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## Individualism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism

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## Chapter 3

# A Conceptual Model of the Relationships between Individualism, Ethnocentrism, Nationalism and Authoritarianism

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### 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present a comprehensive literary review of the definitions and interdependencies among individualism, ethnocentrism, nationalism and authoritarianism that will serve as input to the conceptual model to be tested in subsequent empirical chapters.

The present chapter deals with the *theoretical* validity of the concepts, as distinguished from measurement validity. Theoretical or conceptual validity analyzes the theoretical meaning of concepts, their dimensions and interrelations. Measurement validity, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters, deals with the relationship between (observed) empirical indicators and the theoretical constructs (or latent variables)

The reason for an extensive chapter on conceptual validity is that there is no conceptual model readily available. This follows from for instance, Altemeyer (1981) who mentions the following four reasons to theoretically and empirically analyze authoritarianism:

- 1) *Conceptualizations have been very casually constructed*—the various pieces of the authoritarian puzzle have been added and deleted at will and for that reason indicates that the various researchers do not have a clear understanding of the problem they are attempting to investigate.
- 2) *Scales have usually been developed very quickly and published long before they were ready for useful scientific investigation*—basically item analysis studies were either completely lacking or substandard in quality or quantity.
- 3) *The research which has been done with these scales has been quite deficient methodologically*—Altemeyer appears somewhat dismayed at the poor reporting of fundamental scientific data, e.g. sample sizes and mean scores, and regards it rather skeptically as a desire to bolster and even disguise poor results, especially when aligned with selective research.
- 4) *The vast majority of papers in this literature report the results of one-shot, unreplicated studies*—the lack of replication and testing of generalizability, is regarded as a symptom of overall poor research and adherence to scientific procedures.

I shall argue on theoretical grounds and on the basis of a literature review that there is a strong and positive relationship between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism (Schmidt and

Heyder, 2003; Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1982; Eisinga and Scheepers, 1989), and also a strong and positive relationship between nationalism and authoritarianism (Smith, 1998; Scheepers, et al., 1989; Todosijevic, 1999; Stellmacher and Petzel, 2005). The literature also suggests that there is also a strong and positive relationship between ethnocentrism and nationalism (Billiet, et al., 2005). On the other hand Billiet, et al. (2005) support the view that there is a negative relationship between individualism and authoritarianism.

Duckitt (1989) suggests a link between authoritarianism and collectivism, and that both are in opposition to individualism, particularly that both authoritarianism and collectivism submerge individual rights and goals to group goals, expectations and conformities. Nevertheless, Peters and Marshall (1996) argue that collectivism, if properly defined, is based on consensus decision-making, the opposite of authoritarianism.

Individualistic people tend to not be coercive in their behavior; they will not try to dominate other people. In liberal government, in which the concept of individualism is highly regarded, authoritarianism is not a strong ideology. Liberal government has a tendency to not conduct repressive action to compel or dominate its citizen.

In a community that is ethnicity-oriented, individuals are suggested or even obliged to acknowledge the origin of their own indigenous people and adopt their ethnic-cultural practices and customs. If they do not, they will be penalized for breaking rule. This imposition is carried out through various mechanisms, although not necessarily by means of physical force. In this way, the self-interest of individual will be neglected, in the interest of the ethnical group. Hence, the ethnocentrism leads to authoritarianism.

That tendency also applies to nationalism. Nationalism is also a belief in the collective. The difference between nationalism and ethnicity is that ethnicity is more based on the relation of people with similar historic-cultural background, while nationalism is based on the obligation to value and follow the state or country. Albeit ethnicity more focuses on the cultural aspect and nationalism on the state, both concepts have similarities, namely put the group interest above the individual interest.

Below, the four concepts are defined in micro terms and related to the underlying philosophical paradigms and value systems. Moreover, they are integrated into one comprehensive conceptual model. In section 3.2, the concept of individualism is discussed and in section 3.3 the concept of ethnocentrism. In section 4.4 the concept nationalism is paid attention to and in section 3.5 the concept of authoritarianism. In section 3.6, the conceptual model of interdependencies between individualism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and authoritarianism variables is presented.

### 3.2 Individualism

For the present study, individualism involves the pursuit of personal happiness and independence rather than collective goals or interests, and the belief that society exists for the benefit of individual people, who must not be constrained by government interventions or made subordinate to collective interests. In general, it can be said that individualism is each system of thought that puts an individual above the collective. Individualism gives importance to each individual and emphasizes the differences of each individual (Elliott and Lemert, 2006).

The term ‘individualism’ itself was significantly coined by the French intellectual Alexis de Tocqueville in the early nineteenth century to describe an emerging sense of social isolation in American society (Elliott and Lemert, 2006). The term ‘individualism’ was used in connection with democracy in American society and contrasted the American social structure with the structures found in the aristocratic European tradition. In this way, de Tocqueville was the first to present individualism at the individual level as more than just egoism, although he feared that egoism would become its final phase (Gelfand, et al., 1996).

In general, the term individualism refers to the emphasis on individuals. The individual rights and freedom can only be limited by the equal rights and freedom of other individuals, and not by the internal relation with the community. Thus, the social order might be fostered and steadied if only the personal interest of each individual is respected and fed well so that cooperation and harmony will come.

In a social-political context, Stata, (1992) asserts that individualism means, *first*, that the core virtuosity of community or state is to foster the rights, give assurance of freedom, and improve the development of individuals. Community or state is a device used by the individuals to achieve those objectives. The community exists for the sake of its individual members. *Second*, individualism holds that the government should not intervene too much to fulfill the individual interests, especially if that involvement might harm other members of community. *Third*, the government must comprise the individual powers such that they can withstand external pressure.

Historically, Liberalism has been the root of individualism. Liberalism is a belief in individualism which, under the influence of neo-classical liberal economics, is postulated in terms of *homo economicus*, a universalist conception based upon three main assumptions: individuality, rationality, and the maximization of self-interest. Individualism emphasizes civic liberties and freedom. It emerged in opposition to authoritarian oppression during the late 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially the American Revolution and French revolution (Kemmelmeier et al., 2003). In a social-politic context, it implies the recognition of individual self-determination, individual human rights, and the limitation of state control over the individual.

