

Chapter III

American and Soviet structural transformations in German universities, 1945 through the early 1960s

Introduction

When the victorious powers occupied Germany, there were 23 universities within its prewar borders. Three of these universities, located in Königsberg, Breslau, and Danzig, were lost for Germany, because Königsberg became the Russian city of Kaliningrad, and Breslau and Danzig the Polish cities known as Wrocław and Gdańsk. Just like the territory of Occupied Germany, the remaining universities were divided among the Allies. The American Occupation Military Administration initially controlled six universities, and after 1948 they controlled seven German universities because of the University of Berlin being split up. The Soviet Occupation authorities supervised six German universities during that period.

To implement their planned strategies and transformations, the Occupation Administrations of the United States and the Soviet Union divided German university life into three dimensions in need of revision: the first dimension was the infrastructure of the university comprising the administrative body, departments (faculties), research institutes, and libraries, and their “filling” or substance, which constituted defined values, traditions, and the ideology of the university rectors, the statutes, academic programs, curricula, courses of lectures, and the holdings of the libraries; the second dimension was the professoriate; and the third dimension was the student body. The initial reforms implemented by the United States and the Soviet Union concerned the first dimension of the German universities. The Occupation authorities transformed the administrative body of the German universities replacing *rectors* and rewriting *statutes*. Both powers attempted to change a *curriculum* of every department by introducing *new disciplines*. Moreover, *new academic establishments* were created at the universities and *the holdings of the university libraries* were thoroughly modified.

Before beginning our analysis of these transformations, two observations should be made. First, neither of the powers had developed their plan for reforms before 1945; at the end of the Second World War,

the Allies elaborated the sole basis for implementing reforms, namely, the Potsdam Agreement that provided for the famous denazification of academic programs, curricula, etc. Second, not all of the intended reforms were carried out by the United States and the Soviet Union in the German universities. The Soviet Occupation authorities, however, managed to carry out more of their planned reforms than the American authorities did. All of the subsequent reforms were suggested, discussed, and implemented by the Allies under pressure from conditions of social and political disorder, from the context of permanent resistance by the universities to the proposed reforms, in the context of a weak understanding of the traditions of German university education on the part of both American and Soviet military officers, and, finally, in the context of the bad physical state of the university buildings.

The available records allow us to distinguish the following reforms carried out by the American and Soviet Occupation authorities in German universities during the period 1945 through the early 1960s: 1) reopening the German universities and replacing the rectors; 2) revising the curricula of the faculties; 3) establishing new divisions (institutes, departments, and chairs) at the universities; and 4) transforming the holdings of the university libraries.

Hence, the structure of this chapter will proceed from these areas of reform. First to be reviewed will be the American activities in German universities. The second part will discuss Soviet policy, and a brief conclusion will compare the approaches and policies of these rivals.

I. American transformations in German universities

1. Reopening German universities and replacing the rectors

The American model for reopening the universities could be summed up by the following specific features: detailed regulation and supervision of the procedure for reopening and a great deal of attention for the personality of the university rectors.

Preliminary stage in the reopening of the universities and the resumption of university life

In October of 1945, the directive pertaining to the reopening of the German universities was issued. The directive stated that the reopening, supervision, and control over the German universities was the responsibility of the head of OMGUS, along with an American Education

Officer to be appointed at every university. To prepare for the opening of every university, this Educational Officer was to name a loyal and screened faculty member as chairman of the *University Planning Committee*. The chairman would submit five to ten names of professors to act as members of the Committee. The University Planning Committee would discuss the problems involved in reopening the university and submit the minutes of proceedings and all papers to the Education Officer. An official request for the reopening of a department would then be submitted by the university committees to the central office of the American Military Administration in Berlin. This request was to include: 1) nominations for an acting rector and acting deans; 2) a list stating the names and qualifications of the teaching and administrative staff, along with a list of the university personnel who needed to be excluded for political reasons; 3) a detailed operational plan; 4) curricula; 5) standards for the selection and admission of students, and their supervision; and 6) a draft of a new statute and other items.

On approval of this application by the American authorities the departments or universities could start operating.¹⁸³ At that point, the nominated and approved acting rectors submitted to the American Education Officer a list of courses to be offered during a given semester at the university, together with a brief description of their content and the names of instructors. Only after the American authorities had given their final approval, could the proposed courses or lectures be announced. In addition, at the end of each semester, rectors were required to submit a report on research or scholarly activity in the humanities to the Education Officer.¹⁸⁴ The directives emphasized that *even* after approval of the university's statute, life at the university would be subjected to the continued control and supervision of the Military Administration.

The reopening of the universities in the American Zone took much more time than that of the universities in the Soviet Zone. The German universities resumed activity over a period from 1945 until the end of 1948.¹⁸⁵ Preference was given to the universities and the faculties which had high scientific prestige or had closely cooperated with the Occupation authorities. American military officers considered that the most significant universities, for reason of their level of research

¹⁸³ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Tent, *Mission*, xv-xvii.

activities and therefore those to be allowed to open first, were the University of Heidelberg and then the Universities of Marburg, Erlangen, and Frankfurt.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, the medical and theological faculties were given the first preference: the medical faculties provided the authorities with essential expertise and help, and the theological faculties were the first ones which had expressed their intention of cooperating with the United States.¹⁸⁷

The first of the reopened universities was the University of Heidelberg, located in Baden-Württemberg. When the American troops arrived there in April 1945, the University of Heidelberg was closed by General Eisenhower. Most of the university buildings were at once requisitioned. As early as a few days after arriving, a “Committee of the Thirteen” was established with the permission of the American security agents under the leadership of Professor Karl Jaspers. Initially, the Military Administration planned to reopen the university no sooner than fall 1946; however, the need for medical expertise compelled the Military Administration to open the medical faculty in August 1945.¹⁸⁸ By January 1946, all faculties were functioning. The first rector was Karl Bauer, professor of medicine. The University of Heidelberg was followed by the Universities of Frankfurt and Marburg. The procedure was the same: Committees of the Ten or Committees of the Thirteen were established to work on the documents necessary for the reopening procedure. The Universities of Frankfurt and of Marburg were finally reopened in winter 1946. The reopening of the universities in Hessen and Baden-Württemberg states presented almost no difficulties for the American Occupation authorities. However, the reopening of the universities in Bavaria became the first challenge for the United States. The universities in Würzburg, in Munich, and in Erlangen had gone over completely to the National Socialists during the rise of Hitler and were therefore considered the most nationalistic and conservative. Thus, the process of

¹⁸⁶ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ NARA Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS. Württemberg-Baden. Records of Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1945-1949. Box 913-917A.

denazification turned out to be a prolonged one. Because of their the unsatisfactory political background, they were only reopened in 1948.¹⁸⁹

As a result, during the first two to three years of the Occupation the universities restarted the academic process; however, their initial work was continually damaged and interrupted by American intervention in the management of the universities and in the everyday work of the rectors and the senate. The rectors became the primary target for this American intervention, because they were considered to be the individuals who could influence the adoption of new American-modeled statutes. According to the theory of the Occupation authorities, these new statutes were to contribute to the successful implementation of subsequent American reforms.

Modification of university statutes and replacement of rectors

We have noted that modification of the university *constitutions* – the American officers used this term – evoked strong resistance on the part of the university administration, the rectors, and the senate. In particular, the resistance of the rectors to the American proposal to rewrite the statutes forced the American authorities to replace the first rectors with new ones more favorably inclined to American ideas. Although the archives contain only a few documents relative to the replacements of rectors, it is clear that these replacements were frequent and that they were mainly due to the rectors' standpoints in regard to the American drafting of new constitutions as well as in regard to the denazification of the teaching staff.

After the arrival of American troops, all rectors lost their jobs. The first acting rectors and their successors were selected and nominated by the Occupation authorities. The first acting rectors together with the selected members of the University Planning Committees were offered the chance to rewrite the university statutes of the Weimar period. However, the rectors and the University Planning Committees were reluctant to do it and often even ignored the American call to establish the new statutes reflecting American higher-educational practices.¹⁹⁰ The American higher-educational practices included articles for a representative board comprised of members of the community, representatives of the province or state, and possibly also representatives

¹⁸⁹ NARA. Record Group 59. Confidential US Department of State Central Files. Germany. Internal and Foreign Affairs 1945-1949. Microfilm. Reel 7.

¹⁹⁰ Tent, *Mission*, 275.

from of labor unions, industry, science, and the arts. The main function of this board was to direct university activities in the public interest. The article concerning the authority of the rector implied that the functions of the rector should be increased in order to make him or her more than a mere figurehead. The rector should be elected for four years. The rector should be appointed by the board on the basis of three suggestions for nominees made by the general assembly of the professors. And he or she should have a decisive influence on all university matters. The other article of the proposed statute instituted new departments to replace the former faculties. Finally, the Americans proposed including a third administrative body. This would be a general assembly of all teachers, not just the senior professors in the highest positions who for all practical purposes defined the policy of the university along with making appointments.¹⁹¹ All these new articles were unacceptable to the German rectors and their universities as a whole, because they damaged the aristocratic and elite position of the universities and made them more dependent on society.

The American Occupation authorities summoned a conference of the rectors and senior professors in autumn 1946 in order to convince them of the necessity to modify the old statutes of the universities. The senior professors, deans, and rectors, however, refused to modernize the constitutions and to accept the other elements proposed to produce “more democratic climate in the universities, to incorporate the board of trustees, and to dilute the considerable powers of the senior faculty through establishing a teaching assembly, and to allow the existence of an independent administration on the American model.”¹⁹² These American proposals were vigorously and emotionally rejected. The bellwether of the reaction became Professor Karl Jaspers, who had closely cooperated with the Americans, but who now rejected the interference of the Military Government in the structure of German universities.¹⁹³ The United States then decided to negotiate with the rectors alone, and the final standpoint of the rectors concerning the American proposal to incorporate the new

¹⁹¹ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS. Württemberg-Baden. Records of Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1945-1949. Box 913-917A; NARA Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

¹⁹² Tent, *Mission*, 275-276.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

constitutions ended up influencing the future and personal fate of every rector. Some were replaced; others agreed to cooperate.

As in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, the American authorities sought rectors favorable to the American policies, because their allegiance was seen as being the primary basis for a successful outcome for American reforms. New rectors were selected from among former émigrés and from among those university people who had articulated some opposition during the Nazi regime. Applying this approach, the United States, for example, nominated Walter Hallstein as the first rector of the University of Frankfurt. He had emigrated to the United States and been active in organizing the legal faculty for the German prisoners of war in *Fort Getty*¹⁹⁴ in the United States. Returning from America, he became the dean of the law faculty and, in the spring 1946, rector of the University of Frankfurt. Walter Hallstein admired the American educational system and truly believed that German universities should be reconstructed according to the American model: the rector should be renamed as the president; every university should have a board of trustees, campuses for students, a tutorial system, and so on. He called upon his university to follow these changes,¹⁹⁵ and most of the American reforms were realized in the University of Frankfurt.

Disloyal rectors were replaced, however. This happened with the famous physician, a specialist in oncology and rector of the University of Heidelberg, Karl Bauer. He was the first postwar rector and, together with his friend Karl Jaspers, did the preparations for the reopening of the university. However, the American authorities were alerted to the negative position that Karl Bauer had taken concerning denazification and to his resistance to purging university professors. Bauer actually kept many professors and students who were former members of the Nazi party. Besides these “sins,” the rector was for some reason disliked by the

¹⁹⁴ The United States established schools for German captives in 1942. They called these schools the “Idea Factory.” In contrast to the Soviet Union, who encouraged their “students” to join the communist party, the United States did not make liberals of the German soldiers. However, some of the German prisoners of war decided to cooperate with the United States and help them in building a new Germany // N.A. Tsvetkova, “*Cultural Imperialism*”: *Mezhdunarodnaya Obrazovatel'naya Politika SSHA v Period Holodnoy Voynu* (“*Cultural Imperialism*”: *International Educational Policy of the United States during the Cold War*) (St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Press, 2007), 87-89.

¹⁹⁵ See, for example, one of his articles: Hallstein, “The Universities,” 155-167.

famous American reformer Edward Hartshorne,¹⁹⁶ a specialist on German education from Harvard University, and by an officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Daniel Penham, a German-Jewish émigré, born Siegfried Oppenheimer. It was a personal animosity. Both men sought out documents discrediting the rector. It was found that the rector had been able to hide certain information about his life during the Nazi regime. This information concerned his scholarly works on racial hygiene, which Penham duly revealed. As a result, the Americans began a persecution of the rector in the hope that Bauer would resign his position. However, the rector began his own campaign against these American experts, declaring publicly that there were no scientists without close associations with the Nazi Party during the period of the Third Reich. American documents show that on November, 15, 1946, Rector Bauer was removed for having been an active member of the Nazi party.¹⁹⁷ The agent involved in the inspection of University of Heidelberg recommended dismissal of the rector, and even suggested hanging the rector for his collaboration with the Nazis.¹⁹⁸ As of yet, now there is no precise date known as to when the rector of the University of Heidelberg was forced to leave his post. We do know that he was recalled as vice-rector of the University on November 22. His place was occupied by another professor who also lost his position soon after.¹⁹⁹

Bavarian universities suffered persecution more than the other universities because of their strong resistance to American reforms and because of the conservatism of their rectors. Three to four replacements happened at every Bavarian university during the 1945-1947 period. A case similar to the Bauer case occurred at the University of Munich. The American authorities appointed the philosopher and dean of the

¹⁹⁶ James Tent, in his books and article has evaluated the activity of this American expert in the area of the German educational system. See, for example: J. Tent, "American Influences on German Education System," in *United States and Germany*, 394-400.

¹⁹⁷ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS. Württemberg-Baden. Records of Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1945-1949. Box 913-917A.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ See some interpretations of the Bauer case: E. Wolgast, "Karl Heinrich Bauer—der erster Heidelberger Nachkriegsrector. Weltbild and Handeln 1945-1946," in *Heidelberg 1945. Papers from a Conference sponsored by the German Historical Institute of Washington, DC and Historisches Seminar der Universität Heidelberg, held May 5-8, 1993 in Heidelberg* (Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996): 107-129; M.W. Clark, "A Prophet without Humor: Karl Jaspers in Germany 1945-1948," *Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 2 (2002): 197-222.

philosophy faculty, Albert Rehm, as the new rector. The professor had not been an active supporter of the Nazi party, which influenced his selection from among other figures. However, it later became clear that the rector did not feel any sympathy towards the United States either, since he was deeply conservative. He publicly questioned whether the German university system could really learn anything from the American educational system. Consequently, the American authorities stated that the rector was frustrating the American democratization process, and they ordered the Bavarian Educational Ministry to remove Rehm from his post and replace him with another professor who was, in turn, also replaced thereafter.

It is not feasible to reconstruct in detail the process of replacement of the rectors. Did it always happen through the decision-making process within the Occupation Administration as it happened with the Munich rector, or by means of elections in the university senate or in the University Planning Committee? The available documents and previous research yield nothing about the actual procedure.

The problem of resentful rectors was resolved by other means after 1949. The Department of State proposed the idea of sending German rectors to the United States “to enable the rectors to bring back first-hand knowledge of university administration in the US and learn by observation of the relationship of the American universities to the public and to the state.”²⁰⁰ The evaluations in regard to the effectiveness of the program stated later that this observation by German rectors helped to convince them that American universities had something useful for Germany to simulate or adopt, a much better way of convincing them to learn from them than being told to do so by Americans located in Germany.

2. Revision of university curricula

The American revision of German university curricula could be summed up as a chain of failed and successful attempts aimed at introducing certain disciplines into the academic programs of the humanities faculties, and, consequently, at establishing new structural units featuring American academic programs, curricula, and courses. The policy of this revision can be divided into two stages: 1) the elaboration

²⁰⁰ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS. Württemberg-Baden. Records of Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1945-1949. Box 913-917A.

of revision plans; and 2) the implementation of the proposed plans and reforms.

Elaboration of revision plans

Some traditions of the German university system relevant to the content of courses or to the organization of the curriculum, in particular at the philosophy, theology, law, and history faculties, provoked a steady desire in American officers and experts for revision. The American staff at the Educational Division constantly articulated the following characteristics of the German academic process as being ripe for transformation. First, the curricula of faculties such as those of philosophy and theology were assessed as being remote from public life and from the problems of the contemporary world (*Annex 1*). Second, the place of the social sciences in the German curriculum was considered too minor, and, along with this, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and political science were often seen as lacking in the curriculum of the humanities faculties. Where these disciplines were noted, they were seen as founded on a very strong philosophical basis that itself needed revision. Third, the priority of research over teaching in the academic programs was evaluated as the specific feature that needed to be thoroughly altered. Finally, the aristocratic or ivory-tower status of German universities along with their nationalistic intellectualism was deemed an essential detail in need of reform.

However, from the moment when these observations were made to the moment when the reforms were begun, four years passed. During the period 1945 through 1949, American experts had only managed to elaborate plans for a revision of curricula, while at the same time making a few tentative though often unsuccessful attempts at introducing some modifications to German universities. Therefore, one might ask: What disciplines were being taught in German universities after their reopening but before the arrival of American reforms in 1949? We can assume that during the first years of Occupation all the usual courses were allowed to be taught as long as they did not contain nationalist theories. The American officers asked the rectors to provide them with a list of courses together with a brief description of their content and the names of the instructors. If racist, militaristic, and nationalistic ideas were not discovered in the descriptions submitted, the lectures were allowed to be given to students despite all the traditional features inherent in the German university educational system and disliked by the Military Administration.

Concurrently, the first American educationalists were invited by the Occupation authorities to elaborate a plan of revision and the means for introducing new disciplines. The proposals of several of these experts were approved by the American Military Administration and some of the proposed reforms were carried out by the officers.

In 1946, a team of American specialists in German higher education, led by George F. Zook, President of the American Council on Education, arrived in the American Zone of Occupation. They went to several major states in the American Zone, namely Greater Hessen, Baden-Württemberg, and Bavaria. There, they visited and evaluated the institutions of higher education and proposed a set of reforms for General Clay. One of their proposals concerned a method for changing the curriculum in the universities without any American intervention: The team proposed introducing *advisory bodies* to the universities that would be broadly representative of social groups other than educators, and which would advise the faculty of each university on ways in which the curriculum should be modified in order to adapt it more closely and more immediately to changing social conditions.²⁰¹ In the opinion of these Americans, the result of such cooperation would be that the traditional curriculum would be modernized according to the needs of the market and would become more professionally than philosophically oriented. During the first years of Occupation this idea worked; however, in the early 1950s, the German universities rejected these rulings, and the local community – businessmen, trade unions, etc. – were no longer able to impose their influence upon university academic programs.

In 1948, the Dean of the Teachers College of Columbia University in New York, and a friend of President Harry Truman, William Russell, visited Germany and informed the President of his observations concerning the situation in German universities. Russell found the attitudes of the rectors, deans and professors of the universities particularly discouraging. He indicated that their educational ideals were limited by a desire to foster erudite learning and pure research with little attention to the needs of the people. Russell noted that the Germans had not the vaguest idea of American democracy and indicated that the way to get at this problem was to teach *political science* at the university level

²⁰¹ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation. High Commissioner for Germany. Office of OMGUS, Hessen. Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1947-48. Box 702.

and to stimulate self-government.²⁰² The idea of introducing political science to the curriculum had already been circulating among those American officers who saw the political science as a tool of political education.

The American expert Franz Neumann, a former German émigré and a professor of Political Science at Columbia University in New York, had a much more dramatic impact on reforms in this field. In 1949, he submitted his report to the Military Administration concerning the status of the social sciences in German universities. His recommendation for the immediate introduction of the *social sciences* in German universities in the same way as this field was represented in American universities – encompassing economics, anthropology, social psychology, history, government, sociology – became the foundation for all subsequent activities by American reformers at German universities. In addition, he insisted on the introduction of *political science*, while eliminating the “philosophical” approach to the social sciences and the German emphasis on a nationalistic and parochial view of the world.²⁰³

Another expert also seriously influenced the reform of German universities. The president of Harvard University, Dr. James Conant, who had studied German methods of scientific research in the 1920s, became an expert in the American Military Administration in the 1940s, and subsequently the US High Commissioner and the first American Ambassador to West Germany during the period 1953-1957. He first introduced the idea of *general education* as a set of compulsory introductory courses for German students. Conant had three premises for promoting this idea. The first concerned the growing political tensions in Europe. He was the first to declare as early as 1948 that university disciplines had to promote liberal ideology in order to curb expansion of the Soviet one. The second foundation for his proposal was based on his research: He had elaborated the concept that a university curriculum should be divided into general and specialized courses. General courses or general education was not considered by him to be universal education, but was viewed as so-called citizen education that would encourage every student to be a responsible citizen living in a democratic country.²⁰⁴ This thesis convinced the military officers that the

²⁰² *Documentary Story of Truman Presidency*, 539-546.

