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Resilience in radicalization prevention

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State of the Art

Resilience made its entrance into security studies around the mid-2000s and was thoroughly discussed in relation to counter-terrorism, disaster management, cyber security and national security (Walker and Cooper, 2011; Collier and Lakoff, 2015; Joseph, 2016; Zebrowski, 2016; Grove and Chandler, 2017). More recently resilience became a topic in relation to radicalization prevention, putting scholars in front of the same problem as in the aforementioned security fields: the meaning of resilience is elusive (Wimelius *et al.*, 2018; Jore, 2020; Stephens and Sieckelinck, 2020; Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier, 2021). I am proposing that resilience in relation to radicalization prevention is serving as a norm. Accordingly, radicalization prevention tries to normalize individuals and populations to prevent deviance from emerging by pre-emptively constructing an ideal – the resilient subject and the resilient society. In contrast to the above mentioned contexts in which resilience was studied, resilience in radicalization prevention introduces a different disciplinary background, psychology, which changes the mode and meaning of normalization (O'Malley, 2010; Aranda *et al.*, 2012; Hardy, 2015; Howell, 2015; Burman, 2018).

First, I engage with resilience in Critical Security Studies, arguing for why I chose to emphasize the differences between ecological and psychological resilience and show that in relation to radicalization prevention resilience serves as enhancement of security. Secondly, I engage with resilience as affective governmentality, and illustrate how resilience ventured from therapeutic education to prevention practices to regulate and correct social deviancy. Finally, I show by engaging with the Critical Terrorism Studies literature, how resilience could emerge because political violence was psychologized as radicalization.

2.1 Resilience in Critical Security Studies

I start with a short introduction to resilience, and follow-up with a discussion on the relation of resilience to security in which I identify three strands: resilience as replacement of security, resilience as enhancement of security, and resilience from below. I pay special attention to Chris Zebrowski's argument that resilience is a value, to explain why I argue that psychological resilience in radicalization prevention serves as a norm. I also discuss why I chose to emphasize the differences between psychological and ecological resilience, rather than the similarities.

There are three different conceptualizations of resilience: engineering, psychological and ecological. Engineering resilience was the first, coining the concept in 1859 as the capacity of certain material to return to its former state after having been exposed to stress (Alexander, 2013). From the 1930s onwards physiology also started to research stress reactions. In the 1950s stress reactions were mapped in three phases: alarm, resistance through adaption and fatigue (Höhler, 2014, p. 432). Stress reactions were conceptualised as having external and internal origins, leading to adaption or resistance as well as to adjustment or overload (*ibid.*).

Physiology's first conceptualisation of resistance as adaption to stress of a living system subsequently spread to psychology and ecology (Höhler, 2014).

Grove (2018) and Bröckling (2017) offer an overview of the three conceptualizations of resilience based on identifying similarities. Grove emphasizes that all conceptualizations share a common ontology based on uncertainty and instability, as resilience presupposes a world in which one can never be entirely secure from disaster, trauma or other adversities (Grove, 2018, pp. 33–34). Resilience is the capacity to cope with uncertainty, and improve through challenges and disturbances (ibid. 34). Resilience can be “nurtured, trained, designed or managed” and thus is a learnable quality (ibid. 35). In the same vein Bröckling (2017) describes resilience through the metaphor of immunity, equally stressing that the external world cannot be changed, and the internal be that a material, an ecosystem or a human, cannot be sealed off or protected, but only become immune through exposure. I am not neglecting this reading in its entirety, but I chose to emphasize the differences. First, because improving a system's capacity to be resilient looks different than teaching an individual on how to be resilient and the affective dimension of this learning process is important. Second, I chose to emphasize the differences, because when an ecosystem or an organization is not resilient and switches to another state, it is different and has different consequences than when an individual does, constituting a shortcoming in these sweeping meta-narratives.

A first strand in Critical Security Studies argues that ecological resilience is a replacement of security. Ecological resilience emerged in the 1970s and according to Walker and Cooper (2011, p. 143) “marked a move away from the homeostasis of Cold War resource management toward the far-from-equilibrium models of [...] complex systems theory”. Complex systems theory proposes that there is no single state of stability, rather an ecological system is in a constant flux, adapting to outside stressor through absorption and is capable of multiple equilibria while still persisting. Outside regulation to maintain stability decreases the system's ability to self-regulate and be resilient. The emphasis on adaption to outside circumstances, rather than protection from them, is what leads these authors to see an ‘intuitive fit’ with neoliberal governance, which responsabilizes citizens to self-regulate and care for their own security, rather than to protect them from harm through external regulation. This notion of the resilient subject is most succinctly put by Joseph (2016, p. 378) in the following way:

“Resilience is appealing as a policy tool because it urges a turn to ourselves and suggests a need for people to show initiative, enterprise, and adaptability. In a more general sense, resilience is significant because it refocuses on subjectivity [...] However, this occurs in a paradoxical sense because this more active conception of the subject is founded on a passive conception of its relation to the wider social condition.”

