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Resilience in radicalization prevention

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Governmentality and the Extended Case Methodology

This research explores resilience as a practice of normation and normalization in relation to radicalization prevention in two cases, primary and secondary prevention, and two sites, Germany and the Netherlands. I chose the Netherlands for its pioneering role in introducing radicalization prevention whole scale throughout the country (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018; Fadil, De Koning and Ragazzi, 2019). I chose Germany because of its different approach to prevention, encompassing society as much as the individual (Berczyk and Vermeulen, 2015). First, I conduct a policy analysis to establish the meaning and role of resilience in relation to radicalization prevention. Against the backdrop of this policy analysis, I research resilience through 40 interviews in both sites and in relation to two governing practices. The first governing practice is primary prevention, for which I chose one project, called “Bounce-resilience training for youngsters” which was implemented in both countries. This project is an exemplary case for showing how practitioners use psychological resilience to prevent radicalization. The second governing practice is secondary prevention, a practice trying to restore resilience to individuals deemed to be already radicalizing. For secondary prevention practices, I chose different regional sites in the Netherlands, and one program in one federal state in Germany. I show how resilience emerges because of understanding the process of becoming a terrorist as “radicalization”. Therefore, I chose a time frame mainly oriented on the introduction of radicalization as a concept. In order to understand continuities and discontinuities, for the Netherlands this means that I capture the early 2000s until 2020, and for Germany, this means I capture approximately the 1990s until 2020. The theoretical lens is governmentality, which I complement with the “extended case method” (Lai and Roccu, 2019).

This thesis explores the meaning making and role of resilience in the context of radicalization prevention through a policy analysis to establish the image of the ideal resilient subject in these two contexts. Regarding the role of resilience, I refer to the question if resilience is enhancing security. I use governmentality as an analytical approach to research practices of subjectification. Government according to Foucault is governing the “conduct of conduct” meaning the “governing of self” as much as the “governing of others” (Lemke, 2001, p. 193). Rather than trying to get to a single meaning of resilience, the aim of this study is to explore resilience as a norm, gaining its meaning from the context and the power relations it is embedded in. This approach towards studying resilience allows me to show varieties in resilience following Jonathan Joseph`s (2018) governmentality approach. Rather than employing a comparative approach to analyze resilience in different European country contexts and policy fields, Joseph (2018, pp. 4–8) contrasts the uptake of resilience against the baseline of the UK. My approach is similar considering that a) I contrast the emergence and role of resilience in the Netherlands and Germany rather than comparing it, and b) I analyze this emergence against the backdrop of studies about resilience in radicalization prevention mainly stemming from the UK (see chapter 2). However, I put the case study

about the Netherlands forward as a challenge to the dominance of the UK, although there are similarities between the two cases. Against the backdrop of these “baseline cases” (Joseph, 2018, p. 4), I introduce Germany as a contrast, in which radicalization and resilience were only recently introduced.

However, I also go beyond Joseph’s approach, by showing how resilience is taken up and embedded in particular practices and local settings. As Judith Butler (1997, p. 11 italics from the original) reminds us when studying subjectivation “a power *exerted* on the subject is still a power *assumed* by the subject”. Therefore, I employ the extended case method and conducted interviews with practitioners to research their understanding of resilience and how practicing resilience is embedded in power relations. In the spirit of Butler, I aim at engaging with appropriations, re-significations and critique of radicalization and resilience discourses that I encountered in the field.

My approach to researching resilience as governing practices is guided by the “extended case methodology” (Lai and Roccu, 2019). I chose the approach, because it allows for a “flexible approach to theory building” and “reconstructing” in which the research approach is informed by theory, but not determined by it (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 69). Research in this approach is informed by theory because the research questions and the exploration process are guided by a theoretical position (ibid., p. 72). But the approach is open enough that this theorizing “entails confronting one’s thinking with those living the social world under scrutiny, without imposing epistemic superiority on them, but at the same time without uncritically reproducing their claims or assumptions” (ibid., p. 72). The extended case methodology allows for a reflexive approach to research, recognizing the researcher as an intervention in the social field (ibid., p. 69). Reflexivity also takes into account that the point of view of the researcher changes throughout the research process: “from design to fieldwork, or from field-work in different sites to the analysis/interpretation of findings” (ibid, p. 71). The “extended case methodology” thus allows for theory-guided research, while being flexible enough to incorporate a reflexive stance of the researcher and a subsequent “reconstruction” of theory in conjuncture with the empirical material.

The reason for choosing this approach is that I do not claim that the governing practices I research are outside of governmentality, as they are aimed at shaping the conduct of populations and individuals. However, a governmentality inspired policy analysis alone cannot account for how those subjected to practices shaping conduct, conduct themselves in the process. Simultaneously, this is not a positivist work trying to falsify or verify claims. Rather, I aim at a theory reconstruction in light of empirical findings, through those “uneasy encounters with the social world” (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 75). Therefore, the proposition to “extent” a theory through case reconstruction serves the purpose of this dissertation.

In total I conducted 40 interviews, which I subcategorized as interview phase one, roughly covering the Bounce project, exemplifying primary prevention (April 2019-February 2020), and phase two, roughly covering case management, exemplifying secondary prevention (March 2020-January 2021). Regarding the Bounce project, I conducted 19 interviews related to the project, in three countries (Netherlands, Belgium, Germany). Regarding case management, I conducted in total 17 interviews in both countries (Netherlands and Germany). I will account for these interviews (and the missing four) in the following sections.

I subdivided the chapter as follows: first, I elaborate more on why I chose the Netherlands and Germany as field research sites. I also engage in a discussion which policies I chose in the respective settings and how I relate the policy material to the interviews. Second, I engage with how I chose the interview partners for primary and secondary prevention practices and how I relate these interviews to the broader aim of studying psychological resilience. Third, I shortly talk about questionnaires and the choice of semi-structured interviews. Fourth, I engage in research ethics and/in interviewing. Finally, I engage with the coding process and theory reconstruction.

4.1 Choices: Countries and Varieties

In this section, I engage with the country case selection. I will shortly elaborate on why I chose the Netherlands and Germany, and subsequently continue to discuss the material for the policy analysis and the timeframes. Psychological resilience emerges because of introducing radicalization as a concept. The psychologized understanding of radicalization brings forth a psychologized answer to the problem. However, both radicalization and resilience are introduced against the backdrop of broader discourses about domestic and foreign policy, as well as a broader social and historical context. Regarding sites, I chose Germany and the Netherlands, because they offer a different approach to counter-terrorism, in turn influencing their introduction and up-take of radicalization and resilience. Through the policy analysis I show I contextualize how resilience is envisioned as the idealized norm in order to shape the conduct of individuals and populations.

