, omissions, and hyperbole, large-scale invention seems implausible given that his audiences included people who knew what had transpired, and that some characters are attested.<sup>2</sup> Anyway, virtually everyone continues to use Josephus, if paying special attention to his account of Herod (Book 1), the opening of the war (Book 2), and Masada (Book 7), while homogenising much of what lies between in the simple scheme of a national-provincial revolt.

This essay cannot take up the subjects just canvassed. They are part of the framework and suggest potential stakes. This is a modest probe of the speeches mentioned and found (in the Appendix). I hope that it can serve as a sort of biopsy of *War 4*, exposing the nature of the tissue so that we have a better idea of what we are dealing with. Only then is it worthwhile to begin imagining the real-life scenarios that best explain this material.

## 2 Soundings in Relevant Scholarship

Studies of *War's* speeches are relatively numerous, and have taken one of two paths. Either they have abstracted *War's* main speeches, so as to examine them together for common features, or article-length studies have focused on one major speech, its structure, and rhetorical influences. All this is helpful. Lacking so

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<sup>2</sup> See Tal Ilan in this volume.

far, however, are studies of the speeches as integral parts of a stretch of narrative. This can be done only in sections unless one embarks on a monograph. Although this is a brief probe, I would like to offer some preliminary observations in this direction.

Discussion of speeches in ancient historiography usually begins from Thucydides' famous, and exquisitely slippery, explanation of his practice (1.22.1):

As for the speech that each man uttered, when they were about to make war or when they were already in it, it is hard to recollect with precision what was said – whether things I myself heard or things that others report to me from another source. So, each man has [in my account] been given to say what it seemed to me he *should have said* in the prevailing circumstances, though *staying as close as possible to the overall gist of what was truly uttered*. (emphasis mine)

This marvelous obfuscation has contradictory implications: we stay close to what was actually said, which requires that this is known; we do not know exactly what was said, but offer the gist (how can we be sure?); and, because we *do not know* we relate what *such a person would* or *should* have said on the occasion. Whatever Thucydides intended, he made it possible for successors to suppose that speeches in history were up for grabs. By the time of Polybius a century and a half later, they had become a zone of free creativity for authors, which he was reluctant to indulge. That is why Dionysius of Halicarnassus could criticize Thucydides – not his characters – for artistic defects in his speeches (even that of Pericles), and why Lucian, though he insists that historians make every effort to report the truth, viewed speeches as a chance for the historian to show off his rhetorical skills.<sup>3</sup>

Scholars have applied this background to Josephus' *War* in ways that reflect changing frameworks in Josephus research. In the 1920s, Wilhelm Weber and Henry St-John Thackeray were convinced that Josephus was writing Roman propaganda. Weber thought that he borrowed an official source for much of *War* 3–7, but the speeches were his own “oriental” contributions, full of bombast with little serious content. Thackeray, by contrast, read them as the clearest indications of Josephus' propagandistic aims. These “oratorical displays” drove home the theme: “Bow to the invincible world empire.”<sup>4</sup> The *Judaean* transplant must have written these fine compositions, Thackeray thought, with the help of slaves more accomplished in Greek.

When serious Josephus research resumed after the half-century hiatus of the Second World War and its aftermath, three dissertations tackled the speeches. Donna Runnalls' 1971 analysis of eight speeches in *War*, never published, was a

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<sup>3</sup> Polybius 12.25–25a.4–5, 25i–26b, especially 12.25i.9 (Loeb numbering); Dionysius, *Thuc.* 16, 18; Lucian, *Hist. conscr.* 58.

<sup>4</sup> Weber, *Josephus und Vespasian*, 15; Thackeray, *Josephus*, 43.

fine-grained technical study of their classical and biblical elements. A year later, Helgo Lindner took three major speeches in *War* as the most secure vantage-point for understanding Josephus' view of history – as safe ground because they were not attributable to the sources he may have used for his narrative. Runnalls and Lindner independently found that, although the speeches reveal familiarity with Greek rhetorical principles, their outlook is ultimately influenced by the biblical prophets, especially Jeremiah. Josephus' characters drive home prophetic themes of submission to a divine governance that supervises the rise and fall of world powers, and also expose the folly of rebel groups for missing this foundation of true piety, anchored in the temple and relying on divine providence.<sup>5</sup>

Pere Villalba i Varneda's detailed study of Josephus' historiography, submitted for publication in 1981, devotes about thirty pages to the speeches. Although he acknowledges their shared atmosphere and themes as well as their traffic in rhetorical commonplaces, he stresses the distinctiveness of each one and its appropriateness to the speaker and occasion – highlighting that side of Thucydides' remarks. A 1991 essay by Tessa Rajak on the great speech of Agrippa II makes a similar point. Whereas Villalba i Varneda thought the situational fit resulted from a correspondence with what was actually said on the occasion, however, Rajak more plausibly attributes it to Josephus' art.

Recent article-length contributions assume Josephus' complete freedom in crafting the speeches, focusing on one or two to seek out their inspirations, sources, and/or programmatic themes.<sup>6</sup> Jonathan Price's insightful survey of all the main speeches in *War* reads them against Thucydides' analysis of *stasis* – the political strife that is also *War's* *Leitmotif* (*Bel.* 1.10, 25–27, 31) – as something fundamentally irrational. In the world of convoluted values that *stasis* produces, Price proposes, Josephus presents rational appeals as unsuccessful. Only the irrational arguments of Eleazar at Masada find their mark.<sup>7</sup>

My main contribution argues that ancient historians, although they controlled the script, were not as preoccupied as we are with ideology, ideas, or

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5 Runnalls, "Speeches", ii (they convey "his own moderate Pharisaic theological and ideological evaluation of the conflict [. . .] against the radical rebels – that is, the Zealots – whom he believed had destroyed the Temple and the state"), 346–55; Lindner, *Geschichtsauffassung des Flavius Josephus im Bellum Judaicum*, 18–20, 142–50.

6 Sources and inspirations: Ladouceur, "The Language of Josephus," 18–38; Luz, "Eleazar's Second Speech on Masada," 25–43. Ideology: Saulnier, "Flavius Josephé et la propagande flavienne," 199–221; Stern, "Josephus and the Roman Empire,": Agrippa's speech reflects a combination of Thucydidean realism and traditional Jewish views (78).

7 Price, "The Failure of Rhetoric".

world-views. Ancient rhetoric was not, after all, designed for the expression of sincere views.<sup>8</sup> Persuasion required attention to one's audience and their capacity to receive.<sup>9</sup> Aristotle and Plutarch agreed that a political leader must be frank and truthful, but only with peers and not in public orations. Speeches to the masses require a measure of deception or dissimulation, a principle still cherished by modern politicians. This assumption creates the conditions of irony or "playfulness" of language. I have argued, accordingly, that we should not draw direct lines between any speech that Josephus writes for a character and his sincere views. But saying this much leaves open the question of how speeches advance the narrative in particular cases. In considering these five speeches in the first half of Josephus' *War*, Book 4, I shall illustrate their "playful" character, even in their seriousness, and suggest ways in which they serve the unfolding drama.

## 3 Five Characters and their Speeches in *War* 4

### 3.1 Vespasian at Gamala (4.40–48) 241 words

In spite of the common impression that *War* is a Flavian product, Vespasian does not appear until nearly half-way through (Book 3), and Josephus' portraits of him differ from those of the conquering hero of Flavian myth. Josephus' audiences did not need a Judaeans to introduce the current emperor to them. Flavian propaganda was everywhere, in a city undergoing an Augustus-like reconstruction following the Great Fire of 64, Nero's abortive building projects thereafter, and the devastating civil wars. His audiences were presumably more interested in hearing how this Judaeans, who had lived to tell the tale of facing the great man in battle, would portray events of which the outcome was clear, which had vaulted Vespasian to power, and which were endlessly celebrated around the city, indeed around the empire in ever-new coin series.

Not surprisingly, Josephus exploits Vespasian's well-known image to enhance his own and that of his people. That is the frame of *War* 3, for example. Josephus interrupts his description of Vespasian's imposing order of battle, as he leads 60,000 professional soldiers into Galilee (*Bel.* 3.64–69, 115–26), for a digression on the legions, which claims that they have never been beaten (3.70–109). Although this is obviously untrue (Roman legions had met disaster at Carrhae in 53 BCE and in the Teutoburg forest in 9 CE, not to mention in devastating civil wars), it

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<sup>8</sup> Mason, "Speech-Making in Ancient Rhetoric".

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 1124b; Plutarch, *Prae. ger. reip.* 799b–801e. Cf. Mason, "Figured Speech".

heightens the drama of Josephus' own predicament. He has allegedly been tasked (*Vita* 28–29 modifies the story) with defending Galilee – without soldiers. He claims to have trained an army of 60,000, but they vanish at the first rumour of the Romans' arrival (*Bel.* 3.129). What can he do now against the mighty commander and this massive unbeatable force?

The digression heightens the drama of his doomed efforts. Josephus disarmingly confesses that he tried to flee Iotapata and save his life (*Bel.* 3.194–204), but once compelled to stay he managed to keep the Romans at bay for over a month – by a series of Caesar-like tricks and deceptions (cf. Frontinus, *Strategemata*) – before the inevitable end. One of Josephus' men even hit Vespasian with an arrow in the foot, and the sight of the commander's blood caused sheer panic among the legions. Titus' frantic concern exacerbated their terror, though tough old Vespasian brushed it off (3.236–39). In sharp contrast to this legionary sensitivity, when Vespasian captures a prisoner and has him tortured, burned, and crucified, this ordinary Judaeans of Iotapata, who is no trained soldier, meets death with the calm smile typical of the national character (3.321–22). All of this supports *War's* theme of the Judaeans' masculine toughness, against the prevailing denigration of his people in post-war Rome (1.1–8).

The siege of Gamala occurs, according to Josephus, because, after Vespasian has quickly finished a perfunctory campaign in Galilee (by ca. 1 July 67), his hostally King Agrippa II requests help with unrest in the lakeside cities that Nero recently granted the king, which were otherwise not on Vespasian's itinerary. Many residents of Tiberias and Tarichea are not happy about falling under the absent king's ownership. They had joined other cities in sending delegations to welcome Vespasian and Agrippa at Ptolemais (*Vita* 410). so they apparently wish no problems with Rome, but there is a potent strain of anti-Agrippa feeling among the sailors and traders. We do not know the exact causes, but disadvantageous changes in the economic situation and/or Judaeans law are not hard to imagine (cf. *Vita* 36–42, 64–66). Vespasian, grateful for Agrippa's hospitality, recalls his army from winter quarters, to which he had sent them early – at Scythopolis and coastal Caesarea – in order to intimidate the towns into coughing up their trouble-makers. He will not attack the cities as such, so as not to damage his friend's possessions (3.443–46). He captures and destroys many culprits, but some escape to the natural fortress of Gamala across the lake in the Golan, which has also had issues with Agrippa. It will become Vespasian's last stop in the north, in late September 67, before he resumes his focus on Jerusalem.

Josephus' portrait of Vespasian to this point does not contradict his image in Rome as a no-nonsense commander, who enjoys the respect of his soldiers and is

personally tough.<sup>10</sup> Josephus builds on this picture from his experience, but to serve his narrative interests. Vespasian is, in keeping with Roman tradition, risk-averse in using his precious legionary troops. He prefers to win by intimidation and manoeuvre, though he is happy to let them burn the villages of unarmed, fleeing foreigners, for the sake of display violence and revenge for Cestius' ambush (*Bel.* 3.132–34). Although he was sent to take over the late Cestius Gallus' planned return to Jerusalem in force (3.1–5), Vespasian lingers for a year in the north (67 CE), evidently in no hurry to reach the Judaeian capital. Even in early 68 he does not rush to the highland objective, but encircles Judaea, increasing the sense of terror as his army tightens the noose with garrisons a day's march in each direction from Jerusalem. All the while he takes conspicuous care of his soldiers, maintaining their morale in this alien environment, attentive to their needs for rest and recreation in the region's Graeco-Roman cities. They fight only where they have an overwhelming advantage, in sieges with easy resupply or in open terrain where the cavalry can run down motley enemies.

