

## University of Groningen

### Introduction

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*Published in:*  
Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy

*DOI:*  
[10.1007/978-3-031-08593-2\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08593-2_1)

**IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.**

*Document Version*  
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

*Publication date:*  
2023

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*

Peijnenburg, J., & Verhaegh, S. (2023). Introduction: Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy. In J. Peijnenburg, & S. Verhaegh (Eds.), *Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy: Selected Papers of the Tilburg-Groningen Conference, 2019* (pp. 1-21). (Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences; Vol. 15). Springer Nature. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08593-2\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08593-2_1)

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction: Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy



Sander Verhaegh and Jeanne Peijnenburg

For centuries, women have encountered too many hurdles to make it to the forefront of academia. They missed out on proper education or lacked the necessary cultural, social and economic resources to continue their studies. Even if they were granted equal access to higher education and did make it to the vanguard, their work was often consciously or unconsciously marginalized. The conclusion is as disturbing as it is inescapable: mistaken and often reprehensible ideas on sex and gender have affected centres of learning throughout our history and created numerous barriers for female scholars.<sup>1</sup>

Analytic philosophy is no exception. As we shall see in detail later on, only a very small proportion of the articles published in journals that shaped the analytic tradition in its first decades (e.g. *Mind*, *Erkenntnis*, and *Analysis*) were written by women. The philosophers who are widely considered to have started the analytic

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<sup>1</sup> Women had unequal access to higher education until well into the twentieth century. See Malkiel (2017). Only in 1948 did the University of Cambridge terminate the tradition to withhold degrees to women—the last British university to do so. Quota limiting the number of female students at Oxford University were abolished as late as 1957. At Harvard University female students could not be awarded degrees until 1963. Women could study at its all-female sister institution Radcliffe College but were denied library privileges and access to college dining rooms. It was only in 1999 that women could receive a Harvard degree identical to that of their male colleagues (i.e. without a signature of the president of Radcliffe). On the social and institutional marginalization of female scholars in science, see, e.g., Kass-Simon and Farnes (1990); and Watts (2007). Waithe's four-volume *A History of Women Philosophers* (1987, 1989, 1991, 1995) offers insight into the role gender has played in the history of philosophy.

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movement—among others G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein—made little reference to work of their female colleagues. Even today women are strongly underrepresented in analytic departments and journals. In 2008 female philosophers made up less than twenty percent of faculty of the top twenty predominantly analytic graduate programs in the United States (Haslanger, 2008). Less than twenty percent of the publications in the most prestigious analytic journals between 1993 and 2015 were authored by women (Healy, 2015; Wilhelm et al., 2018).

Given this situation it is hardly surprising that textbooks, anthologies, and handbooks of analytic philosophy often discuss only male scholars. Thus Scott Soames's two-volume *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth-Century* (2003a, b) contains chapters on Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, A. J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap, Carl Hempel, C. L. Stevenson, W. D. Ross, W. V. Quine, Gilbert Ryle, P. F. Strawson, R. M. Hare, Norman Malcolm, J. L. Austin, Paul Grice, Donald Davidson, and Saul Kripke, but not a single chapter on a female philosopher. The same applies to Schwarz's *A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy* (2012) and Hallett's *Linguistic Philosophy: The Central Story* (2008). Likewise, many anthologies of 'classic papers' in the analytic tradition do not include any papers written by women (e.g. Feigl & Sellars, 1949; Weitz, 1966; Ammerman, 1990; Baillie, 2002).

At first sight the absence of female scholars in text- and handbooks might seem innocent and even justified. If women played a minor role in the development of analytic philosophy, then why include them in overviews? It seems only natural that their absence or the insignificance of their contributions is reflected in our textbooks. But this is to ignore, of course, that textbooks themselves play a role in molding the philosophical canon. By the choices they make, by the books they rely on, historians and educators influence our ideas about who are and who are not important analytic philosophers. In addition to the *historical marginalization* that led to the neglect of female contributions in the past few centuries, we should also be aware of the effects of what might be called *historiographical marginalization*.

It is a fact that only a small percentage of the publications in analytic journals were written by women. It is also a fact that these contributions did not receive many references and were largely ignored by the philosophers we view as the central figures of the analytic tradition. There are several explanations for these facts: social, cultural, economical, psychological, or philosophical. But explanations are not justifications, and nowadays hardly anybody will argue that these facts are indeed justified (cf. O'Neill, 1998, 39). Precisely for that reason present-day historians may choose to focus on the dozens of women who *did* manage to publish articles in the main journals, and to avoid routinely and uncritically reinforcing the impression that analytic philosophy is the work of exclusively 'great men'.

What happened happened. The processes that led to the exclusion of women cannot be reversed—we cannot go back in time and provide female scholars with better resources to develop their ideas. But it *is* possible to reveal particular historiographical choices and to correct omissions, oversights or even downright mistakes. In studying the lives and work of women analytic philosophers, we can tell untold stories, explore forgotten arguments, and shed new light on the developments that have shaped the discipline as we know it today. Once we have understood that the

current canon of analytic philosophy is the result of developments that have not always been fair to a significant portion of the academic community, we can help to uncover processes that have led to the standard view, explore alternative lineages, and develop broader, more inclusive, accounts.

The present volume aims to promote these goals by collecting papers on ten female thinkers who directly or indirectly contributed to the development of analytic philosophy but who did not always receive the attention they deserve, either because their work was unduly neglected by contemporaries or because historians paid insufficient attention to their contributions. Even though a corpus of ten is small, we believe it illustrates that women made significant contributions in all phases of analytic philosophy—from its very start in late nineteenth-century England (see, e.g., James Pearson’s chapter on Victoria, Lady Welby and Gary Ostertag’s chapter on E. E. C. Jones) until the first decades after the Second World War, when analytic philosophy began to dominate American philosophy departments (e.g. Sander Verhaegh’s chapter on Susanne K. Langer and Gregory Lavers’s chapter on Ruth Barcan Marcus).

