

European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism I

The 2014 European Election and the Rise
of Euroscepticism in Western Europe

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FOUR FLAVOURS OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

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Dutch politics has always been characterized by pluralism: due to the openness of the electoral system, the existence of multiple historical cleavages and high electoral volatility in recent years, the Netherlands has a high number of parties. This means that Eurosceptic positions have been formulated by different kinds of parties. This chapter analyses four flavours of Euroscepticism: the resistance to European supra-nationalism from Protestant communities; the anti-capitalist Euroscepticism of the left; radical right-wing populism that mixes opposition to EU integration with opposition to immigration; and, finally, the latest shoot of Euroscepticism, the green Euro-critique.

These four flavours all won seats in the European elections held on May 22, 2014. Twenty parties¹ competed for twenty-six seats. This analysis is limited to the ten parties that won seats in these elections. First, we will describe the historical evolution of the positions of Dutch parties towards the European Union (EU). Next, we examine the programs, the electoral campaigns and the positions expressed taken by party leaders in 2014 in order to determine to what extent the positions of these parties can – or cannot – be classified as Eurosceptic. After having analysed the results of the European elections, we concentrate on the five Eurosceptical parties we have found in the subsequent section: the orthodox Protestant parties Political Reformed Party (*Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij*, SGP) and the Christian Union (*ChristenUnie*), which participated in the elections with a common list of candidates; the left-wing Socialist Party (*Socialistische Partij*, SP); the radical right-wing populist Freedom Party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV); and the Party for the Animals (*Partij voor de Dieren*, PvdD) with their green Euro-critique. In the last section, we analyse the electorate of these parties in more detail, focusing on their demographics and opinions.

The term Euroscepticism is often used to describe a variety of negative attitudes with respect to the EU. In this paper, we follow the definition of Scszerbiak and Taggart, who distinguish between hard and soft Euroscepticism: they define hard Euroscepticism as “principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU”² – that is: institutional cooperation based on transferring sovereignty to the European, supranational level. Soft Euroscepticism is not a principled opposition to the European project, but objection to “the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the *further* extension of competences that the EU is planning to make”.

1 Two parties, the Christian Union and the SGP competed with a common list.

2 Aleks SCSZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, “Theorizing Party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality”, in: Aleks SCSZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART (eds.) *Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 247-248.

1. Historical Perspective: The Positions of the Dutch Political Parties towards Europe

Over the years, the core parties of the Dutch party system³, the Christian-Democratic Appeal (*Christen-Democratisch Appèl*, CDA) (and its predecessors), the Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid*, PvdA), and the market-liberal Liberal Party (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD) have generally supported European integration (see Table 1)⁴. These parties together held the vast majority of seats in Dutch parliament. Since 1946, cabinets have always been formed by at least two of these three parties. From the beginning, however, at both wings of the political spectrum, small parties have opposed supranational European integration. According to the orthodox-Protestant SGP, a united Europe would be predominantly humanistic or – even worse – Catholic which would jeopardize the Calvinist character of Netherlands. In 1963 and 1981, two other orthodox Protestant parties entered parliament. They joined the SGP in opposing supranational cooperation. On the far left, the Dutch Communist Party (*Communistische Partij van Nederland*, CPN) considered European integration a capitalist project, giving free reign to large enterprises at the expense of the interests of the working class. In 1959, the CPN was joined by another left-socialist party that opposed EU integration on similar grounds. For different reasons, both Calvinists and communists rejected any degradation of national sovereignty. With reference to the Dutch history as an independent and Calvinist country and the vision of a communist future for the Netherlands respectively, they took a strong Eurosceptic position. In numbers, the Eurosceptic current in the Dutch Parliament was quite marginal: from the 1950s until the 1980s, the share of these Eurosceptic parties of the left and right averaged less than 9 percent of the total number of seats.

The traditional pro-European consensus was challenged in the 1990s when VVD-leader Frits Bolkestein criticized the idea of a federal Europe⁵. He wanted to limit European integration to a liberalized and efficiently operated common market. He accepted supranational co-operation in order to achieve such a market. Bolkestein did favour monetary integration. He proposed to drastically cut agricultural subsidies and structural funds, which would provide the possibility to reduce the Dutch financial contribution to the EU. Initially, his criticism did not prompt a fundamental change among the major parties, including his own: They all agreed on the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Gradually, however, CDA and Labour also started to criticize the inefficiency, cost and bureaucracy of the EU, and to question a federalist Europe as the final goal of Euro-

3 Gordon SMITH, "Core persistence: Change and the 'people's party'" *West European Politics*, 12.4, 1998, p. 157-168.

4 This section is based on Gerrit VOERMAN, "De Nederlandse Politieke Partijen en de Europese Integratie", in: Kees AARTS, Henk VAN DER KOLK (ed.), *Nederlanders en Europa*, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 2005, p. 44-63 ; Hans VOLLAARD, Gerrit VOERMAN, Nelleke VAN DER WALLE, "The Netherlands", in: Donatella M. VIOLA (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European elections*, London, New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 167-187; Hans VOLLAARD, Gerrit VOERMAN, "De Europese opstelling van Nederlandse politieke partijen", in: Hans VOLLAARD, Jan VAN DER HARST, Gerrit VOERMAN, *De Europese opstelling van Nederland*, Amsterdam, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2015.

5 Gerrit VOERMAN, "Een euroscepticus in Brussel? Frits Bolkestein, lid van de Europese Commissie (1999-2004)", in: Gerrit VOERMAN, Bert VAN DEN BRAAK, Carla Van Baalen (eds.), *De Nederlandse eurocommissarissen*, Amsterdam, Boom, 2010, p. 261-293.

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pean integration. However, they remained yet more reticent than the VVD⁶. Nevertheless, all these parties endorsed the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, followed in 2000 by the Treaty of Nice. The social-liberal Democrats 66 (*Democraten 66*, D66), who warmly embraced the notion of “an ever closer union”, also approved these Treaties. With the growing criticism of Europe in the three core parties, D66 soon became the most pro-European party in the Netherlands. For this party, the Treaty of Nice did not go far enough: they wanted Europe to unify faster.

While in the 1990s the three core parties became more critical towards the EU, GreenLeft (*GroenLinks*, GL) developed in the opposite direction. This party was founded in 1990, as the result of a merger of the aforementioned hard Euro-sceptic Communists and left-wing socialists with radicals (who opposed the focus of the European Community on economic growth but not the principle of EU integration). From the outset, GreenLeft accepted the European Community (or European Union after 1993) despite reservations about its lack of openness and democratic procedures. GreenLeft recognized that it would not be able to realize its democratic, social and environmental ambitions unless the EU’s supranational character was bolstered. Therefore, the party supported the Nice Treaty while it had voted against the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam.