Individualists emphasize independence, self-reliance, and agency, rather than social integration or communion, and tend to pursue their self-interests rather than collective goals (Kemmelmeyer et al, 1999). From the socio-cultural point of view, Goncalo and Staw (2006) define individualism as a set of cultural values that emphasizes individual autonomy, the prioritization of personal goals over group goals, and the definition of one's self in terms of one's individuality and uniqueness different from the group. In contrast, collectivism is a set of cultural values that emphasizes group harmony, the prioritization of collective goals over personal goals, and the definition of one's self in terms of the groups one belongs to.

The debate about the nature of the relationship of the individual to the state culminated in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century and early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Gelfand et al. (1996) explains that philosophers such as John Locke emphasized the freedom of the individual within the state. The importance of freedom of individuals was reflected in the American Revolution (all humans are created equal) and the French Revolution (liberty, equality, fraternity). Other philosophers, such as Jean Jacques Rousseau emphasized the importance of the collective over any particular individual. Both views are reflective of the emphasis on the relative importance of the individual and collective.

Gelfand et al. (1996) also shows that political philosophers of the 20th century, including Dewey (1930), Dumont (1986), and Kateb (1992), further developed ideas related to individualism. Dewey (1930), for example, distinguishes what he referred to as 'old' individualism, which includes the liberation from legal and religious restrictions, from the 'new' individualism, which focuses on self-cultivation. Dumont (1986) discusses individualism as a consequence of Protestantism (i.e. humans do not have to go to church to communicate with God), political developments (emphasis on equality and liberty), and economic developments (e.g. affluence).

A major recent development in political philosophy is the exploration of the possibility of societies in which there are some desirable attributes of both collectivism and individualism (Taylor, 1989). "Collectivism and individualism are culturally-related psychological structures which have been used to distinguish people within and across various societies" (Shulruf et al, 2007). On the basis of a literary review Taylor (1989) argues that "the most salient feature of individualism is valuing personal independence, which includes self-knowledge, uniqueness, privacy, clear communication, and competitiveness. Collectivism is associated with a strong sense of duty to group, relatedness to others, seeking others' advice, harmony, and working with the group" (Shulruf et al, 2007).

With respect to the social sciences, Gelfand et al. (1996) note that there has been extensive discussion of the constructs of individualism and collectivism in sociology, anthropology, and psychology. While sociology and anthropology mostly focus on the individual as a member of a community, psychological research has mostly focused on the

individual as the unit of analysis. According to Kemmelmeier et al. (2003), one of the central lessons of cultural psychology is that individual and societal levels of analysis have to be carefully distinguished and findings obtained using societies as units of analysis do not necessarily correspond to findings obtained in studies using individuals. This is most apparent in the relationship between the constructs of individualism and collectivism. Individualism (like collectivism and authoritarianism as political-economic-cultural perspectives) are assumed to shape the shared beliefs, attitudes, self-conceptions, norms, and values held by individuals (Triandis, 1995). Because individualism and collectivism are semantic opposites, early research assumed them to define opposite ends of the same psychological dimension such that societies high in individualism are simultaneously low in collectivism and vice versa. However, when individualism and collectivism were assessed as aspects of an individual's belief system, and not as cultural-level phenomena, a different pattern emerged. At the individual level of measurement, according to Kemmelmeier et al. (2003), there is evidence that individuals who are high in individualism are not necessarily low in collectivism and vice versa. It entails that those who are high in individualism may be relatively low or high in collectivism; and those who are low in individualism may be relatively low or high in collectivism.

Nevertheless, individualism and collectivism are usually taken as opposing views. According to Stata (1992) “individualism holds that the individual is the primary unit of reality and the ultimate standard of value. This view does not deny that societies exist or that people benefit from living in them, but it sees society as a collection of individuals, not something over and above them. On the other hand, collectivism holds that the group—the nation, the community, the proletariat, the race, etc.—is the primary unit of reality and the ultimate standard of value. This view, of course, does not deny the reality of the individual. Collectivism holds that one's identity is determined by the groups one interacts with, that one's identity is constituted essentially of relationships with others”.

In the 1980s, specifying the attributes of individualism and collectivism was a central focus of research. A defining attribute of collectivism appears to be the definition of the ‘self as independent for individualists, and as interdependent for collectivists (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In collectivist cultures, the self is conceived as an aspect of a collective—family, tribe, work-group, religious group, party, geographic district, or whatever is considered as an in-group by members of the culture. By contrast, among individualists the definition of the self is unrelated to specific collectives.

A second defining attribute of collectivism, as asserted by Gelfand et al. (1996), is concerned with the goals of the individual and the collective. Among collectivists these goals are such that the individual does what the collective expects, asks, or demands, and rarely opposes the will of the collective. When a conflict exists between one's own goals and the goals of the collective, collectivists think that it is obvious that the collective goals should have priority. By contrast, individualists may have personal goals that are inconsistent with

the goals of their in-groups. When a conflict does exist, many individualists think that it is 'obvious' that the individual goals should have priority.

Triandis (1995, 2001) suggests that "individualism and collectivism may be horizontal where equality is emphasized or vertical where hierarchy is emphasized. Horizontal individualistic people desire to be unique and to do their own thing whereas vertical individualistic people do not only want to do their own thing but also strive to be the very best. People who are horizontal collectivists cooperate with their in-groups. In contrast, those collectivists who submit to the hierarchy defined by their in-groups and are willing to sacrifice themselves for their in-groups are generally vertical in their orientation or focus on hierarchy" (Triandis, 2001; Triandis & Suh, 2002).

According to Gelfand et al. (1996), in addition to defining the attributes of individualism and collectivism, the dimensionality of the constructs has been a topic of debate. Whereas Hofstede's (1980) cultural level analysis suggested that individualism and collectivism have the same basic dimensions, Triandis (1995, 1996) has found that individualism and collectivism have different dimensions. Particularly, Gelfand et al. (1996) observe that exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and also multidimensional scaling analysis, have demonstrated that the constructs of individualism and collectivism are not opposite poles of the same dimension. For instance, individualism and collectivism can be differentiated with respect to achievement. According to Stata (1992), individualism holds that the individual is the unit of achievement. While not denying that one person can build on the achievements of others, individualism points out that achievement goes beyond what has already been done; it is something new that is created by the individual. The individual here is seen as 'the most important element in promoting welfare' (Treasury, 1987). Collectivism, on the other hand, holds that achievement is a product of society. In this view, an individual is a temporary spokesman for the underlying, collective process of progress. However, there is also room for individual contribution.

