university of groningen

University Medical Center Groningen

University of Groningen

Resilience in radicalization prevention

Gruber, Barbara

DOI:
10.33612/diss.675764944

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:
2023

Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database

Citation for published version (APA):
Gruber, B. (2023). *Resilience in radicalization prevention: a study about resilience as a norm in primary and secondary prevention in Germany and the Netherlands*. [Thesis fully internal (DIV), University of Groningen]. University of Groningen. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.675764944

Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.

Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.

Download date: 20-04-2024

5

The Netherlands – a Radicalization Prevention Pioneer

The Netherlands is not only one of the pioneers in establishing a counter-terrorism approach including radicalization prevention, but more importantly the Algemene Inlichtigen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) coined the concept of radicalization as used in many contemporary prevention policies (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018; Fadil, De Koning and Ragazzi, 2019). In the aftermath of 9/11, the warnings of the AIVD that Islamist terrorism is becoming a major threat gained traction in the Netherlands. As a result of two political high-profile murders[12] in the early 2000s, the Dutch cemented their pioneering role in counter-terrorism and radicalization prevention policy making not only in the Netherlands but also in the European Union and European countries (Vidino, 2008; Ragazzi, 2014; Kundnani and Hayes, 2018). The AIVD introduced a new prevention conceptualization, based on the idea that radicalization is an individual process that can be recognized, before an individual commits a violent act (Coolsaet, 2019; Fadil and de Koning, 2019). Based on this conceptualization of radicalization, resilience as psychological norm and internal defense capacity to prevent radicalization emerges in Dutch CT policies.

In this chapter I trace the emergence of resilience in Dutch counter-terrorism and radicalization prevention policies after 9/11. Resilience in relation to radicalization prevention is deriving from development psychology which ventured first into crime prevention (see chapter 2), and as I show in this chapter from there resilience is taken up in radicalization prevention. Resilience in development psychology is described as protective factor during times of adversity, very close to how the Dutch Counterterrorism (CT) strategies will use resilience as internal defense capacity starting in 2011. But I also show how resilience receives a particular Dutch connotation, illustrating that resilience is a marker for social conformity. In 2007, the Dutch government published its first policy strategy to prevent radicalization called "Actieplan polarisatie and radicalisering 2007-2011" (Ministry of the Interior and Kingodm Relations, 2007). This plan was based on a predecessor document called "Resilience and Integration Policy" (Weerbaarheid and Integratiebeleid), entangling resilience in radicalization prevention with integration (Koning, 2020, p. 130). In the same period, first research was published about protective factors to prevent radicalization how to strengthen psychological resilience in the Netherlands (Meertens, 2007). These factors, as well as the Action Plan followed a youth crime prevention approach and put forth that radicalization was also caused by structural factors for example housing, employment and education for example. Hence, resilience in the first Action Plan was seen as a result of a stable living situation as well as integration in form of cultural assimilation. I include this because the

12 In 2002, rightist politician Pim Fortuyn, who supported anti migration politics, was attacked by an environmentalist (Ragazzi, 2014, p. 7).
In 2004, the Dutch filmmaker and Islam critic Theo van Gogh was attacked by the Hofstadgroep, a loose network of militant Islamists.

policy analysis shows a shift to a psychological understanding of resilience, suggesting that structural conditions (housing, employment etc.) no longer matter, while in chapter eight I show that case management in practice exhibits both: a psychological understanding of resilience, as well as one corresponding to stable living situations. Additionally, it is important to discuss the first Action Plan to demonstrate the relation between resilience and integration/cultural assimilation.

In the first CT strategy of 2011, and the follow-up strategy of 2016, two notable shifts took place. One shift was towards a public health-based approach of preventing radicalization. The second shift was to reduce radicalization to a psychological process (Kundnani, 2012; Malthaner, 2017). A public health based approach follows an epidemiological model and places more emphasis on prevention (Kruglanski *et al.*, 2007; Bhui and Jones, 2017; Heath-Kelly, 2017b). Subsequently, the three tier model of prevention based on primary, secondary and tertiary prevention was introduced (cf. also Castel, 1991). Against these two backdrops, resilience as a psychological norm emerges, and introduces a disciplinary-normative system to normalize susceptible populations, and normate deviating individuals. At the same time, more extensive studies about how to apply psychological resilience in relation to radicalization prevention were carried out in the Netherlands, and influenced policy making (see chapter 3) (Doosje, Loseman and van den Bos, 2013; Feddes, Mann and Doosje, 2015; Mann *et al.*, 2015; Sieckelinck and De Winter, 2015). In contrast to the Action Plan of 2007, structural factors no longer play a role for conceptualization radicalization or resilience. In this decade, the Dutch connotation of relating resilience firmly to integration is also discernable in these strategies, and I will show how resilience as cultural assimilation is not only a continuity, but gets stronger.

