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Resilience in radicalization prevention

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Conclusion

“All norms implicate us in relations of power” Taylor (2009, p. 52) reminds us in a recurrence to Foucault. But the implication in relations of power is not the issue as long as we are able to “modify, negotiate, and/or reverse these relations”. Norms become an issue if they are “uncritically accepted as natural and necessary”, and if they “increase the capacities and expansion of possibilities to an intensification of existing power relations” (Taylor, 2009, p. 53).

In this dissertation I put forth the research questions: How did resilience become a norm in radicalization prevention? How is resilience enacted? “How does resilience relate to security in radicalization prevention?” In the following I address how I answered these questions, following the chapter structure of this dissertation.

I argued in this dissertation that resilience is a prescriptive norm, which is “uncritically accepted as natural and necessary” in radicalization prevention policies (Taylor, 2009, p. 53). The psy-sciences, particularly development psychology, defined and legitimized what psychological resilience is and how it is operationalized. Clearly, the “what” is not undisputed in the psy-sciences, but this dissertation demonstrated that the most common characteristics are recurrent in radicalization prevention policies and practices. Such characteristics are: emotional self-regulation, self-appreciation, self-esteem, and self-efficacy. I argued that there is a disciplinary component in how norms are established in the psy-sciences as they are not only measured against a medical, or a biopolitical ideal of health but they are also measured against social conformity, or a disciplinary and prescriptive ideal (Foucault, 2003a, p. 162). In accordance with Schwarz (2018, p. 8), I proposed that “[M]ental health and concepts such as resilience are not ontological facts but contain the moral codes of a current society”. To substantiate this claim I traced the moral codes imbued with resilience in relation to radicalization prevention in the psychological conceptualization of resilience as well as in CT and prevention policies which put forth resilience as the solution to radicalization.

Regarding radicalization prevention and the psychological conceptualization of resilience, I argued that the emergence of resilience in policies hinges on a certain psychological conceptualization of radicalization. This conceptualization refers particularly to the elements of a personal crisis, identity issues which might result in a crisis, and frustrations (Kundnani, 2012; Malthaner, 2017, p. 381). While in-group bonding and social ties are assessed as relevant, the main concern in these studies is nonetheless the individual and how “individuals are transformed” and “around a notion of ‘propensity’ to engage in violence, as a particular cognitive-ideological state of an individual” (Malthaner, 2017, p. 282). The assessment of radicalization as a series of risk factors, gives rise to resilience as a preventive intervention, to curtail the risk factors of individuals. In this regard, resilience foremost consists of protective factors and coping mechanisms tailored to the specific risk factors of

radicalization. This dissertation showed that resilience does not just emerge in policies as a result of the introduction of this conceptualization of radicalization, but how also in primary and secondary prevention, practitioners put forth resilience as a solution to the description of a personal or identity crisis, alienation, and the need for a sense of belonging.

In addition, this dissertation also showed that there are country specific differences in the emergence of resilience, which hinge on the threat perspective put forth in the Netherlands and Germany. Inspired by Joseph (2018), I analyzed these differences as “varieties of resilience”. Joseph (2018) argued that the UK, and a particular Anglo-Saxon approach to resilience, is the baseline against which variations can be shown. This approach is due to that he argues other approaches are not “distinct in themselves” rather they are variations of this Anglo-Saxon approach (ibid. 189). In this dissertation I showed that the Netherlands are quite similar to the UK in the timing of incorporating psychological resilience in radicalization prevention policies. In contrast, in Germany resilience in relation to radicalization only emerged around 2016, and while introducing similar governance strategies, still exhibit a variety particularly regarding the element of democratization and an emphasis of creating a resilient society. Joseph (2018) further argued that rather than constituting a governance from a distance, resilience can also lead to a more coercive and disciplinary governance particularly when national security is concerned, which is “not about shifting power away from the state, but it is about shifting or devolving responsibility” (ibid. 189). In contrast to this analysis, I demonstrated that in Germany the introduction of the discourse of radicalization and resilience actually led the state to take over responsibility from NGOs and turned particularly secondary prevention into a more tightly integrated state endeavor. In accordance with this analysis, I demonstrated in detail how the coercive and disciplinary power of specifically psychological resilience unfolds through the enactment of normation and normalization in both primary and secondary prevention in the Netherlands and Germany. The emphasis, and difference of this dissertation, is that I also engaged with how resilience is enacted, to demonstrate practitioners’ critique and appropriation of resilience. This matters, because in accordance with the literature strand, I termed “resilience from below” I was interested in “opportunities afforded by resilience” (Zebrowski and Sage 2017, p. 57) and questioned the overarching assertion that only responsibility is devolved, but never power, particularly in processes of subjectivation.