According to Stata (1992), Individualism or at least how it is defined is often inaccurate meaning that one's being an individualist does not mean that one must alienate oneself from the rest of society. The true definition of individualism has more to do with the focus on the self or individual rather than the whole of society thus having completely different goals and motivations. It is just that working or mixing with others may not always necessarily benefit the individual. The idea behind individualism is not excluding oneself from others or the rest of society but instead working and being with others while maintaining that the individual part or sum thereof is greatly more significant than the whole.

Another widespread misconception relates to extreme individualism and extreme collectivism. In reality, collectivism or individualism if extreme is not right. Rather, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Extreme individualism and extreme collectivism are

contradictory positions—there is no middle ground between them. Extreme “collectivism maintains that the group is an entity in its own right, a thing that can act upon people” (Stata, 1992). Extreme individualism denies this. “Realistic” collectivism, however, sees people being influenced by the group; “realistic” individualism sees them being influenced by other individuals. Realistic collectivism sees people cooperating with the team; realistic individualism with other people. Realistic collectivism sees people focusing on social achievements whereas realistic individualism focuses on the individual and their own achievements. Realistic collectivism and realistic individualism are, by nature, a tightrope walk with the desires of the whole hanging in the balance and the desires of the individual on the other. Realistic collectivism and realistic individualism are, by their natures, acts of balancing the need of the individual against the need of society.

In regard to globalization, new information technologies and multinational capitalism, Elliott and Lemert (2006) affirm that individualism has changed in two crucial ways. *First*, the undermining of traditions—and in particular traditional ways of living—has enormously expanded the range of personal choice and opportunity for many people. As modern societies are more and more ‘detraditionalized’, preexisting ways of doing things become less secure, less taken for granted.

The *second* crucial way in which the ideology of individualism has changed is a consequence of privatization. The neo-liberal crusade to free individual initiative from the control of the state has in recent years seen ravages of cutbacks in welfare provisions or services, as well as the spread of a more market-led, business orientation to the institutions of government, on both sides of the Atlantic. Privatism as a result has become of central importance to large areas of contemporary urban life, especially so in an age of increased mobility and digital technologies.

In regard to their philosophical “implications, both collectivism and individualism rest on certain values and certain assumptions about the nature of man”, as noted by Stata (1992), namely: (1) Responsibility vs. the safety-net, (2) Egoism vs. altruism, (3) Reason, and (4) Political implications.

The first issue, “responsibility versus the social safety-net” mainly has to do with taking responsibility or action and ultimate responsibility for the product or result thereof. The individualists look at themselves as to provide a better life or chance of a more fruitful existence whereas the collectivists expect society to provide. When the result does not meet the individualists’ expectations, they analyze their individual actions and take ultimate responsibility. However, the collectivists do not look to themselves in failure but look to the attributes of society as the ultimate factor.

The second issue, “egoism versus altruism” also has to do with responsibility of the individual and collective but differs from the first issue in that responsibility has more to do with duty and sacrifice. The true individualist has a duty to oneself and may sacrifice for

personal gain whereas the collectivist has a duty to others and are in essence their “brother’s keeper” and willing to make sacrifices for the overall good of the whole or another.

The third issue of reason has to do with original thought and motivation and is often what defines humanity. The fact that humans still exist today is a result of reason in itself. Everything “we think, feel, imagine and do is based on our awareness and our thoughts. Our character, personal identity, and history of achievement are defined by our thoughts. Our very survival depends on reason. Our food, clothes, shelter, and medicine—all are products of thought. Reason is at the core of being human” (Stata, 1992). The individualists see reason as originating from individuals as separate thoughts. Although one may gather with others to share ideas and or reason, still the thoughts or thinking process is individualistic. The collectivists argue that the individual does not determine reason, but in fact reason is determined by society or various groups there within.

The fourth and final issue “political implication” is quite simple and straightforward in nature. This issue mainly has to do with the government’s role as an organizer versus protector. The individualists see the government as protectors of individual freedoms and rights to choose whilst the collectivists see the government as the organizer of individuals to benefit the whole of society so that certain advantages can be enjoyed and shared by all for the greater good or higher purpose that often exceeds that of the individuals themselves.

### **3.3 Ethnocentrism**

The term ‘ethnocentrism’ should be related to terms like ‘ethnic’, ‘ethnicity’, or even ‘ethnogenesis’ and further to terms like ‘prejudice’, ‘stereotype’, ‘racism’ or ‘racial discrimination’. In a simple fashion, ethnocentrism is the conviction of own cultural superiority. Specifically, it is a belief in or assumption of the superiority of the social or cultural group that a person belongs to. In multiethnic society, ethnicity creates the evils of ethnocentrism, prejudice, stereotype and discrimination.

Myers (1990) defines ethnocentrism as “a belief in the superiority of one’s own group and a corresponding disdain for all other groups”. The concept of ethnocentrism according to Morand (1998) implies a strong distinction between “in-groups” (groups with which the individual identifies him or herself), and “out groups” (those, typically minority groups, toward which he or she has no sense of belonging or which are perceived as antithetical to the in-group). Herzon et al. (1978) define ethnocentrism as tendency to glorify in-groups and vilify out-group.

In classic ethnocentrism, the central idea is the favorable evaluations of one’s own group and negative evaluation of other groups. The term classic ethnocentrism is used to designate ethnocentrism that involves this linkage, as when an in-group rates itself favorably

and an out-group unfavorably on the same traits. This form of ethnocentrism is a rigid one because attitudes toward the in-group and out-group are viewed in absolute rather than relative terms. Although the classic version involves in-group bias, it can be distinguished from a less restrictive in-group bias version in which ethnocentrism is simply a matter of giving ratings to one's own group that are higher than those given to another. In this way, classic ethnocentrism is a special and distinctive type of in-group bias. However, according to Raden (2003) this distinction is often not made, and the classical type of in-group bias is treated as prototypical ethnocentrism.

