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## Resilience in radicalization prevention

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# The Productivity of Norms in Governmentality



Foucault has an interesting relationship with norms, reformulating and reconceptualizing them in accordance with changes and developments of his thinking. In IR, psychological (but also ecological) resilience has been mostly analyzed as an enhancement of populations, exhibiting the biopolitical understanding of resilience as a quality that is normally distributed within a population and can be enhanced by certain governing practices (O'Malley, 2010; Neocleous, 2012; Howell, 2015). Neglected in these accounts, is that resilience in psychology is measured against social conformity, and is constituting a prescriptive ideal, which not only normalizes but also normates.

In this chapter I trace Foucault's (2003, p. 162) understanding and conceptualizations of norms, especially with regards to the psy-sciences where the norm is still an "unresolved problem". The norm in the psy-sciences is an unresolved problem because the norm is not only a product of biopower, but also of disciplinary power, perpetuating a normative-disciplinary system of social conformity in the name of health. Psychological resilience is not just determining what resilience is, but by establishing this meaning, it renders not being resilient abnormal (Aranda *et al.*, 2012). As Foucault stressed in his early works on the psy-sciences and discipline, abnormality was rendered into something potentially dangerous and therefore warrants a state intervention to correct or rehabilitate. Therefore, part of this chapter will excavate Foucault's conceptualizations of norms in relation to biopower as well as disciplinary power and show their specific mixture within the power/knowledge formation of the psy-sciences.

To research norms in a Foucaultian framework means to approach norms cautiously and to understand them as historically contingent and potentially normalizing. Norms are neither benevolent nor repressive as such, rather they have the potential for both. "All norms implicate us in relations of power" Taylor (2009, p. 52) reminds us in a recurrence to Foucault. But the implication in relations of power is not the issue as long as we are able to "modify, negotiate, and/or reverse these relations". Norms become an issue if they are "uncritically accepted as natural and necessary", if they "increase the capacities and expansion of possibilities to an intensification of existing power relations" and if they "promote power at the expense of freedom" (Taylor, 2009, pp. 53, 60). The psy-sciences define resilience and thereby turn resilience into a norm. This justifies a range of interventions to normalize and normate populations and subjects alike, which indeed "promotes power at the expense of freedom" (*ibid.*). But when resilience is embedded in different power relations, it not only has the potential to perpetuate them, but also harnesses the potential to disrupt them. In approaching resilience as a psychological norm, I take into consideration the normalizing power of the psy-sciences, while also remain open to how resilience is taken-up and shaped in accordance with my empirical material.

In the first and second section, I will focus on showing how these two ideas of the norms are integrated in governmentality. To centralize the psy-sciences in governmentalities is hardly a new endeavor, the most famous proponent is surely Nikolas Rose (Rose, 1985, 1996a, 2018). Rose (Rose, 1989, 1996a, p. 2) shows how the psy sciences, an umbrella term designating psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, became an intrinsic part of governing practices in relation to child rearing, development, the military and the workplace. I follow Rose in most of his analysis, as Foucault's own project of analyzing the evolution of the psy-sciences focuses on the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, whereas Rose continues in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. I use both of them to show how the psy sciences became linked to security, and how particular psy practices such as mental hygiene are a predecessor of prevention practices. In this regard, resilience is not a particularity as such, as the psy-sciences formed part of prevention governance at least since the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Rose has a broader focus and argues that subjects are "obliged to be free", that modern day's involvement of the psy-sciences in governing practices furthers "freedom, autonomy, and fulfilment" which "provides for the mutual translatability of the languages of psychic health and individual liberty" (Rose, 1989, p. 217). In contrast, I put more emphasis on the normative-disciplinary system and the disciplinary components involved in sites of security, which are less concerned with self-regulation and autonomy, and focus more on surveillance and intervention.

But discipline no longer works as a strict relementation, drilling and training of bodies, but disciplinary power nowadays is more subtle. It works through and on emotions, in what Penz and Sauer (2020) conceptualize as affective governmentality. Current normalization and normation practices are particularly imbued with emotions, expressed for example by the imperative of creating emotional literacy. As such, psychological resilience is measured and determined through self-efficacy, self-esteem, emotional control, all categories that illustrate a normalization and normation not only of cognition and behavior, but also of emotions through a governance of resilience.

Against the backdrop of my empirical material, I also include a section that engages with ways to counter and appropriate normalization and normation processes to give credit to Foucault's aim of fragmentation rather than totalization. In this section engage with the process of subjectivation, counter-conducts and signification to show how normalization and normation can be shaped by the subject.

Finally, in the last section, I use the previous sections to analyze the emergence of resilience in development psychology. Development psychology is the strand of psychology which is particularly concerned with healthy development of children and youth, and therefore the most relevant psy discipline in shaping policies concerned with youth, such as radicalization. Resilience stemming from development psychology was at least a decade

before radicalization was coined, implemented in youth crime prevention policies and from there ventured towards radicalization prevention (for an overview of the relation between youth crime and radicalization prevention see Heath-Kelly and Shanaáh, 2022a). Therefore, I engage with development psychology's understanding of resilience, rather than with other strands of psychology.

### 3.1 Governmentality and Norms

Governmentality, according to Foucault an “ugly term” (Foucault, 2009, p. 115), is one of his most widespread theoretical frameworks in and beyond IR (Rose, 1989; Lemke, 2001, 2002; Joseph, 2018). In this section I will provide a short overview of the main premises of governmentality which are relevant for this dissertation. Therefore, this section will mainly capture how governmentality relates to Foucault's previous work on norms, normalization and normation. In this course of action, I will also embed necessary definitions of important concepts.

Governmentality is an approach that appeared relatively late in Foucault's oeuvre, specifically in two lecture series, *Security Territory and Population* (1977-78) as well as the *Birth of Biopolitics* (1978-79). Thus, governmentality appears after he had already coined several influential concepts including disciplinary power (1975). Therefore, it is unsurprising that Foucault's prior work forms part and influences the newly coined governmentality approach. In the conceptualization of governmentality in the lecture series “*Security, Territory, Population*” (1977-78), he re-evaluates and relocates his different conceptions of power within the bigger picture of governmentality and calls the question of the “norm” to be at the heart of things (Foucault, 2004a, p. 56). As the two most detailed accounts engaging with the question of norm in Foucault's writings point out, definitions and conceptualizations of the norm and normalization are most central in the lecture series *Psychiatric Power* (1973-74), *Abnormal* (1974-75), *Society Must be Defended* (1975-76) and *Security, Territory and Population* (1977-78) (Taylor, 2009; Kelly, 2019). In the following, I only contrast Kelly (2019) and Taylor (2009) on including “*Discipline and Punish*” (1975), because not only does Foucault discuss normalization in the book, but normalization in relation to disciplinary power, which is important for my argument. After this brief exercise in locating Foucault's writings, I will continue with elaborating on the concept of governmentality itself.