Vespasian's risk-aversion becomes surprisingly clear in Josephus' portrait of his rise to imperial power at the end of the volume (*Bel.* 4.588–663). After rejecting as too dangerous the acclamation of his soldiers as *imperator*, when they force him to oblige *their* ambitions at sword-point, he claims – in June – that he cannot possibly travel to Rome in “winter”, then proposes that the way to defeat Vitellius is not to fight him (the reason the soldiers acclaimed him) but to cut off the grain supply from Alexandria. Then he sends Mucianus to lead his army in Italy, as he waits things out in Alexandria for nearly a year – until the war in Italy is won and all possible challenges removed. None of this matches Flavian image-making.

Josephus' Vespasian – the man turned 60 in November 69 CE – is well aware of the succession problem that has plagued his predecessors, and carefully prepares his not yet 30-year-old son for rule by giving him a series of graduated responsibilities. These begin with command of the Fifteenth Legion at just 27 and end with the siege of Jerusalem at 30, under the tutelage of such senior advisors as Philo's nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander (*Bel.* 5.45–46). At each stage, even for this biggest test, Titus' father remains nearby (in Alexandria).

Josephus' Vespasian is not only supremely cautious, but also a ready liar and deceiver, as all generals need(ed) to be. For example, he tries to get Josephus to leave the cave at Iotapata with claims about his great respect for the Judaeian defender and pledges of safety, which Josephus wisely mistrusts. When he does finally surrender, not because he believes Vespasian but because he is confident of divine protection, Josephus claims that he would in fact have been killed on entering the

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. Suetonius, *Vespasianus*; Tacitus, e.g. *Hist.* 1.50; 2.1, 4–5, 78–80.



Roman camp, had Titus not intervened with his cold-hearted father (*Bel.* 3.345–54, 392–99). Later, Vespasian promises those whom he arrests in Taricheae safe passage out of the city, but then proceeds to kill the old and weak while sending the fitter men as slaves for Nero's canal project at Corinth (3.532–42).

Against this background, the siege of Gamala is an oddity, though an understandable one. When Vespasian arrives, with a sizeable force and Agrippa as leading figure, Titus is on a diplomatic visit to Mucianus in the north. Vespasian, with his massed force in the middle of nowhere and no established supply lines in the changing autumn weather (they must forage), wants the operation over quickly. Since his army is many times the size of the helpless resident population, Agrippa approaches the walls in hopes of persuading the residents to give up the town and its refugees. When the king is injured by a stone from a defiant resident (4.14), however, an indignant Vespasian decides on a direct, violent assault. His men quickly batter a hole in the weakest part of the wall and pour in, screaming battle-cries (4.20). Once inside, however, they find themselves in trouble, in the town's steep and narrow alleyways. Josephus claims that most of them die, because men keep pouring through the breach but those in front cannot keep advancing. Defenders are on the top ridge firing rocks and arrows downward. The soldiers have nowhere to escape with the pressure from behind. Eager Vespasian has himself advanced up the hill without realising it (4.31). Eventually, soldiers at the rear exit through the breach, leaving Vespasian almost alone near the summit. While giving cover to the few men around him, he manages to walk backward, skilfully but perilously, down the slope and also to flee through the gap in the wall.

When Titus returns, according to Josephus, he is appalled at the costly fiasco (4.70). Gamala will fall, of course, but only after Titus leads a more cautious attack: undermining the watchtower at night, causing panic, and entering by stealth with a small detachment. Vespasian follows up, as he had always done in support of his son, when the advance party is secure.

The first speech of *War* 4, then, comes from Vespasian after the debacle at Gamala before Titus' arrival. His army is despondent, because they are not used to setbacks and because they have left him in the lurch. Vespasian does not immediately rub salt in their wounds by accusing them, but opens with airy reflections on the nature of war. Fortune always moves from one side to the other – as unmentioned Polybius had shown. They need to be Stoic (my term), face this temporary defeat, and press on regardless. Victory will come! Vespasian gives no credit to the Judaeans side, insisting only that his men learn how to manage fortune's turns (4.43). This is not Josephus' view, which celebrates the strong sites and stout hearts of Judaeans. Given the nature of rhetoric, the speech may not even be supposed to represent Vespasian's real views. He must encourage his troops. Untrained Judaeans irregulars

have given them a serious bloody nose. Vespasian blames the terrain at first, but a competent force would have taken that into account.

His diplomacy wears out quickly, at any rate, as he turns to direct criticism. They should never have got themselves trapped in such a predicament, he scolds. They should have controlled the terrain and forced the enemy to come to them, to fight where they had the advantage. A half-critical reader realises that this sounds fishy and self-serving, for Vespasian himself not only planned the assault but personally led it. Following his own logic, he should be as guilty as anyone of losing situational awareness, finding himself vulnerable at the hilltop where the enemy has a decisive advantage. His men are at least full of remorse for their failings, whereas he drills down on their guilt with no recognition that *his* escapade has caused many deaths. Josephus does not spell out such criticisms, of course, but anyone willing to look between the lines would see them. Vespasian is normally a highly competent commander, according to Josephus and all other sources. But in this case, the circumstances – anger at the injury to Agrippa, impatience at an isolated site, and over-confidence in his strength – led to rashness. Above all, he did not reckon with Judaeans courage and the qualities of their site. He deflects criticism onto his soldiers, however, to buck up their morale for another round.

It fits with Josephus' view of the power of rhetoric (cf. Eleazar's second speech at Masada) that the pep talk achieves its aim.<sup>11</sup> Notice three features of the speech. First, it is unmistakably Josephus' composition, full of his thematic language about fortune's twists and turns. Reversals of fortune constitute a root theme in *War*, announced in the prologue (1.9–12), and King Herod has made very similar remarks to his troops after a reverse (1.373–79). Second, the speech is not transportable to any other place in *War*, but suits this commander at this moment. It is brief, dense, and terse – laconic in Spartan-like simplicity. Its language is that of a commander in combat. Vespasian describes easy victories in the past, uses the wrestling-word *πταῖσμα* (stumble, fall) for this little setback, digresses on the nature of combat, and otherwise invokes the simple and clear language of masculine virtue or valour (*ἀρετή*), eschewing any softness, and of spirit, nerve, tactics, charging, vigour, and victory. He may stretch the truth in referring to the *μυριάδας* of Judaeans the soldiers have killed already (4.41). Finally, notice the A-B-A structure. Vespasian opens and closes the speech with attention to himself. He suppresses his self-regard at the beginning, though Josephus remarks that it is on his mind. But he concludes by promising that he will be there, personally risking his body, in the next round. This fits with the rhetorical imperative that one

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<sup>11</sup> See Mason, "Speech-Making".

end a speech on a high emotional note, which such a pledge of personal sacrifice achieves better than anything else.

### 3.2 Ananus II in Jerusalem (4.162–92) 832 words

Although the next speech is more than three times as long, it boasts a similar A-B-A structure. Here the speaker is Ananus II, who served a brief term as high priest four years before hostilities broke out in Jerusalem. Many of his class reportedly fled the city after the ambush of Cestius' legion in 66 and affirmed their loyalty to Rome – even more do so when Vespasian reaches Caesarea in late 67. Meanwhile, the men who rebuffed and attacked Cestius have elected leaders to help Jerusalem deal with whatever is to come now. Tellingly, they keep the most vigorous fighters out of leadership positions, electing the chief priest Ananus and a prominent Pharisee (*Bel.* 2.562–68) – perhaps because they trust such men to both care for the city (cf. 2.411–15) and find a safe way forward. After all, their violence against the auxiliary garrison and Cestius' force was provoked by the brutality of Nero's agent Gessius Florus, not by a deeper anti-Roman animus.

The situation now, at any rate, is that even as many residents of Jerusalem have fled, Ananus faces the growing contra flow mentioned earlier. A steady current of migrants from the villages, who do not feel safe with the legions roaming the countryside (whatever their outlooks or motives), are seeking refuge in the mother-city's thick walls. Some are coating their flight in glory by posturing as brave fighters, haranguing others to embrace “freedom” instead of slavery to these advancing Romans and claiming to be national saviours. Like many would-be revolutionaries, however, they are effectively enslaving their fellow-Judaeans, seeking to shame those who do not accept their leadership, portraying them as traitors. Although they would not dream of facing the legions in combat, they find it easy to elevate their standing inside Jerusalem's walls by claiming to be champions in a brave struggle.

Chief among these imports is John son of Leius, from Gischala in northern Galilee.<sup>12</sup> John evidently hoped that the Flavians would ignore his town and let him alone, and he nearly succeeded. But when Titus arrived outside with 1,000 cavalrymen, after Vespasian returned the army to winter quarters, John used a ruse to escape overnight and make his way to Jerusalem with a band of others. Upon reaching Jerusalem, after a desperate flight and losing many en route, John boldly claims that he has come for a final reckoning with Rome, for even Rome's

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<sup>12</sup> See Rappaport, יוחנן מגוש חלב.

army could never surmount Jerusalem's walls! Some believe him, especially young men, whereas mature people shudder at what this portends. Although John then pretends to ally himself with Ananus' efforts to keep calm, becoming his trusted aide, he secretly insinuates himself into leadership of the "Zealots" (or Disciples of Eleazar son of Simon), who have a base among the younger priests on the temple esplanade. With greater or lesser coordination, they begin to assault, rob, and eventually murder Judaeans who oppose their leadership (*Bel.* 4.92–161).

The speech of Ananus comes after Josephus has given many examples of the Zealot-led crimes. Among the most serious, for the proud establishment-priest Josephus, is their replacement of the serving high priest, from a traditional high-priestly family, with a country priest whom they choose by lot (*Bel.* 4.131–57).

The speech by Ananus has correspondences with Vespasian's. For example, both begin with a reference to the speaker's courage and isolation. Both proceed with an analysis of the enemy and the reasons for understandable fear on the part of their addressees, which the speaker tries to negate. Both evoke the spirit of righteous vengeance for injuries caused by that adversary, and conclude with the speaker's rousing pledge to be in the forefront of the fight. Nevertheless, the speech of Ananus occupies a completely different literary register and its diction, tone, and themes differ accordingly. I limit myself to four observations.

First, as a former high priest would, Ananus focuses on the temple, the dignity of the high priesthood, the sacred spaces, and their fateful pollution by the Zealots. Josephus frames the speech with Ananus looking toward the temple with tears, because the Zealots have turned the holy place into a tyrant fortress (4.151). His opening appeal is that "murder-polluted feet" have entered the sanctuary, and lingers on his own high-priestly status. He continually returns to the temple, using it also for his emotional ending as he calls upon the citizens to fight the Zealots and be willing, if necessary, to die at the sacred gates (4.191–92).

Nevertheless, second, Josephus interweaves Ananus' priestly temple focus with a worldly-wise, statesman-like outlook. He does this in part by frequent allusions to the speeches of the fourth-century BCE orator Demosthenes, in particular Demosthenes' speeches against Philip II of Macedon: the *Philippics*. In Flavian Rome Demosthenes was intensively studied as the consummate Greek orator, a model for Cicero, Quintilian, Pliny, and many others, and Josephus elsewhere shows affinities with his style.<sup>13</sup> Not long after Josephus' *War*, Plutarch will advise a young man entering politics (*Prae. ger. reip.* 802d–803b):

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. after Cicero's abundant citation of Demosthenes and admission that the *Philippics* have been his model of statesman-like discourse (*Att.* 2.1.3), Pliny, *Nat.* 33.25; Quintilian, *Inst.* 2.5.16; 3.8.65; 6.5.6–8; Valerius Maximus 8.7 (ext.).1 and Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 2.19. Cf. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, 168; Criboire, *Gymnastics of the Mind*, 38, 144.

They say that one cannot control a wolf by the ears, but a populace and a *polis* one *must* lead chiefly by the ears. [ . . . ] [Those who try to rule by means of bread and circuses are treating the people as ‘wild animals’ (ἀλόγων ζῴων), 802e.] Leading a populace *means* leading those who are persuaded by speech [or: reason, διὰ λόγου]. [ . . . ] Political speech [ . . . ] allows maxims, histories, tales, and metaphors, by which those who use them can especially move their audiences – in a calibrated way and at the right moment [ . . . ] On the whole, dignity and grandeur are more suited to political speech, for example the *Philippics* [by Demosthenes] and, among the orations in Thucydides . . . .

Although he did not know Plutarch’s essay, Josephus gives Ananus a speech that matches these prescriptions, even down to the image of a populace as wild animals (*Bel.* 4.170; Plutarch, *Prae. ger. reip.* 802e), taking Demosthenes as a partial model.