In the empirical part of this dissertation, I first demonstrated that psychological resilience hinges on the aforementioned psychologized conceptualization of radicalization. In the following I summarize how I traced resilience in the policy documents of the Netherlands and Germany (chapter five and six).

In the Netherlands, radicalization is associated with non-conformity to an ideal of Dutch identity and citizenship (Scholten and Holzhaecker, 2009; Koning, 2020). Radicalization is perceived as a threat first and foremost to social cohesion and public order, and only in second place as a threat to democracy. Therefore, integration policies and radicalization prevention became coalesced, particularly targeting the Muslim minority in the Netherlands (Fadil and de Koning, 2019). But there is a recognizable shift in how radicalization is conceptualized in relevant policies. I traced this shift to show that the understanding of resilience hinges on the conceptualization of radicalization. In the 2000s, the prevention policy still recognized structural issues as factoring into radicalization, hence relating resilience to external structures. Around 2010/11, the prevention part of the official CT strategy put forth a more psychologized understanding of radicalization as an internalized process of self-transformation. Resilience as conceptualized by the psy-sciences emerged.

During the 2000s the Action Plan against radicalization and polarization put forth resilience as solution to these issues. In this plan, strengthening resilience included measures such as access to the labor market and to education, curbing school drop-out, and promoting a housing policy for young people (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007, p. 17). While radicalization was not detached from structural issues, the Action Plan targets these issues on an individual case base. Rather than to roll-out welfare state programs tackling the whole sector of youth unemployment or housing, punctual interventions for single individuals “at-risk” were introduced, based on former programs which targeted youth delinquency. “Person-oriented approaches” to “isolate and contain the radicalized person or organization” were initiated not only to safeguard the individual, but also to protect society (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007, p. 7). At-risk youth and migrants were targeted as “disorderly” subjects who needed to be made productive again to be integrated to society as a form of social defense. Against this backdrop, a marker for resilience was adequate bonding with Dutch society and an assimilation to Dutch culture. As Thomas (2019) pointed out in relation to the UK radicalization programs, identity formation in line with national values became the objective for interventions.

The shift towards a psychologization of radicalization took place around 2010, when radicalization was reduced to “the process of a growing internalisation of a way of thinking”, consequently perceiving a way of thinking, a cognitive change, as a threat, as this leads to a justification of intervening in the pre-crime space: “not only is the actual use of violence relevant, but also the willingness to use violence and the violence potential” (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 69). Against this backdrop, resilience emerges as an internal defence capacity, which differentiates between those who are normal, and those who are abnormal because they internalise “a way of thinking”: “The problem is that this natural resilience can be broken [which] may result in the transition to a willingness to

use violence” (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 70). Resilience is not only a differential category to mark those who are abnormal and must be corrected, resilience becomes the opposite of radicalization. Resilience is then an internalized or even a “natural” capacity and characteristic of normal individuals who do not radicalize. Resilience and radicalization are thus on a continuum, where non-resilience is equated with radicalization. Subsequently, programs to strengthen and restore this resilience were initiated, which particularly target the psyche in form of a self-transformation, a sense of identity and a feeling of belonging.

