Does Basel II affect the market valuation of discretionary loan loss provisions?

Malika Hamadi a, Andréas Heinen b, Stefan Linder c, Vlad-Andrei Porumb d,e,1

a School of Management, University of Leicester, LE1 7RH Leicester, UK
b THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 33 Boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy-Pontoise, France
c ESSEC Business School, Avenue Bernard Hirsch, BP 50105, 95021 Cergy-Pontoise, France
d University of Groningen, Nettelbosje 2, 9747 AE Groningen, The Netherlands

A R T I C L E   I N F O

Article history:
Received 27 February 2015
Accepted 2 June 2016
Available online 25 June 2016

JEL classification:
G21
G14
M41
G28

Keywords:
Basel II
Market valuation
Income smoothing
Loan loss provisions
Regulatory capital
Banks
Europe

A B S T R A C T

We use a sample of banks from 24 European countries to investigate whether the adoption of the Basel II Capital Accord in 2008 affects the market valuation of discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs). Although Basel II lowers the incentives of internal ratings-based (IRB) banks to recognize income-increasing DLLPs in an opportunistic manner, it has no such impact on the remaining banks, which adopt the Standardized methodology. We use this setup in a difference-in-difference (DiD) design, where Standardized banks act as a control group. Our evidence supports the three hypotheses that, for IRB relative to Standardized banks, Basel II is associated with (i) less income-increasing DLLPs and (ii) less income-smoothing via DLLPs, which enhances the informational content of DLLPs about future loan losses and leads to (iii) higher market valuation of DLLPs. Our findings are timely and have policy implications for future regulatory developments in the banking industry.

1. Introduction

Loan loss provisions (LLPs) represent banks' main accruals, over which managers have considerable discretion. Managers can use this discretion either opportunistically to smooth income (i.e., manage earnings) or to convey private information to investors (Beatty et al., 2002; Kanagaratnam et al., 2003; Kanagaratnam et al., 2004; Kanagaratnam et al., 2010). Under Basel I, reducing LLPs allows managers to increase earnings and regulatory capital and, thereby, the market valuation of the bank (Kim and Kross, 1998). The Basel II Capital Accord, effective since 2008, introduces a countervailing link between LLPs and regulatory capital. In this paper, we investigate whether this new regulation affects the market valuation of the discretionary part of LLPs.

Basel II has sparked substantial debate and scholarly interest in recent years regarding, among others, internal risk rating systems (Jacobson et al., 2006), a potential pro-cyclical effect of the regulation on lending cycles (Gordy and Howells, 2006; Heid, 2007), proposals for forward-looking modeling of default probabilities (Pederzoli and Torricelli, 2005), and country-specific differences in the implementation of the new regulation (Barth et al., 2008; Herring, 2007). In contrast, the effect of Basel II on the market valuation of discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs) has yet to receive attention. As documented in the extant literature, changes in banking or accounting regulations that affect banks’ provisioning practices tend to affect the informativeness of banks’ DLLPs and their market valuation. For example, Moyer (2006) finds evidence that banks make accounting adjustments to follow capital adequacy guidelines. Consistent with this finding, Kim and Kross...
The DLLPs of IRB banks should exhibit a higher informational content, making it difficult to comply with the solvency requirements. As a consequence, Standardized banks, because such opportunistic use of DLLPs makes it difficult to engage in more income-increasing activities, reduce the regulatory capital of IRB banks through income-increasing (negative) DLLPs. Whereas under Basel I, a decrease in banks' LLPs results in an increase in both earnings and the capital ratio for all banks, the adoption of Basel II requires IRB banks to compute a forward-looking measure of expected loss on their loan portfolio and to deduct the difference between this expected measure and the actual (accounting) LLPs from their regulatory capital (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). Thus, whereas the incentive to smooth income for Standardized banks does not change with the adoption of Basel II, every additional Euro of income-increasing DLLPs reduces the regulatory capital of IRB banks by \( (1 - \text{tax rate}) \times (1 - d) \) Euros, where \( d \) is the dividend payout ratio. By introducing a direct relation between LLPs and the level of regulatory capital, Basel II reduces IRB banks' incentive for income smoothing through an opportunistic use of income-increasing DLLPs. In contrast, the incentives to use DLLPs opportunistically for income-smoothing purposes remain unchanged for banks following the Standardized approach. Therefore, with the adoption of Basel II, IRB banks should rely less on DLLPs for the purpose of smoothing income than Standardized banks, because such opportunistic use of DLLPs makes it difficult to comply with the solvency requirements. As a consequence, the DLLPs of IRB banks should exhibit a higher informational content for financial market participants, in comparison to the Standardized banks.

Extant evidence suggests that less opportunistic DLLPs have higher market valuations (Wahlen, 1994). For instance, Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) find that the valuation of DLLPs depends on auditor reputation, which is inversely related to the opportunistic use of DLLPs. Hence, Basel II should lead to an increase in the market valuation of IRB banks' DLLPs.

We draw on a sample of 103 listed banks from 24 European countries for the years 2006–2011 and use a difference-in-difference (DiD) research design to test our hypotheses. Because many of the variables necessary to study the impact of Basel II on the valuation of DLLPs are not available from public databases, such as BVD Bankscope, we hand-collect much of our data. This results in a unique data set that allows us to test our hypotheses using empirical models that to date have been used only for U.S. samples, for which data are more readily available than in Europe. To investigate whether the adoption of Basel II has affected the market valuation of IRB banks' DLLPs, we perform the following three tests. We first estimate DLLPs as the residuals of a regression of LLPs on all of their normal determinants (as in Wahlen, 1994; Adams et al., 2009; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). Further, we follow Cohen et al. (2008) and split DLLPs into income-increasing and income-decreasing ones. Because Standardized banks are not affected by the new prudential regulations, they can serve as a control group in our DiD design. In line with our expectations, after the adoption of Basel II, income-increasing DLLPs are lower for IRB relative to Standardized banks. This raises the question of whether the reduction in income-increasing DLLPs translates into a lower level of opportunistic reporting, proxied by income smoothing behavior.

Therefore, in a second step, we test the effect of the adoption of Basel II on the association between LLPs and earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPT) for IRB and Standardized banks. Consistent with our prediction, the level of income smoothing through DLLPs is significantly lower in the post- than in the pre-Basel II period for IRB relative to Standardized banks. This finding suggests that Basel II discourages managers of IRB banks from recognizing opportunistic DLLPs, which is in line with banking regulators' objective of ensuring the long-term financial stability of banks (Borio et al., 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). The economic climate prevailing in the year during which Basel II was adopted represents a notable challenge for the empirical test of our hypotheses. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) and DeFond and Park (1997) argue that income-increasing activities are more prevalent in times of economic hardship because of concerns over job security and management credibility. Thus, given an economic crisis, we should find that all banks engage in more income-increasing activities following the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007. Indeed, we find that Standardized banks recognize more income-increasing DLLPs and engage in more income smoothing after the adoption of Basel II, which is a normal response to the economic turmoil (as documented in Liu and Ryan, 2006). Unlike Standardized banks, IRB banks need to comply with Basel II, which curbs their ability to smooth income through income-increasing DLLPs in the post-Basel II period. As expected, our results confirm that IRB banks do not increase their opportunistic reporting after 2008, which indicates that our results are attributable to the change in banking regulation rather than to the economic crisis.

In a third step, we regress stock returns on DLLPs to investigate whether DLLPs are valued more by the market given the impact of Basel II on both income-increasing DLLPs and income smoothing. We find that the post-adoption DiD coefficient of DLLPs is positive and significant, which suggests that the market assigns a higher valuation to the DLLPs of IRB banks after the adoption of Basel II. The positive association between returns and IRB banks' DLLPs in the post-Basel II period indicates that Basel II sends a twofold message to financial market participants. First, DLLPs contain more information regarding future expected losses, which is incorporated into stock prices by the market, consistent with previous literature (such as Wahlen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). Second, their lesser reliance on DLLPs for income-smoothing purposes also tells investors that, in times of financial distress, IRB banks are more likely to maintain capital solvency, which is positively valued by investors (Huizinga and Laeven, 2012).