Table 1: Positions of Dutch Parties Concerning European Treaties, 1986-2007

	Single European Act (1986)	Treaty of Maastricht (1992)	Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)	Treaty of Nice (2001)	European Constitution (2003)	Treaty of Lisbon (2007)
Vote	18/11/1986	12/11/1992	5/11/1998	22/11/2001	(vote cancelled)	5/6/2008
PvdA	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
VVD	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
D66	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
CDA	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
SGP	Against	Against	Against	In favour	Against	Against
CU *)	Against	Against	Against	In favour	Against	In favour
GL *)	Against	Against	Against	In favour	In favour	In favour
SP	-	-	Against	Against	Against	Against
LPF	-	-	-	-	Against	-
PVV	-	-	-	-	Against	Against
PvdD	-	-	-	-	Against	Against

*) Including its predecessors

On the other side of the political spectrum, the orthodox Protestant parties also softened their anti-European stance, but they certainly did not go as far as GreenLeft. The SGP and the Christian Union, which the two small orthodox Protestant parties mentioned above had merged with in 2000, accepted the Treaty of Nice; both parties agreed with the enlargement of the EU without a concomitant transfer of sovereignty. The SGP as well as the Christian Union remained clearly anti-federalist: They did not want to go further than a union of

6 Hans VOLLAARD, Gerrit VOERMAN, “De Europese opstelling van Nederlandse politieke partijen”, *op.cit.*

independent European states, and were reluctant regarding the ongoing integration⁷. Yet both parties softened their traditional rejection of supranational decision-making within the EU, especially concerning the internal market. All in all, their positions can be qualified as soft Eurosceptic.

Thus, in the years around 2000, there was still a certain consensus in Dutch politics regarding Europe, but it differed from the consensus of ten years before. The three core parties had become more critical towards European integration, although not all to the same extent. At the same time, Eurosceptic parties had come closer to what could be called a more “critical consensus”, since they had become less negative about “Brussels”. Because of this overall convergence, a hard Eurosceptic voice was lacking in Dutch politics, leaving voters who rejected Europe outright without a voice in parliament. Only one of the new parties emerging in the decades before and after 2000 would provide for this need by explicitly demanding the Netherlands to leave the European Union. Several other newcomers took a Eurosceptic position⁸.

In 1994, the anti-neoliberal, left-wing populist Socialist Party (*Socialistische Partij*, SP) made its appearance in the Dutch parliament. The SP started as a Maoist sect, but gradually transformed itself into a left-wing populist party. After 2000, it adopted a more social democratic course. Its opinion on European integration was crystal clear: It appreciated cooperation between independent states, but rejected any transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level. The party echoed the critique of the communist party: It considered multinational companies and large countries to call the shots in the EU. National democracy and the welfare state would be sacrificed to increased economic competitiveness. Although the SP gradually accepted the EU, it criticized the absence of a “social Europe”, rejected further integration, and remained fundamentally opposed to federalism – which could be labelled a soft Eurosceptic stance.

Since the early 2000s, new right-wing populist parties emerged that were also opposed to European integration⁹. At the parliamentary elections in 2002, the debuting List Pim Fortuyn (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, LPF) became the second-largest party. Its leader Fortuyn who was killed a few days before the elections had strongly criticized the political establishment for neglecting issues of immigration. His position concerning Europe was somewhat ambivalent: Fortuyn considered himself “a loyal supporter of the EU, while maintaining our own identity and – where possible – our sovereignty”¹⁰. On the one hand, Fortuyn appreciated the European Union as a project promoting peace and prosperity, but on the

7 Hans Vollaard, “Euroscepticism and Protestantism in the Netherlands”, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 7, no. 3, 2006, p. 276-297.

8 From 1989 till 1998 the national-populist and soft Eurosceptic Centre Democrats were represented in Parliament, with one and three seats respectively. This marginal party is excluded here, just as its predecessor the Centre Party, which had one seat in Parliament from 1982 till 1986.

9 Paul Lucardie, “Animalism: a nascent ideology: exploring the idea of animal rights parties in Europe”, Paper presented at the Workshop “Political Animals and Animal Politics” of the ECPR Joint Sessions Antwerp 10-15 April 2012; Hans Vollaard, Gerrit Voerman, “De Europese opstelling van Nederlandse politieke partijen”, *op.cit.*

10 Pim Fortuyn, *De puinhopen van acht jaar paars*, Karakter, Copenhagen, 2002, p. 181

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other hand, he was reluctant regarding the ongoing political integration¹¹. He preferred a confederation of sovereign states which would all maintain their own national identity. The European Parliament had to be replaced by a senate composed of representatives of national parliaments.

The LPF did not survive long after its leader's demise: In 2006, the party disappeared from parliament. The political and electoral space Fortuyn's party had left was subsequently occupied by the national-populist *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Freedom Party, PVV), which made its parliamentary debut in 2006. The PVV was founded by liberal MP Geert Wilders who had broken with the VVD because contrary to his party, he was fully opposed to a possible membership of Turkey in the EU. Wilders insisted on the 'repatriation' of sovereignty from Brussels if this was in the Dutch interest; parliament in The Hague had to regain its authority in all policy areas. The PVV aimed for European economic cooperation on a voluntary basis; in a way, the EU should return to the structure of the former European Economic Community (EEC). The views of the PVV regarding European integration radicalized: in 2012 the party adopted a hard Eurosceptical attitude by pleading for the Netherlands to leave the EU: Like Switzerland, the Netherlands would continue to trade with the EU on a bilateral basis. For the first time in decades, this demand was heard again in Dutch Parliament.

In 2006, the Party for the Animals (*Partij voor de Dieren*, PvdD) also entered Parliament. It advocated the interest of non-human creatures and has therefore been described as "animalist"¹². In its view, animals should not be made subjects of economic interests. It had already been a visible part of the campaign against the European Constitutional Treaty, attacking the established parties for supporting the animal unfriendly treaty¹³. The party rejected the Lisbon Treaty which it believed to subordinate animal rights to non-animal-friendly cultural and religious traditions.