In order to detect this disorderly behavior and thinking, a whole range of surveillance practices were introduced which permeate the whole population. The CT strategies propose programs for local governments and professionals who work with young people, such as the police, social and youth workers, but also health care professionals and educators to detect signs of radicalization. Subsequently, these young people are normated through individualized interventions programs called “case approach” or “person-oriented approach” (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 68). Heath-Kelly and Shannah (2022, p. 2-3) referred to these programs as a hybrid form of penalty through which the risky individual is supposed to be reformed through welfarist programs, for public protection. In this regard, resilience as social defense against the disorderly becomes entangled with national security objectives. The danger the individual poses is simultaneously a danger to the whole social body. This is not a replacement of security, rather it is an enhancement.

The originality of the Dutch approach, in contrast to other intervention programs, is that these programs do not require the consent of the individual who is subjected to such an intervention. This particularity can be explained through the non-distinction between high or low security risk in the Netherlands. Basically, every suspected radicalization case is handled through the same procedure, but the measures and approaches taken for the case are adjusted in accordance with their individual trajectory. Such measures might be care based, which can be based on consensus with the subject, but non-agreement might lead to more punitive measures, which puts the actual consensual nature in question (Eijkman and Roodnat, 2017). Therefore, I argued that this approach is best analyzed as an expansion of disciplinary power, rather than exertion of pastoral power as in the UK (Martin, 2018).

I selected Germany as a contrasting case to the Netherlands and the UK regarding radicalization as well as resilience, because Germany’s distinct past turned the engagement with extremism, and subsequently radicalization, into a constitutional matter. Germany’s constitution includes the principle of “militant democracy”, meaning that democracy must be able to defend itself against a totalitarian state take over. Therefore, in Germany, extremism and by extension radicalization is still first and foremost considered to be a

threat against the democratic constitution of the state, and only subordinated as a threat to security and social cohesion. This differentiation is also discernable when considering why Germany does not have its own Counter-terrorism strategy, as most other European countries do, but rather refers to the constitution with regards to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization. The German constitution is unique as it does not only apply to penal law, but also to an “institutional and societal/discursive dimension” (Berczyk and Vermeulen, 2015). Hence, Germany’s extremism and radicalization prevention policies are an extension of this principle and constantly refer back to the constitution. This matters with regards to resilience, because prevention does not simply entail to foster resilient subjectivities, but rather resilience entails the whole population, to foster democratization. As such the meaning of resilience becomes imbued with being properly democratized, as only democratized citizens do not pose a threat to the democratic constitution of the state.

Therefore, Germany is a contrasting case to the Netherlands and the UK, because Germany’s prevention focus is not only on individuals, but targets society as a whole through political education, civic engagement in democratic processes and a strong commitment to a pluralistic society. Societal inclusion to the prevention effort is exemplified by including several institutional levels of the government into the prevention effort (such as local and municipal “partnerships for democracy”). Such partnerships aim at the promotion of democracy and pluralism as well as anti-racism and anti-discrimination measures. State institutions, such as the military and the police, also become targets of this prevention approach, for example through raising awareness against racial profiling in the police. A further notable difference in Germany’s prevention approach is the role of NGO’s, which the prevention strategy refers to as promoting an active civil society. Indeed, NGO’s have a quite active role in the German prevention effort in primary as well as secondary prevention. Specifically, the active role of NGO’s in secondary prevention is a unique feature (Baaken *et al.*, 2020), because secondary prevention is in most European countries a matter handled by the state as security is at stake. But until radicalization was introduced, the German state did not want to engage with prevention measures which could be publicly perceived as a restriction of freedom of speech and hence as an anti-democratic state intervention. Therefore, NGO’s handled radicalization prevention programs as a more neutral and trustworthy actor. To conclude, Germany’s prevention measures target society as a whole with the main aim of creating resilience through strengthening a democratic awareness.

