

University of Groningen

Essays on the Morality of Risk Impositions

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DOI:
[10.33612/diss.563502810](https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.563502810)

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Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:
2023

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):
Maheshwari, K. (2023). *Essays on the Morality of Risk Impositions*. [Thesis fully internal (DIV), University of Groningen]. University of Groningen. <https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.563502810>

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PROPOSITIONS

Essays on the Morality of Risk Impositions

by Kritika Maheshwari

1. Imposing pure risks on others, namely, risks that fail to materialize, is sometimes wrong insofar as it involves or gives rise to domination or domination-like effects. (Chapter 1)
2. Imposition of risk is dominating, or has domination-like effects, when and because risk-imposers' imposing (pure) risks on risk-bearers is constitutive of the former exercising their *arbitrary* power over the range of safe options that the latter are in a position to choose from. (Chapter 1)
3. The Harm View can sometimes explain the wrong of imposing risk when (and because) risk itself is contingently, rather than constitutively harmful. However, it is unsuccessful as a general, exhaustive account of what makes imposition of pure risk wrong. (Chapter 2)
4. There exists an explanatory relation between the morality of imposing pure risks and that of non-risky cases. (Chapter 3)
5. A *general* moral fact that some non-risky act is *pro tanto* wrong can ground or make it the case that risking that act is also *pro tanto* wrong even if and when the risk fails to materialize, other things being equal. (Chapter 3)
6. Non-consequentialist theories like Scanlonian contractualism support the judgement that sometimes, permanent loss of possible people who could otherwise come into existence with good lives is a relevant wrong-making feature of failing to prevent the risk of our extinction from materializing under some, if not all circumstances. (Chapter 4)

7. By offsetting our risky emissions, we may satisfy some, if not all of our *specific* justice-based duty not to harm or risk harming specific individuals. (Chapter 5)
8. The Offsetting Objection fails as a *general* objection against offsetting, insofar as considerations of justice can *sometimes* give us a strong moral reason to offset our risky emissions, rather than do good differently. (Chapter 5)
9. There is more than one way of capturing the moral significance of imposing pure risks on others. This speaks in favour of a pluralistic approach towards developing an ethics of pure risk impositions.