The introduction of resilience in radicalization prevention takes place against the backdrop of an increasing securitization of social, educational and health care professions as they become incorporated in the prevention effort. This in cooperation is caused by the public health approach, which emphasizes the need for a broader engagement and early intervention. CSS scholars analyzed this securitization of social policy especially in the UK, but more recently also in other European countries (Ragazzi, 2014, 2016; O'Donnell, 2016; Ragazzi, 2017; Stanley, Guru and Gupta, 2018; Jukschat and Leimbach, 2019). In this regard, I show how the Netherlands differs from other countries especially the UK, because the local government is responsible for radicalization prevention, rather than the police. Additionally, in contrast to other individualized intervention programs for the radicalizing (Lindekilde, 2012; Martin, 2019), the Dutch program is involuntary, illustrating that resilience is part of a disciplinary-normative system of normating and normalizing. I analyze the cooperation between the local government, the police, social, educational and health care professionals as "functional de-differentiation". Schinkel (2011) proposed that "pre-pression", a repressive intervention

before a crime occurs through preventive means, works in conjuncture with "functional de-differentiation" because this mixture of prevention and repression leads to new institutional arrangements, including social and security actors, which weakens professional boundaries and clashes with their primary mandates (Schinkel, 2011). I show that in the Netherlands the shift to radicalization prevention through resilience leads to a functional de-differentiation and in the process enhances security.

5.1 The emergence and context of resilience in Dutch Radicalization Prevention

> "The city's [note: Amsterdam] municipal authority sought to create an 'early warning' system that could identify young Muslims who were ideologically radicalizing and then intervene to stem this process [...] And so the pre-emptive strategy at the heart of contemporary CVE policies was born: a 'Minority Report' scenario in which 'pre-criminals' are identified and targeted for intervention prior to any crime being committed" (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018, p. 6).

In this section I trace the pre-emptive approach of radicalization prevention back to crime prevention programs in "at-risk" neighborhoods in the Netherlands and show how crime prevention and integration issues got entangled with the emerging radicalization prevention practices and discourses. I seek to show that the understanding of resilience hinges on the conceptualization of radicalization. Accordingly, I illustrate first how resilience in the First Action Plan engaging with radicalization and polarization prevention running from 2007-2011, was not only concerned with the psyches of susceptible individuals and groups, but with structural issues such as housing, employment and education. Secondly, I illustrate how a distinctly psychological understanding of resilience emerges, when radicalization was psychologized.

The governance of risk profiling, which is nowadays so prominent in radicalization prevention, is remarkable similar to the governance of Dutch youth crime prevention in the 1990s (Van Swaaningen 2002, p. 268). In the 1990s, youth crime prevention policies established recognizable signs for deviancy and established early warning systems in order to intervene pre-emptively. To exemplify, so-called "systematic offenders", often with a Moroccan background, were integrated into "intensive programmes of training, geared to their individual situation" (ibid.). The current governance of radicalization, for example through correcting troubling individuals and intervening in high-risk areas, resembles this youth crime prevention approach. Furthermore, (youth) crime prevention programs were modelled in accordance with an epidemiological approach towards prevention, differentiating between primary, secondary and tertiary prevention (ibid. 268). In a similar vein, radicalization policies were later on modelled in accordance with an epidemiological prevention approach,

introducing primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. Moreover, specific programs for high-risk radicalization cases were established, paralleling the intensive training programs for crime offenders. To sum up, in the Netherlands, radicalization prevention was modelled on (youth) crime prevention, especially targeting "high-risk profiles" in the pre-crime space.[13] In the following I will sketch out how this approach was adapted for radicalization prevention and how resilience was introduced as a consequence.