We perform a number of robustness tests on our results. First, in our estimations, we control for the impact of macroeconomic variables on loan loss provisions. We check the robustness of our findings to the use of different time windows. A set of placebo tests confirms that the effect we find is attributable to the new regulations and not to possible confounding factors. Finally, we check the robustness of our results to the use of an alternative control group composed of U.S. commercial banks instead of Standardized banks.

Our findings contribute to the banking literature and provide policy implications for banking and accounting regulators. In particular, we show that a change in prudential regulations aimed at furthering financial stability has a significant impact on IRB banks' earnings and the capital ratio. 

---

2 More precisely, the 1990 Basel I Capital Accord defines general loan loss provisions (GLLPs) as those set aside to cover expected "but not yet incurred" losses. Thus, these GLLPs contain forward-looking information on a bank's future credit losses (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). According to Basel I, they are not part of Tier 1 capital and can only be included directly in Tier 2 capital up to a proportion of 1.25 percent of risk-weighted capital. Therefore, for banks with GLLPs that exceed this threshold, a decrease in LLPs results in an increase in both earnings and the capital ratio.

3 The beginning of the economic crisis is often associated with the rapid increase in interbank interest rates in the United States on August 9, 2007.
provisioning practices and heightens the informational content and the market valuation of the DLLPs of IRB banks. The results of our study inform the debate over the effects and merits of Basel II and the potential implications of Basel III. Moreover, these results are relevant for accounting regulators and practitioners in the context of the introduction of IFRS 9 in 2018. This new accounting standard introduces a one-year horizon forward-looking expected credit loss model, which conforms to the requirements of Basel II. Therefore, we offer accounting regulators early evidence of the relevance of IFRS 9 from the perspective of investors.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe our hypotheses. We present our empirical methodology in Section 3 and our data in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our results and Section 6 our robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions.

2. Hypotheses

General loan loss provisions (GLLPs) are provisions set aside to cover expected “but not yet incurred” losses. By construction, they contain forward-looking information on a bank’s future credit losses (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). According to the 1990 Basel I Capital Accord, GLLPs are not part of Tier 1 capital and can only be included directly in Tier 2 capital up to a proportion of 1.25 percent of risk-weighted capital. Therefore, for banks with GLLPs that exceeds this threshold, a decrease in DLLPs results in an increase in both earnings and the capital ratio. More specifically, a reduction in DLLPs of 1 Euro leads to an increase in earnings of \((1 – \text{tax rate})\) Euros. This increase has an indirect effect of 1 – tax rate \((1 – d)\) Euros on Tier 1 capital, where \(d\) is the dividend payout ratio, through the channel of retained earnings. Hence, under Basel I, banks have an incentive to reduce DLLPs because doing so achieves the double objective of increasing net income and regulatory capital (Kim and Kross, 1998).

Moreover, IFRS, through IAS 39 Financial Instruments, prohibits the recognition of GLLPs altogether and thus banks cannot include GLLPs in Tier 2 capital—the channel through which provisioning could directly influence the level of regulatory capital. In turn Basel I prohibits the inclusion of types of provisions other than GLLPs, even if allowed by accounting regulations. Thus, by prohibiting GLLPs, IFRS cut the only link recognized under Basel I from DLLPs to regulatory capital.

Under IFRS, banks can only exercise their discretion in provisioning by recognizing collective DLLPs. Collective provisions are set for “incurred but not yet reported (not yet observed)” losses (PriceWaterhouseCooper’s, 2012), which are similar to provisions recognized for the “expected but not yet incurred” losses (GLLPs) that IFRS prohibits (PriceWaterhouseCooper’s, 2004). Banks can use their discretion and recognize collective DLLPs; however, according to Basel I, only provisions created for losses not yet identified may be included in Tier 2 capital. Specific and collective provisions cannot be included in Tier 2 capital because they do not cover “not-incurred” losses. Thus, in the pre-Basel II period, banks have no incentive to increase their provisions because doing so would decrease their earnings and concurrently decrease their Tier 1 capital. Instead, banks have an incentive to register income-increasing (negative) DLLPs to keep their LLPs small.

In contrast, Basel II allows for collective provisions to be used for the purpose of increasing regulatory capital for banks that adopt the IRB approach. Basel II differs from Basel I in that it divides banks according to their internal risk management systems into IRB and Standardized banks, and adjusts their capital requirements accordingly. The IRB approach is characterized by internally determined risk measurements and high differentiation in required capital between riskier and safer credits. The Standardized approach is implemented by banks with less developed internal risk management systems. Their credit risk and the size of their capital requirements are measured on the basis of external credit assessments from ratings agencies.

Generally, the IRB approach results in a lower capital charge; thus, banks have strong incentives to adopt it. To become IRB, banks need to apply to their national regulators and show that they have the technical capacity to accurately measure the credit risk of their portfolio in-house. The costs of such a sophisticated IRB risk management system are high. Therefore, in practice, banks are naturally segmented into large banks that adopt the IRB approach and smaller banks that stay with the Standardized approach (see e.g. Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011). In our empirical work, to alleviate potential concerns of endogeneity given the choice between Standardized and IRB banks, we include bank fixed effects and control for size.

For Standardized banks, Basel II does not change the regulatory treatment of DLLPs. Yet, the post-2008 period is marked by increased economic turmoil given the onset of the financial crisis. According to previous studies, managers are more likely to perform income-increasing activities and smooth earnings during economic downturns (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; DeFond and Park, 1997). Given this incentive and the fact that the provisioning of Standardized banks is not affected by the adoption of Basel II, we expect that they engage in more income-increasing activities after 2008. Whereas IRB banks are subjected to similar incentives given macroeconomic conditions, their income-increasing activities are constrained by the adoption of Basel II. According to the new Capital Accord, they are required to cover all expected losses with specific and/or collective DLLPs (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). Regulatory capital under Basel II is only supposed to cover unexpected losses. Any difference between provisions and expected losses must be covered with regulatory capital. More specifically, IRB banks need to compute expected losses on a one-year horizon and compare this amount with actual (accounting) LLPs. The difference must be covered with 50 percent Tier 1 and 50 percent Tier 2 capital. Thus, when performing income-increasing activities, IRB banks face the risk of suffering capital pressures.

Similar to Cohen et al. (2008), we decompose DLLPs into income-increasing (negative) and income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs and separately analyze the effect of the change in regulation on each component. Separating negative from positive DLLPs is important to understand how reporting responds to regulatory requirements. Basel II introduces an incentive to narrow the gap between actual LLPs and expected losses, which can be reduced
by either reducing negative DLLPs (in absolute terms) or increasing positive DLLPs. As documented by Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), given their positive impact on earnings, income-increasing DLLPs are more likely to be driven by opportunistic motives (earnings management) than income-decreasing DLLPs. To close the gap between LLPs and expected losses and to avoid a reduction in regulatory capital, banks have an incentive to reduce their opportunistic DLLPs as a result of the new regulation. Because the new capital requirements apply only to banks following the IRB approach, we expect a decrease in the absolute value of income-increasing DLLPs for these banks relative to Standardized banks, which leads to our first hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 1.A.** Income-increasing DLLPs decrease after the adoption of Basel II for IRB relative to Standardized banks.

As outlined in Hypothesis 1.A, in contrast to Standardized banks, IRB banks have an incentive to narrow the gap between actual LLPs and expected losses by reducing income-increasing DLLPs. In principle, they could achieve the same result by recognizing more income-decreasing DLLPs. However, if banks choose to strategically increase positive DLLPs and build up “cookie-jar” reserves, they may revert them in future periods by recognizing income-increasing DLLPs. They then incur high regulatory capital costs. Thus, at best, this solution is only short-term and does not close the gap between actual LLPs and expected losses in the long run. This option becomes even less likely in light of Hypothesis 1.A, which already predicts a reduction in income-increasing DLLPs. The mechanical relationship between income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs in the long run implies that any discretionary reporting based on accruals needs to be reverted in future periods. Thus, given the strong incentive to reduce income-increasing DLLPs under Basel II, in the long run, IRB banks should also reduce their income-decreasing DLLPs relative to Standardized banks. Given our short-term window of analysis, we have a mild expectation to find support for the following hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 1.B.** Income-decreasing DLLPs decrease after the adoption of Basel II for IRB relative to Standardized banks.