But there are also programs in Germany targeting the individual. Even before the radicalization discourse took hold in international and national security discourses, in Germany a binary existed between being “extremist” and being “democratic”. Extremism and extremists are outside the legitimate political order and constitute a threat. Oppenhäuser (Oppenhäuser quoted after Bürgin, p. 17) analysed this conceptualization of extremism as

related to Foucault's differentiation between normal and abnormal, where normal refers to health. Programs existed to target extremism through social work and normalize deviating individuals already in the 1990s. Extremists were also the target of surveillance by the intelligence sector. But crucially, only the introduction of radicalization led to an increased interaction and cooperation between intelligence services, the police, social and youth work and NGO's working in the field of extremism prevention. Radicalization is constitutive for this entanglement, because it puts thinking and acting in a causal relationship to each other, allowing to intervene in what was dubbed the "pre-crime" space. In Germany, it becomes even more visible that resilience follows the introduction of radicalization. As radicalization is conceptualized as an internal development, resilience becomes the answer as an equally internalized capacity of becoming resilient against radicalization. Resilience also emerges in relation to Islamist extremism, as a proper identity formation of migrant youth, similar to the Netherlands and the UK (Martin, 2019).

But based on Germany's previous differentiation between extremist and democratic, also the continuum radicalized and resilient is imbued with this former differentiation. The goal is not only to correct individuals and to reintegrate them to society, but to democratize them. Resilience gets a democratic connotation, in which being resilient corresponds to "personal responsibility, openness and reflexivity" (Kart *et al.*, 2022, p. 5). Also in Germany, resilience and radicalization are thus on a continuum, where non-resilience is equated with radicalization and extremism. Again, this introduces resilience as social defense against the disorderly which is entangled with national security objectives. The danger the individual poses is simultaneously a danger to the whole social body. Again, this does not lead to a replacement of security, but to an enhancement. This enhancement is particularly visible in Germany, as the state started to incorporate tasks to state institutions, which were previously a matter for NGO's.

Both cases demonstrate that there was a shift from repressive counter-terrorism measures, mainly targeted through law, to pre-repression (a combination of prevention and repression) through radicalization prevention measures, mainly targeted through care but also coercive measures in the pre-crime space. Care and coercion measures are spearheaded by a turn to resilience, as resilience offers a justification for preventive intervention through a recourse to health and social conformity, rather than to law. This shift is accompanied by functional de-differentiation which means that health care, social and youth work as well as education become part of the security realm to preventively surveil populations, detect those at-risk of radicalizing, and to intervene in the name of national security. I call this "functional de-differentiation" in accordance with Schinkel (2011) who proposed that pre-repression, a repressive intervention before a crime occurs through preventive means, works in conjuncture with "functional de-differentiation" because this mixture of prevention

and repression leads to new institutional arrangements, including social and security actors, which weakens professional boundaries and clashes with their primary mandates (Schinkel, 2011). I showed that in the Netherlands and Germany, the shift to radicalization prevention through resilience leads to a functional de-differentiation, albeit in different forms, and in the process enhances security.

Therefore, I disagree with the Critical Security Studies literature which argues that resilience is a replacement of security (Walker and Cooper 2011; Zebrowski 2016) I do not contest that resilience is based on an ontology of insecurity. But in contrast to other areas of security, in which citizens become responsabilized to care for their own security and the state functions as a facilitator, the introduction of psychological resilience as social defense led to more state interventions carrying out social control. In the state of the art, I identified a second strand of Critical Security Studies literature, concerned particularly with counter-terrorism, which argues that resilience is an enhancement of security (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015; Hardy 2015; Jore 2020). Rather than interpreting the shift from state responsibility to a variety of other actors as a roll-back of security, these studies argue that the state extends its reach through incorporating ever new actors in the security effort, thereby enhancing security. I agree with this second strand and contributed to this strand by showing that psychological resilience introduces a disciplinary governance of normating and normalizing individuals, tying social control more firmly to national security.

Regarding psychological resilience as a norm, the policy analysis showed that this norm “increases the capacities and expansion of possibilities to an intensification of existing power relations” as the same power relations moved to the pre-crime space (Taylor, 2009, p. 53). However, this move is also contested and it becomes modified and negotiated. I chose instances of primary and secondary prevention to research the governance through resilience in practice and to put “resilience from above” and “resilience from below” in conversation with each other. Primary and secondary prevention are thereby more than just case studies in relation to the selected countries, as I showed how this governance is indicative of a public health governance through resilience. The differentiation of these different stages of prevention are independent from the countries. Rather, they follow a medical reasoning of disease prevention. Hence, I argued that resilience is a therapeutic governance, which I captured through “affective governmentality”.

