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The fight on the right: what drives voting for the Dutch Freedom Party and for the Forum for Democracy?

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Abstract

In 2017, the Forum for Democracy (FvD) and the Freedom Party both won seats in the Dutch parliament. Both of these parties are radical right-wing populist parties. It does not happen often that two radical right-wing populist parties gain seats in the same election. The question is to what extent these two radical right-wing populist parties have been able to carve out different niches for themselves. This paper examines the competition between these two parties looking at three surveys spanning between 2017 and 2019, when FvD became the largest party in the Dutch Senate. The paper finds that there are social-economic differences between the two electorates in terms of economic policy preferences and education level. The electorate of the FvD is also more libertarian where it comes to moral issues than PVV voters are. The paper concludes that despite not having the manifesto of a neo-liberal populist party, in electoral terms FvD is the functional equivalent of one.

Keywords Radical right-wing populism · Neo-liberal populism · Economic policy · Moral issues · Freedom Party · Forum for Democracy

Introduction

In the spring of 2019, the radical right-wing populist Forum for Democracy (*Forum voor Democratie*, FvD), led by Thierry Baudet, became the largest party in the Dutch Senate.¹ This result is noteworthy not just because FvD is currently

¹ The Senate is indirectly elected by provincial councils. These were elected in 20 March 2019. FvD became the largest party in these elections. In the Senate election on 27 May 2019, the Liberal VVD and the FvD both won twelve seats.

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the smallest party in the House of Representatives but also because there already is another radical right-wing populist party in the Dutch parliament: the Freedom Party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV) led by Geert Wilders. The situation in the Netherlands since 2017 is exceptional in a comparative sense because there is substantial competition *within* the radical right-wing populist party family between two parties with parliamentary representation. The question rises *why there is room among voters for two radical right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands*. In order to understand the electoral constituencies of these two parties, this article will examine two subquestions: namely, *under what conditions do voters vote for Forum for Democracy?* And *how do these voters differ from those who voted for the Freedom Party?*

This study examines what drives voting for the Freedom Party and Forum for Democracy in terms of social backgrounds and ideological characteristics. The expectation is that the electorates of the two parties differ in social-economic terms. There is a growing literature arguing that although economic issues are not the primary motivator for voting for radical right-wing populist parties, these factors may play an important secondary role in electoral appeal of these parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; De Lange 2007). Harteveld (2016) has shown that the social-economic policy positions of these parties come with electoral consequences: the more left-leaning radical right-wing populist parties are on economic issues, the more likely that they will appeal to lower educated voters and voters on the economic left. That is: who supports radical right-wing populist parties depends on the nature of the supply (Mudde 2007, p. 8). Differences in social-economic profile of the two parties are quite marked in this specific case, leading some to hypothesize that Forum for Democracy attracts “better situated voters,” while Freedom Party voters live in “working-class districts” (Lucardie 2017).

This article does not only contribute to understanding why voters support Forum for Democracy, the largest party in the Dutch Senate, it is also relevant for the comparative literature on the populist radical right. The rise of the FvD is an important case: not many cases exist where there is more than one radical right-wing populist party in parliament. This allows one to test the *comparative* finding of Harteveld (2016) in a *competitive* setting where two radical right-wing populist parties have been able to win representation: do economic programs of competing radical right-wing populist parties matter for what kind of voters vote for them?

Radical right-wing populism and the economy

Where it comes to economic attitudes, the dominant perspective in the political science literature is that one can differentiate between left-wing and right-wing views on economic matters. Lipset et al. (1954, p. 1135) proposed that egalitarianism is the core of the left–right dimension: “[b]y left we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic or social; by right we shall mean (...) opposing change towards greater equality.” Economic egalitarianism is not a primary driver of voting for radical right-wing populist parties (Mudde 2007). The radical right-wing populist family is spread along the economic left–right dimension (Mudde 2007, p. 123). The academic literature has struggled



with this diversity, often attempting to see common policy positions and consistent trends in their social-economic positioning. For instance, Kitschelt and McGann (1995) argued that in their combination of right-wing policies on economic issues and authoritarian and nativist positions on cultural matters, radical right-wing populist parties had a winning formula. Recent studies such as Eger and Valdez (2015) follow Kitschelt and McGann in placing the radical right consistently on the economic right.

Lefkofridi and Michel (2014), Betz and Meret (2013), De Lange (2007), and Otjes (2019) see a movement of the party family to the center of the economic left–right dimension. As economic views are not at the core of the radical right-wing populist ideology, parties have considerable flexibility: even when a neo-liberal economic agenda was “employed successfully, as it was by the French Front National in the mid-1980s, it was a tactical tool to be abandoned as soon as the political wind changed and protectionism and welfare chauvinism seemed more promising” (Minkenberg 2000, pp. 173–174). De Lange (2007) called the combination of centrist economic and cultural conservative policies “a new winning formula.” This gave them access to the left-wing conservative quadrant of the political spectrum, the most underserved area of the political space (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Lefkofridi et al. 2014).²

Any image of unity underestimates the diversity in the party family. The key question is: What the impact of the diversity within the radical right-wing party family is? Hartevelde (2016) has studied the effect of the economic positioning of radical right-wing populist parties on their electoral niches in a comparative design. We cannot understand the support for radical right-wing populist parties without taking into account both the supply and the demand for these parties (Mudde 2007, p. 8; Mudde 2010; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003). The central idea here is that the nature of the ‘supply’ affects the nature of the ‘demand’ for populist radical right-wing parties. The economic positions of these parties are reflected in their electorates (Hartevelde 2016): radical right-wing populist parties that have a more left-wing profile have less support among higher educated and upper- or middle-class voters and more support among lower educated and working-class voters.³

1. *Economic egalitarianism hypothesis* The more economically left-wing of two radical right-wing populist parties attracts voters who favor redistribution more compared to the less economically left-wing of the two.

² Some like Otjes (2019) argue that the PVV is primarily concerned with the “deserving poor.” When we use an item to test this using the DPES, we find a significant difference in line with the results presented elsewhere in the paper: FvD attracts more economically libertarian voters, whereas the PVV attracts those who show greater concern for people who could be considered deserving poor.

³ Since there were no questions about class in the 2018 or 2019 LISS, a class hypothesis could not be tested. Model A9 and A18 consider the effects of class on voting for and sympathizing with the PVV and FvD in 2017. It finds no significant effect of class. We also look at the effect of income. This is available in the LISS but only for part of the DPES. We find no significant effect of having an income above or below the median.



2. *Education hypothesis* The more economically left-wing of two radical right-wing populist parties attracts more lower educated voters than the less economically left-wing of the two.

Conventional characteristics of radical right-wing populism

This study is based on the assumption that both the PVV and the FvD share a radical right-wing populist ideology. The key elements of radical right-wing populism (nativism, authoritarianism, Euroscepticism, and populism) will be introduced, as these are characteristics that matter for determining that the FvD fits in the radical right-wing populist category and factors that will serve as control variables in the empirical analysis of voting PVV and FvD.

Nativism is the view that members of the nation should exclusively inhabit the territory of the nation (Mudde 2007). Nativists see foreign influences like immigration as a threat to the nation. Voters of radical right-wing populists share these views: they are opposed to immigration, take hardline positions on civic integration, and see Islam as a threat (Van der Brug 2003; Rooduijn 2017; Lubbers et al. 2002).

In the approach of Mudde (2007, p. 23) authoritarianism has two important elements. The first element is “punitive moral conventionalism” and the second is a commitment to “law and order.” What these two elements share is an ideal of an ordered society, where those who transgress are punished severely. This transgression can not only be breaking the law, but it can also be violating the dominant moral code: for instance, many radical right-wing populist parties are conservative on moral issues such as women’s rights. Many radical right-wing populists see women as second-rate citizens, who are reduced to motherhood and are thought to have a duty to secure the survival of the nation by providing offspring (Mudde 2007; Kofman 1998). Yet, as Kofman (1998, p. 91) also observes, there is no single and consistent attitude concerning the family among radical right-wing populist parties. Dutch radical right-wing populism deviates from the rest of Europe. Dutch radical right-wing populists have been more progressive on moral issues compared their sister parties in the rest of Europe. The godfather of radical right-wing populism in the Netherlands Pim Fortuyn was an openly gay man. He was one of the first Dutch politicians to link a progressive position on the rights of women, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals with opposition to immigration from Islamic countries (Akkerman 2005, p. 341; De Lange and Mügge 2015, p.76).