The growing criticism of the EU and European integration had clearly manifested itself at the European elections of 2004. It was also expressed in the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty of June 1, 2005. CDA, VVD, D66, PvdA and GreenLeft, together occupying 85 percent of the seats in Parliament, defended the draft; the Christian Union, SGP, LPF, SP, Wilders (at that time an independent MP) and the extra-parliamentary PvdD opposed it. They feared that the constitution would result in a federal European "superstate" in which the Netherlands would lose its sovereignty and identity. Whereas only 39 percent of the Dutch electorate made their way to the polls in the 2004 European elections, no less than 63 percent of voters cast their vote. At 62 percent, the no-voters formed a vast majority. The Lisbon Treaty replaced the Constitutional Treaty and was ratified by the Second Chamber by 111 votes to 39 in June 2008. The soft Eurosceptic Christian Union, the SGP's partner in the European elections, was now

11 Cas MUDDÉ, "A Fortuynist Foreign Policy", in: Christina SCHORI LIANG (ed), *Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, p. 217; Cas MUDDÉ, Petr KOPECKÝ, "Eurosceptis: een conceptualisatie", in: Hans VOLLAARD, Bartho BOER (eds.), *Eurosceptis in Nederland*. Utrecht, Lemma, 2005 p. 15-22.

12 Paul LUCARDIE, "Animalism: a nascent ideology: exploring the idea of animal rights parties in Europe", *op.cit.*

13 Simon OTJES, "Animal Party Politics in Parliament", in: Marcel WISSENBURG, David SCHLOSSBERG (eds.), *Political Animals and Animal Politics*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2014, p. 107-122.

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part of the governing coalition for the first time and voted in favour. It was the only party to do so that had previously voted against the European constitution.

In the first decade of the 21st century the Eurosceptics in the Dutch parliament certainly were a motley crew. Its traditional components – orthodox Protestant parties and far left parties – were still present, although mostly in another organizational form. The SP had replaced the Communists and left-wing Socialists; and two small Eurosceptic orthodox Protestant parties had merged into the Christian Union. The SGP was the only party that had been present from the beginning in the early 1950s – but in the course of time, it had moved from its harsh Euroscepticism to a soft variant. In the 2000s, these parties were joined by the national-populist PVV and the animalist PvdD. At the European elections in 2009, these Eurosceptic parties together received 34 % of the vote.

2. Election campaign 2014

2014 was a record year in terms of the number of parties participating in the European elections in the Netherlands. In total, there were 19 lists, two more than in 2009 (which was also a record then). Eighteen parties participated with a list of candidates of their own; two parties (Christian Union and SGP) had a combined list. The number of competing lists reflected the diversity in the Dutch Lower House which at the time hosted eleven parties. Except for the pensioners' party 50Plus, all these parties managed to obtain seats in the European Parliament (see Table 3). The other parties did not succeed to pass the electoral threshold.

2.1 Top candidates

Parliamentary experience at the national or European level seems to have been a precondition to become the leader of the nine parties that were already represented in the European Parliament before the elections of 2014. The two liberal parties VVD and D66, the SP and the CU/SGP combination appointed the same top candidate as in 2009. The four others chose new leaders to head the list. Both CDA and GreenLeft appointed a serving MEP; Labour a former member of the lower house of parliament, and the PVV the leader of their group in the upper house. The top candidate of the PvdD – which had not been successful in the 2009 elections – was member of a provincial council.

Dutch political parties do not send their national figureheads to Europe, nor is it customary for Dutch political heavyweights to continue their national career in Brussels and Strasbourg – as for example the former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt did. Although nearly all Dutch leaders heading the party lists at the European election in 2014 had been active in national or European politics, the parties complied with this old tradition: None of them was very prominent. Therefore, the electorate is not really familiar with those leaders. VVD's top candidate Hans van Baalen was relatively most well-known by the voters (46%). He had served in Dutch Parliament from 1999 till 2009 (with a single interruption) and was the President of the Liberal International between 2009 and 2014. Second came D66 leader Sophie in't Veld (25%); she has been a MEP since 2004. Labour candidate Paul Tang, member of the Dutch parliament from 2007 till 2010, held

the third position (20%). All the others scored less than 20%. The three leaders mentioned here were also known by more than half of the voters of their parties; the others were quite unfamiliar to their party's own electorate¹⁴.

2.2 Programs

Generally speaking, the programmatic views of the Dutch political parties on the eve of the European elections were in line with their previous basic positions already described¹⁵. D66 and GreenLeft were clearly pro-European. The Democrats advocated "a political union in the form of a European federation"; GreenLeft attached much value to the EU "as a political union". Compared to these two champions of European integration, VVD, CDA and PvdA were more critical towards the EU. The conservative liberals wanted to limit European cooperation to its "core tasks"; the Christian democrats explicitly mentioned in their programmes that they "were and are against a federal Europe". The PvdA was less explicit, but did not use terms like federalism or political union. It realised that because of the financial crisis, member states had to share competences, "perhaps more than we actually found comfortable". These three parties placed greater emphasis on national interests either in financial or social terms. The five Eurosceptic parties self-evidently distanced themselves from the European integration process. The CU/SGP claimed that they "were always principally opposed to the process of integration that could or should lead to a federal Europe". The PvdD stated that "Europe is not a federal state and it is not desirable or necessary to strive for it". The SP repeated that it did not want a "European super-state nor a European government". The PVV simply wanted "the Netherlands to leave the EU".

Between the two champions of European integration, D66 and GreenLeft, and the PVV, the only hard Eurosceptic party, there is a group of seven parties that were all opposed to a federal Europe. This does not mean, however, that they held identical opinions which will be demonstrated below in respect of the solutions they offered to solve the euro-zone crisis. Since the European elections of 2009, the European Union has changed drastically. In response to the bank crisis, Brussels established, among other things, the European Stability Mechanism (a structural bail-out program to assist Member States in the Eurozone in financial difficulties), the European Fiscal Compact (permitting the European Commission to monitor Member States budgets) and the Banking Union (transferring supervision of banks from the national to the European level). As a result, the competences of the EU Commission concerning Member State's economic policies increased substantially¹⁶. No wonder the euro crisis and the measures to resolve it featured prominently in the parties' manifestos for the 2014 European

14 Jos KESTER, "Achterban kent EP-lijsttrekker vaak niet.", EP 2014, site.ipsos-nederland.nl/content.asp?targetid=1300 (24 April 2015).

15 The programs of the parties represented in Dutch Parliament participating in the European elections have been published as a collection; see Huub PELLIKAAN, Joop VAN HOLSTEYN, Gerit VOERMAN, Rianne HARTEVELD, *Verkiezingen van het Europees Parlement 22 mei 2014: Verkiezingsprogramma's*, Amsterdam, Rozenberg Publishers, 2014.