In the *Philippics*, singled out by Plutarch, Demosthenes tries to rouse the Athenians to protect their city against encroachment by Philip. He points out how the tyrant has gradually advanced throughout Greece, even “ensconcing a tyranny” in Euboea to intimidate Athens (*Phil.* 4.8). Demosthenes’ *Third Philippic* in particular anticipates Ananus. Both men essentially plead: “What are you waiting for? You have stood by and watched as the tyrants have steadily increased their insults and outrages, from the mild to the worrying to the dangerous. They have succeeded so far because of our disunity. If we wait any longer it will be too late and they will be on top of us. We must unite now and face our duty. If we stand up to tyranny, we will be able to stop it. They will back down in the face of our united strength. Otherwise, we are condemning ourselves to slavery.” Allusions to Demosthenes are clear not only in the general content but also in specific phrases, such as the dumb animals metaphor (4.170) and the ensconced tyranny (4.172, from the 4<sup>th</sup> *Philippic*, its authenticity being irrelevant for this question).

In Josephus’ narrative, Ananus’ promise of success turns out to be true – for a time. He manages to raise a citizen army that outnumbers the Zealots and drives them into the temple compound, hemming them in. The Zealots are on the verge of surrender, in that hopeless situation, when they get word out to Idumaeen fighters to come to their aid. The arrival of these ferocious fighters from the south, ready to ally with John and the Zealots, will spell the death of Ananus and the beginning of the chaos that will spell bring Jerusalem’s end.

Third, in keeping with the sophistication of the allusions to Demosthenes, which Josephus’ audience should recognise, Ananus speaks at a far higher level of sophistication than Vespasian had with his troops. Donna Runnalls has shown that this speech and the one following by Ananus’ colleague Jesus satisfy the requirements of the grand or elevated style described in Demetrius’ later work *On Style*. Namely, Ananus uses contrasts between elaborate and short, sharp periods and questions, with long syllables predominating, frequent superlatives, such

figures of speech as asyndeton (omission of conjunctions) and aposiopesis (conclusion by the omission of understood words), and a diction that is “rarefied, strange, and distinctly unfamiliar” (*Eloc.* 77).<sup>14</sup> Examples of strange vocabulary abound. Most striking are σεβάσμιος (‘august’, 4.163), ἀκαταιτίατος (‘uncharged’, 4.169), and προσθάλπω (‘find warm comfort’, 4.172), which are either first or only attested here in ancient Greek literature. Other terms – ἐπιστένω (‘utter a groan’, 4.165), ἀναφανδά (‘in the open’ 4.165), ἀνεξικακία (‘putting up with wrongdoing’, 4.166), ἀλιτήριος (‘deviant’, 4.168), φιλόδουλος and φιλοδέσποτος (‘slavery- and mastery-lover’, 4.175), ἐμπεριπατέω (‘amble about’, 4.183), βεβαιωτής (‘guarantor’, 4.184) – are extremely rare and elegant formations, befitting Ananus’ stature. The image of honing or whetting one’s soul for defence against mortal danger (τὰς ψυχὰς [. . .] θηξετε πρὸς τὴν ἄμυναν) seems borrowed from Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.3.7; *Cyr.* 1.2.10, 6.41; 2.1.11, 20), another esteemed author in first-century Rome, while the resonant phrase “longing for freedom” (ἐλευθερίας ἐπιθυμία) may be Josephus’ appealing coinage.

Ananus is, fourth and finally, in spite of his unique way of speaking, a carrier of ongoing themes initiated in *War*’s prologue (1.9–12): tragic calamities (συμφοραί), sufferings (πάθη), and groaning (ἐπιστένω) or lamentation, and the deviant, profane, or obnoxious men (οἱ ἀλιτήριοι), synonymous with the scoundrels (οἱ πονηροί) at 4.187, tyrants (τύραννοι) who have caused these evils by preying upon the cowed mass of the people. No audience could fail to notice that this oration is woven from the threads of Josephus’ *War*. But it is in no sense a flat ideological statement that could be dropped anywhere. And it does not simply reflect Josephus’ outlook. He crafts a fitting speech for Ananus that applies his themes to this unique situation in late 67 CE, as part of the tragic build-up to the speaker’s murder. The speech could only have been given by Ananus, or someone in the same position such as his colleague Jesus.

### 3.3 Jesus son of Gamalas at Jerusalem’s Gate (4.238–69) 886 words

Jesus’ turn comes later, and many of the same observations hold for his effort. His oration occurs when a reported 20,000-strong Idumaeen force (2,000 would be impressive and more plausible) arrives at Jerusalem’s western gate, after being secretly summoned by the Zealots. It is curious that Josephus gives this speech to Ananus’ colleague, who wore the high-priestly robes just two or three years before the story time (*Ant.* 20.213, 223), though they are both present in the tower watching

<sup>14</sup> Runnalls, “Speeches,” 108–11.

the Idumaeans' arrival (4.238), and Josephus later remarks that Ananus was the more impressive of the two (4.322). Although Jesus may have given a speech at this point, we might guess that on the occasion, if anything of the kind happened, there were many spontaneous exchanges between the two chief priests and the Idumaeans below them, which Josephus has honed into a neat speech and given it to Jesus son of Gamalas for the sake of variety. Like that of Ananus, this one exhibits the grand or elevated style described by Demetrius and suits a high priest's dignity of subject and language.

Arresting vocabulary comes thick and fast. In a single sentence (4.241–42) we have *κατασπεύομαι* ('squander', first attestation in the TLG, and rare later), *παρεισρέω* ('trickle in', 3 earlier attestations), *λεληθότως* ('imperceptibly', 15 earlier), *ἀβέβηλος* ('invulnerable', first known user), and *ἔμμεθύσκομαι* ('act like a drunk', the only attestation in ancient literature). The rest is sprinkled with striking compounds: *ἐξαγριώω* ('brutalise') and *λογοποιέω* ('write speeches') in 4.246, *ἐπίπλαστος* ('fabricated') at 247, *ἀπόρθητος* ('unravaged') at 248, *συναναστρέφω* ('wholly occupied', 4.253), *ἀποστατέω* ('keep aloof from', 255), *συνεξαίρῳ* ('root out', 258), *προαικίζομαι* ('torture beforehand', 259), *μελανειμονέω* ('dress in black', 260), *νεανιεύομαι* ('strut like an adolescent') and *στρατολογέω* ('enlist for combat') in 263, *συναγανακτέω* ('share indignation') in 264, *διακαλύπτω* instead of *ἀποκαλύπτω* ('expose') and *προσοικέω* ('station against') at 268, *εὐγνώμος* ('agreeable') at 269. Even the simple-looking compound *προσπωλέω* in 248 ('sell out to'), is attested only here in Greek literature. The result is an elegant speech suited to a figure of such dignity and culture.

Its diction is matched by an impressive rhetorical structure. Whereas Ananus' oration was aimed at persuasion to action, and marshalled every moral, practical, and pious consideration to that end, this is a speech of *dissuasion*. Like Agrippa II in Book 2, Jesus begins with the declared intention of his audience and proceeds to dismantle it by an exercise in logic-chopping. His premise: the Zealots have summoned the Idumaeans to enter the city and support them against Ananus and Jesus. The Idumaeans have naively accepted, however, the Zealots' purity of intention. Jesus opens by expressing astonishment at the unprecedented spectacle of their presence in arms outside the mother-city, before taking apart their motives and intentions.

Immediately we are reminded of the lack of sincerity in all rhetoric, for Jesus' first gambit is to drive a wedge between the Idumaeans and the men they have come to help, whom he writes off as criminals and scum deserving 10,000 deaths: mere murderers and robbers who have invaded the holy ground, behaving as drunks in the sacred precinct. This looks duplicitous to Josephus' literary audience because he has portrayed the Idumaeans themselves in not dissimilar colours, as innately violent men who live for fighting and killing (*Bel.* 4.231).



Josephus' literary audience might have expected Jesus, therefore, to lash out at the interlopers as fellow-scum. Instead, he opens with honeyed words and a soft approach by pleading that such virtuous men could surely have nothing in common with those who called them.

In 4.244, Jesus moves to the central question of their motives. Why have they come? Here Josephus faces a small problem, in that he has reported that the Zealots' letter was a secret (4.228–32, 236). How, then, could Jesus know to analyse their motives? Josephus' clever solution (4.245) is to say that the two chief priests have heard the words “Romans” and “betrayal” thrown about by the assembled Idumaeans, along with “freedom of the mother-city”. Joining the necessary dots, they have reconstructed the Zealots' appeal. Jesus can now deconstruct, so to speak, the claims that he and his colleagues are planning secret dealings with Vespasian, while the Zealots are concerned with Jerusalem's freedom.

He begins with a classic argument from probability (4.246–47), which is to say, one based on character. Look at the character of the parties involved, and decide which is trustworthy: the chief priests or the murderous Zealots. He then (4.248) extends this to an argument from honour: he and Ananus would indeed have preferred peace from the start, but for them to beg the Romans for an accommodation *now*, after a year of Jerusalem's resistance, would be a disgrace. Next (4.251) he begins the logic-chopping, forcing the audience repeatedly to make choices and demolishing each option: it must be either X or Y, but either is absurd. For example, if the Zealots claim that they have been secretly negotiating, they must believe *either* that the leaders contacted the Romans with no one else knowing *or* that it was a public decision to do so. Either possibility is unbelievable given the physical circumstances.

Nearing the half-way point of the speech (4.258), Jesus turns from abstract arguments to the concrete situation: Here you are in arms outside Jerusalem. What are you going to do? You have three options. First, you are welcome to enter the city with us and see what is actually happening, which is not as you have been told. When you see the devastation caused by the Zealots, you (being fine fellows) will join us in destroying those deviants (4.264). Or second, if you do not trust us and want to find out for yourselves alone, as impartial judges, drop your weapons outside and we shall let you go and look. You will come out convinced of our cause. Third, if you do not like either of those options, and remain convinced that we are treating with the Romans, you can stay outside with your weapons and monitor all access roads, to see whether anyone is communicating with Vespasian in Caesarea. These are the reasonable options we can offer. If you cannot accept any of them, you will have to sit here and stew.

The speech by Jesus is a *tour de force*, its relentless logic matched by elegant turns of phrase and the gradual move from diplomatic flattery of the Idumaeans



to tough-minded confrontation from an assumed position of strength and truth. In this too there is an echo of Vespasian's movement from consoling, abstract concerns, to scolding his troops.

### 3.4 Simon son of Cathlas, Idumaeen Leader at the Gate (4.271–83) 267 words

Just as Josephus gives Jesus a speech befitting his dignity and culture, so he scripts for the Idumaeen commander Simon a speech suited to such a man. Notice Josephus' language at 4.270: although Jesus spoke *such words as these* (τοιαῦτα) – Josephus is congratulating himself for Jesus' impressive analysis – the Idumaeen ruffians are distinctly unimpressed. Such elevated moral reasoning and fancy diction flies far above their heads. It does not belong to their world. True to form as thugs, they are only annoyed at being delayed from entering the city. Josephus chooses one of their leaders, Simon, to convey the group sentiment. This is another artful composition, but for a very different kind of speaker.

The complete absence of fancy talk suits a military commander more used to the direct style of Vespasian, though without his philosophical refinements. The only thing Simon took from Jesus' brilliance was that it oozed arrogant dissimulation (279): Who can tolerate such εἰρωνεῖα, he asks, when we can see that the truth is the opposite of what Jesus claims? The "tyrants" in Jerusalem are *obviously* not the men who are besieged in the temple, but the ones who are besieging them in the holy place and who are barring entry to Idumaeans, though they have always enjoyed free access.

Simon sees right through Jesus' attempt to flatter the Idumaeans – *as if* the chief priest Jesus could ever have trusted them as impartial judges. So 4.274: You say you would trust us to be fair judges, but you want to disarm us first. Some trust! *You* are the ones throwing your weight around, obviously planning to reach terms with the Romans. You are traitors, and if we have the chance we will kill you. Simon minces no words and is incapable of irony, deception, or indirection. Believing that this is a straightforward issue of freedom and honour, he will violently but justly oppose the tyranny of Jesus and Co. His speech is thus an exercise in sarcasm and ridicule. Its only fancy words are those he throws back at Jesus, as in 4.280: those *whom you call* "most distinguished" and "uncharged" (ἐπισημοὺς καὶ ἀκαταίτιátους).