Pirro and Van Kessel (2017) argue that Euroscepticism is a common denominator of the radical right. In the view of radical right-wing populists, the EU is an elitist project and a threat to national sovereignty. Euroscepticism is an expression of these parties’ nativism and populism. The evidence that Euroscepticism drives voting for radical right-wing populist parties separately from anti-immigration sentiments is weak (Rooduijn 2017).

Populism consists of three core beliefs (Mudde 2007): the first is that the common people form a homogenous and virtuous whole; the second is that the elite is corrupt and that it acts as one; and the third is that the elite denies the people the



power to govern. Voters of radical right-wing populist parties share this political orientation with these parties (Akkerman et al. 2014; Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013).

Populism is a thin-centered ideology. It has to be attached to other, more substantive sets of ideas (Mudde 2007; Stanley 2008; Otjes and Louwerse 2015). This means that one can contrast radical right-wing populism with other combinations between populism and different host ideologies. Here, neo-liberal populism is relevant (Pauwels 2010; Betz 1993; Weyland 1999; Mudde 1996, 2007, p. 30). In this case, populism is explicitly attached to an ideology (neo-liberalism) that is centered on an economic agenda: the drastic curtailing of the government, a flat tax, privatization of public enterprises, and deregulation of the economy (Betz 1993, p.679-680; Pauwels 2010, p. 1012). In neo-liberal populism, the *people* are seen as the hard-working but over-taxed common man. The bureaucrats are seen as the *elite*, which overregulates citizens to serve special interests (Weyland 1999, p. 382). The key difference between neo-liberal populism and radical right-wing populism is not a matter of position as much as it is a matter of saliency: for a neo-liberal populist, economy is central to their program; for a radical right-wing populist, immigration is (Betz 1993, p. 680; Pauwels 2010, p. 1009; Mudde 2007, p. 30). Neo-liberal populists also are expected to appeal to a different group of voters than radical right-wing populist parties, in particular the radical right-wing populists appealed to voters “with lower level of education” (Betz 1993, p. 684).

Comparative context

This paper concerns the structure of party competition *within* the right-wing populist party family between two parties with parliamentary representation. More (recent) examples of the successful entry of a second right-wing populist party are listed in Table 1.⁴ In most of these cases, a radical right-wing populist party (focused on a nativist cultural agenda) competed with a neo-liberal populist party (focused on a neo-liberal economic agenda): the Danish Progress Party, the Belgian List Dedecker, and the Austrian Team Stronach have all been classified as neo-liberal populist (Pauwels 2010; Mudde 2007, pp. 47–48; Schmuck et al. 2016, p. 88). The only other example of two radical right-wing populist parties competing are the BZÖ and FPÖ. As this paper is focused on the effect of social-economic differences, the economic positions of the parties are included in Table 1. Interestingly, the largest distance on economic issues is between the PVV and FvD, despite the fact the FvD is not generally considered a neo-liberal populist party. The following section will delve into the ideological profiles of the two parties.

⁴ The French-speaking *Front National* and the Flemish-speaking *Vlaams Belang* in the Belgian parliament are not included in the table, as these two parties are not competing for the same votes. The presence of the *Alleanze Nazionale* and *Lega Nord* in the Italian party system between 1994 and 2008 is also excluded because the AN is a post-fascist national conservative party rather than a populist party. We do not list the *Schweizer Demokraten* and the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* because the SVP only became a truly radical right-wing populist party after the SD was already in parliament.



Table 1 Competition between right-wing populist parties where both parties won representation 1998–2017 *Source* Bakker et al. (2015), Polk et al. (2017)

Country	Period	Name			Economic left–right (CHES)
		Abb.	English name	National language name	
Austria	2006–2013	FPÖ	Freedom Party Austria	<i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</i>	4.8
		BZÖ	Alliance Future Austria	<i>Bündnis Zukunft Österreich</i>	6.0
	2013–2017	FPÖ	Freedom Party Austria	<i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</i>	5.5
		Team Stronach			7.9
Belgium	2007–2014	VB	Flemish Interest	<i>Vlaams Belang</i>	7.9
		LDD	List Dedecker	<i>Lijst Dedecker</i>	8.9
Denmark	1998–2001	FrP	Progress Party	<i>Fremdskriftspartiet</i>	8.9
		DF	Danish People's Party	<i>Dansk Folkeparti</i>	7.3
Netherlands	2017–	PVV	Freedom Party	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>	5.7
		FvD	Forum for Democracy	<i>Forum voor Democratie</i>	8.9

West-European systems with proportional representation where more than one radical right-wing party was elected to parliament 1998–2017. CHES data for year closest to the election

Forum for Democracy and Freedom Party

As Mudde (2007, p. 8) has argued and Hartevelde (2016) has shown in a comparative study, the nature of the supply (the political parties) matters for the nature of the demand (that is who votes for them). Therefore, in order to understand the voters of the PVV and FvD, one would need to understand the differences between the parties. After briefly touching upon the formation of two parties, the questions which of the two parties is more economically left-wing of the two and whether both parties truly fall into the radical right-wing populist category will be answered.

The history of the PVV has been described in greater detail in the literature (Vossen 2016; Lucardie and Voerman 2012; Van Kessel 2015; Voerman and Vossen 2019). The party was founded in 2006 by Geert Wilders, who had belonged to the right-wing of the parliamentary party of the Liberal Party (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD) between 1998 and 2004. Since 2006, the PVV has parliamentary representation.

Forum for Democracy was founded in February 2015 as a think tank around the self-proclaimed “public intellectual” Thierry Baudet.⁵ Baudet received a PhD in

⁵ Smouter, K. (23/2/2011) “Excellentie is belangrijker dan gelijkheid” *De Groene Amsterdammer*.






Fig. 1 Polling results for PVV and FvD March 2017–April 2019. Gray: PVV, with 95% confidence interval; black: FvD, with 95% confidence interval Source Louwse (2019)

2012 from Leiden University on the dissertation *The Significance of Borders: why representative government and the rule of law require nation states*. Before entering politics, Baudet gained considerable attention as a spokesperson of the conservative right. Baudet founded Forum for Democracy as a Eurosceptic think tank.⁶ It already operated in the political realm: in 2016, Forum was also involved in the petition drive to hold a consultative referendum on EU–Ukraine Association Agreement (Jacobs 2018). The treaty was rejected in the referendum. For a year after the referendum, the treaty was in limbo as the Dutch government sought a way to do justice to the outcome of the referendum without disrupting EU–Ukraine relations. The fact that the government did not veto the agreement, led Baudet to register Forum for Democracy as a political party.

The FvD participated in the 2017 national elections with a manifesto that focused on democratic reform and Dutch independence from the EU. In March 2017, the party won two seats out of 150. Between March 2017 and April 2019, the support for the FvD in polls increased, as can be seen in Fig. 1. In 2017, the party went from 2% to 8% in the polls. Its support subsequently plateaued. In 2019, however, its support increased sharply from 9% to 16%. This increase coincided with the strong performance of FvD in the provincial election in March of that year, where it became the largest party with 15% of the vote. The growth of the FvD is mirrored by a decline of the PVV in the same period: it went from 13% in 2017 to 8% in 2019. In the European Parliament elections in May 2019 (outside of the range of the surveys covered in this paper), this trend continued and FvD won three seats, while the PVV lost all its seats. After that, however, internal conflicts in the PVV erupted and the

⁶ Baudet, T., Broers, V., Mujagic, E. and Wellens, A. (30/5/2015) “Een oproep voor de democratie en dus tegen de Europese Unie” *NRC Handelsblad*.