16 Michael W. BAUER, Stefan BECKER, "The unexpected winner of the crisis: The European Commission's strengthened role in economic governance" *Journal of European Integration*, 36,3, 2014, p. 213-229.

elections. Broadly speaking, four possible solutions of the crisis can be distinguished¹⁷. Based on two simple scales

- more or less Europe; i.e., do parties favour or oppose to the transfer of sovereignty to Brussels.
- more or less market; i.e., do parties prefer more or less government intervention in the market.

the parties running in the 2014 European elections can be classified according to their position on these two scales (see Table 2). VVD, CDA and D66 favour “more Europe and more market”. They endorse the actions of the European Commission: strict surveillance of the budgets of member states in order to prevent budget deficits. They also favour economic reforms, austerity measures and privatizations in eurozone countries with excessive deficits; and the completion of the internal market which they consider the engine of economic growth and employment. There are differences as well between these three parties. D66, for example, favours far-reaching European integration. The party supports a European tax – that is a European VAT to replace the national contributions to the EU. The VVD is explicitly against this; this item is absent in the Christian democratic program. D66 also advocates joint Eurobonds, by which member states will share their national debts. CDA and VVD are opposed to this.

The positions of the GreenLeft and the PvdA have marked similarities and differences compared to the positions of these three parties. Their position is “more Europe and less market”: both parties also stand for more supervision by the European Commission, but at the same time, they stress the need for a social Europe. The European Union should not just monitor budget deficits but also monitor whether eurozone states are combatting unemployment. So both parties do not reject the internal market, but want to impose social limits. This includes a transfer of powers to the European level, for instance in the form of a EU-wide minimum wage. These parties are critical of the current policies of the European Commission, for instance of plans to further liberalize additional economic sectors, which according to some definitions of Euroscepticism makes them soft Eurosceptic¹⁸. The fact that they do favour further European integration in order to achieve a “social Europe” shows the limitation of this definition. GreenLeft goes farthest in its vision of a social Europe. The party endorses a far reaching redistribution in Europe through a European financial stabilization fund that would transfer funds from countries with high economic growth to countries in a recession.

17 Simon OTJES, “Animal Party Politics in Parliament”, *op.cit.*

18 Aleks SCZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, “Theorizing Party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality”, *op.cit.*

Table 2: Positions of Parties towards Transfer of Sovereignty and Completion of the Internal Market in Their Manifestos, 2014¹⁹

		Market	
		Less	More
Europe	Less	SP PvdD	CU SGP PVV
	More	GL PvdA	D66 VVD CDA

The SP and the PvdD subscribe to the view of ‘less Europe, less market’. Both parties disapprove of the further transfer of sovereignty to the European Commission to resolve the eurozone crisis; the SP suspects that Brussel is abusing the financial crisis to quickly realize a European federation. The PvdD condemns the Commission’s exclusive focus on the financial aspect; member states should not only reduce their financial, but also their ecological deficit. Both parties also believe that the liberalization of the internal market has gone too far. Like Green-Left and the PvdA, they favour coordinated European policies to limit the market which would imply the transfer of sovereignty: The SP favours the introduction of European minimum standards for taxes and the PvdD a European minimum wage.

According to the PVV and the Christian Union/SGP it is not Brussels that will save the day. The Christian Union and SGP opt for less Europe, but want to maintain and complete the internal market. The PVV wants no Europe at all: the Netherlands should leave the European Union and give up the Euro. The party, however, hopes to maintain access to the internal market and its profits by signing bilateral trade agreements with Brussels. The party names Switzerland as an example of a prosperous country outside the EU²⁰.

On the basis of this classification we can qualify SGP and Christian Union, SP, PVV and PvdD as Eurosceptic. They differ, however, fundamentally in their opinion about the internal market: the SP and PvdD take similar positions as the far-left parties that historically opposed EU integration as a capitalist project; PVV, SGP and Christian Union oppose the transfer of sovereignty but not the free market that the EU entails.

2.3 Campaign

The campaign for the European elections was not spectacular at all²¹. An employee of a renowned Dutch campaign bureau thought the campaign was “invisible... The absence of the Dutch political parties, politicians and top candi-

19 Source: Simon OTJES, “Animal Party Politics in Parliament”, *op.cit.*

20 The position of the pensioners’ party 50Plus can also qualified as less Europe, more market, but since this party was not able to win a seat at the European elections, it will not be taken into account here.

21 Hans VOLLAARD, “Euro-pragmatisme domineert in Nederland”, *De Hofvijver*, no. 42, 19 mei 2014, www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/9353000/1/j9vvj72dlowskug/vjjsbfn4r2wi?pk_campaign=hofv-1405&pk_kwd=vjjsbfn4r2wi (24 April 2015).

dates in the streets, in the debates and through other channels was almost embarrassing²². A journalist spoke of “a sluggish situation”²³. As often in the past, the election campaign was not so much about Europe, but more about national politics; and compared to the European first candidates, national politicians played a relatively prominent role²⁴.

The fact that the main European parties had appointed “frontrunners”, candidates for the presidency of the European Commission in the run-up to the European elections, did little to change this national orientation²⁵. The debates between the European presidential candidates held at the beginning and the end of the campaign were not broadcasted on the Dutch television channels – not even the one held in Maastricht. The European top candidates did not visit the Netherlands often²⁶. The frontrunner of the European People’s Party, Jean-Claude Juncker, attended a meeting of the CDA, and ALDE’s top candidate Guy Verhofstadt was present at the start of the campaign of D66. VVD and PvdA did not receive the candidates. The campaign committee of the PvdA decided that the Party of European Socialists’ (PES) top candidate Martin Schulz should not participate in the party’s campaign²⁷. The attitude of the VVD was also ambivalent: early in 2014, party leader and prime minister Mark Rutte had mediated between ALDE’s two liberal candidates, Verhofstadt and the Finnish member of the European Commission, Olli Rehn. But Rutte had not been enthusiastic at all about this experiment – probably also because of Verhofstadt’s outspoken federalist views on Europe. Resistance within the VVD to ALDE’s candidate was strong. The party’s spokesman in the Dutch parliament considered “militant Europhiles” like the former Belgian prime minister “more dangerous for Europe” than Eurosceptics like Wilders or Marine Le Pen of the French Front National²⁸. D66, on the contrary, fully supported Verhofstadt – his views regarding Europe strongly resembled theirs. Therefore the surprise was great when during the campaign the national leader of D66 Alexander Pechtold announced that the pace of European integration had to be adapted in order not to lose the Euro-critical citizens.