According to Hypotheses 1 and 2, Basel II introduces incentives to lower income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs for IRB banks. Hypothesis 2 relates the pre- to post-adoption difference in DLLPs between IRB and Standardized banks to a weaker reliance on DLLPs for the purpose of earnings management, proxied by income smoothing. According to Liu and Ryan (1995) and Liu and Ryan (2006), all else equal, banks prefer smoother earnings.

Nonetheless, extant research suggests that banks adjust their income smoothing behavior to regulatory pressure. For instance, Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) find that the adoption of IFRS lowers banks’ incentives to use discretion in provisioning, which leads to an understatement of LLPs and reduced levels of income smoothing. We expect a similar effect for Basel II. As already outlined, the adoption of Basel II provides IRB banks with a strong incentive to fill the gap between incurred and expected losses. In reaction to the capital pressure imposed on them under Basel II, banks no longer have incentives to use their discretion over the recognition of collective provisions to understate DLLPs, which may affect the level of income smoothing via DLLPs.

Two possible explanations for this impact are plausible. On the one hand, given Basel II’s capital pressure, banks may recognize more positive DLLPs and simply “mechanically” smooth their income by incorporating future expected losses into earnings (for a related discussion on LLPs and IFRS, see Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). On the other hand, under the threat of a decrease in their regulatory capital caused by a gap in provisioning, IRB banks may rely less on income-increasing DLLPs for income smoothing purposes.

Hence, for IRB banks, the opportunistic recognition of income-increasing DLLPs for income smoothing purposes should be less prevalent after the adoption of Basel II. Table 1 summarizes the regulatory changes and their implications.

However, after 2008, banks’ incentives to smooth earnings are further affected by the onset of the financial crisis. According to previous research, banks engage in greater earnings smoothing in times of economic turmoil (Liu and Ryan, 1995). Therefore, both Standardized and IRB banks have an incentive to smooth their earnings in the post-adoption period. As the regulatory pressure introduced by the new Capital Accord does not apply to the provisioning of Standardized banks (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011), their recognition of income-increasing DLLPs for income smoothing purposes is solely driven by the effect of the economic crisis. Given the asymmetric impact of Basel II on the two groups, Standardized banks are likely to manage their earnings more in the post-adoption period. Therefore, relative to these banks, the income smoothing of IRB banks via DLLPs should decrease with the adoption of Basel II, which leads us to our second hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 2.** Income smoothing through DLLPs decreases after the adoption of Basel II for IRB banks relative to Standardized banks.

Accruals in general and DLLPs in particular contain both an informational and a non-informational component. Given that LLPs represent banks’ main accruals, by construction, DLLPs should reflect information about future loan defaults (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Wahlen, 1994; Kilic et al., 2013). Consequently, their market valuation will be low if they are perceived as being driven by opportunistic motives (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Lennox and Park, 2006; Dechow et al., 2012). Through the incurred loss approach of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39, IFRS discourages managers from incorporating their private information on expected loan losses into DLLPs (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). As a result, managers are prevented from disclosing their expectations of foreseeable losses and are likely to end up communicating less information to the market through DLLPs. Nonetheless, they can use collective provisions to increase the variability in DLLPs. Such an increase can occur to either enhance the informational component of banks’ DLLPs or attain opportunistic objectives by inflating the non-informational component of DLLPs. Basel II provides IRB banks with an incentive to avoid understating DLLPs through income-increasing activities. The incentive to reduce the largely opportunistic income-increasing DLLPs (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009) should lead to increased valuation of DLLPs after the adoption of Basel II.

Moreover, according to Huizinga and Laeven (2012), in times of financial distress, such as during 2008 when Basel II was implemented, investors positively value regulations that encourage banks to maintain capital solvency. If IRB banks comply with the requirements of Basel II and avoid understating DLLPs, they will not suffer regulatory capital losses and thus find it easier to maintain solvency in periods of economic turmoil. In contrast, while Standardized banks’ understating their DLLPs will not directly affect their regulatory capital, such understatement reduces their ability to cover potential loan losses. Relative to IRB banks, they are therefore less resilient to loan defaults. As a consequence, market participants are should to value the DLLPs of IRB banks more than those of Standardized banks.

Taken together, relative to Standardized banks, the DLLPs of IRB banks are valued more by market participants as they contain a
higher informational content regarding both future losses and banks’ ability to meet capital solvency requirements. Therefore, on the basis of the extant literature, we formulate our third hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 3.** The market valuation of DLLPs increases after the adoption of Basel II for IRB banks relative to Standardized banks.

### 3. Empirical models

We test our hypotheses using a panel data method with firm fixed effects to control for the possible effect of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the bank level, which could otherwise lead to omitted variable bias and cause endogeneity problems in pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. Failing to control for bank fixed effects can result in biased coefficients and misleading conclusions.⁹ Given that our main issue is to shield our estimations from potential endogeneity concerns, we chose to use firm fixed effects for all models throughout the paper, which is the more conservative option. In the following subsections, we provide a detailed explanation of the specific models that we estimate to test each of our hypotheses.

#### 3.1. Income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs

To determine the impact of Basel II on the level of income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs, we use a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we follow previous literature (Wahlen, 1994; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009) and estimate the non-discretionary component of DLLPs as the residual of the following OLS regression of DLLPs on their normal determinants:

\[
\text{DLLP}_t = \theta_0 + \theta_1 \text{NPL}_t + \theta_2 \text{ANPL}_t + \theta_3 \text{Loan}_t + \theta_4 \text{NCO}_t + e_t
\]

where, for bank i, year t, and country c, DLLP, stands for loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets, NPL, and ANPL, are, respectively, non-performing loans and their differences scaled by beginning total assets, Loan, and NCO, is net charge-offs scaled by beginning total assets, and e is a residual. Although a number of possible loan loss provision models exist (for a detailed discussion, see Beatty and Liao, 2014), our choice is limited by our use of a cross-country sample. Moreover, we refrain from using specifications that include leads and lags because doing so might interfere with our research design and obscure the comparison of the pre- and post-Basel II periods. We consider as normal determinants of DLLPs the level and change of loans and nonperforming loans (NPLs), as well as net charge-offs (NCO). Banks are expected to set the level of DLLPs according to the size of their loan portfolio. Given the uncertainty regarding the quality of loans, the effect of changes in loans on DLLPs is ambiguous (Kanagaretnam et al., 2004). In contrast, DLLPs should increase with NPLs, which represent an objective measure of portfolio risk (Wahlen, 1994). Because changes in NPLs are likely to be serially correlated (Wahlen, 1994), they constitute a good predictor of future losses. We further expect that provisions increase with NCOs because the two variables are mechanically related (Kanagaretnam et al., 2004). Because our aim is to control for normal determinants of DLLPs, we choose not to include control variables, such as bank size and Tier 1 ratio, that do not qualify as normal determinants of DLLPs but that are more likely connected to the discretionary part of DLLPs (Ahmed et al., 1999; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008).

Table 2 provides further details about our variables. The estimated residual from Eq. (1) is the discretionary part of DLLPs, DLLP, = e_t (Wahlen, 1994; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). In the second stage, we split DLLPs into income-increasing (negative) and income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs. We further use a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) design to test whether IRB banks use their discretion to recognize more or less income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs relative to Standardized banks and subsequent to the adoption of Basel II. We build on Ashbaugh et al. (2003); Kanagaretnam et al. (2009); and the cross-country study of Kanagaretnam et al. (2010). In addition, we include bank fixed effects in our model, which allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant bank-level heterogeneity.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main changes in regulation</th>
<th>Basel I &amp; IFRS 2005–2008</th>
<th>Basel II &amp; IFRS 2008-present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect of DLLP on earnings</td>
<td>- DLLP(1–tax rate)</td>
<td>- DLLP(1–tax rate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of DLLP on regulatory capital</td>
<td>Through retained earnings (indirect effect)</td>
<td>Through regulatory requirements (direct effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1</td>
<td>- DLLP(1–tax rate)(1–d)</td>
<td>$\text{+ DLLP/2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\text{+ DLLP/2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total effect (Tier 1 + Tier 2)</td>
<td>- DLLP(1–tax rate)(1–d)</td>
<td>$\text{+ DLLP}[1–(1–\text{tax rate})(1–d)]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This figure shows that the effect of a DLLP change in LLP impacts earnings by its after-tax amount, - DLLP(1–tax rate). Further, this change impacts Tier 1 capital by the after-tax and after-dividend amount, - DLLP(1–tax rate)(1–d), where d is the dividend payout rate. In the pre-Basel II period, banks have little incentive to recognize positive (income-decreasing) DLLPs because doing so has an adverse impact on earnings, - DLLP(1–tax rate), and on regulatory capital, - DLLP(1–tax rate)(1–d).