Governmentality is one of Foucault's neologisms consisting of the terms govern and mentality. With govern he is referring to the roots of its meaning which is “conduct”, in the sense of conducting oneself and conducting others (Foucault, 2009, pp. 120–21). This is relevant because govern is not concerned with territories, but govern is always referring to people (ibid. 122). “Mentality”, or modes of thought, refers to the organized practices of governing (Lemke, 2001, p. 191). Mentalities are studied as thoughts that are “made practical

and technical” (Mitchell, 2010, p. 27). According to Mitchell, governmentality can be defined as an “analytics of government examin[ing] the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained and are transformed” (Mitchell, 2010, p. 31). Governmentality goes beyond institutions and it allows to link particular mentalities of governing through time and space, which is why it is such a powerful analytical tool. This theoretical approach shares with genealogy that it is a problematization of the present, but rather than exclusively tracing the genealogy of a practice, it allows to follow a practice in different settings.

In Foucault’s own work, governmentality emerged through his engagement with governing practices and the state. This approach, of tracing practices, allows him to supersede the state as the grid of intelligibility, because the state is only “an episode in governmentality” (Foucault, 2004a, pp. 247–48). By focusing on the practices of governing oneself and others, he is able to trace these governing processes that resulted in the modern state, or of which the modern state forms part, to the *pastorale*<sup>1</sup>, to “governmentality proper” in the 16<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> century, liberal governmentality and neoliberalism (Gordon, 1991, p. 3). Within these different stages of governmentality, or rather different governmentalities exhibiting continuities, Foucault locates and (re-)conceptualizes several forms of power. I will shortly characterize these powers in relation to the practices of normalization and normation.

I want to emphasize that governmentality is particularly useful in analyzing practices of resilience as normalization and normation, because governmentality still includes disciplinary and biopower. Governmentality connects them through a common rationale, without absolving them of their different functioning. Relevant for this dissertation is Foucault’s central placement of the norm as defining element connecting the different forms of power:

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1 According to Mitchell (2010, p. 93), Foucault investigates the *pastorale*, to trace the antecedents and the contradictions of the welfare state. The contradiction of the welfare state problematic discovered by Foucault, according to Mitchell, are the distinctive objectives of the governmentalities of the *pastorale* and the Greek polis. The characteristics of the *pastorale* are described in the main text. In contrast to the characteristics of the *pastorale*, in the Greek polis “political power is exercised within and by a self-governing political community” consisting of “citizens”, subjects who are defined by their “rights and obligations” in relation to the political community (Mitchell, 2010, p. 93). In contrast, pastoral power is defined by the “shepherd-flock” dynamic, it is a “governing of souls” and fundamentally it is a caring power. The welfare state thus still entails these two different governmentalities and is hence also subject to its contradictions.

Not only Mitchell, but also Gordon (1991, p. 8) in the Foucault Effect point to the same origin of the contradictions in the welfare state as being the ‘daemonic coupling of “city-game” and “shepherd-game”’.

“The element that circulates between the two is the norm. The norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population that one wishes to regularize. [...] The normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation” (Foucault, 2004b, pp. 252–53).

The notion of the “normalizing society” largely disappeared after the lecture series *Society Must Be Defended* (1975–76). However, the location of the norm as binding element between biopower and disciplinary power remains the same in his later work on governmentality. In the following I will elaborate on the two conceptualisations of the norm and relate them to the psy-sciences and prevention practices.

Foucault starts tracing the pastoral power as a mode of governing in the Mediterranean East, in Egypt, Assyria, Mesopotamia, Babylonia to the Christian forms of governing (Foucault, 2009, pp. 123–24). The *pastorale* is a form of governing oriented by the shepherd and his flock. The shepherd and his flock are not territorially bound, rather “pastoral power is exercised on a multiplicity on the move” (Foucault, 2009, p. 126). The shepherd is responsible and tends to his flock, seeking the salvation of “each and all” (ibid. 128). The *pastorale* is also an individualizing power because every sheep is as important as the herd (ibid. 128). The defining element of this form of power is its beneficence, it is a “power of care” (ibid. 127). Mitchell (2010, p. 92) emphasizes the relevance of this form of power by referring to practices in the 21<sup>st</sup> century still exhibiting elements of this power like the “psy’ disciplines, counselling, social work and other therapeutics, [that] seek a knowledge of the individual and his or her inner existence, and require that the individual practice a form of self-renunciation”. In relation to government practices, Foucault still sees this power operating because it engages with the population as well as the individual. Pastoral power and the way individuals are conducted, are also especially important in relation to the psy-function as confession and spiritual direction are the antecedents of modern day’s therapeutic practices (Foucault, 2003a, p. 169). Pastoral power is not directly linked to the practice of normalization, but normalization practices still contain elements of pastoral power.

On several occasions in his early works on the psy-sciences and later in relation to governmentality Foucault emphasizes the centrality of the norm in relation to power, and analyses practices of normation and normalization (Taylor, 2009; Kelly, 2019). Especially in the conceptualization of disciplinary power the norm is a central element: “The norm is not simply and not even a principle of intelligibility; it is an element on the basis of which a certain exercise of power is founded and legitimized” (Foucault, 2003a, p. 50). Therefore, in the following I will discuss the emergence of two differing conceptualizations of the norm in relation to disciplinary power and biopower/governmentality.



During the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century, and especially in the lecture series *Psychiatric Power* (1973-74), *Abnormal* (1974-75) and his seminal work *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Foucault investigates disciplinary power. In Foucault's work on governmentality, he traces governing practices in different episodes throughout history. In contrast, when engaging with discipline he is tracing practices of bodily normation across several institutions (schools, the military, hospitals, prisons) which developed similar techniques of standardization at the same time. In this regard, Foucault argues that disciplinary power emerges, because modern societies became increasingly complex and sovereign power<sup>2</sup> was not able to effectively control these societies anymore (Taylor, 2009, p. 49). Foucault outlines that "[O]n almost every occasion they [note: disciplinary techniques] were adopted in response to particular needs: the industrial innovation, a renewed outbreak of certain epidemic diseases, the invention of the rifle [...]" (Foucault, 1975, p. 138). The same practices then spread throughout different institutions, of which treatment during confinement (psychiatry hospital and prison) are most thoroughly analysed in Foucault's own writings.