²⁰³ NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.

²⁰⁴ “The Harvard Report on General Education, 1945,” in *American Higher Education Transformed 1940-2005. Documenting the National Discourse*, eds. W. Smith, Th. Bender (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 14-20.

introduction of general education, along with studies in comparative politics and government, would contribute to altering young people's political culture and to containing the expansion of Soviet ideology. Finally, the third foundation for his ideas was the widely held thesis that German universities should be involved in public life. Conant and the other experts stated that the job of universities was to teach future politicians, officials, businessmen, and public figures, and not just scholars.²⁰⁵

Finally, in the early 1950s, the idea of intensively promoting American studies as part of the German curriculum was born. According to documents, this suggestion was first made in 1952. The Military Administration had, however, already carried out a few projects aimed at introducing new American studies course at German universities before that date.

Following the proposals made by these American specialists, the Military Administration, together with the Department of State and the Pentagon, decided to introduce disciplines from following fields into German universities: 1) political science; 2) the social sciences, 3) general education; and 4) American studies. The process of introduction was launched during the period 1947-1958; this involved not only a revision of curricula but also the establishment of new divisions in the universities.

Introduction of new disciplines

The US Military Administration hoped up until the early 1950s that the question of the introduction of new disciplines would be resolved through negotiations with the rectors, the university senates and the university planning committees, and this process of introduction would be easy. To begin negotiations, the Americans set up several conferences for the rectors and deans where proposals about the necessity of including political science and the social sciences in the curriculum of all the humanities faculties were advanced. American experts, scientists, military authorities, and politicians believed that the introduction of new academic disciplines would lead to an essential change in the ideology of German education, which was that the value, the weight, and the role of

²⁰⁵ University of Arkansas Libraries. Special Collections. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection. Manuscript Collection 468. Box 239. Germany. Folder 18. [Articles on German Exchange, 1949-1962, n.d.]; NARA Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

abstract and philosophical subjects would be decreased, while the weight of practical knowledge would become central to the formal curriculum.

Political Science. The law faculties were chosen as the first target for American revision, because these faculties, in the opinion of the American specialists, had been the most nationalistic and conservative. The law faculties taught constitutional law, which was actually the clandestine study of politics. However, these constitutional law studies were dominated by conservative professors who focused on nationalistic views and disseminated the idea that the policy of the American Occupation authorities was illegal. The American experts believed, therefore, that the introduction of political science in every law faculty would be able to change the environment there and that a new generation of specialists would be fostered as a result.²⁰⁶

To realize these aspirations, in 1947 the US Military Administration summoned all the deans of the law faculties along with the rectors of the universities and suggested that they should initially introduce the case-study approach in the teaching process as well as courses in political theory, government, and comparative law. The representatives of the universities replied that this innovation would destroy the traditional academic programs of the law faculties and they thus were obliged to completely reject this proposal. During the ensuing two years, American officers, visiting American professors, and experts, tried to convince the university administrations to introduce these new disciplines. In 1949, the rectors of the universities, the deans of the law faculties, and the ministers of education in the occupied German *Länder* finally yielded to American pressure during a newly organized conference, however. The Americans insisted that courses on politics and government had to be given a prominent place in every university.²⁰⁷ More than ninety German university administrators, along with representatives from each of the ministries of education, signed the final resolution requiring them to introduce political science.²⁰⁸ However, no reforms were actually begun by the universities, a fact which was noted by American university

²⁰⁶ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

²⁰⁷ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

²⁰⁸ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7

curators in the early 1950s.²⁰⁹ This resistance forced the American authorities to amend their policy on the revision of the curriculum by proposing the idea of establishing new academic units, where new and American disciplines would be imposed, in the universities.

Why did the universities refuse to introduce political science? The documents lead us to assume that the old professoriate considered political science to be a quasi-science because of its multidisciplinary approach. These professors stated that the subjects studied in political science were related to the curriculum of both the history and law faculties, and that this made this discipline not an independent one; in addition, it was felt that there was no over-riding necessity to introduce additional disciplines that combined law and history.

Social Science. The social sciences curriculum was meant to bring German higher education institutes closer to public life. The Americans believed that the social science disciplines were able to promote a better understanding of the traditions and practical workings of democracy and to produce an understanding of foreign social and cultural points of view as well as educating new democratically minded leaders for the new kind of Germany that American politicians envisaged. German universities needed to adopt a social role in order to form outstanding builders of a new and wholesome German way of life, and social studies was meant to prepare students to cope with perplexing problems, educate them about domestic and international affairs, and instill in them the habits and techniques of democratic living. The establishment or re-establishment of social studies implied the introduction of academic disciplines such as economics, rationalization and business, sociology, sinology, comparative and American education, American theology, history of art, etc., with a strong emphasis on interpretations of distinctive American developments and models of Western culture.²¹⁰

In 1948, the American officers arranged for a conference to begin negotiations with the rectors and deans for the introduction of social science courses in the curriculum of the philosophy faculties. The curriculum of these faculties was regarded as the appropriate field for seeding disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, etc., which would transmit American postulates in the field of the methodology of

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ NARA. Record Group 59. Bureau of Public Affairs. International Exchange Service 1950-58. Annual Program Proposal. US Educational Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany. Program year 1957. Box 1, 3.

social research. At this conference on the social sciences, convened in Bavaria in 1948, the American experts stressed the necessity of widening the scope of the social sciences in the universities by placing them at the center of the curriculum which until then had been occupied by the philosophy faculties.²¹¹ There is no accurate and truthful data on how the professoriate reacted to these American proposals. However, the American side remarked that the results so far were not very satisfactory.²¹² The senior professors did not reject the proposals outright as the professors of the law departments had previously done; however, introduction of these disciplines proceeded very slowly. The American university curators noted in the early 1950s that “there has been little progress in the developing of the social sciences in German universities since the war. The Germans have failed to realize that the teaching of the humanities, which they did emphasize and perhaps overemphasize, failed to save them from an endemic Germanic nationalistic intellectualism or to foster properly a critical insight into contemporary problems.”²¹³ Nevertheless, the new disciplines would finally find their place in German universities from the mid-1950s through the early 1960s, when a new generation of scholars arrived on the scene who had been trained by means of American exchange programs.

Courses on General Education. The introduction of the courses in the field of general education, which were courses about the contemporary political situation, began to be implemented in all the universities starting in 1948. General education diluted the tradition of the German humanities as philosophical sciences by means of a range of courses that dealt with the facts of public life, real politics, and the real world. This was meant to increase an appreciation of foreign social and cultural developments, and to create responsible citizenship and an understanding of the contemporary world. Due to the efforts of James Conant, the US Military Administration engaged separately with each university. The Americans were buoyed by the fact that general education would be introduced in the philosophy faculties and that every professor would propose at least one course in the field of general education.²¹⁴ Attempts were made almost everywhere to broaden general education by means of

²¹¹ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

²¹² *Ibid.*

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

courses given during the whole semester to all students. Attendance initially was voluntary and thus low.²¹⁵ Revision of the curriculum in this domain took several years, and it was only in 1953 that the first General Studies Program was included in the curriculum at University of Heidelberg. University of Heidelberg thus became the first and only university to carry out the proposed reform.²¹⁶ All the other universities introduced their courses only in 1956 and 1957. These courses became compulsory for all students and lasted one semester. The goals and objectives of general education only became clear by the end of the 1950s rather earlier on. Compulsory courses implied the notion of political education designed to give students the correct orientation in terms of political concepts and to inculcate in a critical comprehension of problems on a worldwide basis. Obviously, the introduction of such courses was provoked by the Cold War context, and it was the political situation in Europe that compelled the universities to agree to such propagandistic education. These courses were similar to the Soviet courses introduced in East Germany, namely “The Political and Social Problems of Contemporary World.” Much as the Soviet Union did, the United States attached great importance to political education within the universities in the 1950s and 1960s. The Academy for Political Education in Bavaria, the *Land* most resistant to American reforms, was opened in 1954 in order to formulate unified standards for teaching and to conduct research in this field.

American Studies. American studies as a series of disciplines concerning American civilization had not been developed in German universities before the Occupation. English seminars had existed in some universities, and the University of Hamburg had given a few courses about the United States.

We can state that the introduction of American studies did not produce the strong negative reaction among professors that political science did. The more or less positive reaction to this revision of the curriculum was, in our opinion, paved by a proper policy on the part of the Military Administration. First, Washington had begun by inviting German *Amerikanisten* and specialists in English to the United States during the first years of the Occupation. These Germans subsequently established numerous institutions for American studies. Second, a certain academic basis for the development of the American studies already

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.

existed in Germany: English-language seminars served as a foundation for their development.

Nevertheless, misunderstandings between Americans and Germans as to the American studies created obstacles to the expansion of the field in German universities. The most important of these misunderstandings revolved around the interpretation of what the essence of the American studies was. While Americans considered the American studies to be the study of American civilization with a compulsory combination of subjects such as American history, American literature, American education, American government, American architecture and arts, and political and social sciences dealing primarily with the development of institutions in the United States, the Germans, however, considered American studies primarily as part of the English-language studies, English and American literature, and history. German universities therefore applied more traditional approaches to these studies without integrating them by means of interdisciplinary methods. This discouraged American specialists who stressed that German professors had not differentiated this discipline concerning the United States from the disciplines of language and literature, and that of the courses offered by the various departments, the bulk of them were English-language seminars.²¹⁷ Moreover, the universities, while formally cooperating with American experts in this field, sabotaged American studies to some extent and stated that they could not be inserted into the curriculum because of a lack of specialists, knowledge, and interest. To cope with this attitude was much too difficult, and so American experts suggested the idea of establishing independent institutions, departments, and chairs at German universities where a new curriculum for American studies could be offered.

The Military Administration subsequently acknowledged by the early 1950s that revision of the curriculum through negotiations with rectors, senates, and deans had not worked. The social sciences continued to occupy a very small podium, and political science was not taught in German universities. The resistance of the professoriate and a lack of qualified personnel, of lack of interest, and lack of understanding stood in the American reformers' way. James Conant, in his role as US Commissioner in Germany, remarked that direct American intervention in the decentralized educational system of Germany had achieved only

²¹⁷ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

mixed results. Attempts to impose American practices had been deeply resented.²¹⁸ The resistance of universities forced the United States to modify the means of revision: Instead of attempting to place political science, social sciences, and American studies in the existing traditional curricula, the experts decided to create establishments – institutes, departments, and chairs named after the disciplines introduced – in order to form a new curriculum based on the American model. At the same time young German lecturers were sent to American universities to observe developments in these fields there. Any further American revision policy in German universities would therefore proceed along the following new directions: establishment of new institutes in the fields of the social sciences, political science, and American studies, and close cooperation with the junior German teaching staff.

3. Establishment of new institutions, departments, and chairs in German universities, and the founding of the Free University

The University Education Sector of the American Military Administration officially declared the following main reasons for setting up new academic units: “The older German universities looked too traditional and conservative and the founding of new ones could be more effective for the democratization of the German university system: new institutions and universities might be the theater in which American and other visiting professors could make the most useful contributions, since it will be probable that such new institutions will be less bound to tradition than the older ones and that their teaching staff will be more receptive to changes and improvements. It may be much easier in them to develop programs of general education, the social sciences, and better training of secondary school teachers than in the old universities. Above all, new higher institutions may provide a special avenue for American policy in Germany to realize in a shorter term of years some of its basic conceptions of the social responsibility and social functions of the universities.”²¹⁹

It was actually easier for American politicians to create new faculties or institutes than to alter a German university’s curriculum and academic programs. With the intention of introducing the disciplines of the social

²¹⁸ University of Arkansas Libraries. Special Collections. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection. Manuscript Collection 468. Box 239. Germany. Folder 18. [Articles on German Exchange, 1949-1962, n.d.]

²¹⁹ NARA. Record Group 59. Central Files 1950-54. Box 2450, 2451, 2456.

sciences, political science, and American studies, the United States now sought to create new institutions of: 1) political science; 2) American studies; and 3) pedagogy during the period under analysis here.

Every one of these institutions was established as part of the universities but was granted independence. Moreover, most of the establishments were set up initially in the two German cities where problems regularly arose. These were Berlin and Munich. Berlin was the city where the influence of the Soviets and German communists turned out to be extensive and so created grounds for a possible ideological defeat for the United States, and with the city's cultural centers and educational institutions falling under the control of the Soviet Union. The United States and the Soviet Union therefore intensified their ideological struggle by opening institutions such as Soviet Culture Houses and American Information Centers, Marxism-Leninism Institutes and Political Science Institutes. Munich, in its location far from the influence of communists, was the *Land* of nationalists and conservatives. Munich and Bavaria as a whole maintained a highly oppositional standpoint in regard to American reforms, undermining American efforts aimed at revising Bavarian schools and universities. In the capital of Bavaria, American military officers therefore set up new institutions to disseminate alternative values in this *Land*.

Political Science institutes

The establishment of political science turned into a very important project that implied not just the introduction of such new disciplines such as international law, comparative politics, and American political systems, but also the establishment of new independent institutes and departments within the universities such as the Institute for European History in Mainz, the Max Planck Institutes for Public and International Law in Heidelberg, the Institute of Political Science at the Free University in Berlin and others.

The policy aimed at setting up new academic units in the universities was initiated by the American expert F. Neumann, as mentioned earlier. He suggested to Washington that they create institutes of political science. Being a former German scholar, he reported to Washington that it would be difficult to establish political science faculties within German universities: hence, he recommended establishing *new* and independent institutes for political science. Moreover, this expert pinpointed Bavaria as the specific state where political education should become central to

university education in order to undermine the conservative traditions there.²²⁰

The American government reacted at once. The *Hochschule für Politik* existed during the Weimer Republic, where Neumann had worked before emigrating to the USA, was re-established in Berlin in 1948. The full German name was the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, Berlin*.²²¹ The reconstituted *Hochschule* had as its first director Otto Suhr, the famous leader of the Social Democratic Party in Berlin and chairman of the Berlin City Assembly. The aim of the School was the study of politics through the eyes of a practicing political party, a trade union, as well as through the eyes of academicians. A series of lectures devoted to the specific aspects of the on-going reorganization of German statecraft were given by prominent members of the Parliamentary Council in Bonn. The School closely cooperated with the Free University, established in 1948.²²² In 1952, at a joint session of the senates of the Free University and the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*, a draft of affiliation was approved.²²³ The *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* was renamed the Otto Suhr Institute at the end of the 1950s. There were 300 regular students and 400 adults from the government who studied history, geography, law, economics, sociology, internal politics, foreign policy, international politics, and political theory. However, by the end of the 1950s, the American government and specialists had to admit the fact that political science had still not become a recognized discipline and that this institute had not gained any influence within the German university system. Vacant chairs were mentioned as the main problem for development of the Otto Suhr Institute. Nevertheless, this political science institute became the first channel for instilling an understanding democratic processes in prospective government officials, politicians, teachers, lawyers, and judges.²²⁴

In Munich, the Institute for Political Science was set up in 1950. The full German name was *Hochschule für Politische Wissenschaften*,

²²⁰ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² NARA. Record Group 59. Confidential US Department of State Central Files. Germany. Internal and Foreign Affairs 1945-1949. Microfilm. Reel 7.

²²³ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration Programs 1949-1952. Box 7, 12, 25.

²²⁴ NARA. Record Group 59. Confidential US Department of State Central Files. FRG. Internal Affairs 1955-1959. Microfilm. Reel 30.

München. The opening of this institution was accompanied by problems. The rector of University of Munich, Alois Hundhammer,²²⁵ who at the time was also the Bavarian Minister for Education, known for his opposition to school reform and for his persistent attempts to retain a mixture of church and state influence in education, frowned on the independent initiatives of the American officers. He appealed to the public and to university people to stop the American initiatives. As a result, in 1951 he was replaced by a new minister, who was much more favorably disposed towards the *Hochschule*. Nevertheless, antipathy and tension continued to exist between the Bavarian educational authorities and the *Hochschule* for a long time because of the independent status of the school. The German authorities stated that, to the extent that there were no academic entrance requirements, the school would never attain a high standard. University of Munich was also fearful that precious financial aid might possibly be diverted to the *Hochschule*, and that the school would encroach upon the realm of higher learning.

Actually, the main activity of both schools was the provision of two-year courses in politics. These courses were centered on the study of political theory, political institutions, and international relations, but also included lectures on economics and sociology. In the 1960s, the Americans observed that the diploma offered by the schools had not proved entirely satisfactory, and did not carry the same prestige as

²²⁵ Alois Hundhammer (1900-1974) was an economist and politician. He was a minister of culture and education in Bavaria during the period 1946-1950. The Soviets described him as a reactionary minister who was eager to establish a system of education with a strong religious component. Americans considered him as a leader of the Bavarian opposition to American reforms, which obliged them replace him in his position as minister in 1951. Hundhammer attempted to establish a new university in the theological seminary: In 1949 he began advocating a change of the status of the theological seminary in Bamberg-Regensburg to that of a university. His argument was based solely on the fact of overcrowding in the existing Bavarian universities. The American Administration was against his proposal, and thus followed a continuing series of disagreements between the Ministry and American authorities. Under Title 8 of Military Government regulations, the final decision in this matter rested with the American authorities. Hundhammer did not send any application for the opening of a new university and the matter was referred to the cultural committee of the *Landtag*, where it was discussed. American diplomats saw no signs of increasing enrollment at the universities; on the contrary, enrollment in Bavarian universities was decreasing. However, an order to Hundhammer sent by the American authorities concerning the impossibility of opening a new university resulted in complaints about of the American Administration being "undemocratic" // NARA. Record Group 59. Confidential US Department of State Central Files. Germany. Internal and Foreign Affairs 1945-1949. Microfilm. Reel 7.

German university diplomas and degrees. This status of the diplomas influenced good students so that they often hesitated to spend two years at the schools.²²⁶

Subsequent years witnessed the creation of two other institutes of political science at universities in Saxony and Hessen. They taught and carried out research in this field. Moreover, up until the early 1960s the universities in Frankfurt, Marburg, Heidelberg, and Berlin (the Free University) established chairs and institutes of political science. In addition, these institutes carried out actual research projects such as on the formation of public opinion in the Eastern Zone of Germany, an analysis of the contemporary party system in Germany, concerning Germany's future role in international organizations, about totalitarian education in the Soviet Zone, on total dictatorship, and other projects as well.²²⁷ Yet, the position of political studies at the universities was far from satisfactory, because universities regularly had vacant chairs in political science.²²⁸ The American government sent American professors to occupy these chairs in order to accelerate development of the prestige of political science; however, this policy did not change the situation, and political science did not attain much of a strong position vis-à-vis the traditional German disciplines such as history or philosophy, for example.

American Studies institutes and chairs

As we mentioned earlier, the American officers were dissatisfied with the place in German universities occupied by disciplines about the United States. The American experts were concerned about the approach that German professors took by teaching American studies as part and parcel of disciplines such as history, literature, or English rather than teaching American civilization as an independent discipline within the framework of interdisciplinary methodology. By the early 1950s, the Military Administration had still not managed to change this situation, in observing that, first, the German senior professoriate had rejected the idea of integrated or independent American institutes; second, literature on the discipline was not to be found in the university libraries; third, the young teaching staff was the only segment of the community interested in studies of American civilization; and, fourth, the positions of director and

²²⁶ R. Hiscocks, *Democracy in Western Germany* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), P. 251-259.

²²⁷ NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.

