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### Social networks and intergroup conflict

Takács, Károly

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# **SOCIAL NETWORKS AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT**



**RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN**

**SOCIAL NETWORKS AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT**

**Proefschrift**

ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de  
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Károly Takács

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Promotores: Prof. dr. F.N. Stokman  
Prof. dr. W.B.G. Liebrand

Referenten: Dr. R. Popping  
Dr. A. Flache

Beoordelingscomissie: Prof. dr. G. Bornstein  
Prof. dr. M.W. Macy  
Prof. dr. W. Raub

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Remaining mistakes are mine.

Nemesvámos, April 2002

Károly Takács

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