Central characteristics of disciplinary normation are "hierarchical observation", "normalizing judgement [note: normation]", and "the examination" (Foucault, 1975, pp. 170-95). "Discipline organizes an analytical space" and within that space "it is an anatomy of detail" (ibid, p. 143) Discipline creates the individual, because for the first time individual differences were noted and relevant (ibid. p. 191). Therefore, the body has a specific role, as the body is the basis of analysis and it is the body which can be trained to become "docile" and be "improved" (ibid. p. 136). In order for the instruments of differentiation, classification, ranking, training and correcting to work, they need something to be compared against, because observation, judgement and examination are in need of a standard and this is why the norm is crucial for this power:

"Disciplinary normalization [normation] consists first of all in positing a model, an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the operation of disciplinary normalization consists in trying to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this model, the normal being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that which is incapable of conforming to the norm. [...] That is, there is an originally prescriptive character of the norm and the determination and identification of the normal and abnormal becomes possible in relation to this

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2 Sovereign power is a concept that Foucault tends to use only to contrast the conceptualisations of his other forms of power. Sovereign power is defined as "the right to take life or let live" and one of its defining characteristics that Foucault aimed to undermine through his other forms of powers is that domination is sovereignty's main expression of power (Bargu, 2014, p. 456). Overall, sovereignty is less relevant for this dissertation.

posited norm. Due to the primacy of the norm in relation to the normal, to the fact that disciplinary normalization goes from the norm to the final division between the normal and the abnormal, I would rather say that what is involved in disciplinary techniques is a normation [...] rather than a normalization' (Foucault, 2009, p. 57).

The norm in disciplinary power is thus a pre-conceived optimum state and prescriptive in its application. Foucault elaborates in this regard, why in relation to disciplinary norms, he would call the practice derived from the norm "normation" rather than "normalization", as normation indicates that the norm is first, and normation is what is derived from this norm. I will maintain this differentiation throughout this dissertation.

In relation to this thesis disciplinary power matters, because disciplinary power and the norm are intrinsically related to the psy-sciences: "It seems to me that, in the end, the diffusion of psychiatric power takes place by way of this development of the concept of the 'normal'" (Foucault, 2003a, p. 49). Since disciplinary power is concerned with producing the norm, it inevitably also produces those who fail to conform "the irreducible, the unclassifiable, the inassimilable", which also means that disciplinary power is always concerned with inventing new "recovery systems": "what characterizes disciplinary systems is the never-ending work of the norm in the anomic" (Foucault, 2003b, pp. 53, 54). In this regard, what Foucault calls the "psy-function" derives its special role from engaging first, with those who fail to conform and second later on, the psy function started to control disciplinary systems altogether:

"the psy-function was extended to all the disciplinary systems: school, army, workshop and so forth. That is to say, the psy function performed the role of discipline for all those who could not be disciplined. Whenever an individual could not follow school discipline or the discipline of the workshop, the army, and, if it comes to it, of prison, then the psy function stepped in. [...] Then, finally, at the start of the twentieth century, the psy function became both the discourse and the control of all the disciplinary systems. The psy-function was the discourse and the establishment of all the schemas for the individualization, normalization, and subjection of individuals within disciplinary systems." (Foucault, 2003b, p. 86).

After having elaborated on the centrality role of the norm in relation to disciplinary power and the psy-sciences, I will continue with elaborating on the role in relation to biopower and/ in governmentality. Foucault himself calls the question of the norm as being at the "heart of things" in the third lecture of *Security, Territory and Population* (1977-78), which is the lecture series in which he first introduces governmentality and relocates disciplinary power and the question of normalization within this new governmentality approach. Regarding governmentality, this is the lecture during which he introduces a second definition and

functioning of the norm. This definition is the norm of biopower, in which the norm is an expression of the normal distribution in a population and the question on how to enhance a population. This biopolitical norm emerged in relation to particular security<sup>3</sup> problems, of which Foucault looks at epidemics in order to exemplify the differences between governing through discipline and governing through biopower.

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century the technique of statistics showed regularities in phenomena, that were previously considered to be arbitrary or at least irregular (Foucault, 2004a, p. 63). Statistics showed that there was a regularity to morbidity which is relevant in Foucault's exemplification of the relevance of statistics through epidemics. Since a normal rate of morbidity could be established, also the increase of deaths through the epidemic could be established (ibid. p. 62). As a result, the governing of epidemics became not only more efficient, but also led to new regimes of prevention (ibid. p. 63). These regimes of prevention have the "case" as base "which is not the individual case, but a way of individualizing the collective phenomenon of the disease [...] in the form of quantification of the rational and identifiable" for example signs of a disease and their relationship to risk and danger levels (ibid. p. 60). Risk was calculated in accordance with populations (e.g. age groups) (ibid. p. 61). From this distribution of risk, it was discernable that the risk was not the same for every population and that some populations were more endangered than others (e.g. under three year olds had a higher mortality when catching smallpox, people in cities had a higher chance of catching smallpox than those at the countryside) (ibid. p. 61). Thus, danger is the third category in this new prevention regime. The fourth category, Foucault elaborates on is crisis in the meaning of a regular but "sudden bolting" of a phenomenon (ibid. p. 61). Deriving from this new governing of diseases, a new objective of altering conditions in a population occurred. The new aim was to alter populations either by preventing the disease altogether through enhancing the resistance capacity through an early technique of vaccination, or to reduce risk factors in particular populations. This new form of governing led Foucault to reconsider his understanding of the norm in relation to what he would call "biopower" which is a power aiming at regulating populations:

"In the discipline one started from a norm, and it was in relation to the training carried out with reference to the norm that the normal could be distinguished from the abnormal. Here, instead, we have a plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves of normality, and the operation of normalization consists in

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3 The first four lectures of Security, Territory and Population are confusing, because the term "security" is used for what in lecture five is suddenly "governmentality" without much explanation. Moreover, in the first four lectures security also partially designates what is later understood as biopower.

establishing an interplay between these distributions of normality and [in] acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable. So we have here something that starts from the normal and makes use of certain distributions considered to be, if you like, more normal than the others, or at any rate more favorable than the others. These distributions will serve as the norm. The norm is an interplay of differential normalities. The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it, or the norm is fixed and plays its operational role on the basis of this study of normalities. So, I would say that what is involved here is no longer normation, but rather normalization in the strict sense” (Foucault, 2004a, p. 63).

The norm in biopower is thus referring to the normal distribution of a phenomenon in a population, or in other words the average. The quantification of what is normal is the starting point, and not the optimal state. Rather the determination of the normal sets an enhancement of the normal in motion. Since the normal is the starting point, normalization is what is derived from it, rather than normation.

After having established the central technique (statistics) of biopower and its definition of the norm, I will briefly introduce the relevance of the concept in relation to governmentality and the psy-sciences. Biopower is directed at the body of the population, “to enhance humans’ biological functioning” (Kelly, 2019, p. 16). Biopower regulates serial phenomena and increases productivity through measures on a population level. Thus, such regulatory interventions are foremost engaging with health (e.g. improving hygiene, sewer systems), of which also sexuality (influencing mortality and natality) became a part. Governing through biopower is also called biopolitics, and brought forth techniques to govern the conduct of healthy behavior in a population. “Public health” is a prime example of biopower, which also includes mental health. In this regard, Rose (1989) argues that the psy-sciences are a prime driver on creating knowledge about how to govern the behavior and conducts of populations. Thus, the psy-sciences are “intrinsically linked to the history of government” (Rose, 1996a, p. 11) Additionally, the psy-sciences play an important role in relation to prevention, as most interventions are normalizing interventions, trying to enhance the normal distribution of a characteristic in a particular population. Therefore, the psy-sciences are relevant in regulatory enhancement processes of biopower.