In Sect. 1.1 of this introduction we briefly recall the standard account of analytic philosophy as we know it from the textbooks. Section 1.2 indicates that the tides are turning: in the past few years interesting and illuminating research has been done on the role of women in analytic philosophy. However, it also becomes clear that, despite good intentions, the study of female analytic philosophers is still in its infancy and more needs to be done. In Sect. 1.3 we offer a quantitative analysis of 3,274 publications in the major analytic journals between 1896 and 1960. We conclude our introduction in Sect. 1.4 with an overview of the ten chapters in this volume.

## 1.1 Analytic Philosophy: The Narrative

It is notoriously difficult to define what unites the variety of views and methods that are subsumed under the label ‘analytic philosophy’. Although the movement is well known for its attachment to clarity and precision, the *term* ‘analytic philosophy’ continues to escape definition. The movement has sometimes been characterized by way of its opposition to metaphysical speculation, its commitment to analysis, or its rejection of idealism, theism, and ‘continental’ philosophy, but none of these characterizations appear to be adequate (Glock, 2008; Peijnenburg, 2003). After all, metaphysics is currently one of analytic philosophy’s most flourishing subdisciplines (Simons, 2013); a significant number of professional philosophers have abandoned the analytic-synthetic distinction (Bourget and Chalmers, 2014); and recent years have witnessed the rise of prominent schools of analytic Hegelians (Brandom, 2019), analytic Thomists (Haldane, 2004), and analytic existentialists (Benatar, 2016).

Part of the problem is that the term was born with a Janus face. When philosophers in the 1930 and 1940s first started to employ the label in a way that resembles its contemporary use, they were introducing it as an umbrella concept that was

to cover not only the technical work of Russell, the Vienna Circle, and the Lvov-Warsaw School, but also the therapeutic and common-sense approaches favoured in the United Kingdom.<sup>2</sup> The labels that had been popular in the interbellum—‘mathematical philosophy’ (Russell, 1919), ‘scientific philosophy’ (Reichenbach, 1930), and ‘logical positivism’ (Blumberg & Feigl, 1931)—were deemed to be too narrow in that they excluded the work of especially G. E. Moore and his followers. Moore, after all, was one of the philosophers who had set things in motion through his opposition to British idealism in the late 1890s.

Moore and Russell are widely viewed as the founding fathers of the analytic movement. Both adhered to ‘analysis’ in their arguments against the idealists, but they meant something different by it and also had very different philosophical styles. Moore presupposed what Michael Beaney called a decompositional conception of analysis aimed at dissecting propositions into “constituent concepts” (Moore, 1899, 182), whereas Russell adopted an alternative, ‘transformative’ conception of analysis directed towards eliminating philosophical problems by rephrasing them into their ‘correct’ logical form, as he did in his landmark paper “On Denoting” of (1905) (Beaney, 2007).<sup>3</sup>

The revolt by Moore and Russell did not arise out of thin air. It is generally recognized that a wide range of nineteenth-century philosophers (e.g. Bernard Bolzano, Franz Brentano, G. F. Stout) paved the way.<sup>4</sup> These forerunners are often classified as *pre-analytically*. An exception is Gottlob Frege, who generally *is* included in the canon of analytic philosophy, for he invented modern quantificational logic and was employing a transformative conception of analysis when Russell still considered himself a Hegelian.<sup>5</sup> Two of the most significant contributions to the early development of analytic philosophy, Whitehead and Russell’s *Principia Mathematica* (1910-1913) and Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921), would have been impossible without Frege’s work.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to the advances in mathematical logic, revolutionary developments in science, too, played a prominent role in the first decades of the analytic turn. Especially in Central Europe, philosophers took a keen interest in the early twentieth-century breakthroughs in physics and psychology. Several central figures of the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Group—Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, and Hans Reichenbach—acquired their initial fame through analyses of relativity theory (Carnap, 1921; Reichenbach, 1920; Schlick, 1917) and quantum physics

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Ernest Nagel’s “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe” (1936a, b), Arthur Pap’s *Elements of Analytic Philosophy* (1949), and Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars’ *Readings in Philosophical Analysis* (1949).

<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that Russell, in the early 1900s, also briefly advocated a decompositional notion of analysis. See Hylton (1990) and Baldwin (1990), and more recently MacBride (2018) and Shieh (2019) for detailed reconstructions of Russell’s and Moore’s early development.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Coffa (1991), Künne et al. (1997), Textor (2006), van der Schaar (2013), and Lapointe (2019).

<sup>5</sup> Indeed, most textbooks and anthologies of the analytic tradition include chapters on Frege. See, for example, Stroll (2000), Martinich & Sosa (2001), and Potter (2020).

<sup>6</sup> See Anscombe (1959), Baker (1988), Diamond (1991), Reck (2002), and Travis (2006).

(Feigl, 1929). Inspired by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and early twentieth-century philosophers of science such as Ernst Mach and Henri Poincaré, the Viennese philosophers in particular gradually converged toward a unified approach for the analysis of science, first set out in their seminal manifesto *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis* (Hahn et al., 1929).<sup>7</sup>

In the early 1930s, the Vienna Circle quickly fell apart into distinct factions. Yet the Viennese approach, which would become known as 'logical positivism' or 'logical empiricism', was to have a tremendous impact on the Anglophone development of analytic philosophy. Young American philosophers like W. V. Quine, Ernest Nagel, and Charles Morris were much influenced by the views that had arisen in Central Europe. In the years before the Second World War, when the political climate on the continent had become too hostile, they helped several European logicians and philosophers of science (such as Carnap, Reichenbach, and Alfred Tarski) to find positions at universities in the U.S., thereby contributing to the gradual transformation of the American philosophical landscape.<sup>8</sup>