While most established Dutch parties kept the European parties and their presidential candidates at a distance in their campaigns, it was paradoxically the most Eurosceptic party of Netherlands, the PVV, which openly demonstrated its

- 22 Bram FESTEN, “De verkiezing zonder champagne”, 24 December 2014, bkbcampaign-watch.nl/het-campagnejaar-2014/ (24 April 2015).
- 23 Teun VAN DE KEUKEN, “De Europese verkiezingen zijn een lamlendige toestand”, in: *Het Parool*, 22 mei 2014, www.parool.nl/parool/nl/14629/TEUN-VAN-DE-KEUKEN/article/detail/3659664/2014/05/22/De-Europese-verkiezingen-zijn-een-lamlendige-toestand.dhtml (24 April 2015).
- 24 Bertjan VERBEEK, “Netherlands”, in: Andrei KULIKOW (ed.), “2014 European Parliament elections: Views from across Europe”, *Bulletin on European and CIS Studies*, Special edition, Moscow, August 2014, p. 24-27.
- 25 Paul BORDEWIJK, “Europese verkiezingen of nationale peiling?” 28 May 2014, www.paulbordewijk.nl/artikelen/566 (26 April 2015).
- 26 Virginie MAMADOUH, Herman VAN DER WUSTEN, “De triomf van de Spitzenkandidat” *Geografie*, 23.7, 2014, p. 16-18.
- 27 Chris PEETERS, “Spitzenkandidaten – hoe verder”, www.wbs.nl/ opinie/blogs/cpeeters/spitzenkandidaten-%E2%80%93hoe-verder (26 April 2015).
- 28 Maaïke VAN HOUTEN, “VVD: Niet voor Europa, niet tegen, maar wel héél kritisch” *Trouw*, 23 November 2013.

links with congenial parties elsewhere in the EU²⁹. Since 2013, Wilders sought cooperation with the French Front National, the Italian Lega Nord, the Belgian Vlaams Belang, and the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), aiming to form a joint hard Eurosceptic group in the European Parliament after the European elections. He visited several parties, and in November 2013, he received National Front leader Marine Le Pen. Wilders called the cooperation “the beginning of the liberation from the political elite and the monster of Brussels”³⁰. The plan to start the election campaign together with a joint statement in mid-April 2014 was cancelled after racist statements of Andreas Mølzer, the top candidate of the FPÖ at the European elections. After this, the parties cooperated again in the election campaign. Within Wilders’ party, the rapprochement to these radical right-wing populist parties was controversial; one of their MEPs who was regarded as a possible first candidate decided not to stand for re-election for the PVV. During the campaign, Dutch party leaders attacked PVV leader Marcel de Graaff for doing business with a party whose founder Jean-Marie Le Pen had denied the holocaust. De Graaff pointed out that his daughter Marine Le Pen had distanced herself from the anti-Semitic views of her father.

3. Electoral results

Electoral turnout increased slightly from 36.8 percent in 2009 to 37.3 percent in 2014. Just like in 2009, the Netherlands had the lowest turnout of the six founding members of the European Economic Community. Moreover, it was below the average European turnout of 43 percent. The voter turnout also remained well below the 74.6 percent of the last national elections.

CDA and PvdA lost support in the 2014 elections (see Table 3). Together they obtained only 37 percent of the votes. The Christian Democrats had been the largest party since the European elections of 1989, but now became second. The share of the vote in 2014 (15 percent) was their lowest since the first direct European elections in 1979. In comparison to the latest national elections in September 2012, however, the CDA nearly doubled its share. Like the Christian democrats, Labour (with 9 percent) recorded its worst result by far since 1979; this was particularly notable because in the 2012 national elections, the PvdA had had a strong showing.

Facing competition from both the cosmopolitan D66 and the nationalist PVV, the VVD slightly increased its share vis-à-vis the 2009 European elections (when it had recorded its worst “European” result ever): the Liberals went from 11 percent up to 12 percent. The party performed considerably poorer than it had done in the 2012 national elections. As both government parties, PvdA and VVD, had performed poorly, the election result was seen as a punishment for the performance of the government³¹.

29 Paul BORDEWIJK, “Europese verkiezingen of nationale peiling?”, *op.cit.*

30 Jesse VISSER, “Wage bargaining institutions – from crisis to crisis”, *European Economy Economic Papers* 448, April 2013.

31 Bertjan VERBEEK, “Netherlands”, in: Andrei KULIKOW (ed.), “2014 European Parliament elections: Views from across Europe”, *op.cit.*

The winner of the European elections was the cosmopolitan, clearly pro-European D66, with 16 percent of the vote – an increase of more than a quarter compared to 2009. Since 1979, however, the largest party at the European elections has never won such a small percentage of the vote. It was the first time in its history that D66 became the largest party at national or European elections – in voters, but not in seats: the CDA obtained one seat more than D66 due its electoral alliance with the Christian Union/SGP. GreenLeft, about just as pro-European as D66, lost a little compared to 2009 but considerably less than it had in the 2012 elections.

Table 3: Outcome of the European Elections 2009 and 2014, and National Elections, 2012

Name			Position		Affiliation	European elections				National elections 2012	
Abb.	English	Dutch	Economy	EU integration		2009		2014		seats	%
						seats	%	seats	%		
CDA	Christian-Democratic Appeal	Christen-Democratisch Appel	Market	More	EPP	5	20.1	5	15.2	13	8.5
PVV	Freedom Party	Partij voor de Vrijheid	Market	Less	-	5	17.0	4	13.3	15	10.1
PvdA	Labour Party	Partij van de Arbeid	State	More	PES	3	12.1	3	9.4	38	24.8
D66	Democrats 66	Democraten 66	Market	More	ALDE	3	11.3	4	15.5	12	8.0
GL	GreenLeft	GroenLinks	State	More	Greens/EFA	3	8.9	2	7.0	4	2.3
VVD	Liberal Party	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie	Market	More	ALDE	3	11.4	3	12.0	41	26.6
SP	Socialist Party	Socialistische Partij	State	Less	GUE/NGL	2	7.1	2	9.6	15	9.7
CU-SGP	ChristianUnion-Political Reformed Party	ChristenUnie-Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij	Market	Less	ECR	2	6.8	2	7.7	8	5.2
PvdD	Party for the Animals	Partij voor de Dieren	State	Less	GUE/NGL	0	3.5	1	4.2	2	1.9
Total	-	-				26 ³²	-	26	-	150	-