I carried out a policy analysis of the most relevant counter-terrorism, radicalization and extremism prevention policies in both countries (see chapter 4 and 5). Regarding governmentality as method, Wagenaar (2015, pp. 126, 132) describes governmentality in policy analysis as a “more or less straight forward discourse analysis” focusing on the “way that programs of government are formulated within broad discourses of collective truth, proper ruling, and moral justification”, which “follow a genealogical path”. Discourses “articulate what is generally ‘sayable’ or ‘thinkable’ [...] in relation to a given class of phenomena (terrorism) in any given cultural and historical context” (Stump and Dixit, 2013, p. 106). Through the policy analysis I aim to show how power/knowledge configurations

enable phenomena to become a security risk, and the “heterogeneity of strategies, devices and technologies used for governing [...]” security risks such as the radicalizing (Gottweis, 2003, p. 255). Governmentality refers to practices that shape the conduct of individuals through direct interference, and the conduct of conduct, through presupposing how populations are supposed to govern themselves (Lemke, 2002). In this regard, policies are “often guided and informed by ideas, theories and knowledge that originate outside the policy realm” (Gottweis, 2003, p. 257). I show how a psychological concept was taken up in prevention policies, introduced to order and shape conduct. The policy analysis helps to show the context specificities of this introduction, and the idealized norm of what it means to be resilient to radicalization.

The Netherlands is a pioneer in radicalization prevention, and also introduced psychological resilience already in the early 2000s. In the UK, these different stages have been accompanied by a host of critical scholarship, in comparison, the Netherlands received less scrutiny, despite having a prevention approach spanning the whole country for nearly two decades (Fadil and de Koning, 2019). Moreover, Kundnani and Hayes (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018) note that the Dutch secret service pioneered the focus on radicalisation after 9/11, conceptualising how normal people become extremists as heightened susceptibility due to cultural background and identity issues of second and third generation Muslims, and developing in stages. Amsterdam issued the first “Countering Violent Extremism” policy in the aftermath of a high-profile political murder of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker, in 2004 (ibid. p. 6). Kundnani and Hayes (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018) emphasize that this new prevention strategy was the blueprint for current European CVE policy making. While the Netherlands show striking similarities to the UK, there are also remarkable differences with regards to disciplinary governance and municipal led prevention efforts showing that there is a different power/knowledge configuration at play (see chapter 5). As a consequence of the early introduction, I can show the changes of the meaning of resilience in relation to radicalization, showing a) that resilience depends on radicalization and b) how the meaning of resilience changes.

“Researchers are not presented with a series of discourses to analyze. Instead, they delimit discourses based on their research puzzle” (Stump and Dixit, 2013, p. 105). To delimit my research puzzle, I selected the following policies regarding the Netherlands, based on their relevance for researching the discourse of resilience in radicalization prevention. I selected a predecessor of an official Counter-Terrorism strategy was issued by Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations called “Action Plan Polarisation and Radicalisation 2007-2011” (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007). This action plan was superseded by an official Counter-Terrorism strategy that “integrates all public policies in relation to terrorism and radicalisation” in the so-called Dutch “comprehensive approach” in 2011 (Eijkman et al. 2012, 21). The comprehensive approach encompasses Counter-Terrorism measures as well as

radicalisation prevention and was issued for the time frame 2011-15 (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011). An update was issued covering the years 2015-2020 (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2016). In 2014 special measures were taken regarding radicalisation prevention which are listed in the “Integral Approach against Jihadism” (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2014). This action plan covers new measures accompanied by the establishment of new institutions to prevent radicalisation. Some practitioners directly referred to this plan when explaining their mandate (Interview 28, NL, 21/4/2020, online; Interview 31, NL, 24/6/2020, online; Interview 32, NL, 17/7/2020, online). Additionally, I took AIVD reports that were either important as a strategic outlook for the policies, or included sections on resilience into consideration.

I chose Germany because the approach to prevention appeared radically different from counter-terrorism policies in the UK, the Netherlands and the US. Joseph (2018, p. 49) notes in regards to Germany: “it is noticeable there is none of the ‘our values’ rhetoric or ‘resilience of the nation’ characteristic of US, British and French national security discourse”. Rather, Germany is oriented towards its distinct past as “[n]ational identity and the way security is understood is a product of history and is enshrined in the constitution” (Joseph, 2018, p. 49). Indeed, Germany does not have a separate counter-terrorism policy, as counter-terrorism is subsumed under the constitutional principle of “militant democracy” through which counter-terrorism becomes a matter of protecting the state from extremism and a totalitarian state take-over (Engelmann, 2012). Foremost extremism prevention, and later on radicalization prevention, is thus a matter of protecting the democratic constitution, leading to a strategy aiming a democratization of society. This allows me to show that also resilience becomes a matter of proper democratization of the whole society. Regarding the status of “militant democracy” and the consequence for prevention, Berczyk and Vermeulen (2015, p. 90) argue that:

“[...] due to the concept of militant democracy, German authorities understand and address Islamic extremism as form of extremism, similar to how they would right-wing extremism. This approach has two notable consequences. First, unlike many other European countries, the authorities are less inclined to see Islamic extremism and terrorism as something inherent to Islamic communities and their supposedly failed integration into Western societies [...]. Second, in dealing with Islamic extremism, the authorities make use of practices already developed for right-wing extremism.”

Therefore, I started with analyzing rightist extremism programs in Germany from the 1990s, and traced their development until the last prevention strategy called “Living Democracy” issued in 2016, and two accompanying strategies called “National Action Plan against Racism” and the “National Prevention Program against Islamist Extremism”. The Living Democracy

program is not only a policy, but likewise a funding program for initiatives with a budget of 104.5 million Euro in 2017, to date the most extensive funding scheme issued in Germany (Said and Fouad, 2018, p. 3).

The German approach allowed me to show a) a different approach to prevention and thus resilience as democratization, and b) the introduction of the Dutch and British approach of radicalization and psychological resilience (approximately in 2016) and how these discourses merged with the German approach of prevention. Notably, through radicalization, prevention became a security issue, leading to a comparatively late debate about the securitization of social policy in Germany (Jukschat and Leimbach, 2019; Figlesthler and Schau, 2020). Against this backdrop, resilience is used as a counterforce against this securitization, albeit within a securitized setting, allowing me to show that resilience is appropriated by the social sector, while also fitting into the bigger picture of democratization. Thus, Germany is a contrasting case regarding radicalization and resilience.