Ecological resilience proposes a complex world of ontological insecurity, without the possibility of protection. Consequently, resilience was critiqued as a replacement of security and as thoroughly depoliticizing because resilience focuses on shaping adaptive subjects and populations rather than changing the social condition (Chandler, 2013, 2016; Evans and Reid, 2014; Collier and Lakoff, 2015). But these studies are neglecting psychological resilience, they are not going into much detail on how exactly resilient subjects are shaped, they just present how they are supposed to look like.

In a similar vein Zebrowski (2016, pp. 4–5) inquiries into the relation between resilience and security as a “rolling-back of liberal security governance”, starting from an ecological conceptualization of resilience as “moving to alternative stables in a complex system” producing “new normals”. He argues very elegantly that resilience is a value eluding a singular meaning, but is characterized by four functions: “quality in relation to which systems, populations, individuals and even behaviours can be assessed and evaluated”, resilience serves as a “mark of distinction” and it generates “objectives for security governances” and lastly, it is “functional” (Zebrowski, 2016, p. 6). He shows how resilience is brought forth by a political economy pertaining to a biopolitical mode of valuing life. I am not disputing Zebrowski’s overall claim and his genealogy. Rather I drew inspiration from Zebrowski’s analysis. But by focusing solely on ecological resilience, he missed the normative-disciplinary system of psychology.

Psychological resilience differs, particular from Zebrowski’s genealogy of ecological resilience in two ways: 1) the psy-disciplines perpetuate a normative-disciplinary system, which Zebrowski (2016, p. 87) claims was absolved in relation to ecological resilience, 2) the psy-sciences conception of norms are based in medicine (not ecology or economy) which values life differently, as it distinguishes between a healthy state which is desirable and a pathological state which must be corrected if possible (Masten, 2014). First, Zebrowski (2016, pp. 84, 87) claims that the normative-disciplinary system of governing to maintain “a natural equilibrium” was absolved and resilience “is not a programme of standardization utilizing disciplinary technologies to structure the mentality of individuals in accordance with an ideal normality”. I disagree, as the psy-function, as Foucault (2003b) calls it, still proposes an “ideal normality” and certainly aims to structure and order the psyches of individuals, or in other words it aims to normalize them. Secondly, the psy-sciences propose a norm distinguishing between normal and pathological. While the meaning of normal is somewhat malleable, the lack thereof is not. The lack thereof warrants an intervention, in form of a correction and/or a cure. I am not the first one to note that while ecological and psychological resilience share commonalities beyond doubt, the transferability ends with pathology (cf. Höhler, 2014). When an ecosystem switches to another equilibrium because it was not resilient, it is not comparable to the consequences of an individual turning out

not to be resilient, because they might be dangerous. While ecosystems might be left to self-regulate, abnormal individuals cannot be left unattended, because they might be dangerous: “the medical concepts of normality and abnormality allow a transformation in the courts such that the state is now able to seek to correct the behavior of individuals who, though not criminals, are socially abnormal” (Talcott, 2014, p. 296).

In psychology resilience is not just a quality against which individuals and populations are evaluated, psychology established a system of differentiation of abnormal and normal, giving rise to disciplinary interventions if the norm is not met. Since abnormality is dangerous, resilience not only generates objectives for security governance, it enables disciplinary interventions based on therapeutic forms of governance. This is the reason why I dispute Zebrowski’s elegant way of not fixing the meaning of resilience, because the meaning of resilience is more fixed in psychology as it has to be a positive outcome rather than an abnormal one. Hence, while the meaning of what constitutes resilience retains some malleability in psychology, the lack thereof does not, because it is potentially dangerous, and thus warrants different consequences. Therefore, the psychological conception of resilience serves as a norm, normalizing and normating individuals and populations and correcting those who are not. Hence, I depart from Zebrowski’s (2016) argument that resilience is a value.

