9 The case of the BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst)

What is the quality of a security agency report on anti democratic elements within a legal protest movement? This question will be answered in this case study on a report by the BVD – the Dutch Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, in English known as the National Security Service.

This second case study comprises three chapters. Chapter 9 introduces the case study. In chapter 10, the BVD-survey is tested against the criteria of chapter 5, to identify the extent to which the survey meets the set demands. In chapter 11, complementary aspects concerning its quality are investigated.

In 9.1, information, about the survey, is presented and which is evaluated in chapters 10 and 11.

In 9.2, an introduction to the BVD, the organization that produced the survey is presented. Information is provided about its structure and aims.

In 9.3, the societal and political context of the issues mentioned in the BVD-survey is explained.

Finally, in 9.4, an explanation is given as to why this BVD-survey was selected as the second case study. Insights are also given in regard to the sources consulted.

9.1 The investigated survey

The particular security agency report that is the object of this case study focused on anti democratic elements within a legal protest movement. It was published in a quarterly survey – the fourth quarterly survey of 1981.

The BVD produced different types of intelligence products. For internal use, it made daily and weekly surveys. For external use, the BVD produced monthly surveys, which in 1978 changed to quarterly surveys.\(^1\) There were also other products, such as reports written for a minister.\(^2\) Of course, there were also a wide variety of intelligence products – ranging from raw intelligence to final analysis – that were exchanged with sister agencies.

The three main groups of BVD-products included periodical background information, information on phenomena and ad-hoc information to be used for short-term actions.

The main consumers of the BVD-products were ministers, the Lower House (committees), the Public Prosecutor, the police, other public bodies, social

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\(^1\) Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

\(^2\) These so-called ‘governmental’ letters were official messages by the agency to the government or a minister. These letters belonged to the most balanced way of reporting by the BVD (interview with Dick Engelen by the author, 14 March 1996 and 7 March 2001).
organizations, and corporate business. The BVD supplied consumers with oral and written information.³

The intelligence product that is central in this case study is a quarterly survey. Surveys were not aimed at a specific policy issue. The aim of the surveys was to provide background information. It was distributed in an edition of 400 to 500 copies. The main consumers were municipal and regional police forces. Other consumers, for example, were the security sections of the Royal Military Police and sister agencies. Within a police force, the mayor, the head of police, and the local intelligence unit could access a survey. Although a quarterly survey was primarily focused on background information, a policy maker – like a mayor – was free to consider this information in policy considerations. Furthermore, these surveys were also a means to indicate to police officers from local intelligence units as to which issues were worth investigating. Although surveys served these different functions, within the BVD they were seen as a routine action. However, they did not have the same status as, for example, a letter to a minister. The BVD produced this periodic background information until 1989.⁴

The surveys were classified as confidential. Generally, the BVD prevented the distribution of (parts of) a quarterly survey. ‘In certain cases [...] but only after permission was obtained from the BVD,’ was it possible to distribute a survey.⁵ In confidential reports like quarterly surveys, the majority of the information was from open sources. The rest of the information – not from open sources – was processed in such a way that it looked as if they were from open sources. Information that could not be traced to a specific source or sources was only used.⁶

**Fourth quarterly survey of 1981**

Most reports by the BVD never reached publicity, at least not completely. One exception is the fourth quarterly survey of 1981. This survey was leaked to and subsequently published in *Bluf!* (an Amsterdam-based left wing activist periodical).⁷ It was, among others, composed of articles focusing on activities by and discussions about squatters, anti-militarists, and activists who were against nuclear energy. Besides, *Bluf!* focused on international developments and other activist related issues.