4.2 Choices: Primary Prevention and the Bounce Program

“There is no single way to research medicine or the psy disciplines, and no one type of source will reveal their workings. While policy documents are a useful place to begin, they can only tell us about the aspirations of their authors. In order to get at the messy actualities of governing, it becomes important to go beyond policy.” (Howell, 2012, p. 130)

I was not only interested in showing the idealized resilient subject as envisioned in policies, but also in particular programs promising to enhance the resilience, or render individuals resilient, to radicalization. In order to show how a governance of resilience is enacted, I selected a particular program that featured a psychological understanding of resilience to prevent radicalization, and offered a practical training enhancing resilience. Through analyzing, such a training I aim to illustrate if resilience corresponds to the resilient subject envisioned in the policies, or if resilience was appropriated, re-signified or became the subject of critique on the ground.

To research resilience in primary prevention, I chose one of the first resilience trainings to prevent radicalisation in Europe called “BOUNCE – Resilience Training for Youngsters”. It was one of the earliest resilience programmes distributed widely in Europe and was implemented in five European countries between 2015-2018, before resilience became a widespread concept in academic literature engaging with radicalisation prevention (Altermark and Nilsson, 2018; Wimelius *et al.*, 2018; Stephens and Sieckelinck, 2020; Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier,

2021). Bounce fitted my research question because a) it is a training to enhance psychological resilience towards radicalisation and b) it was already implemented in two Dutch cities and two German cities. Since it is the same project, it allowed me to show appropriations in relation to the respective country contexts.

Regarding the research set-up, first I analysed the predecessor studies on which Bounce was based. Bounce was based on a predecessor study commissioned by the European Union investigating if psychological resilience training could prevent radicalisation. This study was called “Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalisation I” (STRESAVIORA) (2013-2015). The project had three research outcomes: a) a literature review, b) field research consisting of interviews with youth (only available in Dutch), and b) outcomes and conclusions (Krols *et al.*, 2013; Euer, Krols, *et al.*, 2014; Euer, Van Vossole, *et al.*, 2014). Based on this project, a Belgian NGO adapted one of their already existing training programs to include the major themes of STRESAVIORA (Christiaens, Hardyns and Pauwels, 2018, p. 5). The subsequent Bounce training program, consisting of a manual for Bounce-Young (aimed at the training of youth), Bounce-Up (Train the Trainer program), and Bounce-along (including the social environment of youth). The project was also externally evaluated (Christiaens, Hardyns and Pauwels, 2018). I used these documents in a two-fold fashion: a) to gather interview partners, and b) to have a first impression of how psychological resilience is understood and enacted in this project.

My aim was not necessarily to compare the understanding of resilience of the project to the ones of Bounce trainers, my aim was to understand if and how resilience was appropriated on the ground. This could for example mean that interviewees added something, shared their own experience or tell me what they thought is most relevant. Therefore, I aimed at conducting interviews with trainers. In order to reach the trainers, I contacted the persons responsible for implementing the projects in the cities. When this approach did not yield the desired outcomes, I started to make an outreach to the organising institutions responsible for the development and distribution of the project. The main partners of Bounce also involved in the distribution of the program were: the European Commission, Belgian Home Affairs, the Belgian NGO, Radar Advies (a Dutch company also hosting the Radicalisation Awareness Network) and European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS). I also wanted to have a holistic view on the project and its background and therefore asked institutions responsible for the set-up of the project for an interview and for further contacts. I managed to arrange five interviews with institutions responsible for the set-up of the project, two of them were also Bounce trainers. In addition to these two Bounce trainer interviews carried out in Belgium between April 30 and May 2 2019, I also reached out to a third Bounce trainer in Belgium. Rather than conducting this last interview in person, we resorted to an online questionnaire because of language difficulties. Regarding Bounce, I conducted five background interviews

concerned with the organisation of Bounce, distribution of the project, and to receive further contacts. Apart from the Bounce trainer interviews, these interviews were not included in the analysis text corpus, as the main research aim was to find out how resilience is understood and practiced by the Bounce trainers. The interviews with the two trainers responsible for Bounce were especially valuable, because they gave me insight into resilience as a practice and the importance of experiencing resilience.⁵

During my field research and the background interviews, it came as a slowly unfolding revelation to me that the implementation of Bounce was only successful in one German city, Augsburg, and one Dutch city, Groningen. Thus, my sample of interview partners was limited. In general, the implementation of the program was not as successful as the organisers hoped it would be, mainly because of organisational reasons (e.g. street workers were the wrong target audience; the city administration of prevention changed). In Germany, the project was implemented in Düsseldorf (10 participants) and Augsburg (13 participants/3 dropouts) (Christiaens, Hardyns and Pauwels, 2018, p. 36). In Augsburg, the local prevention office organised the training and asked the trainers who was willing to participate in an interview and three persons agreed. In the Netherlands, the project was implemented in Amsterdam (7 trainers) and Groningen (13 trainers) (Christiaens, Hardyns and Pauwels, 2018, p. 36). In Groningen, the local Safety and Security Department organised the training and asked the trainers for their permission to give me their names and email addresses. I did not have direct access to the Bounce trainers, but had to work with “gate keepers”, intermediaries who organized the training locally, in order to reach them (Wiles, 2013, p. 130). These “gate keepers” were themselves bound by confidentiality requirements and were not allowed to give me a list of trainers, but had to ask for permission themselves. Even if these “gate keepers” were in Augsburg and Groningen not the direct superiors of the Bounce trainers, this approach limited the possibility for anonymity for this sample, which might have affected the response rate. In the first round of emails to ask for interviews three people agreed. In the second outreach, two more people agreed to an interview.⁶ In total, I interviewed three Bounce trainers in Augsburg, and five in Groningen.

The aim of this work is to show how resilience is shaped by the context it is embedded in. I reasoned that cities implementing an international project, are actively engaged in radicalisation prevention and could therefore serve as exemplary cases to show how

5 I would like to mention at this point, that the municipality of Groningen was kind enough to invite me to one of the Bounce train the trainer trainings that they had planned in the near future, for me to experience the training myself. Unfortunately, this event never happened (possibly due to Covid) and the opportunity never materialized again.