It is impressive that Josephus would devote such care to crafting compelling speeches for such distinctive characters. The audience is drawn in, even by Simon's speech, which seems to have a point. This happens elsewhere. The speech that Josephus writes for Korach when he leads a popular rebellion against Moses'

authority, appealing to democracy and against authoritarianism (*Ant.* 4.14–23), might also sound more appealing to post-Enlightenment readers than Moses' response based on divine authority (4.24–34). Although Josephus is quite capable of ridiculing Zealots, Idumaeans, or false prophets without concern for their motives, he can add depth to his narrative by scripting such speeches for his characters, sometimes creating duelling perspectives as Thucydides and Sallust did.

### 3.5 A Rogue Disciple Blows the Whistle (4.345–52) 173 words

Josephus' care makes our final example one of the most intriguing speeches in his corpus. As for style and vocabulary, this one is brief and direct, like that of Vespasian, but with a tone of trusting intimacy. The diction and main point, though supposedly from a Zealot, reprises terms that have been used by Ananus, Jesus, and Josephus as narrator: mother-*polis*, betrayal, tyranny, brazen acts, internecine murder, undoing the ancestral ways, the destruction of the citizenry, unbridled savagery, crimes, ensconced tyranny, and vile people. It is a crucially important speech because it is the vehicle through which the Idumaeans, whose entry into Jerusalem has now had its disastrous effects, are persuaded to leave in disgust. It is thus a recognition scene, in tragic terms. A Zealot decides to reveal that the Idumaeans were in fact called to the city under false pretences, as Jesus had said. They have committed terrible crimes under this illusion, thinking that they were doing unpleasant but necessary and righteous work. Now they must depart immediately, or they will face serious consequences, and leave the Zealots who deceived them to bear the sole blame for the carnage in the capital.

What is strange about the speech? Almost everything.

- 1.) The speaker has no name, though it is Josephus' practice otherwise to name speakers and give a specific context to significant speeches.
- 2.) The content is highly implausible from a Zealot, because it requires a level of wholesale self-criticism that no Zealot could express and remain part of the group. Its three main points echo charges made by Jesus against the Zealots when he was trying keep the Idumaeans out.
- 3.) First (347–48), the Zealots' assertion that Ananus and Jesus were negotiating with Romans – the pretext that brought the Idumaeans – is exposed as a lie. The Idumaeans by now know that they have seen no evidence of such intended betrayal. Incidentally, this speech, like that of Vespasian and Ananus, has an A-B-A structure, in which betrayal to the Romans is the first point (4.347) and reiterated

in the conclusion (4.352). The Idumaeans had no grievances against Ananus and Jesus, aside from that slander by the Zealots and their annoyance at being kept outside the walls in the winter. But the men who ordered that are now dead at their hands, and they have no further grievances in the city. So they must leave.

4.) The whistle-blower's second point is that the Idumaeans have witnessed heinous crimes committed by the Zealots alone, not by Ananus and Jesus, again exactly as Jesus promised, if they could see for themselves. Accusing the chief priests was the Zealots' ploy to deflect attention from their own murderous brutality. Again, Josephus' audience must ask, how could a Zealot make such confessions?

5.) The third point assumes that the Idumaeans have been fairly innocent observers of this, and men completely unlike the contemptible Zealots – again as Jesus flattered them in the opening part of his speech, though the literary audience knew that not to be true. After seeing the Zealots in action, the Idumaeans have begun reconsidering their alliance (4.345), and now this actual Zealot is urging them to follow their instinct and leave, to avoid complicity in *the Zealots' crimes*. This flatly contradicts Josephus' narrative, however, which has portrayed Idumaeans as “savage by nature and given to murder” (4.310; cf. 4.231) and detailed their furious bloodletting (4.305–315). *They* have provided the lethal muscle for the Zealots, murdering without qualms everyone they encountered, making members of the elite suffer gruesome tortures, and killing the common people of Jerusalem like a herd of unclean animals (3.326–27). Until the set-up line of this speech (4.345), Josephus has given no hint of second thoughts among the Idumaeans. Now he says that the recent killing spree has got to them and made them regret their presence (τῆς παρουσίας μετέμελε καὶ προσίστατο). Again, how could a Zealot flatter the Idumaeans in this way while denigrating his own group as criminals?

6.) A final puzzle is that, although the Idumaeans are now said to leave en masse at the Zealot's urging, a few paragraphs later (4.566) we find them in Jerusalem still, tiring of John of Gischala's tyranny and breaking from him. This suggests that Josephus has created the mass departure of the Idumaeans as a literary book-end to their massed arrival, to serve his isolation of the Zealots as chief culprits. This oddity highlights the artificiality of the speech.

It seems to me that we face a stark choice in trying to understand this speech. Either Josephus, who has exercised such extraordinary care with the other speeches, just gave up and created a completely implausible episode to move the story along, *or* he retained his craftiness and intended something more subtle on the part of the Disciples. We cannot reject the former possibility out of hand, since many passages, especially in the later volumes of *Antiquities* and the *Vita* but also in the central

books of *War*, leave puzzling loose ends or make implausible claims. Nevertheless, we should try to make sense of his moves where we can, especially since the preceding speeches have been so attentively designed.

In this case, what he says in his narrator's voice before and after the speech might offer clues. Just before the speech he does say, albeit without prior hints in this vein, that Idumaeans were reconsidering their presence. Historically speaking, this is not implausible, putting aside ideological or moral concerns. This was, after all, a military *expedition* for the Idumaeans, with an objective: removing the native leaders and handing power to the Zealots led by John. The Idumaeans reportedly regretted coming already when Jesus and Ananus locked them out. Compare Cestius Gallus' decision to leave a year earlier, with a larger army, when he found the city gates locked. The Idumaeans persisted only because they were too ashamed to return home empty-handed (4.284–85).

In the unfolding story, it stands to reason they would think of returning to their families once the objective has been accomplished. They have dispatched many native leaders and given the Zealots control. It is also psychologically plausible that a group from outside might have come to resent their hosts after such a spree of killing, in which they were expected to do the dirty work for the others' benefit, even if they believed it necessary at first. Likewise from the other side, immediately after the Idumaeans leave Josephus claims that, whereas the populace hoped this would bring an end to violence in the city, the Zealots became yet more intent on killing prominent targets, including the popular figures Gourion and Niger the Peraean (4.354–65). They are happy to be relieved of the Idumaeans because they were nagging critics, according to Josephus. This too is not historically implausible. Niger was not part of the chief-priestly group that the Zealots had wanted the Idumaeans to remove. Niger had served as governor of Idumaea, before the defensive preparations of late 66 (2.566). He was likely known to the Idumaeans and possibly respected by them. After all, he fought bravely in Judaea's interests, leading the attacks on Ascalon (3.20, 28). He was trusted and loved by the people of Jerusalem, at least. It is conceivable, therefore, that the Idumaeans drew the line at killing such men. If so, their departure would have given the Zealots a freer hand to dispatch additional enemies, whom they considered threats to their control but the Idumaeans would not touch.

If we reconsider the speech from this perspective, we might read it not as a clumsy plot device from Josephus but as a clever ploy by his Zealots to get rid of their Idumaeen allies, once they have outworn their usefulness. Just as Jesus had absurdly flattered them in order to keep them out, the Zealots (led by the wily and scheming John of Gischala) concoct a plan to persuade them to leave. Just as secret messengers had invited them in, a secret messenger now spills the "truth" to persuade them to leave. If the Zealots had wanted them to stay, after all, the

smart play would have been to *implicate* the Idumaeans in their crimes: You are up to your necks in this with us, so you cannot leave now. We will blame you for all the violence in the city until now. Compare the complex arguments that Josephus registers among John's followers at *Bel.* 4.390–94: some wanted John as leader; some disliked him but stayed so that he would receive all the blame for their crimes; others left because they could not bear his tyranny, though they knew that he could implicate them in earlier crimes and so felt they had to destroy him. There, however, John wants the Zealots to stay.

If the Zealots here want the Idumaeans gone, it could make sense to tack in the opposite way. If many Idumaeans were getting restless anyway, and friction was increasing over the Zealots' still-planned victims, the Zealots might have wanted to persuade them that staying around would involve them with the Zealots' "crimes", including those ahead that the Idumaeans cannot support. Why don't they leave, then, and wash their hands of the whole business? Since the Zealots do not consider their actions crimes, of course, this understanding of the speech would see it as wholly ironic. But irony pervaded ancient rhetoric, and Josephus' works provide numerous examples of ironic speech. So *that* is not a problem. I cannot claim certainty for this interpretation of such a surprising speech, but it seems to me much more likely that Josephus intended another Zealot deception than that he suddenly forgot his art and gave this one Zealot a naïve perspective that clumsily echoed that of Jesus at the gate, with no regard for scene or situation.

## 4 Conclusions

My conclusions are straightforward. First, although Josephus wrote all the speeches in his corpus, he did not use them in a mechanical way, to reflect his own or anyone else's ideology. He was alive to the possibilities of rhetoric and took the trouble to draft a suitable oration for each character: the style and vocabulary each would use, as well as the tone – somber seriousness, intimate confidentiality, encouragement, condescension, or sarcasm. He recognised the opportunities that speeches afforded him and, unlike Polybius, took full advantage of their dramatic potential. Presumably, he expected his audiences to respect the skill involved.

My other main conclusion has to do with the use of Josephus' works for history. On the one hand, he is telling a story that does not simply – as no story could simply – reflect the complexity of the lived reality behind it. The speeches are the clearest examples of pure craftsmanship, which likely bear little relationship to anything said at the time. On the other hand, we may not discard his account for this reason. The fact that he had biases and limited perspectives, and

used his intelligence to make a story, only makes him less than divine. He was a contemporary eyewitness to the scene, even if he was a prisoner in Vespasian's camp while all this was happening. The speeches that he imaginatively crafts are embedded in a detailed story line filled with names, some of which have independent verification. The historian today needs to explain his evidence in some way. It would be reckless to dispense with everything – the Zealots' precarious position, entry of Idumaeen fighters, murder of Ananus, Jesus, Niger, and many others, or the importance of John of Gischala and later Simon bar Giora in shaping Jerusalem's fortunes. Although much of Book 4 is ignored in simple schematisations of the war, I hope that this probe of the speeches helps to expose the level of care Josephus expended in making his story come alive. We must then decide in each case, as we investigate our historical questions, whether it is more likely that Josephus invented figures and their relationships out of whole cloth or whether, knowing the main players and their relations in some measure from experience, he tried to bring them to life and make their positions textured and plausible for his first audiences in Rome.

## Appendix: Five Speeches in the Fourth Book of Josephus' *Judaean War*

### 1. Vespasian at Gamala (4.40–48): 241 words<sup>15</sup>

4:40 *περὶ μὲν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸν ὑποστελλόμενος, ὡς μὴ δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν μέμφοσθαι δοκοίη, δεῖν δὲ τὰ κοινὰ λέγων ἀνδρείως φέρειν τὴν τοῦ πολέμου φύσιν ἐννοοῦντας, ὡς οὐδαμοῦ τὸ νικᾶν ἀναμωτὶ περιγίνεται, δαπανᾷ δ' ἡ τύχη τι καὶ παρίσταται.*

**39** With the army unnerved, in perplexity at the setbacks and because in all this time they had never met with calamity, and feeling all the more ashamed that they had left their general exposed, alone with the dangers, Vespasian began consoling them.

**40** Suppressing anything about himself, so that he might not be seeming to assign any hint of blame, he spoke about the need to bear these common [sufferings] manfully, and how they should reflect on the nature of war, which never brought about victory bloodlessly, and that Fortune visits with reversible steps:

<sup>15</sup> Greek text: Benedictus Niese. *Flavii Iosephi opera*. 7 vols. Berlin: Weidmann, 1887–1895.