The introduction of this governance was taking place against the backdrop of a growing controversy of immigration policy and politics. Hence, radicalization prevention served to "expand the already existing link between security and integration" (Fadil and de Koning, 2019, p. 58). Accordingly, the first Action Plan issued to tackle the problem of radicalization, portrays radicalization as a result of failed multiculturalism:

> "The greatest threat to the Dutch democratic legal order is currently the existence of a broad social problem in which interethnic confrontations are provoked in an atmosphere of frustration about the Dutch 'multicultural' society on both the native and immigrant sides. Ongoing inter-ethnic confrontations can in the long run threaten the cohesion in Dutch society'. The AIVD 2006 annual report pays special attention to the increase in Islamic radicalization: 'The radicalization process among young migrants is continuing. The Salafist movement in the Netherlands, which, although not calling for violence, does preach an anti-integration and intolerant message, is an important driver in this regard. To prevent radicalization from further increasing, both a repressive and a preventive approach are necessary." (Ministry of the Interior and Kingodm Relations, 2007, p. 2)

Before engaging with resilience in the repressive and preventive approach of the Dutch Action Plan against polarization and radicalization, I will shortly contextualize the controversy regarding multi-culturalism in the Netherlands. This matters, because it allows me to show that resilience is a marker for social conformity, which in the case of Dutch radicalization prevention is specifically related to cultural assimilation, as it mainly targets "otherness".
During the 1990s the Dutch integration model was perceived as "multicultural", which means that "the recognition and accommodation of cultural, ethnic and religious groups in society will lead to their successful emancipation into the Dutch multicultural society" (Duyvendak and Scholten, 2011). As a consequence, policies aimed at first preserving the identity of immigrant in-groups, before integrating them to Dutch society (Scholten and Holzhacker, 2009). A concrete example is that Dutch schools taught foreign languages as first languages

---

13 For more information on the overlap of youth crime and radicalization prevention see (cf. Heath-Kelly and Shanaáh, 2022b, 2022a)

to minority groups, before teaching Dutch as a second language. However, in the early 2000s, the appreciation of multiculturalism as an integration model changed significantly. This turn was illustrated by the "Scheffer debate" pillorying multiculturalism as "tragedy", exemplifying the issue through dilemmas such as "imams ma[king] radical statements about homosexuals, or refus[ing] to cooperate with the female Minister for Integration" (Scholten, 2013, p. 104). Furthermore, multiculturalism was made responsible for problems such as "urban segregation, criminality, radicalization and alienation of signification groups within Dutch society" (Scholten, 2013, p. 97). Especially Islam was singled out as being particularly incompatible with liberal and secular Dutch values (Koning, 2020). In the 2000s, there was a discernable shift in the integration policies. The new integration model stressed the importance of "preserving Dutch identity and culture", and put an emphasis on individual achievement, for example through concepts such as "active citizenship", leading to a stronger focus on cultural assimilation, rather than preserving different cultural identities (Duyvendak and Scholten, 2011). This new policy approach not only influenced integration, but also spilled over into other policy areas.

This new integration model based on cultural assimilation was introduced in crime and radicalization prevention policies (Schinkel and Van Houdt, 2010; Eijkman, Lettinga and Verbossen, 2012). To exemplify, "active citizenship" was used for crime prevention, as active citizens are vigilant becoming "the eyes on the street" of the government, and form "preventive communities" (van Houdt and Schinkel, 2014, p. 56). Apart from the turn to assimilation, van Houdt and Schinkel (2014) also note that this shift allowed for a "selectively tough state" in relation to crime prevention. Since multiculturalist policies were reproached for being too lenient, which led to more insecurity regarding crime and neighborhood safety, the new spirit allowed for a "tougher" intervention approach. I discern this tough approach, or as I would call it a disciplinarian notion, as well as the assimilation strategy also in the first Action Plan engaging with radicalization.

In accordance with this contextualization, resilience in the Action Plan is referring a) to an assimilation, and b) to a punctual responsibilization of the Dutch Muslim community to police themselves. The second resilience refers to a strategy of taming Islam, by strengthening moderate streams of Islam to counter the more radical streams (General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), 2010). This is based on the AIVD report called "Resilience and Resistance" pointing out that "Salafist centres and mosques" are no longer a "breeding ground" for radicalization, but rather positioned themselves against "violence in the name of Islam" (Sieckelinck and De Winter, 2015, p. 26). I will engage with the first reference of resilience as cultural assimilation, as it is relevant for explaining how resilience becomes an individualized psychological quality later on.