²²⁸ Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 211; Hiscocks, *Democracy*, 251-259.

full professor in the newly established institutes on American studies were permanently vacant.²²⁹ To improve the situation, the experts proposed opening institutes of American studies at every university despite resistance from the professoriate to this, and thereby putting these disciplines on the examination list, filling the university libraries with literature on the United States, training the junior teaching staff in the United States in order to involve them in conducting research in the field, and, finally, developing a center of German-American studies at one of the universities. These proposals were articulated in the early 1950s, and by the mid-1950s the first results were achieved.

The American government managed to open American institutes at four out six universities by the mid-1950s, and later by the mid-1960s at every university throughout West Germany. The establishment of American Institutes began in 1947. University of Munich became the first to establish a chair of American literature and culture. Previous to this, American studies did not figure at all in the Munich curriculum, although there was a professor who used to offer courses on American literature from time to time. Yet, when establishing the chair, the military officers observed “the lack of interest in the life of the United States and European arrogance towards America.”²³⁰ After the chair was established, the teaching process was still weak because of the lack of literature and teaching staff. This moved the American Administration to send American scholars to Munich. They ran the Institute, cooperated with Germans, and encouraged the government of the United States to award the Munich American Institute the status of a European center for American studies. This came about. An American professor, H. Peters, from a college in Oregon, who had lobbied for the idea through the Department of State, became the first director of the American Institute at University of Munich.²³¹ He invited to teach at the Institute such prominent historians as Merle Curti from Wisconsin and Quincy Wright from Chicago. The Rockefeller Foundation made permanent grants to the Institute to cover salaries of visiting professors from the United States for a three-year period, and also to purchase essential library materials, and to expand the library. By 1955 and 1956 documents on the Munich American Institute mention this establishment as the most important

²²⁹ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

²³⁰ NARA. Record Group 59. Confidential US Department of State Central Files. Germany. Internal and Foreign Affairs 1945-1949. Microfilm. Reel 7.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

center for American studies in Europe. The extensive program of the Institute included both general courses on American civilization available to all students at the University and more advanced courses leading to a doctoral degree as well.²³² However, the Munich Institute later lost its significance in terms of the development of American studies in Europe because of permanently vacant positions and the strong resistance of the Bavarian professoriate to studying about the United States, and so Berlin, the John F. Kennedy Institute of the American Studies at the Free University to be exact, replaced Munich as the European center for American studies.

American specialists observed several problems that decreased the effectiveness of what had been done in Munich and elsewhere as far as promoting American studies in the traditional German curriculum was concerned. First, American scholars were unable to overcome the traditional German approach to studies: most of the courses in the field of political science and governmental studies remained untouched and were devoted to either language, and literature or the history of the United States. American scholars instead had hoped that German professors would deliver lectures and conduct research on the US government, US politics, religion in the US, and similar subjects. The interdisciplinary approach that American visiting professors had hoped to implant in German universities did not take root. Young German scholars, when answering the question of why studies about American government and the American party system had not taken root in the universities, argued that political science and aspects of the political life in the US were the most difficult to be introduced in Germany because of rigid German traditions, lack of open-mindedness in Germany, differences in educational system, and different presuppositions in the field of study and different mentality of Germans.²³³ Second, the number of German professors who delivered lectures in the field had not been increased. The institutes were only half-filled by American lecturers and the position of director was often vacant.²³⁴ The theories and methods brought by the Americans therefore were not taught by German professors, but were instead taught by Americans themselves in German universities. Third,

²³² NARA. Record Group 59. Records of the Plans and Development Staff, Evaluation Branch, 1955-1960. Box 44.

²³³ NARA. Record Group 306. Records of USIA. Office of Research Country Project Files, 1951-1964. West Germany. Box 117.

²³⁴ NARA. Record Group 59. Records of the Plans and Development Staff, Evaluation Branch, 1955-1960. Box 44.

the disciplines involved in American studies were not recognized as being on an equal footing with other fields in the humanities. They were not included in the examination list and did not constitute either a major or a minor specialization for which a student could present himself for examination for a degree. At universities where American studies were offered, a student had to choose English history as a major in order to devote most of his or her time to American subjects. Or, if he or she was studying to be a specialist in American law, such a student was formally known as simply a student of law. In this fashion, the universities did teach students about America but as part of classes in philosophy, law, and economics, and, when American departments existed, they were usually anchored in English-language seminars. There were, however, three universities in Germany which did allow students to major in American studies and earn a PhD in this subject. These were the universities in Berlin, Munich, and Mainz.

Therefore, the American government recognized that the initial approach of taking American studies out of control of the old professoriate had not brought about “a large return,” and so a new plan, elaborated in 1955 and 1956, suggested consolidating American studies into one integrated university department (a *chair*) as the Soviets had done with regard to studies of Marxism-Leninism.

According to the new plan, every university and all teachers colleges in West Germany were to develop American studies chairs. The plan was supposed to include all eighteen universities that existed at the end of the 1950s in West Germany. These chairs were meant to implant these disciplines in the various German academic programs being established as interdepartmental units. The teaching staff of these chairs would give lectures at different faculties, conduct research, and foster young lecturers. Washington clearly defined the necessity of changing the “American Institutes” paradigm for an “American Chairs” one: “the American government encouraged actively the German Universities to establish Chairs in American Studies, because Chairs could contribute to increasing the prestige of the American Studies. As to the German traditions, if there is no Chair and no professor for a given subject, that subject is somehow not quite respectable intellectually and not quite worth serious consideration by other professors, students and by general public. It is thus necessary for American Studies chairs to be established in the universities for the subject itself to gain the prestige both that it inherently deserves and that is necessary for a dissemination of

knowledge about the United States.”²³⁵ In 1957, the United States stated its intention of establishing at least fifteen American studies chairs at eighteen universities by 1962. After this, the next goal was to establish American studies chairs at forty-six teachers colleges, because the graduates of these institutions would have the most direct effect upon the nearly eighty percent of Germans who did not attend universities. Finally, the next phase was the establishment of American studies chairs at eight German technical universities and colleges.²³⁶

In order to implement this plan, American university staff was once again mobilized. In 1959, just over a hundred American professors were written to and informed about the situation in Germany. Of these, twenty-six replied that they were interested and appeared, on paper, to be qualified. The result was the selection of eight of these twenty-six professors as fully qualified. They would become presidents of the chairs in American studies in German universities but for no more than five years.²³⁷ Some American professors, however, were dissatisfied with a new and too unusual a demand from the Department of State with regard to the manner in which they should conduct their lectures at German universities. The Department of State pointed out that “the American lecturers had to realize that a soft and mumbling lecture before German students may not be easily understood and lead to low attendance. Further the artistic approach of many representatives of this category and ‘applied Thoreauism’²³⁸ may be the cause if very casual dress and manners of some lecturers. In view of the high social standing of university teachers in Germany and their rather reserved manners and customs, conservative habits of American lecturers will be of great importance in establishing good relations.”²³⁹

The final results of the plan aimed at establishing new chairs at German universities were controversial. On the positive side, the United States managed to create thirteen chairs at eighteen universities by 1962, and American universities opened thirty-one research centers in

²³⁵ NARA. Record Group 59. Bureau of Cultural Affairs, 1957-1962. Box 50.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Thoreauism is an idea named after American writer and philosopher Henry Thoreau (1817-1862). Thoreau wrote in his book, *Walden*, about simple living in natural surroundings, and in his essay, *Civil Disobedience*, about an argument for individual resistance to civil government in moral opposition to an unjust state.

²³⁹ NARA. Record Group 59. Office of Educational, Cultural Affairs. Lot 98D 252. Box 169-172, 205-206.

American studies in Germany. By 1965, there were twenty-three chairs in American Studies at these eighteen universities, and only three chairs of the were held by Americans.²⁴⁰ Another outstanding achievement could be considered to be the opening of the John F. Kennedy Institute of American Studies at the Free University which became a new center for *Amerikanistik* in Germany and in Europe.

However, failures regarding this American policy could be also observed. First, fifteen out of the twenty-three new chairs concentrated on studies of American literature, but not on political science and American civilization as Americans had intended. Two chairs studied American history; two, social and economic sciences; two, American civilization; one, political science (government); and one, geography. Political science was studied at the John F. Kennedy Institute and at University of Heidelberg, and, hence, only 1000 students out of 18,000 were studying political science within the framework of American studies. Literature as a concentration field was prominently featured, and that bore witness to the fact that the traditional approach of German scholars had not altered. Second, the disciplines of American studies were not listed for compulsory examinations. American reformers had hoped that the German Society for American Studies, established in 1953, would become one of the influential tools in the Standing Conference of Cultural Ministers in terms of formulating standards for examining university students in American studies.²⁴¹ The Society, however, did not promote this objective of the American government, and diplomats indicated that the absence of the disciplines on an examination list undermined the vitality of American studies in Germany.²⁴² Third, library holdings with regard to the American studies remained weak and undiversified, because the universities continued emphasizing literature as the main subject for the holdings. A diversity of holdings was therefore absent with the exception of the holdings at the John F. Kennedy Institute.²⁴³ Fourth, the positive achievements of the Occupation Administration were strongly challenged by some misunderstandings concerning contemporary life in the United States and negative attitudes towards America among professors and, to a greater extent, among

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ NARA. Record Group 59. Records of the Plans and Development Staff, Evaluation Branch, 1955-1960. Box 44.

²⁴² NARA. Record Group 59. Office of Educational, Cultural Affairs. Lot 98D 252. Box 169-172, 205-206.

²⁴³ Ibid.

students. This was noted for the first time by American diplomats and American professors in 1963. Some German Anglicists suddenly declared that they were no longer in favor of the specialized study of American literature and American linguistics. Students neglected lectures and later demonstrated against American international politics. Consequently, the American government was compelled to modify its policy in the field of exchange programs in order to head off the anti-American movement within the student body. Instead of inviting the German teaching staff to do research in the United States, German students, who had long been neglected by the American government, became the primary target. Of one hundred German participants in the American governmental exchange programs, ninety-eight were German university teaching staff and two were students during the period 1945 through the early 1960s; starting in 1964, out of one hundred German participants, ninety-eight were students and two were professors.²⁴⁴

The American embassies and consulates supervised the content of the academic programs and maintained contacts with the directors of all the programs that sponsored lectures by American specialists for Germans and with the former grantees who had been invited to the US to do research in the field. The latter were provided with additional grants to arrange seminars and lectures, and to purchase books about the United States.²⁴⁵ According to the annual reports of American diplomats, the academic activity of each lecturer who taught the disciplines included in American studies was recorded and evaluated.²⁴⁶ Here, for example, is a description of the development of the American Studies department at University of Bonn in 1965: "There has been progress in American Studies since the chair was established in 1962. A somewhat negative attitude had prevailed up to that time. During the past several years, however, the attitudes have changed gradually. There are now four full professors. Professors <...> interested in American literature have succeeded in building the American section of the library, the other professors are the most active academicians. <...> They invited American professors and used their experience as a part of the curriculum and gave them all academic rights to advise doctoral candidates and conduct oral examinations."²⁴⁷

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ NARA. Record Group 59. Office of Educational, Cultural Affairs. Lot 98D 252. Box 169-172, 205-206.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

We have excluded a detailed account of all the courses taught by the professors. These reports illustrate, however, that the intensified expansion of American studies became the primary and more or less successful tool for maintaining a liaison with the German university professoriate, which by the early 1960s had begun articulating strongly unfavorable attitudes.

Despite all the challenges, controversies, and uncertainties surrounding American reforms, the government of the United States believed that American studies would become the cornerstone of the US cultural diplomacy in Western Europe. Actually, it became the only means of promoting a favorable image of the United States in the changing political context of the mid-1960s through the early 1970s and the only means of altering the leftist attitudes of German students.

Research institutes in Education and Pedagogy

The American Occupation authorities, like their counterparts in the East, sought to re-establish pedagogy as a branch of science and as a means for reforming teachers' education in Germany. A corps of German teachers was trained either at the philosophy faculties in the universities or at the special Teachers Institutes.²⁴⁸ American experts, invited for the purpose of coming up with proposals for future reforms in German teachers' education in 1946, suggested establishing independent faculties of pedagogy at German universities to prepare a new corps of teachers for secondary schools. In addition, these experts suggested opening new research institutes in the fields of education and pedagogy.²⁴⁹ However, the first proposals were rejected by American military officers as inappropriate. Instead, they opened sixteen Education Centers to provide teachers and professors with new literature and magazines in the field of

²⁴⁸ Ever since the two-track school educational system in Germany consisted of people's schools for children 6-14 years of age and of the more elite gymnasiums for children of 9-18, teachers for these divergent school worlds were trained in the special teachers' institutes, where studies lasted for three years, as well as in the philosophy faculties of the universities. After the end of the First World War, all teachers were trained in pedagogical academies, and the graduates of the philosophy faculties became teachers in the gymnasiums. The Nazis transformed the pedagogical academies into pedagogical schools, which enrolled the graduates of the people's schools with studies lasting five years, similar to Soviet pedagogical education.

²⁴⁹ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation. High Commissioner for Germany. Office of OMGUS, Hessen. Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1947-48. Box 702.

education.²⁵⁰ The Military Administration financially sponsored thirty-six pedagogical establishments (*Lehrerbildungsanstalten*, *Pädagogische Instituten*, and *Pädagogische Hochschulen*) where future teachers could be trained; yet, the kind of reforms conducted there by the American authorities remains unknown.²⁵¹

During the first years of Occupation, the United States was worried about Soviet activities in some German pedagogical schools. The Soviets, as will be shown later, introduced Soviet pedagogical approaches²⁵² to education in Germany. The American officers were concerned about Berlin, where the system of pedagogical schools and academies had been developed according to earlier reforms by Wilhelm Humboldt and by famous German pedagogues who worked in Berlin. The Soviet authorities successfully established contacts with several famous scholars, appointing them to high positions in schools, local governments, etc. The famous German pedagogue Wilhelm Blume became *Bezirksbürgermeister* in Berlin and director of the most prestigious of the pedagogical schools, the *Pädagogische Hochschule* in Berlin. The school was reopened by decision of the *Magistrat* of Berlin and Allied *Kommandatura* in 1946.²⁵³ In as much as the school was located in the Russian Sector of Berlin, the Soviet officers increased their interest in and control over the *Pädagogische Hochschule*. They sat in on lectures, sitting among the students; they searched the student card index and made notes on the addresses of many of the students as well as other information. In December 1948, the director of the *Pädagogische Hochschule*, W. Blume, received a letter from the Berlin *Magistrat*, which cooperated closely with the Americans, stating that the present political situation at that time, which was the conflict between the Soviet and American Occupation Administrations over University of Berlin, made it necessary to transfer the *Pädagogische Hochschule* to the western part of Berlin. For this reason the *Pädagogische Hochschule*, the letter continued, would be transferred to the building of the secondary

²⁵⁰ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

²⁵¹ NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.

²⁵² The main ideas of Soviet pedagogics were narrowly evaluated as being the ideology of labor and polytechnic education.

²⁵³ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

school for girls, Berlin-Lanwitz, Barbarastrasse.²⁵⁴ In December 1948, the *Hochschule* was moved by the American Military Administration. The Department of State sent American specialists in the field of the philosophy of education in order to teach the prospective teachers new methods for their future profession.²⁵⁵

The 1950s witnessed a new stage in American intervention in German pedagogy. New institutes at the universities were opened to do research in the field of education. In February 1951, the *Deutschen Institut für Internationale Pädagogische Forschung* was established in Frankfurt as a special project of the Military Administration.²⁵⁶ The German pedagogue and émigré, and a consultant to the American Occupation authorities, Erich Hylla,²⁵⁷ promoted reforms in German pedagogical research and teaching. He applied to the Department of State for permission to introduce psychological methods to Germany. He, together with some American specialists, established this Institute and he became its first director. Hylla called for university status for the Institute and received it. The Institute was incorporated into University of Frankfurt. In 1952, the first thirty students were admitted to study questions of educational psychology and measurement, along with school administration and curriculum. Among the Institute's main concerns was the development of psychological and achievement tests for controlled experimentation – a field almost untouched by German educational research – and the subsequent training of German school administrators and teachers in the use and interpretation of such tests.²⁵⁸ This institution became the first school for educational research and advanced studies in education in Germany, and influenced the development of other research institutes in West Germany. American and European specialists, recruited by the Department of State, contributed to the development of educational research tools and techniques and helped in the training of specialists for key positions in German education.²⁵⁹ In the course of the following three years, the United States established three institutes for

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

²⁵⁷ Erich Hylla was evaluated as a German who contributed enormously to the development of a new pedagogy and to the establishment of American studies in the Federal Republic of Germany. See, NARA. Record Group 59. Records of the Plans and Development Staff, Evaluation Branch, 1955-1960. Box 44.

²⁵⁸ NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.

²⁵⁹ NARA. Record Group 59. Central Files 1950-54. Box 2450, 2451, 2456.

pedagogical investigations: The Munich Testing Institute, The Pedagogical-Psychological Institute in Berlin, and The Pedagogical Institute in Wiesbaden in Hessen.²⁶⁰ Pedagogy and psychology were the primary topics of investigation.

A brief comparison with Soviet policy in this field would lead us to conclude at this point that the Americans were more interested in creating a basis for doing research than in reforming the existing teachers institutes (*Pedagogical Institutes*) where the first reforms were begun only at the end of the 1960s.

Establishment of the Free University in Berlin

Another project attributable to American policy in the domain of setting up new educational institutions in Germany was the opening of a new university in Berlin named the Free University in 1948. This event has attracted the attention of scholars and politicians right up until the present day, and, of course, has been the subject of numerous conventional facts and judgments about why and how the United States created this university in their zone of Occupation. Every scholar dealing with the subject knows from the many books and articles that after increased Soviet pressure on academic freedom in University of Berlin, which was opposed by three students (Otto Stolz, Joachim Schwarz, and Otto Hess) who were in turn expelled from the University in April 1948, the American Military Administration supported the request of German students, professors, and the Berlin *Magistrat* to set up a new university in Dahlem-Dorf. The Free University began functioning in December 1948.

This story would seem on the whole to be true, if we go by the American documents prepared in the period of the 1950s and 1960s. These documents related the events of 1948 within the new political context of worsening Soviet-American relations, which reshaped the story. However, the documents prepared by the American Military Administration in the days surrounding the establishment of the university, which was the period of 1945-1948, tell us a different story. Our task here is therefore to trace how official American documentary versions of the events were changed over the time and how the actual American participants perceived the events. We will use all available documents that deal with the reaction of the American Occupation

²⁶⁰ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

authorities and of Washington to the events that happened at University of Berlin.

Before this analysis, we should note that, on having examined the documents of the American Military authorities and of the Department of State, we came to the conclusion that only a few of these documents could be attributed to the immediate reaction of the authorities to the current events which surrounded the founding of the Free University. Most of the documents are official representations of the events which had happened several weeks or months earlier, or even years previously. Hence, the available documents can be divided into two groups: 1) those documents pertaining to the immediate reaction and engagement of the American authorities in the case, where the issuing date of the document comes close to the date of the event; and 2) those documents depicting past events, where the issuing date of the document is not near the date of the event. To differentiate between these two types of documents, we will call the documents of the first type the *concurrent* documents and the documents of the second type the official *post-event* descriptions of the founding of the Free University.