The share of the Eurosceptic parties as a whole remained the same as in 2009. Remarkably, the Eurosceptic SP did not fully reap the benefits of Labour's poor

32 In 2004, Dutch parties held 27 seats in the European Parliament. Because the Lisbon Treaty had not yet been ratified by all member states in 2009, the European elections were still held in accordance with the Treaty of Nice. As a result, the number of Dutch seats in the European parliament fell by two to 25. When the Lisbon Treaty came in force, the number of seats for the Netherlands rose to 26 in December 2011. The extra seat was awarded to the PVV.

performance; the party went up from 7 percent to 10 percent. However, for the first time, the SP was larger than its main social democratic rival, albeit in percentage terms only: Labour and GreenLeft had also formed an electoral alliance, which resulted in an extra seat for the PvdA. The joint list of candidates of the Christian Union and the SGP gained one percent in comparison to the European elections of 2009. These previous European elections had marked the breakthrough of the nationalist populist PVV, which then became the second-largest party. In 2014, the party lost one fifth of its electorate – which was frequently contributed to his rapprochement with the Front National³³. Wilders had taken the last place on the list of candidates in order to attract votes. He was elected MEP but refused to take his seat. The PvdD was able to pass the electoral threshold thus making its debut in the European Parliament.

If we take the four positions into account by which we have classified the parties in the Dutch parliament participating in the European elections, we do not discern a clear pattern in the outcome of the elections. In the category “more Europe and more market”, CDA lost but the VVD and especially D66 won. In the category “more Europe, less market”, both Labour and GreenLeft lost. In the category “less Europe, more market” the Christian Union/SGP won, but the PVV lost. Only both parties in the category “less Europe, less market”, SP and PvdD, won. On an aggregate level, however, the pattern is clearer. The parties which (in varying degrees) are in favour of “more Europe” obtained 59 percent of the vote in 2014 and nearly 64 percent in 2009. The soft and hard Eurosceptical parties increased their share a little, to nearly 40 percent in 2014 (see Table 4).

Table 4: Eurosceptic Vote at European Elections, 2009 and 2014 (%)

		Market		
		Less	More	
Europe	Less	2009: 10.6 2014: 13.8 PvdD+SP	2009: 23.8 2014: 21.0 PVV+SGP/CU	2009: 34.4 2014: 34.8
	More	2009: 21.0 2014: 16.4 PvdA+GL	2009: 42.8 2014: 42.7 VVD+D66+CDA	2009: 63.8 2014: 59.1
		2009: 31.6 2014: 30.2	2009: 66.6 2014: 63.7	

4. Electoral Bases of Eurosceptic parties

4.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Electorate of the Eurosceptic Parties

In this section, we turn to the demographic characteristics of the electorate of the Eurosceptic parties. We focus on five characteristics: education (i.e. whether citi-

zens have completed their education before or after the age of 20)³⁴, age,³⁵ gender,³⁶ class³⁷ and whether voters are Protestant.³⁸ The last variable is important to understand the voters of the Christian Union/SGP which are both Protestant parties. For each party, we look at both the 2012 national (Table 6) and the 2014 European election voters (Table 5). We analysed the data of the 2014 European Election Study³⁹.

Table 5: Demographic Characteristics – Voters European Elections, 2014

Party	PVV	SP	CU/SGP	PvdD
Intercept	-2.08*** (0.51)	-2.48*** (0.40)	-2.33*** (0.47)	-2.49*** (0.62)
Education = After 20	-0.98*** (0.38)	0.42 (0.026)	-0.32 (0.32)	0.40 (0.46)
Age	-1.43 (0.99)	0.76 (0.72)	-1.99** (0.89)	1.18 (1.19)
Gender = Male	0.27 (0.34)	-0.16 (0.23)	-0.19 (0.31)	-0.86** (0.43)
Religion = Protestant	-0.88 (0.55)	-1.01*** (0.37)	2.31*** (0.45)	1.11 (0.75)
Class = Working Class	0.97*** (0.37)	1.22*** (0.28)	-0.33 (0.45)	-0.65 (0.75)
AIC	292	528	332	229
N	708	708	708	708
Percentage	6%	13%	8%	4%

For the PVV, only two demographic characteristics stand out in 2014: It is a party for working class and lower educated voters. Working class voters are about two and a half times more likely to vote PVV than middle or upper class voters. Voters with lower levels of education are one and a half times more likely to vote for the party compared to voters with a higher education. As for its much larger 2012 electorate, three variables stand out: the PVV-voters are again more often working class and less often higher educated. Religion also has an impact: the party is more likely to attract non-Protestant voters than Protestant voters.

34 Citizens who were still studying were assigned to before their twentieth if they were younger than twenty and after their twentieth if they were older than twenty.

35 For reasons of comparability with the other dichotomies the ratio interval data for age was normalized to fall between 0 and 1.

36 A simple male/female dichotomy.

37 We divide between working class and non-working class voters.

38 We identify Protestant and non-Protestant voters.

39 EES "European Election Study 2014, Voter Study", Advance Release, 1/1/2015, <http://eeshomepage.net/voter-study-2014/> (5 May 2015).

Table 6: Demographic Characteristics – Voters National Elections, 2012

Party	PVV	SP	CU or SGP	PvdD
Intercept	-1.84*** (0.44)	-1.60*** (0.33)	-1.86*** (0.58)	-3.51*** (0.86)
Education = After 20	-0.90*** (0.32)	-0.16 (0.22)	-0.30 (0.31)	0.32 (0.64)
Age	-1.32 (0.89)	-0.54 (0.63)	-2.80*** (0.89)	-0.29 (1.64)
Gender = Male	-0.04 (0.28)	-0.10 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.29)	-1.41** (0.65)
Religion = Protestant	-1.16** (0.53)	-0.88*** (0.33)	2.41*** (0.30)	-16.65 (1319)
Class = Working Class	0.72** (0.32)	0.68*** (0.24)	0.20 (0.38)	-0.06 (0.79)
AIC	407	702	382	153
N	933	933	933	933
Percentage	6%	13%	6%	2%

For the SP-voters in 2014, two characteristics stand out. In the first place, they are more often working class: people who identify as working class are more than three times more likely to vote SP than other voters. Moreover, these voters are significantly less often Protestant. In 2012, this pattern can also be observed: SP-voters are less often Protestant and more often working class.