In the United Kingdom, meanwhile, the 'Cambridge school of analysis' had become a major philosophical force, even more so after Wittgenstein's return to England in 1929. Established dons like Moore and C. D. Broad as well as a new generation of talented philosophers such as John Wisdom and Max Black viewed analysis as *the* instrument of philosophy, even though most of them propagated a new type of analytic philosophy. Instead of Russell's transformational approach, which they viewed as metaphysically shallow because it aims to replace ordinary expressions with alternative sentences quantifying over the same entities, they advocated an alternative, 'directional' approach, which aims to unearth the facts which account for the truth or falsity of these expressions.<sup>9</sup>

After the war analytic philosophy rapidly started to dominate philosophy departments all over the Anglophone World. In the United Kingdom, Oxford philosophers like Austin, Ryle, and Strawson became influential, whereas a young generation of American philosophers (Quine, Davidson, Kripke and others) developed analytic philosophy in the U.S. further in new directions. The two groups however deeply disagreed about the viability and usefulness of so-called 'ordinary language' versus 'ideal language' philosophy, and in doing so they widened the methodological split that had characterized the field since its inception.<sup>10</sup> Still, most of them agreed that they were all part of one 'analytic' tradition, for they all employed a philosophical

<sup>7</sup> See Giere & Richardson (1996), Friedman (1999), and Stadler (2015) for reconstructions of the early development of the Vienna Circle. Ryckman (2005) reconstructs the philosophical reception of relativity theory.

<sup>8</sup> Uebel (2007) offers a detailed reconstruction of the emerging split within the Vienna Circle in the early 1930s. Hardcastle & Richardson (2003), Reisch (2005), and Verhaegh (2020a, b, c) reconstruct the American reception of logical empiricism.

<sup>9</sup> Important exceptions were Frank Ramsey and A. J. Ayer, who advocated variants of the transformational approach. See, e.g., Misak (2020) and Tuboly (2021). On the Cambridge School of Analysis, see Beaney (2003) and Baldwin (2013).

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Strawson (1950; 1952) and Quine (1953). Rorty (1967) offers an overview of the metaphilosophical squabbles between these 'ideal' and 'ordinary language philosophers'.

style that was fundamentally opposed to the existentialist, phenomenological, and structuralist approaches that were swiftly becoming more popular on the continent. It is perhaps no coincidence that the origin of the term ‘continental philosophy’ dates back to the early 1950s, when analytic philosophers started to foster a shared identity by creating a contrast class.<sup>11</sup>

## 1.2 Women and the History of Analytic Philosophy

The above standard account suggests that in the early days of analytic philosophy women were practically absent. In none of its four phases—Moore’s and Russell’s revolt against idealism, the onset of logical empiricism, the rise of the Cambridge school of analysis, and the turn towards analysis in the United States—did they seem to have played a prominent role. It looks as though they entered the scene not before the 1960s, when the second wave of feminism created more opportunities for female scholars. Again the impression is consolidated by the handbooks. The most voluminous anthology of analytic philosophy, Martinich & Sosa’s (2001) collection of 49 classic analytic papers, contains only two papers written by women—G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) and Philippa Foot’s “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” (1972)—both published more than half a century after Moore and Russell started to launch their views.

Recent work on the history of the analytic tradition, however, reveals that the story is more nuanced.<sup>12</sup> By casting the nets wider and lowering the anchors deeper, historians succeeded in showing that at the beginning of analytic philosophy women played a more significant role than usually thought. It is now clear, for example, that Victoria Welby was a driving force behind the study of meaning in late nineteenth-century England; that Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones was a prominent voice in Russell’s and Moore’s Cambridge; that Susan Stebbing was a key figure in the development of the Cambridge School of Analysis; that almost a dozen female logicians contributed to the development of the Lvov-Warsaw school; that Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum’s work was instrumental for the development of inductive logic; that Alice Ambrose, Margaret MacDonald, and G. E. M. Anscombe helped in systematizing, developing and promoting Wittgenstein’s later philosophy; and that Ruth Barcan Marcus was the first to present a system of quantified modal logic.<sup>13</sup>

The importance of female philosophers becomes even more manifest when we abandon the somewhat myopic view that analytic philosophers exclusively study logic, language, and science. The traditional narrative of analytic philosophy tends

<sup>11</sup> See e.g. Frost-Arnold (2017) and Strassfeld (2020).

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, the fourth volume of Waithe’s above-mentioned *A History of Women Philosophers* series, and van der Schaar and Schliesser’s special issue of the *Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy* (2017).

<sup>13</sup> See Pakszys (1998), Beaney (2003), Galavotti (2008), Petrilli (2009), Williamson (2013), Janssen-Lauret (2017), Diamond (2019), Ostertag (2020), and Loner (2020).

to focus on logic, epistemology, and the philosophy of language—disciplines that still are frequently referred to as “core analytic” areas (Preston, 2007). Yet analytic methods have also proven fruitful in other fields such as ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of action, areas in which women have been active as well: Susanne Langer was one of the first to employ logical analysis in studying art (Langer, 1942), Anscombe’s *Intention* (1957) has been described as “the most important treatment of action since Aristotle” (Davidson as quoted in Ford et al., 2011), and the so-called ‘wartime quartet’ (Iris Murdoch, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and Mary Midgley) has played a pivotal role in the development of an analytic *moral* philosophy (Hacker-Wright, 2013; MacCumhaill & Wiseman, 2018).

Despite these welcome additions to, and corrections of, the historiography of the analytic tradition, the study of female analytic philosophers is still in its infancy. True, the attention to their contributions increased, but the preponderance of work on the development of analytic philosophy is still devoted to a few canonized philosophers. Some years ago, the *Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy* expressed the wish to “promote work engaging with lesser-known figures and trends”. Notwithstanding these good intentions, however, more than half of the papers presented at the last five meetings of the Society (2015–2019) were about just four philosophers (Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Carnap).<sup>14</sup> Female philosophers, on the other hand, were the subject of only 4 out of the 246 papers presented—less than 2%.