Common in the governance through resilience in both cases is the governance of and through affect. I used Penz and Sauer’s (2020, p. 48) notion of “affective governmentality” to show the productivity of affects in relation to normation and normalization processes through resilience, because they argue that “the governmentalization of the state [...] has strongly relied on normation processes, on the alignment of conduct and affect, according to a given norm”.

As I demonstrated, resilience is indeed a governance of affective states, tied to emotional regulation and correction, exercised through affect of those who govern through resilience.

Regarding primary prevention, I chose the Bounce program to showcase how psychological resilience as a norm is enacted through affective governmentality. “Bounce – Resilience Training for Youngsters” is a program which proposes to strengthen psychological resilience through emotional literacy, self-regulation, enhancement of self-efficacy and self-esteem. As such the training consists of exercises eliciting affects in subjects and subsequently these affects are rendered tangible through a rationalization of these experiences into emotions. It is not only important to target what individuals are thinking and how they behave, it is important to shape how they feel. The ordering of these emotions is a normation process, as there is a pre-selection of which emotions are helpful to prevent radicalization, and those that are not helpful and must be corrected. Therefore, I argued that the Bounce training is a perpetuation of a normative-disciplinary system to install social conformity, as resilience as a norm is pre-determined in this program. Additionally, I elaborated that this form of affective subjectivation is part of a bigger turn towards “therapeutic education”, which criticizes that this form of governance individualizes socio-economic inequalities (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009; Burman, 2018).

But I also showed how resilience is appropriated by social and youth work, to challenge and contest threat perspectives imposed by security concerns as well as an individualized notion of resilience. Regarding Bounce, social and youth work is converging prevention with another discursive regime, because as professionals their perspective is driven by a broad understanding of prevention. This broad understanding of prevention counters a narrow threat-based approach, because they perceive the discourse of radicalization as stigmatizing and refuse to replicate it and they focus on the individual and his/her development, rather than if a person is constituting a threat. These findings do not only correspond to my particular setting, but similar findings were also noted in relation to radicalization prevention in the UK and in a different setting in Germany (Stanley, Guru and Gupta, 2018; Doering, Roeing and von Boemcken, 2020). Hence, from a professional standpoint, social and youth workers use resilience to push back against a securitized notion of radicalization prevention, because in their perspective the security driven prevention approach renders individuals into threats for society. In contrast, resilience allows them to see their clients as in need of support and care, and strengthening their resilience also safeguards their clients from surveillance and prosecution. To conclude, particularly regarding primary prevention it is questionable if such practices should include a threat perspective at all. As social and youth workers pointed out it is detrimental to their work. Therefore, further research might inquire if this threat perspective which was included through the notion of radicalization is not counter-productive with regards to the primary aims of this work.

Furthermore, social and youth workers questioned the prescriptive character of resilience as norm. Whereas resilience in development psychology is measured against “age-salient development tasks” and social conformity such as school success, social and youth work tend to not start from a prescriptive norm of what it means to be resilient, but rather start from the subject. “Just being you is enough” was the key phrase in relation to Bounce, stressing that the aim is not to correct or improve a subject, but understanding resilience from the needs and perspective of the subject in question. Practitioners stressed that a self-appreciative relation to oneself is important in this context, but not measured against an external goal to how such a relation is supposed to look like, but is meant as a goal in and of itself. From this perspective, resilience can take different forms as long as it corresponds “to who you are”. Furthermore, practitioners stressed that there is a relational element to resilience, as support is a necessary component of resilience, challenging an individualized notion of resilience. This demonstrates that practitioners re-signify resilience, to shape the meaning in accordance with what they consider to be the primary aim of their work namely to support individuals in their own trajectory. I acknowledge that this does not challenge for example socio-economic inequality, but it shows that normalization is subverted and modified, and thereby challenges rather than intensifies existing power relations.