This section served to define important concepts in relation to this work. I have shown how I understand governmentality and that I intend to use governmentality to show that resilience serves as a norm in governing practices (Chapter 5 and 6). Within a governmentality framework, I show resilience is practiced differently, depending on who is to be made resilient, a population or an individual. Therefore, the conceptual differentiations between normalization, targeting populations (Chapter 7) and normation, targeting the individual

(Chapter 8) is important. Nonetheless, both practices might aim to enforce the same norm, but the way of procedures differs. I have also engaged with elaborating on the psy-sciences in shaping norms, which will be relevant in the later section about resilience as a norm. However, before engaging with resilience, I will engage with how norms are established in the psy-sciences. This will set the stage of allowing me to show how I engage with the psy-sciences shaping of resilience and how this is intrinsically linked to security for the final section of this chapter.

### 3.2 The Psy-Sciences and the Norm in Prevention

In this section I dive deeper into Foucault's early works on the norm(s) in relation to the psy-sciences. I show how in an earlier work of Foucault, *Abnormal* (1974-75), his conception of the norm in relation to the psy-sciences already included both operations of the norm. This is important as he develops this conception by showing that the psy-sciences are intrinsically linked to "social defence" in governing practices, especially how all criminals became abnormal, and vice versa. Social defence designates that society must be defended from dangerous individuals, inextricably linking the psy sciences to security. How to protect society would also lead to prevention paradigms, from mental hygiene to today's risk assessment. But even more so, it shows how the psy sciences are perpetuating a normative-disciplinary system in security practices through its conceptualization of norms.

Foucault (2004c, p. 13) argues that while the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries social systems were governed by laws, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century "doctors are in the process of inventing a society, not of law, but of the norm [...] a perpetual enterprise of restoring the system of normality". Medical conceptions of the norm are differentiated through health and disease, which on the one hand speaks to a vitalist and biological conceptualization of norms as in biopower, but on the other hand also still implies a prescriptive norm of what ought to be, speaking to disciplinary power. Foucault (2003a, 163) poses the issue of the two norms, a medical and a social one, as an unresolved problem in relation to the psy-sciences:

"the norm understood as rule of conduct, informal law, and principle of conformity opposed to irregularity, disorder, strangeness, eccentricity, unevenness, and deviation. Psychiatry introduces the norm with explosion of the symptomatological field. However, by being rooted in organic and functional medicine, psychiatry is also able to exploit the norm understood in a different sense: the norm as functional regularity, as the principle of an appropriate and adjusted functioning; the 'normal' as opposed to the pathological, morbid, disorganized and dysfunctional. Within the field organized by the new psychiatry, or by the new psychiatry that takes over from the medicine of the alienists, two usages and two realities of the norm are joined together, mutually adapted, and partially superimposed in a way that is still difficult to theorize (but that is another question). **There is the norm as rule of conduct and the norm as functional**

**regulation; the norm opposed to irregularity and disorder, and the norm opposed to the pathological and the morbid.** [...] psychiatry is now entirely underpinned by this interplay between the two norms. [...] Everywhere, all the time, in the simplest, most common, and **most everyday conduct, in its most familiar object, psychiatry will deal with something that is an irregularity in relation to a norm and that must be at the same time a pathological dysfunction in relation to the normal**" (Foucault, 2003a, p. 162; emphasis added by the author).

At the time of *Abnormal* (1974-75) Foucault had not conceptualized biopower yet, but in the above quote, I discern an early reference to biopower in this split of the norm in a disciplinary and a biopower component. Regarding "the irregularity to a norm", there is the definition of a prescriptive norm about how things ought to be in relation to proper societal conduct, which is synonymous to disciplinary power. Regarding the "pathological dysfunction in relation to the normal", we see an early definition of the norm in biopower, very clearly linked to the psy-sciences. In this regard, a norm as defined by the psy-sciences to measure and define what is normal, is based on medical conceptions of health (biopower) but also including a measurement based on social conformity (disciplinary power).

Norms in the psy-sciences are still an expression of both a disciplinary-normative system and biopower. Regarding the biopower element, the psy-sciences were scientized during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when their focus changed from engaging with the soul to the psyche. Psychology and psychiatry started to mimic and apply the methods and the materiality of the natural sciences, especially the then dominant science of physiology (Sonntag, 2001). Subsequently, psychology switched from the realm of philosophy to the natural sciences, especially through measuring and quantifying the psyche by equating the psyche with consciousness (Rau, 2010, p. 201). Psychophysics for example measured stimuli and sensation of particular physical labor processes, in order to calculate performances (ibid. p. 203). Through this example Rau (2010, p. 206) shows psychology also became an intrinsic part of governing because 19<sup>th</sup> century psychologists argued that "emotions and attitudes of the people" need to be "trained in the right way". In this regard, Rau (2010, p. 209) elaborates that early psychology is as much disciplinary, in its anatomo-politics "which individualizes specific self-relationships", as biopolitical because the production of these individuals serve the population.

I illustrate this entanglement of the two conceptions of the norm in the psy-sciences through two Foucaultian quotes. These quotes not only engage with the position of the norm, but also show that the normative disciplinary system is perpetuated by the psy-sciences because of its entanglement with security. The psy-sciences receive their central role through gaining dominion over governing criminals, abnormal and political dissidents for the purposes of "social defence":

“Between the description of social norms and rules and the medical analysis of abnormalities, psychiatry becomes essentially the science and technique of abnormal individuals and abnormal conduct. An obvious implication of this is that the connection between crime and madness becomes a regular phenomenon for psychiatry rather than the extreme case” (Foucault, 2003a, p. 163)

“At the turn of the nineteenth century, **psychiatry became an autonomous discipline and assumed such prestige precisely because it had been able to develop within the framework of a medical discipline conceived of as a reaction to the dangers inherent in the social body.** [...] they [note: psychiatrists and alienists] were treating a social ‘danger,’ either because insanity seemed to them to be linked to living conditions (overpopulation, overcrowding, urban life, alcoholism, debauchery), or because it was perceived as a source of danger for oneself, for others, for one’s contemporaries, and also for one’s descendants through heredity. **Nineteenth-century psychiatry was a medical science as much for the societal body as for the individual soul.**” (Foucault, 1978, p. 7; emphasis added by the author)

A normative-disciplinary system is perpetuated by the diagnostics of the psy-sciences and spread through its engagement with the abnormal. The psy-sciences treat abnormality as a medicalized endeavor, as they seek to cure or reform the abnormal. But a psy-diagnosis can also lead to confinement, if the individual is assessed to be a danger for him/herself or society. This normative-disciplinary system spread with the psy-sciences to ever more practices broadly concerned with the social, gaining sovereignty of meaning of what it means to be normal (Rose, 1996a, pp. 68, 71). Rose (1996a) and Rau (2010) argue that the psy-sciences are intrinsically linked to liberal state formation. Howell (2011, p. 43) shows us how the psy sciences are an important to “order society” and for “the security of states”. Rose (2018, p. 9) reminds us in this regard, that the question of the norm is still a timely one:

“We know that the idea of the norm, as it came to use in the late nineteenth century, linked together the ideas of statistical normality, social normality and medical normality: the norm was the average, the desirable, the healthy, the ideal and so forth. [...] Clearly, normality – of what it is to be normal, to think of oneself as normal, to be considered as normal by others – leads to a set of rather profound questions.”