There are notable differences in the first Action Plan concerning polarization and radicalization on the national level, when comparing it to the later policies and plans. These differences especially concern the conceptualization of radicalization and the reasons for radicalization. This is relevant, because the conceptualization of resilience changes as a result of how radicalization is analyzed. In 2007, radicalization is inter alia caused by structural issues. The policy outlines that an effective radicalization prevention is not only a security issue but concerns also "employment, education, security, integration, emancipation, health care, housing, youth policy, foreign policy" (Ministry of the Interior and Kingodm Relations, 2007, p. 17). On the national level, the tackling of "breeding grounds" for radicalization is noted. In the policy "breeding grounds" are described as access to the labor market and education, curbing school drop-out, and promoting a housing policy for young people (ibid. p. 17). Resilience is associated with "offering people opportunities to participate fully in Dutch society" (ibid. p. 21). Therefore, the first of the three objectives of this Action Plan, refers to prevention as 1) "preventing (further) processes of isolation, polarization and radicalization by (again) including people who are in danger of slipping or turning away from Dutch society and the democratic legal order. Particular consideration should be given to inclusion through "training, internships and work" (ibid. p. 13). In this regard, prevention in relation to radicalization prevention recognizes that employment and education have an impact on

Regarding resilience, the Action Plan outlines in relation to this first goal: "increasing the resilience and bonding to society of individuals and groups that are susceptible to polarization and radicalization, and their environment (parents/educators, etc.)" (Ministry of the Interior and Kingodm Relations, 2007, p. 18). In accordance with the aim of "bonding", resilience is supposed to be increased through "promoting knowledge and skills of democratic citizenship", through including parents in training programs to support them engage with radical ideas of their children and properly integrating young people in the labor market. In this regard, resilience is concerned with assimilation as mainly foreigners are supposed to be familiarized with Dutch culture and values and be integrated as productive citizens into society. Consequently, resilience as a marker for social conformity is entangled with cultural assimilation.

Resilience in relation to Dutch radicalization prevention becomes entangled with the rejection of multiculturalism and a more disciplinarian approach towards prevention. Resilience is hereby for the first time mentioned as an ideal state, as what ought to be, as designating an internal defense capacity of susceptible individuals and groups. Increasing this resilience is described as bringing them closer to society, and thus closer to a societal standard. While resilience is already conceptualized as internal defense capacity, resilience is also related to employment for example. In this Action Plan, resilience depends on structural factors, such as employment as stability factor, because these structural factors are a cause

for radicalization. This changed in the next decade, when resilience is at least in the policies devoid of structural elements such as housing, employment or education.

In the first Action Plan pre-emptive intervention was introduced through two goals: 1) "the early identification of these processes by administrators and professionals and the development of an adequate approach" and 2) "excluding people who have crossed clear boundaries and ensuring their influence on others is limited" (Ministry of the Interior and Kingodm Relations, 2007, p. 7). The first goal leads to an inclusion of a variety of non-security professions such as youth workers and teachers because "in order to be able to act in time, it is important that the 'eyes and ears' of the local government and professionals who often work with young people (such as the police, youth workers, etc.) are open to the signs of radicalization" (ibid. p. 24). This approach introduces a securitized approach towards prevention, as it is based on identifying threats and singles out high-risk areas. Therefore, Kundnani (2012) and de Koning (2015) critique this approach for creating "suspect communities", which discriminates whole neighborhoods. The second goal refers to "person-oriented approaches" to "isolate and contain the radicalized person or organization" which I refer to as disciplinarian intervention. To sum up, the cornerstones of the securitized and individualized approach to radicalization prevention are laid in the first Action Plan of 2007. In the next section, I will discuss the continuities and discontinuities of resilience in radicalization prevention.