6 The evaluation of the project stated that the implementation rate was quite low in general (Christiaens, Hardyns and Pauwels, 2018, p. 43).

national discourses of resilience resonated on the local level, and how they interact with the understanding from Bounce. It turned out that these two cities were indeed quite engaged in prevention efforts, and that they are exemplary cases to show the variance of the Dutch and German approach. Augsburg serves as an internationally recognized exemplary case of community led primary prevention (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2019). Groningen is within the Netherlands seen as exemplary in its awareness raising prevention effort because the city trained 1200 professionals in recognizing radicalisation without receiving any additional budget as Dutch high-risk regions do (Interview 28, NL, 21/04/2020 online; Interview 1/1, NL, 18/03/2019). The cities are exemplary settings to show how the country setting shapes Bounce, and which differences these settings bring forth in terms of the appropriation and critique of resilience.

In order to understand the influence of community led primary prevention on resilience (Augsburg), I interviewed practitioners engaged in the local prevention organisation. Including the Bounce trainers, I conducted nine interviews in Augsburg in September 2019. In my prior desktop research, I searched specifically for radicalisation prevention in relation to resilience. I found five institutions that engaged with resilience in radicalisation prevention, four of them agreed to talk to me. All of them are participating in the communal prevention effort in different capacities. The organisations carry out prevention tasks and all of them allowed me disclose this information: one was the communal prevention office, one organisation engages with the prevention of youth criminality, one with gender equality, one with migration/integration and one was a Respect Coach. There are two organisations specifically tasked with radicalisation prevention, one organisation engaged in pedagogical approaches against Islamist radicalisation, and the Violence Prevention Network engaged in primary as well as secondary prevention. The latter does not give interviews. In October 2020, I reached out to the local police in Augsburg, but after initial positive contact did not hear back from them.⁷ Including the Bounce trainers, I conducted nine interviews in Augsburg. I conducted these interviews to show how the national discourse on resilience resonates on the local level to enable me to show critique, a variance, or an appropriation, as well as to see if Bounce resonates with the local understanding of resilience and is shaped by the local context.

In order to understand the influence of a broad awareness raising approach (Groningen), I planned to interview people who were recipients of this awareness-raising program. It was difficult for me to find these recipients in Groningen. I reached out to organisations

7 This was most likely related to the attacks in Vienna on November 2nd, as also other security related potential interview partners in Germany at that time did no longer respond to my emails or rejected interview requests straight away.

that are usually receiving radicalisation awareness training such as youth welfare, the youth work institution, the “WIJ” which is broadly a social institution engaged in social welfare and strengthening social cohesion, and the regional Safety and Security House. They either did not reply to emails or rejected the interview request. At this moment in time, February and March 2020, the Covid pandemic hit Europe and started to majorly affect my field research. My second attempt was to participate in one of the recognising the signals of radicalisation trainings and recruit interviewees there (Informatiepunt Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2020). Due to the Covid pandemic, the training was cancelled and according to my knowledge not taking place online. My third attempt to gather information on these trainings, their content and purpose, and to gain introductions to further interview partners was to interview the national institution conceptualising and distributing the trainings. I was able to conduct two online interviews with this institution, but they were not able to help me with further interviewees. My fourth attempt to recruit interviewees was at an online webinar for municipalities to evaluate their radicalisation prevention interventions that was kindly suggested to me by a colleague, which took place on June 17, 2020. I was able to conduct an interview about the role of resilience in radicalisation prevention from the Social Ministry, but not for the local level of Groningen.

Therefore, I resorted to the interviews with the Bounce trainers regarding questions of local embeddedness, and critique of resilience again. Regarding an assessment of how municipalities, social and youth workers, as well as the police took up the awareness raising trainings in the Netherlands I could at least resort to recently published articles on the matter (Eijkman and Roodnat, 2017; Ragazzi and de Jongh, 2019; van de Weert and Eijkman, 2019, 2020a). I embedded my interview material about the specifics of resilience within this literature. Additionally, I supplemented this part with two interviews from the training institute, from my observations in the webinar and the interview from the Social Ministry on resilience in awareness raising to prevent radicalization on the local level.

Squire (2013, p. 40) emphasizes in her article on “Attuning to mess” about “research designs” and field research:

“[...] the cut of my research design remained pragmatic in its formulation, conditioned amongst other things by resources, fortune, and goodwill on the part of research participants. Research design in this regard cannot be understood in terms of a repeatable formula, but rather itself remains a messy process that demands openness and focus, as well as sensitivity and commitment.”

Initially, I had a clearly outlined research design⁸ based on a defined project (Bounce) which from the outset looked like I might have a large enough pool of interviewees in both countries. However, I learned that field research is indeed an “attuning to mess” and at times needs a pragmatic approach, as participation is not a pre-given, despite the possible pool, and that a research design needs to be open enough to be adjusted to the realities that I found myself confronted with. The extended case method allows for a changes “from design to fieldwork” as a result of reflexivity (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 71). I add, that also a change in design because of “resources, fortune and goodwill on the part of research participants” should be accounted for (Squire, 2013, p. 40).

4.3 Choices: Secondary Prevention and Case Management

Secondary prevention engages with individuals deemed at-risk. These individuals are identified by their social environment and/or the police, and are subsequently approached to voluntarily or involuntarily participate in a program, that helps them restore their resilience to radicalization.

Regarding the research process of negotiating access to this site, and organising interviews, it is necessary to mention that the Netherlands and Germany organize secondary prevention differently. The Dutch policies suggest that secondary prevention is a municipal affair, and every municipality is supposed to have a case management approach. However, there are simply not that many radicalization cases, and therefore municipalities tend to organize case management regionally through an established institution called “Security and Care Houses”. Regarding Germany, every federal state organizes secondary prevention differently, either state-led, NGO-led or a mixture of both. In the end, I conducted five interviews with one institution in Germany, featuring a decentralized organisation structure, and I conducted interviews relating to five different Dutch case management institutions.

As other researches have pointed out getting access to professionals, working in the field of radicalisation, is very difficult (Stump and Dixit, 2013; Pettinger, 2020b). Especially in

8 In addition to the set-up for primary prevention, I also had a well thought out research design for secondary prevention, which was thwarted right from the beginning. To research resilience as a practice in secondary prevention, I initially intended to research case management in two high-risk settings, and two low risk settings in the Netherlands and Germany. The two high-risk settings were supposed to be Dusseldorf and Amsterdam, while the two low-risk settings were supposed to be Augsburg and Groningen. In this regard, I would have had the same settings and the probability of having similar actors and ideally some overlaps between practices of resilience in primary and secondary prevention. But the same institutions that were responsible for Bounce in Düsseldorf and Amsterdam were also responsible for secondary prevention. Since I was not able to establish contact with them, this plan failed before it even started.

relation to secondary prevention, a practice that warrants more secrecy, negotiating access was a long process. Initially, my second field research phase was planned for March-June 2020. Therefore, I started preparations in form of researching interview partners and writing interview requests in December 2019. I will introduce my failed attempts, before moving on to the successful ones, in order to make my choices transparent.