The entanglement of the psy-sciences with social defence, made the psy-sciences also into an important discipline in regards to security. But during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the question of how to produce lasting security, led to the question of how to prevent undesired futures from happening. In this regard, the psy sciences are relevant for prevention practices, not only normalizing those who are already classified as abnormal, but also trying to prevent

abnormality from emerging. Rose (1985, 1986, 1996b) shows how prevention practices and the psy sciences intertwined in the 1920s and the 1930s in the US, UK and France in the so called “mental hygiene movement” which would later become public health. Mental hygiene set forth to act on populations in order to minimize the danger of abnormality to emerge and was transmitted through institutions such as the army, courtrooms and schools. These populations were more often than not part of a lower social class (Castel, 1991, p. 284). Juvenile delinquency was of particular interest and soon pedagogy also became invested with new techniques from the psy sciences in order to create “social normality and competence” (Rose, 1996b, p. 10). The hope was that mental pathology was preventable if only one could intervene early enough, leading to techniques such as “early diagnosis and treatment”, teaching proper regimes to young parents and “recognizing the signs of maladjustment” (Rose, 1996b, p. 11). These techniques would spread to social work, who became the new case workers “linking up the home, the school, the court, the clinic, the playground and the street around the focus of the individual case” (ibid.). Rose (1985, p. 159) argues that mental hygiene became part of public health considerations to maximize the potential and the efficiency of society, and to socially regulate those who would not conform. In a similar vein, governmentality approaches touching upon the governance of social inconformity in the Netherlands also illustrate a disciplinary-normative system to normate and normalize these individuals and populations (Van Houdt, 2014). To sum up, the psy sciences spread normalizing techniques to order populations, governing them through prevention.

This prevention paradigm prevails, albeit shifting and adapting in the following decades. Castel (1991) traces this shift from dangerousness to risk over a century, to ask what this shift does to the prevention regime. He critiques the prevention regime created by psychiatry, categorizing prevention in three layers: primary, secondary and tertiary. This prevention regime took inspiration from epidemiology in how risk categories are set-up. Primary preventions concerns everyone and is according to Castel (1991, p. 286) the justification for “a whole program of political intervention”. Secondary prevention concerns individuals who show first signs and run greater risk, while tertiary prevention treats possible relapses. Through this shift, dangerousness is no longer the main focus, but rather the possibility, measured in form of risk. This new category led to new techniques in prevention, foremost risk assessment, not only to be used by psy professionals, but a governing technique spreading beyond disciplinary boundaries.

How prevention and resilience relate to each other will be part of a later section in this chapter. In order to conclude this section, I would like to shortly reflect on the role of the psy-sciences and their relation to governmentality. Psy critics point out, that the psy-sciences are still a “highly normative discipline, and its role was one of social protection” (Rose 2018, p. 17). Rose (1986, p. 44) argues the psy-sciences are a “medicalization of social control”. More



recent developments led Rose (1996) to argue that the psy-sciences achieve this social control through governing from a distance. In a similar vein, the shift from dangerousness to risk, led Castel (1991, pp. 293-94) to the question if we are now in a post-disciplinary order, as the psy-sciences work no longer through individual repression or care interventions, but through an epidemiological method aiming at enhancing the efficiency of populations and individuals alike. In contrast, Howell (2011, p. 48) points out that the psy sciences are not only still a crucial way to order populations and individuals, but they work through sovereign, disciplinary and biopower in different empirical sites. I agree with Howell (2011, p. 56), that there is a need for empirical work to show how “[...] governmental, and disciplinary power are at times articulated together”. The empirical material of this dissertation shows, that the normative-disciplinary system of the categorization of the psy-sciences, classifying normality as resilient, and abnormality as radicalizing or radicalized is still intact. But I also see how primary prevention practices, in my empirical examples, show more governance from the distance, while secondary prevention practices have a very distinct disciplinary notions of surveillance, coercion and care. I put forward that the psy-sciences are perpetuating a normative-disciplinary system by virtue of being normalizing and normating. However, how exactly this normalization or normation is enacted is best studied in its (empirical) context.

The interviews I conducted show that resilience is not a normation and normalization only of the body, but rather what is governed, what is the target of normalization and normation through governance are emotions. Regarding the centrality of how one feels, and capturing these feelings as emotions, in the psy-sciences as therapeutics it makes sense that they are the target of governing practices.

### **3.3 Affective Governmentality**

Several theoretical strands developed governmentality further against the backdrop of the psy-sciences, therapeutic practices and their involvement in governing emotions, affects and feelings (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009; Sauer and Penz, 2014; Ashworth, 2017; Penz and Sauer, 2020; Klein *et al.*, 2021). Regarding this literature, resilience was especially discussed in relation to therapeutic governance and therapeutic education (Ecclestone and Lewis, 2016; Pykett and Enright, 2016; Burman, 2018). While I will make recourse to this literature, my main concerns in this section are some of Penz and Sauer’s (2020) conceptualizations of affective governmentality. Their conceptualizations are relevant, because they emphasize the centrality of normation and normalization of emotions in governmentality:

“Foucault locates the origins of this modern form of government – the ‘conduct of conducts’ [...] – in the secularisation of pastoral power, a power that influences and directs ‘gently’. Without doubt, rational arguments have been effective in this regard since the Enlightenment, but also the appeal to emotions and affective forms of community

building. The new pastoral technologies of government no longer encompass only the 'normation' of behaviour, like mandatory feeling rules or the repression of emotions, but also processes of normalisation, such as the selective and arbitrary recognition of affects. If they are functional for certain purposes, then they are permitted (within a certain range). It is evident, however, that the governmentalisation of the state since the 18th century has strongly relied on normation processes, on the alignment of conduct and affect, according to a given norm" (Penz and Sauer, 2020, p. 48)

Normating the body in the form Foucault has described for example in relation the military is a drilling and exercising to bring forth complete synchronized movement. Affective governmentality is a further development of how power targets bodies, but in a more contemporary fashion, and specifically showing that governmentality is concerned with normalizing and normating emotions. This is relevant for this dissertation, because psychological resilience is expressed through emotional states such as self-efficacy, emotional regulation and control, or self-esteem (Masten, 2014). As such, psychology describes resilience by referring to particular emotional states that resilient subjects exhibit, and in turn therapeutic practices aim to teach these emotional states, for example through exercises in emotional literacy. Hence, resilience is normating and normalizing the emotional states of subjects, because being in such a state, adhering to this norm, is supposed to prevent deviant behaviour to emerge or makes subjects less susceptible to being drawn to deviancy.