General in-group bias occurs when in-group members give the in-group more favorable evaluations but do not pair favorable evaluations of the in-group with unfavorable evaluations of the out-group. General in-group bias can be regarded as a composite of classic ethnocentrism and simple in-group bias. The importance of the distinction between the classic ethnocentrism and simple in-group bias lies in the possibility that the classic version is a stronger form of ethnocentrism because it involves explicit derogation of the out-group, whereas simple in-group bias does not. Raden (2003) distinguishes the following types of ethnocentrism: (1) classic ethnocentrism, (2) general in group bias, and (3) simple in-group bias.

Ethnocentrism is closely related to racism, namely the prejudice or animosity against people who belong to other races. According to Zick et al. (2008), racism is a strong support of racially legitimized inequality between groups, and it asserts the idea of superiority of one group on the basis of biological or natural differences. With regard to prejudice, Van Hiel and Mervielde (2005) note that people tend to associate prejudice with claims that the White race is superior and beliefs that people of different races should be segregated.

The concept of ethnocentrism was first introduced and used descriptively by Sumner (1906), in which the term has the general meaning of provincialism or cultural narrowness; it meant a tendency in the individual to be 'ethnically centered,' to be rigid in his/her acceptance of the culturally 'alike' and in his/her rejection of the 'unlike'. In Sumner's (1906) ethnocentrism formulation, the notion is that perceptions of in-group superiority are strongly associated with perceptions that out-groups are inferior. One shift from Sumner's formulation, according to Raden (2003), is that he focused largely on in-groups that are unitary societies and have external out-groups, whereas more recent treatments often deal with large and ethnically diverse societies such as the United States. The in-group is typically the dominant ethnic or racial group, and internal minority groups serve as the out-groups.

The concept of ethnocentrism was refined and operationalized by Levinson (1950). Ethnocentrism is considered as being an aspect of ideology. In this view, Levinson (1950) prefers the term 'ethnocentrism' to 'prejudice' because the term 'prejudice' is not entirely adequate, since it has numerous meanings and connotations. In addition, the traditional conception of ethnocentrism differs in several important respects from the usual notion of prejudice. Levinson (1950) states that "prejudice is commonly regarded as a feeling of

dislike against a specific group”, which has specific reference to “race prejudice” or “prejudice against racial and religious minorities”. Ethnocentrism, on the other hand, refers to a relatively consistent frame of mind concerning “aliens” generally. Ethnocentrism, so to say, refers to group relations generally; it has to do not only with numerous groups toward which the individual has hostile opinions and attitudes but, equally important, with groups toward which he is positively disposed (Levinson, 1950). Nevertheless, in Rokeach’s (1960) theory of belief congruence, it is argued that prejudice will be a function of the degree to which other people (groups) are seen to hold dissimilar beliefs. It is belief discrepancy, not categorical distinctions like race and ethnicity, which leads to prejudice.

Ethnocentrism, to a certain extent, is rather different from prejudice or stereotypes. Gardner (1994) notes that the term prejudice refers simply to a judgment about something before the fact (a prejudgment), that represents a preconceived notion about something. A prejudice, however, may have an evaluative component, and the evaluation may be positive or negative. Nevertheless, the definition of prejudice may be restricted even more to refer to negative judgments, in which the definition is often used in the context of ethnic relation.

Based on Adorno, et al (1950), Scheepers et al (1990) emphasize that people who felt attracted to ethnocentrism, had high respect for the in-group, its norms and values, whereas they rejected out-groups in general. This general rejection is not necessarily based on knowledge of out-groups: ethnocentric people may even show their rejection without having had any actual contacts with particular out-groups. This rejection is evidenced by the stereotypical perception of characteristics of out-groups: ethnocentric people perceived out-groups as being dirty, aggressive, lazy, untrustworthy and bad-mannered, whereas the in-group is perceived as being clean, un-aggressive, hard working, honest and well-mannered.

Gardner (1994) also emphasizes that stereotypes have been characterized as rigid, illogical, oversimplified, exaggerated, negative, and so forth. Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) propose that the term “stereotype should be reserved for the set of beliefs held by an individual regarding a social group and the term ‘cultural stereotype’ should be used to describe shared or community-wide patterns of beliefs”.

Levinson (1950) states that “ethnocentrism is based on a pervasive and rigid ingroup-outgroup distinction; it involves stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding out-groups, stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes regarding in-groups, and a hierarchical, authoritarian view of group interaction in which in-groups are rightly dominant, out-groups subordinate”. Levinson (1950) established links between the overriding concept of authoritarianism and its relationship with ethnocentric behavior.

In recent times, some researchers have sought to conceptualize the term prejudice in terms of ethnocentrism in a “modern sense”. This kind of prejudice is opposed to what so-called “old-fashioned” prejudice which mostly contains covert forms of racism. It is called

*modern prejudice* or *subtle prejudice*. Van Hiel and Mervielde (2005) point out that *modern prejudice* or *subtle prejudice* refer to a form of racism that surfaces in less direct ways whenever it is safe, socially acceptable, or easy to rationalize. According to Devine et al (2001), the more subtle forms of racism have been referred to as *modern racism* (McConahay, 1986), *symbolic racism* (Kinder & Sears, 1986), *ambivalent racism* (Katz and Hass, 1988), and *aversive racism* (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986) in the United States. In recent research examining ethnic-national associations in the US, Devos and Banaji (2005) identify a divergence in Americans' *explicit* and *implicit* associations between ethnicity and the concept 'American.' They report that American undergraduates implicitly perceive America as monocultural. "That is, the national category 'American' is consistently more closely implicitly associated with White people, be they faces of unfamiliar White Americans (relative to faces of unfamiliar African and Asian Americans), faces of famous White athletes (relative to faces of African American athletes)" (Sibley, et al, 2009), or first and last names of White celebrities "known to be European (relative to names of Asian celebrities known to be American). In all instances, White Americans" respond more quickly when Whites were paired with symbols representing America. In brief, it shows the somewhat White superiority over the inferiority of out-group. It seems that "implicit" racism still indicates the privileging of Whiteness in the US national imagination.