Basel II modifies the effect of DLLPs on regulatory capital by introducing a direct link between DLLPs and both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital of DLLP/2 each. This makes the net effect of DLLPs on regulatory capital positive with magnitude $\text{+ DLLP(1–tax rate)(1–d)}$ in the post-Basel II period, thus providing banks with an incentive to increase DLLPs as a result of the new regulation. The overall effect of the Basel II adoption on the effect of DLLPs and regulatory capital is DLLP, which depends neither on the tax rate nor on the dividend payout ratio.
We estimate the following equation to control for the determinants of DLLPs:

\[
\text{DLLP}_{it} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 \text{Basel}_i + \theta_2 \text{IRB}_i + \theta_3 \text{Basel}_i \cdot \text{IRB}_i + \theta_4 \text{LLP}_{it-1} + \theta_5 \text{EBPT}_{it} + \theta_6 \text{Loss}_{it} + \theta_7 \text{Size}_{it} + \theta_8 \text{Growth}_{it} + \theta_9 \text{Tier1}_{it} + \theta_{10} \text{GDP Growth}_{it} + \theta_{11} \text{Unemployment}_{it} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{it},
\]

where \(\text{Basel}_i\) is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, \(\text{IRB}_i\) is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, \(\text{LLP}_{it-1}\) is lagged LLPs scaled by beginning total assets, \(\text{EBPT}_{it}\) is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets, \(\text{Loss}_{it}\) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise, \(\text{Size}_{it}\) is bank size measured as the log of beginning total assets, \(\text{Growth}_{it}\) is the growth rate of total assets, \(\text{Tier1}_{it}\) is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, \(\text{GDP Growth}_{it}\) is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, \(\text{Unemployment}_{it}\) is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, \(\gamma_i\) is a year dummy, \(\delta_t\) is a bank fixed effect, and \(\epsilon_{it}\) is a residual. Note that in Eq. (2) and in the following, we include \(\text{Basel}_i\), and \(\text{IRB}_i\), for completeness of the DiD effect; however, the \(\theta_1\) and \(\theta_2\) parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects and year dummies in the estimations that include them. Our controls include variables that do not qualify as normal determinants of LLPs but that are more likely connected to the discretionary part of LLPs, such as Tier 1 and Size. Given the incentives for opportunistic reporting that Tier 1 introduces, it can be considered one of the main determinants of DLLPs (see Ahmed et al., 1999; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008). Regarding Size, the same explanation holds. Banks of different size are likely to be subject to different levels of regulatory scrutiny Beatty and Liao, 2014, which will result in differences in the level of discretion over provisioning. We also include a Loss indicator, which accounts for the fact that banks are more likely to manipulate provisions when their income is negative (see Brown, 2001; Frankel et al., 2002). We further include a control for growth in assets, which is associated with abnormal accruals, as documented in prior research (see Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). Finally, we control for the effect of the business cycle on provisioning by including GDP growth (following Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Perez et al., 2008; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015) and growth in unemployment (following Beck and Narayanamoorooth, 2013).10

In turn, we estimate Eq. (2) with the absolute value of income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs as dependent variables. Income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs are defined as \(\max(\text{DLLP}_{it}, 0)\), whereas income-decreasing (negative) DLLPs are defined as \(-\min(\text{DLLP}_{it}, 0)\). Note that, according to this convention, both components are positive such that a decrease in both positive and negative DLLPs implies an overall decrease in discretionary reporting. Another way to think about this concept is that the share of discretionary LLPs decreases, or DLLPs become less volatile. Thus, a negative DiD coefficient \(\theta_3\) in Eq. (2) means that, after the adoption of Basel II, IRB banks recognize less income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs relative to Standardized banks.

### 3.2. Income smoothing through LLPs

Building on previous literature (Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011; Klic et al., 2013), we estimate income smoothing as the coefficient relating LLPs to earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPT), after controlling for differences in the amount and type of loans, non-performing loans, bank size, time dummies, and bank fixed effects. Although our interest is in the effect of Basel II on DLLPs, which involves regressing the residuals of Eq. (1) on the Basel II dummy, such a two-step approach may lead to an attenuation bias in the second stage coefficients. Therefore, we follow (Kanagaretnam et al., 2004) and, in a single step, regress LLPs simultaneously on their normal determinants and the Basel II dummy. Similar to (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011), we refrain from including taxes as a determinant of discretion in LLPs. Income taxes in most European countries are based on individual (statutory) financial statements and individual tax effects cancel out for consolidated accounts. Thus, we do not expect tax incentives to play a major role.

---

10 We thank an anonymous referee for making this suggestion.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the adoption of Basel II is associated with a decrease in the level of income smoothing. To determine whether IRB banks engage in less income smoothing, we focus on the relationship between LLPs and EBPT. If banks engage in income smoothing, they use DLLPs to lower LLPs when EBPT are low and increase them when EBPT are high (Ahmed et al., 1999; Liu and Ryan, 2006). Consequently, a positive association between these variables indicates that banks are smoothing income. We control for the normal determinants of LLPs to test whether the discretionary part of LLPs is associated with EBPT. We test Hypothesis 2 in the following regression, inspired by Kim and Kross (1998), Ahmed et al. (1999), Liu and Ryan (2006), and Kilic et al. (2013):

$$\text{LLP}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Basel}_{i} + \beta_2 \text{IRB}_{i} + \beta_3 \text{Basel}_{i} \cdot \text{IRB}_{i} + \beta_4 \text{EBPT}_{it} \cdot \text{IRB}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{IRB}_{it} \cdot \text{EBPT}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{NPL}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{NCO}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Loan}_t + \beta_9 \text{Tier 1}_{it} + \beta_{10} \text{Size}_{it} + \beta_{11} \text{GDP Growth}_{it} + \beta_{12} \Delta \text{Unemployment}_{it} + \beta_{13} \text{HPI}_{it} + \beta_{14} \text{Term Spread}_{it} + \gamma_1 + \delta_1 + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (3)$$

where HPI$_t$ is the country-specific House Price Index (HPI) return and Term Spread$_{it}$ is the country-specific difference between short-term and long-term interest rates. The $\beta_4$ coefficient represents the association between LLPs and EBPT, and, if positive and significant, shows that banks smooth income. $\beta_5$ is the incremental effect after the adoption of Basel II. If the requirements of Basel II make banks rely less on LLPs to smooth their income, then $\beta_5$ should be negative and significant. Hypothesis 2 implies that the DiD coefficient $\beta_7$, which measures the incremental effect of the Basel II adoption on the extent to which IRB banks smooth income, is negative. As in Eq. (2), we use NPL, $\Delta$NPL, Loan, $\Delta$Loan, and NCO to control for the normal determinants (non-discretionary part) of LLPs. We expect a positive coefficient for Loan because the larger the amount of loans held as assets by a bank, the more LLPs it will have. The change in total loans outstanding can be positively or negatively related to the level of LLPs depending on the riskiness of the loans. Regarding the level of non-performing loans (NPL) and their change ($\Delta$NPL), we expect a positive relation with LLPs because more non-performing loans require higher provisioning. We further include controls for Tier 1 and Size, and we account for the potential impact of the business cycle on loan loss provisioning using GDP Growth, $\Delta$Unemployment, House Price Index returns, and Term Spread. Our use of year dummies and bank fixed effects is consistent with the cross-country studies of Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) and Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011).