Table 2 PVV and FvD *Source* Bakker et al. (2015), Polk et al. (2017), Green-Pedersen and Otjes (2017)

Concept	Measure	Data source	PVV					FvD
			2006	2010	2014	2017	2017	
Economic left–right	Position on economic dimension	CHES	8.3	5.2	4.6	5.7	8.9	
	Attention to economic issues	CAP	26%	22%	21%	23%	21%	
Nativism	Position on immigration	CHES	9.4	10.0	9.9	10.0	9.4	
	Attention to immigration and integration	CAP	11%	20%	12%	40%	13%	
Populism	Anti-elite saliency	CHES	–	–	9.4	9.3	9.5	
	Attention to government	CAP	24%	7%	4%	6%	17%	
Authoritarianism	GAL-TAN	CHES	6.6	7.2	7.8	7.1	7.1	
	Attention to justice	CAP	10%	10%	12%	15%	6%	
Euroscepticism	Position on EU integration	CHES	1.6	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.1	
	Attention to EU	CAP	5%	3%	18%	3%	3%	

Position on immigration, elite saliency, GAL-TAN, and economic left–right dimension run from 0 to 10 (where 10 means anti-immigration, very salient, TAN, and economic right). Position on EU immigration runs from 1 to 7 (where 7 means EU integration should go further). Attention from CAP codes. Justice includes criminal justice but also family law and issues related to “vice” such as prostitution. Attention to Economic issues concerns social affairs, labor, macro-economy, taxes, and enterprise. For reference, the averages for the other parties: position immigration 4.9; attention to immigration 8%; anti-elite saliency 2.8; attention to government 6%; GAL-TAN 4.8; attention to justice 7%; position on EU integration 4.5; attention to EU 3%; position on economic dimension 4.6; attention to economic issues 22%

party lost three of its newly elected Senators. This led to a decline of the party in the polls while the PVV made up for lost ground.

Crucial for the hypotheses are the parties’ positions on economic issues: which one of the two parties is more left-wing? As can be seen in Table 2, the experts of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey see a left-wing drift in the positioning of the PVV: from 8.3 in 2006 to 5.7 in 2017 (on a ten-point scale, where 10 is most right-wing). The PVV mixes left-wing and right-wing positions. On many economic issues, for instance concerning taxation, the party takes a right-wing course. The exceptions are mainly in the domain of healthcare and pensions. Here the party takes more left-wing positions: the party proposes to lower the retirement age, opposes cuts to care for seniors, and opposes increasing out of pocket healthcare payments. Otjes (2019) proposes to understand this mix of left-wing and right-wing positions as a reflection of the party’s nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. The PVV takes left-wing positions specifically when making proposals that affect private sector elites (such as bankers) and the “deserving poor,” that is social groups like the handicapped and pensioners whose poverty is not due to their own choice. It takes right-wing positions when making proposals that affect non-native groups, public sector elites (such as civil servants), and the “undeserving poor,” that is people who can work but refuse to or those who break rules like welfare fraudsters.

FvD does not yet have an extensive track record on economic issues. The economic paragraphs of its manifesto focus on tax cuts and less regulation for small companies. When looking at the party’s parliamentary activity between September



2017 and March 2019, 21% of the 78 motions it proposed concerned economic issues. Half of the economic motions propose to cut taxes, for instance taxes that small business pay, gift, estate, or property taxes. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey gives FvD a right-wing position close to where the PVV originally was placed back in 2006. Given these positions, the PVV is marked as the more economically left-wing of the two. Therefore, one can expect that *the PVV does better among lower educated and economically egalitarian voters compared to the FvD*.

Can both the PVV and FvD be characterized as radical right-wing populist? Or is FvD perhaps better considered neo-liberal populist? Nativism, populism, authoritarianism, and Euroscepticism will serve as criteria. Table 2 shows some Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) data on their profile. Both the PVV and FvD are nativist. Immigration and civic integration are prominent in both manifestos: FvD spends an eighth of its manifesto on these issues. This is more than the PVV spends on the issue in two out of its four manifestos. Both parties oppose immigration. The FvD advocates for an “Australian style” restrictive immigration policy. The PVV focuses on its opposition to Islam, about half of the single-page PVV 2017 manifesto is devoted to measures like banning hijabs, mosques, and the Quran. In contrast, Baudet has made explicitly race-based statements. For instance, Baudet has said: “I want to welcome a lot of people here, but (...) I want to live in a world or a country that is mainly white or predominantly white. I do not want to become an ethnic minority.”⁷ Geert Wilders has never crossed this line: his nativist appeals were against certain religious groups (Islam) and certain national groups (Poles, Dutch-Turks, and Dutch-Moroccans), but never against racial groups. Experts place both parties squarely on the nativist side of the spectrum.

Authoritarianism plays a relatively minor role in the profiles of the FvD and the PVV. Here, it is useful to distinguish between law and order authoritarianism and moral authoritarianism. For the PVV, their views about morality flow from their nativism: the PVV positions itself as the defender of the Western liberal values of Enlightenment, humanism, and modernity against a perceived threat from the Islam. The party is outspoken against Islamic cultural practices that go in against the rights of women, such as female genital mutilation (De Lange and Mügge 2015, p.77). Here, Wilders clearly echoes Pim Fortuyn (Akkerman 2005, 2015). Where it comes to moral conventionalism, Forum for Democracy expressed adherence to equality, independent of gender and sexual orientation and freedom of partner choice in their manifesto. Yet, Baudet has commented that “women in general excel less in jobs and have less ambition.”⁸ There is a discrepancy between the more liberal manifesto and the more conservative messages stated by Baudet. These statements may be signals to his electorate that the party would actually pursue a more conservative position on these issues than is evident in the manifesto (López 2014). When it comes to law and order policies, the pattern is also complex. For the PVV, their law and order policies are tied to their nativism: for

⁷ *De Overnachting* NPO Radio 1 20/9/2015.

⁸ Schimmelpennick, S. (14/4/2017) “Dit is Quote mei; een glaasje met Thierry Baudet” <https://www.quotenet.nl/nieuws/a194892/dit-is-quote-mei-een-glaasje-met-thierry-baudet-video-194892/>.



instance, they favor the expulsion of criminal migrants. FvD is ambivalent: it favors harsher penalties, such as an “American style,” “Three Strikes You’re Out” system. On the other hand, the party favors the protection of privacy. In the 2018 referendum on the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act, which would expand the agencies’ ability for online surveillance, the FvD campaigned against the bill, while the PVV spoke out in favor of it. If one were to use the GAL–TAN indicator of the CHES as a proxy for authoritarianism, both parties are clearly on the authoritarian side. FvD did devote considerably less attention to justice issues than the PVV.

Where it comes to EU integration, both the PVV and FvD favor “Nexit” (De Vries 2018, p. 1544; Van der Woude 2017, pp. 66–67). The EU is an important element of the development of FvD: Thierry Baudet got national exposure as the voice of the “no-campaign” against the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement in the 2016 referendum. Experts place the two parties on the anti-EU side of the spectrum. The EU forms a small part of both parties’ manifestos.

Populism is an important element of the rhetoric of both the PVV and the FvD. PVV leader Wilders claimed that the Dutch parliament was a “fake parliament” because they ignored the demands of voters (Hakhverdian and Schakel 2017, pp. 11–12). Fighting the “party cartel” is an important element of the platform of the FvD: in their view, the fact that the members of established parties divide government jobs is the biggest problem of the country. As an alternative, they want to introduce a “Swiss style” system of direct democracy. The CHES experts believe that both these parties attach great salience to anti-elite rhetoric. Kemmers et al. (2018) also consider the FvD populist. In 2017, a large share of the FvD manifesto was devoted to the functioning of the government; the PVV’s attention to these issues decreased markedly between 2006 and 2012.

If one considers the PVV to be a radical right-wing populist party during this entire period, the FvD must fall in the same category. FvD scores the same on nativism, populism, and Euroscepticism: the parties are equally anti-immigration and (except for 2017) FvD’s attention to immigration is greater or the same as the PVV’s attention. FvD is similarly populist with a considerable attention to government. Like the PVV, FvD is also a hard Eurosceptic party with the same level of attention to the EU. It would be incorrect to characterize FvD as neo-liberal populist: it does not spend more attention than the PVV on economic issues and these issues are not central to the party’s ideology. Baudet’s (2012) own political philosophy focuses on the importance of national borders.