Non-White Americans to some extent are haunted by their own inferiority. For example, Asian American undergraduates express similar implicit biases, and view their own group as less American than White Americans (Devos and Banaji, 2005). Thus, for both majority and minority groups in the US, it appears that White Americans form the prototypical exemplar of 'real America'.

In Western Europe, the term *subtle racism* is used to capture these more hidden forms of prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995). In spite of this, research efforts to develop measures of old-fashioned and modern racism have evolved independently. Hence, a general framework integrating these various prejudice dimensions is not available.

Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993) develop a model in which four alternative expressions of racism are arrayed on a single dimension that runs from blatant racism through subtle racism to egalitarianism. The most extreme racist position is called *biological racism*, which refers to a belief in White supremacy. Those who adhere to this form of racism agree that differences between racial groups are inherited from parents or possessed from birth. *Symbolic racism* is the second form of racism on the cumulative dimension that also refers to an eagerness to discriminate, but symbolic racists do so because they believe that minorities' different moral values threaten their own culture. The third form of racism, namely *ethnocentrism*, does not imply the wish for racial segregation, but instead is characterized primarily by the differentiation between in-groups and out-groups, as well as by the demand for the submission of out-groups. Finally, *aversive racism*-the least severe sort of prejudice-refers to reluctance to interact with out-group members. People who do not score high on

either of these facet scales are labeled egalitarians. In this sense, Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993) view threat as characteristic for all forms of racism, although threat manifests itself in various ways. In the case of biological racism, out-groups are seen as a biological threat that endangers in-groups, and intergroup conflict represents a racial problem. In the case of symbolic racism and ethnocentrism, the out-group poses a cultural threat, and the conflict is experienced as a societal problem. In the case of aversive racism, contact with members of out-groups is considered threatening, and this is considered to be a social problem. Still, Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993) explicitly arrange the various forms of racism according to their potential to elicit threat and dominance motivations. They assume that superiority is a component of biological and symbolic racism, as well as ethnocentrism, whereas superiority is not typical for aversive racism. In the case of biological racism, superiority translates into biological superiority; in the case of symbolic racism and ethnocentrism, superiority takes the form of assumed cultural supremacy.

### **3.4 Nationalism**

Nationalism, plainly speaking, is a political and social attitude of a group of society that has identical culture, language, and regional background. Thus, those people in that group feel the intense loyalty toward the in-group. In modern sense, nationalism can be traced back from the French Revolution, in which its roots have grown with the resurgence of centralized kingdoms, with the doctrine of Mercantilism economic policy, and birth of strong middle classes. Smith (1998) argues “that while there is significant debate over the historical origins of nations, nearly all specialists accept that nationalism, at least as an ideology and social movements, is a modern phenomenon originating in Europe. Precisely where and when it emerged is difficult to determine, but its development is closely related to that of the modern state and the push for popular sovereignty that came to a head with the French Revolution in the late 18th century” (Laqueur, 1997). “Since that time, nationalism has become one of the most significant political and social forces in history, perhaps most notably as a major influence or cause of World War I and especially World War II due to the rise of fascism, a radical and authoritarian nationalist ideology.”

According to Smith (1993), nationalism is in line with a belief, aspects of culture, or behavior that represents and or focuses on the nation itself. He notes that the paradigm of nationalism, which was so dominant till recently, is that of *classical modernism*. This is the conception that nations and nationalism are intrinsic to the nature of the modern world and to the revolution of modernity. Nowadays, nationalism is associated with desire to unify or national independence, such as the reunification of the two German states; on the other hand, it could be a destructive force in countries with multiethnic society, such as in India, Indonesia, or Israel.

It is necessary to have a clear idea about the term ‘nationalism’ and other key concepts as ‘nation’, ‘nationality’, or ‘national identity’. In this sense, Young et al. (2007) argues that the terms ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ need to be analytically distinguished from that of the ‘state’, especially in the case of composite state-nations like Great Britain. This means that the much-vaunted ‘decline of the state’ in a post-modern epoch is not the same as a decline of nations; analytically, these are quite separate issues. At the same time, substantively, the national state is heavily involved in the question of the decline or persistence of ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’. In the same way, terms like ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ need to be sharply distinguished from ‘nationalism’, seen as an ideology and movement, or ideological movement. They also need to be separated from ‘national sentiments’, defined as overreacted sentiment directed at a particular nationality.

“As an ideology, nationalism holds that ‘the people’ is the nation, and that as a result only nation-states founded on the principle of national self-determination is legitimate. In many cases nationalist pursuit of self-determination has caused conflict between people and states including war (both external and domestic), secession; and in extreme cases, genocide”.

Miscevic (2001) explains that “although the term “nationalism” has a variety of meanings; it centrally encompasses the two phenomena noted at the outset: (1) the specific attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their identity as members of that nation and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take in seeking to achieve (or sustain) some form of political sovereignty”. Each of these aspects requires elaboration. *First*, “it raises questions about the concept of nation or national identity, about what it is to belong to a nation and about how much one ought to care about one's nation. Nations and national identity may be defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties. *Second*, it raises questions about whether sovereignty entails the acquisition of full statehood with complete authority for domestic and international affairs, or whether something less than statehood would suffice” (Miller 1992 and Miller 2000).

“Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of agreement about what is historically the most typical, paradigmatic form of nationalism. The state as political unit is seen by nationalists as centrally ‘belonging’ to one ethno-cultural group and as charged with protecting and promulgating its traditions. This form is exemplified by classical, “revivalist” nationalism, that was most prominent in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Europe and Latin America. This classical nationalism later spread across the world” (Miscevic, 2010).

Nationalism and ethnicity are related, though different. The difference between ethnicity and nationalism is a simple one. Eriksen (1993) notes that “a nationalist ideology is an ethnic ideology which demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group”. In practice, however, the distinction can be considerably problematic in several ways (Eriksen, 1993). Firstly, “nationalism may sometimes express a polyethnic ideology which stresses shared civil rights rather than shared cultural roots”, such as in the United States of America. Second, certain categories of people may find themselves in a grey zone between nation and ethnic

category. For example, in Indonesia, the Sundanese tribe feels different from the Javanese tribe, but as an Indonesian (nation), they do not feel different. Third, in the mass media and in casual conversation the terms are not used consistently. Nevertheless, “nationalism does not necessarily imply a belief in the superiority of one ethnicity over others, but some people believe that some so-called nationalists support ethnocentric protectionism or ethnocentric supremacy”.