For the Christian Union/SGP two characteristics stand out clearly: Protestantism and age. Protestant voters are 10 times more likely to vote Christian Union/SGP than voters in general. We see this pattern in 2012 and in 2014 as well. In both years, we also find a negative relationship with age: this means that the Christian Union/SGP attracted younger voters.

The PvdD is outstanding on one variable: gender. This party attracts female voters. Women are two to three times more likely to vote PvdD than men. In 2012, the PvdD also attracts more lower educated, younger, non-Protestant and middle or upper class voters but these patterns are not significant.

All in all, most electorates of the four parties involved can be identified on the basis of a limited number of key demographic characteristics: the PVV and SP attract working class voters; the PVV moreover also lower educated voters; the Christian Union/SGP attract Protestant voters, a sign of the parties' Protestant political principles; and the PvdD female voters, which may reflect this party's post-materialism, as post-materialist parties, like greens tend to attract women voters⁴⁰.

40 Martin DOLEZAL, "Exploring the Stabilization of a Political Force: The Social and Attitudinal Basis of Green Parties in the Age of Globalization" *West European Politics*, 33(3), 2010, p. 534-552.

4.2 Opinions of the Electorate of the Eurosceptic Parties

Finally, we add five opinion items to our models. These concern egalitarianism,⁴¹ environmentalism,⁴² ethics,⁴³ exclusion⁴⁴ and Euroscepticism.⁴⁵ Again, we look at both the 2012 national election (Table 8) and the 2014 European election (Table 7).

When we look at the opinion variables, two stand out for the PVV: their exclusionist position on immigration and their Eurosceptic position. This is the case for both 2012 and 2014. In both analyses, the anti-European scale has a stronger effect than the anti-immigration item. In 2012 the party also scores marginally better among voters that are opposed to gay marriage. In terms of the demographic control variables, the effect of a working class background remains significant in both analyses, while for the 2014 electorate, their non-Protestantism is also significant. However, the effect of the opinion variables is far stronger and more significant than the effect of the demographic characteristics

Table 7: Policy Positions – Voters European elections 2014

Party	PVV	SP	CU/SGP	PvdD
Intercept	-6.27*** (1.17)	-5.73*** (0.76)	-5.03*** (1.37)	-7.38*** (1.44)
Egalitarianism	-0.66 (0.78)	2.93*** (0.61)	0.58 (1.00)	1.40 (1.13)

41 Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “you are fully in favour of the redistribution of income (0)” to “you are fully opposed to the redistribution of income (10)”. For comparability's sake this variable was normalized to fall between zero and one. It was flipped so high values are more egalitarian.

42 Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “environmental protection should always take priority even at the cost of economic growth (0)” to “economic growth should always take priority even at the cost of environmental protection (10)”. For comparability's sake this variable was normalized to fall between zero and one. It was flipped so high values are more egalitarian.

43 Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “you are fully in favour of same-sex marriage (0)” to “you are fully opposed to same-sex marriage (10)”. For comparability's sake this variable was normalized to fall between zero and one.

44 Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “you are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration (0)” to “you are fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration (10)”. For comparability's sake this variable was normalized to fall between zero and one. It was flipped so high values are more exclusionist.

45 This was a complex variable consisting out of six items: EU budget: EU should have more authority of the EU members' budget (1) vs. the Netherlands should retain full control over its budget (11).

1 Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “European unification already gone too far (0)” to “European unification should be pushed further (10)”.

2 Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “the EU should have more authority over the EU Member States' economic and budgetary policies (0)” to “the Netherlands should retain full control over its economic and budgetary policies (10)”.

3 Four-point agreement scale: you trust the institutions of the EU.

4 Four-point agreement scale: the European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens.

5 Four-point agreement scale: you feel a citizen of the EU.

6 Question: Generally speaking do you think that the Netherlands' membership of the EU is a good thing (1), a bad thing (3) or neither (2)?
These items form a strong scale (H-value = 0.50).

Party	PVV	SP	CU/SGP	PvdD
Environmentalism	-0.34 (0.93)	0.07 (0.61)	1.04 (1.17)	4.15*** (1.23)
Exclusionism	2.89*** (0.92)	-0.31 (0.56)	-1.16 (1.06)	0.69 (1.01)
Ethics	-0.10 (0.67)	-0.79 (0.53)	5.57*** (0.68)	-0.25 (0.96)
EU	4.66*** (0.99)	3.53*** (0.70)	1.19 (1.28)	2.61** (1.26)
Education = After 20	-0.45 (0.43)	0.65** (0.30)	0.23 (0.50)	0.28 (0.53)
Age	-1.59 (1.25)	0.55 (0.83)	2.79*** (1.39)	-1.62 (1.42)
Gender = Male	-0.68 (0.44)	0.24 (0.26)	-0.90* (0.47)	-1.17** (0.55)
Religion = Protestant	-0.83 (0.67)	-1.00** (0.42)	1.82*** (0.47)	-0.62 (0.80)
Class = Working Class	0.79* (0.48)	0.50 (0.34)	-0.69 (0.65)	-2.14* (1.11)
AIC	209	435	172	173
N	644	644	644	644
Percentage	6%	13%	8%	4%

For the SP two factors stand out: Euroscepticism and egalitarianism. This is true for both the national and European voters of this party. These two effects rival each other in terms of strength. In 2012 and 2014, the voters are significantly non-Protestant. The effect of identifying as working class which was significant above is no longer significant in these analyses.

Table 8: Policy Positions – Voters National Elections 2012

Party	PVV	SP	CU or SGP	PvdD
Election	National	National	National	National
Intercept	-6.19*** (0.96)	-4.35*** (0.63)	-5.37*** (1.19)	-8.95*** (1.93)
Egalitarianism	0.74 (0.67)	2.91*** (0.52)	0.20 (0.86)	-0.01 (1.35)
Environmentalism	-0.02 (0.73)	0.20 (0.52)	1.87* (0.98)	5.16*** (1.65)
Exclusionism	2.71*** (0.77)	-0.34 (0.49)	-0.42 (0.85)	0.72 (1.22)
Ethics	0.91* (0.54)	-0.77 (0.48)	4.71*** (0.55)	0.55 (1.23)
EU	3.51*** (0.84)	2.49*** (0.60)	1.22 (1.11)	2.92* (1.65)

Party	PVV	SP	CU or SGP	PvdD
Election	National	National	National	National
Education = After 20	-0.25 (0.36)	-0.03 (0.25)	0.15 (0.44)	0.50 (0.71)
Age	-1.55 (1.05)	-0.77 (0.73)	3.41*** (1.22)	0.09 (1.91)
Gender = Male	-0.08 (0.34)	0.23 (0.23)	-0.76* (0.42)	-2.75** (1.08)
Religion = Protestant	-1.02* (0.57)	-0.73** (0.37)	2.06*** (0.42)	-16.41 (1268.64)
Class = Working Class	0.66* (0.38)	0.13 (0.28)	0.18 (0.52)	-0.32 (0.89)
AIC	302	580	225	117
N	828	828	828	828
Percentage	6%	13%	6%	2%

The Christian Union/SGP voters are not defined by their Euroscepticism. The key opinion variable for this group is their ethical conservatism. In 2012, the parties also attracted an electorate marginally more environmentalist. In demographic terms, these voters are also identified by their Protestantism and their youth.