Methods

This paper examines the support for the PVV and FvD at three points in time: the 2017 elections (15 March 2017), the spring of 2018, and the spring of 2019.⁹ This allows one to follow the FvD electorate during its rapid expansion. In order to

⁹ The 2017 survey had a pre-election wave and a post-election wave, the 2018 and 2019 survey were split into three parts. The fieldwork for the first part was held in December and January; for the second part in January and February and the for the third part in February and March.



Table 3 Sympathy between sympathy for PVV and FvD

	2017		2018		2019	
	< 6	≥ 6	< 6	≥ 6	< 6	≥ 6
PVV						
< 6	68% (66–70%)	9% (8–11%)	64% (62–65%)	7% (6–8%)	72% (71–74%)	9% (8–10%)
≥ 6	13% (12–15%)	9% (8–10%)	19% (19–20%)	10% (9–11%)	8% (8–9%)	10% (10–11%)
Correlation	0.42***		0.49***		0.60***	

Percentages with 95% confidence intervals; * > 0.1; ** > 0.05; *** > 0.01



Table 4 Descriptives 2017

Variable	Mean	Median	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N_{items}	$N_{\text{respondents}}$	Low	High
Sympathy differential	-0.35	0.00	2.89	-9.00	10.00	2	2092	More sympathy for FvD than PVV	More sympathy for PVV than FvD
Voting FvD/PVV	0.05	-	-	0.00	1.00	2	5884	Not voting FvD/PVV	Voting FvD/PVV
Party = PVV	0.50	-	-	0.00	1.00	1	28,288	Party = FvD	Party = PVV
Political cynicism	0.48	0.50	0.45	0.00	1.00	2 ^a	2340	Low cynicism	High cynicism
Moral conventionalism	0.23	0.17	0.26	0.00	1.00	2 ^b	1882	Progressive	Conservative
Eurocepticism	0.59	0.50	0.31	0.00	1.00	1	2963	Pro-European	Euroceptic
Nativism	0.63	0.67	0.28	0.00	1.00	1	3134	Pro-immigrant	Anti-immigrant
Economic egalitarianism	0.66	0.67	0.27	0.00	1.00	1	3068	Larger income differences	Smaller income differences
Education level = low	0.22	-	-	0.00	1.00	1	2912	MBO, HAVO, VWO HBO, WO	BO, VMBO
Year of birth	0.59	0.56	0.20	0.05	0.99	1	3424	1913	2000
Gender = male	0.49	-	-	0.00	1.00	1	3428	Female	Male

^a $H=0.77$

^b $H=0.67$



Table 5 Descriptives 2018

Variable	Mean	Median	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N _{items}	N _{respondents}	Low	High
Sympathy differential	- 1.45	- 100	2.64	- 10.00	9.00	2	4453	More sympathy for FvD than PVV	More sympathy for PVV than FvD
Voting FvD/PVV	0.08	-	-	0.00	1.00	2	4362	Not voting FvD/PVV	Voting FvD/PVV
Party = PVV	0.50	-	-	0.00	1.00	1	28,288	Party = FvD	Party = PVV
Political cynicism	0.66	1.00	0.42	0.00	1.00	2 ^a	6248	Low cynicism	High cynicism
Moral conventionalism	0.30	0.30	0.17	0.00	0.96	11 ^b	5836	Progressive	Conservative
Eurocepticism	0.61	0.50	0.28	0.00	1.00	1	5384	Pro-European	Euroseptic
Nativism	0.52	0.50	0.17	0.00	1.00	7 ^c	5705	Pro-immigrant	Anti-immigrant
Economic egalitarianism	0.70	0.75	0.24	0.00	1.00	1	5645	Larger income differences	Smaller income differences
Education level = low	0.32	-	-	0.00	1.00	1	11,233	MBO, HAVO, VWO HBO, WO	BO, VMBO
Year of birth	0.64	0.63	0.21	0.00	1.00	1	9517	1913	2000
Gender = male	0.49	-	-	0.00	1.00	1	11,416	Female	Male

^aH=0.76^bH=0.45^cH=0.45

Table 6 Descriptives 2019

Variable	Mean	Median	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N_{items}	$N_{\text{respondents}}$	Low	High
Sympathy differential	- 0.23	0.00	2.42	- 10.00	10.00	2	4176	More sympathy for FvD than PVV	More sympathy for PVV than FvD
Voting FvD/PVV	0.09	-	-	0.00	1.00	2	3690	Not voting FvD/PVV	Voting FvD/PVV
Party = PVV	0.50	-	-	0.00	1.00	1	28,288	Party = FvD	Party = PVV
Political cynicism	0.68	1.00	0.42	0.00	1.00	2 ^a	5622	Low cynicism	High cynicism
Moral conventionalism	0.29	0.30	0.17	0.00	0.91	11 ^b	5228	Progressive	Conservative
Eurocepticism	0.57	0.50	0.29	0.00	1.00	1	4862	Pro-European	Euroceptic
Nativism	0.52	0.50	0.17	0.00	1.00	7 ^c	5136	Pro-immigrant	Anti-immigrant
Economic egalitarianism	0.71	0.75	0.23	0.00	1.00	1	5082	Larger income differences	Smaller income differences
Education level = low	0.32	-	-	0.00	1.00	1	9714	MBO, HAVO, VWO HBO, WO	BO, VMBO
Year of birth	0.63	0.62	0.21	0.00	1.00	1	8220	1913	2000
Gender = male	0.49	-	-	0.00	1.00	1	9856	Female	Male

^a $H=0.74$

^b $H=0.46$

^c $H=0.46$



make sure that differences are not the result of question wording but of substantial changes, it would be preferable to use the same survey. The Longitudinal Internet Studies for Social sciences (LISS) held its “Politics and Values” module at each of these three moments. Regrettably, in the spring of 2017, it did not include questions about the FvD. The LISS panel for 2018 and 2019 and use the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) for 2017 will be employed.

The DPES consists of a random sample of 3428 respondents (Van der Meer et al. 2017).¹⁰ It had a wave before and after the 2017 election. The LISS 2018 and 2019 Politics and Values waves have 5592 and 6263 respondents (Elshout 2018, 2019). LISS is an internet panel drawn by means of the population registry of the Central Bureau of Statistics.¹¹ Both the DPES and the Politics and Values survey included variables concerning political behavior, including party preferences, policy positions on a wide range of issues and demographic variables.

Two dependent variables are used: a binary vote choice variable (the actual vote in 2017 and the current party preference in 2018 and 2019) and a scale measuring respondents’ sympathy to these parties. The combination of preferences in 2017, 2018, and 2019 allows one to analyze the expanding appeal of the FvD. The combination of binary and a more nuanced indicator allows one to grasp the appeal of the parties. In order to compare voting for the PVV and the FvD directly, a stacked dataset is employed (cf. Van Spanje and Van der Brug 2009): the dependent variable for vote choice is first the choice for the FvD and then the choice for PVV. This leads to two observations per respondent for whether they voted PVV and whether they voted FvD. In order to model the voting behavior, a dichotomy is included which is zero for the FvD and one for the PVV. Interactions with this variable are added on all the independent variables to see whether these variables affect voting for PVV differently from voting FvD. The standard errors in these logistic regressions are clustered by respondent. Where it comes to sympathy, the difference between the sympathy for the FvD and for the PVV is calculated: so this is +10 if a voter has great sympathy for the PVV but none for the FvD and -10 if a voter has great sympathy for the FvD but none for the PVV. Table 3 shows the overlap between the sympathy scores for the PVV and FvD. It shows that there is a substantial overlap between the voters of PVV and FvD. About half of those who give the PVV a six or higher (on a ten-point scale), give the FvD a similar score and vice versa. Tables 4, 5, and 6 provide descriptives.

To test the education level hypothesis, which proposes that lower educated voters are more likely to vote for the more economically left-wing of the two parties, a dichotomous variable is constructed to identify respondents that have a lower education level. These categories are divided as they are generally used in the Netherlands: “lower educated” refers to citizens who only have a primary school diploma

¹⁰ It consists out of two subsamples, which were ran in different polling databases. Not all questions were asked in each subsample, leading to a significant decrease in the N if one combines certain items in the same analysis.