A second strand of Critical Security Studies argues that resilience is an enhancement of security. Still deriving from ecological resilience conception based on complexity, resilience in counter-terrorism, disaster management and cyber security allows to include a range of actors into the security effort in order to strengthen a system’s internal capacity to self-regulate before, during and after an external shock (Coaffee, 2006). This strand focuses particularly on Counter-terrorism and posits that resilience is related to “territorial security” enhancing for example surveillance (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015). Jore (2020, p. 342) argues resilience is an extension of the militarization and securitization starting with crime prevention practices in the 1990s. The preparedness part of the UK Counter-terrorism strategy shows according to Hardy (2015, p. 10) that “government accountability is increased rather than decreased”. Rather than interpreting the shift from state responsibility to a variety of other actors as a roll-back of security, these studies argue that the state extends its reach through incorporating ever new actors in the security effort and thereby enhance security. In this regard, Bourbeau and Vuori (2015, p. 261) pointed out that resilience often occurs “after – or in response to – security” to soften security measures. As I show further below, radicalization prevention tends to lead to a “securitization of social policy” (Ragazzi, 2017; Heath-Kelly and Shanaáh, 2022a) as it incorporates ever more actors in the prevention effort, corresponding with what resilience does as an organizational principle in relation to Counter-terrorism, but the Critical Terrorism Studies literature has not yet apprehended this connection or overlap.

Particularly in relation to Counter-terrorism, authors note that the role of resilience in preventing radicalization is something else entirely. Hardy (2015, p. 11 emphasis in the original) notes in relation to the UK Counter-terrorism strategy:

“Resilience has therefore played a key role in shaping *Prevent* work, although it is not clear how this definition corresponds with the work of Holling [note: ecological resilience] [...] If there is a relevant shock or disturbance, it is not an isolated event such as a flood or terrorist attack, but rather a protracted exposure to political, religious and ideological views that the state considers to be harmful. [...] The closest analogy is perhaps to psychological resilience—as if the UK government is aiming to create mass psychological resistance to terrorist ideology.”

Five years later, Jore (2020, p. 349) also notes that in relation to radicalization prevention: “The psychological understanding of resilience has thus spread to radicalization and crime prevention.” Finally, Joseph (2018, p. 39) notes in relation to the US Counterterrorism strategy: “While many of the arguments here are similar to the ones already covered, with terrorism it is worth considering the strong psychological element present in American thinking. Resilience is, therefore, seen very much as a psychological attitude towards terrorism.” While noting the relevance of psychological resilience particularly in relation to Counter-terrorism radicalization, they do not go into more detail, which is a gap that I address with this dissertation.

A third strand of studies about resilience in Critical Security Studies puts forward an understanding of resilience which can be subsumed as “resilience from below”. Rather than inquiring the philosophical and theoretical implications of resilience through policy analysis, these studies are based on field research aiming at understanding resilience through the perspective of practitioners, or/and study the consequences of resilience in practice. These studies show the potential of resilience as resistance (Michelsen, 2017; Bourbeau and Ryan, 2018), resilience as solidarity (Kelly and Kelly, 2017) and examples for collective resilience (Walsh-Dilley and Wolford, 2015). There are also studies inquiring if resilience policies work as they were intended, coming to different conclusions: resilience exercises can lead to a feeling of powerlessness (Kaufmann, 2016), there are failure nodes (Vilcan, 2017), and resilience can be ‘unwanted’ (Krüger and Albris, 2020). This dissertation forms part of this growing body of literature inquiring how resilience is understood and enacted by practitioners, partly challenging the dominant notion of the neoliberal resilient subject as a thoroughly adaptable, flexible and self-reliant individual. Regarding psychological resilience in radicalization prevention there is still a lack of empirical research, which I address with this thesis.

Resilience in relation to radicalization prevention is different than in the aforementioned critiques about ecological resilience, because in relation to radicalization prevention the referent security objects are not (eco-)systems, organizations or networks, but the psyches of vulnerable individuals who might radicalize. The critiques analyze ecological resilience through a biopolitical lens, stressing the neoliberal quality of resilience as a self-regulation and adaptation in complex systems (Walker and Cooper, 2011; Evans and Reid, 2016; Zebrowski, 2016). Equally, governmentality approaches analyzing governance through ecological resilience stress that resilience rests on an ontological perspective of complexity, requiring a constant adaptation of the subject and thereby shifting the responsibility from the state to the subject (Chandler, 2013; Joseph, 2013). Neither psychological resilience, nor the distinctively disciplinary approach to governing as part of the psy-sciences, are of much concern in these critiques. But engaging with psychological resilience shows the micro-regulation of emotions, behavior, and thinking in shaping the conduct of conduct, as well as the distinctly disciplinary component of engaging with those who are not resilient. Different power relations are at play in the normalization of populations and individuals through psychological resilience.

Therefore, I engage with the critical psychological resilience literature in forms of therapeutic governance in the next section and show how from there psychological resilience was taken up in radicalization prevention.