This section served to contextualize the emergence of resilience in relation to radicalization prevention. Radicalization prevention policies were based on youth crime prevention. Youth crime prevention introduced the early identification of risky and at-risk individuals and communities and pre-crime interventions. Regarding the securitization of social policies through radicalization, this stems from an older approach of crime prevention, and was adapted for the purpose of radicalization prevention. These policies got entangled with the growing neglect of multiculturalism and a shift in integration policies towards demanding cultural assimilation. Against this backdrop, resilience in radicalization prevention policies emerged, also becoming entangled with cultural assimilation. However, the first Action Plan still conceptualized radicalization as also caused by structural factors, such as education, employment and housing, and therefore, resilience was also still considered to depend on structural issues. In the next section, I show how resilience becomes reduced to an individualized psychological quality because the conceptualization of the causes of radicalization changes significantly.

5.2 Resilience as a psychological norm in radicalization prevention

In 2011 the first counter-terrorism strategy was issued in the Netherlands. The strategy implements a "comprehensive approach" encompassing "preventive and repressive

measures" (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011). The follow-up strategy from 2016 is an update of the previous strategy, but does not imply major policy shifts. An update of the follow-up strategy is that it also aims at "curative" measures (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2016). Notable in these strategies is a stronger emphasis on a "public health model" of CT or CT as "containment of a social epidemic" (Kruglanski *et al.*, 2007; Bhui and Jones, 2017). These models place greater emphasis on prevention and introduce the triad of prevention: primary, secondary and tertiary. They also focus on what makes populations and individuals susceptible, and change the focus to counteraction, or preventing, risk factors through early interventions in individuals or enhancement of populations (Bhui and Jones, 2017, p. 405). This shift entails a turn towards psychological factors of radicalization, and in turn also brings forth a psychological understanding of resilience. In the following I will trace this shift and how it changes the meaning of resilience and introduces a normative-disciplinary system against the backdrop of securitization.

Both CT strategies are based on five pillars, which are similar to the UK's and the European Union's strategy of counter-terrorism (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 37). The five pillars are Procure, Prevent, Protect, Prepare and Prosecute. In accordance with a public health model, the pillar prevent is emphasized as being the most important in the strategy (ibid.). Radicalization is reconceptualized as a psychologized process, differing considerably from the conceptualization in the Action Plan of 2007:

> "Radicalisation is the process that can lead to violent extremism and eventually even to terrorism. Violent extremism is defined as 'the willingness to use or legitimise violence as the extreme consequence of an extremist way of thinking'. Radicalisation in the current context refers to the process of a growing internalisation of a way of thinking inspired by al Qaeda [...] which is referred to as global jihadism. From the perspective of the comprehensive approach, not only is the actual use of violence relevant, but also the willingness to use violence and the violence potential of extremist groups or individuals." (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 69).

In this strategy, radicalization is conceptualized as an individual and psychological process of internalization that an individual undergoes before committing an act of violence. Radicalization is no longer associated with structural causes; it is reduced to a cognitive process. Fadil and de Koning (2019, p. 72) also note this shift in the following way:

> "This results in a particular analytical model whereby attempts to contextualize radicalization (by accounting for the structural factors within Dutch society, or in some cases internationally) become combined with a strong focus on the individual, which often psychologizes so-called trigger factors. In line with the security gaze,

> political grievances, structures of inequality and injustice are thus turned into signals of potential risks to national security. "

Against the backdrop of this psychologization of radicalization, resilience is also reconceptualized and reduced to a psychological process (cf. also Hardy, 2015). Resilience emerges in relation to recruitment and the loss of resilience is equated with becoming radicalized:

> "Almost everyone has a certain resilience to the extremist discourse and to groups regarded as extreme. The problem is that this natural resilience can be broken. At that point, the existing supply (which is relatively easy to obtain) may result in the transition to a willingness to use violence. Recruiters therefore try to break through that resilience by exploiting uncertainties, sensitivities and frustrations." (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 70).

In this quote, resilience is mentioned as psychological norm for the first time. Resilience is the normal state of individuals, and not being resilient is abnormal. As Foucault (2003a) showed, abnormality became equated with danger is thus the object of governmental intervention. Additionally, the causes for radicalization are expressed through emotions, collapsing the structural causes outlined in the Action Plan of 2007, into psychological factors. Accordingly, the strategy outlines measure to increase the resilience of "sensitive" populations, and restore the resilience of radicalizing individuals.