Before that day, April 16, 1948, when the Soviet authorities expelled the three German students from University of Berlin, which, as we know, became the main reason for founding the Free University, the American authorities had had intensive discussions about the idea of establishing *a new University in Berlin*. The discourse of the debates centered on a new university but not on a free or democratic university or, indeed, on the reestablishment of the old University of Berlin, nor did it have anything to do with Soviet oppression. As long ago as 1946, a team of American educationalists under the direction of George Zook recommended to the American Occupation authorities and General Lucius Clay that all the institutes for advanced study and research be unified in one organization to be made available in the American Sector in Berlin: "The problem of higher education in Berlin is complicated by the fact that one occupying power is in sole control of University of Berlin. There are in the American Sector of Berlin a number of institutes for advanced study and research. These institutions, many of which are the most distinguished of their kind in the world, could be joined in a cooperative organization and be given them such assistance, material and otherwise, [sic] as they may

need to resume their work.”²⁶¹ There is no document about the reaction of the American authorities to this proposal. However, in 1948, before the three students’ case, an outline for a new university was prepared in the Education Branch. The outline covered the faculty divisions for this new university, its ideology, the system of management, etc. The document contained an extremely significant phrase that could be used as evidence of early deliberations by the American authorities about establishing a new university in Berlin: “For more than two years there have been announcements and rumors that the Americans would help establish a new university in Berlin. It is time to move ahead and actually establish such a university.”²⁶² Some Soviet documents also bore witness to the fact that, before the Berlin University division, the United States had intended to establish a new university, but – according to the Soviet version – by exploiting the academic institutes of University of Berlin, that were located in the American Sector of the city. In documents issued after April 1948, the idea of establishing *a democratic university in the Western Sectors of Berlin*, which would be a prestigious victory for the democracies over Russian activities in the universities and would change the German model of teaching, can be found in the American documents.²⁶³ In addition to its democratic essence, this university was meant to reflect American approaches to university education. American experts believed that political education, general education, and sociology should be compulsory courses, and they should destroy the German selfish individualism of the isolated specialists; the philosophy courses ought to be culture-historical sketches, setting the students free from the adoration of so-called ‘German Idealism’ and abstract philosophical facets which, according to Americans, enable the Germans to adore great mystical ideologies. Moreover, mass lectures should be changed radically and a system of classes (seminars) should be introduced, and the free attendance should be restricted.²⁶⁴

In May 1948, the first post-event description of how *a Free University – not a New University* – was established was issued by the

²⁶¹ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation. High Commissioner for Germany. Office of OMGUS, Hessen. Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1947-48. Box 702.

²⁶² NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

American Occupation authorities. In May 1948, the first mention of the new university as the Free University occurs. The document is the dispatch of the United States Political Adviser for Germany, Richard Sterling, to the Secretary of State about the Berlin University crisis and the movement to establish the Free University. Sterling participated in the events and he centered the beginnings of the founding of the University not on the problems involving the three students, as now is conveyed, but on problems involving the Berlin *Magistrat*. These events occurred within the governing structures of the city and were the ones which instigated all subsequent actions. He writes that the Berlin City Council authorized the Berlin *Magistrat* to immediately take all steps necessary to establish a free and independent university in Berlin. The SED members of the Council were against this decision and thus the final resolution turned out to be controversial. This resolution *did not call for a new university in Berlin but demanded the establishment of a free university*. This can be interpreted to mean that the *Magistrat* was empowered to explore the ways and means of restoring academic freedom to the University of Berlin. Only if the *Magistrat* was unable to reestablish the University of Berlin as a free institution it would propose and support the founding of a new university.²⁶⁵ The idea of the reestablishment of the University of Berlin as a new university was born. In addition, the author of the document mentions a fact which never turned up later in other documents. According to the author, the Soviet authorities attempted to readmit the expelled students to the University in order to stop the movement towards founding a new university. Moreover, he indicates the specific standpoint of the rector of the University of Munich concerning events: “Meanwhile the SED-controlled central administration for education attempted, in conjunction with Berlin University authorities, to appear more reasonable in the handling of the expulsion of the three students <...> The Soviets tried to avoid the establishment of a new university in the Western Sectors. Using the professors of University of Berlin, they invited two of the expelled students, Schwartz and Stolz, and declared that Wandel²⁶⁶ was prepared to readmit the three expellees to the University, if they admitted their attacks on the University. They refused and, moreover, Otto Stolz went to Munich and addressed a protest

²⁶⁵ NARA. Record Group 59. Confidential US Department of State Central Files. Germany. Internal and Foreign Affairs 1945-1949. Microfilm. Reel 7.

²⁶⁶ Wandel is Paul Wandel, the president of the German Administration for People's Education in the Soviet Zone.

meeting of two hundred students. The Rector of the University of Munich refused to take part in the demonstration as did the Student Council on the grounds that all the facts pertaining to the expulsion were not available."²⁶⁷ Finally, the author specifies at the end of the report that General Clay established a special committee to estimate the possible assets on hand in Berlin's Western Sectors for the establishment of a new university.²⁶⁸

Hence, according to the early official version of the founding of the Free University, the Berlin *Magistrat* intended to restore the University of Berlin through establishing a new university called a free university. The Soviets tried to stop this, proposing instead that the three students should return to the University of Berlin, while the American authorities went about estimating the financial possibilities available for creating a new university in the American Sector of Berlin.

In July 1948, the Major of Berlin, Ernst Reuter,²⁶⁹ sent a letter to the British, French, and US Military Governments to ask for their support for the project to establish a new university in Berlin. The author tells us that on June 19, 1948, a large group of professors, students, and other Berliners met and resolved to establish a new university in Berlin, which would be free from Russian influence. This group of Berliners created a preparatory committee to carry out this project and appealed to the Allied authorities. Reuter admitted the fact that the project could not be realized without the support of the Western Occupation authorities. The letter was read by the Office of Military Administration in August, and the United States stated that it would fund the activity of *the preparatory commission for the Free University*.²⁷⁰ From other concurrent documents we know that this preparatory committee consisted of one of the expelled students, Otto Hess, as well as Ernst Reuter and other Germans, and was set up at 4 Boltzmannstrasse in Dahlem, and that it did most of the work necessary for the enrollment of about 1500 students in November. The

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Reuter was a unique individual. He had been a communist after the First World War, and he was a close associate of Lenin; he knew Stalin personally. He had returned from the Soviet Union in 1918 to form the Communist Party of Germany, but then he defected from the party and became a Social Democrat and a member of the Reichstag. During the Nazi regime he had to flee Germany and worked in Turkey. After the Second War he returned to Berlin and became the major of this city.

²⁷⁰ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

head of the secretariat was Dr. von Bergmann. The secretariat made direct contact with over 100 prospective professors and *Dozenten*.²⁷¹ About 1100 students indicated their desire to attend the university. The preparatory committee found that the institute buildings in Dahlem were considered highly favorable for a new university. They were the Biology Building, Anthropology Building and a large *Völkerkundemuseum*. To begin the projects, the committee asked for DM 2 million from the Western Allied governments. However, the question was that of creating a legal status for the university. To make the university independent from the state, the *Magistrat* gave it the status of a public corporation and the American Military Administration approved this act. However, the French and British representatives rejected participation in the project. The British representative stated that the times and conditions were not favorable for launching a project of this size and that the British government had to finance and handle the Technical University which cost them DM 7 million per year.²⁷² Kendal Foss,²⁷³ the American editor of the *Neue Zeitung*, was mentioned as the person who should be the main mediator between the Germans and the American Military Administration.²⁷⁴ Furthermore, the preparatory committee together with the Higher Education Branch at the American Military Administration, was involved in the establishment of the Free University.

In November 1948, the second post-event description of the founding of the Free University was recorded by Kendal Foss, as mentioned above. It was a report prepared specially for the Department of State. Foss was an American journalist and a staunch anti-communist, as well as being an active mediator between German students and the American authorities in Berlin, and, in the opinion of James Tent, he was just in Berlin to cover the breaking story.²⁷⁵ The personal characteristics and mission of Foss influenced the content of the document. The tone of the entire text is pompous. Foss starts off by saying that, while the official opening ceremonies of the new school will not be held until early

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Kendall Foss was a journalist, who wrote for the *Neue Zeitung*, and he became a new editor of the newspaper in the 1940s. He was American-born, Harvard-educated, fiercely anti-communist and a great admirer of German culture.

²⁷⁴ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134

²⁷⁵ Tent, *The Free University*, 94.

December, the moment seems appropriate to review the growth of this dynamic concept from its inception on April 23, to its implementation six months later. Consequently, according to Foss, the roots of the founding of the university stemmed from the date of April 23. On this day, he continues, some 2000 students of the old university met in protest against the expulsion of three of their fellows by the authorities of the Soviet Zone. The issue, in the opinion of Foss, was not whether the three had deserved their dismissals, but whether the university still enjoyed its traditional autonomy and the privileges of academic freedom. After this protest meeting, the Military Governor authorized the establishment of a committee to examine the feasibility of this desire on the part of the Germans. In May, the committee declared that a free university could be created. Meanwhile the City Assembly (with the SED alone opposing) had voted to instruct the *Magistrat* to attempt once more to bring the old university back under city control and, failing that, to take steps to found a new free university. Like the previous author, Foss also mentioned that a group of Berliners decided to take the initiative and take up the job of establishing a new university in the Western Sectors of Berlin; and they named this job initiative the preparatory committee. The chairman was Ernst Reuter. The Military Government decided to invest DM 2 million to start up a new university. The secretariat was created and led by Fritz von Bergmann, son of two of Germany's well-known doctors. By mid-September, the organizers were ready to seek a legal foundation. The *Magistrat* officially recognized the Free University as an institution under public law with the right to engage in the business of higher education. The problem had been to find a way to confer the city's approval on an administrative act (which would not require four-power approval) and to avoid a legislative act which would have had to have had a four-power blessing. It was decided to confine the first semester's activities to three faculties – the Philosophy Faculty, the Medical Faculty, and the Law Faculty.²⁷⁶ So, according to Foss, Soviet oppression in University of Berlin, the protest of students, the aspiration of Germans in Berlin to establish a university free from Soviet control, all contributed to the decision made by the United States.

Finally, on November 20, 1948, after the official opening of the Free University, a political adviser for Germany sent a report to the Secretary

²⁷⁶ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS. Württemberg-Baden. Records of Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1945-1949. Box 913-917A.

of State about the founding of the Free University. It was the third post-event description and the most impressive of the stories about the expulsions of the three students, about the activities of the *Magistrat*, and about how the United States created a free and democratic university. The story then became more turgid and centered on the struggle between democratic Berliners and the Soviet Union. The blockade of Berlin was first mentioned here as being critical to the situation in Berlin, in the framework of which the new university would come to symbolize for many Berliners their opposition to communist and such acts in its name. The Free University was hailed as the most democratic university in Europe, and one which would guide other universities in Germany. The author indicated that “the university’s official opening on November 8 for 1948-1949 academic year, just six months from its original conception, is one of the outstanding achievements to date by democratic elements in Berlin and a heartening example of the strong core of resistance in the city to political and intellectual domination by the Communists. Successful establishment of the Free University was the result of a series of measures adopted by the Soviet Military Administration aimed at denying the basic rights of free expression and academic independence to University of Berlin...” Finally, the report indicated that “a significant factor in enlisting support was the eminent historian Friedrich Meinecke’s official break with the University of Berlin and his subsequent selection as Rector of the new University.”²⁷⁷ The first rector of the Free University was indeed the professor of history from the University of Berlin, Friedrich Meinecke.²⁷⁸

In the subsequent years of the Cold War period, the stories about the founding of the Free University and its development during its first years necessarily assumed a political tone similar to the third version. The American documents in 1951, for example, related that the Free University was founded in the face of strong Soviet opposition and in spite of the blockade, for the purpose of achieving academic freedom. Documents from 1953 correlated the movement of the day to make Berlin a free city with the founding the Free University²⁷⁹ and an official history

²⁷⁷ NARA. Record Group 59. Confidential US Department of State Central Files. Germany. Internal and Foreign Affairs 1945-1949. Microfilm. Reel 7.

²⁷⁸ Friedrich Meinecke was a prominent historian. His tenure as Rector was short due to his age, 86. Later the Historical Institute at the Free University was named after Meinecke, *Geschichte Friedrich Meinecke Institut*.

²⁷⁹ NARA. Record Group 466. Records of US High Commission for Germany. Berlin Element. Public Affairs Division, 1943-1953. Box 1, 2, 4, 5, 9.

of the founding of the Free University was written by a young assistant in the history department. The founding period was depicted in darker tones in 1958: "The Free University was created by a group of students, professors and politicians because Communist penetration of the old University of Berlin (unfortunately located in the East Sector), coupled with growing coercion and oppression, as well the arrest and ouster of students, had reached such proportions that the establishment of a new university in the Western Sector appeared to be the only solution."²⁸⁰

There is no need to set out a detailed conclusion about the interpretation of the facts with regard to the establishment of the Free University. We can only emphasize that before the events of 1948, the American authorities in Berlin had discussed the idea of establishing a new university and after the oppressive Soviet activities in the old University of Berlin, this idea was transformed into the suggestion of establishing a free and democratic university. It is evident that, by having set up the Free University, the United States had acquired a strong ideological weapon against the Soviet Union which found itself thoroughly defeated in this matter. However, it also led to serious difficulties such as the need for permanent funding for the university, strong student opposition, and other problems.

4. New holdings in university libraries

Analyzing American and Soviet policy towards German universities, we cannot pass over that aspect of their policy which is connected to the libraries, because this aspect was directly related to the reforms of curricula and academic programs. The policy towards the university libraries implied the following activities for the United States: supervision of the content of textbooks and monographs available in German libraries, establishment of new libraries for the university teaching staff and students, publication of new textbooks and books, and the dissemination of literature throughout the university libraries.

Air bombardments caused irretrievable damage to German university libraries: half of all holdings were incinerated. However, some holdings, for example, those of the Marburg University library had been evacuated in time and hence were entirely preserved.²⁸¹ The American authorities

²⁸⁰ NARA. Record Group 59. Confidential US Department of State Central Files. FRG. Internal Affairs 1955-1959. Microfilm. Reel 30.

²⁸¹ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation. High Commissioner for Germany. Office of OMGUS, Hessen. Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1947-48. Box 702.

started reopening the libraries in 1946 with the condition that Nazi books would be eliminated from circulation according to the directives. To open a library, the rectors of the universities needed to obtain special permission from the Military Administration.²⁸² On the whole, Nazi literature was eliminated; however, in the early 1950s, libraries were checked again in order to eliminate communist literature. The US High Commissioner James Conant in 1953 issued the order which provided for this new inspection of each university library as well as of reading rooms of *Amerika Häuser* to remove books which had communist passages.²⁸³ At the same time American authorities encouraged cooperation between German and American libraries. The Military Administration informed universities in 1948 of the possibility of ordering books from the United States at American expense; however, for a long period of time, the United States continued to examine lists of books requested by German universities.²⁸⁴

Besides supervising university libraries, the American officers built and opened quite a few libraries in their zone and later throughout West Germany. Sixteen of the Education Service Centers mentioned above had libraries with reference books, along with source books for research in writing textbooks and in planning course of study. Special collections were developed to provide professors and students with books in the field of social studies. There were collections of American textbooks for students, and the centers became places where German teaching staff met American university people and learned about the best educational practices, read curriculum reports, along with professional books and magazines. The centers provided universities with additional materials (both audio-visual and printed) and facilities.²⁸⁵ American information centers, opened everywhere, also had libraries aimed at students and

²⁸² NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

²⁸³ The order mentioned two authors whose books had to be removed: Howard Fast and Anna L. Strong. They were American leftist writers and their novels dealt with political themes. Both were Marxists and members of the Communist Party. Fast wrote about American life, and Strong appraised Soviet life, although she had been arrested by Soviet agents in 1949 // NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

professors.²⁸⁶ Twelve American-controlled branch libraries were opened in Bavaria alone, and the university public made up the majority of all registered borrowers.²⁸⁷ American libraries, opened at German universities where American Institutes or Chairs had been established, seemed to have the strongest influence on the modification of holdings in the university libraries. They were a direct channel for books and magazines coming from the United States. These libraries were headed by Germans who had the full confidence of the American Occupation Administration: for example, the American library at the American Institute at the University of Frankfurt was headed by Fritz Meinecke, who had also been the organizer of the orientation course for the German prisoners of war at Fort Getty, located in the United States.²⁸⁸ Finally, new libraries were opened by the Americans for the new university establishments as well. Although the names of these libraries did not have the word “American” in them, they were American in essence. This was manifest in the content of the library holdings which mostly consisted of American books and – more important to German perception at the time – was arranged in a system of open shelves. The Germans were impressed by the system of the open-shelf system, and local newspapers mentioned this novelty to German universities several times: “The ‘open shelf’ library plays an important role in the American library system. Nearly all university libraries give their students open access to the books which they need for their studies. With some exceptions, scientific libraries in Germany still adhere to the controlled book lending system, but some of our popular libraries have begun to introduce the open shelf system with which the *Amerika Häuser* have made us acquainted.”²⁸⁹

What kinds of new books were sent to those existing and newly opened libraries? First of all, the United States initiated an expensive but effective *textbook program* in 1950 in order to write manuscripts and publish books and then to provide the libraries at universities and those at American Centers with new literature. Favorably inclined German

²⁸⁶ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS, Berlin. Education and Cultural Relations Branch, 1945-49. Box 128-134.

²⁸⁷ NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.

²⁸⁸ NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation. High Commissioner for Germany. Office of OMGUS, Hessen. Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1947-48. Box 702.

²⁸⁹ NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449. Fritz Meinecke was an associate director of the Institute of American studies at Frankfurt University and became a participant in an American exchange program for the German elite in the 1950s.

emigrants and American scholars were asked to participate in this project. They wrote books in the newly introduced disciplines such as American studies, political science, or general education. Before publication, a manuscript was screened by the American authorities with the participation of respectable German and American scholars.²⁹⁰ The books prepared by F. Neumann, who developed political science and law at the Free University in Berlin, had a particular significance. His books laid the foundation for a new curriculum and teaching process in the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*, integrated into the University. His textbooks dealing with civil rights in the United State were very popular in Germany.²⁹¹ Another book entitled *Picture History of Western Man* was published as the primary textbook for junior university students in the framework of the textbook project in 1951. The book was evaluated as the most important due to its special ideological message and fairly good statements about American ideas.²⁹² It tells the history about “Western man who was the architect of the modern world, the chief contributor to its patterns of thought and action; he was a most interesting, instructive and colorful individual whose manifold activities through the centuries elevated the human spirit and ennobled the human heart; he was a Christian and his faith served as a mighty engine of civilization which not only produced works of art that remain the wonder and the admiration of posterity, but also evolved a set of moral standards which are the very bedrock of his heirs’ society today. Western Man, by any definition, is a product of Western Europe.”²⁹³ Moreover, the textbook project published books criticizing the dogmas of communism. For example, in 1951, as a response to the distribution of Stalin’s “Short History of the Soviet Communist Party” in millions of copies throughout the Soviet Zone of Germany, the United States published its own version of the history of the Communist Party. In the opinion of the American Military Administration, “it would be a true and factual short history of the Bolshevik Party, explaining all errors, lies, distortions and myths, and hence the book would be the most effective means of anti-communist

²⁹⁰ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² NARA. Record Group 466. Records of US High Commission for Germany. Berlin Element. Public Affairs Division, 1943-1953. Box 1, 2, 4, 5, 9.

²⁹³ *Picture History of Western Man*, ed. H. Luce (New York: Time Inc., 1951), 1.

propaganda. The scholars of a German journal, *Der Monat*, established by the former German émigré community, contributed to this book.”²⁹⁴

However, in conducting the textbook program, the American government was not safeguarded from oversights. Books that included pro-communist passages were sometimes missed by the American experts and were published. The *World History Textbook*, containing definite communist and anti-Catholic biases only discerned after publication in November 1952, is a case in point in illustrating to what extent improper ideological passages could be a challenge for the American government. The manuscript was prepared by the German socialists, Arno Peters²⁹⁵ and his wife. The book was a timeline study of world history. The project was fully supported by the American Administration within the framework of the textbook program. Before publication, the manuscript was screened by American experts and German scholars who did not find any objectionable information.²⁹⁶ The authors established their own publishing company and published 14,000 copies of the book, as agreed with the Americans. Only when about 10,000 had been distributed among the various universities and American libraries, did journalists in the United States and Germany discover some strong communist passages in the textbook, and more interestingly, later, when an investigation was begun, these journalists ironically stated that the Red-authored book was an embarrassment to the US, thus implying that the American government could not allow a communist book to be published under its auspices. The investigation carried out by a special security division in the Department of State found that communist bias was shown in the selection, phrasing, arrangement, or omission of historical data; in the application of modern communist terminology to social conditions in ancient times; in considering all historical movements in terms of social changes in favor of or against “workers and peasants”; and in applying Stalinist historical concepts to pre-Soviet and Soviet history, and to recent history elsewhere. An anti-religious bias was revealed in stressing the abuses and weaknesses in the medieval church,

²⁹⁴ NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.

²⁹⁵ Arno Peters (1916-2002) was a historian who focused on giving all people of the world equal voice by making a timeline with each year receiving equal space on a page. This project culminated in the development of the Peters World Map in 1974, which depicted a new size for lands and states. Giving a voice to the people of the Third World on the map, America was shown as smaller than Africa.

