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Resurrection and Bodily Identity

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Propositions accompanying the thesis

Resurrection and Bodily Identity

Critical Responses to Locke's Theory of Personal Identity

By Anita van der Bos

1. It is an advantage of Locke's theory of personal identity that it can explain the sense of sameness in the resurrection. Locke's tension in thinking about persons, however, makes it difficult to pinpoint what a person is (chapter 1)
2. Locke makes a strict distinction between organisms and bodies. He does not consider organisms as a kind of body, namely a living body (chapter 2)
3. Locke cannot allow organisms to be substances because this would exclude the possibility of the resurrection of the body (chapter 2)
4. To refute Locke's claim that sameness of body is not necessary for the resurrection, all one has to do is show that it *is* necessary. It is irrelevant whether "same body" is understood in Locke's strict philosophical sense (chapter 3)
5. Trotter Cockburn does not equate "man" and "person", even though she thinks that the Lockean man is body-soul-person compound (chapter 4)
6. Although Locke does not find proof in Scripture for the resurrection of the body, he does not deny the possibility of the resurrection of the same body in whatever sense (chapter 4)
7. In the early modern period, religion and philosophy were closely intertwined. This is illustrated by the belief in the resurrection which is accompanied by philosophical themes and questions. A historian of philosophy should not prioritize philosophical thinkers over religious ones, since these thinkers are often both, and in communication with each other.