2.2 Psychological Resilience and Affective Governmentality

As mentioned above, resilience in psychology is also based on ontological insecurity, as not all adversity can be averted, rather individuals have to cope with or grow through adversity. Resilience in relation to psychology was researched as a reaction to stress, in which individuals showed adaptive or maladaptive behaviour (Brunner, 2019, pp. 222–24). Research into psychological resilience and radicalization prevention goes into more detail on how resilient subjects are actually shaped through cognitive behavioural training and therapeutic engagement, and they also emphasize the emotional dimension of being and becoming resilient. I give a short introduction to this literature, and show why I focus on therapeutic education as the backdrop for resilience in radicalization prevention. Critical engagement with the psy-sciences from a Foucaultian perspective acquired a variety of terms like “psychopolitics” (Rau, 2010), “therapeutic governance” (Ecclestone, 2017) and “affective governmentality” (Penz and Sauer, 2020). Since I use a governmentality framework “affective governmentality” fitted my purpose best.

Development psychology was one of the first strands to research how and why some children turn out to be resilient towards adversity (Garmezy, 1987; Luthar, 1991; Rutter, 2012; Masten, 2014; Rose and Lentz, 2017). Positive Psychology took up some of these findings and started

whole scale resilience trainings programs in a variety of sectors (Binkley, 2014; Schwarz, 2018). Therapeutic programs and trainings spread to the military, education, disaster management and the work force. Resilience got a critical reception in relation to the military, where it serves as enhancement to prevent trauma and reduces entitlements for pensions in case of trauma (Howell, 2015; Brunner, 2019). In disaster management to institute a constant need for preparedness (Neocleous, 2012). Joseph and McGregor (2020) research the intersection between ecological and psychological resilience, based on complexity. Some authors noted that resilience shapes the affective relations of subjects particularly in emergency and disaster management (Grove, 2014; Kaufmann, 2016; Brassett, 2018). Cabanas and Illouz (2019) as well as Binkley (2014) wrote critical accounts the “happy worker”, showing how the productivity of the workforce is increased through positive thinking. The most important contributions relevant in the context of radicalization prevention, stem from the increasing critique towards therapeutic governance in the educational sector (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009; Ecclestone and Lewis, 2016; Burman, 2018; Winter and Mills, 2020). From there resilience also spread to social policy (Amery, 2019) and social work (Park, Crath and Jeffery, 2020), where resilience received an equally frosty welcome, due to its fit with neoliberalism.

Resilience engages with the construction of particular “emotional subjectivities” (Burman 2018, p. 2), connecting several policy fields across “education, social care, mental health, well-being, child safeguarding and securitisation” in the UK as outlined in the *“Character and Resilience Manifesto an All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Mobility Document”* (Burman, 2018). Resilience forms part of the “affective turn of capitalism” necessary for “post-industrial knowledge economies” (Burman 2017, 106). Governing through resilience as therapeutic education refers to a micro-regulation and normalization in accordance with desirable characteristics such as “emotional well-being, optimism, emotional literacy (especially self-awareness, empathy and emotional regulation) [...] self-esteem and stoicism” (Ecclestone and Lewis, 2016). Similar to the resilience critique in Critical Security Studies, resilience thereby not engages with the wider social condition, such as inequality and poverty, but focuses on individual achievements. In this regard, resilience is not only a subjectivation creating subjects equipped to deal with life’s challenges happily, but intervenes more deeply into the behavior and thoughts of subjects to make them socially conform in accordance with a prescriptive norm of what it means to be resilient, and moreover serves as identifying those who do not correspond to this norm:

“This subject is the psychological norm. The normal resilient subject reflects these capacities or potentialities; to be resilient is to be independent, exercising rational choices, acting in one’s own best interests and whose internal states are reflected in external behaviours. Hence much resilience research stays focused on the individual and their personal capacities and responsibilities to adapt, cope or succeed [...]

One important consequence of these definitions is how the non-resilient subject is then conceived in opposition to this psychological norm. [...] subjects of welfare are commonly defined in opposition to this norm, being viewed as deficient or lacking in one or more of the 'normal' or 'natural' attributes, which positions them as 'invariably dependent, unpredictable, and unable to act in their own interests'. They then become the target of psychological interventions." (Aranda *et al.*, 2012, p. 551).

According to Foucault (2004a, p. 56) "the question of the norm" is at the "heart of things", and the "psy-function" becomes the driver of normative-disciplinary systems. From a governmentality perspective, the norm circulates between disciplinary and bio-power, normating individuals and normalizing populations. Normation and normalization lead to a subjectivation, which in the case of resilience aims at the emotional states of subjects and how subjects rationalize, regulate and control their emotions towards themselves and others. Resilience trainings propose to enable the control of emotional states through changing perception (aiming at cognitive processes) which are also supposed to alter the behavior of individuals. Simultaneously, this categorization enables to differentiate between those who are resilient, and who are potentially dangerous, in order to render those are not resilient productive but also non-dangerous again through interventions.