²⁹⁶ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

playing up cruelties when chargeable to Catholic Church leaders and overlooking them when committed by reform movements, and in depicting Christian teaching as primarily social revolutionary in character while disregarding its emphasis on human salvation.²⁹⁷ Consequently, the book was eliminated from all libraries.

In addition to conducting the textbook program, the United States filled German university libraries with books and journals that had come directly from America. Some of the literature was translated into German, but the most it was sent to the libraries in the original. Since the 1950s the American government annually spent US\$403,000 to provide the German university libraries with American books and journals. This was more than the total funds spent on medical equipment and library facilities.²⁹⁸ The American literature received by the German universities could be divided into three groups. The first group was made up of books about the United States such as the following: *The U.S.A., its Lands, its People, its Industries*; *Amerika und die europäische Geist*; *Seeing the U.S.A. through Maps*; *The U.S.A.*; *The Spirit of '76* (an explanation of the significance of the Fourth of July in American history); *The Negro in American Life* (about the life of the American Negro and social changes affecting his life); *U.S.A. – Permanent Revolution* and its German variant, *USA. Die permanente Revolution*, (a description of various aspects of the American way of life, with an emphasis on the philosophy of the American form of government); *United Action in Korea* (a pictorial story of the member nations of the UN in action in the Korean War); and others.²⁹⁹ The second group of literature comprised American periodicals such as the following: *Time*, *Department of State Bulletin*, *Fortune*, and *The New York Times*. The third group consisted of books about the American educational system. As a whole, the United States managed to provide German libraries with new literature through establishing new libraries, conducting the textbook program, and by sending new literature from the United States. All these projects were helpful for revision of the German traditional curricula and academic programs in the universities.

To conclude the first part of the chapter devoted to American structural transformations in German universities, we can state that projects such as the establishment of new institutes, chairs, and libraries

²⁹⁷ NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.

²⁹⁸ NARA. Record Group 466. Records of US High Commissioner for Germany Bremen Land Commissioner. Records relating to Special Projects. Box 133.

²⁹⁹ NARA. Record Group 466. Records of US High Commission for Germany. Berlin Element. Public Affairs Division, 1943-1953. Box 1, 2, 4, 5, 9.

at the universities turned out to be more successful than those projects related to the introduction of new disciplines such as general education, political science, the social sciences, and American studies into the traditional curriculum of the humanities faculties of German universities.

II. Soviet transformations in German universities

1. Reopening German universities and replacing the rectors

Soviet views on how to reopen the German universities, on the one hand, differed slightly from the American approach. The Soviet Military Administration did not deliberate thoroughly as Americans all the necessary formal papers, orders, and directives for regulating the reopening procedure, and the Soviets did promote a new university statute more persistently than Americans did. On the other hand, there were quite a few similarities between the Soviet and American approaches: The rector of every German university was evaluated by the Soviets as the primary figure who could impede or facilitate the promotion of the new statutes and initial reforms. As in American policy, the Soviets therefore took the personality of the rector into consideration. Based on Soviet documents, we can define two main stages for the reopening of the universities: 1) the preliminary stage of opening; and 2) modification of the statutes and the policy towards the rectors of the universities.

Preliminary stage in the reopening of the universities and the resumption of university life

The Soviets occupied the six German universities in Berlin, Halle, Leipzig, Greifswald, Jena, and Rostock. The universities in Leipzig, Halle, and Jena had been occupied for some time by American troops and, in June 1945, were handed over to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. According to Soviet observations, most of the universities were in bad condition. The universities in Berlin and Leipzig had suffered the most – the majority of Berlin University buildings and the main administrative unit were destroyed. The same conditions were observed in Leipzig where out of 98 university buildings only 20 had survived the fire, and the main administrative unit with its library was completely lost. The buildings of the other universities remained untouched. According to Soviet reports, however, massive damage was done by American troops who removed “the equipment and

university scholars of the Universities of Leipzig, Halle, and Jena and transformed the buildings of the universities into American hospitals.”³⁰⁰

In September 1945, the Soviet Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Soviet troops in Germany, George Zhukov, issued an order which determined the procedure for a renewal of academic life in German universities and established forms of control over the universities. A new German education administration established by the Soviet authorities had to eliminate Nazi ideology and renew the instruction process in the universities, and the Education Division of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany had to modify admissions rules and curricula.³⁰¹ The university in Jena was the first to be reopened due to the help of a leader of the German communists, Walter Ulbricht, in October 1945. Jena was followed by the University of Berlin, reopened in January 1946. Later, in February 1946 the universities in Halle, Greifswald, Leipzig and Rostock were reopened too.

Soviet officers, like their American counterparts, had not previously elaborated any plan for reforms, and their first acts centered on denazification of the curriculum, libraries, and administration, as specified in the Potsdam Agreement.³⁰² During the summer of 1945, the Soviet Military Administration began elaborating a procedure for reopening universities, and, in September 1945, a directive concerning the universities was issued. It made provisions for conditions which would bring about the resumption of academic life in the universities. The German Administration for People’s Education, led by the communist Paul Wandel, along with the presidents of the states, and the mayors of the cities, had to report to the Occupation authorities on the state of affairs in the universities and to eliminate Nazi doctrines in the curriculum. The Education Division of the Soviet Military Administration and its chief, Professor P. Zolotukhin, had to examine candidates and to approve the rectors of the universities, deans of faculties, and heads of chairs as well as check curricula and syllabi. The Division had to take total control of the universities.³⁰³ In short, this directive indicated that

³⁰⁰ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 1: 1-14; Semiryga, *Kak Mu Upravlyali (How We Governed)*, 228.

³⁰¹ “The Order #50. The Opening of the German Universities. September 4, 1945,” in *Za Antifashistskuyu Demokraticeskuyu Germaniyu. Sbornik Dokumentov (In Favor of an Anti-Fascist Democratic Germany. Documents)*, 143-144.

³⁰² Heinemann, “Interview mit Pjotr I. Nikitin,” 127.

³⁰³ *Za Antifashistskuyu Demokraticeskuyu Germaniyu. Sbornik Dokumentov (In Favor of Anti-Fascist Democratic Germany. Documents)*, 143-144.

the preliminary activities for reopening the universities meant the denazification of the universities by German communists under the control of the Russians.

The chief of the Soviet Military Administration, Marshal G. Zhukov,³⁰⁴ personally was not eager to resume the activities of the universities in 1945 and in 1946. He considered it best to continue the denazification of professors, students, libraries, and courses for several years, and then to reopen the universities. Yet, Moscow insisted on a fast-track policy for reopening and convinced the Marshal of the political gains from this in the context of rising competition among the former Allies for German educational and research institutions.³⁰⁵ Consequently, Zhukov prepared the directive mentioned above, and, in order to be first among the Allies, the preliminary stage for reopening was conducted quickly and without a thorough denazification of the teaching staff and curriculum. In November 1945, denazification was formally ended. However, every officer of the Soviet authorities in Germany and every politician in the government in Moscow recognized that there were too many professors and administrators, who had formerly been active members of the party, both in the universities and libraries, and that their courses had not been checked in depth.³⁰⁶ In as much as the Soviet Union was keen to be the first of the Allies to reopen Germany universities, on the December 19, 1945, Zhukov officially gave the order for University of Berlin to reopen and on January 4, 1946, to reopen the remainder of the universities.³⁰⁷

However, it became clear in February 1946 that even before Zhukov's orders, the University of Jena had been allowed to resume by the local staff of the Soviet Military Administration in October 1945. This happened due to an internal conflict between the Soviet officers of Berlin and those of Jena with regard to control over the reopening procedure. The former insisted on their primary responsibility over the procedure, while the latter claimed that the local Soviet authorities should

³⁰⁴ George Zhukov (1896-1974) was the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet troops during the World War II and Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany until 1946.

³⁰⁵ Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Record Group 059. Inventory 4. Box 5. File 26: 93.

³⁰⁶ Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Record Group 082. Inventory 27. Box 123. File 36: 30-31.

³⁰⁷ Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Record Group 082. Inventory 30, Box 134, File. 68: 1.

be in control of it.³⁰⁸ As a result, the University of Jena was reopened without any preliminary denazification of courses, professors, libraries, or members of the administration, which later became a real headache for the Soviets who were compelled to purge both former Nazis and anti-communists from the university. The university was reopened with a formal ceremony at which the head of the Soviet Military Administration in Thüringen, General V. Chuykov, in his speech illustrated the essence of Soviet policy in the universities from 1945 to 1947. He said: “When I fought against the Germans near Stalingrad, I never thought that I along with other Soviet comrades would be reopening the University of Jena. I must confess that I hated all German people then. However, after the victory my hatred disappeared, and my Russian heart said to me that we must never hit a man when he is down. Stalin said once that Hitler has come and gone, but that the German people should remain. So, I would like to raise my glass to the prosperity of the German people and to the revival of Germany as a democratic country. And I appeal to all the professors of the University of Jena to contribute to the reeducation of the German people in the spirit of democracy.”³⁰⁹ Chuykov brought out here a very important detail of Soviet policy in Germany: the shift from the profound hatred towards the Germans to friendship with them. For most Soviet officers, in particular for those who had lost their families, it was very difficult to make this shift. This general and others encouraged the Soviet officers who dealt with German education to conduct a soft policy in the universities in order to win the hearts and minds of the Germans and to establish friendly relations with them for the sake of future relations between the USSR and Germany. However, this soft policy lasted only two to three years. As soon as resistance within the universities became strong, Soviet policy took a hard-line course.³¹⁰

The reopening of the University of Jena was followed by the reopenings of the universities of Berlin, Halle, Leipzig, Rostock, and Greifswald. They were reopened from December 1945 through February 1946. However, the reopening of the universities and the conducting of solemn ceremonies did not imply that academic life had revived. As a rule, within two months of reopening, the teaching process had resumed. The resumption of academic life contributed to an actual acquaintance of

³⁰⁸ Heinemann, “Interview mit Pjotr I. Nikitin,” 127.

³⁰⁹ *Za Antifashistskuyu Demokraticeskuyu Germaniyu. Sbornik Dokumentov (In Favor of Anti-Fascist Democratic Germany. Documents)*, 169-170.

³¹⁰ Heinemann, “Interview mit Pjotr I. Nikitin,” 132.

Soviet officers with the traditions of German academic programs, and courses, as well as with the behavior and attitudes of the administration of the universities.

Modification of university statutes and replacement of rectors

Having reopened the universities, the Soviet Military Administration had two main two concerns: modifying university statutes and the personalities of the rectors in terms of their positions concerning the new statutes and reforms being proposed. These two questions – the statutes and the rectors – were closely interconnected: The policy aimed at revising statutes according to the Soviet model would entail the replacement of those rectors who were primarily against this initial Soviet reform.

The Nazi model of the university statute, which had abolished university autonomy, had given full powers to the rectors, and had required that all lectures comply with Nazi ideology, was eradicated by the Soviets. In its place the university statutes of the Weimar period were reinstated. However, the Soviets were dissatisfied with the Weimar statutes, and they summoned the rectors in 1947 in order to propose the acceptance of a new statute elaborated by the Soviet officers and German communists. This model specified an increase in the power of the rectors, the establishment of new departments, and the enrollment of lower social groups in the university community. The rectors and professors refused to approve this proposed model and stated that the statutes of the Weimar Republic were well formulated and that there was no need to replace them. Dissatisfied with the results of these negotiations, the Soviet Military Administration then issued a directive which obliged every university to work according to the new model of the statute. All the universities and their administrations openly protested against this. However, the universities were annoyed not with the content of the statute but with the Soviet policy of imposing the statute from above. The rectors stated that the Soviet Military Administration should discuss the new statute with each university and its teaching staff. Open resistance was very strong at the University of Halle, led by its rector, Otto Eisfeld,³¹¹ who officially declared that the Soviet model of the university constitution would never be approved.

³¹¹ Otto Eisfeld (1877-1973) was a theologian and a professor at Halle University. He was rector of the University from 1945-1948.

The indignation of the universities made the Soviet officers discontinue promoting the statute.³¹² However, the Occupation authorities had no intention of giving up, considering instead that private negotiations with the rectors would bring about the desired results. They proposed a different policy in 1948 aimed at “convincing” the rectors to cease their resistance to this initial Soviet reform. This policy was called “strengthening management in the universities” and implied the replacement of every disloyal rector if negotiations failed and if the rectors continued resisting. The rectors and the deans would be replaced by new ones who demonstrated a favorable position vis-à-vis Soviet reforms.³¹³ This policy was articulated at the end of March 1948, and by the end of October 1948 the rectors of Jena, Halle, Greifswald, and Leipzig Universities were replaced through official elections by the university senates. This marks a very important difference from the American policy towards rectors. Although the American Military Administration conducted a softer policy towards them, the US Occupation authorities themselves nominated and replaced the rectors during the initial years of Occupation. The Soviets ventured to implement this replacement policy through the university senates and were successful. Their success was determined by the fact that some influential professors (such as Valter Markov,³¹⁴ Eduard Winter,³¹⁵ and many other scholars and professors) in every university actually supported Soviet policy, and some of the apolitical professors were convinced by the Soviets to elect a predefined kind of rector.³¹⁶

The most difficult situation emerged at the University of Jena where the rector, Fredrich Hund, one of the most famous specialists in quantum theory,³¹⁷ adhered to a firm standpoint against Soviet reforms. Due to his

³¹² State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 8: 88-94.

³¹³ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 6: 143.

³¹⁴ Walter Markov (1909-1993) was a historian and a member of the SED. He taught at Leipzig and Halle Universities after the end of the Second World War. He was expelled from the SED because of his support for the Titoist movement. Markov was famous for Slavic studies and for his studies on the French revolution.

³¹⁵ Eduard Winter (1896-1982) was a historian and professor at Halle University. From 1948-1951 he was rector of Halle University and in 1951 became director of the Eastern European History Institute at Humboldt University.

³¹⁶ Semiryga, *Kak Mu Upravlyali (How We Governed)*, 228.

³¹⁷ Friedrich Hund (1896-1997) was a physician and a professor of theoretical physics. He was rector of Jena University in 1948. After his replacement by the Soviet authorities, he

position, the new statute was not accepted, new students from lower social groups were not enrolled, and new courses were not introduced. One of the Soviet officers, the chief of the Education Division of the Soviet Military Administration in Thüringen, N. Bogatyrev, who later would defend a dissertation about Soviet reforms in Thüringen, decided to replace Hund without coming to any agreement with the Soviet central agencies in Berlin. He suddenly burst in on a meeting of the senate of University of Jena, which shocked the senior professoriate, and declared that the senate had to replace the rector and, if not, then the senate would be dissolved. The reasons for the replacement, as N. Bogatyrev stated, were “mistakes” purposely made by Hund when enrolling new students. Finally, the senate agreed under duress and the rector was replaced by a new one, the communist Otto Schwarz.³¹⁸ However, the professors of the University of Jena sent a letter to the central office of the Soviet Military Administration in Berlin concerning the attack by this Soviet officer, and N. Bogatyrev was disciplined and sent back to Moscow. Otto Schwarz kept his position, but Hund was compelled to flee to the Western Occupation Zone. Later, the Soviets realized the loss of this famous physicist and presented Hund with the National Prize of East Germany for his outstanding findings in quantum physics.³¹⁹

Today, it is very difficult to reconstruct how the Soviet officer actually behaved at the University of Jena, what he actually said to the professors, and to what extent the events in the University were typical. However, Hund’s case and Bauer’s case which occurred in the American Zone were often discussed in documents, articles and recollections that bear witness to the serious challenges to American and Soviet educational policy. Here are some extracts from the recollections of one of the Soviet officers working with Bogatyrev in Jena. This officer offers some additional details to the picture of Hund’s replacement: “Since his first days of activity as rector of the University, Professor Hund proved himself an ardent opponent of democratization. He openly sabotaged our demand to improve the social composition of the student body. So, eventually we were obliged to say goodbye to Professor Hund. The local staff of the SED nominated Otto Schwarz, a member of the SED, to the

became a professor at Frankfurt University in the American Zone in 1951. He was very famous for his contributions to quantum physics.

³¹⁸ Otto Schwarz (1900-1983) was a botanist. He had emigrated during the Nazi regime to Turkey. After the war he became a member of the SED and a professor at Jena University. From 1948-1951 and from 1958-1962, he was rector of Jena University.

³¹⁹ Heinemann, “Interview mit Pjotr I. Nikitin,” 97-99, 134.

position of rector. When it became known within the University, his candidacy provoked heated discussions among members of the senate and professors. These heated discussions alarmed us, because we did not want to get 'a second Hund' instead of Schwartz as rector of the University. We therefore decided to take control of the election by giving the professors guidance. Hoping that my participation in the election would not be perceived by the professors as interference in senate affairs but would be perceived as my desire to help the university deal with the rector crisis, I went to the university and gave a talk to the senate and professors. During the talk I convincingly explained why the Soviet officers considered the candidacy of Schwartz to be the most appropriate. At the same time the chief of the Education Division, N. Bogatyrev, had a talk with professors of every faculty of the university. Our work turned out to be effective and Professor Schwartz was elected as rector of University of Jena. He became the first rector who was a member of the SED and his election opened new perspectives for further democratization and creation of a healthier political environment in the University: some professors were removed and replaced by members of the SED."³²⁰

This quote demonstrates how the Soviets conducted their coercive policy of transformation within German universities. The Soviet officers simply pressured the professoriate to make them elect the person desired.

By conducting such a policy, the Soviets produced results: by early 1949, out of 62 rectors and deans working at ten higher education establishments, 20 were members of the SED, 33 were unaffiliated, and the rest were members of liberal parties. In addition, the Soviets managed to appoint members of the SED as vice-rectors and vice-deans.³²¹ This success with the policy of appointing politically loyal figures to key positions in the universities influenced the approval of the new statutes by the senates. Finally in May 1949, they were accepted by all the universities. According to the statutes, the universities were declared state higher educational institutions. The rectors, deans, teaching staff, and lists of students were subject to approval by the state ministries of education. The rector had undivided authority. Every discipline had to be backed by an approved syllabus. The new statute contained not one word about university autonomy, however. On the contrary, it introduced a position

³²⁰ Kolesnichenko, *Bitva Posle Voynu (Battle After the War)*, 188-190.

³²¹ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 14: 64.

of curator, a member of the SED, who would take control over personnel and budget policy.³²² Finally, the statute had two important provisions that reflected the essence of Soviet reforms: the first provision stipulated the very important status of new preparatory departments as full-fledged departments in the universities; the second provision gave priority to lower social groups in terms of admission to the universities.

However, the story of Soviet policy towards the rectors did not end in 1949. Later, the German Administration for People's Education was authorized by the Soviet Occupation authorities to be the primary supervisor of German universities. German communists could approve and replace rectors, deans, and ordinary teaching staff were entitled to amend the statutes as well. Consequently, they included all the previous Soviet reforms in the new official education law issued in 1951. According to this new law, universities were subordinate to the Minister of Education. A new organization of universities was established: the rector had four vice-rectors responsible for teaching Marxism-Leninism, for Russian and German language and literature, for research and extended education, and for postgraduate studies and professional practice outside the university. The rector was subject to *appointment* by the Minister of Education, and the senate could elect only the vice-rectors. In addition, the law defined a new length for the academic year, vacations, examination sessions, and the terms of professional practice for students outside the university. This law and the new rules were modeled entirely on the Soviet university system.

Finally, during 1957 and 1958, the cardinal reforms of the universities were implemented. After the well-documented protests in 1956 of students and some professors who called for revisionism, which meant decreasing Marxist-Leninist disciplines in the university curricula, and after the rector of University of Jena, Josef Hämel,³²³ fled East Germany at the same time, both the German communists and Moscow were left in a state of shock. The regime summoned all the rectors and deans of the German universities in 1957 and declared for the first time officially that East Germany would build a socialist system of university education. Some of the rectors and deans opposed this declaration and

³²² State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 10: 69-71.

³²³ Josef Hämel (1906-1969) was a professor of dermatology. He became rector of Jena University in 1951. As rector he supported the demand of students to decrease the influence of Marxism-Leninism and the communists on the academic life. He fled in 1957 and later worked in Würzburg University.

stated that the SED was a non-academic and hence alien element in German universities. In answer to this opposition, the communists warned the universities that scholars who publicly opposed the state and its leading party, and who influenced the students in this regard would be removed from the universities. This campaign for “socialist universities” was rounded off with the partial exercise of a self-criticism session and some rectors, for example, the rector of University of Greifswald, advanced a slogan that Marxism-Leninism should be the foundation of university education. University life, statutes and the behavior of the rectors were entirely modified from that moment on.