We still lack a systematic overview of the role women played in analytic philosophy’s early development. For example, we even do not know the percentage of women that published in the journals which shaped the analytic tradition in its early days. In the next section we offer a quantitative analysis of publications in six important journals between 1896 and 1960 and estimate the percentage of articles written by women. Though we realize that journal publications alone are not sufficient for a comprehensive overview—for that, we would also need citation data, non-journal publications (books, volume chapters), Ph.D. dissertations, placement data, lists of members of prominent analytic societies, conference participation, grants, awards, and honorary titles etc.—we hope that this analysis constitutes a useful step toward a more systematic study of women’s contributions to the development of the analytic tradition.

### 1.3 Analytic Philosophy: The Numbers

*Data and methodology.* We collected the metadata of articles published in six philosophy journals between 1896 and 1960: *Mind*, *The Monist*, *Erkenntnis*, *Analysis*, *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, and *Philosophical Studies*. These journals were the main outlets for analytic philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century. *Mind* was without doubt the central venue for analytic philosophers in the late nineteenth and

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<sup>14</sup> <http://sshap.org/> (accessed January 2021).



early twentieth century. Edited by Stout (1891–1920), Moore (1921–1947), and Ryle (1947–1972), the journal gradually changed from a generalist periodical for philosophers and psychologists into a journal devoted to exclusively analytic philosophy (Katzav & Vaesen, 2017). *The Monist* was a key venue for philosophers of science until it was discontinued in 1936 (only to appear again in 1962). It used the subtitle “Devoted to the Philosophy of Science” and featured papers by prominent logicians (e.g. Frege and Russell) and philosophers of science (e.g. Mach and Poincaré). *Erkenntnis*, edited by Reichenbach and Carnap, was the central journal of the logical empiricist movement in the 1930s (until its interruption of thirty-five years starting in 1940), whereas *Analysis* (founded by Stebbing, Ryle, Macdonald, and C. A. Mace) became the main outlet for British analytic philosophers from the 1930s onwards. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* (first edition 1936) was the first international journal for logicians and *Philosophical Studies* (subtitle: “An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition”) was the first American journal for analytic philosophers.

Publication data from the six journals were retrieved from the JSTOR repository.<sup>15</sup> In order to facilitate comparisons between journals and across periods, we collected only full articles. Discussion notes, critical notices, letters, obituaries, and book reviews were not taken into account. For each journal, we collected all articles published between 1896 and 1960, which gave us a database of 3,288 unique articles.<sup>16</sup> It should be noted that not all these articles count as proper ‘analytic’ publications. Especially in the period between 1896 and 1930, *Mind* and *The Monist* were generalist journals that also published papers by, for example, theologians, experimental psychologists, and idealist philosophers.

Next, we manually coded the author of each article by gender, relying on author names and, in the case of unisex names or names with initials, online information recourses such as encyclopedias, reviews, obituaries, or year books.<sup>17</sup> In this manner we were able to identify the gender of the authors of 99.6% of the articles in our data set. The 14 articles written by authors that could not be identified were removed from our database, leaving 3,274 articles for our analysis. Because publications in the six journals are not equally distributed over time (growing from 162 articles published in 1896–1900 to 445 publications in 1956–60), the data were analyzed per five-year period. This ensures that the results are not skewed to the later decades, in which there are more publications.

*Results.* Table 1.1 presents an overview of the proportion of articles by male and female philosophers in the six journals in every consecutive five-year period between

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<sup>15</sup> <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed January 2021).

<sup>16</sup> Since most journals started after 1896 or were (temporarily) discontinued before 1960, our data set contains issues from the following years: *Mind* (1896–1960), *The Monist* (1897–1936), *Erkenntnis* (1930–1940), *Analysis* (1933–1940; 1947–1960), *Journal of Symbolic Logic* (1936–1960), and *Philosophical Studies* (1950–1960). We chose 1897 as the starting date for our collection of articles published in *The Monist* because this was the first year that the journal started to use the subtitle “Devoted to the Philosophy of Science”. In collecting articles published in *Erkenntnis*, we also

**Table 1.1** Proportion of female and male authors in six analytic philosophy journals between 1896 and 1960

	Mind		The Monist		Erkenntnis		Analysis		JSL		PhilStudies		Total	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
1896–1900	9	88	1	68	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	156
		<b>9.3</b>		<b>1.4</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>6.0</b>
1901–1905	3	85	1	109	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	194
		<b>3.4</b>		<b>0.9</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>2.0</b>
1906–1910	8	74	2	115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	189
		<b>9.8</b>		<b>1.7</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>5.0</b>
1911–1915	3	79	1	99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	178
		<b>3.7</b>		<b>1.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>2.2</b>
1916–1920	4	79	3	115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	194
		<b>4.8</b>		<b>2.5</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>3.5</b>
1921–1925	2	78	3	127	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	205
		<b>2.5</b>		<b>2.3</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>2.4</b>
1926–1930	1	73	9	159	0	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	253
		<b>1.4</b>		<b>5.4</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>3.8</b>
1931–1935	7	70	2	114	1	78	3	40	0	0	0	0	13	302
		<b>9.1</b>		<b>1.7</b>		<b>1.3</b>		<b>7.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>4.1</b>
1936–1940	3	73	0	14	7	82	8	54	1	56	1.8	0	19	279
		<b>3.9</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>7.9</b>		<b>12.9</b>		<b>1.8</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>6.4</b>
1941–1945	2	58	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	42	2.3	0	3	100
		<b>3.3</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>2.3</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>2.9</b>
1946–1950	2	79	0	0	0	2	66	2.9	6	66	8.3	0	10	228
		<b>2.5</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>2.9</b>		<b>8.3</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>4.2</b>
1951–1955	4	111	0	0	0	3	121	2.4	1	102	1.0	3	11	419
		<b>3.5</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>2.4</b>		<b>1.0</b>		<b>3.4</b>		<b>2.6</b>
1956–1960	12	102	0	0	0	9	137	6.2	1	120	0.8	3	25	446
		<b>10.5</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>6.2</b>		<b>0.8</b>		<b>3.3</b>		<b>5.3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>1049</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>920</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>418</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>3143</b>
		<b>5.4</b>		<b>2.3</b>		<b>4.2</b>		<b>5.6</b>		<b>2.5</b>		<b>3.1</b>		<b>4.0</b>

1896 and 1960. It confirms that only a very small proportion of the articles published in ‘analytic’ journals were written by women. In each of the thirteen investigated periods, women were responsible for only 2.0 to 6.4% of the publications (overall average 4%). And although there is some variation between the six examined journals, none of the venues published more than 5.6% of articles by female scholars. Perhaps not surprisingly the journal with the largest proportion of female authors (*Analysis*) is also the journal where women were part of the editorial board, in this case Susan Stebbing and Margaret Macdonald.