Furthermore, I discerned country differences with regards to resilience during the coding process, which I elaborated in two sub-chapters (chapter 6). These elaborations demonstrated how the policies of the countries relate to the interview accounts.

Bounce was implemented in Augsburg, a German city, and in the interviews with prevention practitioners from Germany a strong reference to democracy enhancement and building stood out. This was interesting, because it demonstrated consistency with the policy approach of Germany. Even the organization of prevention in Augsburg exhibited this commitment to democracy, as all prevention practitioners could make suggestions and raise issues during meetings. Regarding the societal aspect of resilience building in Germany, practitioners indeed described radicalization prevention as a societal task for example through challenging discrimination against minorities. In this setting also the role of NGOs in the prevention effort, which is a rather unique feature of Germany, demonstrated a challenging aspect of this organization of societal resilience, namely that there was also critique towards the state. I highlight this point, because it is important to note that critique towards state structures and policies constitutes an important contestation of the individualized psychological resilience discourse. It is important because the psychologized individualization of the radicalization-resilience discourse detaches such processes from the state, although previous conceptualizations of radicalization, stemming from social movement studies, demonstrated that radicalization is a relational process including the state (della Porta and Haupt, 2012). This form of societal resilience, which according to the

policies is supposed to be bulwark against extremism and radicalization, hence is sensitive towards all actors and processes which might impact radicalization. Therefore, it constitutes a good starting point for further research inquiring a form of societal resilience which is sensitive to existing power relations.

Bounce was also implemented in Groningen, a Dutch city, and in the interviews with prevention practitioners from the Netherlands a strong individualistic sense of building resilience stood out as did awareness raising for radicalization to remove the taboo on the topic. But the interviews also showed that practitioners raise critique and concern towards this individualistic approach, as it neglects discrimination and socio-economic inequality. This was highlighted with regards to resilience, as resilience was strongly related to self-sufficiency and active citizenship. I would like to point out, that practitioners were not generally opposed to the idea of raising awareness towards radicalization and removing the taboo on the topic, rather there was a concern with blaming particular groups which they perceived as discriminatory. One practitioner in Germany said during an interview “we cannot talk about the radicals, without talking about the society in which they emerge”, which is a concern which neatly captures what practitioners in the Netherlands also pointed out, by saying “I think every, the whole society is responsible for the behavior of people within it. And if there is a trouble with radicalization, it means there is something wrong in the society” (Interview 24, NL, 26/02/2020). These instances demonstrated that the individualistic conceptualization of resilience in relation to radicalization prevention are questioned and the topic of critique on the ground. This matters because it showed in accordance with Butler (1997) that while one cannot escape normalization, there is room for contestation.

With this research I contributed to a strand in the resilience literature which I termed “resilience from below” as these studies investigate the relation between policy discourses and the actual enactment of resilience, demonstrating how neoliberal governmentalities of resilience are challenged on the ground (Ryan, 2013; Vilcan, 2017; Zebrowski and Sage, 2017; Krüger and Albris, 2020). While I do not neglect that resilience as therapeutic education individualizes socio-economic inequalities, an issue I see as indicative of a neoliberal governmentality (Martineau, 1999), I also demonstrated that how practitioners enact and critique resilience challenges individualizing aspects of resilience. This approach follows Zebrowski and Sage’s (2017, p. 57) interpellation to “explore” “opportunities afforded by resilience”, without falling into the trap of reaffirming practices “we ultimately seek to problematise”. None of my interviewees put forth to dismiss resilience altogether, rather they affirmed parts which they found useful and critiqued parts they found problematic. I followed their accounts demonstrating critique, but also taking seriously that there are opportunities afforded by resilience.

Regarding secondary prevention, I chose programs in both countries which engage with individuals who were assessed to be “at-risk” of radicalizing. I showed that resilience in such programs is a pre-determined norm to which deviating subjects shall be restored. With restoration I do not mean that subjects are returned to a previous state, but rather to a correct state, implying a transformation with a pre-determined outcome. The incentive for subjects to comply with these programs and its requirements of self-transformation is that this self-transformation is a redemption process and a form of recognition.