2. Revision of university curricula

Soviet revisions of German university curricula and academic programs could be divided into two of the following consistent parts: the initial part was the introduction of a unified curriculum, called central study plans, and the second was the introduction of new disciplines in German universities.

Introduction of central study plans

The Soviet Military Administration began its intervention in academic programs and the curricula of German universities with the denazification of the content of all available courses. Courses such as “Theory of Lebensraum,” “Military Philosophy,” “Bolshevism,” and “The German People and Lebensraum” were eliminated. Moreover, the institutes which conducted research on racial questions and colonial countries were closed.³²⁴ This was followed by the second intervention when the Soviets attempted to introduce new disciplines and new rules for teaching.

The Soviet reforms like the American ones challenged the German traditions of university education. The Soviet Occupation authorities and Soviet officers considered some features of German university education and its inherent parts such as academic programs and curriculum as obstacles to reform and thus they were subject to revision based on the Soviet model. While the American experts considered that the content of German academic programs was far too removed from public life, too philosophical and aristocratic, the Soviet specialists noted two other features of the German academic process that were subject to revision: a

³²⁴ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 1: 116-119.

lack of detailed study plans, known as a curriculum, and a lack of detailed plans for every course, known as a syllabus.

German universities actually had never elaborated any detailed curricula and syllabi. Where such documents did exist such as in the medical, law, and theological faculties, they offered only a brief list of the main courses. The Soviets were astonished at such a state of affairs and in particular, with the list that gave information on courses offered at the universities, but gave no information as to the sequence of courses delivered from one semester to another and from year to year.³²⁵ On the contrary, the Soviet standard for a curriculum was a written formal document including information on a strict schedule of courses delivered every semester, the precise duration of a course as measured in academic hours, the lecture-seminar ratio, and methods for monitoring student knowledge. The Soviet standard for a syllabus made provisions for a description of every lecture with a detailed list of reading and other assignments for students.

The Soviets sought to introduce this Soviet model in German universities. The intention to bring some order to these formal educational documents, modeled on documents from the Soviet university system, became the primary premise behind introducing a single curriculum model in every department of the university. The other reason for unification proceeded from the requirements of the German Administration for People's Education and from Wandel personally, who was obliged by the Soviet Occupation authorities to check every syllabus of lecture courses available, which came to 2,000 to 3,000 syllabi annually.³²⁶ Hence, establishment of a unified syllabus model for every course and of a unified curriculum for every faculty could make it easy to exercise control over academic life and the content of lectures.

The establishment of a unified curriculum implied, for example, that the curriculum and academic programs of the philosophy department at the University of Jena would be absolutely no different from those of the University of Berlin, and establishment of unified syllabi implied that the content, the duration, the assignments for students, etc., for similar courses, for example, on the history of philosophy as delivered at the University of Jena, would be similar to the course delivered at the

³²⁵ Nikitin, *Deyatel'nost' Sovetskoy Voennoy Administratsii (The Activity of the Soviet Military Administration)*, 69.

³²⁶ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 1: 147.

University of Berlin. The views and personality of a professor were not taken into consideration; moreover, the Soviet specialists truly believed that the new model for the curriculum and syllabus, introduced in every department and for every course of lectures, correspondingly, would be an easy task. However, such reforms required several years of coercive diplomacy and thus went on until the end of the 1950s.

In July 1946, the Education Division articulated the idea of the unification of all curricula and academic programs. Consequently, all 150 academic programs existing at German universities were grouped by Soviet experts. The first group constituted the academic programs in such fields of study as medicine, philology, physics, and mathematics, which had more or less identical curricula and syllabi. The second group constituted the academic programs in such fields of study as history, philosophy, pedagogics, and psychology, which needed, according to the Soviet understanding, new and equal syllabi to be elaborated.³²⁷ After composing this list, the Soviets urged Wandel's governing body to start elaborating new unified curricula for philosophy, history, theology, law, economics, and other social sciences-oriented departments as well as a model for new syllabi for every course. The Education Division of the Soviet Occupation authorities was, in turn, authorized to encourage the administration of the universities to accept new standards of academic life and teaching processes.

However, the Soviet plans were unexpectedly challenged by the professoriate, if not by the administrations of the universities themselves. The professors stated that these new curricula and syllabi were simply impractical and were poorly composed. They declared also that no specialist from Wandel's body had consulted with German professors on the layout of curricula and syllabi, and thus they could not be applied in the teaching process. The professors forced the Education Division of the Soviet Occupation authorities to back down. The Soviet experts reformulated their demands and declared that the proposed curricula and syllabi should be considered as a blueprint, and that the professors could revise them at their discretion.³²⁸

By 1948, it became clear to the Soviet authorities that the policy aimed at unification of curricula and syllabi had failed. The Soviets urged the German professoriate to reconsider the policy by proposing the

³²⁷ Ibid., 116-119.

³²⁸ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 8: 88-94.

following idea: traditional courses, which had no Nazi concepts, could be offered, but courses introduced or reintroduced by communists such as pedagogy, Soviet history, Soviet literature, Soviet pedagogics, German literature, German history, world literature, and others, had to be provided with new unified and approved syllabi.³²⁹ The universities appeared to agree to this; however, after one year, it became evident that rectors were permitting professors to give lectures which were not specified in any curricula and that Wandel's Administration had not taken absolute control over the situation at all.³³⁰ This situation aroused feelings of dissatisfaction among the Soviet officers, who were afraid of and angry with the growing opposition among the university people that this implied. In 1949, Moscow interfered in the university situation and sent a directive. It specified that each course of lectures must be provided with a standard syllabus.³³¹ The Soviet officers inserted this provision in the university statutes that were approved by the universities in May 1949.³³²

The introduction of a new statute with new provisions about the syllabus and the curriculum did not change the situation any. The universities sabotaged the provision regulating the introduction of identical curricula and syllabi. On inspecting the activity of the universities at the end of 1949, the Soviet officers remarked that "the academic work has not been changed and is entirely based on the old German traditions <...>; the universities have no curriculum and nobody supervises how lecture hours are used. Many universities announce useless and harmful courses such as "Human Races," "The History of German Political Parties since 1848," "Philosophy of Pedagogy," and others."³³³ Understanding that the professoriate and faculties of the universities would never accept the Soviet model of a unified curriculum and syllabi, the Soviet Occupation Administration decided to change this policy. Instead of waiting until the professoriate started elaborating

³²⁹ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7133. Inventory 1. File 254: 15-18.

³³⁰ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7133. Inventory 1. File 254: 15-18; State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 10. File 37: 196-209.

³³¹ Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Record Group 082. Inventory 35. Box 174. File 91: 49-51.

³³² Timofeeva, *Nemetskaya Intellegentsia i Politika (The German Intelligentsia and the Politics)*, 142.

³³³ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 10: 75, 133; State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 14: 75.

syllabi for their courses, the Soviet experts proposed introducing *new* courses, provided with Soviet syllabi and delivered by new and loyal lecturers. The Education Division requested a number of Soviet universities and institutes to send examples of standard syllabi for humanities disciplines in 1951. The syllabi of the Moscow higher educational establishments in the fields of pedagogy, history, economics, and law were used as models for similar academic programs in German universities.³³⁴ The German professors had to make a choice: either leave the university, because their courses were cancelled, or accept the Soviet model for the content of a lecture course.

Introduction of new disciplines

Similar to what went on in the American Zone, the Soviet Occupation authorities introduced new disciplines into the traditional German curriculum. The courses proposed in the American and Soviet Zones had different titles, but the political aims pursued by both powers were similar. While the United States introduced general education courses in order to educate students in the ideals of democracy, the Soviet Union introduced a specific course called “Political and Social Problems of the Contemporary World” in order to convince students of the ideals of socialism. Where the United States introduced political science, the Soviet Union introduced Marxism-Leninism. Both these disciplines brought with them the ideological impact and values of their rival political cultures. While the American studies were introduced everywhere, some disciplines that could be included in Soviet studies were introduced in German universities. While the American experts were reforming the disciplines of the social sciences, the Soviet specialists modified fields such as pedagogy and history.

Course on Political and Social Problems of the Contemporary World.

This was an introductory and general course for new students. The course taught about the international situation, the history of Germany, new political and philosophical concepts, and sought to clarify the political situation in Occupied Germany. The introduction of this course proceeded faster than the introduction of the general education courses in the American Zone. The Soviet Military Administration already arranged a meeting with the university authorities concerning the introduction of the course in October 1946. The universities approved the introduction of

³³⁴ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 11: 80.

this course and its syllabus without any protest except that of the Leipzig rector, Gadamer, who resented the new course.³³⁵ However, due to lack of staff, only Greifswald, Berlin, and Halle were holding lectures in it by mid-1947.³³⁶ Initially, the course was not taught from the perspective of Marxism-Leninism. However, due to the unfavorable atmosphere in the universities at the end of 1948 and due to pressure from Moscow, the course was reworked within the framework of this ideology and introduced everywhere.³³⁷

Courses on Marxism theory. The most well-known courses in the field were “Fundamentals of Scientific Socialism,” “Historical Materialism,” and “Dialectical Materialism.” These courses were designed to have an impact not only on the value system of the students, but also to change research methodology and perceptions in branches such as philosophy, history, sociology, pedagogy, literature, and music. The main idea behind the courses was that common welfare could be achieved through the establishment of a socialist economic system (characterized by production for use rather than profit, by the equality of individual wealth, by the absence of competitive economic activity, and also usually by governmental determination of investment, prices, and production levels, etc.). In addition, this course transferred the basic foundation for any research, particularly in the social sciences and historical studies, in such a way that, for example, world history and the history of every people would be studied in terms of the movement of the proletariat.

Until 1949, Soviet educationalists who worked at in Germany had not even thought to introduce these disciplines, in the belief that they could never take root in Germany. It was German communists, however, who insisted these courses be introduced. On March 22, 1948, the SED approved the “Fundamentals of Scientific Socialism” as a compulsory course to be taught in all universities. However, on April 23, 1948, this decision was cancelled after the return of the SED leaders Wilhelm Pieck³³⁸ and Otto Grotewohl³³⁹ from Moscow. They had gone there to tell

³³⁵ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 2: 152.

³³⁶ Connelly, *Captive University*, 211.

³³⁷ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 9: 10-19.

³³⁸ Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1960) was the main founder of the German Communist party and the President of the German Democratic Republic or DDR.

³³⁹ Otto Grotewohl (1894-1964) was head of the Social Democratic Party in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. He led his party into a merger with the Communist Party led by Wilhelm Pieck in April 1946, thus forming the new Socialist Unity Party (SED).

Stalin about their achievements in Germany and said that they were going to introduce this compulsory examination course. Stalin asked whether other parties and students would agree. Peak answered that they would have to agree. From the available minutes of the meeting it is clear that Stalin did not believe in 1948 that it would be possible to change the curriculum in such a major way in Germany, and he did not give his approval for this initiative by the communists.³⁴⁰ The German communists corrected their previous decision and declared that courses ordained from above could not be introduced in German universities. Nevertheless, they would be introduced step by step from below by means of decisions by the faculty, when trained lecturers who could deliver lectures in the field of Marxism-Leninism became available.

Growing opposition in the universities to Soviet policy accelerated the introduction of new courses. 1949 became the year when conflicts between the Soviet Occupation authorities, on the one hand, and students and professors, on the other, reached their peak. Exclusions, arrests of students, and the division of the University of Berlin compelled the Education Division to shift its policy from a soft to a harder line. The students who remained after the purge at the universities were fed new courses which became compulsory for them. The Soviets were careful, however, not to spread new courses to all the universities. The courses were imposed at a limited number of universities and departments such as the newly established departments of the social sciences and pedagogy, and the philosophy departments of the two universities in Leipzig and Halle. The lecturers were only the teaching staff who had graduated from the Higher Party School in Berlin. Consequently, these limitations on Soviet policy in this field resulted in courses in Marxism-Leninism not being taught in German universities until the early 1950s. One of the Soviet professors sent to Germany to deliver courses at the universities reported that “the universities have still not introduced courses on Marxism-Leninism because of the lack of appropriate lecturers, and lectures on Marxism were attended by students much less frequently than lectures on Idealism.”³⁴¹ Another Soviet observer mentioned in 1952 that “there is disorder on the ideological front in Germany: the curriculum and

Grotewohl became the first Prime Minister of the *Ministerrat* (Council of Ministers) of the German Democratic Republic and held this position from 1949 until his death.

³⁴⁰SSSR i *Germanskiy Vopros. 1941-1949. Dokumenty (The USSR and the German Question. 1941-1949. Documents)*, vol. 3, 624-625.

³⁴¹ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 14: 10, 12.

disciplines in the field of Marxism-Leninism are wrongly compiled; the course on Marxism-Leninism is just entitled 'Philosophy.' Part of the course on Marxism has been substituted by a theme devoted to dialectics. The syllabus is absent, the works by Stalin are ignored, and Hegel and Kautsky are, on the contrary, admired. The Universities of Jena and Berlin are the most oppositional. The courses on dialectical materialism and historical materialism are not taught due to a lack of experienced lecturers."³⁴² Hence, the disciplines of Marxism-Leninism were not separated from the disciplines of philosophy and, although Marxist disciplines were offered, they were taught within the framework of a general course in philosophy.³⁴³

This situation was deemed unsuitable by the German communists who governed East Germany on an almost equal footing with the Occupation forces starting in the early 1950s. The 1951 education law specified a provision that promoted the study of Marxism-Leninism in the universities. It stated that in as much as ideological formation and academic work were unified in the German universities, the study of Marxism-Leninism was compulsory for all departments in the universities. These compulsory studies were declared to be the main foundation for the fostering of a socialist intelligentsia. By the beginning of the mid-1950s, chairs of Marxism-Leninism had been established in all the universities. They had three unified divisions: fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, political economy, and historical materialism. According to the curriculum introduced, students were to study the courses in these fields for three academic hours per week.

New Historical Studies. No other discipline attracted as much attention from the Soviet Occupation authorities as history. Historical science was placed entirely at the service of the German political regime. Narrowly conceived, comprehensive revision of the traditions of interpretation, along with the traditional research subjects in German history, characterized the initial steps taken by the Soviet Occupation authorities.

After the arrival of Soviet troops, the teaching of history was terminated. In order to get an idea about the extent to which professors of history were ready to shift their views along the lines of Marxism, the Soviets arranged a conference for rectors, and for all scholars specializing in history, in May 1946. The plenary speech was given by Anton

³⁴² Russian State Archive of Social-Political History. Record Group 17. Inventory 137. File 90: 22.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, 92.

Ackermann.³⁴⁴ His paper was entitled “The current situation in Germany and its meaning for historical science.” He stated that German historians could contribute to building a new Germany if they reexamined priorities in their research and investigated themes such as: 1) the socio-economic structure of society and the everyday life of the lower social classes; 2) revolutionary movements in the course of German history; and 3) the interrelations of the German people with other nations. Continuing on in his speech, Ackermann claimed that the proposed reexamination of German history did not run contrary to the true development of historical events, but that only the emphasis had shifted. During the heated discussions that followed, some participants completely rejected Ackermann’s ideas and stated that historical science should be independent and should be depicted from various standpoints, not from Marxist ones alone. Another faction of historians, led by W. Markov, supported Ackermann’s proposals and believed that history should be studied and taught from the standpoint of Marxism. During the course of the conference the two groups of historians, whose positions seemed to be irreconcilable, were finally actually able to reconcile their standpoints, and the opponents of Marxism agreed that the materialistic view of history had to be represented on an equal footing with the other approaches that were applied in historical science in the universities. University professors finally promised to revise their lectures on German and world history so as to insert Marxist ideas. However, after the end of

³⁴⁴Anton Ackermann (1905-1973) became a member of the Communist Party of Germany in 1926. He fled Germany in the 1930s and lived in the USSR. In 1946 he became a member of the SED and made a party career as a prominent propagandist of communist ideas among Germans. From 1949 until 1953 he was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the DDR. Anton Ackermann had some unique ideas about the building of socialism in Germany: in his book, *Der deutsche Weg zum Sozialismus*, he considered, for example, that the Soviet model should not be used in Germany; however, he was not able to convince other communists of this. As a result, in 1953-1954 Ackermann was expelled from the Central Committee of the SED and fired as its Secretary because of “party-hostile activity.” In 1956 he was rehabilitated and worked for the State Planning Bureau. In 1973 he committed suicide. Anton Ackerman was likely to be the only East German politician evaluated very highly by the American Occupation authorities. They claimed that he was a really influential figure and also well-known as a publicist and journalist; he was a party theorist; he spoke Russian; he was an intelligent, objective and responsible person; he formulated the doctrine that ‘there would be no formalistic transfer of Soviet conditions to Germany.’ // NARA. Record Group 466. Records of U. S. High Commission for Germany. Berlin Element. Public Affairs Division, 1943-1953. Box 1, 2, 4, 5, 9.

the conference, the representatives of the universities proved in no hurry to do so.

In the early 1950s, a new round of Soviet interference in German historical science was initiated. The German communists, who had received a stiff reprimand from Moscow for their failed projects with regard to the revision of historical studies in the universities and the publication of new textbooks on German history and the history of the German Communist Party,³⁴⁵ formulated a thoroughly new plan for reforming the study of and research in German history. The plan specified establishing new research institutes, writing new textbooks, and promoting new research subjects among scholars. The leader of the German communists, Walter Ulbricht,³⁴⁶ focused special attention on the promotion of new research subjects such as “the history of workers’ movements in the period of imperialism,” “the struggle of German workers during the first Russian revolution of 1905,” “the struggle of the working class under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg,” “the formation of the first Red Army in the Ruhr,” “reparations for the armed insurrection of 1923,” “the struggle against Hitler’s fascism and the leading role of Thalman.” Ulbricht was able to implement many of his intended reforms, but some remained unrealized.

The German communists succeeded in establishing new research institutes for German history at the Universities of Leipzig and Berlin as well as in the opening of a museum of German history, presenting it in terms of the history of revolutionary movements. A new Marxist textbook for university students was finally published. However, the communists failed in their efforts to make German scholars carry out research in the proposed subjects and to write monographs and university books. The scholars, in the opinion of the Soviet experts, did not do research on urgent historical problems, but on problems irrelevant to the history of

³⁴⁵ Moscow was very dissatisfied with the writing of the new textbook on German history. Ulbricht was ordered to speed up the work. Following instructions from Moscow, he officially designated new themes for research in the field of German history // Russian State Archive of Social-Political History. Record Group 17. Inventory 137. File 891: 1-4.

³⁴⁶ Walter Ulbricht (1893-1973) was the preeminent politician of the DDR. He had become a member of the German Communist Party before the Nazi regime. The Nazis had allowed him to emigrate to the Soviet Union. Upon his return to Germany in 1945, he became involved in establishing the Socialist United Party of Germany (*die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED*). Up until the 1970s he was the leader of the SED and the face of the DDR. In 1971 he was removed from his leading position by his old friend Erich Honecker, supported by the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. After that, Ulbricht occupied the politically meaningless post of honorable chief of the SED.

the German people.³⁴⁷ The situation was such that German professors published only one book based on Marxist ideas during the period 1945-1955. This book was called "The History of German Foreign Policy," and the author here exposed the so-called policy of "German imperialism" before the arrival of the Soviets. As the German regime had no other books, this monograph was awarded the National Prize. Historians who were members of the SED published a few newspaper articles on the history of the so-called German liberation movement, for example, an article against Napoleon (!). These publications were scrutinized by Soviet experts who worked in Germany as members of the Soviet Control Commission, the new name given to the Occupation authorities beginning in 1952. The Soviets were disappointed with the interpretations of the events that happened in the nineteenth century. They severely criticized German historians, arguing that they "insufficiently explained German-Russian friendship, belittled the great deeds of the Russian people who liberated Europe from the yoke of Napoleon, and were keen on lists of facts at the expense of broad conclusions and generalizations."³⁴⁸

The lack of Marxist books and research influenced the teaching of history in German universities, which was judged by the Soviets as unfavorable: "The professors of history have never been provided with a new syllabus and have delivered lectures applying their own plan. Hence, they have made an uncontrolled choice of historical themes for lectures. The elaboration of a new standard syllabus for the discipline of German History, initiated by the Minister of Education in 1952, has not yet been finished, and there is no hope that the universities will get this syllabus during the coming years. There is also no hope that the historical subjects proposed by Ulbricht for research will be worked on by historians and new books published."³⁴⁹

Moreover, the dissertations elaborated by doctoral students, who were expected to form a new generation of Marxist historians, became a new source of nightmares for Soviet experts. The students did not investigate the themes proposed by the SED. According to the Soviet documents, out of 87 doctoral student historians, 46 students were specializing in the field of German history, and the themes of their

³⁴⁷ Russian State Archive of Social-Political History. Record Group 17. Inventory 137.