Table 1.1 shows that not much really changed between 1896 and 1960: there is no significant trend toward a better representation of women in the six journals that we examined. It looks as though the gender balance improves somewhat in the last five-year period we investigated, but this might well be an outlier. Indeed, except for *Mind*, not one of the journals has the largest proportion of women in the period between 1956 and 1960. We know that the representation of women in the main analytic journals has improved somewhat in the last few decades (see the aforementioned study by Healy, 2015), but more research is needed to determine when exactly the proportion of contributions by women started to climb. Be that as it may, our data also reveal that at least 70 women *did* manage to publish articles in analytic philosophy journals between 1896 and 1960, hurdles notwithstanding. Table 1.2, printed in full below, lists all 131 publications by the 70 female authors we identified.<sup>18</sup>

## 1.4 Overview of the Chapters

The ten chapters in this volume, authored by both senior and junior academics, illustrate the diverse ways in which women contributed to the emergence of analytic philosophy. They show that female scholars have been active in all phases of its development—from its very start in Cambridge until the first decades after the Second World War, when analytic philosophy began to dominate American philosophy departments.

The first two chapters deal with two female philosophers of language who played a central role in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century British philosophy: Victoria, Lady Welby (1837–1912), whose work on meaning helped to set the agenda for twentieth-century philosophy of meaning; and E. E. C. (Constance) Jones (1848–1922), today best known for supposedly anticipating Frege’s seminal

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included papers published in the 1939–40 academic year, when the journal appeared under the name *The Journal of Unified Science*.

<sup>17</sup> 96.44% of the articles in the dataset is single authored. We coded the gender of the first author when articles had more than one author.

<sup>18</sup> Note that not every article on this list will count as ‘analytic’ since, as we have indicated, two of the examined journals, namely *Mind* and *The Monist*, were generalist journals up until 1930. Because some of the enlisted authors published under different names throughout their careers, we standardized the names as much as possible.

**Table 1.2** Publications by women in six key analytic philosophy journals, 1896–1960

Name	Title	Journal	Year
Alban, M. J.	Independence of the Primitive Symbols of Lewis's Calculi of Propositions	<i>JSL</i>	1943
Ambrose, Alice	Finitism in Mathematics (I)	<i>Mind</i>	1935
Ambrose, Alice	Finitism in Mathematics (II)	<i>Mind</i>	1935
Ambrose, Alice	Self-Contradictory Suppositions	<i>Mind</i>	1944
Ambrose, Alice	Proof and the Theorem Proved	<i>Mind</i>	1959
Anscombe, G. E. M.	Aristotle and the Sea Battle	<i>Mind</i>	1956
Anscombe, G. E. M.	Names of Words: A Reply to Dr. Whiteley	<i>Analysis</i>	1957
Anscombe, G. E. M.	On Brute Facts	<i>Analysis</i>	1958
Anscombe, G. E. M.	Report on Analysis 'Problem' no. 10	<i>Analysis</i>	1957
Barcan Marcus, R.	The Elimination of Contextually Defined Predicates in a Modal System	<i>JSL</i>	1950
Barcan Marcus, R.	Strict Implication, Deducibility and the Deduction Theorem	<i>JSL</i>	1953
Barcan Marcus, R.	Extensionality	<i>Mind</i>	1960
Barcan Marcus, R.	A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication	<i>JSL</i>	1946
Barcan Marcus, R.	The Deduction Theorem in a Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication	<i>JSL</i>	1946
Barcan Marcus, R.	The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of Second Order	<i>JSL</i>	1947
Bliss Talbot, Ellen	The Relation of the Two Periods of Fichte's Philosophy	<i>Mind</i>	1901
Bliss Talbot, Ellen	Fichte's Conception of God	<i>Monist</i>	1913
Bodkin, Amy Maud	The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process Considered in Relation to Thought (I)	<i>Mind</i>	1907
Bodkin, Amy Maud	The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process Considered in Relation to Thought (II)	<i>Mind</i>	1907
Bodkin, Amy Maud	Literary Criticism and the Study of the Unconscious	<i>Monist</i>	1927
Brodbeck, May	Toward a Naturalistic 'Non-Naturalistic' Ethic	<i>PhilStudies</i>	1951
Brodbeck, May	A Note on Descriptions	<i>PhilStudies</i>	1957
Brotman, Honor	Could Space be Four-Dimensional?	<i>Mind</i>	1952
Bryant, Sophie	Variety of Extent, Degree and Unity in Self-Consciousness	<i>Mind</i>	1897
Bryant, Sophie	The Double Effect of Mental Stimuli; A Contrast of Types	<i>Mind</i>	1900
Calkins, Mary W.	Time as Related to Causality and to Space	<i>Mind</i>	1899

(continued)