¹¹ The LISS was one of the two databases used for the DPES. Regrettably, the overlap between the DPES and the LISS is too small to meaningfully analyze the support of the FvD, which only got 2% of the vote in that election.



Table 7 Models examining the sympathy differential

Year	2017	2017	2017	2017	2018	2018	2018	2018	2018	2019	2019	2019	2019
Model	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	8	9	8	9
Political cynicism			0.16 (0.23)			0.30*** (0.10)							0.07 (0.10)
Moral conventionalism			1.22*** (0.36)			0.27 (0.26)							0.25 (0.25)
Eurocepticism			0.05 (0.34)			0.20 (0.16)							0.06 (0.15)
Nativism			1.30*** (0.38)			2.64*** (0.28)							1.88*** (0.27)
Economic egalitarianism		0.86*** (0.23)	0.79*** (0.36)		0.65*** (0.17)	0.73*** (0.17)				0.60*** (0.16)			0.61*** (0.17)
Education level=low	1.12*** (0.16)		0.75*** (0.25)	0.94*** (0.10)		0.49*** (0.11)	0.81*** (0.09)						0.48*** (0.10)
Year of birth			0.22 (0.49)			-0.10 (0.22)							-0.51** (0.21)
Gender= male			0.23 (0.18)			-0.09 (0.08)							-0.11 (0.08)
Constant	-0.60*** (0.07)	-0.97*** (0.16)	-2.56*** (0.50)	-1.64*** (0.04)	-1.90*** (0.12)	-3.70*** (0.25)	-0.40*** (0.04)	-0.65*** (0.12)	-1.54*** (0.24)				
N	1875	1992	902	4396	4197	4004	4121	3954	3727				
R ²	0.02	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.04				

Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater for the PVV than for FvD; * > 0.1; ** > 0.05; *** > 0.01



Table 8 Vote choice models

Year	2017	2017	2017	2018	2018	2018	2018	2019	2019	2019
Model	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
Political cynicism			1.76** (0.79)			1.48*** (0.37)			1.09*** (0.31)	
Moral conventionalism			-1.68 (1.03)			-1.94*** (0.62)			-1.04* (0.53)	
Eurocepticism			2.45** (1.10)			3.10*** (0.63)			2.00*** (0.46)	
Nativism			-0.36 (0.89)			4.32*** (0.66)			3.72*** (0.60)	
Economic egalitarianism			-1.51** (0.55)			-0.73* (0.33)			-0.90** (0.37)	
Education level = low			-0.19 (0.70)			-0.53** (0.26)			0.10 (0.22)	
Year of birth			2.44* (1.46)			0.80 (0.57)			1.03** (0.50)	
Gender = male			0.49 (0.49)			0.75*** (0.21)			0.51*** (0.19)	
Party = Freedom Party			-1.29*** (0.19)			-3.49* (2.12)			-2.26** (0.95)	
Party = Freedom Party * Political cynicism			-1.21 (0.87)			-0.37 (0.52)			-0.24 (0.50)	
Party = Freedom Party * Moral conventionalism			1.87 (1.16)			2.65*** (0.95)			2.21** (0.89)	
Party = Freedom Party * Euroscepticism			-0.35 (1.28)			-0.92 (0.85)			-1.03 (0.67)	
Party = Freedom Party * Nativism			5.55*** (1.30)			0.01 (1.02)			1.30 (0.97)	



Table 8 (continued)

Year	2017	2017	2017	2017	2018	2018	2018	2018	2018	2018	2019	2019	2019	2019
Model	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18					
Party = Freedom Party		2.32*** (0.64)	2.05** (0.99)		1.55** (0.53)	1.46** (0.62)		1.60*** (0.53)	1.81*** (0.60)					
* Economic egalitarianism														
Party = Freedom Party	2.12*** (0.55)		1.01 (0.76)	1.47*** (0.28)		1.37*** (0.38)	0.51* (0.27)		0.48 (0.36)					
* Education level = low														
Party = Freedom Party * Year of birth			0.13 (1.68)			1.38 (0.87)			0.64 (0.81)					
Party = Freedom Party * Gender = male			0.05 (0.56)			-0.74** (0.31)			-0.35 (0.30)					
Constant	-3.97*** (0.16)	-3.18*** (0.34)	-7.01*** (1.74)	-2.53*** (0.09)	-2.08*** (0.24)	-8.61*** (0.64)	-2.38*** (0.09)	-1.50*** (0.24)	-6.68*** (0.54)					
N	5188	5482	2338	4308	4120	3928	3644	3512	3364					
AIC	1925	2040	707	2303	2211	1602	2193	2133	1676					

Standard errors clustered at the respondent level. * > 0.1; ** > 0.05; *** > 0.01



(*basisschool*) or a diploma of the pre-vocational secondary education (*VMBO*). The reference category is formed by those who have a mid-level or higher level diploma (that is a *HAVO*, *VWO*, *MBO*, *HBO*, or *WO* diploma). To test the economic egalitarianism hypothesis, items concerning income redistribution are employed: one item from the DPES is selected and one item from the LISS Politics and Values survey.¹² The Appendix also shows the effect of respondents' income and class self-identification. It also looks at the attitudes towards policies that impact deserving poor groups in particular.

Controls are included for typically radical right-wing populist attitudes: the first is nativism. A single item on immigration attitudes from the DPES and a seven-item scale from the LISS Politics and Values survey are used. The second is authoritarianism. The paper focuses on punitive moral conventionalism. A two-item scale on same-sex couples from the DPES is employed. The Politics and Values survey has an eleven-item scale on views about gender differences. The Appendix looks at views on law and order. While an item on law and order is available in the DPES, no such item is available in the yearly LISS surveys. The Appendix looks at the 2017 Dutch Referendum Study (DRS, Jacobs et al. 2018), which was held in the spring of 2018, which did have questions on the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service powers, which was the subject of the referendum. The third control variable is anti-elitism. The same two-questions scale concerning political cynicism was used in all three surveys to tap into anti-elite views. A populism scale would be preferable but this is (again) not available in the LISS, while it is available in the DPES and the 2018 DRS. The Appendix examines this. The fourth control variable is Euroscepticism. This is measured with a single item in the DPES (again because of the number of missing values) and with a single item from the Politics and Values LISS study. Finally, a binary gender variable and year of birth are also included as control variables. People who self-identify as male are generally found to be more likely to vote for radical right-wing populist parties than people who self-identify as female (Spierings and Zaslove 2015). In order to make the effect sizes of the variables more directly comparable, all independent variables are recalculated so that their minimum is zero and the maximum is one.

Results

The crucial question of this paper is whether the difference in the supply (that is the fact that on economic issues the FvD is more right-wing than the PVV) is reflected in the demand for these parties. Table 7 presents the results for the sympathy differentials. Table 8 presents the results for vote choice in 2017 and the vote choice "if the elections were held today" in 2018 and 2019. The effect of the education level and economic egalitarianism variables is presented both without control variables

¹² In the DPES, there are multiple items on income redistribution. The item with the least missing values is selected in order to minimize the number of respondents lost.






Fig. 2 Visualization of predictors of sympathy differential. Predicted values based on Model 9 (data for 2019)

(Models 1 to 6 and models 10 to 18) and with control variables (Models 7 to 9 and 16 to 18). The results of Model 9 and 18 are visualized in Figs. 2 and 3.

The economic egalitarianism hypothesis is examined first. The idea underlying this hypothesis is that the more economically left-wing party of the two (the PVV) would attract more pro-redistribution voters. Figure 2 shows that in 2019 as we move from the voters that are the least to the most egalitarian, voters go from clearly preferring the FvD over the PVV to being neutral between the two. Figure 3 shows similarly that in 2019 as economic egalitarianism increases, the share of PVV voters increases and the share of FvD decreases. While among those who are least egalitarian, the FvD is significantly stronger, among those who are most egalitarian, the PVV is significantly stronger. In each of the twelve models, the PVV’s electorate is significantly more pro-egalitarian than FvD voters. In the 2017 and 2019 vote choice models, the FvD’s voters are explicitly anti-egalitarian. Therefore, the egalitarianism






Fig. 3 Visualization of regression of vote choice. Predicted shares based on Model 18 (data for 2019). Gray lines are PVV, black lines are FvD

hypothesis is corroborated.¹³ There is no sign that the relationship between egalitarianism and preferring PVV or FvD is affected by the inclusion of the education variable.