3.3. Market valuation of DLLPs

Following Kilic et al. (2013), we measure the market valuation of DLLPs as the coefficient in a regression of annual stock returns on DLLPs. Similar to prior literature that deals with the information content of reported numbers (Tucker and Zarrow, 2006), our study assumes market efficiency. We test Hypothesis 3 using bank fixed effect and year dummies in a DiD design. Our interest is in analyzing how the association between market returns and DLLPs changes before and after the adoption of Basel II for IRB versus Standardized banks. We also allow for a DiD in the effect of EBPT on stock returns to ensure that the adoption of Basel II specifically impacts the valuation of DLLPs and that our results are not driven by the influence of other confounding effects at the time of the adoption. To test Hypothesis 3, we estimate the following regression model.

$$R_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Basel}_{i} + \beta_2 \text{IRB}_{i} + \beta_3 \text{Basel}_{i} \cdot \text{IRB}_{i} + \beta_4 \text{DLLP}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Basel}_{i} \cdot \text{DLLP}_{it} + \gamma_1 \text{IRB}_{it} \cdot \text{DLLP}_{it} + \gamma_2 \text{IRB}_{it} + \gamma_3 \text{Basel}_{i} \cdot \text{EBPT}_{it} + \gamma_4 \text{Basel}_{i} \cdot \epsilon_{it} + \gamma_5 \text{IRB}_{it} \cdot \text{EBPT}_{it} + \gamma_6 \text{Basel}_{i} \cdot \epsilon_{it} + \gamma_7 \epsilon_{it} + \gamma_8 \text{Basel}_{i} \cdot \epsilon_{it} + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (4)$$

where $R_{it}$ is the yearly stock return computed from the end of the first quarter. Note that for this estimation, EBPT$_{it}$, $\Delta$NPL$_{it}$, and NCO$_{it}$ are scaled by the beginning market value of total equity (market capitalization). Our choice of controls is based on the notion that the market reacts more to the disclosure of bad relative to good news (see Mendenhall and Nichols, 1988; Basu, 1997). Non-performing loans (NPL) and net charge-offs (NCO) are considered bad news for banks, and prices are likely to respond to changes in their level. Although Eq. (4) builds on the U.S.-based studies of Kilic et al. (2013) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), in addition to year dummies, we also include bank fixed effects to deal with the endogeneity issues raised by the possible presence of unobserved bank-level heterogeneity given that we rely on a sample of banks from 24 countries.

If the adoption of Basel II discourages IRB banks from relying on DLLPs to smooth income, then the reported provisions should become more informative for investors. Moreover, if IRB banks incorporate more forward-looking information regarding expected losses through the discretionary part of reported LLPs, then the association between returns and DLLPs should be positive and significant. Specifically, we expect that the DiD coefficient $\gamma_1$, which represents the incremental impact of Basel II on IRB banks, is positive and significant. If the market valuation of LLPs changes after 2008 because of other confounding effects and not from the impact of Basel II on DLLPs, then $\gamma_1$ becomes significant.

4. Data description

We test our hypotheses for a broad sample of listed banks in the European Union. We choose listed banks in the EU because they had to apply Basel II in 2008. These banks provide us with a common adoption point to test the impact of Basel II. Second, because all listed banks in the EU had to adopt IFRS in 2008, we also have a homogeneous pre-Basel II adoption sample (from 2005 onwards). This homogeneous setting provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of Basel II relative to the previous banking regulations.

The core financial data stems from the BVD Bankscope database. Given the large number of missing observations, similar to Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011), we complete the data with hand-collected loan loss provisions (LLPs), non-performing loans (NPL), net charge-offs (NCO), net income, total assets, EBPT, and Tier 1 from banks’ annual reports published on their websites. We start from an initial sample of 284 listed banks in the EU, as available from Bankscope. After eliminating banks with missing financial data that could not be manually collected with reasonable efforts, we further exclude banks that underwent mergers or that are subsidiaries of other banks. Finally, we are left with 103 listed banks from 24 EU countries. This process results in 618 bank-year observations. Nonetheless, we lose 80 observations given missing values for Net Charge-Offs (NCO), the most difficult variable to collect. In contrast to Kim and Kross (1998), we do not need to exclude voluntary adopters to avoid biasing our findings, because, to the best of our knowledge, no bank in the sample adopted the IRB approach of Basel II earlier than 2008. We further obtain stock returns and the market value of equity data from Datastream.

Following Kilic et al. (2013), we restrict our sample to focus on the changes around the adoption year and to avoid the confounding effect of other events. Thus, we construct a Basel II dummy
variable, which takes the value 0 in the pre-Basel II period before 2008 and 1 thereafter. 11

To classify the banks on the basis of the extent to which they are affected by the adoption of Basel II, we distinguish the 63 banks that follow the IRB approach from the 40 banks that apply the Standardized approach. Because Basel II changes incentives for IRB banks regarding the use of DLLPs but leaves them unchanged for the banks following the Standardized approach, we use the latter ones as a control group to test our hypotheses. Having such a control group helps us distinguish between the effect of Basel II that affects only IRB banks and any other factors that could affect all banks during that period. This control group is particularly important during times of economic turbulence, which render pre-post comparisons challenging to implement without a control group.

In our sample, seven banks (out of 103) switch from Standardized to IRB after the adoption of Basel II. To mitigate potential identification issues, we keep the late switchers in the Standardized group during the Basel II adoption period until the year of their switch to IRB. Thus, if Standardized and IRB banks are structurally different and our results are driven by effects other than the adoption of Basel II, grouping switchers with Standardized banks likely weakens our results by reducing our DiD coefficients. Thus, our results are robust to this potential identification issue, and our coefficients can be viewed as lower bounds because we are considering the case that is least favorable in terms of finding significant results. 12

Table 3 provides summary statistics. The key characteristics of our sample are similar to those of comparable European samples used in the extant literature. Given the differences in the underlying samples, the mean value for LLPs and NPLs of 0.006 (0.023) for IRB and 0.007 (0.037) for Standardized banks is in line with the mean value of 0.006 for the subsample of European banks in Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) and 0.007 in the sample of Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011). Moreover, the size of the change in Loans in our sample (0.051 for IRB and 0.072 for Standardized banks) seems to correspond well with the values of 0.045 in Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) and of 0.100 in Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011).

Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations of our main variables. As in the previous literature, LLPs are correlated with EBPT, NPL, and Loans (Kim and Kross, 1998; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008).
5. Results

5.1. Income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs

Table 5 shows the results of the first-step regression of LLPs on their normal determinants, as per Eq. (1). We perform this estimation first for the full sample in Column (1) and for a reduced sample in Column (2), which excludes 2008—the adoption year of Basel II—as well as 2011. This estimation is performed to eliminate potential implementation issues with respect to the year of adoption of Basel II. Additionally, because 2008 coincides with the period of an economic crisis in Europe, we want to test whether our results are robust to the exclusion of a year of high economic turmoil that might have affected banks’ reported numbers. Similar to Kilic et al. (2013), we want to avoid a biased analysis from confounding events when using a larger post-adoption window. Moreover, we further exclude 2011 from our sample to have a shorter (two-year) and symmetric pre-and post-adoption window. The residuals of this estimation are the discretionary LLPs, i.e., the part of LLPs that cannot be attributed to normal determinants. The results from both samples are nearly identical and imply that approximately 56 percent of the variation in LLPs is the result of normal determinants, whereas the rest is discretionary.

Further, we split the sample between positive (income-increasing) and negative (income-decreasing) DLLPs and use Eq. (2) to determine whether the adoption of Basel II changes the way IRB and Standardized banks recognize the two types of DLLPs. In Eq. (2), the main coefficient of interest is the interaction between Basel and IRB ($\delta_3$). This coefficient shows whether, after the adoption of Basel II, IRB banks recognize incrementally more or less DLLPs relative to Standardized ones. We perform this estimation with and without time dummies for the full sample and for the sample that excludes years 2008 and 2011.

Table 6 shows the results of the regression of income-increasing (Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7)) and income-decreasing DLLPs (Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8)) on the Basel II dummy, as per Eq. (2). Using income-increasing DLLPs as a dependent variable, we obtain a negative $\delta_3$ coefficient, which is significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficients in Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) imply that, relative to the pre-adoption period, the magnitude of income-increasing DLLPs of IRB banks becomes 78% of a standard deviation smaller than that of Standardized banks after Basel II.13

Moreover, the results are remarkably stable across all four estimations for both the value and level of significance of the coefficient. Therefore, IRB banks, relative to Standardized banks, reduce the level of income-increasing DLLPs after the adoption of Basel II. Taken together, these results confirm Hypothesis 1.A. Basel II introduces an incentive for banks to reduce their income-increasing DLLPs. Specifically, given the connection between DLLPs and regulatory capital, IRB banks are likely to rely less on income-increasing DLLPs for opportunistic reasons in the post-adoption relative to the pre-adoption period. Given that regulatory pressure is targeted at IRB banks, finding an incremental impact of Basel II adoption for these banks confirms our expectations.