I capture this micro-regulation of emotions loosely based on Penz and Sauer (2020) as "affective governmentality". I chose affective governmentality, because it not only engages with the regulation and disciplining of emotions, they also engage with how subjects are governed through emotions. In this regard, affective governmentality provides a further development of governance techniques, which are based in Foucault's conceptions of power, but also recognize their transformations, which Penz and Sauer (2020, p. 48) call the "secularisation of pastoral power". Nonetheless, the norm remains at the "heart of things":

"The new pastoral technologies of government no longer encompass only the 'normation' of behaviour, like mandatory feeling rules or the repression of emotions, but also processes of normalisation, such as the selective and arbitrary recognition of affects. If they are functional for certain purposes, then they are permitted (within a certain range). It is evident, however, that the governmentalisation of the state since the 18th century has strongly relied on normation processes, on the alignment of conduct and affect, according to a given norm" (Penz and Sauer, 2020, p. 48).

Affective governmentality allows me to show how resilience is made productive as a normation and normalization of emotions. Simultaneously, resilience is enacted as a mode of care and concern in governance techniques engaging with radicalization prevention. Therefore, (potentially) radicalizing youth is governed by regulating and disciplinary interventions of care.

Amery (2019, p. 363) shows that resilience in social policy was introduced as “a strategy for working with young people thought to be vulnerable due to social exclusion, troubled upbringing, or low self-esteem” aiming at “regulating social deviancy” (p. 363-64). In this regard, Martineau (1999, p. ii) noted two decades ago resilience is “teaching socioeconomically disadvantaged children to conform to the social norms of the dominant society as rationalizing social and educational programs that help children and youth at risk overcome obstacles [s]uch programs do not work to challenge systemic inequalities”. Particularly in relation to social policies, resilience thus introduces a distinctively disciplinary governance to normalize the same target group which is nowadays deemed vulnerable to radicalization (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Heath-Kelly and Shanaah, 2022a).

The at-risk and risky groups of social policy administrations are remarkably similar to radicalization prevention targets, and resilience ventured from there to radicalization prevention. Stephens and Sieckelinck (2020) published the first literature review about resilience in radicalization prevention. They refer clearly to psychological resilience and state that resilience is mainly targeting “young” and “vulnerable” individuals (Stephens and Sieckelinck, 2020, p. 11). In the same vein as one strand of Critical Security Studies argues, resilience serves in relation to radicalization prevention to introduce a “softer” prevention approach (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Altermark and Nilsson, 2018), and to “avoiding an overly securitizing approach” (Stephens and Sieckelinck, 2020, p. 2). However, this “softer” approach occurs after the introduction of problematizing vulnerable youth as security issue, which I will engage in the next section. In the following, I will briefly introduce the few studies engaging with psychological resilience in primary radicalization prevention (as my study is the only inquiry to date into resilience in secondary prevention), and discuss them with in accordance with my field research findings, partly challenging them through a perspective of “resilience from below”. This matters because I offer empirical insights through interviews which challenges the findings of the literature reviews and policy analysis.

In their literature review Stephens and Sieckelinck (2020, p. 3) note that resilience is a normative concept stating “[O]ne of the first challenges that emerges is deciding on what terms something is considered to be a positive or healthy outcome”. They propose that what is considered to be positive outcome and healthy is context bound and refers for example in relation to the European Commission to increasing “democratic resilience”, while also noting that no further explanation on how this is achieved is given (ibid. p. 6). I analyze this aim and strategies employed in relation Germany. In contrast, Thomas (2019, p. 87) shows that in the UK vulnerability to radicalization is perceived as an “alienation” from “British values” proposing to normalize individuals in accordance with those values. My study gives a more in-depth account of what in the Netherlands and in Germany is considered to be “healthy and positive” in regards to radicalization and against the backdrop of how development

psychology characterizes resilience, to show how the discourse of psychological resilience merge with national security objectives.

Regarding the question of how resilience is enacted, Stephens and Sieckelink (2020) employ two metaphors which are interesting, because they indicate an individualized and a relational version of resilience, both also emerged in my empirical material. Their metaphors are called “resilience as shield”, referring to individualized qualities that young people can learn to cognitively resist radicalization, where I discern the merger of development psychology’s characteristics of resilience with the requirements of radicalization prevention, and “resilience as connection” referring to resilience as a relational quality which binds individuals to society (ibid. pp. 7-8). “Resilience as connection” equally refers to a characteristic from development psychology which is often neglected in resilience critiques, namely, that resilience is also perceived as a result of emotional support “within the family or outside it” (Rose and Lentzos, 2017, p. 16). Again, this quality is merged with the requirements of national security to reconnect deviating or alienating individuals with society, but there is a certain recognition that resilience is also a relational quality. I take this up in chapter 6 and 7, to show how particularly in relation to social work, in contrast to national policies, resilience is not perceived solely as an individualized quality, but rather a relational process. This contradicts the critique towards the resilient subject as completely self-reliant and responsabilized, challenging the dominant notion of the resilient subject.