File 891: 175.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 176.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 177.

doctoral dissertations “were fallacious and were far removed from current problems. For example, one doctoral dissertation at the University of Jena was ‘The medieval man and his critics in contemporary historiography.’ Another of the Leipzig University doctoral students wrote a dissertation on ‘England in the period before the French revolution as described by German travelers.’ Other doctoral students are reported to be keen on research of the history of the Church.”³⁵⁰ The Soviet experts were inclined to blame the university professoriate for such a state of affairs. In order to “improve” the situation, the Soviets proposed that the German regime make a strict plan for scientific work in the universities and research institutes. This meant giving the old professoriate definite and approved themes for investigation that would deprive them of the possibility of carrying out research on optional and free themes. Another means for taking control of historical science was the suggestion of career promotions for historian-members of the SED and scholarly cooperation with the old professoriate that could influence the views of the latter. Finally, Moscow demanded that every lecturer of history be provided with a syllabus based on Marxist interpretations of past events.³⁵¹ All these problems were articulated by the Russians in the mid-1950s, and twenty years later most historical questions worked on by German historians were being interpreted from Marxist standpoints.

Soviet Studies. The branch of science called “Soviet Studies” never existed in the Soviet Union and East Germany, and the Soviet government, as compared to the Americans which introduced “American studies” into German universities, never made the decision to impose a series of disciplines called, in general terms, “Soviet studies.” The Soviets tried to promote the study of the Russian language in Germany, particularly “the language of Old Russian,” “Soviet literature,” and “History of the USSR.” However, a special and comprehensive policy of promotion never existed. During the period under examination here, the process of introduction of these new disciplines moved so slowly that the Soviets seemed in no hurry to introduce these disciplines and had no plans to do so any time soon. The documents mention that in 1949 the Occupation authorities discussed the idea of introducing a course in Old Russian and Soviet literature. However, the profound disagreements about the content of the course that arose among Soviet experts terminated the process of introduction. The experts could not reach

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 178.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 173-179.

agreement with regard to the question of how so-called bourgeois literature, which comprised those works of Russian poets and writers who had lived in the early twentieth century, could be presented to students. Not mentioning Anna Akhmatova, Boris Pasternak, and Marina Tsvetaeva, among others, when delivering a course on Soviet literature, would be to lose a great part of Russian culture, but covering the legacy of these poets and writers would lead students far from the ideas of Marxism and socialist realist literature.³⁵² Finally, the course was introduced only at the end of the 1950s, when the process of de-Stalinization and the ensuing political thaw allowed one to speak more openly about the non-Marxist legacy in Russian culture. The same situation occurred with the course on Soviet History. Its introduction was begun only in the mid-1950s because of the lack of appropriate specialists and literature. The introduction of Russian language studies was more promising for the Soviets. In 1951, the German regime announced that the study of the Russian language was compulsory for students during their first four years and for two hours per week. These studies developed very slowly due to a lack of teachers of Russian.

Concluding the part of our analysis devoted to the Soviet revisions of German university curricula and syllabi, we should make three observations here that might be useful for understanding Soviet policy and its results.

First, the Soviets unlike the Americans had a very strong partner and ally in occupied Germany, the German communists. The first and second generations of these men and women truly believed in the ideals of socialism and the Soviet political system, and thus they often initiated reforms in university academic programs themselves. Soviet archives kept many telegrams sent by German politicians to the Soviet government which requested models of Soviet university curricula, models of syllabi on specific humanities disciplines and literature in order to introduce new courses in the universities. The Americans had no such partners who would request the Department of State to send models of curricula or syllabi. The German communists seemed to be the first to propose the idea of compulsory attendance for Marxist lectures and Russian language classes without any intervention on the part of the Soviets. And it was German politicians who stated in 1950 that German

³⁵² State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group 7317. Inventory 55. File 11: 20-22.

universities should be reformed on the Soviet model.³⁵³ The first delegation from the Ministry of Education under the leadership of the Minister of Education, Harig, soon arrived in the Soviet Union in order to bring back samples of curricula from all the departments at Moscow University and other higher educational establishments.³⁵⁴ Hence, some reforms were initiated by the German regime itself.

A second observation touches on the question of when the revisions ended. The answer could be given by the analysis of a university curriculum. By way of example, we have analyzed two curricula from the University of Berlin, one from 1950 and one from 1958, accordingly. In the 1950 curriculum, there are two new and compulsory disciplines based on Marxist doctrine, *Political Economics*, given for 108 hours per semester, and *Political and Social Problems of the Contemporary World*, 54 hours per semester. These disciplines were studied for one semester. Disciplines such as Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism were not mentioned as separate courses; however, they were often taught within the framework of the course on philosophy.³⁵⁵ In the 1958 curriculum, there are already separate and compulsory courses such as *Historical and Dialectical Materialism*, which was taught for 98 hours per semester, *The Fundamentals of Socialist Political System*, for 64 hours per semester, and *Scientific Socialism*, for 48 hours per semester. These disciplines were to be studied for one or three years by students. The Russian language was mentioned as an elective course, but it was required to pass an exam in it in order to qualify for other final examinations.³⁵⁶ According to later documents, during the 1960s the academic hours were increased for lectures and seminars in these courses. Hence, somewhere in the mid-1950s or at the end of the 1950s the initial transformations of the German university curriculum were completed.

Third, to sum up our analysis of the revisions of the German university curriculum conducted by both American and Soviet political powers, we should note that the United States, having recognized the fact that it would be very difficult to revise the German university curriculum

³⁵³ Russian State Archive of Social and Political History. Record Group 17. Inventory 137. File 637: 5-6.

³⁵⁴ Russian State Archive of Social and Political History. Record Group 17. Inventory 137. File 889: 92-96.

³⁵⁵ NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

³⁵⁶ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group 9396. Inventory 19. File 30: 30-42.

profoundly by means of inserting new disciplines, shifted their policy of curriculum revision to a policy of establishing new independent academic institutions in the universities, where the American curriculum model was imposed. The Soviet Union, on the contrary, concentrated on a profound revision of the curriculum at the universities and, to a lesser degree, on the establishment of new pro-Soviet institutions.

3. Establishment of new institutes, faculties, and chairs in German universities, and the division of University of Berlin

Soviet policy in the domain of establishing new structures at the German universities looks less comprehensive than the American one. This could be explained by two factors: first, the Soviets initially aimed at integrating Soviet and communist ideas with German traditions in education and, second, the Soviet government did not possess the financial resources the American government had to set up new academic establishments. The United States, on the contrary, built and set up new academic units with an independent status, with a new curriculum, and with new professors. While the United States created chairs and institutes in the fields of the American studies, political science, and, to a lesser degree, created research institutes in the field of pedagogy, the Soviet Union planned to establish: 1) pedagogical departments at every university; 2) chairs and institutes of Marxism-Leninism at every university; and 3) chairs of Slavic Studies at several universities. The establishment of the pedagogical departments can be evaluated as a purely Russian project. Other projects (such as instituting chairs of Marxism-Leninism and the development of Slavic Studies) were promoted and conducted by German communists. Finally, the division of the University of Berlin and the establishment of the new university called Humboldt University can be related to this aspect of Soviet policy.

Pedagogical faculties in German universities

The Education Division of the Soviet Military Administration decided in July 1946 to set up pedagogical departments at every university. They were considered to be the main element in the training of new German teachers. The Division justified this for the following reasons: “German teachers for the higher schools, called by Soviet experts the 9-12 *Klassen*, were formerly trained in the philosophy departments of the universities. German teachers for the middle school, called the 5-8 *Klassen*, were trained at pedagogical institutes established during the Weimar period and later transformed by Hitler into the Higher

Schools of Pedagogical Education. It makes no sense to reform these Nazi schools with their deeply distorted ideology. Hence, we should train teachers in the separate departments of the universities.”³⁵⁷ In addition, the experts articulated reasons for the training of teachers at the universities such as the high academic standards of the university, its teaching staff and resources, and, in particular, that these elements could be applied to the training of highly qualified teachers and for developing applied pedagogy as a new field of science.³⁵⁸ Consequently, the order concerning the establishment of six pedagogical departments aimed at “training qualified pedagogical personnel, selected from *democratic elements*³⁵⁹ of German society, who would be able to continue the democratic reform of German schools and education,” was issued.³⁶⁰

The reopening of these pedagogical departments aroused protest on the part of liberal parties and the university professoriate. The opposition claimed that the setting up of these departments would lead to the politicization of education and proposed preparing future teachers in the philosophy departments in order not to break with the traditional structural division of German universities.³⁶¹ This protest compelled the Soviet experts to correct their policy, and teachers for German schools were trained both in philosophy and pedagogical departments.

The first classes were held in autumn 1946 and the enrollment of students exceeded three times over the enrollments in the other departments. The students in the pedagogical departments attended the university for three years and did not pay for their education.³⁶² However, the first students were unable to complete their studies, because most of them were taken from lower social groups and were often poorly educated.³⁶³ The graduates of the pedagogical departments could therefore not compete with the graduates from the philosophy departments, who were also able to teach at German schools and gymnasiums. Because of the low level of knowledge of the graduates of the pedagogical departments, the universities were able to convince the

³⁵⁷ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group 7317. Inventory 55. File 2: 98.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ The notion of “democratic elements” implied the lower social groups.

³⁶⁰ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group 7317. Inventory 55. File 2: 98.

³⁶¹ Timofeeva, *Nemetskaya Intellegentsia i Politika (The German Intelligentsia and Policy)*, 35, 40, 105.

³⁶² State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 8. File 6: 149-150.

³⁶³ Nikitin, *Deyatel'nost' Sovetskoy Voennoy Administratsii (The Activity of the Soviet Military Administration)*, 125.

Soviet Occupation authorities to impose a ban on the employment of these graduates in gymnasiums.

In addition to establishing pedagogical departments, the Soviet Union sought to disseminate information about the methods of Soviet pedagogy throughout Germany. The Soviets arranged various conferences for teachers, students, and university professors in order to acquaint them with the ideas of Soviet pedagogy. The Soviet specialists here mainly promoted the idea that teachers should be trained in the universities and that the German pedagogical idea of the separation of children by talent was incorrect. They stated: "Contemporary German pedagogy was born during the Weimar period and it followed the idea of 'dynamic education,' which was the idea of cooperative education. However, this idea rejects the role of heredity and racial theory in words only, while in fact dividing children into gifted and ungifted groups and composing the classes on the principle of capable and backward children. This idea is antiscientific."³⁶⁴ The Soviet approach of mass and democratic schools convinced many German professionals, who had strongly believed in the efficiency of the two-track (elite and egalitarian tracks) German school, to eliminate the traditional German school system.

The Soviet Union, like the United States, was able to modify these bi-level schools and to create egalitarian school education in East Germany. However, in comparison to the United States, the Soviet Union, in disseminating its approaches to pedagogy, did not establish new independent research institutes to form a community of new researchers in this field. Only during the 1970s would the Soviet Union deal with the promotion of Soviet pedagogy in East Germany.

Marxism-Leninism institutes and chairs

The Soviet Occupation authorities considered that the establishment of separate institutes and chairs for Marxism-Leninism at the universities would be very harmful for the promotion of socialist ideas, because it would be perceived by professors and students as clearly coercive. However, the introduction of the courses on Marxism-Leninism within every department's academic programs was considered to be a more effective tool for the expansion of this ideology in university education. The only institute which was established by the Military Administration

³⁶⁴ Russian State Archive of Social and Political History. Record Group 17. Inventory 132. File 63: 67-80.

was the Institute of Dialectical Materialism at the University of Jena.³⁶⁵ This institute subsequently became the center for writing and publishing textbooks on Marxist-Leninist subjects and for doing research in this field. However, the Institute did not acquire any influence over university education during the period being examined.

The other project concerned the establishment of profoundly ideological departments at the Universities of Rostock, Jena, and Leipzig for training the bureaucratic elite for the new German state. Such departments were called the social science departments. To be admitted, prospective students had to have a year of previous employment and a recommendation from the SED. The students were provided with the highest scholarship (DM 300 per month). However, protests by rectors at these and other universities obliged the Soviets to close down these social science departments in 1951.³⁶⁶ They were subsequently transformed into new higher educational establishments, which awarded a university diploma (!) after two years of study, such as the Institute of Social Science and the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the SED.³⁶⁷

Slavic Studies chairs

Contrary to American studies, doggedly developed by the United States, Soviet studies were not purposely promoted by the Soviet government, although German universities had the grounds for fostering Soviet studies within the framework of *German Slavic Studies*. Since the nineteenth century, there had been an academic tradition in German universities to study the history and language of the eastern and southern Slavs who were those peoples that first settled in the territories of Eastern Europe and Russia. In the 1920s, Slavic Institutes were established at the Universities of Berlin and Leipzig, as well as a special scholarly commission at the Academy of Science in Berlin. German Slavic Studies were centered more deeply on Slavic languages than on Slavic history, and these studies had a nationalistic touch that was to be intensified by Hitler. Many German specialists in the field remained in the Eastern Zone of Occupation, who, while not being members of the SED, cooperated

³⁶⁵ Nikitin, *Deyatel'nost' Sovetskoy Voennoy Administratsii (The Activity of the Soviet Military Administration)*, 109

³⁶⁶ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 8. File 8: 72-74.

³⁶⁷ Russian State Archive of Social and Political History. Record Group 17. Inventory 137. File 888: 156-157.

with the Soviets and initiated the reestablishment of Slavic studies. The rector of the University of Halle, Edward Winter, became the first scholar in this field to propose that the Occupation authorities create a new Institute of Eastern European History at the University of Berlin in 1951. This was supported by the Occupation authorities. However, the Soviets did not go any further; they did not impose Slavic studies everywhere, even though the development of a separate branch of Slavic studies such as Soviet studies would have seemed to be a very effective tool for the Sovietization of East Germany. Only two chairs of Slavic studies were established at the Universities of Leipzig and Greifswald on the initiative of German scholars. Moreover, the German *Slawisten* in their postwar research tended to emphasize Eastern European countries rather than the Soviet Union.

In concluding the section of the chapter on the Soviet approach to establishing new structures at the universities, we cannot avoid the question of the splitting up of University of Berlin.

The division of University of Berlin

The founding of the Free University in the American Sector of Berlin was perceived by the Soviet authorities as the division of University of Berlin, whose main building was located in the Soviet Sector. The Soviet documents contain the Soviet version of those events, which differs somewhat from the American one. As we mentioned in the part of the chapter devoted to the founding of the Free University, the documents that depicted these events can be divided into two groups: the first group is made up of the documents which are concurrent with the events, and the second group comprises the documents which represent the events that occurred around the Free University and the University of Berlin as being in the past. This typology is also suitable for the examination of the Soviet versions of the Berlin University division. Similar to the previous section, we will trace how the Soviet descriptions of the event changed year by year.

We know from Soviet documents that starting in the autumn of 1945 the question of the the University of Berlin was raised in the meetings of the Allied *Kommandantur* of the city, in which representatives of all the Occupation authorities participated. This question was raised both by Soviet and American officers in as much as they were interested in partitioning university property found in both the Soviet and American Sectors. One of the Soviet documents says that the question of reopening the University “turned out to be the most complex, because the building

located in the Russian Sector was destroyed, while the remaining untouched buildings were located in the American and British Sectors. The Americans and British therefore insisted that reopening and controlling the university should be done by all the Allies. The Education Division of the Soviet Military Administration could not give a positive answer to such a suggestion.”³⁶⁸ When the Soviets understood that the Allies would continue their pressure, they quickly reopened the University themselves and placed the University under the authority of Paul Wandel. Otherwise, their Western colleagues could have opened the University in the American Zone, where several buildings were located, without any Soviet participation, and the center of decision-making of the University of Berlin could have been transferred to the Western Sector. Hence, the University of Berlin was reopened and placed under the authority of the German Administration for People’s Education from December 1945 through January 1946.

However, the initial Soviet success in taking control of the University was overshadowed by the strong opposition arising inside the University of Berlin. The professoriate and students ignored the Soviet proposals to admit lower social groups, to introduce new courses, and to establish new institutions at the University. This had not been anticipated by Soviet authorities. When the chief of the Education Division, Professor Zolotukhin, came to the University in 1947 in order to inspect how the University of Berlin was functioning, he found what seemed total sabotage of Soviet directives by staff and students. He wrote in a report: “The Admission Commission works strangely. The rector who led the Commission was in fact barred from participation in its work. The Commission was divided into two sub-commissions: the first reviewed the political background of perspective students and the second, the academic possibilities of the students, and coordination between them was absent. The Commission has lost hundreds of student questionnaires, has enrolled more students than were planned in the medicine and law departments, with many students having been members of the Nazi party, and, as a result, has refused admission to lower classes for lack of any positions open. Students rooted in the lower classes have not been admitted, therefore. The courses of lectures have by no means been changed: the professors of history, philosophy, pedagogy, and psychology are not working on modifications to the content of the course

³⁶⁸State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 1: 12-14.

of lectures, and nobody has elaborated a course to be called ‘The Political and Social Problems of the Contemporary World.’ Finally, the preparatory courses have not been established. In other words, the University of Berlin has turned out to be the most oppositional.”³⁶⁹ The same state of affairs was observed in 1948: Only a few lower social groups were being admitted to the University, too many students held profoundly anti-Soviet attitudes, the teaching staff had not revised the courses of lectures, and the rector had not contributed to the conducting of reforms.³⁷⁰ Hence, the Soviet Occupation authorities were unable to manage this university, and with the University of Berlin lacking balance, its location in the center of the ideological clash necessarily resulted in conflict.

In July 1948, the **first post-event description** of the Berlin University division was prepared by the Information Division of the Soviet Military Administration. The experts looked at the events through the lens of a political struggle between supporters and opponents of the SED, and of Soviet policy as well, a struggle which had expanded throughout all the universities. The experts wrote: “The sharpest political struggle has developed in the University of Berlin. The political life and the attitudes of the student body are under the influence of the tense political environment and the mass media of the Western Sectors of Berlin. <...> In April 1948, three students – Stolz, Hess, and Schwartz – were expelled from University of Berlin by the German Central Administration for People’s Education for their leadership of the reactionary (*oppositional – N.T.*) segment of the student body and for their oral and published attacks against the SED and the progressive (*loyal – N.T.*) professoriate. In connection with this expulsion, the Western press commenced a furious campaign against the policy of the Soviet Military Administration. The reactionary elements distributed leaflets in the University that called on students to strike. A political rally was organized at the Technical University located in the British Sector. Most members of the student council of the University of Berlin supported the reactionary students. These three expelled students were supported by the Berlin *Magistrat*, who started the campaign to establish a new, ‘free’ university in the Western Sectors.”³⁷¹ However, this

³⁶⁹ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 2:57-58.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 122-123.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

document noted that the Soviet position was supported by a portion of the student body, of the professoriate, and of the Senate, which cast doubt on the Western campaign, and that they approved of the expulsion of these students, whose activity had harmed the University.