**Table 1.2** (continued)

Name	Title	Journal	Year
Calkins, Mary W.	The Order of the Hegelian Categories in the Hegelian Argument	<i>Mind</i>	1903
Calkins, Mary W.	The Dual Rôle of the Mind in the Philosophy of S. Alexander	<i>Mind</i>	1923
Choisy, Maryse	Aesthetics	<i>Monist</i>	1926
Cuming, Agnes	Lotze, Bradley, and Bosanquet	<i>Monist</i>	1917
Daitz, Edna	The Picture Theory of Meaning	<i>Mind</i>	1953
Diamond, Cora	Mr. Goodman on Relevant Conditions and the Counterfactual	<i>PhilStudies</i>	1959
Edgell, Beatrice	The Implications of Recognition	<i>Mind</i>	1918
Emmet, Dorothy	A. N. Whitehead: The Last Phase	<i>Mind</i>	1948
Everest Boole, M.	Suggestions for increasing Ethics Stability	<i>Monist</i>	1902
Foot, Philippa	Moral Arguments	<i>Mind</i>	1958
Fremlin, Celia	Must We Always Think in Propositions?	<i>Analysis</i>	1938
Fremlin, Celia	Dialectical Grammar	<i>Analysis</i>	1938
Friedman, Joyce	Some Results in Church's Restricted Recursive Arithmetic	<i>JSL</i>	1957
Frohlic, Fanchon	Primary Qualities in Physical Explanation	<i>Mind</i>	1959
Geiringer, Hilda	Über die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Hypothesen	<i>Erkenntnis</i>	1939
Geiringer, Hilda	Zu "Bemerkungen zur Hypothesenwahrscheinlichkeit"	<i>Erkenntnis</i>	1940
Haezrahi, Pepita	Some Arguments Against G. E. Moore's View of the Function of 'Good' in Ethics	<i>Mind</i>	1948
Haezrahi, Pepita	The Desired and the Desirable	<i>Analysis</i>	1949
Haezrahi, Pepita	Pain and Pleasure: Some Reflections on Susan Stebbing's View that Pain and Pleasure are Moral Values	<i>PhilStudies</i>	1960
Hamlin, Alice Julia	An Attempt at a Psychology of Instinct	<i>Mind</i>	1897
Hansing, Ovidia	The Doctrine of Recollection in Plato's Dialogues	<i>Monist</i>	1928
Hosiasson, Janina	Why Do we Prefer Probabilities Relative to Many Data?	<i>Mind</i>	1931
Hosiasson, Janina	Wahrscheinlichkeit und Schluß aus Teilprämissen	<i>Erkenntnis</i>	1935
Hosiasson, Janina	Bemerkungen über die Zurückführung der physischen auf psychische Begriffe	<i>Erkenntnis</i>	1937
Hosiasson, Janina	On Confirmation	<i>JSL</i>	1940
Hosiasson, Janina	Induction et Analogie: Comparaison de Leur Fondement	<i>Mind</i>	1941
Hurst, Martha	Implication in the Fourth Century B.C	<i>Mind</i>	1935
Jones, E. E. C.	The Paradox of Logical Inference	<i>Mind</i>	1898

(continued)

**Table 1.2** (continued)

Name	Title	Journal	Year
Jones, E. E. C.	An Aspect of Attention	<i>Monist</i>	1898
Jones, E. E. C.	Dr. Ward's Refutation of Dualism	<i>Mind</i>	1900
Jones, E. E. C.	A New 'Law of Thought' and its Implications	<i>Mind</i>	1911
Klein, Augusta	Negation Considered as a Statement of Difference in Identity	<i>Mind</i>	1911
Knight, Helen	Aesthetic Experience in Pictorial Art	<i>Monist</i>	1930
Knight, Helen	A Note on "The Problem of Universals"	<i>Analysis</i>	1933
Knight, Helen	Stout on Universals	<i>Mind</i>	1936
Kokoszynska, M.	Bemerkungen über die Einheitswissenschaft	<i>Erkenntnis</i>	1937
Kokoszynska, M.	Über den absoluten Wahrheitsbegriff und einige andere semantische Begriffe	<i>Erkenntnis</i>	1936
Lake, Beryl	Necessary and Contingent Statements	<i>Analysis</i>	1952
Landes, Margaret	Richard Burthogge, his Life and his Place in the History of Philosophy	<i>Monist</i>	1920
Langer, Susanne K.	A Set of Postulates for the Logical Structure of Music	<i>Monist</i>	1929
Macdonald, M.	Language and Reference	<i>Analysis</i>	1936
Macdonald, M.	Reply to Mr. MacIver	<i>Analysis</i>	1937
Macdonald, M.	Further Reply to Mr. MacIver	<i>Analysis</i>	1937
Macdonald, M.	Things and Processes	<i>Analysis</i>	1938
Macdonald, M.	Necessary Propositions	<i>Analysis</i>	1940
Macdonald, M.	Sleeping and Waking	<i>Mind</i>	1953
Matthews, G. M.	A Note on Inference as Action	<i>Analysis</i>	1956
Matthews, G. M.	Metaphor, and Inference as Travelling	<i>Analysis</i>	1956
Matthews, G. M.	'Evaluative and Descriptive'	<i>Mind</i>	1958
Meager, Ruby L.	Heterologicality and the Liar	<i>Analysis</i>	1956
Miles, Susan	Intuition and Beauty	<i>Monist</i>	1925
Milmed, Bella K.	Counterfactual Statements and Logical Modality	<i>Mind</i>	1957
Mothershill, Mary	C. I. Lewis: Hedonistic Ethics on a Kantian Model	<i>PhilStudies</i>	1954
Mothershill, Mary	Agents, Critics and Philosophers	<i>Mind</i>	1960
Oakeley, Hilda D.	Epistemology and the Logical Syntax of Language	<i>Mind</i>	1940
Oakeley, Hilda D.	Time and the Self in McTaggart's System	<i>Mind</i>	1930
Oakeley, Hilda D.	Professor Nicolai Hartmann's Concept of Objective Spirit	<i>Mind</i>	1935
Olds, M. E	Synonymity: Extensional Isomorphism	<i>Mind</i>	1956
Péter, Rózsa	Zusammenhang der Mehrfachen und Transfiniten Rekursionen	<i>JSL</i>	1950
Pimenoff, Lydia L.	Mind, the Creator of Matter	<i>Monist</i>	1918

(continued)