<sup>41</sup> τοσαύτας μέντοι μυριάδας Ἰουδαίων ἀνελόντας αὐτοὺς ὀλίγην τῷ δαίμονι δεδωκέναι συμβολήν. <sup>42</sup> εἶναι δ' ὡσπερ ἀπειροκάλων τὸ λίαν ἐπαίρεσθαι ταῖς εὐπραγίαις, οὕτως ἀνάνδρων τὸ καταπτησεῖν ἐν τοῖς πταισμάσιν· “ὄξεϊα γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἢ μεταβολῇ, κάκεινος ἄριστος ὁ κἀν τοῖς εὐτυχημασιν νηφῶν, ἵνα μένῃ καὶ δι' εὐθυμίας ἀναπαλαίων τὰ σφάλματα. <sup>43</sup> τὰ μέντοι συμβεβηκότα νῦν οὔτε μαλακισθέντων ὑμῶν οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἀρετὴν γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ κάκεινοις τοῦ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ τοῦ διαμαρτεῖν ἡμῖν αἴτιον ἢ δυσχωρία. <sup>44</sup> καθ' ἣν ἂν τις ὑμῶν μέμψαιτο τῆς ὀρμῆς τὸ ἀταμίευτον ἀναφυγόντων γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ὑψηλὰ τῶν πολεμίων αὐτοὺς ὑποστέλλειν ἐχρῆν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ κορυφὴν ἰσταμένοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ἔπεσθαι, κρατοῦντας δὲ τῆς κάτω πόλεως κατ' ὀλίγον προκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναφεύγοντας εἰς ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐδραῖαν μάχην. νυνὶ δὲ ἀκρατῶς ἐπὶ τὴν νίκην ἐπειγόμενοι τῆς ἀσφαλείας ἠμελησατε. <sup>45</sup> τὸ δ' ἀπερίσκεπτον ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τῆς ὀρμῆς μανιώδες οὐ πρὸς Ῥωμαίων, οἱ πάντα ἐμπειρία καὶ τάξει κατορθοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ βαρβαρικόν, καὶ ὧ μάλιστα Ἰουδαῖοι κρατοῦνται. <sup>46</sup> χρὴ τοίνυν ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν ἀναδραμεῖν καὶ θυμοῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ προσαθυμεῖν τῷ παρ' ἀξίαν πταίσματι. <sup>47</sup> τὴν δ' ἀρίστην ἕκαστος ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας χειρὸς ἐπιζητείτω παραμυθίαν· οὕτω γὰρ τοῖς τε ἀπολωλόσι τιμωρησεσθε καὶ τοὺς ἀνελόντας ἀμυνεῖσθε. <sup>48</sup> πειράσομαι δ' ἐγώ, καθάπερ νῦν, ἐπὶ πάσης μάχης προάγειν τε ὑμῶν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τελευταῖος ἀποχωρεῖν.”

**41** After doing away with so many tens of thousands of Judeans, to have given a [single] engagement to that power is a small thing. **42** Just as it is vulgar to be elated by the successes, so it is unmanly to be downcast by the setbacks. For reversal from one to the other is abrupt, and he does best who is sober in times of good fortune, so that he can remain in good spirits while wrestling his way back from stumbles. **43** What has happened just now is certainly not a matter of your having turned soft, or of valor on the Judean side! No, the reason those people could take advantage and we fell badly short was the harsh terrain. **44** In that regard, one might perhaps blame the unregulated nature of your charge. As the enemy fled up to the heights, you should have restrained yourselves and not followed, to be standing amid the dangers below the peak. Rather, while you had control of the lower city, you should gradually have coaxed those who had fled upward to give battle [on] secure and stable [ground]. As it was, in straining for the victory without control, you disregarded security. **45** Lack of situational awareness in war and manic behavior in the charge are not for Romans, we who succeed in all cases by expertise and tactics; they are a barbarian trait – and why the Judeans are being controlled. **46** We need to get back to our own valor, and be infuriated rather than unnerved by this unworthy setback. **47** But let each man figure out the best consolation by his own hand, for in this way you will avenge the lost and repay those who did away with [them]. **48** For my part, I shall try in every battle, just as [I have done] already, to lead you against the enemy and be the last to withdraw.

**(1.7) 49** By saying such things he reinvigorated the army.

## 2. Ananus II in Jerusalem (4.162–92): 832 words

4:163 “ἢ καλόν γε”, εἶπεν, “ἦν ἔμοι τεθνάναι πρὶν εἰπεῖν τὸν οἶκον τοῦ θεοῦ τοσοῦτοις ἀγεσι καταγέμοντα καὶ τὰς ἀβάτους καὶ ἀγίας χώρας ποσὶ μαιφόνων στενοχωρουμένας. <sup>164</sup> ἀλλὰ περικείμενος τὴν ἀρχιερατικὴν ἐσθῆτα καὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον καλούμενος τῶν σεβασμίων ὀνομάτων, ζῶ καὶ φιλοψυχῶ, μηδ’ ὑπὲρ τοῦμοῦ γηρωσ ὑπομένων ἐύκλεῆ θάνατον εἰ δεῖ μὴ ἄλλο εἶμι καὶ καθάπερ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ἐπιδώσω μόνην ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ. <sup>165</sup> τί γὰρ καὶ δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δημῷ συμφορῶν ἀναισθητοῦντι καὶ παρ’ οἷς ἀπόλλωλεν ἢ τῶν ἐν χερσὶ παθῶν ἀντίληψις; ἀρπαζόμενοι γοῦν ἀνέχεσθε καὶ τυπτόμενοι σιωπᾶτε, καὶ τοῖς φονευομένοις οὐδ’ ἐπιστένει τις ἀναφανδόν.

**162** So, when the mob had come together into the assembly, they were all indignant about the seizure of the holy places, the robberies, and those who were still being murdered, but they had not yet rushed to the defense because of the difficult prospect – this was real enough – of quashing the Disciples. Ananus positioned himself down in the middle of them. After looking away repeatedly at the shrine, his eyes having filled with tears, he spoke:

**163** It would truly be well for me to have died before watching the house of God being filled with such accursed things: the impassable and holy spaces crammed with the feet of murder-polluted men. **164** But, wearing the high-priestly robe and being called by the most honored of the august names, I live and love my soul, not subjecting myself to a glorious death befitting my age. If it is necessary, then, I shall go alone and, just as if in a desert, I shall give up my soul alone for the sake of God. **165** For why should one live among a populace that cannot feel the calamities, and among whom the remedy for their sufferings, though it is in their hands, has been lost? Look: When you are being robbed, you put up with it! When being struck, you are silent! And no one utters a groan, in the open, for those who are being murdered.



<sup>166</sup> ὦ τῆς πικρᾶς τυραννίδος, τί [δὲ] μέφομαι τοὺς τυράννους; μὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἐτρέφθησαν ὑφ' ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀνεξικακίας; <sup>167</sup> μὴ γὰρ οὐχ ὑμεῖς περιιδόντες τοὺς πρῶτους συνισταμένους, ἔτι δ' ἦσαν ὀλίγοι, πλείους ἐποίησατε τῇ σιωπῇ καὶ καθοπλιζομένων ἡρεμοῦντες καθ' ἑαυτῶν ἐπεστρέψατε τὰ ὄπλα, <sup>168</sup> δέον τὰς πρῶτας αὐτῶν ἐπικόπτειν ὀρμάς, ὅτε λοιδορίαὶ καθηπτοντο τῶν συγγενῶν, ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀμελησαντες ἐφ' ἀρπαγὰς παρωξύνετε τοὺς ἀλιτηρίους, καὶ πορθουμένων οἰκῶν λόγος ἦν οὐδεὶς· τοιγαροῦν αὐτοὺς ἤρπαζον τοὺς δεσπότης, καὶ συρομένοις διὰ μέσης τῆς πόλεως οὐδεὶς ἐπημυεν. <sup>169</sup> οἱ δὲ καὶ δεσμοῖς ἠκίσαντο τοὺς ὑφ' ὑμῶν προδοθέντας, ἐὼ λέγειν πόσους καὶ ποδαπούς; ἀλλ' ἀκαταιτιάτοις ἀκρίτοις οὐδεὶς ἐβοήθησε τοῖς δεδεμένοις, <sup>170</sup> ἀκόλουθον ἦν ἐπιδεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς φονευσομένους ἐπίδομεν καὶ τοῦτο καθάπερ ἐξ ἀγέλης ζώων ἀλόγων ἐλκομένου τοῦ κρατιστεύοντος αἰεὶ θύματος, οὐδὲ φωνὴν τις ἀφήκεν οὐχ ὅπως ἐκίνησε τὴν δεξιάν.

**166** What a bitter tyranny! But why am I blaming the tyrants? Were they not nurtured by you and your putting up with wrongdoing? **167** You looked on as the first of them were forming up, when they were still few, and created more of them by your silence. By being idle while they armed themselves, you turned those arms against yourselves. **168** You should have cut off their very first forays, when they were imposing on the family members with insults. But since you showed no concern about their robberies, you provoked these deviants, and when households were utterly ravaged there was no word at all. That is why they seized the owners, and when these were dragged through the middle of the city no one rose to their defense. **169** So then they tortured – in chains – those whom you had betrayed. I refrain from describing their number and different situations, but no one helped those who were bound, uncharged and untried. **170** The result was [our] watching those same people being murdered. Even this we have watched – just as from a herd of dumb animals the choicest one is always pulled out for sacrifice. No one emitted a sound, and certainly none moved his right hand.

<sup>171</sup> φέρετε δὴ [τοῖνον], φέρετε πατούμενα βλέποντες τὰ ἅγια καὶ πάντας ὑποθέντες αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἀνοσίοις τοὺς τῶν τολμημάτων βαθμούς μὴ βαρύνεσθε τὴν ὑπεροχὴν· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντως ἂν ἐπὶ μείζον προκούψαν, εἴ τι τῶν ἁγίων καταλύσαι μείζον εἶχον.

<sup>172</sup> κεκράτηται μὲν οὖν τὸ ὀχυρώτατον τῆς πόλεως· λεγέσθω γὰρ νῦν τὸ ἱερὸν ὡς ἄκρα τις ἢ φρούριον· ἔχοντες δ' ἐπιτετειχισμένην τυραννίδα τοσαύτην καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑπὲρ κορυφὴν βλέποντες, τί βουλευέσθε καὶ τίσι τὰς γνώμας προσθάλλετε; <sup>173</sup> Ῥωμαίους ἄρα περιμενεῖτε, ἵν' ἡμῶν βοήθησιν τοῖς ἁγίοις; ἔχει μὲν οὕτως τὰ πράγματα τῇ πόλει, καὶ πρὸς τοσοῦτον ἤκομεν συμφορῶν, ἵνα ἡμᾶς ἐλεησῶσι καὶ πολέμιοι. <sup>174</sup> οὐκ ἐξαναστησεσθε, ὧ τλημονέστατοι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς πληγὰς ἐπιστραφέντες, ὃ κάπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, τοὺς τύπτοντας ἀμυνεῖσθε; οὐκ ἀναμνησεσθε τῶν ἰδίων ἕκαστος συμφορῶν οὐδὲ ἂ πεπόνθατε πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θέμενοι τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπ' αὐτοὺς θηξετε πρὸς τὴν ἄμυναν;

<sup>175</sup> ἀπόλλωλεν ἄρα παρ' ὑμῖν τὸ τιμώτατον τῶν παθῶν καὶ φυσικώτατον, ἐλευθερίας ἐπιθυμία, φιλόδουλοι δὲ καὶ φιλοδέσποτοι γεγόναμεν ὡσπερ ἐκ προγόνων τὸ ὑποτάσσεσθαι παραλαβόντες. <sup>176</sup> ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοί γε πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτονομίας πολέμους διηνεγκαν καὶ οὔτε τῆς Αἰγυπτίων οὔτε τῆς Μηδῶν δυναστείας ἠττηθησαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖν τὸ κελεύομενον.

**171** Well, be tolerant then! Be tolerant as you see the holy places being trampled! Since you have supported all the footholds for the brazen acts of these profane [men], by all means don't cave in [when they are] at the top! By now they certainly would have advanced to something even greater – if they had anything greater than the holy places to undo.

**172** And so the strongest point of the city has been mastered – yes, let the temple now be spoken of as some citadel or fortress. Facing such an ensconced tyranny, and seeing your adversaries over the summit, what do you advise? And where do you find warm comfort for your resolve? **173** Are you going to wait around for the Romans, that they might bring aid to our holy places? Is this how the public affairs stand in the city? Have we come to such a state of calamities that our enemies should feel sorry for us? **174** Will you not rise up, you who are so extremely care-worn, and turn to face the blows – which even beasts are seen to do – and repel those who are striking you? Will you not remember, each of you, your private calamities and, bringing the things you have suffered before your eyes, hone your souls against them for defense?