In societies where nationalism is presented as an impartial and universalistic ideology based on bureaucratic principles of justice, such as in Indonesia, ethnicity, ethnocentrism, and sometime ethnic organization may appear as threats against national cohesion, justice, and the state. A different kind of conflict between ethnicity and nationalism, which is perhaps more true to the conventional meaning of the term nationalism, can be described as a conflict between a dominating and a dominated ethnic group within the framework of a modern nation-state.

The concept of nationalism can be scrutinized from different viewpoints. Weiss (2003) explains that theories of nationalism have been developed by different disciplines. Social-psychological research centers on interaction processes between groups (competition and conflict, social identity), whereas investigators with a depth-psychology approach conceive features of the individual’s personality as a primary causality (e.g., research in the fascist or authoritarian personality). By contrast, sociological and political theories derive nationalism from societal developments—modernization, disintegration, or crises—and postulate that such social conditions as inequality or rapid change will be reflected in individuals’ interpretations of a given social situation, attitudes, orientations and nationalism.

Smith (1998) argues that “nationalism as a sentiment or form of culture, sometimes described as ‘nationality’ to avoid the ideology’s tarnished reputation, is the social foundation of modern society. Industrialization, democratization, and support for economic redistribution have all been at least partly attributed to the shared social context and solidarity that nationalism provides” (Gelner, 2005; Miller, 1995).

From a normative typology, Gans (2003) divides the term ‘nationalism’ into two types, namely *statist nationalism* and *cultural nationalism*. According to statist nationalism, in order for states to realize political values such as democracy, economic welfare and distributive justice, the citizenries of states must share a homogeneous national culture. In cultural nationalism, members of groups sharing a common history and societal culture have a fundamental, morally significant interest in adhering to their culture and in sustaining it across generations. In spite of these similarities, these types do not have a common origin. Within statist nationalism, the national culture is the means, and the values of the state are the aims. Within cultural nationalism, however, the national culture is the aim, and the state is the means. Moreover, within statist nationalism, any national culture, not necessarily the national

culture of the states' citizenries or a part of their citizenries, could in principle be the means for realizing the political values of the state. Within cultural nationalism, on the other hand, states are the means or the providers of the means for preserving the specific national cultures of their citizenry or parts thereof.

The term *statist nationalism* (Gans, 2003) “expresses the normative essence of a nationalism that historians and sociologists call *territorial-civic*”, while *cultural nationalism* expresses the normative essence of the type of nationalism that is called *ethnocultural* by historians and sociologists. In making the distinction between territorial-civic nationalism and ethnocultural nationalism, Gans (2003) emphasizes that historians and sociologists have mixed geographical, sociological, judgmental and normative parameters. Territorial-civic nationalism is Western and ethnocultural nationalism is Eastern. The former involves a strong middle class whereas the latter involves intellectuals operating in a society whose middle class is weak or which lacks a middle class. The former is progressive and is inspired by the legal and rational concept of citizenship while the latter is regressive and is inspired by the *Volk's* unconscious development.

To interpret the distinction of a normative typology of nationalist ideologies (statist and cultural nationalism), Seymour et al. (2000) “characterize territorial-civic nationalism as a type of nationalism within which individuals give themselves a state, and the state is” what binds together the nation. It entails that the concept of nation is subjective since it emphasizes the will of individuals. And it is individualistic since the nation is nothing over and above willing *individuals*. Voluntarism, subjectivism and individualism thus characterize this type of nationalism. Ethnic or ethnocultural nationalism is based on a conception of the nation as the product of objective facts pertaining to social life. These facts are that members of the nation share a common language, culture and tradition. In this type of nationalism, the nation exists prior to the state. It is also a collective that transcends and is prior to the individuals of which it consists. Objectivism, collectivism and a lack of individual choice characterize this form of nationalism.

Again, Gans (2003) points out that cultural nationalism, according to which members of national groups have a morally significant interest in adhering to their culture and preserving it for generations, is not concerned with how a national culture can contribute to the realization of the state's values but rather with the support which states should extend to national cultures. Statist nationalism, according to which citizenries of states must share a homogeneous national culture in order for their states to realize political values, is not concerned with the support which states should extend to national cultures. Rather, it is concerned with the support which national cultures should extend to states.

It is important to emphasize that calling the one type of nationalism ‘cultural’, and the other ‘statist’, does not mean that cultural nationalism is a-political, and that statist nationalism is a-cultural. Cultural nationalism is political, for it seeks political protection for national cultures. Statist nationalism, with regard to civic nationalism, is cultural for it

requires that citizenries of states share not merely a set of political principles, but also a common language, tradition and a sense of common history. In other words, the difference between statist and cultural nationalism is not due to the fact that the former is purely political and the latter is purely cultural but rather because of their different normative and practical concerns.

Nationalism may manifest itself as part of an “official state ideology or as a popular (non-state) movement and may be expressed along civic, ethnic, cultural, religious or ideological lines. These self-definitions of the nation are used to classify types of nationalism. However, such categories are not mutually exclusive and many nationalist movements combine some or all of these elements to varying degrees. Nationalist movements can also be classified by other criteria ” (Brutents, 2010), such as the magnitude and location.

“Civic or cultural nationalism is focused on cultural rather than hereditary connections between people. Civic nationalism promotes common cultural values and allows people of different origins to assimilate into the nation. Ethnic nationalism is based on the hereditary connections of people. Ethnic nationalism specifically seeks to unite all people of a certain ethnicity heritage together. Ethnic nationalism does not seek to include people of other ethnicities. Irredentism is a form of nationalism promoting the annexation of territories, which have or previously had members of the nation residing within them, to a state which composes most or all of the nation's members. Expansionist nationalism promotes spreading the nation's members to new territories, usually on the claimed basis that existing territory which the nation has resided in is too small or is not able to physically or economically sustain the nation's population. Many nationalist movements in the world are dedicated to national liberation, in the view that their nations are being persecuted by other nations and thus need to exercise self-determination by liberating themselves from the accused persecutors. Finally, fascism is an authoritarian nationalist ideology which promotes national revolution, national collectivism, a totalitarian state, and irredentism or expansionism to unify and allow the growth of a nation. Fascists often promote ethnic nationalism but also have promoted cultural nationalism including cultural assimilation of people outside a specific ethnic group” (Brutents, 2010).