**Table 1.2** (continued)

Name	Title	Journal	Year
Powell, Betty	A Note on Deceiving	<i>Analysis</i>	1957
Powell, Betty	Uncharacteristic Actions	<i>Mind</i>	1959
Rabel, Gabriele	Kant as a Teacher of Biology	<i>Monist</i>	1931
Rand, Rose	Kotarbinskis Philosophie auf Grund seines Hauptwerkes	<i>Erkenntnis</i>	1937
Robbins, Beverly L.	Some Remarks on Semantic Systems	<i>PhilStudies</i>	1953
Robbins, Beverly L.	On Synonymy of Word-Events	<i>Analysis</i>	1952
Robinson, Julia	Definability and Decision Problems in Arithmetic	<i>JSL</i>	1949
Saw, Ruth L.	Dr. Margaret Macdonald	<i>Analysis</i>	1956
Singer, D. W.	A Generalized Basis of Faith	<i>Monist</i>	1923
Smith, Constance I.	A Note on Choice and on Virtue	<i>Analysis</i>	1956
Smith, Helen M.	Sensible Appearances, Sense-Data, and Sensations	<i>Monist</i>	1929
Smith, Helen M.	Sensations and the Constancy Hypothesis	<i>Monist</i>	1930
Smith, Helen M.	Pre-Existence and Freewill	<i>Analysis</i>	1936
Spencer, M. E.	Spinoza and Nietzsche – A Comparison	<i>Monist</i>	1931
Stawell, F. Melian	Some Problems of Philosophy	<i>Mind</i>	1914
Stebbing, L. Susan	Mind and Nature in Prof. Whitehead's Philosophy	<i>Mind</i>	1924
Stebbing, L. Susan	Mr. Joseph's Defence of Free Thinking in Logistics	<i>Mind</i>	1933
Stebbing, L. Susan	Concerning Solipsism: Reply to R. B. Braithwaite	<i>Analysis</i>	1934
Stebbing, L. Susan	A Second Reply to Mr. Joseph	<i>Mind</i>	1934
Stebbing, L. Susan	Directional Analysis and Basic Facts	<i>Analysis</i>	1934
Stebbing, L. Susan	Language and Misleading Questions	<i>Erkenntnis</i>	1939
Stewart, Margaret	Our 'Sex Complex' and What Produced It	<i>Monist</i>	1923
Swabey, Marie C.	The Universe and Universals	<i>Monist</i>	1929
Swabey, Marie C.	Reason and Nature	<i>Monist</i>	1929
Tulloch, Doreen M.	The Logic of Positive Terms and the Transcendental Notion of Being	<i>Mind</i>	1957
de Vogel, C. J.	On the Neoplatonic Character of Platonism and the Platonic Character of Neoplatonism	<i>Mind</i>	1953
Wacker, Jeanne	Particular Works of Art	<i>Mind</i>	1960
Walsh, Dorothy	Linguistic Meaning and Ethical Utterances	<i>Analysis</i>	1953
Warnock, H. M.	A Problem in the Relation between Use and Meaning	<i>Analysis</i>	1949
Warren, G. O.	A Philosophical Aspect of Science	<i>Monist</i>	1910
Washburn, M. F.	Subjective Colours and the After-Image: Their Significance for the Theory of Attention	<i>Mind</i>	1899
Welby, Victoria	Sense, Meaning, and Interpretation I	<i>Mind</i>	1896

(continued)

**Table 1.2** (continued)

Name	Title	Journal	Year
Welby, Victoria	Sense, Meaning and Interpretation II	<i>Mind</i>	1896
Welby, Victoria	Notes on the ‘Welby Prize Essay’	<i>Mind</i>	1901
Welby, Victoria	Time as Derivative	<i>Mind</i>	1907
Wodehouse, Helen	Judgment and Apprehension	<i>Mind</i>	1908
Wodehouse, Helen	Knowledge as Presentation	<i>Mind</i>	1909
Wodehouse, Helen	The Apprehension of Feeling	<i>Mind</i>	1910
Wodehouse, Helen	Language and Moral Philosophy	<i>Mind</i>	1938
Wood, Mary Hay	Plato’s Psychology in Its Bearing on the Development of Will (I.)	<i>Mind</i>	1908
Wood, Mary Hay	Plato’s Psychology in Its Bearing on the Development of Will (II.)	<i>Mind</i>	1908
Wrinch, Dorothy	Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848)	<i>Monist</i>	1917
Wrinch, Dorothy	On the Nature of Judgment	<i>Mind</i>	1919
Wrinch, Dorothy	On the Nature of Memory	<i>Mind</i>	1920

distinction between sense and reference. James Pearson reconstructs Welby’s philosophical program, which inspired philosophers of meaning like C. K. Ogden and members of the Dutch Significs group. Pearson sets out to find what Welby wanted, why she wanted it, and to what extent subsequent developments in the history of analytic philosophy suggest that she got what she wanted. Drawing connections with Strawson’s program of connective analysis, Pearson argues that Welby was predominantly concerned to expose the ways in which our concepts are interconnected. After having reconstructed her analysis of metaphors as well as her contributions to educational reform, Pearson concludes that Welby wanted us to recognize the plasticity of language and see it as an adaptable and evolving instrument that we can shape, but which also shapes us.

In his paper on Jones, Gary Ostertag warns against seeing her purely as the philosopher who predates Frege’s distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* and Russell’s distinction between meaning and denotation. Such a focus, Ostertag argues, “both misidentifies and limits her significance”. According to Ostertag it is not the distinction as such that is important, but the use that Jones makes of it in her so-called law of significant assertion, which forms the heart of her ideas on predication. Ostertag explains that Jones takes her inspiration from Hermann Lotze’s identity theory of predication, but also deviates from it, and he evaluates Jones’s exchanges with W. E. Johnson, Bernard Bosanquet and F. C. S. Schiller.