**175** We have lost that most honored and most natural of feelings: a longing for freedom. We are both slavery-lovers and master-lovers, as if we had received the legacy of submissiveness from our ancestors. **176** But they bore the burden of wars, many and great, for the sake of self-government – for the sake of not doing what they were directed to do – and they were not defeated by the supreme power of Egyptians or of Medes.

<sup>177</sup> καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ τῶν προγόνων λέγειν; ἀλλ' ὁ νῦν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμος, ἐὼ διελέγχειν πότερον λυσιτελῆς ὦν καὶ σύμφορος ἢ τουναντίον, τίνα δ' οὖν ἔχει πρόφασιν; <sup>178</sup> οὐ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν; εἴτα τοὺς τῆς οἰκουμένης δεσπότης μὴ φέροντες τῶν ὁμοφύλων τυράννων ἀνεξόμηθα; <sup>179</sup> καίτοι τὸ μὲν τοῖς ἔξωθεν ὑπακοῦειν ἀνελέγκαι τις ἂν εἰς τὴν ἄπαιξ ἠττησασαν τύχην, τὸ δὲ τοῖς οἰκείους εἴκειν πονηροῖς ἀγεννῶν ἔστι καὶ προαιρουμένων.

<sup>180</sup> ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἅπασ ἐμνησθην Ῥωμαίων, οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν ὃ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων ἔμπεσόν ἐπέστρεψε τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅτι κἂν ἀλώμεν ὑπ' ἐκείνοις, ἀπείη δὲ ἡ πείρα τοῦ λόγου, χαλεπώτερον οὐδὲν παθεῖν ἔχομεν ὢν ἡμᾶς διατεθείκασιν οὗτοι. <sup>181</sup> πῶς δὲ οὐ δακρύων ἄξιον ἐκείνων μὲν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ καὶ ἀναθηματα βλέπειν, τῶν δὲ ὁμοφύλων τὰ σκύλα σεσυληκότων καὶ ἀνελότων τὴν τῆς μητροπόλεως εὐγένειαν, καὶ πεφονευμένους ἀνδρας ὧν ἀπέσχοντο ἂν κάκεινοι κρατησαντες; <sup>182</sup> καὶ Ῥωμαίους μὲν μηδέποτε ὑπερβῆναι τὸν ὅρον τῶν βεβηλων μηδὲ παραβῆναι τι τῶν ἱερῶν ἔθῶν, πεφρικένοι δὲ πόρρωθεν ὀρώντας τοὺς τῶν ἁγίων περιβόλους, <sup>183</sup> γεννηθέντας δὲ τινὰς ἐν τῇδε τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ τραφέντας ὑπὸ τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἔθεσι καὶ Ἰουδαίους καλουμένους ἔμπεριπατεῖν μέσοις τοῖς ἁγίοις θερμὰς ἔτι τὰς χεῖρας ἐξ ὁμοφύλων ἔχοντας φόνων; <sup>184</sup> εἴτ' αὖ τις δέδοικεν τὸν ἔξωθεν πόλεμον καὶ τοὺς ἐν συγκρίσει πολλῶ τῶν οἰκείων ἡμῖν μετριωτέρους; καὶ γὰρ ἂν, εἰ ἐτύμους δεῖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὰς κλησεις ἐφαρμόζειν, τάχα ἂν εὖροι τις Ῥωμαίους μὲν ἡμῖν βεβαιωτὰς τῶν νόμων, πολεμίους δὲ τοὺς ἔνδον.

**177** But why should one speak of the ancestors? There is now a war against Romans. I shall not debate whether it is in your interest and advantageous or the opposite, but what does it have for a justification? **178** Isn't it freedom – for which cause, though not tolerating the masters of the world, we are putting up with compatriot tyrants? **179** Yet one has had to obey those from outside because Fortune has comprehensively defeated us, whereas yielding to these home-grown contemptibles is ignoble and something we are consciously choosing!

**180** Since I have once mentioned Romans, I shall not hold back from telling you what occurred to me in the middle of my words and diverted my thinking: that even if we were captured by those [people] – may the proof of these words remain unrealized! – we would have nothing harsher to suffer than what these [fellows] have arranged for us. **181** How is it not worthy of tears to see the votive offerings of those [Roman men] in the temple, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, compatriots who have stripped the spoils and done away with the nobility of our mother-city, and men left murdered – things those others [Romans] would have refrained from, if they had taken control? **182** And [to see] that the Romans have never overstepped the boundary for commoners or transgressed any of the sacred customs – watching the precincts of the holy places from afar in shuddering awe – **183** whereas some born in this very land, nurtured by our own customs, and calling themselves Judeans, amble about the holy places with their hands still hot from compatriot murders? **184** Can anyone still be anxious about the external war, then, against those who by comparison with the home-grown [men] are far more reasonable with us? If it is necessary to apply true labels to public affairs, one would quickly find that Romans are guarantors of the laws for us, and [their] enemies are those inside.

<sup>185</sup> ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἐξώλεις οἱ ἐπίβουλοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας, καὶ πρὸς ἃ δεδράκασιν οὐκ ἂν τις ἐπινοησειεν δίκην ἀξίαν κατ' αὐτῶν, οἴμαι πάντας ἤκειν πεπεισμένους οἰκοθεν καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων παρωξύνθαι τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπ' αὐτοῦς, ἃ πεπόνθατε. <sup>186</sup> καταπλησσονται δ' ἴσως οἱ πολλοὶ τό τε πλήθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν τόλμαν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ τόπου πλεονεξίαν. <sup>187</sup> ταῦτα δ' ὡσπερ συνέστη διὰ τὴν ὑπερέραν ἀμέλειαν, καὶ νῦν αὐξηθησεται πλέον ὑπερθεμένον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πλήθος αὐτοῖς ἐπιτρέφεται καθ' ἡμέραν παντὸς πονηροῦ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους αὐτομολοῦντος, <sup>188</sup> καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἐξάπτει μέχρι νῦν μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον, τῷ τε τόπῳ καθύπερθεν ὄντες χρῆσαιτο καὶ μετὰ παρασκευῆς, ἂν ἡμεῖς χρόνον δώμεν. <sup>189</sup> πιστεύσατε δὲ ὡς, ἐὰν προσβαίνωμεν ἐπ' αὐτοῦς, ἔσονται τῇ συνειδησει ταπεινότεροι, καὶ τὸ πλεονέκτημα τοῦ ὕψους ὁ λογισμὸς ἀπολεῖ. <sup>190</sup> τάχα τὸ θεῖον ὑβρισμένον ἀναστρέψει κατ' αὐτῶν τὰ βαλλόμενα, καὶ τοῖς σφετέροις διαφθαρησονται βέλεσιν οἱ δυσσεβεῖς. μόνον ὀφθῶμεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ καταλέλυνται.

<sup>191</sup> καλὸν δέ, κἂν προσῆ τις κίνδυνος, ἀποθνησκῆν πρὸς τοῖς ἱεροῖς πυλῶσι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰ καὶ μὴ πρὸ παίδων ἢ γυναικῶν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁγίων προέσθαι. <sup>192</sup> προστησμαι δ' ἐγὼ γνώμη τε καὶ χειρὶ καὶ οὔτε ἐπίνοιά τις ὑμῖν λείψει πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν ἐξ ἡμῶν οὔτε τοῦ σώματος ὀψεσθε φειδόμενον.”

**185** That these plotters against freedom are pernicious, however, and that one could not conceive of a fitting judgment against them for what they have done, I suppose you were already convinced when you left your houses. Before my words, you were already provoked against them by their actions, which you have suffered. **186** Perhaps most of you feel terrified by their mass and their brazenness, and again by the advantage of their position. **187** But just as these things came about because of your neglect, so they will be made all the worse by your delaying, for their mass is growing every day, as every contemptible man deserts to those like him, **188** and inflames their brazenness until now there is no impediment. As for their occupying the superior position, yes, and they would certainly exploit it – with added preparation if we were to give them time. **189** But trust me now: if we go up against them, they will become humbler in their conscience, and reasoning will nullify the advantage of their elevation. **190** Maybe the Deity, having been so insulted, will even turn back their projectiles on them, and the irreverent [men] will be wrecked by their own arrows! Let us only make our appearance to them, and they are undone!

**191** And it is well, if there is a certain risk, to die at the sacred gates and relinquish the soul, if not also for children and wives, then for the sake of God and the holy places. **192** I myself shall support you with my resolve as well as my hand. From our side, no possible scheme for your security will be lacking; nor will you see any sparing of the body.

## 3. Jesus son of Gamalas at the Gate (4.238–69): 886 words

<sup>239</sup> παρείναι γοῦν ὑμᾶς ἀνθρώποις ἐξωλεστάτοις μετὰ τοσαύτης προθυμίας ἐπαμυνοῦντας καθ' ἡμῶν, μεθ' ὅσης εἰκὸς ἦν ἐλθεῖν οὐδὲ τῆς μητροπόλεως καλούσης ἐπὶ βαρβάρους. <sup>240</sup> “καὶ εἰ μὲν ἑώρων τὴν σύνταξιν ὑμῶν ἐξ ὁμοίων τοῖς καλέσασιν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἄλογον τὴν ὁρμὴν ὑπελάμβανον· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως συνίστησι τὰς εὐνοίας ὡς τρώπων συγγένεια· νῦν δ', εἰ μὲν τις αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζει καθ' ἓνα, μυρίων ἕκαστος εὐρεθησεται θανάτων ἄξιος. <sup>241</sup> τὰ γὰρ θύματα καὶ καθάρματα τῆς πόλεως ὅλης, κατασωτευσάμενα τὰς ἰδίας οὐσίας καὶ προγομνάσαντα τὴν ἀπόνοιαν ἐν ταῖς πέριξ κώμαις τε καὶ πόλεσι, τελευταῖα ληληθότως παρεισέρρουσαν εἰς τὴν ἱερὰν πόλιν, <sup>242</sup> λησταὶ δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀσεβημάτων μιαινόντες καὶ τὸ ἀβέβηλον ἔδαφος, οὓς ὄραν ἔστι νῦν ἀδεεῖς ἐμμεθυσκομένους τοῖς ἀγίοις καὶ τὰ σκύλα τῶν πεφονευμένων καταναλίσκοντας εἰς τὰς ἀπληστους γαστέρας. <sup>243</sup> τὸ δ' ὑμέτερον πλῆθος καὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ὄπλων ὄραν ἔστιν οἷος ἔπρεπεν καλούσης μὲν τῆς μητροπόλεως κοινῶ βουλευτηρίῳ, συμμάχους δὲ κατ' ἄλλοφύλων. τί ἂν οὖν εἴποι τοῦτό τις ἢ τύχη ἐπήρειαν, ὅταν λογάσι πονηροῖς αὐτάνδρον ἔθνος ὄρᾳ συνασπίζον [αὐτοῖς];

**238** Accordingly, the most senior of the high priests with Ananus, Iesous, stood in the tower opposite them and declared that many and varied disturbances had seized this city, but none caused one to marvel at fortune as this, that they would team up with these contemptibles, and at these extraordinary circumstances:

**239** So, here you are helping to defend these truly abominable people against us, with such a degree of eagerness that its like would not come about if the mother-city had issued a call against barbarians! **240** If your body of troops were found to be of the same sort as the men who summoned you, I would not have considered your foray so absurd. For nothing unites acts of good will like kinship in manners. But as it is, if one could examine them one by one, each would be found deserving of 10,000 deaths. **241** For the carcasses and dregs of the whole country, after squandering their own property and training their recklessness in the surrounding villages and cities, eventually trickled imperceptibly into the holy city – **242** bandits who pollute inviolable ground, given the excess of their impieties, now to be seen acting like drunks in the holy places with impunity, and devouring the spoils of those who have been murdered into their insatiable stomachs. **243** Now, seeing your mass and the polish of your weapons is the sort of thing that would have been fitting if you had been called by the mother-city in general council, as allies against foreigners. What could one possibly call this – an affront by fortune? – when one sees a nation, down to the last man, sharing the cover of their shields with these contemptible specimens?