The second hypothesis concerned education level. The education hypothesis proposed that the more left-wing of the two radical right-wing populist parties would be more attractive to lower educated “losers of globalization.” The coefficient for education has the expected direction in each of the analyses presented in the paper. It is significant in each of the models without control variables. Yet it is only significant

¹³ The robustness test shows weaker results, in particular in 2017 where N is smaller: the results are not significant when an alternative economic indicator picking up on the “deserving poor” is included in the analysis of sympathy (Model A4), when populism is included in the analysis of vote choice (Model A14) and when class included in the analysis of vote choice (A18). This shows that in 2017 the economic differences between FvD and PVV voters were weaker than in 2018 and 2019.



for one of the three vote choice models with control variables (in 2018). Where it comes to the sympathy differential, a consistent significant pattern is present in the expected direction, as Fig. 2 shows.¹⁴

The analyses also looked at nativism, Euroscepticism, political cynicism, and moral conventionalism. The expectation was that both of the radical right-wing populist parties would attract voters that were nativist, morally conventionalist, populist, and Eurosceptic. In 2017, the FvD voters were not significantly nativist while the PVV voters were; therefore, there is a significant difference between these two parties on this variable. In the vote choice models for 2018 and 2019, the FvD and PVV electorates do not differ significantly and both parties attract more nativist voters. The sympathy differential does show a persistent difference: the PVV appeals to a more nativist electorate.¹⁵

Where it comes to moral conventionalism, a less consistent pattern is present: in each year, FvD does better among morally progressive voters, there is a significant effect in 2018 and 2019. In each survey, PVV voters are more conservative on moral issues, in 2018 and 2019 those differences are significant. Where it comes to the sympathy differential, the FvD sympathizers are significantly more libertarian than PVV sympathizers.¹⁶ These results show that since 2018 the FvD voters do not fit in the authoritarian category. This stands in contrast to the conservative views that Baudet has expressed. The differences for age or gender are not consistent between models.

When it comes to Euroscepticism, the two electorates are more similar. Both parties attract a Eurosceptic electorate and the sympathy differential does not show a difference either. The PVV voters are significantly less Eurosceptic than the FvD voters only in 2019.¹⁷ For the vote choice in 2017, the PVV appeared to have cornered the market for nativist voters, while FvD was backed by Eurosceptic voters. The pattern for political cynicism is also similar: both parties attract politically cynical voters. Their appeal does not differ except in the 2018 sympathy differential.¹⁸

So what story do these results tell? In 2017, Forum for Democracy won two seats. The party's voters were primarily Eurosceptic. In the same election, the PVV was supported in particular by an electorate of culturally nativist and economically egalitarian voters. In 2018 and 2019, Forum for Democracy expanded its support base by appealing to voters who had right-wing views on migration but progressive views on moral issues. The PVV appealed to a more economically left-wing electorate than the FvD.

¹⁴ The robustness tests in the Appendix support this result in every analysis.

¹⁵ This pattern is corroborated in all of the robustness tests.

¹⁶ The robustness tests support this pattern.

¹⁷ In no robustness test there is a significant difference between PVV and FvD voters.

¹⁸ The robustness tests support this pattern. Only in 2018 is there some sign of a difference on this variable. It is also not the case that the pattern was stronger when political cynicism was replaced by populism.



Conclusion

This paper was the first to explore the profile of FvD voters and contrast them with voters of another radical right-wing populist party in the Dutch political landscape: the PVV. The central expectation was that the voters of the two parties shared a radical right-wing populist profile but would differ in their economic views and education level. That is: difference between the programs of these two parties (the supply) would be reflected in their electorates (the demand for these parties). In both cases, the results were mixed.

The central hypotheses were that the electorates would deviate on the issue of income equality and their level of educational attainment. The electorates of the FvD and the PVV differed in their economic preferences. As expected, FvD did better among voters that favored a less egalitarian income distribution than the PVV, particularly in 2018 and 2019. These results corroborate previous results of Harteveld (2016)'s comparative study but now in a competitive setting where two radical right-wing populist parties are vying for voters. The lower educated voters are more likely to vote for PVV over the FvD if one does not include control variables. This pattern is less consistent if one examines party choice in combination with control variables, in particular in 2017. Economic differences play a role in differentiating the electorates of these two populist right-wing parties. This makes it likely that in other situations where more differentiated radical right-wing populist and neo-liberal populist parties compete, economic attitudes differentiate these two electorates.

Yet, there are also differences between the electorates on other aspects of the radical right-wing populist ideology. A striking and unexpected result is in how the two electorates differed in their views on moral conventionalism. This was operationalized through respondents' views on gender, marriage, and family. Contrary to expectations, the FvD electorate had more libertarian views on these moral issues than the PVV electorate (in 2018 and 2019). Yet, it is on these issues, that FvD's leader, Baudet, has emphasized the difference between men and women in their likelihood to excel at work or to have ambition. A weaker pattern was present for nativism. Here again, FvD sympathizers fit less well with the radical right-wing populist party family than PVV sympathizers. Those who sympathize more with the PVV than FvD are opposed to immigration and the voters who supported FvD when it entered parliament in 2017 were Eurosceptic but were not opposed to immigration. This indicates that voters were sensitive to the specific profiles of the parties: Baudet and Forum came to the public's attention in their resistance to the European Union and specifically the EU-Ukraine association agreement. It is reasonable that their voters were primarily Eurosceptic, given that the FvD focused strongly on regaining sovereignty from European integration.

So what do these results mean outside of the borders of the Netherlands? The competition between the PVV and FvD is an example of a handful of cases in Western Europe where there was meaningful competition *within* the populist right. In a competitive setting, the economic policy choices of the parties come with electoral consequences. The most striking result is that the notion of a single winning formula



for the populist radical right (De Lange 2007; Kitschelt and McGann 1995) does not fit with reality. The case of the fight between the PVV and FvD shows that when one party has moved on economic issues, it leaves space open for a new competitor. In a system with low entry barriers like the Netherlands, this new party may enter parliament and can grow to become the largest party. When a party leaves its flank open, a new party can enter and win votes. Competition is dynamic, not static. A winning formula may soon be outdated.

In other cases where two populist right-wing parties have been represented in parliament (in Denmark, Austria and Belgium), one of the two parties was neo-liberal populist and the other was radical right-wing populist. It would be incorrect to consider FvD a neo-liberal populist party on the basis of its party manifesto. The core, motivating notion Baudet's (2012) political philosophy is the importance of borders, not the need for a small government. Yet, when one compares the two electorates, one can see similarities to descriptions of neo-liberal versus radical right-wing populist constituencies from the 1990s (Betz 1993). For instance, compared to sympathy for the PVV, sympathy to FvD can be found among higher educated voters and among voters who are more economically libertarian. This libertarianism persists where it comes to moral issues. Where Betz (1993, p. 680), Mudde (2007, p. 30), and Pauwels (2010, p. 1009) all emphasize the importance of the issue of nativism in distinguishing between neo-liberal and radical right-wing populism, this paper points to authoritarianism as a deciding factor. Although often mentioned in the trifecta nativism-populism-authoritarianism, it is the element that gets the least attention of the three. Yet, while both FvD and the PVV electorate are nativist, the two electorates did differ in their commitment to authoritarianism, specifically moral conventionalism. Focusing the distinction between radical right-wing populism and neo-liberal populism on nativism instead of authoritarianism neglects the notion that nativism in itself is not conceptually related (positively or negatively) to neo-liberalism. Yet, authoritarianism, which requires government action to take strong actions to protect moral or legal codes, is conceptually at odds with neo-liberalism, which distrusts the government and its ability to do good. Programmatically, the FvD does not fit well in the existing ideal type of neo-liberal populist, given that the party's nativism. Yet, FvD voters do appear to fit better in a neo-liberal than radical right-wing populist mold as they have a libertarian streak where it comes to government intervention and morality. In electoral terms, FvD appears to be the functional equivalent of a neo-liberal populist party. This shows the persistence of this category, even if the supply does not perfectly match the ideal type.