Regarding the Netherlands, I ideally wanted to sample case management institutions that stressed resilience as being important. Although, since the Dutch CT strategy stressed resilience for the whole of the country, targeted resilience sampling in the Netherlands was less of an issue. Nonetheless, at first, I primarily chose cities having their own radicalisation prevention policy ideally stressing resilience as being important. I wrote eleven personalized and well-researched interview requests to institutions and individuals engaged with radicalisation prevention. These requests were either unanswered or rejected, showing how much one depends on the goodwill of the participants. One rejection is worth mentioning, because it gave me more insight into why my interview requests went unanswered: "We receive weekly requests and ideas for graduation studies, internships and interviews. Because of this we cannot respond to the request" (email correspondence Gemeente Rotterdam 17.2.2020).

Regarding Germany, I ran into similar issues. My initial research plan rested on the idea to research a non-government organisation and a government organisation engaged with case management exemplifying Germany as the case for societal resilience. The non-government organisation I chose was the Violence Prevention Network (VPN), because they developed their own understanding of psychological resilience in radicalisation prevention (Muecke, 2012), while also engaging in primary prevention campaigns against discrimination. VPN is active in six federal states, and thus is the most important non-state organisation in the field. VPN also issues its own journal and wields considerable influence on the resilience discourse in Germany. But VPN rejected my interview requests twice, once at the very beginning of my research, the second time even after I had tried to establish prior contact through participating in two of their workshops. One government organisation, called Leitplanke, engaged in the training of professionals to recognize radicalisation early on, and to build individual resilience, based on salutogenetic psychology, never replied to my interview request. In conclusion, gaining access to the field of secondary radicalisation prevention proved to be as difficult as literature suggested.

As stated above, my second field research phase was planned for March-June 2020, coinciding with the first lockdown of the Covid 19 pandemic. All the interviews I conducted after March 9th 2020 were thus online or on the phone. Regarding access to interview partners, the lockdown was both an advantage and a disadvantage for me. It was advantage insofar as during the first lockdown people working in bureaucracies were suddenly out of their offices with more

time at hand and hence agreed to online interviews. It was a disadvantage, because I learned snowballing does not work well in online research. People are less likely to follow up on their promised referrals to more interview partners and were less likely to respond to follow up emails. However, some organisations also strictly forbid online interviews. Two high-level security organisation interviews that I managed to set-up and that were already scheduled never took place because the first attempt got delayed by the first lock down, and two more were finally thwarted by the second lock-down.

In the middle of all these setbacks, I reflected on how I could enhance the interest of potential interview partners in my project, and changed my way of “negotiating access”. More than in primary prevention, potential interviewees in secondary prevention had questions about my research before engaging with me. I needed a way to communicate the value of my research to practitioners, in a way they could understand and relate to the project, while also staying true to my critical approach. This critical approach is an issue in this field, as practitioners are aware they are working in a tricky balance, because a) they have to protect their clients, b) they also want to protect themselves from attacks or receiving a bad reputation, c) the engagement of social work with security issues is eyed suspiciously by a variety of audiences starting with the clients and their parents, the broader public, academia, and also politics⁹, d) their further funding is based on their success, d) their work carries considerable responsibility and the impact of failure is high, to name just a few issues. I was thus confronted by the question of how much criticality to reveal on the one hand in order to gain some access, and on the other hand in order to still conduct methodologically sound research. I decided to be as upfront about my research as possible, and send a short and compact one pager outlining my research project with my interview requests (Annex). The central points of the outline were that I was interested in researching the role of resilience in radicalisation prevention in the field of tension between security and social politics, investigating a “securitisation” or “socialisation”. My response rate increased, but I can only assume that the increase was a reflection of my new communication strategy (or maybe the sudden increase of time resources due to the pandemic). From March 2020 (Interview 25-40) onwards I attached this outline to every interview request to ensure equal treatment to my interviewees. I did not inform two Dutch interviewees in secondary prevention through this outline, because the original interviews were scheduled before March 2020, but the interviewees rescheduled the interviews several times (Interview 1/2; Interview 30). I will elaborate more on this on the ethics section.

9 To exemplify an opposing political party in Germany made several parliamentary inquiries regarding the secondary prevention organization in question out of a concern for a) their results of success in consideration of their budget, and b) the lenient approach of the federal state in engaging with radicalizing subjects (AfD, 2017).

Regarding the Netherlands, I managed to conduct ten interviews with eleven persons engaged in the process of individual case management between February 2020 and January 2021. Nine interviews cover four regional and one national case management setting. Following Ragazzi and de Jongh`s (2019, p. 148) field research approach to interview street-level bureaucrats in the Netherlands to analyse how they “enact, appropriate and at times resist the imperatives that are imposed on them by the contradictory logics of counter-radicalisation” I also sampled street-level bureaucrats. I interviewed security professionals, municipality administrations, and Safety- and Security House employees engaged with case assessment and management. Lipsky (Lipsky, 1980, p. xi) coined the concept street-level bureaucrats referring to “schools, police and welfare departments, lower courts, legal services offices, and other agencies whose workers interact with and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of public sanctions”. Most of the interviews lasted one to two hours. Additionally, I was participating in the Dutch police CETR training course, which teaches Dutch police officers the signals of radicalisation, its documentation, and the basics of the assessment on February 12-13 2020. This enhanced my understanding about how someone becomes a case for radicalisation prevention, as my interviews suggested that in the Netherlands, that most cases were entered through the police to non-voluntary case management. I conducted one expert interview with the NCTV regarding the national Counter Terrorism policy, the relevance of case management and its enactment, as well as the role of resilience. The interview with the NCTV and the interview with the Ministry of Social Affairs were important in addition to the policy analysis and regarding the role of resilience in case management. In total, I have gathered material about five case management sites and one expert interview regarding the accompanying policy in the Netherlands.