With income-decreasing DLLPs, $\theta_3$ is negative and has the same magnitude as income-increasing DLLPs for the entire sample, but is

---

13 Because the coefficients are based on a fixed-effect estimation, we use the within firm standard deviation of income-increasing DLLPs based on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with firm effects as the only factors. The result is 0.0014 for income-increasing DLLPs.
IRB Basel try-specific Gross Domestic Product, $D$ dict log of beginning total assets, Growth in the estimations that include them.

The impact of Basel II on banks’ income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 2008 &amp; 2011 excluded</th>
<th>Whole sample</th>
<th>Negative DLLP</th>
<th>Positive DLLP</th>
<th>Negative DLLP</th>
<th>Positive DLLP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel</td>
<td>0.0014**</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0011*</td>
<td>-0.0010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel*IRB</td>
<td>-0.0011*</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0011*</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL (lagged)</td>
<td>-0.1154**</td>
<td>0.2349**</td>
<td>-0.0619</td>
<td>0.2008*</td>
<td>0.0334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBPT</td>
<td>0.0848**</td>
<td>0.1244</td>
<td>0.0936**</td>
<td>0.1544</td>
<td>0.1866*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>0.0011*</td>
<td>0.0055**</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0050*</td>
<td>0.0019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>-0.0027</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>-0.0050</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>0.0026*</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0029*</td>
<td>-0.0012</td>
<td>0.0027*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier1</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0003**</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0005**</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔUnemployment</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.0127</td>
<td>0.0271</td>
<td>-0.0205</td>
<td>0.0516</td>
<td>-0.0184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year dummies</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses: "p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.

The regression model is:

$$\text{DLLP}_{it} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 \text{Basel} + \theta_2 \text{IRB} + \theta_3 \text{IRB} + \theta_4 \text{IRB} + \theta_5 \text{EBPT}_{it} + \theta_6 \text{Size}_{it} + \theta_7 \text{GDP Growth}_{it} + \theta_8 \text{ΔUnemployment}_{it} + \theta_9 \text{Tier1}_{it} + \theta_10 \text{Loss}_{it} + \theta_11 \text{EBPT}_{it} + \theta_12 \text{Size}_{it} + \theta_13 \text{GDP Growth}_{it} + \theta_14 \text{ΔUnemployment}_{it} + \theta_15 \text{Tier1}_{it} + \theta_16 \text{Loss}_{it} + \epsilon_{it},$$

where, for bank $i$, year $t$, and country $c$, DLLP<sub>it</sub> are discretionary loan loss provisions, obtained as the residual of Eq. (1), Basel is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRB is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, LL<sub>it+1</sub> is lagged LL scaled by beginning total assets, EBPT<sub>it</sub> is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets, Loss<sub>it</sub> is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise, Size<sub>it</sub> is bank size measured as the log of beginning total assets, GDP Growth<sub>it</sub> is the growth rate of total assets, Tier1<sub>it</sub> is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, GDP Growth<sub>it</sub> is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, ΔUnemployment<sub>it</sub> is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, $\gamma_i$ is a time effect, $\delta_i$ is a bank fixed effect, and $\epsilon_{it}$ is a residual. Basel, IRB, and EBPT are included in the equation for completeness of the DID effect, but the $\theta_i$ parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects and year dummies in the estimations that include them.

not significant. This lack of significance is potentially the result of a reduced sample size<sup>14</sup> or to the short post-Basel II adoption window in our sample. The reduction in the magnitude of income-decreasing DLLPs corresponds to 38% of the standard deviation of positive DLLPs, approximately half the effect we obtain for negative DLLPs.<sup>15</sup> Thus, overall, we find very weak support for Hypothesis 1B.

Regarding the control variables, their coefficients are in line with the previous literature. Lagged DLLPs are positively (negatively) associated with the absolute value of positive (negative) DLLPs. The coefficient of the Loss variable suggests that when banks suffer losses, they tend to increase both types of DLLPs. Growth is positively associated with the absolute value of income-increasing (negative) DLLPs, but insignificant for income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs. GDP growth is negatively and significantly related only to income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs, whereas the change in unemployment is insignificant for both positive and negative DLLPs.

Our next test allows us to determine whether the overall reduction in income-increasing DLLPs leads to an incremental reduction in the level of opportunistic reporting in IRB banks, proxied by income smoothing through DLLPs.

<sup>14</sup> We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this explanation.

<sup>15</sup> The within firm standard deviation of income-decreasing DLLPs is 0.0029.

5.2. Income smoothing through DLLPs

Table 7 reports the results of the income smoothing regressions of LLPs on EBPT for the entire sample in Columns (1), (2), and (3), and for the reduced sample excluding 2008 and 2011 in Columns (4), (5), and (6). As in the previous subsection, we do this to check the robustness of our results with a shorter post-adoption time window. In this subsection, we are interested in measuring the effect of Basel II adoption on the discretionary part of LLPs, which we obtain as the residual of the regression of LLPs on their normal determinants, as per Eq. (1). However, regressing DLLPs on the Basel II dummies and interactions involves a two-step approach in which the residuals of the first equation are used as a dependent variable in a second stage regression. To avoid an attenuation bias on the coefficients of the second stage, we follow Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) and regress LLPs simultaneously on their normal determinants and on the Basel II variables, as in Eq. (3). Thus, by controlling for the normal determinants of LLPs, we actually assess the association between DLLPs and EBPT without the econometric problems posed by a two-stage regression.

Hypothesis 2 addresses the impact of Basel II adoption on the discretionary part of LLPs, which is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, GDP Growth<sub>it</sub> is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, ΔUnemployment<sub>it</sub> is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, $\gamma_i$ is a time effect, $\delta_i$ is a bank fixed effect, and $\epsilon_{it}$ is a residual. Basel, IRB, and EBPT are included in the equation for completeness of the DID effect, but the $\theta_i$ parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects and year dummies in the estimations that include them.
that banks use DLLPs to reach their income smoothing objectives. The coefficient of interest is $\delta_1$ in Eq. (3) because it measures the incremental impact of Basel II on the income smoothing behavior of IRB relative to Standardized banks. If Basel II reduces the opportunistic use of income-increasing DLLPs for IRB relative to Standardized banks, then we should find that the level of income smoothing for the former is significantly lower relative to the latter sample.

The coefficient $\gamma_1$ of the interaction of Basel IRB and EBPT is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all specified models, which confirms Hypothesis 2. Again, our coefficient is remarkably stable across different periods and is unaffected by the inclusion of year dummies. The magnitudes of the effects imply that a one standard deviation change in EBPT leads to a reduction of approximately 20% of a standard deviation in LLPs in IRB compared to Standardized banks after the adoption of Basel II. 16

The coefficient of the interaction between IRB and EBPT, $\delta_2$, is not significant in any of our estimations. This lack of statistical significance suggests that no pre-intervention differences exist between the IRB and Standardized banks, which lends support to our choice of the control sample. However, the coefficient of the interaction between Basel and EBPT, $\delta_3$, is positive and significant in all specifications. This result suggests that, after 2008, as a reaction to the financial crisis, banks engage in more smoothing of earnings.
Table 8
The association between DLLPs and returns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 2008 excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel</td>
<td>0.2146 0.1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel*IRB</td>
<td>0.0260 −0.0064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.155) (0.107)</td>
<td>(0.167) (0.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLLP</td>
<td>0.7379 −2.7807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.009) (2.770)</td>
<td>(4.296) (3.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel*DLLP</td>
<td>0.6403 1.5738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.416) (2.354)</td>
<td>(3.466) (2.554)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRB*DLLP</td>
<td>4.8257 −4.9095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12.611) (8.725)</td>
<td>(12.268) (9.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel<em>IRB</em>DLLP</td>
<td>30.5861** 17.5741*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11.770) (8.145)</td>
<td>(10.993) (8.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBPT</td>
<td>3.3878** 1.8507**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.579) (0.410)</td>
<td>(0.620) (0.467)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel*EBPT</td>
<td>−1.5427* −1.0232*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.629) (0.436)</td>
<td>(0.638) (0.474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRB*EBPT</td>
<td>−1.0972 −0.9840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.730) (0.511)</td>
<td>(0.776) (0.578)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel<em>IRB</em>EBPT</td>
<td>0.6095 0.8120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.819) (0.572)</td>
<td>(0.833) (0.622)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANPL</td>
<td>0.0064 −0.1633*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.098) (0.069)</td>
<td>(0.103) (0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>−0.9379* −0.3262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.443) (0.308)</td>
<td>(0.494) (0.365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.4748** −0.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year dummies</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.297 0.6570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel<em>DLLP + Basel</em>IRB*DLLP = 0</td>
<td>7.53 5.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>0.0064 0.0155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel<em>EBPT + Basel</em>IRB*EBPT = 0</td>
<td>1.73 0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>0.1899 0.6808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses: **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.