According to Penz and Sauer (2020, p. 17) emotions are a "result of historical processes of interpretation, explanation, and definition of bodily experiences", they "become intelligible through cultural patterns of perception, norms, and social structures". Feeling in turn can be defined as "conscious awareness that one is experiencing an emotion" (Mercer quoted after Clément and Sangar, 2018, p. 5). Penz and Sauer (2020, p. 20) do not differentiate as rigidly between affects and emotions, as they neglect that a socially unmediated reality can be tangible as for example Massumi does (Massumi, 2021, p. xxxvii).. This is relevant, because it changes the vocabulary of Penz and Sauer in that they "regard affect, feeling, and emotion as a continuum and affect functions in our research as an umbrella term" (Penz and Sauer, 2020, p. 30). Affect is the umbrella term, because affect allows to conceptualize that emotions are transmitted, in that one is being affected and affects, hence affective states can be "contagious" (Penz and Sauer, 2020, p. 33). Therefore, affective governmentality takes into consideration, that normalization and normation is not only targeting emotions, but that also governing works through being affective and that this affectiveness of governance is supposed to shape and/or normate a subject. This shaping and normating is what they call "affective subjectivation":

"With the concept of affective subjectivation, we want to emphasize that a new form of 'control' and government of people with and through feelings, namely the 'affective

government of the self', was institutionalized in modernity [...]. Affects are not only controlled or repressed but are also normalised, and the increasing importance of affects in the context of immaterial labour and neoliberal post-democratic constellations [...] is proof of the normalisation of such affects that were once considered a disturbance" (Penz and Sauer, 2020, p. 51).

Resilience is part of this turn to affective subjectivation. I see resilience, in line with Burman (2017, p. 106) as part of "the rise of emotional literacy agendas that have accompanied the shift to post-industrial, knowledge-society economies". Within this shift, resilience as an emotional literacy and competence training first entered class-rooms and introduced "normative assumptions" in order to "teach 'appropriate' thought patterns and behaviors" (Ecclestone and Lewis, 2016). These agendas were later on intermingled with the prevention objectives of preventing radicalization as outlined previously (chapter 2). Resilience as affective subjectivation allows to show how prevention was transferred from being an external protection, to being an internalized defence as emotionally stable and well-balanced aka resilient subjects are not affected by radicalization. In a following section, I show how resilience research in development psychology from the very beginning was meant as prevention through perpetuating a normative-disciplinary system. This perpetuation is not only, but also expressed on an affective level in the governance of emotions and a governing through affect.

Before moving on to this part, I introduce the last theoretical concepts necessary for the empirical part of this dissertation. The theoretical concepts I will introduce next are relevant, because Foucaultian conceptualisations tend to appear more totalizing and all-encompassing as they are intended to be. In order to show, that normalization and normation are not inevitable, inescapable or impossible to modify, I will briefly engage with counter-conducts and re-signification in the process of subjectivation.

### **3.4 Subjectivation, Normalization and Counter-Conducts**

Knowledge-power formations produce subjects, a process known as subjectivation. In Foucault's oeuvre, there are again several phases of how he engaged with this process. From the production of the soul through disciplinary power most centrally in *Psychiatric Power* (1973-74) and *Discipline and Punish* (1975), to the *Care of the Self* in the latest stage of his work. I am interested in the question of subjectivation in two regards, and will therefore not engage with the changes occurring throughout these different stages of Foucault's work. The first reason is that in this early work, the production of modern subjects and processes of subjectivation are intrinsically linked to the psy sciences and to the role of the psy sciences in governance (Rose, 1996a; Foucault, 2003b). The second reason is that according to Butler subjectivation is a process amenable for subjects, because 'a power *exerted* on the subject is still a power *assumed* by the subject, an assumption that constitutes the instrument of

that subject's becoming" (italics from the original Butler, 1997, p. 11). Thereby, she engages with how subjects themselves engage with their normalization. I will shortly engage with subjectivation according to Foucault, before discussing Butler's interjection, because the empirical objective of parts of this dissertation is to show how practitioners take-up and shape, or in short order words, assume resilience.

In accordance with Foucault, subjectivation is the process by which particular knowledge-power formations, such as disciplinary and bio-power, produce subjects. The psy sciences were on the forefront of shaping what was aptly termed "the modern soul", referring to this juxtaposition of the soul and psyche, resulting from the scientification of the soul to the modern understanding of the psyche. The psy-sciences are dominant in the analysis and the explanation of "who we are and how we know ourselves (or are known by others)" (May, 2014, p. 498). The psy-sciences not only shape how societies are governed (through management practices, through pedagogy, social work etc.), but also how individuals govern themselves (Rose, 1996a, pp. 16–17). In this regard, normalization and normation not only happens through the exertion of power onto a subject, but also through assuming this ideal of the norm and striving to become normal by the subject. In this regard, Foucault shows how power is not only repressive, but also productive, because it produces its manifestations. Additionally, different practices of subjectivation also "mold us in different ways" and subjects are always exposed to different forms of power (May, 2014, p. 499).

Butler critically interrogates Foucault's theoretical concerns with subjectivation, regarding the counter-conduct to and the re-signification of dominant norms, that are relevant for the empirical part this dissertation. Butler is specifically concerned with Foucault's understanding of subjectivation in *Discipline and Punish*. In relation to disciplinary power, subjectivation is also termed "subjection", expressing a comparatively more repressive understanding of the process of the becoming of the subject, as in Foucault's later works. Nonetheless, Butler's critique on the shortcomings of Foucault is relevant beyond the context of *Discipline and Punish*.

Aptly titled, Butler engages with "subjection, resistance and resignification" in elaborating how subjects assume the power that is exerted on them. Re-signification concerns how subjects might transform discursive elements that produces frames of reference. While a subject cannot transform a discourse or a norm in its entirety, she concludes that a re-appropriation of "names, terms and identities external to ourselves" is possible (Butler, 1997, p. 86). She calls this process "re-signification", because while the signifier (names, terms, identities) might stay the same, the meaning for the subject, who assumes it, changes fundamentally (e.g. gay as pejorative signifier to demarcate an out-group, whereas gay appropriated by a gay community means being proud to be gay) (Butler, 1997, p. 86). In this

regard, a re-signification of what it means to be resilient for particular subjects is a possibility of shaping the meaning of resilience. In accordance with Foucault, she also points out that resistance is an effect of power, that power produces its own self-subversion (Butler, 1997, p. 92). For example, the possibility of subversion occurs, through “the convergence with other discursive regimes [...] undermin[ing] the teleological aims of normalization” (Butler, 1997, p. 93). In sum, while there is not necessarily an escape of being shaped by power knowledge formations, the very same power knowledge formations also bring forth ways to engage with them in a contesting, subverting and critical way.