Regarding the governmental intervention to increase of resilience in sensitive populations, measures are "creating social networks, setting up programmes to increase the capacity for critical judgement, reinforcing democratic awareness, providing resilience training, and cooperating with role models and leaders" (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 71). In this regard, the follow-up strategy of 2016 is a continuation of the 2011 one. In 2016, increasing resilience is similarly stressed in relation to preventing recruitment, with the only difference being that the strategy indicates that there is more knowledge about which groups and communities are more vulnerable to radicalization (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2016, p. 13). In accordance with these conceptualisations, increasing resilience corresponds to primary prevention, as it enhances a pre-determined norm in a population.

Regarding subjectivation through citizenship, there is a continuation between the Action Plan of 2007 and the CT strategies of 2011 and 2016. In the 2011 strategy primary prevention is inter alia described as "reduction of the breeding ground" to offer people "opportunities to participate fully in Dutch society", but also stresses that "citizens accept the fact that the

Netherlands is an open, pluralist society in which various forms of religion and lifestyles coexist" (ibid., p. 72). Consequently, democratic values and particularly raising democratic awareness are stressed as being important to counter radicalization and factor into resilience as well. But the discourse about democracy in the Netherlands, also serves to reinforce a particular concept of active citizenship, responsibilizing citizens to behave in accordance with a certain standard (Schinkel and Van Houdt, 2010). Otherwise, it warrants interference by the state to protect the democratic constitution of the state:

> "In a constitutional state the government calls citizens to account with regard to their behaviour, and not their ethnicity, religion or other differences. However, the constitutional state principles only acquire meaning if they are known, acknowledged and supported by citizens. If citizens do not make the most of their citizenship, their rights and obligations to participate individually, but also together with others, in their country, city of neighbourhood [...] Citizenship is therefore essential for a living democratic constitutional state." (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 73)

Therefore, the counter-terrorism strategy perpetuates the integration discourse of the previous Action Plan and is concerned with integration as active citizenship. Active citizenship refers to a responsibilization of citizens as it shifts "accountability from the state to citizen and reduces the claim citizens can make on the state" (de Koning, 2015, p. 158). In a similar vein, the strategy states "the government can publicise the fact that it recognizes certain grievances or feelings of hurt among some groups in society and even emphasises with these emotions" collapsing discrimination into emotions and feelings to be recognized, but which cannot be transferred into claims (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 73). This is in accordance with the shift away from recognizing structural issues as causes for radicalization, as well as an equation of integration with cultural assimilation.

Regarding the restoration of broken resilience, the strategy perpetuates the early intervention approach from the Action Plan of 2007, but professionalizes the approach. But before resilience as a prescriptive norm can be restored in secondary prevention, deviancy has to be detected. Therefore, the strategy outlines that it is necessary to train "local government and professionals who work a lot with young people (such as the police and youth workers)" to make them aware of "signals" of radicalization (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 73). These trainings are extended in the follow-up strategy of 2016 to social and youth work, health-care, education as well as security professionals on a nation-wide scale (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2016, p. 9; Eijkman and Roodnat, 2017; Ragazzi and de Jongh, 2019; van de Weert and Eijkman, 2019, 2020b). To exemplify this professionalization: the Dutch state founded a new institution called the "Rijksopleidingsinstituut tegengaan

Radicalisering" which professionalized such trainings and which has the task to connect different professions through such trainings. In such joint trainings the value of cooperation is stressed. The inclusion of these social, education and health care professionals in this duty, as well as in the programs to increase resilience through trainings and awareness raisings, as mentioned above, was termed "securitization of social policy" in CSS literature (Mcgovern and Coppock, 2014; Stanley and Guru, 2015; Ragazzi, 2017). It establishes a narrow approach to prevention as it establishes a narrow focus on preventing a threat from materializing and overrides the other mandates of these professions, like caring for the well-being of clients, pupils and patients.

