# Stellingen

behorende bij het proefschrift

# Evolutionary dynamics under strategic interaction in networks

van

Wouter Baar

1. In a collective decision-making model on a networked multi-population, if the parameter of spontaneous uncommitment is larger than the effect of imitation, players become uncommitted. (Chapter 2)
2. For the dynamics in a collective decision-making model on a regular networked multi-population, the average long-term behavior in each population is the same. (Chapter 3)
3. In a large collection of prosumers, a mean field game arises if we couple the decision of a player to produce or not with the average behavior of the population. (Chapter 4)
4. In a collective decision-making model, it is possible to obtain limit cycles in the behavior under suitable feedback laws. (Chapter 5)
5. In a networked prisoner's dilemma with environmental feedback, lower network degrees promote cooperation. (Chapter 6)
6. Down here it's just winners and losers and don't get caught on the wrong side of that line.

   - B. Springsteen

7. And all this science I don't understand, it's just my job five days a week.

   - E. John & B. Taupin