<sup>244</sup> μέχρι πολλοῦ μὲν ἀπορῶ, τί δη ποτε καὶ τὸ κινήσαν ὑμᾶς οὕτω ταχέως ἐγένετο· μὴ γὰρ ἂν δίχα μεγάλης αἰτίας ἀναλαβεῖν τὰς πανοπλίας ὑπὲρ ληστῶν καὶ κατὰ δημοῦ συγγενοῦς· <sup>245</sup> ἐπεὶ δὲ ἠκούσαμεν Ῥωμαίους καὶ προδοσίαν, ταῦτα γὰρ ὑμῶν ἐθορύβουν τινὲς ἄρτίως, καὶ τῆς μητροπόλεως ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει παρεῖναι, πλέον τῶν ἄλλων τολμημάτων ἐθαυμάσαμεν τοὺς ἀλιτηρίου τῆς περὶ τοῦτο ψευδοῦς ἐπινοίας· <sup>246</sup> ἄνδρας γὰρ φύσει φιλελευθέρους καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα τοῖς ἐξωθεν πολεμίοις μάχεσθαι παρεσκευασμένους οὐκ ἐνῆν ἄλλως ἐξαγριῶσαι καθ' ἡμῶν ἢ λογοποιήσαντας προδοσίαν τῆς ποθουμένης ἐλευθερίας. <sup>247</sup> ἄλλ' ὑμᾶς γε χρὴ σκέπτεσθαι τοὺς τε διαβάλλοντας καὶ καθ' ὧν, συνάγειν τε τὴν ἀληθειαν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιπλάστων λόγων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων.

<sup>248</sup> τί γὰρ δὴ καὶ παθόντες ἂν ἡμεῖς Ῥωμαίοις προσπωλοῖμεν ἑαυτοὺς νῦν, παρὸν ἢ μηδὲ ἀποστῆναι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ προσχωρῆσαι ταχέως ἀποστάντας ὄντων ἔτι τῶν πέριξ ἀπορθητων; <sup>249</sup> νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ βουλομένοις διαλύσασθαι ῥάδιον, ὅτε Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ὑπερόπτας πεποίηκεν ὑποχείριος ἡ Γαλιλαία, φέρει δ' αἰσχύνῃν ἡμῖν θανάτου χαλεπωτέραν τὸ θεραπεύειν αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἢ δὴ πλησίον. <sup>250</sup> καὶ ἐγὼ καθ' ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἂν εἰρηνῆν προτιμησαίμι θανάτου, πολεμούμενος δ' ἅπαξ καὶ συμβαλῶν θάνατον εὐκλεᾶ τοῦ ζῆν αἰχμάλωτος.

**244** For a while I have been at a loss as to what in the world it was that moved you so urgently, for you would not have taken up your full kit for the sake of bandits – and against a kindred populace – without a great reason. **245** We heard “Romans” and “betrayal” when some of you were recently causing a disturbance about these things, and about being here “for the freedom of the mother-city,” and we marveled at the deviants for the conception of this lie, even more than for their other brazen acts. **246** Indeed, men who are by nature freedom-friendly, and especially prepared to fight enemies from outside on that account, would not be in a position to be brutalized against us other than by having made up stories about a betrayal of that cherished freedom. **247** But you need to consider who is doing the slandering, and against whom, and figure out the truth not on the basis of fabricated stories but from the common public affairs.

**248** Seriously, what could we have possibly suffered now, that we would sell ourselves out to the Romans? It was possible for us either not to revolt at all initially or, having revolted, quickly to capitulate while the surrounding area was still unravaged. **249** But now, even for those who want to reach a settlement it is not easy, when a submissive Galilee has made the Romans contemptuous, and trying to conciliate them when they are nearby brings a disgrace harsher than death. **250** As for me personally, although I would certainly prefer peace to death, once I am making war and have joined the fray [I prefer] a glorious death over life as a captive.

<sup>251</sup> πότερον δέ φασιν ἡμᾶς τοὺς τοῦ δήμου προσεστῶτας πέμψαι κρύφα πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἢ καὶ τὸν δήμον κοινῆ ψηφισάμενον; <sup>252</sup> εἰ μὲν ἡμᾶς, εἰπάτωσαν τοὺς πεμφθέντας φίλους, τοὺς διακονησαντας τὴν προδοσίαν οἰκέτας. ἐφωράθη τις ἀπιών; ἀνακομιζόμενος ἐάλω; <sup>253</sup> γραμμάτων γεγόνασιν ἐγκρατεῖς; πῶς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τοσοῦτους πολίτας ἐλάθομεν, οἷς κατὰ πᾶσαν ὥραν συναναστρεφόμεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὀλίγοις καὶ φρουρουμένοις καὶ μηδ' εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ προελθεῖν δυναμένοις ἐγνώσθη τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν λαθραίως ἐνεργούμενα; <sup>254</sup> νῦν δ' ἔγνωσαν, ὅτε δεῖ δοῦναι δίκας τῶν τετολημένων, ἕως δ' ἤσαν ἀδεεῖς αὐτοί, προδότης ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὑπώπτευετο;

<sup>255</sup> εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δήμον ἀναφέρουσι τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐν φανερωῶ δηπουθεν ἐβουλεύσαντο, οὐδεὶς ἀπεστάτει τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ὥστε τάχιον ἂν τῆς μηνύσεως ἔσπευσεν ἢ φημὴ πρὸς ὑμᾶς φανερωτέρα. <sup>256</sup> τί δέ; οὐχὶ καὶ πρέσβεις ἔδει πέμπειν ψηφισαμένους τὰς διαλύσεις; καὶ τίς ὁ χειροτονηθεὶς; εἰπάτωσαν

<sup>257</sup> ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δυσθανατούντων καὶ πλησίον οὔσας τὰς τιμωρίας διακρουομένων σκῆψίς ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ προδοθῆναι τὴν πόλιν εἴμαρτο, μόνους ἂν τολμησαὶ καὶ τοῦτο τοὺς διαβάλλοντας, ὧν τοῖς τολμημασιν ἐν μόνον [κακὸν] λείπει, προδοσία.

**251** Which is it? Are they claiming that we, the leaders of the populace, sent [word] secretly to the Romans, or that the populace voted for this in public? **252** If it is us, on the one hand, do let them tell which friends were sent, or which members of their households negotiated the betrayal! Was someone detected leaving? Apprehended returning? Have they come into possession of letters? **253** And how did we keep this hidden from so many citizens, with whom we are wholly occupied every hour – while they [Disciples], few and closely watched and unable to advance even into the city from the temple, knew what was being done secretly throughout the countryside? **254** And they learned of this now, just when they are about to face justice for their brazen acts, whereas as long as they were acting with impunity none of us was suspected as a traitor?

**255** If, on the other hand, they are bringing this charge against the populace, presumably they deliberated in the open and no one kept aloof from the assembly, so that the report of this decision would have sped to you more quickly and also more openly. **256** But how? Would it not have been necessary, after voting for the settlement, to send emissaries? Well, who was hand-elected? Do let them tell!

**257** No, this is the excuse of those who, finding it hard to die, are trying to evade the acts of retribution that are near. If it were fated for the city to be betrayed, these slanderers are the only ones brazen enough to do that too – the one thing alone that remains undone among their brazen acts: betrayal.

<sup>258</sup> χρή δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἐπειδηπερ ἅπαξ πάρεστε μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων, τὸ μὲν δικαιοτάτον, ἀμύνειν τῇ μητροπόλει καὶ συνεξαίρειν τοὺς τὰ δικαστηρια καταλύσαντας τυράννους, οἱ πατησαντες τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν ξίφεισι πεποιήνται τὰς κρίσεις. <sup>259</sup> ἀνδρας γοῖν ἀκαταιτιάτους τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἐκ μέσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀρπάσαντες δεσμοῖς τε προηκίσαντο καὶ μηδὲ φωνῆς μηδ' ἰκεσίας ἀνασχόμενοι διέφθειραν.

<sup>260</sup> ἔξεστιν δ' ὑμῖν παρελθοῦσιν εἶσω μὴ πολέμου νόμῳ θεάσασθαι τὰ τεκμηρια τῶν λεγομένων, οἴκους ἠρημωμένους ταῖς ἐκείνων ἀρπαγαῖς καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ γενεάς τῶν ἀπεσφαγμένων μελανειμονούσας, κωκυτὸν δὲ καὶ θρήνον ἀνά τὴν πόλιν ὄλην· οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστιν, ὃς οὐ γέγευται τῆς τῶν ἀνοσίων καταδρομῆς·

<sup>261</sup> οἱ γε ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξώκειλαν ἀπονοίας, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν ἐξωθεν πόλεων ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὄλου τοῦ ἔθνους μετενεγκεῖν τὴν ληστρικὴν τόλμαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὸ ἱερόν. <sup>262</sup> ὀρητηριον γοῦν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο καὶ καταφυγὴ ταμιεῖόν τε τῶν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς παρασκευῶν γέγονεν, ὃ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκουμένης προσκυνούμενος χώρος καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ περᾶτων γῆς ἀλλοφύλοις ἀκοῆ τετιμημένος παρὰ τῶν γενηθέντων ἐνθάδε θηρίων καταπατεῖται. <sup>263</sup> νεανιεύονταί τε ἐν ταῖς ἀπογνώσεσιν ἡδη δημοὺς τε δημοὶς καὶ πόλεσι πόλεις συγκρούειν καὶ κατὰ τῶν σπλάγχων τῶν ἰδίων τὸ ἔθνος στρατολογεῖν. <sup>264</sup> ἀνθ' ὧν τὸ μὲν κάλλιστον καὶ πρέπον, ὡς ἔφην, ὑμῖν συνεξαίρειν τοὺς ἀλιτηρίους καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀπάτης ἀμυνομένους, ὅτι συμμάχους ἐτόλμησαν καλεῖν οὓς ἔδει τιμωροὺς δεδιέναι·

**258** But seeing that you are now present with the weapons, you are obliged – it is indeed supreme justice – to defend the mother-city, and join in rooting out the tyrants who are undoing the law-courts, who are trampling the laws and have been rendering verdicts by their swords. **259** Uncharged men of the most illustrious kind they have seized from the middle of the market-place in chains and executed, after first torturing them, while showing no tolerance for utterance or even a plea for mercy.

**260** You are welcome to come inside, not by the law of war but to see for yourselves the proofs of what has been said: houses emptied by the robberies of those men, women and families of those who have been butchered dressed in black, shriek and dirge across the whole city. For there is no one who has not had a taste of the onslaught of these profane men.

**261** They persisted so far on their course of recklessness that they transferred their bandit brazenness not only from the countryside and outside cities to the face and head of the whole nation, but also from the city to the temple. **262** At least, this became for them a base, a refuge, and a depot for their preparations against us. The place where obeisance is made by the world, and which is honored by reputation among foreigners from the limits of the earth, is being trampled down by the beasts who were created in it. **263** They strut around like adolescents in their antagonisms, cause friction between populace and populace and between city and city, and enlist the nation for combat against its own vital organs. **264** In this situation, the finest and most fitting thing, as I stated, is for you to join in rooting out these deviants and to pay them back for this trick: that they were so brazen as to call as allies those avengers they should have been anxious about!



<sup>265</sup> εἰ δὲ αἰδεῖσθε τὰς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπικλησεις, ἀλλά τοι πάρεστι θεμένους τὰ ὄπλα καὶ παρελθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν σχηματι συγγενῶν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸ μέσον συμμάχων τε καὶ πολεμίων ὄνομα δικαστὰς γενομένους. <sup>266</sup> καίτοι λογίσασθε, πόσον κερδησοῦσιν ἐφ' ὁμολογουμένοις καὶ τηλικούτοις κρινόμενοι παρ' ὑμῖν οἱ τοῖς ἀκαταϊτιάτοις μηδὲ λόγου μεταδόντες· λαμβανέτωσαν δ' οὖν ταύτην ἐκ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀφίξεως τὴν χάριν.

<sup>267</sup> εἰ δ' οὔτε συναγανακτεῖν ἡμῖν οὔτε κρίνεσθαι δεῖ, τρίτον ἐστὶ καταλιπεῖν ἐκατέρους καὶ μητε ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐπιβαίνειν συμφοραῖς μητε τοῖς ἐπιβούλοις τῆς μητροπόλεως συνέρχεσθαι. <sup>268</sup> εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα Ῥωμαίοις ὑποπτεύετε διειλέχθαι τινὰς, παρατηρεῖν ἔξεστι τὰς ἐφόδους, κὰν τι τῶν διαβεβλημένων ἔργω διακαλύπτηται, τότε φρουρεῖν τὴν μητρόπολιν ἐλθόντας κολάζειν τε τοὺς αἰτίους πεφωραμένους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑμᾶς φθάσειαν οἱ πολέμιοι τῇ πόλει προσωκμημένους.