There are several critiques on nationalism (Smith, 1998). Some political theorists eloquently presents the notion that nationalism is very broad and can encompass many areas. It does not fit into strict or rigid guidelines. Any commonality or form of culture that is shared throughout a nation’s population is considered nationalsim. (Zakzaky, 1992) Nationalism includes civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, irredentism, expansionist nationalism, and radical or revolutionary nationalism, which consists of liberation

Nationalism is sometimes seen as an “extremely assertive ideology, making far-reaching, if sometimes justified, demands, including the disappearance of entire states. This has attracted vehement opposition. Much of the early opposition to nationalism was related to its geopolitical ideal of a separate state for every nation. The classic nationalist movements of the 19<sup>th</sup> century rejected the very existence of the multi-ethnic empires in Europe. This resulted in severe repression by the (generally autocratic) governments of those empires. That tradition of secessionism, repression, and violence continues in Europe and elsewhere today. Even in the early stages, however, there was an ideological critique of nationalism. That has developed into several forms of anti-nationalism in the western world” (Brutents, 2010). The Islamic revival of the 20th century also produced an Islamic critique of the nation-state, that Islamic nations in the world must be led by one Muslim ruler, such as Pope in Rome.

Nationalism or the definition of has been in debate for some time now. Not only the definition, but how nationalism has been acted upon as well. In fact, just about the only fact that is widely agreed upon is that nationalism has definitely impacted the world on a large scale. It is also quite common for pride in one’s culture or nation can infringe on the rights and freedoms of another nation.

### **3.5 Authoritarianism**

According to Gelfand et al. (1996) “authoritarianism, as a political philosophy is the negation of democracy” and is associated with three attributes:

- (a) the political system is not based on the consent of the governed but on the rulers,
- (b) there is a monopoly of power, and
- (c) discussion and voting are replaced with the decisions of leaders.

This philosophy denies freedoms of the individual and requires individuals to submit to the wills of authorities, such as the King. It is widely believed that obedience to authority is essential to control excessive individualism, and avoid lawlessness and anarchy.

In a simpler way, ‘authoritarianism’ can be regarded as a dictatorial movement that favors dictatorial government, centralized control of private enterprise, repression of all opposition, and extreme nationalism. The supporters of authoritarianism may be against the democratic system, accusing that the democratic system is lame and inefficient. Altemeyer (2006) notes that “authoritarianism is something authoritarian followers and authoritarian leaders cook up between themselves. When the followers submit too much to the leaders, trust them too much, and give them too much leeway to do whatever they want”, an undemocratic, tyrannical and brutal system may arise. It is not surprising if nowadays authoritarian fascist and authoritarian communist dictatorships pose the biggest threats to democracies.

Theorists, as asserted by Kimmelmeier et al., (1999), generally agree that authoritarianism is incongruous with the pursuit of individual rights and liberties. The authoritarian type of man may threaten to replace the individualistic and democratic type. Hence, it may not be surprising that Gelfand et al. (1996) propose that authoritarianism is the conceptual opposite of individualism.

Authoritarianism has been found to be correlated with conservatism, militarism, nationalism, and religiosity (Adorno et al., 1950), leading to what was labeled the “Authoritarian Personality”. This “Authoritarian Personality” was criticized as the right-wing authoritarian, without regarding the left-wing version. Between 1920 and the end of World War II, such as the continental conservative movement in Germany has provided support to Nazism to authoritarian.

Eckhardt (1991) emphasizes that authoritarianism and conservatism are closely related to each other. They share many affective, behavioral, cognitive, ideological, and moral characteristics. Moreover, they project the denied or disliked aspects of the self upon others (especially inferiors), which justifies the actualization of denied values (such as aggression and dominance) in order to contain or control these values as perceived in others. This psychological pattern makes authoritarianism, like conservatism, a self-destructive<sup>9</sup> and antisocial guide to human relations. Another outstanding feature common to both authoritarianism and conservatism is a pattern of punitive and restrictive childhood training which tends to contribute to both of these personality patterns, especially (and perhaps only) if reinforced by similar disciplines at church, school, factory, and office.

Eckhardt (1991) proposes an interesting construction between authoritarian and democratic social structure. If human beings are basically evil, according to the conservative philosophy of human nature, then it follows logically that we need to be controlled by an authoritarian social structure. But, if we are basically good, according to the radical philosophy of human nature, then it follows logically that it would be better for us to treat one another as free and equal human beings, that is, in a democratic social structure. If neither conservative nor radical philosophies are correct, but rather some combination of the two applies [as suggested by Eysenck and Wilson (1978)], then a basic task of political psychology would be to find that combination and then to find ways of promoting and actualizing it.

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<sup>9</sup> Self-destructive means that authoritarian persons are inclined to behave in a way that destroys their own and others' lives to defend their ideology.

Presently, the most comprehensive and widely accepted theory of authoritarianism is that proposed by Altemeyer (1988, 1996, 2006). Altemeyer defines authoritarianism as a value syndrome that comprises three distinct elements:

- (a) conventionalism,
- (b) submission to authority, and
- (c) aggression.

Authoritarians (a) adhere to conventional morality and value compliance with social norms, (b) emphasize hierarchy and deference to authority figures, and (c) possess a “law and order” mentality that legitimizes anger and aggression against those who deviate from social norms and conventions.

Altemeyer (2006) also notes that “authoritarian followers usually support the established authorities in their society, such as government officials and traditional religious leaders. Such people have historically been the “proper” authorities in life, the time-honored, entitled, customary leaders, and that means a lot to most authoritarians. Psychologically these followers have personalities featuring: (1) a high degree of submission to the established, legitimate authorities in their society; (2) high levels of aggression in the name of their authorities; and (3) a high level of conventionalism”.