In August 1948, when the preparatory committee for the Free University began to work in Dahlem-Dorf, the Education Division observed: "University of Berlin has been splitting for 4 to 5 months. The process has resulted in a vote of the city parliament (*Berlin City Council – N.T.*), and it has voted for it, because the majority of votes belong to liberal parties; the signboard saying 'Free University – Secretariat' has appeared on a building in Dahlem. The student Stolz has become a member of the Secretariat. The Secretariat has obtained assistance from the United States. All facilities are provided by the American Military Administration. Teaching staff and students are being recruited: 2,250 students have submitted their applications, while 10,500 students have submitted their applications to Humboldt University."³⁷² According to these documents, after receiving this information, the Soviet Military Administration tried to stop the division of the University through a campaign that presented a positive image of the SED among students of the old University of Berlin. However, the Soviet experts recognized that this was too late, because there were strong sentiments of support for the "free" university.³⁷³ And "the state of affairs resulting after the opening of the 'free university' by the Americans remains alarming, because the Deans of the Economics and Forestry Departments and their group of students have fled <...> The Free University is turning into a real factor in the struggle of reaction [conservators] against the process of democratization in higher educational institutions. There are four departments, philosophy, law, economics, and medicine, in the university. <...> As before, the University of Berlin remains littered with a bourgeois student body and a conservative teaching staff <...> The teaching of new, young university faculty is unsatisfactory in substance, and the reeducation of the old (*conservative and traditional – N.T.*) members of the faculty is in the developmental stage."³⁷⁴

³⁷² State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 6: 125-127.

³⁷³ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File no # "Reports on the Inspection of Higher Educational Institutions", 86.

³⁷⁴ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 14: 47.

After the founding of the Free University in December 1948, the Education Division sent Moscow a detailed report entitled “The Functioning of the University of Berlin under Special Conditions.” This was a **second post-event description** of the division. The document gives a new perspective on the division, blaming the United States for it: “The University of Berlin has a special place among other universities located in the Soviet Zone, not only because of its size, but also because of the role that it plays as the capital’s university. <...> The Western powers sought to bring the University under the control of the Berlin *Magistrat* and the four Allies. The Soviet representatives could not concede it to the Allies, because their intervention in the University would undermine the democratization of the latter. The Soviet side placed the University under control of the German Administration for People’s Education. <...> The American power then illegally decided to transfer some of the University’s property to the Berlin *Magistrat*: the Botanical Garden was placed under the control of the Berlin *Magistrat*. When the University started functioning under the control of the Soviet Military Administration, the Americans started preparing a division of the University. Initially, they tried to do it through propagating the idea of a ‘World University.’ They sent a project paper for establishing the ‘World University’ to every foreign mission in Germany. When this idea failed, in early 1947 the assistant head of the Education Branch at the American Military Administration, Dr. Karsen,³⁷⁵ suggested creating a ‘super university in Berlin’³⁷⁶ under the control of the Americans. This idea was not supported by the German professoriate, because it ran counter to the German tradition of the unity of research and study. However, the idea was supported by Schumacher’s agents³⁷⁷ at University of Berlin such as

³⁷⁵ Fritz Karsen (1885-1951) was a professor of pedagogy. In 1933, he emigrated to the United States. There he met John Taylor, the future Chief of the Education Branch of the American Military Administration in Germany. Taylor invited Karsen to return to Germany and reform education there. In the opinion of the researcher Manfred Heinemann, Karsen had earlier promoted the idea of the division of Berlin University and the idea of establishing a postgraduate studies institute as well as the idea of establishing the World University in Berlin on the basis of the available institutes of Berlin University located in the American Sector. See, Heinemann, *Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau des Hochschulwesens in Deutschland 1945-1949*, 118.

³⁷⁶ It is difficult to understand what “super university in Berlin” means. Probably an author of the document implied the American idea of establishing a new university in Berlin.

³⁷⁷ With the words *Schumacher’s agents*, an author of the document implied those students who were members of Schumacher’s party. This was the Social Democratic

Stolz, Schwartz, Hess, and others. This has happened, because too many students, originating in the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, were enrolled after reopening of the University. Consequently, they followed the bourgeois parties and protested against the admission of lower social groups and the introduction of the new *Political and Social Problems of the Contemporary World* course. For their active resistance, supported by external forces, the German Administration for People's Education has expelled the leaders of the opposition.³⁷⁸ In answer to this action, the Berlin *Magistrat* made the decision to set up a 'free' university in the Western Sectors of Berlin in spring 1948. An American commandant sympathized with the decision and provided the 'free' university with a building. The 'Free' University started classes in the departments of philosophy, law, and medicine on November 15, 1948. According to the admission rules, individuals who cannot enter the universities of the Eastern Zone for political reasons may be enrolled in the 'Free' University. The Senate of University of Berlin in turn passed a resolution on December 2, 1948, whereby every student of University of Berlin who studies at the 'free' university excludes himself from a list of Berlin University students. The student council of Berlin University, made up of the expelled students, has been dissolved.³⁷⁹

Hence, we can argue that the Soviet authorities placed responsibility for the division of Berlin University squarely on the American Military Administration. Soviet documents constantly transmitted the thesis that the Americans had established a new university in order to get their hands on the Berlin University buildings located in their sector, and the expulsion of the three students provided an excuse to carry out this plan.

Party (*Die Sozialdemokratische Partei, SDP*). The leader of the party was Kurt Schumacher (1895-1952). His party existed only in the Western Zone, because he had rejected the proposal of his former partner, Otto Grotewohl, to merge with the German communists. The SDP merged into the Communist Party, and as a result the United Social Party of Germany (SED) was established. Schumacher therefore left for the West and established the new SDP.

³⁷⁸ Both the Soviet and the American Occupation authorities issued a directive in 1946 that provided for the dismissals of those professors and students who put up any resistance to the "democratization of the universities and contributed to the dissemination of the Nazi ideologies." Each Occupation authority interpreted differently the expression "resistance against democratization of the universities" pursuant to their rival ideologies and political culture.

³⁷⁹ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 1: page no #.

Finally, a **third description** of the Berlin University division appeared fifty years after the fact in the memoirs of the main participant in those events, the Soviet officer and head of the University Sector at the Soviet Military Administration, Pjotr Nikitin. His version does not contradict the previous Soviet documents; yet, he provides more details for further deliberations on the topic. Nikitin begins his story with his first visit to the University of Berlin in the summer of 1945. The Rector of the University was Eduard Spranger, a professor of education, who, in Nikitin's opinion, was not elected by the Senate, but took control of the University on his own.³⁸⁰ When Nikitin entered the building of the University, he did not encounter the rector; the professors who were working that day at the University said that Spranger was busy *removing some documents to the area of Dahlem-Dorf to reopen the University where those buildings of the University untouched by bombs were located* and where *some of the teaching staff and Spranger himself* were living. The professors also said that the rector had been in talks with the Americans to put the University under their power and care. Nikitin decided to remove the rector, and Johannes Stroux was elected as the new rector in August 1945. At the same time, the British and Americans started promoting the idea of the subordination of the University to the Berlin *Magistrat* and the Allied *Kommandantur*. Their proposal ran counter to German university tradition: the University of Berlin had been directly subordinate to the German Ministry of Education before the Occupation. In addition, discussions about control of the University division the professoriate of University of Berlin into two irreconcilable groups: those professors who aspired to subordinate the University to the *Magistrat* and lived in Dahlem supported the former rector and the idea of reopening the University of Berlin in Dahlem, while those professors who did not want to open the University in Dahlem were inclined towards the Soviet policy aimed at keeping the University in the Soviet Sector.

Observing this situation, the Soviet officers, Nikitin and Zolotukhin, prepared a document for discussion at a meeting of the Allied *Kommandantur* that specified the subordination of the University of Berlin to the Soviet Military Administration in as much as the University was located in the Soviet Sector. The disagreements between the Allies as

³⁸⁰ During the Nazi period the rector of Berlin University was Prof. Lothar Kreuz, M.D. (1888-1968), a member of the Nazi party. He was captured by American troops in 1945. He was released in 1948 and continued his academic career at Tübingen University.

to this paper resulted in approval of *the decision in February 1946 that German universities would be subordinated to the Administration of the zone where they were located*. This decision was likely seen as suiting the Soviets. But the American Occupation authorities interpreted it as a provision for taking control of the Berlin University buildings located in their zone. In July 1946, the Soviet members of the Allied *Kommandantur* asked the Americans not to take the equipment and facilities and to share the buildings of University of Berlin as well. John Taylor, the head of the Education Branch at the American Military Administration, said that the Americans would cease their activities if the Russians agreed to accede to the joint running of the University and to its subordination to the Berlin *Magistrat*. Nikitin and the other officers rejected this blackmail.

In early 1947, John Taylor invited Nikitin and his wife for dinner. Near Taylor's house the Soviet officer saw a poster about a lecture entitled "The World University," to be delivered by an American officer. Nikitin asked about it, and Taylor answered that some people from the United States wanted to establish an international university in Berlin, but it was, in his opinion, too expensive and unreasonable. Later, Fritz Karsen, a German adviser at the American Administration, told Nikitin that the United States would establish the World University using the buildings of University of Berlin. At the end of 1947 and in early 1948, the Western press, however, discussed not the idea of the World University, but the idea of the Free University as analogous to the World University.

This imbroglio obliged Nikitin to try to counter opposition in the University of Berlin and turn it into a more favorable educational institution by strongly promoting the SED and by imposing lectures on Marxism there. However, this had just the opposite effect: students protested, and some of them were expelled on April 16. On May 11, the *Magistrat* decided to set up the Free University. Twelve professors from University of Berlin, who later left for West Germany, sent an open letter to the *Magistrat* opposing this decision. They demanded that the *Magistrat* cancel the decision in order to safeguard the unity of the biggest and one of the most famous universities in Europe. According to Nikitin, the Soviet Military Administration was not opposed to the founding of the Free University, but against the American approach to establish this university in the buildings of the University of Berlin, which, in the opinion of the Soviet experts, belonged to them, although they were located in the American Zone. To prevent this, the Soviet staff

of the Education Division intended to transport equipment of the University from the American into Russian Zone; however, the cost of doing so was too high (DM 4.7 million), and the Soviets repudiated this plan. So in November 1948, the Free University opened on the property of the University of Berlin. In April 1949, the Soviet authorities received American documents from the hands of the new rector of the University of Berlin, Walter Friedrich, whereby the new University of Berlin was informed of the loss of its buildings in the American Zone. The rector sent a letter to the rector of the Free University asking that this split-up be stopped. The rector of the Free University answered that he had no authority to cancel the decision made by the United States.³⁸¹

Hence, the Soviet versions emphasized the problem of the property of the University of Berlin. The Soviet documents transmit the thesis that the United States had no right to seize the buildings of the University and that American attention focused on the fate of the expelled students was determined by a strong desire to possess the resources of the University. American versions, on the contrary, emphasize the ideological grounds for founding the Free University as being due to the growing coercion and oppression of the Soviets, thus bypassing the question of property.

4. New holdings in university libraries

The Soviet policy towards German university libraries differed from the American approach: The Soviet Occupation authorities did not set up new libraries as the American Military Administration did. However, the number of new textbooks and books translated into German and published in Germany exceeded similar American projects. Soviet policy can be divided into the following elements: supervision of the content of those holdings which remained after the war, and denazification of the university libraries; and the translation of Soviet textbooks for the universities and publication of new ones.

The Soviet authorities, like their Western colleagues, began their library policy with the elimination of Nazi literature. The directive concerning this was issued in September 1945. The directive said that all the books and textbooks comprising the ideology of fascism and anti-Sovietism had to be removed together with their index cards.³⁸² Every university organized a special commission to remove books and cards,

³⁸¹ Heinemann, "Interview mit Pjotr I. Nikitin," 411-420.

³⁸² *Za Antifashistskuyu Demokraticeskuyu Germaniyu. Sbornik Dokumentov (In Favor of Anti-Fascist Democratic Germany. Documents)*, 147-148.

and transported them to special depositories. Some of the books removed were recycled and some books were sent to the Soviet Union. In the end, the holdings of the university libraries were reduced by half.³⁸³ In as much as the universities had already reopened, the Soviet authorities allowed the universities to use those textbooks published before 1933, but they were also checked.³⁸⁴

While American officers removed pro-communist literature during the 1950s, the Soviet Occupation authorities removed anti-communist literature. In 1947, the Soviets began removing books coming from the Western Zones.³⁸⁵ *The History of Western Man*, mentioned above, was removed by Soviet experts. In 1948, the Soviet authorities began a new wave of removals called “the quest for harmful anti-Soviet literature.” The “anti-Soviet literature” notion implied those books written by Soviet opponents of the Stalinist regime such as Trotsky, Bukharin, and many others. The literature of philosophy and the social, economic, and political branches of science as well as German fiction were especially thoroughly checked.³⁸⁶

On the other hand, the Soviet government attached great importance to the restocking of library holdings through translating Soviet university textbooks from Russian into German. Soviet military officers indicated in 1947 that “we urgently need to implant as many Soviet books as possible into German libraries in order to educate professors and students. If there is no literature from us, then English, French, and American books will fill the gap and that would be undesirable for us.”³⁸⁷ According to the documents, the Soviet government began translating Soviet university textbooks in 1944. The German communists who had emigrated to the Soviet Union translated Soviet textbooks on world history, Soviet history, pedagogy, and geography. This helped the Occupation authorities to flood the libraries with qualified translations of Soviet textbooks, published in Germany. In September 1948, the Education Division elaborated a plan to supply every university with Soviet books translated

³⁸³ Semiryg, *Kak Mu Upravlyali (How We Governed)*, 218.

³⁸⁴ Nikitin, *Deyatel'nost' Sovetskoy Voennoy Administratsii (The Activity of the Soviet Military Administration)*, 49.

³⁸⁵ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 3: 126.

³⁸⁶ Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Record Group 0457-b. Inventory 4. Box 31. File 34: 54.

³⁸⁷ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 81: 88-94.

into German. Priority was given to books on pedagogy, dialectical materialism, and the Russian language. The rectors soon obtained a directive indicating that they had to ensure student access to this new literature,³⁸⁸ which meant making students read these books.

The Soviet government was able to manage this plan. The newly created publishing company “People and Knowledge” disseminated books on pedagogy throughout the pedagogical departments. Soviet books such as “Pedagogy,” “Moral Education in the Soviet Union,” and others became the primary textbooks for students. All the universities were provided with German versions of the works of Lenin and Stalin; works by the latter were removed from the libraries in the early 1960s with de-Stalinization.³⁸⁹ During the period 1945 to 1949, around 7.5 million volumes by Lenin were published to replace the 15 million volumes of Nazi literature removed as part of the process of denazification.³⁹⁰ If the German population constituted 19 million citizens, then every 2.3 Germans were provided with one volume. The language courses were provided with 2.5 million textbooks on the Russian language. However, textbooks on Soviet history were published slowly. Until the mid-1950s, German university libraries had obtained only a few copies of the only textbook on the history of the Soviet Union translated into German.

Still, the Soviet Union was able to supply the German libraries with the new books necessary for the revised curricula. Unlike the way in which the United States sent literature about the American political system to Germany, the Soviet Union flooded the libraries with books on Marxism and pedagogy that became the primary tools for the Sovietization of the universities.

Conclusion

A comparative analysis of the first American and Soviet reforms in German universities during the period of 1945 through the early 1960s allows us to define common and different features:

1) Reopening the universities, the modification of statutes, and the replacement of rectors.

³⁸⁸ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 4: 118-119.

³⁸⁹ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group 9606. Inventory 1. File 606: 155.

³⁹⁰ State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File 11: 78-87.

Both powers sought to reopen the occupied universities as soon as possible in order to resume normal academic life, to decrease the tense social situation and political confusion, to purify the universities of the influence of Nazi values, and finally to exploit the universities for their political agenda. Moreover, the temptation to be first among the Allies caused activities dealing with the policy of the resumption of university life in Germany to be rushed.

Both powers implemented preliminary preparations for the universities to reopen. These preliminary preparations meant denazification of courses, of teaching staff and the student body, and of library holdings. The United States conducted the preliminary stage more thoroughly by creating a solid legal basis for regulating the reopenings and for the ensuing functioning of the universities. In addition, the Americans purged university people more severely than the Soviets did. The universities in the American Zone therefore reopened later than those of the Soviet Zone. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did not elaborate any legal basis in detail, confining itself to issuing just two or three directives, and they did not profoundly purge the professoriate. This was primarily determined by the goal of the government to be the first of the Allies to restore normal life in Occupied Germany.

Once university studies had been resumed, both powers began reforming the university statutes so that they would contribute to their reforms and mirror the American or Soviet university systems. The American government proposed the insertion of provisions expanding the influence of society on university curricula through trustee boards, as well as provisions expanding the influence of young lecturers in the decision-making process in the Senate, and other provisions containing new democratic and American norms. The Soviet government proposed increasing the authority of the rectors and elimination of their elective status, and arranged for the establishment of new departments and the admission of lower social groups to the universities. The German universities resisted these new models both in the American and Soviet Zones. The imposition of new statutes from above was the main factor that caused indignation. Consequently, the United States gradually acquiesced to the demands of the opposition and most American proposals were not introduced into the university statutes during the period under examination here. The Soviet Union was able to promote a new model of statute by exploiting the power of German communists and by pressuring the rectors and professors.

Both powers sought to appoint or promote loyal rectors through the election process in the Senate. The Occupation authorities of the US replaced and appointed new rectors themselves, while the Soviet Administration campaigned for new communist rectors in the Senate. Consequently, by applying different approaches, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to ensure their success in reforming the universities.

2) The revision of the German university curricula.

Both powers introduced new courses to the existing curricula of German universities. The courses introduced obviously reflected the political culture of the rivals. The United States intended to impose courses in fields of study such as general education, political science, social studies, and American studies. The Soviet Union introduced the introductory course “Political and Social Problems of the Contemporary World” and they added disciplines such as Marxism-Leninism, pedagogy, and, to a certain extent, Soviet studies as well. The selection of these fields and courses were determined by the political aims of implanting a definite ideology (liberalism or socialism) in occupied Germany.

The implementation of the revisions took a very long time, and only by the end of the 1950s were the new courses of lectures being more or less taught in German universities. The resistance of the universities did have an impact in terms of slowing down the introduction of these reforms. The Soviet Union, however, turned out to be more persistent than the United States in pushing for reforms and, as a result, Soviet disciplines found a formal place in the traditional German curricula of the humanities departments. The United States recognized the fact that even when the German universities formally acquiesced to the American revision of the curricula, they refused to develop the new disciplines proposed by the Americans. The United States resigned itself to the fact that German university curricula would not be fully reformed and, therefore, shifted to a policy of establishing new structures in order to introduce new disciplines.

3) The establishment of institutes, departments, and chairs at German universities.

The establishment of new structures was viewed by the United States as a means of undermining the curriculum and academic programs which existed in German universities. Setting up independent institutes of political science, of American studies, and of education research at universities actually turned out to be more effective than inserting certain courses from these fields into the German curricula. The United States

emphasized the establishment of chairs of American studies in every Germany university; this became an effective tool for promoting a favorable US image and for popularizing American fields and methods of research in German universities. The Soviet Union, on the contrary, did not apply this means to deal with German universities; they mainly established departments of pedagogy in the period we have examined.

4) The founding the Free University and the division of University of Berlin.

Both powers had a hand in the fall of the great and famous University of Berlin in order to take full control over its resources, brains, scientific potential, and property, scattered all over the three sectors of occupation in Berlin. Moreover, the activities of the two states, determined by their ideological goals, contributed to the division the university. The Soviet Union strongly promoted communists and Marxism in the university in order to ensure its allegiance. The United States, on the other hand, by discrediting their opponent for this policy and denouncing it as oppressive, was able to find the ideological basis and persuasive justification for opening a new University of Berlin, to be called the Free University, in the buildings of the old Berlin University. The decline of the University of Berlin is a study in miniature of the attitude of the Allies towards German universities and towards each other.

5) Transformation of the university libraries' holdings.

The United States and Soviet Union were both able to effectively organize permanent replacements of holdings in the libraries. The United States supplied the universities with literature about the political system of the United States and most of the literature was in English. The Soviet Union translated the Soviet literature on Marxism-Leninism and pedagogy into German and flooded the libraries.

Finally, the initial reforms of both Occupation authorities, as examined in this chapter, were instrumental in attaining political goals such as the implantation of a new ideological constituent in German university education and the fostering of a new political culture in German society by means of the universities. The revision of statutes, curricula, libraries, as well as the establishment of new institutes, departments, and chairs were more or less effective means of achieving the political goals of those who occupied Germany. All the reforms we have examined were imposed on German universities and, hence, aroused indignation and resistance to them among university people.