In chapter 7, I engage shortly with re-signification on the level of subjectivation. In the same chapter, I also show how resilience becomes embedded in other discursive regimes, undermining some of the aims set-out by a particular resilience training. In this chapter I will also show how resilience is also criticized as a form of contesting a dominant discourse. In chapter 8, I show how a power knowledge formation produces its own excess, a category that cannot be normalized by established means, although produced precisely by the dominant power knowledge formation. Therefore, normalization and normation are not inevitable, as the process of subjectivation allows to the subject to assume the power that is exerted on it.

### **3.5 Psychological Resilience as Norm in Prevention Practices**

In this section, I focus on the emergence of resilience in development psychology. The focus is on development psychology, rather than other psychology strands, because radicalization prevention policies and practices derive from child and youth delinquency, which first took up resilience as prevention. Rose (1989, p. 123) shows that “childhood is the most intensively governed sector of personal existence” and that it has been a security concern ever since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Development psychology derives from a medico-hygienic expertise operating through a complex of “moralization” and “normalization”, as the healthy upbringing of children was measured through moral categories aiming at a medicalization of “drunkenness, debauchery, viciousness, masturbation and insanity” as unhealthy environment for children leading to a “weak constitution” (Rose, 1989, p. 130). Burman (2017, p. 22) shows how development psychology naturalized development through “confounding the notions of medical with mental”. She illustrates that development psychology is an intensive surveillance of childhood to create moral citizens, and in the case of resilience also harnesses affects in a turn to emotional literacy (Burman, 2017, p. 106). Thus, development psychology produces norms about normal child development, which become prescriptive for governing, in this case specifically in relation to prevention.

From the very beginning, resilience research, back then still called “invulnerability”, formed part of the prevention paradigm and was by one of the pioneers, Garmezy, even proposed to replace primary prevention with something more effective:

“With our nation [note: the USA] torn by strife between races and between social classes, these ‘invulnerable’ children remain the ‘keepers of the dream’. Were we to study the forces that move such children to survival and to adaptation, the long-range benefits to our society might be far more significant than our many efforts to construct models of primary prevention designed to curtail the incidence of vulnerability” (Garmezy 1971, p. 114).

From the beginning resilience research had the objective to lead to a more effective prevention, as fostering resilience traits, and later on teaching characteristics associated with resilience, would render prevention superfluous. Resilience research focused on “at-risk youth” aiming at governance advice, to develop programs in order to prevent these at-risk subjects from developing mal-adaptive behavior. From there resilience became a standard in youth policies in the UK, the US, in Australia and Canada already in the 1990s (Martineau, 1999; Masten and Powell, 2008; Bottrell, 2009).

Development psychology started to conceptualize resilience in the 1960s and 1970s. Development psychology used epidemiological reasoning to research behavioral outcomes of so-called “at-risk populations”, illustrating that the psy-sciences are still legitimizing themselves through a recurrence to medicine in their methods as well as in the reference to healthy and pathological physical functioning. The early studies, aiming at measuring traumas and potential negative effects of adversity, not only generated results about trauma, they also showed an anomaly: despite adversity, some people turned out to be remarkably normal. Normal in this context meant well adapted, showing that resilience is not only measured through the absence of illness, but also through social conformity. Masten (Masten, 2014) a pioneer from these early studies, referred to resilience as “doing ok”, measured through “effective performance in developmental tasks that are salient for people of a given age, society or context, and historical time” such as “academic and social competence” and to “follow rules of conduct”. Moreover, development psychology not only determined “at-risk populations” through medical categories of mental health (e.g. genetic factors - schizophrenic parents), or stressful life events (grouping vastly different experiences such as war, divorce and maltreatment), but also social categories such as alcoholism, criminality, drug addiction, delinquency, suicide and poverty (Garmezy, 1971; Masten, 2014). As such, development psychology’s research is still concerned with preventing societal danger, illustrating the link Foucault established between security and the psy-sciences. Therefore, a disciplinary-normative system is inherent in how development psychology researched and measured what would later on be called resilience.

In the 1980s and 1990s a shift occurred from researching resilience as static character traits, which are inherent, to a more dynamic set of factors, which can be acquired and

are thus learnable and teachable. In the 1960s and 70s, the psy-sciences were still focused on measuring static character traits to determine different personalities. Therefore, development psychology researched and established a set of protective factors to determine the characteristics of resilient personalities. However, this early research into what makes children invincible or invulnerable was too deterministic for the paradigm shift occurring in the 1980s. Subsequently, a variety of important psychologists in the field proposed more dynamic definitions of resilience such as: "The process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful adaptation despite challenging or threatening circumstances" (Masten, Best and Garmezy, 1990, p. 426), or "A dynamic process encompassing positive adaptation within the context of significant adversity" (Luthar, Cicchetti and Becker, 2010, p. 543). Still, also in psychology indicators for resilience depend on the context, as for example in the military resilience is measured through the absence of psychiatric symptoms, while for schoolchildren academic achievement is more applicable (Fletcher and Sarkar, 2013, p. 14). Through this shift, resilience was no longer an innate quality that one possessed, or possessed the disposition to develop, but it became a quality one could acquire throughout one's life, or also learn through particular programs. Despite the paradigm shift, the earlier studies about protective factors are the base for later statistical studies (Martineau, 1999, p. 103; Burman, 2017, p. 105) and for determining which qualities are favorable to acquire in order to become or to enhance resilience:

"Most of the problems associated with [...] resilience are explained by the evolution of resilience as an ideological code for social conformity to mainstream norms. In this politicized context, resilience means social competence, academic achievement, self-control and progressive aims, regardless of sociocultural context and socioeconomic status" (Martineau, 1999, p. 196).

Indeed, resilience in development psychology is focused on teaching and acquiring individualized qualities, particularly those aiming at emotional self-control, regulation, planfulness, self-esteem and self-efficacy. Masten's (Masten, 2014) short list of resilience factors based on her 50 year research also includes "intelligence and problem-solving skills", "motivation to succeed", and "faith, hope, belief life has meaning". All of these qualities pertain to emotional states of the individual, aiming at particular normation of such individualized emotional states. But there are also a range of relational factors, as development psychology (in contrast to other psychology strands) is a strong representative for defining resilience as an outcome of supportive relationships with caregivers. Masten's (Masten, 2014) shortlist includes the following categories: "effective caregiving and parenting quality", "close relationships with other capable adults", "close friends and romantic partners", but also "effective schools" and "effective neighborhoods" to include environmental factors more broadly. This inclusion illustrates that the capacity for individual resilience depends on supportive relationships. The inclusion of environmental factors such as including the

neighborhoods and schools is indicative of a further shift in psychological resilience research namely the shift to complexity theory.