Chapters 4 to 7 take us to early twentieth-century Central Europe, and also serve as an illustration that some female analytic philosophers, like some of their male counterparts, were scientists as well. In Chaps. 4 and 5 the emphasis is on the contributions to logic and mathematics, the motors behind so many developments in analytic philosophy. First Dilek Kadioglu reconstructs the work of Emmy Noether (1882–1935),



known for her groundbreaking proof of the intimate connection between symmetries and conservation laws, the Noether Theorem. Kadioglu however concentrates on Noether's algebraical work. She argues that this work freed the way for an alternative to set theory, namely category theory, which influenced philosophical discussions about the foundations of mathematics. In Chap. 5 Andrea Reichenberger discusses the work of Rózsa Péter (1905–1977), in particular her contributions to the special theory of recursive functions. In addition, Reichenberger deals extensively with the book in which Péter explains major mathematical achievements in a popular way, *Playing with Infinity*, which first appeared in 1944 and was translated into no less than fourteen languages. Among other things the book contains a popular sketch of Gödel's proof, which according to Reichenberger was interpreted by Péter in a Kantian way, as a claim about the limits of our knowledge.

Kantian and neo-Kantian views are also important for the work of Grete Hermann (1901–1984), the subject of Chap. 6. Michael Cuffaro explains how Hermann, a student of Emmy Noether and of the neo-Kantian philosopher Leonard Nelson, became interested in the claim made by physicists that quantum mechanics violates Kant's ideas on causality. Hermann tries to solve the matter by arguing that our knowledge of the natural world is essentially split; as Cuffaro phrases it, "the objects of quantum mechanics are only objects from a particular perspective and in the context of a particular physical interaction".

In Chap. 7 Katarina Mihaljević discusses the tragic life and career of Rose Rand (1903–1980), a Polish-Jewish logician who contributed to the development of analytic philosophy through her work on (deontic) logic and through translations of Polish and Russian logicians. Rand was a student of Moritz Schlick and a member of the Vienna Circle, but she failed to obtain a position in philosophy after her escape from Europe in the years before the Second World War. She tried to gain an academic post, first in the United Kingdom and then the United States, but never succeeded. Among other menial jobs, she had to work in a machine factory to make a living. In her paper, Mihaljević explores material from Rose Rand's personal and academic archives to reconstruct the factors that contributed to her hardships. She concludes that though Rand was well connected with a range of prominent analytic philosophers (*inter alia* Wittgenstein, Stebbing, Neurath, Popper, Carnap, Quine, and Hempel), she lacked the social and cultural resources to secure a stable position in academia.

Chapters 8 and 9 bring us back to the United Kingdom; they deal with Susan Stebbing (1885–1943) and Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001), both important philosophers in mid-twentieth-century Britain. Although it is now generally recognized that Stebbing was a crucial figure within the Cambridge school of analysis, her philosophical contributions have not been frequently studied; the reason most likely is that historians still tend to view her as a mere disciple of G. E. Moore. Frederique Janssen-Lauret however argues that the similarities between Moore and Stebbing are relatively superficial, and she reconstructs Stebbing's views about analysis and common-sense truths. Janssen-Lauret argues that Moore aimed (but failed) to dismiss idealist analyses of common-sense truths, whereas Stebbing devises a new and viable route towards the refutation of idealism. According to Stebbing, arguments for an idealist interpretation of physics, for example, rest on level confusions that can be dispelled

using her ‘directional analyses’, which, incidentally, can also be used to solve the paradox of analysis. Janssen-Lauret minutely reconstructs Stebbing’s conception of analysis and shows how she applied it in her philosophy of physics and in her work on common-sense truths.

In Chap. 9, Naomi Kloosterboer explains in what sense exactly Anscombe’s account of intentional action differs from the influential causal theory of action (CTA), with which it has sometimes been incorrectly identified. According to Kloosterboer, Anscombe regards concepts such as ‘intentional action’, ‘reason for action’, and ‘rationalization’ as constituting a conceptual nexus—a view that is incompatible with CTA. Kloosterboer argues that Anscombe defends a so-called form approach, which differs from a decompositional approach favoured by adherents of CTA. In the second part of her paper Kloosterboer uses the form approach to set up an Anscombe-inspired theory of reasoning.

In the final two chapters of the volume, we turn to the United States, which became the most important bastion of analytic philosophy after the Second World War. Chapter 10 is about Susanne Langer (1895–1985). Today she is best known for her work on art and aesthetics, but Sander Verhaegh argues that she played an important role in America’s analytic turn in the late 1920s and early 1930s. He discusses a range of archival evidence from this period and shows that Langer’s *The Practice of Philosophy* (1930)—arguably the first systematic exposition of the analytic approach by a U.S. philosopher—made her a noteworthy player in the Euro-American network that paved the way for the development of analytic philosophy in the U.S. In the second part of his paper, Verhaegh considers the reception of Langer’s best-seller book *Philosophy in a New Key* (1942). He reconstructs the responses of the rapidly growing U.S. analytic community and argues that they shed new light on the forces that have shaped the analytic movement as we know it today.

The final chapter, by Gregory Lavers, is devoted to the work of Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921–2012), especially to her decades-long debate with W. V. Quine. Contemporary discussions about Quine’s views about analyticity and ontology tend to focus on his arguments against Carnap’s philosophical framework. Lavers, however, argues that Quine’s central arguments in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) arose out of a response to Barcan Marcus’s work on quantified modal logic (QML), which Quine famously rejected. Lavers details both Barcan Marcus’s defense of QML and her views about meaning and ontology. He concludes that she successfully dismantled Quine’s arguments that were supposed to show that it is impossible to add quantification to modal logic. Barcan Marcus’s arguments, Lavers shows, forced Quine to change his tactic and to claim that modal logic involves a problematic commitment to essentialism. Although Quine mostly focused on Kripke’s views in advocating the connection between QML and essentialism, Lavers argues that Barcan Marcus offers us a theory that does not force us to accept non-trivial, necessary attributes.

Each of the ten chapters in this volume is preceded by a photo and a short biography of the philosopher in question, as well as a list of her major works.

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