<sup>269</sup> εἰ δ' οὐδὲν ὑμῖν τούτων εὐγνωμον ἢ μέτριον δοκεῖ, μὴ θαυμάζετε τὰ κλειθρα τῶν πυλῶν, ἕως ἂν φέρητε τὰ ὄπλα.”

**265** If, however, you continue to be impressed by the appeals of such people, well look, it is open to you, if you park the weapons and enter the city in the role of relatives, to become judges and take on the middle role between allies and enemies. **266** Consider, too, how much those people, who would not exchange even a word with the uncharged men, will gain from being judged by you – for their openly confessed and egregious acts. Let them receive this favor, then, from your expedition!

**267** If you cannot bring yourself either to share our indignation or to serve as judges, a third [possibility] is that you leave both sides alone, and neither enter upon our calamities nor join in the plots against the mother-city. **268** For if you really suspect that some people have been in discussion with Romans, you are welcome to surveil the approaches, and if anything of what has been slanderously alleged should be exposed in the act, then, since you have come to guard the mother-city, you can punish those who are detected as culprits. Surely no enemies could possibly get past you, when you have been stationed hard up against the city.

**269** If none of these [options] seems agreeable or reasonable to you, don't be amazed at the blocking of the gates, as long as you continue to bear the weapons!

**270** Although Iesus said such things as these, the mass of the Idumeans paid no attention, but were infuriated that their entry into the city was not forthcoming.

## 4. Simon son of Cathlas (?), Idumaean Commander Responds (4.271–83): 267 words

4:272 οὐκέτι θαυμάζειν ἔφη φρουρουμένων ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τῶν προμάχων τῆς ἐλευθερίας, εἶ γε καὶ τῷ ἔθνει κλείουσί τινες ἤδη τὴν κοινὴν πόλιν, <sup>273</sup> καὶ Ῥωμαίους μὲν εἰσδέχσθαι παρασκευάζονται τάχα καὶ στεφανώσαντες τὰς πύλας, Ἰδουμαῖοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων διαλέγονται καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ὅπλα κελεύουσι ῥῖψαι, <sup>274</sup> μὴ πιστεύοντες δὲ τοῖς συγγενέσι τὴν τῆς μητροπόλεως φυλακὴν τοὺς αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς ποιοῦνται τῶν διαφόρων, καὶ κατηγοροῦντές τινων ὡς ἀποκτείνειαν ἀκρίτους, αὐτοὶ καταδικάζουσι ὅλου τοῦ ἔθνους ἀτιμίαν· <sup>275</sup> τὴν γοῦν ἅπασιν τοῖς ἀλλοφύλοις ἀναπεπταμένην εἰς θρησκείαν πόλιν τοῖς οἰκείοις νῦν ἀποτετεῖχισθε. <sup>276</sup> πάνυ γὰρ ἐπὶ σφαγὰς ἐσπεύδομεν καὶ τὸν κατὰ τῶν ὁμοφύλων πόλεμον οἱ διὰ τοῦτο ταχύναντες, ἵν' ὑμᾶς τηρησωμεν ἐλευθέρους. <sup>277</sup> τοιαῦτα μέντοι καὶ πρὸς τῶν φρουρουμένων ἠδίκησθε, καὶ πιθανὰς οὕτως ὑποψίας οἶμαι κατ' ἐκείνων συνελέξατε.

<sup>278</sup> ἔπειτα τῶν ἔνδον φρουρᾶ κρατοῦντες ὅσοι κηδονται τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῖς συγγενεστάτοις ἔθνεσιν ἀθρόοις ἀποκλείσαντες μὲν τὴν πόλιν ὑβριστικά δ' οὕτως προστάγματα κελεύοντες, τυραννῆσθαι λέγετε καὶ τὸ τῆς δυναστείας ὄνομα τοῖς ὑφ' ὑμῶν τυραννουμένοις περιάπτετε. <sup>279</sup> τίς ἂν ἐνέγκαι τὴν εἰρωνεῖαν τῶν λόγων ἀφορῶν εἰς τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῶν πραγμάτων; εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὑμᾶς ἀποκλείουσιν Ἰδουμαῖοι τῆς μητροπόλεως, οὓς αὐτοὶ τῶν πατρίων ἱερῶν εἴργετε.

**271** One of the commanders, Simon son of Cathlas, having barely quelled the uproar among his people and positioned himself within ear-shot of the high priests, declared:

**272** When the champions of freedom are being watched in the temple, and some people are closing our common city to the nation, **273** even as they prepare to welcome the Romans and perhaps even festoon the gates, it should no longer cause amazement that they talk with Idumeans from the towers and direct them to discard their weapons “for the sake of freedom” – **274** not trusting the kinfolk they would make “judges” with guarding the mother-city! And while they accuse some of having killed without trial, they themselves condemn the whole nation to dishonor. **275** At any rate, a city that has been opened wide for worship even to foreigners you have now walled off against its own. **276** Oh sure, we sped here for slaughter and war against our compatriots – we who came only for this: to keep you free! **277** Such were no doubt your unjust verdicts against those now being watched; I suppose that the grounds for suspicion you collected against them are just as persuasive.

**278** On top of that, while you control inside, under sentry-watch, those who show real concern for the public affairs, and you have shut the city against the most closely related nations gathered here, and issued the most insulting orders, you say that you are being tyrannized, and attach the label of [seeking] absolute power to those who are being tyrannized by you! **279** Who can bear such dissimulation with words, when he can plainly see the opposite in the public affairs – unless it is the Idumeans, whom you are shutting out of the ancestral sacred rites, who are barring you from the city?

<sup>280</sup> μέμψαιτ' ἂν εἰκότως τις τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ πολιορκουμένους, ὅτι θαρσασαντες τοὺς προδότας κολάζειν, οὐς ὑμεῖς ἄνδρας ἐπίσημους καὶ ἀκαταίτιτους λέγετε διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐκ ἀφ' ὑμῶν ἤρξαντο καὶ τὰ καιριώτατα τῆς προδοσίας μέρη προαπέκοψαν.<sup>281</sup> ἀλλ' εἰ κάκεῖνοι τῆς χρείας ἐγένοντο μαλακώτεροι, τηρησομεν Ἰδουμαῖοι τὸν οἶκον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῆς κοινῆς πατρίδος προπολεμησομεν ἅμα τοὺς τε ἔξωθεν ἐπιόντας καὶ τοὺς ἔνδον προδιδόντας ἀμυνόμενοι πολεμίους.<sup>282</sup> ἐνθάδε πρὸ τῶν τειχῶν μενοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς ὄπλοις, ἕως ἂν Ῥωμαῖοι κάμωσι προσέχοντες ὑμῖν ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐλεύθερα φρονησαντες μεταβάλησθε.”

**280** One might reasonably blame those who are under siege in the temple for this: that although they were bold enough to punish traitors, they did not [punish] the men you describe as “most distinguished” and “uncharged” (because of your association with them) – and they did not begin with *you*, and cut off in advance the most vital elements of the betrayal. **281** But if they were rather soft in their treatment, we Idumeans will preserve the house of God and serve as guards for our common homeland, defending equally against enemies who attack from outside and traitors from within. **282** We are staying right here, before the walls and with the weapons, until either the Romans become exasperated after extending their offers to you, or you yourselves reverse course and set your minds on free things.

**283** At these [remarks] the mass of the Idumeans kept shouting applause, but Iesous withdrew unnerved, seeing the Idumeans in no reasonable state of mind and the city at war from two directions.

## 5. The Anonymous Rogue Disciple (Zealot) to the Idumaeans (4.345–52): 173 words

4:345 Τοῖς δὲ Ἰδουμαίοις ἡδη τῆς παρουσίας μετέμελε καὶ προσίστατο τὰ πραττόμενα.<sup>346</sup> συναγαγὼν δὲ αὐτοὺς τις ἀπὸ τῶν ζηλωτῶν κατ' ἰδίαν ἐλθὼν ἐνεδεικνυτο τὰ συμπαρανομηθέντα τοῖς καλέσσαι καὶ τὸ κατὰ τῆς μητροπόλεως διεξήκει·

**345** By this point, the things that were being done made the Idumeans regret their presence and caused them offense. **346** Someone from the Disciples got them together, came to them privately, pointed out the joint crimes committed by those who had called them, and analyzed the situation in the mother-city:

<sup>347</sup> παρατάσσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχιερέων προδιδομένης Ῥωμαίοις τῆς μητροπόλεως, εὐρηκέναι δὲ προδοσίας μὲν τεκμηριον οὐδέν, τοὺς δ' ἐκείνην ὑποκρινομένους φυλάττεσθαι καὶ πολέμου καὶ τυραννίδος ἔργα τολμώντας. <sup>348</sup> προσηκκει μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς διακωλύειν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἅπαξ εἰς κοινωνίαν ἐμφυλίου φόνου προέπεσον, ὄρον γοῦν ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς ἁμαρτημασι καὶ μὴ παραμένειν χορηγοῦντας ἰσχὺν τοῖς καταλύουσι τὰ πάτρια.

<sup>349</sup> καὶ γὰρ εἴ τινες χαλεπαίνουσι τὸ κλεισθῆναι τὰς πύλας καὶ μὴ δοθῆναι μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων αὐτοῖς ἐτοίμην τὴν εἰσοδον, ἀλλὰ τοὺς εἴρξαντας τετιμωρῆσθαι· καὶ τεθνάναι μὲν Ἄνανον, διεφθάρθαι δὲ ἐπὶ μιᾶς νυκτὸς ὀλίγου δεῖν πάντα τὸν δῆμον· <sup>350</sup> ἐφ' οἷς τῶν μὲν οἰκείων πολλοὺς αἰσθάνεσθαι μετανοοῦντας, τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων δὲ ὄραν ἄμετρον τὴν ὠμότητα μὴ δὲ οὐς ἐσώθησαν αἰδουμένων· <sup>351</sup> ἐν ὄμμασι γοῦν τῶν συμμάχων τὰ αἰσχίστα τολμᾶν, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων παρανομίας Ἰδουμαίοις προσάπτεσθαι, μέχρις ἂν μητε κωλύη τις μητε χωρίζηται τῶν δρωμένων. <sup>352</sup> δεῖν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ διαβολὴ μὲν πέφηνε τὰ τῆς προδοσίας, ἔφοδος δὲ Ῥωμαίων οὐδεμία προσδοκᾶται, δυναστεία δ' ἐπιτετείχισται τῇ πόλει δυσκατάλυτος, αὐτοὺς ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ οἴκου καὶ τῷ μὴ κοινωνεῖν τοῖς φαύλοις ἀπάντων ἀπολογησασθαι περὶ, ὧν φανακισθέντες μετὰσχαιεν.

**347** Although you are in formed up for battle because the mother-city was supposedly being betrayed to Romans by the chief priests, you have found no proof of betrayal – rather, that those pretending to protect it [the city] are brazenly perpetrating war and acts of tyranny. **348** It was your job to prevent [this] from the outset, but since you have fallen in with partnership in internecine murder, you should at least put a lid on your errors and not stay around providing muscle to those who are undoing the ancestral ways.

**349** If some are still harshly disposed because the gates were shut and you were not granted ready access to the mother-city with the weapons, well, those who shut you out have suffered retribution: Ananus has died. Indeed, in a single night the populace was destroyed in very nearly all its parts. **350** As these things were happening, one could perceive that many of your own were changing their minds, whereas among those who had summoned you one could see only unbridled savagery, showing no regard for those by whose agency they had been saved. **351** So, before their allies' very eyes, they brazenly committed the most shameful deeds. Their crimes are being ascribed to you Idumeans too – as long as no one either prevents or detaches himself from the goings-on. **352** Since on the one hand, the betrayal matter has been exposed as slander, and no approach by the Romans is expected, but on the other hand, a power-base that is hard to smash has been ensconced in the city, you need to to withdraw homeward and, by not continuing to partner in all that those vile people do, make the defense that what you did share in was because you were duped.

**353** Now the Idumeans were wholly persuaded by this . . .

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