Since the publication of “The Authoritarian Personality,” there have been several attempts to reformulate the theory of authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Rokeach, 1960; Duckitt, 1989; Feldman, 2000, 2003, Oesterreich, 2005). However, according to Stellmacher and Petzel (2005), at least three important problems have not yet been solved:


*The problem of reductionism* - Since authoritarianism takes place or is defined by a mass group of people’s behavior or attitude, it only makes sense that any attempt to explain such would also have to be based on a group level. Unfortunately, most theories are based on the individual. (Duckitt, 1989).

*The social context* - Most theories on authoritarianism fail to take into consideration the overall social impact. More is concentrated on individual personalities or to be exact authoritarianism personalities. (cf. Altemeyer, 1988; Feldman, 2003; Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; Rickert, 1998). Until now this fact has not yet been integrated into most authoritarianism theories.

*The political bias of the measurement* - Conservatism is often confused with authoritarianism which leads to only one side, the right-wing orientation as opposed to exploring the possibility of or lack thereof of a left-wing authoritarianism. (Stone & Smith, 1993).

### 3.6 Conceptual model of interdependence

In this thesis, the relationships among individualism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and authoritarianism are analyzed on the basis of a theoretical model. It is assumed that individualism is opposed to authoritarianism, while ethnocentrism and nationalism support authoritarianism. In other words, the effect of individualism on authoritarianism is negative, while the effect of both ethnocentrism and nationalism is positive. The conceptual model of the interdependencies between individualism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and nationalism will be the foundation of this study. We postulate the following conceptual model of the relationships among individualism (I), ethnocentrism (E), nationalism (N) and authoritarianism (A):



**Figure 3.1. The hypothesized recursive (causal chain) structure between latent state variables individualism (I), ethnocentrism (E), nationalism (N) and authoritarianism (A)**

The structure between the latent state variables individualism (I), ethnocentrism (E), nationalism (N) and authoritarianism (A) is made up of the following five relationships:

- (1) *Individualism has a negative effect on authoritarianism.* The rationale for this hypothesis is as follows. Individualism the pursuit of personal happiness and independence- conflicts with authoritarian- the strict obedience to the authority of a state or organization and adherence to enforcing and maintaining control through the use of oppressive measures- because authoritarianism by its very nature stands in the way of independence and individual action to pursue personal happiness. Authoritarianism is based on the believe that citizens ought to accept state authority in many aspects of their lives. Authoritarianism erodes the civil liberties and freedom which are typical for individualism (Billiet, et al., 1996) Therefore, individualism has a negative effect on Authoritarianism.
- (2) *Authoritarianism has a positive effect on ethnocentrism.* Authoritarianism- the strict obedience to authority- makes people susceptible to ethnocentrism- the tendency to view the own group as superior to other groups. The rationale for this hypothesis is as follows. Authoritarianism reduces critical attitudes and the inclination to question the views and ideology as expressed by the authority (Knopfelmacher and Amstrong, 1963). Therefore, it is hypothesized that authorianism positively impacts on ethnocentrism
- (3) *Nationalism has a positive effect on authoritarianism.* Nationalism- the tendency to feel intense loyalty toward the ingroup-implies acceptance of the interests of the ingroup. This in its turn implies strict obedience to the authority representing the ingroup, since it is viewed to serve the interests of the ingroup (Sidanius, 1994). Hence, loyalty to the ingroup makes people accept its authority which implies a positive impact of nationalism on authoritarianism.
- (4) *Individualism has a negative effect on nationalism.* Individualism implies the pursuit of personal happiness and independence while nationalism requires loyalty toward the ingroup. The individual who pursues their personal hapiness and independence tends to see submission to the ingroup as an obstacle to this pursuit. After all, when the nation or ingroup demands the supreme loyalty of its citizens, the freedom of the individual may be sacrificed (Way, 2008). Therefore, individualism is hypothesized to have a negative effect on nationalism.
- (5) *Ethnocentrism has a positive effect on nationalism.* Ethnocentrism and nationalism are similar in the sense that they both involve positive attitudes toward an ingroup and negative attitude toward some or all outgroups. Nationalism, however, can be conceived as a more extreme form of ethnocentrism. Moreover, nationalism may also imply a state (Jaffrelot, 2003). Acceptance of the latter may be facilitated if it is grounded on ethnocentrism. Therefore, we assume that ethnocentrism has a positive effect on nationalism.

### 3.7 Conclusion

This chapter provides the theoretical background for the empirical models estimated in subsequent chapters. In the first part of this chapter, I have defined the notions of individualism, ethnocentrism, nationalism and authoritarianism as follows:

- (i) **Individualism:** the pursuit of personal happiness and interdependence rather than collective goals or interests. According to individualism in a social-political context the core task of a community or state is to foster the rights and improve the development of individuals and to assure their freedom. Community or state is seen as a device to individuals to achieve those objectives. The community exists for the sake of its individual members. Individualism implies that the government should not unduly intervene too much in individuals' lives. Instead, it should guarantee that individuals do not harm each others' interests.
- (ii) **Ethnocentrism:** a belief in the superiority of one's own group and a corresponding disdain for all other groups. The concept of ethnocentrism implies a strong distinction between "ingroups" (groups with which the individual identifies him or herself), and "outgroups" (those, typically minority groups, toward which he or she has no sense of belonging or which are perceived as antithetical to the ingroup).
- (iii) **Nationalism:** "an ideology, a sentiment, a form of culture, or a social movement that focuses on the nation. As an ideology, nationalism holds that 'the people' are the nation, and that as a result only nation-states founded on the principle of national self-determination are legitimate. In many cases nationalist pursuit of self-determination has caused conflict between people and states including war (both external and domestic), secession; and in extreme cases, genocide".
- (iv) **Authoritarianism:** a political philosophy that negates democracy. It is an ideology that accepts a political system that is not based on the consent of the governed but on the rulers. Moreover, it accepts a monopoly of power, and discussion and voting are replaced with the decisions of leaders.

Based on the above definitions, the recursive structure between individualism, ethnocentrism, nationalism and authoritarianism are hypothesized as follows:

- (1) *Individualism has a negative effect on authoritarianism.*
- (2) *Authoritarianism has a positive effect on ethnocentrism.*
- (3) *Nationalism has a positive effect on authoritarianism.*
- (4) *Individualism has a negative impact on nationalism.*
- (5) *Ethnocentrism has a positive impact on nationalism.*

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