So, what are the future perspectives for multiple radical right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands? As shown in Table 3, sympathy for the PVV is not identical with sympathy for FvD. In 2017, 2018, and 2019, the group that sympathized with both parties was about half of those who sympathized with either party. This shows that the parties have two different electoral niches, which differ in their level of economic and cultural libertarianism. While increasing support for one party will likely come at the cost of the other, both parties have an appeal beyond this common base. The two radical right-wing populist parties are likely appeal to a broader group of voters than a single radical right-wing populist party would. In other countries, if the electoral system would allow it, the presence of second radical right-wing populist party would likely not just come at the cost of the existing radical right-wing



populist party but would if the parties are sufficiently differentiated two radical right-wing populists have a broader appeal than one.

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Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest The author states that there is no conflict of interest.

Appendix

See Table 9.

Tables 9 and 10 present robustness tests.

- Model A1 and A10 are models with an additional item tapping into the “deserving poor.” These items concern the policy deductible for healthcare costs (“eigen risico”) that hits “deserving poor” groups (elderly and handicapped people) harder than other groups. In the model analyzing the sympathy differential, egalitarianism is no longer significant once this item is included. This may imply that it was concern for the “deserving poor” rather than concern for the income distribution in general which differentiated FvD and PVV sympathizers. Due to a lack of items, we cannot test this for 2018 and 2019.
- Model A2, A3, A11, and A12 include a populism item instead of a political cynicism item. This item was not available in the 2019 survey. Their effect is similar to the effect of political cynicism. Now, when analyzing vote choice, egalitarianism no longer differentiates the FvD and PVV voters in 2017.
- Model A4, A5, A13, and A14 add a law and order authoritarianism item. The item relates to punishment for 2017 and to surveillance for 2019. This item was not available in the 2019 survey. Preferences about punishment or surveillance do not significantly differentiate FvD and PVV voters.
- Model A6 and A15 include a class item. It does not significantly affect the choice of vote between PVV and FvD. If this variable is included, the effect of egalitarianism is weakened.
- Model A7, A8, A9, A16, and A17 include an item whether a respondent’s income is greater than the median. This is not a significant difference between the groups. If this variable is included, the results are in line with the models in the paper. The Vote Choice Model for 2017 did not converge, in Model A10, we can already see how including this variable reduces the number of cases.
- Model A18, A19, and A20 look at sympathy not in terms of the sympathy differential but like the vote choice model in stacked set-up. These results are in line with the models in the paper.

See Tables 10 and 11.



Table 9 Additional sympathy differential models

Variables	A1 2017	A2 2017	A3 2018	A4 2017	A5 2018	A6 2017	A7 2017	A8 2018	A9 2017
Political cynicism	0.08 (0.23)			0.24 (0.23)	0.16 (0.17)	0.18 (0.23)	0.46 (0.36)	0.30** (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)
Populism		0.66 (0.59)	0.61 (0.43)						
Moral Conventionalism	1.21*** (0.36)	0.96*** (0.34)	-0.16 (0.45)	1.20*** (0.36)	-0.05 (0.43)	1.19*** (0.36)	0.97* (0.53)	0.16 (0.27)	0.23 (0.26)
Law and order authoritarianism				-0.66 (0.48)	0.25 (0.30)				
Eurocepticism	-0.04 (0.35)	-0.04 (0.33)	-0.20 (0.29)	0.08 (0.35)	-0.06 (0.27)	0.03 (0.35)	0.01 (0.51)	0.25 (0.16)	0.12 (0.16)
Nativism	1.20*** (0.39)	0.92** (0.36)	2.51*** (0.50)	1.41*** (0.39)	2.44*** (0.50)	1.34*** (0.38)	2.06*** (0.58)	2.61*** (0.29)	1.94*** (0.28)
Economic egalitarianism	0.44 (0.38)	0.80** (0.32)	0.84*** (0.30)	0.68* (0.36)	0.88*** (0.28)	0.78** (0.37)	0.98* (0.54)	0.81*** (0.18)	0.52*** (0.18)
Deserving poor item	0.92*** (0.35)								
Education level=low	0.72*** (0.26)	0.64*** (0.23)	0.64*** (0.19)	0.83*** (0.26)	0.57*** (0.18)	0.75*** (0.26)	0.71* (0.38)	0.47*** (0.11)	0.49*** (0.11)
Year of birth	0.22 (0.50)	0.21 (0.45)	-0.85** (0.39)	0.24 (0.49)	-0.69* (0.38)	0.26 (0.50)	0.99 (0.75)	-0.05 (0.22)	-0.50** (0.22)
Gender= male	0.27 (0.19)	0.01 (0.17)	-0.17 (0.14)	0.24 (0.19)	-0.17 (0.14)	0.26 (0.19)	0.45 (0.27)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)
Income > median							0.33 (0.29)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)
Class						-0.04 (0.26)			
Constant	-2.73*** (0.51)	-2.37*** (0.48)	-3.09*** (0.44)	-2.08*** (0.62)	-3.21*** (0.42)	-2.59*** (0.61)	-3.60*** (0.78)	-3.78*** (0.26)	-1.50*** (0.25)
Observations	881	1028	1395	889	1514	888	469	3738	3455
R ²	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.05



Table 10 Additional vote choice models

Variables	A10 2017	A11 2017	A12 2018	A13 2017	A14 2018	A15 2017	A16 2018	A17 2019	A18 2017	A19 2018	A20 2019
Political cynicism	1.77* (0.79)			1.85* (0.81)	2.03** (0.67)	1.78* (0.78)	1.58*** (0.38)	1.25*** (0.33)	0.62** (0.21)	0.16* (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)
Populism		1.81 (1.43)	4.10*** (0.94)								
Moral convention- alism	-1.67 (1.04)	-1.24 (0.89)	-2.45** (0.90)	-1.71* (0.99)	-2.81** (0.87)	-1.71* (1.03)	-1.82** (0.64)	-0.94* (0.56)	0.10 (0.36)	0.96*** (0.25)	1.27*** (0.26)
Law and order authoritarianism				-1.48 (1.37)	0.75 (0.85)						
Euroscepticism	2.45* (1.11)	2.76** (0.92)	2.13* (0.99)	2.67* (1.16)	2.92** (0.98)	2.51* (1.16)	3.14*** (0.65)	1.96*** (0.48)	1.82*** (0.32)	0.79*** (0.15)	0.98*** (0.15)
Nativism	-0.34 (0.91)	-0.16 (0.89)	4.99*** (1.16)	-0.16 (1.06)	4.59*** (1.07)	-0.42 (0.90)	4.42*** (0.68)	3.91*** (0.63)	1.28*** (0.34)	3.70*** (0.28)	4.90*** (0.29)
Economic egalitari- anism	-1.47* (0.82)	-1.07 (0.82)	-1.13* (0.65)	-1.79* (0.73)	-0.64 (0.59)	-1.45* (0.85)	-0.58 (0.40)	-0.71* (0.40)	-1.41*** (0.36)	-1.33*** (0.17)	-0.93*** (0.18)
Deserving poor item	-0.23 (0.62)										
Education level = low	-0.18 (0.70)	-0.22 (0.70)	-0.41 (0.42)	-0.13 (0.70)	-0.43 (0.38)	-0.13 (0.70)	-0.60* (0.28)	0.05 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.23)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.11)
Year of birth	2.40 (1.47)	3.06* (1.22)	0.79 (0.97)	2.50* (1.51)	0.65 (0.92)	2.47* (1.42)	0.96 (0.60)	0.95* (0.54)	1.42** (0.46)	2.08*** (0.20)	2.18*** (0.21)
Gender = male	0.47 (0.49)	0.75* (0.45)	0.38 (0.34)	0.43 (0.49)	0.45 (0.31)	0.50 (0.49)	0.69** (0.22)	0.60** (0.20)	0.00 (0.17)	0.22** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.08)
Income > median							-0.11 (0.24)	0.12 (0.22)			
Class						0.31 (0.63)					
Party = PVV	-3.52 (2.16)	-3.58* (1.92)	-0.43 (1.62)	-5.41* (2.35)	-0.12 (1.62)	-2.23 (2.20)	-1.25 (1.13)	-1.42 (1.02)	-2.49*** (0.53)	-3.94*** (0.26)	-1.52*** (0.25)
Party = PVV * political cynicism	-1.28 (0.87)			-1.32 (0.89)	-1.17 (0.86)	-1.34 (0.85)	-0.47 (0.55)	-0.44 (0.52)	0.13 (0.23)	0.27** (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)
Party = PVV * populism				3.25* (1.72)	-0.69 (1.45)						