Regarding Germany, I managed to conduct six interviews with eight persons engaged in the process of individual case management in September 2019 and between October and December 2020. I got in touch with an institution called Signpost which in publications listing secondary prevention organisations had the aim of “strengthening resilience” (BAG ReLex, 2017). Signpost is a primary and secondary religious radicalisation prevention institution in the federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) and is thus a representative for individual and societal resilience. Signpost is a state organisation as it was founded by the Office of the Protection of the Constitution (an equivalent might be Homeland Security in the US or the AIVD in the Netherlands). The set-up of Signpost was a response to NRW having one of the highest rates of so-called travellers in Germany. In 2021, Signpost had 25 locations providing me with a comparatively high sample opportunity. I managed to get in touch with four more Signpost locations, and interviewed six more employees, as in two interviews two counsellors were present. These interviews lasted two hours each. Seven Signposts did not respond or rejected my interview requests. A sixth interview was rejected on behalf of the Office of the Protection of the Constitution, which was mostly likely due to

the timing: at the beginning of November, there was an attack in Vienna and the subsequent investigations also included Germany. Since at the same time, my interview requests and already established contact in Bavaria also came to a gridlock, I am assuming all security related organisations put a hold on public relations. The sixth interview consists of an expert interview relevant regarding the set-up and task of Signpost as an institution. I conducted this particular in the end in form of an online questionnaire, due to the pandemic. In total, I have gathered material about five case management sites and one expert interview regarding the accompanying policy in NRW.

I have also conducted one interview with a non-state civil society organization engaged in the prevention of rightist extremism in NRW (Interview 11). Due to changes in the research design, I could only incorporate it as background information and to understand the position of Signpost in the composition of prevention actors in the local setting.

4.4 Research Ethics and/in Interviewing

In total I conducted 40 interviews, which I subcategorized as interview phase one, roughly covering primary prevention (April 2019-February 2020), and phase two, roughly covering secondary prevention (March 2020-January 2021). During interview phase one I was adapting the Informed Consent sheet that I was using to my research. Phase one was also characterized by relatively easy access to my interviewees and less concerns about how to frame my research. Phase two consisted of informing potential interviewees beforehand about the broad strokes of my research in order to gain access.

In accordance with the extended case method, one part of the first step is to enter the field and to perceive one's entrance as intervention in this field. This means, to be reflective about how one modifies or affect the field through one's presence, and how this might affect the collection and interpretation of data (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 74).

During the first interview phase, and for the first nine interviews, conducted between March and April 2019, I used an informed consent sheet from the University. However, this informed consent sheet was geared towards psychology and was not applicable in my research, because it was based on random samples which could be fully anonymized. Since my research engages with a selected sample, I cannot guarantee complete anonymity. In the course of these first nine interviews, I explained before the interview started what anonymity in the case of this interview and in relation to the dissertation means. Since I conducted these interviews in relation to the Bounce project, I elaborated that they were part of a selected sample and that the interviews are used in relation to the project and the site (country) they were taking place in. Additionally, the informed consent sheet of the university required research participants to sign the form, which made my interviewees uncomfortable.

Therefore, I restored to oral consent as is usual in ethnographic field research (Ryen, 2016, p. 33). Oral consent is usual in settings where research participants feel vulnerable due to the negative potential implications a research might have on themselves or on their work, should their answers be traced back to them (Potter, 2018, p. 52). In this case, to name a few potential vulnerabilities these could be repercussions from their superiors, a negative impact on funding decisions, and harm to their clients as well as themselves. Therefore, I used the same informed consent sheet that I drew up myself for the remaining 31 interviews (see Annex). I prepared this informed consent sheet in close and recurring consultation with my supervisor, as Ryen (2016, p. 33) suggests research ethics concerns are best approached through “invit[ing] experienced researchers with particular knowledge in research ethics and in your field to discuss these issues with you”.

In all interviews and during the CETR training participation, I followed the research ethics of informing the participants that they are researched, they were informed about the nature of the research and that they have the right to withdraw at any time (Ryen, 2016, p. 32). The informed consent sheet that I used from Interview 9 to 40, consisted of informing the participants about the difference between anonymity and confidentiality. Based on this explanation, I elaborated what I can guarantee (e.g. not using names) versus what I cannot guarantee, like that it is possible for readers to figure out institutional and organizational affiliations from the context.

Not using names is especially important in the field of radicalization prevention, because of the possibility of personal attacks on the practitioners (Pettinger, 2020b, p. 59). Additionally, practitioners wanted to protect their clients, as their names could potentially also lead to them and practitioners themselves are bound by confidentiality towards their clients (I have to mention in this context, that no one ever explicitly named a client they were working with, but sometimes they used life stories to exemplify a point they wanted to emphasize). Therefore, I decided not to use names at all, even in cases where the interviewees agreed to being named.

Some of these consents were based on my prior elaboration that it is going to be difficult to conceal the organization or institution, because of their uniqueness. Wiles (2013, p. 47) discusses the impossibility of confidentiality guarantees in high profile cases, and argues that “these individuals are likely to be clear about what they are willing and not willing to discuss in a research interview and the implications of doing so. For these individuals, concerns about confidentiality may be minimal.” Such cases were for example the Office for Communal Prevention in Augsburg (Interview 12), the German branch of EFUS (Interview 21), the Landeslijke Steunpunt Extremisme (Interview 32), and the NCTV (Interview 40). With some of the more difficult, to conceal interviewees I made agreements about the

transcript and in one instance about a direct quote authorization (Interview 17). Agreements about the transcript concerned the right of the interviewee to see the transcript and to cut out parts in hindsight (Interview 21, 28, 29, 31, 32, 40). Considering the parts they cut in retrospect, interviewees were cautious about revealing any controversial information, particularly concerning the institution they work for, in cases where I could not guarantee confidentiality. Interviewee 28 and 31 did not respond to three emails each asking them to hand back the transcript. Interviewee 32 edited the transcript, rather than only cutting things out. Following this experience, I informed interviewees that although they were allowed to cut out things, they were not allowed to edit the transcript. One police officer stated explicitly that the interview is his/her own opinion and does not reflect the opinion of the institution he/she works for (Interview 27). I did not make any conscious effort to conceal the organizational or institutional affiliations in these and other cases, if the participants consented that their affiliations are not confidential.