The PvdD voters are identified by their environmentalism. This is true for both its 2012 and the 2014 electorates. The party also attracts a more Eurosceptic electorate but this effect is weaker: First, these voters are environmentalist, Eurosceptic second. In both elections, the effect of gender remains consistent with the findings in section 5.1. The 2014 electorate is also less often working class. This effect is not visible in the 2012 data. The PvdD appears to have attracted a more well-defined electorate in terms of environmental and European orientations.

Two things can be concluded from this analysis: First, the electorate of each party is defined by one key value: an exclusive national identity for the PVV, an egalitarian distribution of income for the SP, conservative ethics for the Christian Union, and environmental protection for the PvdD. Moreover, three of the four parties consistently attract a more Eurosceptic electorate. The PvdD electorate only shows Euroscepticism at the 2014 European Parliament elections.

Conclusion

This article sketched the history, the ideology, and the electoral support base of five Eurosceptic parties in the Netherlands. In historical and ideological terms, we found two currents: one current was left-wing Euroscepticism tracing its roots back to the opposition to the EU as a capitalist project as voiced by the Communist Party. This Euroscepticism is still visible in the discourse of the SP and the PvdD. These parties oppose the expansion of the internal market and the further integration of economic governance. A second stream was right-wing Euroscepticism which we already saw in the resistance to European integration

voiced by the orthodox Protestant SGP in the 1950s: on the right, parties want to maintain the historically grown Dutch identity and independence. The orthodox Protestant parties still voice this concern, but the radical right-wing populist PVV does so, too. These parties support free trade but not the transfer of sovereignty. The PVV stands out from the other Eurosceptic parties because of its hard Euroscepticism and its advocacy of the full withdrawal from the European Union.

Examining the electoral bases of these parties, however, we uncovered four distinct electorates. Three parties consistently appealed to Eurosceptic voters, namely, PVV, SP and PvdD. SP voters conform to their party's ideological niche of left-wing Euroscepticism, i.e. egalitarian and anti-European. The PVV electorate also matched their party's anti-European and anti-immigration positions. The voters of the PvdD were environmentalist first, Eurosceptic second. Despite the fact that these parties have the longest track record of Euroscepticism, the voters of the orthodox Protestant parties Christian Union and SGP are not defined by their Euroscepticism but rather by their conservative positions on ethical questions and their Protestantism.

All in all, we find four flavours of Euroscepticism in the highly pluralist Dutch party system. Euroscepticism comes from the left and right, from animal advocates and orthodox Protestants. The single largest Eurosceptic contingent is the hard Eurosceptic PVV which mixes nationalism and opposition to immigration with opposition to European integration but not to free trade.

The second flavour comes from the SP. Its roots lie in the history of left-wing opposition to unbridled free trade. It is soft Eurosceptic. For the party, anti-market positions are more defining than Euroscepticism. We can see this because the party favours more EU coordination for instance in tax policy.

The third flavour comes from the Christian Union and the SGP. These parties are historically critical of EU integration because they adhere to the notion of Calvinist and independent Netherlands; like the PVV, these parties clearly favour free trade. They have modified their Euroscepticism. To their voters, however, their ethically conservative and Protestant background is of higher importance.

The final flavour is the PvdD: This party shares the ideological outlook of the SP on the EU. It also focuses heavily on fiscal discipline and pays little attention to other values; the two parties differ in the values they prioritize – for the PvdD, it is environmental sustainability and for the SP, economic equality. For PvdD voters, Euroscepticism is clearly secondary to environmentalism: for these voters the 'Green' part of the Green Euro-critique is more defining than the "Euro-critique"-part.

QUATRE SAVEURS D'EUROSCEPTICISME AUX PAYS-BAS

Dans le système parlementaire pluraliste hollandais de 2014, il existe différents types d'Eurosceptiques : Des protestants orthodoxes, des populistes de droite, des socialistes de gauche et des défenseurs des animaux, qui rejettent l'approfondissement de l'intégration européenne. Cet article présente les racines historiques et le développement de l'Euroscepticisme aux Pays-Bas. Il analyse aussi les programmes et les résultats électoraux des partis eurosceptiques aux élections de

2014. Enfin, il présente les raisons des préférences électorales pour les partis hostiles à l'intégration européenne. Il apparaît, sur la base de ces analyses, que la plupart des partis eurosceptiques lient à ce thème des positions spécifiques (environnement, économie, éthique et immigration). L'euroscepticisme est le plus affirmé au sein du Parti de la Liberté et le plus faible dans les deux partis protestants orthodoxes.

VIER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS-GESCHMACKSSORTEN IN DEN NIEDERLANDEN

Im holländischen pluralistischen Parteiensystem des Jahres 2014 gibt es vier verschiedene Arten von Euroskeptizismus: Orthodoxe Protestanten und rechte Populisten, linke Sozialisten und Tierschützer lehnen die Vertiefung der Integration der Europäischen Union ab. Dieser Artikel skizziert die historischen Wurzeln und die Entwicklung des Euroskeptizismus in den Niederlanden. Er untersucht die Programme und die Wahlergebnisse der euroskeptischen Parteien bei den Wahlen von 2014. Und schließlich analysiert er die Grundlage der Wählerzustimmung für die Parteien, die sich der europäischen Integration widersetzen. Deutlich wird, dass die meisten Parteien Euroskeptizismus mit charakteristischen Positionen zu anderen Themenfeldern (Umweltschutz, Wirtschaft, Ethik und Immigration) verbinden. Am stärksten ausgeprägt ist der Euroskeptizismus bei der rechtsradikalen Partei der Freiheit und ihren Wählern, am geringsten bei den Wählern der beiden orthodoxen Protestantischen Parteien.