The debate of the securitization of social policy through radicalization prevention is usually focused on the UK. There are several particularities of this securitization in the Dutch case though, important to highlight in relation to the enactment of resilience in secondary prevention. Collecting the above mentioned signals through raising awareness of radicalization, leads to a sharing and discussing of these signals in a multi-disciplinary approach including "intelligence services, local government, security services, police, the private sector, youth care workers and mental services" (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2016, p. 9). In contrast to the UK, where this approach is headed by the police, in the Netherlands local governments are the head of these multi-disciplinary cooperations. Therefore, the threat perspective can be kept in check by the local government. This also means that security actors, such as the police, become part of a prevention effort as their objective in regards to radicalization prevention is no longer just prosecution, but also turning to the local government to discuss the inclusion of an individual in a specific program called person-centred approach that I discuss below. Therefore, the Dutch approach not only impacts the mandate of the social, educational and health care sector, but also the one of the police. Additionally, it shifts responsibility for security matters to the local level as the mayor becomes the main responsible for radicalization cases.

Schinkel (2011) discusses these cooperations and the massive collection and storage of signals of deviancy, which are not limited to radicalization but affect crime prevention more broadly. Schinkel (2011, p. 375) introduces the concept "functional de-differentiation" in combination with what he calls "pre-pression" a "combination of prevention and repression". Functional de-differentiation refers to new institutional arrangements including social and security actors and leads to softening of professional boundaries, often clashing with the primary mandates of these professions (see chapter 8). Functional de-differentiation is introduced under the umbrella of surveilling emerging deviancies in society and to prevent them. These deviancies are constructed against the backdrop of an idealized image of what ought to be normal and thereby reiterate the normating ideal of disciplinary societies in the present day. Schinkel (2011, p. 367 emphasis added in the original) notes in relation to this massive

collection signals that it is a form of pre-pression, because it "enables one contingent identification of 'society' by drawing all that does not conform to a *prescriptive* rather than *descriptive* ideal of society into the archive […]." Indeed, it is a prescriptive norm which is established, against which abnormality can be observed, assessed, and which warrants an intervention. Regarding radicalization, the collection of signals does not only refer to the inclusion of information towards criminal offences, but they also include cognitive and behavioral changes, thus it targets "forms of behaviour, attitudes, possibilities, suspicions" (Foucault, 1975, p. 214). It is a collection of information about individuals in order to identify, assess and correct them in a non-juridical way. Against this backdrop, the person-centric approach is a disciplinarian intervention, to re-establish the prescriptive norm of resilience as social conformity.

The person centric approach first established in 2007, modelled on crime prevention approaches, shifts to a more health-based intervention in 2011 and 2016. This shift is illustrated in the strategy of 2011 by referring to a "softer approach":

> "Another form of specific action is the 'person-oriented approach' (PGA). Whereas, in 2004, the approach still involved the active disruption of activities by people linked to terrorism (referred to as 'government harassment'), the current PGA adopts a softer approach. The PGA in its current form is tailor-made and ensures that the person in question is encouraged to renounce violent extremism by means of positive interventions, or to 'resocialise' after a conviction or release. The future PGA is also oriented around positive interventions, and its main point of departure is that the person in question should be able to start leading a 'normal' life as quickly as possible, as an alternative to the process of radicalisation he finds (or found) himself in." (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 68)

Individuals are integrated in this approach, when their behaviour is assessed as "worrisome" in multi-disciplinary case meetings. In these meetings the above-mentioned professions come together under the heading of the local government, to discuss how worrisome signals are (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2016, p. 13). Subsequently, the establish a "tailor made" intervention approach, tackling the specific problems raised through the different professionals (ibid. p. 14). The person-oriented, or case approach, changes against the backdrop of a more health-oriented approach towards prevention. As such the comprehensive approach of 2016, outlines that not only preventive and repressive measures are taken, but also "curative" ones to bring "people back on the right path" (ibid. p. 4). This indicates a stronger alignment between mental health and radicalization prevention, also illustrated in the new importance based on cooperations between "mental health services, the police, intelligence and security services" (ibid. p. 14). These interventions are not on a

voluntary basis, rather they are comparable to an involuntary psychiatric intervention. The interventions can also be accompanied with punitive measures as outlined in the "Action Plan Integral Approach to Jihadism" issued in 2014, accompanying the updates of the 2016 CT strategy (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2014). Additionally, it adds a normative-disciplinary goal illustrated by "bringing people back on the right path", which accounts for reinstating them to a prescriptive ideal of normal.