One interview request with a police officer unfortunately led to an end regarding these particular interviews. I had a phone call (22/04/2020) with this policer officer in order to schedule an interview, because s/he told me s/he had questions beforehand. I was told during this phone call that to conduct interviews with police officers one has to make an official request with the Dutch police in order to do research, as all research must be authorized. I was also told that s/he would find it questionable if I published an article about the CETR unit and program based on one interview, expressing concern about public opinion and the reputation of the unit and program. During this phone call, I was interrogated about how many police officers I interviewed, and I was asked for their names. I refused to answer these questions by referring to being bound by the research ethics of my profession. Additionally, I emphasized that the interviewee, he was aware of, shared his/her own opinion and does not speak for the institution, which would be clearly stated in my thesis. Regarding the non-disclosure of the research participants, this is a case of minimizing harm for interviewees and is part of the research ethics agreement (Wiles, 2013, p. 59). However, I was still in an “ethical dilemma”, because of the question if asking for consent with individuals is enough¹⁰, or if I was obliged to ask for consent with the institution, or if this is a matter of censorship and the independence of research. “When ethical dilemmas are confronted [...] there are no absolutes and rarely simple solutions” (Iphofen, 2009, p. 29); I decided to use the material I had collected in good faith and with the consent of the participants to uphold the independence of research, but also not to pursue this lead any longer, as a matter of not bringing harm to further interviewees.

10 Therefore, this is not “covert” research, as I was fully transparent about who I am and what I do (cf. Lee, 1993).

From phase one to phase two, I changed the approach towards information I gave interviewees before the interview. I have to clarify at this moment, that also during the first phase, I gave interviewees information on what I am doing, and always stated some interview questions already in the email invitation, in order to give them some idea what the interview would be about. Despite this prior information, most interviewees thought I will do some kind of evaluation of the Bounce training, which sometimes led to them adopting justificatory positions because the implementation rate of the training was quite low. During the first phase, I did not intend to be openly critical about either resilience or radicalization prevention. In most interviews, I sought to ensure to have an open attitude towards and showed appreciation for the answers, my interviewees gave. However, in some instances, I apparently failed and my preconceived theoretical understanding of both radicalization and resilience brought tension to some interviews. For example, one interviewee replied to one question: “you ask as if there is a correct or a wrong answer to this question” (Interview 20). As stated in the introduction, my research approach is not to “impose epistemic superiority” on interviewees, therefore this comment was definitely giving me a pause (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 72). I reflected upon this statement and listened very carefully to myself during transcribing the interviews 10 to 20 which were all conducted in the time span between September 17th and 27th 2019. Reflecting upon my style of interviewing during transcribing hours and hours of interview material, was one of the reasons why I altered my approach. I realized that I was getting defensive or nervous every time I asked a question, that I thought might cause emotional stress in my interviewees (Ryen, 2016, pp. 40–41). Therefore, I was thinking about how I could ask critical questions, without projecting the stress I experienced with these questions onto my interviewees.

In phase two, interviewees received a short outline of my research with the interview request. The outline specified what I did and that I am interested in securitization and socialization processes in the field of radicalization prevention, focusing on the role of resilience. This was due to several reasons. First, interview partners had more questions about my research upfront and I had to decide on how much information to give beforehand without being suggestive. I decided on giving everyone the same information beforehand, also preparing them more for critical questions. Therefore, it was easier for me to ask critical questions as the interviewees were prepared for it and agreed to the interview. Second, it was an attempt to generate more interview partners. Some interviewees indeed talked about the outline and why they were interested in participating in the research without me asking:

“You mentioned the securitization of the social field - as well as the socialization of the security field - and we see that happening inside our organization, because in essence we provide health care and counseling, but we of course have to deal with security measures at the same time” (Interview 32)

“The balance act between security logic [note: securitization] and social work is definitely an issue that I am personally very concerned with” (Interview 36)

These accounts show that the interviewees were familiar with the problem and related to it. Thus, they perceived my research as valuable in their line of work, as it refers to a tricky balance they have to maintain in their work.

To finalize the ethics section, regarding data protection: the audio files of the interviews are stored securely at the University of Groningen server, accessible only to me and one of my supervisors (Caitlin Ryan).

4.5 Questionnaires and Interviewing

I used semi-structured questionnaires during the interviews. Semi-structured interviews are grounded in literature and relevant theoretical considerations, thus it was the right choice for the research design which draws on theoretical considerations (Haenssger, 2019, p. 27). Semi-structured interviews to interviews where open questions to a particular topic are formulated, but the sequence of the questions is not pre-determined, and researchers are free to ask follow-up questions that emerge during the interview (Haenssger, 2019, pp. 26–27). Accordingly, the researcher is allowed to explore a theme more in-depth that was not necessarily part of the initial questionnaire, if the topic is relevant for the research question (*ibid.*). This approach is necessary in the research design, as I did not know which answers to expect from my interviewees, and because the aim of the research is to look for appropriations, critique, re-signification and the practitioner’s take-up and understanding of resilience in their respective contexts. Therefore, most of my questions were open questions. To exemplify: what does prevention mean for you and in your context? What does resilience mean for you and how is it relevant in your work? While these questions are relatively open giving the interviewees room to voice their own opinions, the questions still refer to a particular topics, as I aim in the analysis to make theoretical extensions, through “anomalies” (Lai and Roccu, 2019). I am not aiming at building theory of what resilience is in a bottom-up manner, but to reconstruct theory by incorporating this knowledge.

The questionnaires were set-up with an initial phase talking about backgrounds as entry questions, more in-depth questions in the middle and critical and open questions at the end – the interviews did not necessarily follow this set-up (Haenssger, 2019, p. 29). If interviews went in the direction of a question that would come later, I asked follow-up questions at the moment the interviewee started to talk about a particular topic. At the end of each interview, I also had a completely open question asking the interviewee if they wanted to add something that they think is important or that they thought I had not touched upon, although it is relevant.

The questionnaires were structured in accordance with the cases. Except for the open concept questions, such as the three mentioned above, which I asked in every interview. Otherwise, there were interview themes and blocs which were the same (e.g. institutional embedding, organizational set-up, professional background, relations between organisations and institutions), while other blocs were adapted to Bounce (primary prevention case) and case management (secondary prevention case). Expert interviews were geared towards the respective policies in the country, and/or towards the context of the case. I built these blocs to allow for an adaption to my interviewees, while still obtain similar types of information (Kallio *et al.*, 2016).

I conducted interviews in Germany in German, and in the Netherlands in English. Clearly, the German speaking interviewees had an advantage and were able to be more elaborate. I translated all interview passages and should there be mistakes, they are my responsibility.

4.6 Coding – Data Analysis

My data analysis consists of coding, as was initially developed in Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2014). I especially relied on initial and focused coding, but rather than building my own theory, my analytical categories emerged in a “dynamic interaction with theory” (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 72). I put my theoretical lens and the interviews in a dialogue with each other, guided by the approach to not “impose epistemic superiority on them, but at the same time without uncritically reproducing their claims or assumptions” (*ibid.*, p. 72). The data analysis corresponds to the final extension proposed by the extended case method, which refers to “theory reconstruction”. This is the stage through which one engages with the “anomalies emerged during fieldwork which challenge the theory as the initial – more or less developed – framework” (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 75). In this stage, the theory is “reconstructed” to explain the “anomalies” of the social world one has observed.