Regarding redemption, the incentive is that after this process subjects are welcomed to society again. De Koning (2020, p. 135) even points this out with regards to the radicalization prevention approach of the Netherlands: “[t]he counter-radicalization approach carries with it a prospect of redemption and change within the racialized framework set by the state“. I argued for both the Netherlands and Germany, that resilience as aim of subjectivation draws on the necessity of recognition. Butler (2015, p. 24) stresses that even in disciplinary power subjectivation does not work through subjugation alone, but also needs the desire of the subject to be subjectivated. This desire stems from the need of recognition from the other in order to have a societal existence (ibid.). As such disciplinary power works through the desire of the subject to be recognized by the other, as an internalization of the norm, restored through affective relationality.

Commonalities of this affective subjectivation through resilience are techniques originating in medicine. The case approach and the restoration of resilience starts with an anamnesis, a diagnostic practice to determine the individual problems that might lead to radicalization. These individual problems are subsequently tackled to improve the subject in question through therapeutic means. Confessionary practices of truth-telling are part of this approach, the removal of guilt, and accepting the goal of self-transformation. This self-transformation process entails to restore an affective relation to the self, to regain self-confidence as a protective factor in order not to fall for the lure of extremist groups. In the same vein, a sense of belonging to society is restored through the affective relationships created by the councilors in this therapeutic setting. Since the radicalizing subject is supposed to be at odds with the society because it feels as if it does not belong and does not receive the recognition it wants, this approach also has the function to transmit and restore these feelings in caring relationships. The case approach and the counseling institution thereby serve as a way to showcase an alternative to a deviant and problematic social environment, supporting the individual in their own aspirations to become part of this environment. Affect is thereby important in a double bind: the people responsible for case management work through affective relations to the subject, through care, concern and interest towards the issues of the subject in question, while the target of these interventions is the affective relation of the subject to the self as well as to society. Regarding the research question of how resilience is

enacted in practice, I conclude that resilience is enacted through affective subjectivation and therapeutic practices.

However, I also discerned differences in the goals of this restoration, as resilience as pre-determined norm amounts to social conformity. Again, there is strong element of self-sufficiency and productivity in the Netherlands, in line with the radicalization prevention goal of social cohesion in the Netherlands. In contrast and in line with the German approach, there is a strong component of democratizing subjects and teaching awareness for tolerance and ambiguity.

Regarding the question of security in secondary prevention, security is again enhanced through these practices. Security is enhanced as case management leads to a functional de-differentiation of social and care professionals and security professionals. Within these practices Sievenbring and Malmros (2021, p. 54 emphasis in the original) note that these efforts are “striking a balance between security measures and social preventive measures”. They identify these two logics as a form of disciplinary struggle between “repressive approaches that emphasize restrictive and punitive measures” and “welfare approaches, the so-called soft measures that mimic programs and methods designed to handle other forms of youth delinquency” (p. 54-55). I problematized these approaches through the concepts of pre-pression and functional de-differentiation, because a) these practices take place in the pre-crime space and therefore widen the influence of security concerns and potentially repressive interventions, and b) because security concerns, or in other words a threat perspective, tends to be detrimental to the primary mandates of the social and care professionals involved in these settings (McKendrick and Finch, 2017; Stanley, Guru and Gupta, 2018; Haugstvedt and Tuastad, 2021). Regarding the two cases I analyzed, I showed that security concerns are outweighing other goals and concerns in case management. However, there are differences in how case management settings engage with the question of security, which also showed that security concerns can become a “negotiated practice” and are not that clear-cut (Silke and Fadil, 2019).