Similar individual intervention programs were also initiated in other European countries, notably Denmark and the UK. The biggest difference of those programs, when compared to the Dutch one, is that the Dutch one is involuntary, even when not engaging with probation cases (to prevent a relapse, belonging in the category of tertiary prevention and is of no concern in this dissertation) (Lindekilde, 2014; Martin, 2018; Dresser, 2021). Martin (2019, p. 133) analysed the British Channel program as governing through pastoral care, similar as in the Dutch case being an extension of crime and social care prevention practices governing "drug or alcohol dependency", "criminality" or "gang-based violence". While in the Dutch case, the emphasis is also on care and concern for the radicalised, which pertains to pastoral power, the treatment is involuntary, which is why I argue it is a disciplinarian intervention to normate deviating individuals. The Dutch case illustrates disciplinary power, as it more clearly relates radicalization to abnormality, leading to a corrective and mandatory intervention for those individuals who are considered to be dangerous for themselves and for society (Foucault, 2003a). Therefore, also resilience is enacted through a disciplinarian approach and is not solely a continuation of pastoral care in governance.

To conclude, in the Netherlands, radicalization was reduced to a psychological process and hence, resilience was equally reduced to a psychological concept. I discern the stronger emphasis on prevention of the public health model of CT as resilience follows the logics of primary and secondary prevention. Resilience in primary prevention is an awareness raising and governmental strategy to shape subjectivities. In the Netherlands there is a strong focus on cultural assimilation. Resilience in secondary prevention brings forth a normative-disciplinary system of reinstating broken resilience in involuntary individualized case-based approaches to reinstate a prescriptive norm of social conformity. The stronger emphasis on prevention also leads to a securitization, which in the Dutch case leads to a de-functionalisation and prepression under local authority.

5.3 Conclusion

In this chapter I traced the changing meaning of resilience and I discerned a shift to a psychologized understanding of resilience in the 2011 CT strategy. The understanding of resilience as an internal defense capacity resembles the psychological definition of resilience as internalized protective factors being a "successful adaptation despite challenging or

threatening circumstances" (Masten, Best and Garmezy, 1990, p. 426). Resilience got adapted for the specific needs of radicalization prevention, but can be traced back to the prevention paradigm established through resilience practices in youth crime prevention. How resilience is adapted depends on the definition of radicalization. As I showed in this section, resilience is at first related to structural factors and was perceived as a result of stable living conditions, while only with the introduction of a psychologized definition of radicalization, it became related to purely psychological protective factors. In this regard, subjectivation processes in primary prevention practices amount to trainings for critical judgment, democratic awareness raising programs and psycho-social resilience trainings. These programs are strongly related to citizenship programs, which aim at a cultural assimilation to produce socially and societally conform subjects. In primary prevention resilience serves as an enhancement of populations, assuming that resilience is a given capacity. But this capacity can also be broken, leading to "dangerous subjects" that must be corrected to ensure security (Foucault, 1978). In these cases, resilience becomes a prescriptive ideal that individuals must regain through specific involuntary intervention programs.

Resilience in radicalization prevention is thus a governance of abnormality, and as Foucault (1978, 2003a) showed has since the 19th century been part of a security governance. Therefore, it is to some extent a perpetuation of security, rather than a securitization. However, it is useful to invoke the notion of securitzation to show how new configurations emerge in this governance. Radicalization prevention, especially in how they use crime prevention early detection and intervention programs, draws in educational, social work and health care professionals even tighter into a threat perspective, that goes beyond policing societal danger such as drug addiction or crime, as radicalization might lead to terrorism. As such, there is a new quality of increased security, which is captured through securitization in a Foucauldian sense.

Regarding the specifics of securitization in this chapter, the Dutch case differs especially from the UK, as the responsibility of prevention is transferred to the local level. This transfer of governance responsibilities to the local level, which does not come with more decision-making power, has been analyzed as a neoliberalization (Joseph, 2018). While I note this overlap, it is only of concern for this dissertation, in its particular consequences for how the securitization of radicalization prevention impacts resilience. Accordingly, I engaged with how this transfer to the local level and the heading radicalization prevention of the local level leads to a functional de-differentiation of security and social professions. This functional de-differentiation not only weakens professional boundaries, but also overrides the primary mandates of these professions, which will be elaborated on in greater detail in chapter 7 and 8.