In this regard, I also partly disagree with the conclusion of Altermark and Nilsson (2018) who engage with the same resilience training as I (chapter 6). Altermark and Nilsson (2018, p. 63) illustrate through the resilience training Bounce how resilience introduces a “softer” version of counterradicalization, particularly targeting the attitudes and “inner life of the individuals” “making social grievances and inequality a feature of the psyche”. I am not neglecting this analysis, but Altermark and Nilsson (2018) on the one hand miss the connection to the bigger picture of how resilience forms part of an affective governmentality, normalizing the emotions of individuals in line with governmental objectives. On the other hand, they also miss the relational engagement of social workers with these individuals, defying the governmental objective of creating completely self-reliant individuals, which is only discernable through field research with practitioners which I offer in this thesis.

Psychological resilience forms part of a bigger picture of “affective governmentality” through which not only the emotions of individuals are regulated and disciplined, but they are also addressed through an emotional administration of care and concern. As such resilience is supposed to be part of a supposedly “softer” approach to countering terrorism in form of prevention. This turn to a “softer” approach seems to implicate that resilience is a better alternative, because it replaces “harder” measures. I agree that resilience is supposedly softer

as it works through affect. But I disagree with the analysis that resilience is less intrusive, as I show that resilience enhances security. By addressing psychological resilience as a norm, I show how individuals are governed through normalizing and normating techniques, which were employed to regulate and discipline socially deviant behavior. From there resilience ventured into radicalization prevention. This presupposes a certain conceptualization of radicalization as socially deviant behavior and as a psychological process, which I will address next.

2.3 Resilience in radicalization prevention and the problem of security

The emergence of resilience in radicalization prevention presupposes a psychological understanding of the process of how individuals turn into terrorists. Most radicalization prevention practices started around 2012, due to a particular problem of young Europeans leaving their homes to fight wars in other countries, which led to a different set of conceptualizations and subsequent practices in policies (Malthaner, 2017; Coolsaet, 2019). Before 9/11 terrorism was mainly conceptualized within the war model, accordingly terrorism was to be “combated” (Kruglanski *et al.*, 2007). After 9/11 terrorism became more conceptualized as a crime treated by law enforcement as through crime prevention, accordingly terrorism was to be “countered” (Crelinsten, 2014). In the last decade, terrorism was parallel to the law enforcement model also conceptualized as a “public health model” or “psychosocial model” of radicalization prevention, accordingly terrorism is now also to be “treated” (Kruglanski *et al.*, 2007; Kundnani, 2012; Bhui and Jones, 2017; Heath-Kelly, 2017b; Hardy, 2020). But if radicalization designates what is undesired and deviant, there needs to be another side of the continuum as Sedgwick (2010) and Malthaner (2017) pointed out. I will engage with how psychological resilience becomes the other side of the continuum in practices supposed to “treat” emerging terrorism.

European police and intelligence circles, on the forefront the UK and the Netherlands, conceptualized radicalization in the early 2000s (Kundnani, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013, 2017b; Coolsaet, 2019). Officials acknowledged, “it was an oversimplification of an extremely complex process”, which nevertheless became all encompassing (Coolsaet, 2016, p. 3). Radicalization signifies the process of becoming a terrorist, conceptualized in a way that allows for preventative strategies going “beyond the threat of violence or detention” (Kundnani, 2012, p. 4). Radicalization research thus explored mainly individual psychological factors that might predict who becomes a terrorist (*ibid.* p. 5). These factors were broken down into signals of cognitive and behavioral transformations on the individual level (Malthaner, 2017, p. 370). Accordingly, the concept received much criticism *inter alia* for psychologizing political violence (Qureshi, 2016; Aked, Younis and Heath-Kelly, 2021; Younis, 2021b). But this psychologization of radicalization allowed for a definition of risk factors, which in turn gives rise to resilience, because resilience offers a range of psychological

protective factors adaptable for the specific risk of radicalization. Resilience promises to preventively strengthen individuals' psychological capacity, decreasing the susceptibility to radicalization. Moreover, both the psychologization of radicalization, and the introduction of resilience, allow for preventive strategies, that indeed go beyond "the threat of violence or detention" (Kundnani, 2012, p. 4), to therapeutic forms of governance or rather to an affective governmentality.