I proposed the Netherlands as a case management model of horizontal negotiation, because social and security actors discuss and assess a case together, giving social and care professionals an equal role in this process. The Dutch case showcases some particularities in case management as the municipality is responsible for this approach, rather than a specialized program or institutions, which also means that the mayor is responsible for including and releasing someone from case management. Additionally, so called “high-risk” cases can be part of case management, which is unusual. Overall, functional de-differentiation is more pronounced in this setting, described for example in the following quote: “it is about understanding all these disciplines [...] work in that chain, and that you

all have responsibility for that one person that we are worrying about” (Interview 30). This is an active crossing of institutional boundaries, which leads to a weakening of the primary mandates of distinct institutions, as for example the police is supposed to care and show empathy towards radicalizing subjects, while care and social professionals are supposed to assess the threat a person might pose to national security. In this context, I again highlight the productive role of affect in increasing functional de-differentiation. In Dutch case management the security imperative is somewhat challenged by the notion of care and concern, in which actually also the security sector is taught empathy and understanding for the radicalizing to enroll them to case management as well as by giving social and care professionals an equal say in the assessment process. Nonetheless these interventions in the pre-crime space, particularly since they are based on involuntary participation, constitute an enhancement of security.

I proposed Germany as a case management model of hierarchical negotiation, as well as an exemplary case demonstrating that the introduction of radicalization prevention allowed the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to access the pre-crime space through prevention. The German case of Signpost falls under the category of hierarchical organization, because Signpost is institutionally embedded within the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, but there is a supposedly strict hierarchical functional differentiation between the two organizations, which is negotiated along the lines of prevention and security. Signpost is responsible for individuals that are prevention cases, whereas the VS is responsible for so called “security-relevant” cases, which refers to “high-risk” cases. Clearly, the difference is not always that clear cut, and in some cases, Signpost has to decide if an individual is “security relevant” and has to report these individuals (Interview 39). Therefore, Signpost to some extent does a form of “pre-screening” in assessing the riskiness of an individual. Otherwise, Signpost is a counseling program similar to Channel. Only cases that are not security relevant can be addressed by Signpost, and Signpost and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution do not work in parallel on cases. This is similar to the Channel differentiation, were individuals who are under surveillance cannot be part of a prevention program (Martin, 2019, p. 127). Additionally, as with Channel cases, participation in the Signpost counseling program is voluntary. In German case management the security imperative is somewhat challenged by trying to maintain a functional differentiation through a division of labor between the security institution and the prevention program. But the issue that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution established its own prevention program, is in itself an enhancement of security in the pre-crime space.

An issue and further line of inquiry which would be fruitful is the question of accountability in either form of cooperation. The question which arises for me is, if all of these institutions and professions are supposed to cooperate, which institution could exert external control

without having its own stake? Second, social and youth workers stressed several times in different interviews (primary and secondary prevention) that they have an advocacy role for their clients. I am not sure if it is possible to resolve the contradiction of being an advocate for one's client, but also to be suspicious about that client at the same time. I think this is also a matter of accountability, because it is a difference if one is accountable for national security or the well-being of a client.

In conclusion, and as a reflection, I started this dissertation in 2017 when resilience was not yet a big topic in radicalization prevention. In the interviews I conducted with specialized organizations in 2019, resilience was not yet a major theme, and yet I encountered entries about the productivity of resilience of the same organizations around 2021-22. In this regard, it was difficult to find adequate cases to study the role and the enactment of psychological resilience in radicalization prevention practices. This is due to the fact, that resilience has not been a major, but an emerging issue back then. Nowadays, and with regards to further research, I assume it would be possible to study the meaning, enactment and productivity of resilience in this field through one ethnographic field research site, showing different discourses of resilience for example. Further research should also strive for extending our knowledge about resilience through interviews with persons subjected to case management for example, although privacy and legal concerns might still impede access (at least this was the barrier I encountered). Overall, I believe this dissertation is the first analysis focusing on psychological resilience as a norm in counter-terrorism policies, demonstrating that resilience is a normalization and normation of subjects. This dissertation is also a first step in researching resilience from the perspective of radicalization prevention practitioners. I explored its enactment in practice and thereby offer an empirical contribution, contrasting, reaffirming and disputing the assumptions about resilience in policies through 40 interviews with practitioners in primary and secondary prevention in Germany and the Netherlands.