The regression model is:

\[
R_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Basel} + \beta_2 \text{IRB} + \beta_3 \text{Basel} \times \text{IRB} \\
+ \beta_4 \text{DLLP}_{st} + \beta_5 \text{Basel} \times \text{DLLP}_{st} + \beta_6 \text{IRB} \times \text{DLLP}_{st} \\
+ \beta_7 \text{EBPT}_{st} + \beta_8 \text{Basel} \times \text{EBPT}_{st} + \beta_9 \text{IRB} \times \text{EBPT}_{st} + \beta_{10} \text{Basel} \times \text{EBPT}_{st} \\
+ \beta_{11} \text{ANPL}_{st} + \beta_{12} \text{NCO}_{st} + \gamma_t + \delta_i + \epsilon_{st}. \tag{8}
\]

where, for bank i, year t, and country c, \(R_{st}\) is the annual stock return measured from April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t + 1. Basel, is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period. IRB, is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II. DLLPs, are discretionary loan loss provisions, obtained as the residual of the LLP equation, EBPT, is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by the market value of total equity (market capitalization), ANPL, is non-performing loans scaled by the market value of total equity (market capitalization), NCO, is net charge-offs scaled by the market value of total equity (market capitalization), and \(\epsilon_{st}\), is a residual. Basel, and IRB, are included in the equation for completeness of the DID effect, but the \(\gamma_t\) and \(\delta_i\) parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects, and year dummies in the estimations that include them.

is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) and the empirical findings of DeFond and Park (1997), Liu and Ryan (1995), and Liu and Ryan (2006) that managers are more likely to smooth earnings in times of economic hardship. Although decreasing in all specifications, an F-test of the null hypothesis that \(\beta_3 + \beta_7 = 0\) reveals that the level of income-smoothing of IRB banks does not change significantly after the implementation of Basel II. Whereas Standardized banks smooth income significantly more after 2008, IRB banks refrain from doing so given the link introduced by Basel II between income smoothing and regulatory capital. The signs of our control variables are consistent with our expectations and with previous research. Regarding the non-discretionary determinants of LLPs, Loans are positively and significantly associated with LLPs in the entire sample, whereas the change in loans is negatively and significantly associated with provisions in all estimations. Both the level and the change in NPL are positively associated with LLPs (Kilic et al., 2013) and are significant (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). Regarding the discretionary determinants of LLPs, Size and Tier 1 do not seem to significantly affect LLPs. Our results suggest that banks recognize more LLPs when the macroeconomic situation deteriorates: LLPs decrease with GDP growth, and increase with unemployment and with the term spread—a predictor of recessions (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). In our sample, housing price index returns do not seem to be systematically related to LLPs.

5.3. Market valuation of DLLPs

Hypothesis 3 predicts that the market valuation of DLLPs increases after the adoption of Basel II for IRB relative to Standardized banks.

Table 8 provides the results of the regression of stock returns on DLLPs. Unlike our previous hypotheses, this estimation assumes market efficiency (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006) because it relies on market prices. We can faithfully assess the information content of DLLPs.

\(^{17}\) Our results are robust to interacting macroeconomic variables with an IRB dummy to allow for a differential impact of the business cycle on IRB and Standardized banks. The results of these estimations (not reported in the interest of space) are available on request.
For Standardized banks, whose provisioning is not affected by requirements, which is incorporated in stock prices by the market.

Expected losses and about banks’ ability to meet capital solvency risks. DLLPs of IRB banks contain more information regarding future earnings and EBPT change in opposite directions following the introduction of Basel II, which makes it very unlikely that the increase in the valuation of DLLPs is the result of factors other than Basel II.

The coefficient \( \theta \) of the Basel*IRB*DLLP triple interaction is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in Column (1), at the 5 percent level in Columns (2) and (3), and at the 8 percent level in Column (4). Although its magnitude is difficult to interpret, it implies that a one standard deviation increase in DLLPs leads to an increase of 28%, 16%, 21%, and 13% of the standard deviation of returns, respectively, for Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4). This result indicates that investors infer additional information regarding future earnings cash flows from the DLLPs of IRB banks (Wahlen, 1994; Liu and Ryan, 2006). We further perform F-tests to assess the relative change in the market valuation of DLLPs between the pre- and post-Basel II adoption periods. Our results show that the DLLPs of IRB banks increase significantly after the adoption of Basel II in all columns of Table 6.

Following Kilic et al. (2013), we also include double and triple interactions of EBPT to ensure that the change in the valuation of DLLPs after Basel II is not driven by other confounding effects. In principle, the relation between EBPT and returns should not be influenced by the adoption of Basel II. However, an increase in both the market valuation of IRB banks’ EBPT and DLLPs could suggest that, overall, an increase in the informativeness of IRB banks’ reported numbers occurred independent of the implementation of Basel II. Our results show a negative and significant Basel*EBPT interaction, suggesting that the market decreases the valuation of EBPT in the post-Basel II period. This result is consistent with the idea that earnings are less informative in periods of economic turmoil. Moreover, the Basel*EBPT*EBPT coefficient is insignificant in all but one column. In fact, using an F-test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no change in the pre- to post-Basel II market valuation of IRB banks’ EBPT, except when we fail to control for time effects in Column (3). Nonetheless, even in that case, the valuation of DLLPs and EBPT change in opposite directions following the introduction of Basel II, which makes it very unlikely that the increase in the valuation of DLLPs is the result of factors other than Basel II.

Overall, our test of Hypothesis 3 confirms that investors view the DLLPs of IRB banks as more informative after the adoption of Basel II. The positive association between returns and the DLLPs of IRB banks in the post-2008 period indicates that Basel II sends a twofold message to financial market participants. Specifically, DLLPs of IRB banks contain more information regarding future expected losses and about banks’ ability to meet capital solvency requirements, which is incorporated in stock prices by the market. For Standardized banks, whose provisioning is not affected by Basel II requirements, we find no significant change in the valuation of their DLLPs.

6. Robustness

6.1. Selection

We further check the robustness of our results to a modification in the manner in which we handle the small group of banks that did not adopt IRB from the beginning, but changed status in the years following the adoption of Basel II. So far, we treated late adopters as Standardized banks up until the year of their switch to IRB. We run our tests again by considering the banks that switch from the Standardized to the IRB group after the Basel II adoption as Standardized during the full sample period, even after they switch to IRB. This helps mitigate potential identification issues and ensures that our results are not driven by differences in the underlying characteristics and structure of banks in the two groups. Grouping switchers with Standardized banks is likely to weaken our results by reducing our DiD coefficients. The coefficients can be viewed as lower bounds because we consider a case that is least favorable in terms of finding significant results. Our results are robust to the use of this different classification of banks into IRB and Standardized banks, which indicates that the change in the market valuation of the DLLPs of IRB banks can be attributed to the adoption of Basel II.

6.2. Placebo

The validity of DiD estimations relies on the parallel trends assumption for the IRB and Standardized groups. Although it is difficult to directly test this assumption, we build on Schnabl (2012), Srivastava (2014) and Chodorow-Reich (2014), and perform a series of placebo tests. The tests consist of re-estimating our models, but with an intervention that occurs in 2007—one year before the adoption of Basel II. To confirm that our results are due to the impact of Basel II, we expect that in all placebo estimations our main coefficients of interest will be insignificant. The results for our three tests (available on request) mostly confirm our findings. With the 2007 placebo, we find no significant effect for either income-increasing or income-decreasing DLLPs. Regarding income-smoothing, we find no significant Placebo*IRB*EBPT interaction in any of the specifications. Significant pre-placebo intervention differences exist between the two groups only in the reduced sample, which is possibly due to there being only one year left in the pre-adoption period. Moreover, in the entire sample, we find a significant change in income-smoothing in 2007 for Standardized banks, which confirms that these banks increase the level of income-smoothing in response to the crisis one year before the implementation of Basel II. Finally, in the market valuation tests, we find no significant effect of any of our DLLP interactions, which confirms our main results.