Both cases are coded in relation to the national site they are embedded in. Therefore, also the coding process reflects the interrelations between the policies and interviews. A first initial coding of the policies as well as the interviews showed national overlaps in emerging themes (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 116–120). For example, democracy building was a code that predominantly emerged in German policies as well as interviews conducted in Germany, but which was not as present in the Netherlands. Raising awareness for the signals of radicalization in different professions was on the other hand a strategy outlined in the Dutch CT policy and repeated throughout the interviews conducted in the Netherlands. In the initial coding round, I also used “in-vivo codes” referring to terms that come “directly from my respondents’ voices” to stay close to my data (Charmaz, 2014, p. 190). The initial round of coding was to get a first impression on emerging themes, similarities and differences.

In the second and third round of coding I used focused coding. Focused coding means to decide “which initial codes make the most analytic sense” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 138). At this stage I started to filter codes in order to concentrate on what is relevant to help me understand the phenomenon of resilience in relation to radicalization prevention, rather than other phenomena. Therefore, focused coding also served as a ‘reduction’ (Rapley, 2016, pp. 339–340). Reduction in this stage for example consisted of filtering different resiliences, for example, the Dutch CT policies use resilience in various contexts like cybersecurity or in crisis communication. However, I only focus on resilience relevant in relation to radicalization prevention. Regarding the interviews, focused coding consisted on figuring out how what was said relates to resilience. I also started to make interconnections between the codes. For example, I realized in relation to the Bounce training, that the Bounce trainers were all social and youth workers, which shaped their understanding of prevention. This understanding of prevention in turn relates to the understanding of resilience. Subsequently, I integrated an open question concerning prevention in the questionnaires for the second case, to see if this category also relates to resilience, and if how. Focused coding supported a refining of earlier codes, as a reflecting on these codes, which could lead to finding different relations and ditching an earlier code, or re-naming it. Focused coding served as a condensation and a filtering of what is relevant to understand resilience in relation to radicalization prevention.

In the last stage coding, I used a variety of “theoretical coding” (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 150–152). I call it variety, as I grouped codes to categories that referred to fitting theoretical notions and I came to theoretical conclusions, which were simultaneously informed by theory. In this regard, I follow the approach outlined in the introduction. Not only did I construct my cases through “a dynamic interaction with theory”, I also used the same approach in my data analysis (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 67). Charmaz (2014, p. 150) points out that in relation to grounded theory, a discussion arose if “theoretical coding” refers to an application or to an emergence. The variety I used is closer to an application, rather than an emergence. But engaging in a dynamic interaction with theory, allowed me to adapt theoretical notions in interaction with what emerged in my data, as also Charmaz (2014, p. 155) suggests: “If you use theoretical codes, let them breath through the analysis, not be applied to it”. To exemplify: categories that were related to theoretical notions were for example filtering codes in relation to the national institutional settings that were relevant in shaping the context of resilience. In chapter five, six and eight I analyze institutional settings through the categories of “functional differentiation” and “functional de-differentiation”, which consisted of several codes I grouped into these two categories. “Functional de-differentiation” is simultaneously also a category that refers to a particular theoretical notion (Schinkel, 2011), while “functional differentiation” is my own derivation. To give a second example: initial coding showed that resilience related differently to the category of norm: in primary prevention the goal was

enhancement referring to biopower, and in secondary prevention the goal was broadly the re-establishment of “state of health/stability”. In both cases, emotion was an emerging theme related to resilience. Thus, my prior engagement with theory informed my categories and put me in a dynamic interaction. However, rather than applying the theory on the cases, I shaped theoretical notions in a way that were useful to explain my material. For example, by showing that resilience in prevention is engaged with emotions, while still working as a subjectivation.

4.7 Conclusion

Following the steps outlined by the extended case method¹¹, I first chose cases in accordance with theoretical considerations. I analysed policy documents through initial coding and coded major emerging themes in both countries and got an impression how primary and secondary prevention are organized. Subsequently, I chose cases in accordance with this organisation and in relation to my research question to analyse the role and meaning of psychological resilience. “Armed with [my] theories and assumptions” I entered the field and started interviewing practitioners and policy experts, being aware that I “modify or affect” the field and be reflective about it within my research process in terms of how I collect data and how I interpret the data (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 74).

The second step, or rather extension consists of “data reduction” which “allow us to move from social situation to social process”. In this step, I considered the power structures of the field that I entered. In my case the power structures are the external understanding of radicalisation or extremism prevention policies in the respective countries, that shape the institutions and professions present in the local settings. In this step, I took into consideration how the “macro-forces structure the social situation in the local context, placing it into a relation of mutual constitution with the forces examined at the micro-level in the field” (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 74). After interviewing the first practitioners of Bounce, I analysed the interviews through a second round of initial coding and drew relations from the policy material and the material of Bounce. I saw contrasts emerging from the two different country backgrounds, and the practitioners understanding of prevention. Subsequently I related the local, national and case specific understanding of resilience to each other. I also reflected about how the research process of this case influenced my initial understanding of the second case. For the second case, I again entered the field and went through the same process of interviewing, an initial round of coding, “data reduction” and drawing relations from practitioners’ understandings to policy material

¹¹ There is a third extension dealing with how the international as external shapes the social field. Unfortunately, this goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.

The final extension I engaged with is “theory reconstruction”, which is the stage through which one engages with the “anomalies emerged during fieldwork which challenge the theory as the initial – more or less developed – framework” (Lai and Roccu, 2019, p. 75). In this stage, the theory is “reconstructed” to explain the “anomalies” of the social world one has observed. In this stage, I used “focused coding” and subsequently “theoretical coding” to come to my final conclusions.

Governmentality is useful to analyse knowledge/power relations, which are so tangible in policies. But governmentality alone does not account for how those subjected to practices shaping conduct, conduct themselves in the process. The extended case methodology allows showing “a power exerted on the subject, is nonetheless a power assumed by the subject”, without rejecting that there is a power/knowledge relation, but accounting for the differences, or “anomalies” (Butler, 1997; Lai and Roccu, 2019).

In the following two chapters, I carry out a policy analysis to show the normalizing and normating strategies derived in shaping and disciplining the resilient subject. In the last two chapters, I show how in primary and secondary prevention, these strategies correspond or reject what is envisioned in policies, and how subjects appropriate, comply or criticize this normalization and normation.