Approximately, in the early 2000s, a further shift occurred in the conceptualization of resilience. In this shift, development psychology integrated complexity theory and resilience was subsequently researched through the lens of complex adaptive systems. Ecology already conceptualized and researched resilience through complexity theory in the 1970s. As outlined in chapter two, ecology's shift to complexity theory is what led Chris Zebrowski (2016, p. 87) to argue that resilience is replacing "a normative-disciplinary system [...] structur[ing] the mentality of individuals in accordance with an ideal normality". Zebrowski (2016, p. 87) outlines how this shift would lead governance to focus on an enabling environment and incentive structures to bring forth resilient populations, rather than focusing on "structuring the mentality of the subject", because subjects could be governed to self-regulate. Regarding psychological resilience the subject-environment interaction became clearly more important through the shift to complexity theory, as does the epistemological understanding of resilience as a complex process. But psychology never switched from having the individual as angle point of its understanding. Rather than focusing on how to create environments that allow for self-regulation, the psy-sciences are still focused on how to structure mentalities in accordance with a pre-determined norm.

This is particularly evident, when taking into consideration Masten's two defining elements of resilience. Masten (Masten, 2014) elaborates that resilience is measured as a) "competence or success in age-salient developmental tasks" and b) as absence of "symptoms of psychopathology".<sup>4</sup> Regarding mental illness, or symptoms which can be defined as maladaptation, can lead to a diagnosis of not being resilient, which in turn allows for an intervention as non-resilience is potentially dangerous. Hence, in the psychological definition, resilience is defined through the binary normal/abnormal. Therefore, psychology perpetuates a normative-disciplinary system as it still defines what is abnormal, which causes a corrective intervention. Thus, despite the integration of complexity theory, resilience is still perpetuating a normative-disciplinary system by determining what is normal and what is abnormal. In turn, abnormality cannot be left to self-regulation because it is potentially dangerous. Therefore, psychological resilience is still normalizing/normating the mentality of the individual subject.

Finally, I would like to highlight that mainstream psychological accounts of what it means to be resilient have been challenged within psychology. On the one hand, the relational factors and the focus on support are a challenge for those strands in psychology aiming to establish

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<sup>4</sup> Again abnormality is not only measured through mental illness, but also through categories of social deviancy such as "teen pregnancy, drugs or dropping out of school" (Masten, 2014, p. 16).



resilience as a purely individualized quality, devoid of inter-personal relationships, such as positive psychology. Further challenges to these dominant individualized factors that are oriented on adapting individuals to the dominant norms of society are also so-called “life story based” studies to resilience, understanding and subsequently defining resilience from the perspective of the research subject (Martineau, 1999; Ungar, 2004). These studies do not presuppose how resilience is supposed to look like, and they do not presuppose what maladaptive behavior is. For example, Ungar (2004) does not consider drug intake to be a maladaptation from the outset. He thereby challenges the normative-disciplinary reproduction of social conformity within the psy-sciences.

Resilience as an object to be studied and as an intervention program is based on at-risk settings remaining remarkably similar during the five decades of resilience research. At-risk settings designate a deviance from social conformity, and the critique of Martineau (1999) that development psychology’s resilience reproduces societal standards is as valid nowadays as it was two decades ago. I show in the policy analysis parts of this dissertation how resilience emerged in governing practices regarding radicalization, briefly trace them back to earlier prevention practices and show what this normalization and normation entails by contextualizing these practices in accordance with the sites.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

The norm is at the “heart of things” Foucault asserts when elaborating on his conceptualizations of power/knowledge formations, because the norm “can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize” (Foucault, 2004b, pp. 252–53). But Foucault also differentiated between how norms are established. Disciplinary power establishes a prescriptive norm, an optimal model and “the operation of disciplinary normalization [note: normation] consists in trying to get people [...] to conform to this model”. Biopower establishes a norm derived from normal distribution “to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable” (Foucault, 2004a, p. 63). The norm in the psy-sciences is an “unresolved question” because it contains a recurrence to biopower, through its referent point of health and through measurement of normal distributions, and a recurrence to disciplinary power, through its recurrence to a prescriptive norm to which individuals shall conform. This is important because interventions from the psy-sciences are legitimized through the biopolitical norm, which has the referent point of health. Therefore, the psy-sciences can intervene to cure abnormality, and to restore a state of health, for the good of the abnormal individual and to protect society from these abnormal individuals. However, the norm as established in the psy-sciences also contains a prescriptive idea of conformity (Foucault, 2009, p. 57). This prescriptive idea is what Schwartz (2018, p. 8) analyzed with regards to resilience, when she points out that: “[M]ental health and concepts such as resilience are not ontological facts but contain the moral codes of a current society”.

As stated in the state of the art (chapter two), there are several accounts of critical psychology demonstrating that psy-sciences characteristics of resilience are imbued with the moral codes of the society and the site in which resilience is proposed as the desired outcome of an intervention (Howell, 2015; Ecclestone and Lewis, 2016; Burman, 2018; Brunner, 2019). For this thesis, I traced development psychology's characteristics of resilience such as self-esteem, emotional self-control and self-efficacy for example, because these are the ones which I encountered in the empirical material. But it is my aim to show how development psychology's characteristics and definitions of resilience are conflated with a) particular protective factors that coincide with the risk factors associated with radicalization, and b) how this conflation has country specific connotations.

Furthermore, I sought to demonstrate in this chapter that the psy-sciences are inextricably linked to cure a range of social ills through for example psychologizing political and socio-economic issues (Howell, 2011; Ecclestone and Brunila, 2015; Younis, 2021b). The psy-sciences tend to individualize structural problems and were hence analyzed as a pertaining to a neoliberal governance. As stressed in the state of the art (chapter two) resilience in radicalization prevention is part of a broader turn to therapeutic governance. Against this backdrop, the aim of the policy analysis of the Dutch (chapter 5) and German (chapter 6) radicalization and extremism prevention policies is to show that psychological resilience hinges on a psychologized understanding of radicalization. Several authors proposed that radicalization as a concept was psychologized and individualized the issue in the process (McGovern and Coppock, 2014; Aked, Younis and Heath-Kelly, 2021; Younis, 2021b). Through the subsequent policy analysis of the German and Dutch radicalization prevention discourse, I seek to show how the outlined conceptualization and characteristics of resilience emerge in policy discourses as a result of a psychologized understanding of radicalization. This conceptualization refers particularly to the elements of a personal crisis, identity issues which might result in a crisis and frustrations (Mitchell and Bhatt, 2007; Kundnani, 2012; Malthaner, 2017, p. 381). While in-group bonding and social ties are assessed as relevant, the main concern in these studies is nonetheless the individual and how "individuals are transformed and "around a notion of 'propensity' to engage in violence, as a particular cognitive-ideological state of an individual" (Malthaner, 2017, p. 282). The assessment of radicalization as a series of psychologized risk factors, gives rise to resilience as a preventive intervention, to curtail the risk factors of individuals. This process turns the potentially radicalizing into a matter for cure, rather than for punishment.