6.3. U.S. control sample

To further check the robustness of our results, we construct a second control sample composed of 63 listed U.S. commercial banks obtained from BVD Bankscope. Like Standardized banks, U.S. banks were not required to implement Basel II and continued to apply Basel I throughout our sample period (see e.g., Dugan and Xi, 2011; Getter, 2012). Moreover, compared with the EU, we expect a lower level of income smoothing in the United States, where the incurred loss model has been strictly applied for decades (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). Thus, even if the financial crisis provides them with similar incentives, U.S. banks likely engage in less earnings smoothing in the post-Basel II period than Standardized banks. Therefore, it is more difficult for us to find significant results from a comparison of IRB with U.S. banks. A significant difference between the behavior of IRB and U.S. banks.

19 These results are not reported to save space but are available on request.
20 Unfortunately, we have only two years in the pre-adoption period, which leaves us with only one year as a possible placebo and a one-year pre-intervention period.
21 The beginning of the economic crisis is often associated with the rapid rise in interbank interest rates in the United States on August 9, 2007.
Table 9 shows the results of our three main estimations obtained with the U.S. control group. Overall, in all model specifications, the direction and significance of our main coefficients of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
<th>Column 3</th>
<th>Column 4</th>
<th>Column 5</th>
<th>Column 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basel</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>-0.0077</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>-0.0106</td>
<td>-0.0796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel*EBPT</td>
<td>0.0858</td>
<td>-0.0222</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>-0.1817</td>
<td>0.2472</td>
<td>0.5333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRB*EBPT</td>
<td>-0.3528</td>
<td>-0.3438</td>
<td>-0.3191</td>
<td>-0.3043</td>
<td>-1.8499</td>
<td>-0.8040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLP (lagged)</td>
<td>0.0094</td>
<td>-0.3057**</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.1515**</td>
<td>0.0577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.1515**</td>
<td>0.0577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆Loan</td>
<td>-0.0165**</td>
<td>-0.0165**</td>
<td>-0.0165**</td>
<td>-0.0165**</td>
<td>-0.0165**</td>
<td>-0.0165**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPL</td>
<td>0.2408**</td>
<td>0.2408**</td>
<td>0.2408**</td>
<td>0.2408**</td>
<td>0.2408**</td>
<td>0.2408**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆NPL</td>
<td>0.1515**</td>
<td>0.1515**</td>
<td>0.1515**</td>
<td>0.1515**</td>
<td>0.1515**</td>
<td>0.1515**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>-0.0094</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>-0.0062</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0014</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPI</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.0242**</td>
<td>0.0807*</td>
<td>-0.0212</td>
<td>-0.0228</td>
<td>-0.4494**</td>
<td>0.1371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>333 213</td>
<td>658 658</td>
<td>512 512</td>
<td>512 512</td>
<td>512 512</td>
<td>512 512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.477</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. This table shows estimation results for Eqs. (2)–(4) when we use U.S. commercial banks as a control group. In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variables are, respectively, income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs. Income smoothing results are shown in Columns (3) and (4), where DLLPs are the dependent variable, and Columns (5) and (6) show market valuation results where the dependent variable is the annual stock return measured from April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t + 1. Basel is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRB is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, EBPT is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets in Columns (3) and (4) and by the market value of total equity (market capitalization) in Columns (5) and (6). Loss is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise, Loan and ∆Loan, are loans and their first difference, respectively, scaled by beginning total assets, NPL is change in non-performing loans scaled by the market value of total equity, ∆NPL is change in non-performing loans scaled by the market value of total equity, Tier 1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, Size is bank size measured as the log of beginning total assets, GDP Growth is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, ∆Unemployment is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, HPI is the country-specific House Price Index (HPI) return.
interest are similar to the ones in our results for Standardized banks. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 show the effect of Basel II on income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs. The magnitude of the effect of Basel on income-increasing DLLPs is very similar to the one obtained using Standardized banks: a decrease of $-0.0016$ vs. $-0.00111$ for the EU sample, significant at the $5\%$ level in both cases. Similar to the EU sample, no significant effect of Basel II exists on income-decreasing DLLPs for IRB relative to U.S. banks. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 show the effect of Basel II on banks’ income smoothing. A significantly lower pre-intervention level of income-smoothing exists for U.S. banks, which is likely the result of stricter implementation of the incurred loss model in the United States (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). The Basel*EBPT interaction is insignificant in both models, which means that the level of income smoothing of U.S. banks after the implementation of Basel II did not change. However, the Basel*IRB*EBPT interaction is negative and significant at the $5\%$ level in both specifications, and the coefficients are larger than for the Standardized control group ($-0.3$ vs. $-0.2$). Finally, for the market valuation of DLLPs, although the Basel*IRB*DLLP triple interaction is not significant, in terms of sign and magnitude, the coefficients are quite similar to the ones we find using the Standardized sample (15 and 23 vs. 30 and 17). Overall, the use of the U.S. sample as a control group confirms our results with the Standardized banks as control group.

7. Conclusion

Although Basel II has sparked substantial debate and scholarly interest in recent years, its effect on the market valuation of banks’ DLLPs has not received attention. Yet, as our results show, the new prudential regulation leads IRB banks to recognize lower income-increasing DLLPs and rely less on DLLPs to smooth their income in comparison to Standardized banks. This makes the DLLPs of IRB banks more informative about, both, future loan losses and banks’ ability to meet capital solvency requirements. As a consequence, Basel II leads to a higher market valuation of IRB banks’ DLLPs relative to those of Standardized banks.

Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we perform an empirical analysis of the implications of the 2008 Basel II adoption on the market valuation of DLLPs. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so and our findings underscore the impact of banking regulators’ requirements on the provisioning of banks for financial reporting purposes (Moyer, 2006). We therefore contribute to the literature that analyzes the impact of changes in banking or accounting regulations on the informativeness and market valuation of banks’ DLLPs (e.g., Ahmed et al., 1999; Beatty et al., 1995; Kim and Kross, 1998; Kilic et al., 2013). Second, our findings add to the literature that analyzes the role of discretion in provisioning for financial reporting outcomes (e.g., Bushman and Williams, 2012; Perez et al., 2008). Our results show that the market values the use of non-opportunistic discretion in provisioning. This finding adds to the debate on the need to improve the incurred loss approach of IAS 39 (PriceWaterhouseCooper’s, 2012).

Our findings are relevant for banking regulators because our results suggest a need to examine how the new IFRS 9 (effective as of 2018) will interact with their own changes in the regulations, namely, the move from Basel II to Basel III in 2019.\footnote{Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) represents the first step in the implementation of Basel III in the EU. This regulation was adopted by the EU in 2013. CRD IV applies as of January 1, 2014. Part of the provisions will be phased in between 2014 and 2019 (European Parliament, 2011).} In fact, our study highlights a strong need for banking and accounting standard setters to coordinate their efforts.

To a certain extent, these standard setters may have diverging objectives and their respective regulations can impair the other party’s ability to achieve its goals. We find evidence for just such an effect. Whereas the IFRS—given the incurred loss approach of IAS 39—in combination with the capital regulations of Basel I, create an incentive to use opportunistic income-increasing DLLPs, this incentive disappears with the adoption of Basel II for IRB banks. Thus, the adoption of Basel II introduces a counter-acting incentive for IRB banks to decrease the use of income-increasing DLLPs, typically viewed as particularly opportunistic. Recognizing less income-increasing DLLPs shields IRB banks from suffering regulatory capital reductions. In turn, this phenomenon contributes to the financial stability of IRB banks, in line with banking regulators’ objectives. Yet, the incentive for using income-increasing DLLPs still persists for Standardized banks—an aspect recently criticized in the literature (Rossignolo et al., 2013). Given the worldwide financial consequences of banking crises, it is important to provide harmonized regulations and avoid conflicting signals, which might otherwise lead to high economic and societal costs.

References


European Parliament, 2011. CRD IV impact assessment of different measures within the capital requirements directive IV.


PriceWaterhouseCooper’s, 2004. ‘Joining the dots – tackling the Basel II and IFRS debate.’