Table 10 (continued)

Variables	A10	A11	A12	A13	A14	A15	A16	A17	A18	A19	A20
Year	2017	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2019	2017	2018	2019
Party = PVV * moral convention-alism	1.84 (1.17)	1.41 (1.03)	4.45** (1.51)	1.89* (1.11)	4.13** (1.42)	1.97* (1.16)	2.40* (0.99)	2.06* (0.94)	0.88* (0.40)	0.16 (0.27)	0.33 (0.27)
Party = PVV * law & order authoritarianism				2.48 (1.92)	0.55 (1.13)						
Party = PVV * euro-scepticism	-0.44 (1.29)	-1.47 (1.11)	-1.19 (1.36)	-0.65 (1.36)	-1.57 (1.28)	-0.39 (1.34)	-0.89 (0.88)	-1.13 (0.70)	-0.10 (0.36)	0.17 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.15)
Party = PVV * nativism	5.30*** (1.31)	4.36** (1.34)	-2.26 (1.76)	5.23*** (1.43)	-1.32 (1.63)	5.87*** (1.31)	-0.27 (1.06)	1.09 (1.01)	1.41*** (0.39)	3.16*** (0.32)	2.01*** (0.28)
Party = PVV * economic egalitarianism	1.66* (0.99)	0.88 (0.98)	2.05* (1.05)	2.36** (0.90)	1.82* (0.93)	1.63 (1.02)	1.40* (0.68)	1.48* (0.64)	0.88* (0.39)	0.84*** (0.18)	0.61** (0.19)
Party = PVV * deserving poor item	1.04 (0.79)										
Party = PVV * education level = low	0.93 (0.75)	1.17 (0.77)	1.40* (0.61)	0.99 (0.76)	1.14* (0.54)	0.64 (0.77)	1.40*** (0.41)	0.42 (0.39)	0.79** (0.26)	0.55*** (0.12)	0.54*** (0.11)
Party = PVV * year of birth	0.01 (1.70)	-0.09 (1.49)	0.65 (1.43)	0.18 (1.73)	0.66 (1.32)	-0.22 (1.66)	1.68* (0.92)	0.87 (0.86)	0.10 (0.49)	-0.12 (0.21)	-0.56** (0.22)
Party = PVV * gender = male	0.09 (0.56)	-0.12 (0.53)	-0.45 (0.51)	0.17 (0.56)	-0.50 (0.46)	-0.05 (0.56)	-0.62* (0.32)	-0.53* (0.32)	0.21 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)
Party = PVV * Income > Median											
Party = PVV * class											
Constant	-6.91*** (1.77)	-7.96*** (1.51)	-8.77*** (1.07)	-5.97*** (1.70)	-8.96*** (1.14)	-7.36*** (1.75)	-8.64*** (0.70)	-7.10*** (0.60)	1.36** (0.49)	0.74** (0.23)	-1.37*** (0.25)
Observations	2268	2586	1380	2308	1508	2294	3662	3122	2138	8819	7974
AIC	703	714	646	703	729	692	1487	1527	9566	39,546	36,003



Table 11 Used items

Survey	Scale	Item	Options
DPES	Law and order authoritarianism	People have various opinions on the way the government fights crime. Where would you place yourself in a line from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for the parties which think that the government is acting too tough on crime, and 7 stands for the parties which think that the government should be tougher on crime?	7
DPES	Nativism	In the Netherlands, some think that foreigners should be able to live in the Netherlands, while preserving their own culture. Others think that they should fully adapt to the Dutch culture. Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7, where 1 means preservation of foreigners' own culture and 7 means that foreigners should fully adapt?	7
DPES	Moral conventionalism	Adoption by same-sex couples should be allowed	4 ^a
DPES	Moral conventionalism	Gay marriage should be forbidden	4
DPES	Political cynicism	MPs do not care for people like me	2
DPES	Political cynicism	Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion	2
DPES	Populism	Compromise is selling out principles	5
DPES	Populism	Politicians do not care about the people	5
DPES	Populism	Most politicians are trustworthy	5 ^a
DPES	Populism	Politicians are the main problem in the Netherlands	5
DPES	Populism	People, not politicians, should make most important decisions	5
DPES	Populism	MPs should follow the will of the people	5
DPES	Populism	I would rather be presented by an ordinary person than by a professional politician	5
DPES	Populism	Politicians talk too much and do too little	5
DPES	Populism	Political differences are mostly between elites and the people	5
DPES	Euro-scepticism	Some people and parties think that the European unification should go further. Others think that the European unification has already gone too far. Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7, where 1 means that the European unification should go even further and 7 means that the unification has already gone too far?	7
DPES	Economic egalitarianism	Some people think that the differences in incomes in our country should be increased. Others think that they should be decreased. How would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7, where 1 means that differences in income should be increased and 7 means that differences in income should be decreased?	7
DPES	Deserving poor	Own risk in healthcare expenses should be abolished	4



Table 11 (continued)

Survey	Scale	Item	Options
DRS	Law and order authoritarianism	Those suspected of crimes are too well protected by the law	5
DRS	Populism	Politicians in the Second Chamber should led themselves be led by the opinion of the people	5
DRS	Populism	Important decisions should be made by the people, not by politicians	5
DRS	Populism	I would rather be represented by a normal voter than by a professional politician	5
DRS	Populism	Political differences between the elite and normal citizens are larger than between citizens	5
DRS	Populism	Politicians talk too much and do too little	5
DRS	Populism	In politics, compromising is a different word for betraying your principles	5
P&V	Political cynicism	MPs do not care for people like me	2
P&V	Political cynicism	Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion	2
P&V	Euroscepticism	Some people and parties think that European integration should go further. Others think that it has gone too far. Where would you place yourself on a scale from one to five, where one means that European integration should go further and five that it already has gone too far?	5
P&V	Nativism	In the Netherlands, some people feel that people with a migration background should be able to live here while maintaining their culture. Others believe that they should adapt to the Dutch culture. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to five, where 1 one means immigrants maintain their own culture and 5 means that people with a migration background should completely adapt?	5
P&V	Economic egalitarianism	Some people think that the differences in income should be greater. Others think that they should be smaller. Of course, there are people in between. Where would you place yourself on a scale from one to five, where one means that income differences should be greater and five that they should be smaller?	5
P&V	Deserving poor	How satisfied are you with the way health care works in the Netherlands?	10 ^a
P&V	Moral conventionalism	A working mother cannot have as warm and tight a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	A child who does not attend school suffers when his or her mother works	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	All in all, family life suffers when a woman has full time job	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	In general, married people are happier than unmarried people	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	People who want children ought to marry	5



Table 11 (continued)

Survey	Scale	Item	Options
P&V	Moral conventionalism	Single parents can raise a child just as well as two parents together can	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	A couple can live together before marrying	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	Married couples with children are allowed to divorce	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	Do you think that women who have baby which is younger than a year old should be allowed to work full time, part time, or not at all?	3
P&V	Moral conventionalism	Do you think that women who have a child who does not attend school yet should be allowed to work full time, part time, or not at all?	3
P&V	Moral conventionalism	Do you think that women whose youngest child attends primary school should be allowed to work full time, part time, or not at all?	3
P&V	Moral conventionalism	Do you think that women whose youngest child attends secondary school should be allowed to work full time, part time, or not at all?	3
P&V	Moral conventionalism	A women is more apt to raise small children than a man is	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	For a girl it is simply not as important to get a good education as it is for a boy	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	You ought to raise boys with more freedom than girls	5
P&V	Moral conventionalism	It is unnatural when women direct a company over men	5

^aItem was flipped

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