Resilience is administered in specific secondary prevention programs for individuals deemed to be at-risk of radicalization. Heath-Kelly and Shannah (2022a, pp. 2–3) assert that:

"P/CVE [note: Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism] and social crime prevention deploy anticipatory rehabilitation through welfare-based support packages, attempting to reform the risky individual through tailored interventions before they turn towards crime. Here the goal of public protection (undertaken through managing risk) is simultaneously balanced against welfarist logics of reforming the individual for their own benefit [...] safeguarding the potential offender from 'radicalization' and/or becoming delinquent, by meeting their socio-economic and psychological needs."

The most prominent are the UK Channel program, and Denmark's Aarhus program (Lindekilde, 2014; Pettinger, 2020a). Aggarwal (2013) shows the distinctly disciplinary governance of deradicalization programs. In the same vein, Elshimi (2015, p. 116) illustrates that the Channel program uses "disciplinary and confessional technologies". "Disciplinary technology" refers to the education and health care administer rehabilitative and preventive interventions programs to create "docile subjects", and "confessional technology" refers to the to "guide the subjectivity of individuals" (Elshimi, 2015, p. 116). Pettinger (2020a) shows how the Channel program proposes that it "safeguards", and that practitioners are in the constant contradiction of fulfilling state security goals and social care goals, while also showing what a slippery slope it is to recognize and treat "risky" subjects. I contribute to this literature by showing how in the Netherlands and Germany secondary prevention practices aim at restoring resilience of radicalizing subjects, in disciplinary and pastoral programs of care and coercion.

Through this transformation, terrorism is no longer solely a concern for security actors, but also for education, social and youth work, and health care, including the social realm in the prevention effort. Indeed, terrorism is no longer subject for punishment, but for psycho-social treatment. Thereby, resilience enters a contested field, because the widening of counter-terrorism through radicalization prevention led to a debate that Ragazzi (2017) termed "securitization of social policy". Ragazzi (2017, p. 168) shows on the one hand, how "care" and "control" are "historically contingent" in the governance of deviancy. This brought

forth a tight relation between social work and criminal justice to “maintain social order” and brought social policy under a security rational which was enhanced through radicalization prevention (Ragazzi, 2017, p. 169). Heath-Kelly and Shannah (2022a) recently showed that the governance of social deviancy and later on radicalization stems from youth crime prevention programs based on care and coercion.

On the forefront of studies about the consequences of this securitization is clearly the UK, where through the “Prevent Duty” the educational sector (including universities), health care workers, and social and youth work are now trained to recognize the signs of radicalization and report them to the police (Stanley and Guru, 2015; Thomas, 2016; Stanley, Guru and Gupta, 2018; Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2019; Younis and Jadhav, 2019; Dresser, 2021; Younis, 2021a; Kaleem, 2022). A further strand engages with the Nordic European countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland) as albeit these countries also alerted the same professionals to the signs of radicalization, but in these countries these signals are not reported to the police, but rather to multi-agency panels (Gøtzsche-Astrup, Lindekilde and Fjellman, 2021). Multi-agency comprise the police, social and youth workers, as well as health care in multi-agency organization that discuss radicalization cases jointly and draw up intervention plans (Sestoft, S. M. Hansen and Christensen, 2017; Haugstvedt and Tuastad, 2021; Solhjell, 2021). Recently, a strand researching the particularities of the “Low Lands”, including Belgium and the Netherlands, emerged (Eijkman and Roodnat, 2017; Fadil, De Koning and Ragazzi, 2019; van de Weert and Eijkman, 2019), which is quite late considering that the Netherlands were one of the first countries to conceptualize radicalization and implement radicalization prevention across the country (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018). In Germany, the concept of radicalization was only introduced recently. Nevertheless, the consequences remain the same: radicalization led to a securitization of social policy. Recent studies demonstrated that social actors and NGOs contest and question this process (Jukschat and Leimbach, 2019; Faglestahler and Schau, 2020; Bögelein *et al.*, 2021). There are several crucial differences between countries on how the “securitization of social policy” is enacted and they have different consequences.

However, apart from the UK and the Nordic countries, this securitization is not fully explored yet, particularly in the Netherlands and Germany. While the overall frame of securitization of social policy works, countries organize the collaboration between the social sector (education, health care, social and youth work), the security sector (police, intelligence services) and (local) government representatives quite differently leading to different consequences depending on the local context. This dissertation offers a rich and empirical account of the securitization of the social sector in Germany and the Netherlands, by researching the specific role resilience plays in this contested field.

2.4 Conclusion

Regarding the resilience literature in Critical Security Studies, it is often proposed that ontologically resilience is based on insecurity, a world beyond control full of contingencies in which no one can ever be secure, but only deal with the inevitable adversities. Biopolitics and governmentality inspired literature thus argues that resilience is a replacement of security. However, especially in relation to Counter-terrorism there is also a second strand of literature arguing that resilience leads to an enhancement of security, and is introduced in highly securitized settings as a “softer version” to complement security. I contribute to this second strand of literature, by showing that resilience is only a supposedly softer version of radicalization prevention, as it proliferates a more disciplinary governance of the social, intervening more firmly to correct social deviancy. While not directed at changing the social condition of subjects, changing inequality or socio-economic conditions, the subject itself is the target of intervention. This assessment corresponds with the first strand and the overarching critique of the resilient subject. However, there is a gap in this literature in showing a) how exactly resilient subjects are shaped particularly through field research and b) an in-depth engagement with psychological resilience is missing although it is identified as being important particularly in relation to radicalization prevention.

I address this gap by showing that psychological resilience is a norm in a Foucauldian sense (chapter 3). I show that resilience on the one hand corresponds to a medical norm of health in line with biopower, and on the other hand corresponds to a disciplinary norm of social conformity. This matters because resilience was introduced against the backdrop of a psychologized conceptualization of radicalization, it aims at managing societal danger by introducing a norm to normalize and normate deviating individuals and populations. In this regard, resilience is not only supposed to render populations productive and responsible in the face of uncertainty, but to make potentially dangerous individuals manageable, before actual danger occurs. Resilience serves as a psychological norm in these interventions, as a yardstick to measure and assess what are societally acceptable thoughts and behaviors. This psychological norm becomes induced with national security objectives and depends on the conceptualization of radicalization.

Hence, resilience serves as a preemptive intervention to enhance populations in primary prevention, and as a preventive intervention to correct deviating individuals in secondary prevention. In both cases the governance of resilience works through affective governmentality, directed at the cognitive, behavioral and emotional states of subjects, while simultaneously also the governance itself works through emotion as these interventions are based on concern and care, rather than on punishment.

The resilient subject is mostly attributed with characteristics such as flexibility, adaptability and self-reliance as it is responsabilized to care for its own security in an insecure world. I contribute to this debate by showing how in relation to radicalization prevention, the resilient subject is no longer flexible and adaptable, rather individuals are supposed to be resisting radicalizing influences. My empirical material shows that in primary prevention, subjects are indeed responsabilized to become resilient towards radicalization, they are supposed to become self-aware, to exert self-control and regulation, and increase their self-esteem and self-efficacy. In relation to radicalization prevention these protective factors that bolster the resistance capacities of subjects, were extended to also include critical thinking and being firm in one's own beliefs, which are matching the respective societal norms. Engaging with psychological resilience as affective governmentality allows the fine tuning of normalization and normation processes of subjectivation in this context, to show not only how subjects are shaped with regards to productivity, but also to social conformity. The resilient subject in this context cannot be flexible, but has to be firm in its beliefs. This is particularly evident in relation to secondary prevention, when radicalizing subjects are identified as abnormal and hence dangerous. Security interventions, enhanced security, is needed to correct this social deviancy, to protect not only the radicalized but also society from danger. Psychological resilience became the norm in this context, because these normation can only work against the backdrop of health. It is a safeguarding of the individual, not framed as punishment, but as care for the well-being. Otherwise, how would one call an intervention in the "pre-crime space", an intervention directed individuals who have not committed an offense, to program them to become socially conform? Bigo (2019, p. 271), in a recourse to a similar debate in the 1970s, notes that it is "impossible to predict human behaviour without entering into a totalitarian logic". It is a stern warning which is more than apt for pre-crime interventions, however pastoral and benevolent they are framed.

Finally, I am adding to the debate in Critical Terrorism Studies discussing if resilience is a securitization of social policy. Not only do I provide one of the first studies engaging with resilience in relation to radicalization empirically, I also contribute to the studies shifting the focus from the UK to other European countries (chapters 5 and 6). Radicalization prevention and the cooperation between the social and security sector works differently, and hence also the role of resilience differs.

Against the backdrop of the policy goals of resilience in radicalization prevention, there is, however, still the practitioner's perspective of "resilience from below". Is resilience applied as it is supposed to be, or do practitioners question and appropriate resilience from their own vocations as social and youth workers? My field research shows (chapter 6 and 7) that social and youth work introduces a strong component of care for the individual, to some extent defying a security perspective and pushing for a relational conception of resilience through

support. Connecting to a subjugated strand in development psychology, being resilient is expressed as a self-actualization within supportive relationships, rather than an individual quality. Social and youth work also take on an advocacy role for deviating youth and thereby engages with the wider social condition, rather than only trying to adapt their clients to a societal standard of conformity, which challenges the prescriptive norm of resilience.