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⁵ Fourth quarterly survey of 1981 by the BVD (this report will be further referred to as ‘quarterly survey’), introductory page.
⁶ Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.
⁷ The quarterly survey of 1981 was published as an appendix of *Bluf!* no. 267. In the 1980’s, on a few more occasions (parts) of reports reached the public. A week later, for example, in *Bluf!* no. 268, some extracts of a monthly survey from 1977 were printed. In 1981, there was commotion concerning two leaked reports on Dutch peace movements (De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 93-99). In 1980, the BVD put a photocopier up for auction which contained three secret documents (*Trouw*, 18 June 1980).
On 29 April 1987, the authorities attempted to prevent *Bluf!* from publishing the leaked BVD-survey. A 45-person strong police unit raided the premises at the request of the BVD. As a result, they confiscated more than 2000 copies of *Bluf!* No. 267 that were ready to be distributed. The police unit also arrested three people and confiscated address files, logs, and minutes of meetings. A *Bluf!*-fellow worker has maintained that he had no idea how the survey was leaked from the BVD.\(^8\)

Despite this raid, the police unit did not find the offset plates. A fellow-worker involved in the publication claimed that the offset plates were present during the raid, simply stored in garbage bags in a corner of the room.\(^9\) The following day on 30 April 1987 – a national holiday to celebrate the Queen’s Birthday – *Bluf!* published the quarterly survey. The authorities decided not to raid *Bluf!*’s premises or to confiscate the publications because of public order issues. On Queen’s Birthday, the center of Amsterdam is crowded. The authorities not only feared that *Bluf!* had a duplicate, but that it had also had made a triplicate copy of the survey.\(^10\)

After a series of legal proceedings, *Bluf!* brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights. On 9 February 1995, this court sentenced the state to a fine of £60,000.- (euro 27,273). The court argued that the right to freedom of speech had been violated.\(^11\)

The most accessible part of the quarterly survey has been chosen for an in-depth investigation. This is the section concerning anti-democratic developments within the Movement Against Nuclear Energy (MANE)\(^12\) – page 29-39 of the survey (9.4). As this text is so central in this study, and because it cannot be found in public sources, it is enclosed as Appendix 2.

### 9.2 Organization

To understand the functioning of the BVD, insights into the organization and its aims are necessary. The BVD – a part of the Ministry of Home Affairs – was founded in 1949, after the dissolution of its predecessor Centrale Veiligheidsdienst (Central Security Agency). The BVD was part of the Dutch intelligence community, which in turn is part of the security policy system.\(^13\) Within the security policy system there is, to some extent, a division between international (or

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\(^8\) *NRC Handelsblad*, 30 May 1987; interview with Wijnand Duijvendak by the author, 27 October 1994.

\(^9\) Confidential interview with an anonymous voluntary worker.


\(^12\) MANE in Dutch: Anti Kernenergiebeweging (AKB).

foreign) intelligence and domestic security. However, an agency may collect information in both fields.\footnote{A security agency is a (government) agency active within a country, aimed at countering threats manifesting itself within that country. A foreign intelligence agency, is a similar agency operating abroad and getting information on anything it wants to know about foreign actors. Both types of agencies produce intelligence – checked and analyzed information (Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004).} In the domain of foreign intelligence, agencies gather information to verify arm treaties, to warn about war or international terrorism, to assist strategic planning, and concerning the nature, possibilities, and intentions of foreign opponents.\footnote{Probst, “Intelligence as a Force Enhancer,” Winter 1987, CIA/SII, 64-66.}

The BVD, however, focused itself mainly on domestic security. The field of domestic security includes combating espionage, terrorism, and political violent activism. These activities were rooted in the first task of this agency, as described in section 8, paragraph 2a of the Intelligence and Security Services Act of 1987. For this, the agency gathered data on – as a result of their goals and activities – organizations and people who were a threat to the existence of democratic legal order, for the security of the state, or for other important interests of the state. In the line of responsibility, it is the minister of Home Affairs – and not the BVD – who determines organizations or people that are to be the object of investigation.\footnote{Andersson, Elffers & Felix, “Een nieuwe BVD,” 1990, 4.}

The division between domestic and international security was not that strict in the Dutch community. To fight proliferation was also a task of the BVD. Although domestic aspects are present, it is intertwined with aspects of international security.\footnote{Lower House, session 1989-1990, 21819, no. 2, 9.} This became even more so after December 1993, when the Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers dissolved the Dutch Foreign Intelligence Agency, the IDB.\footnote{In Dutch: Inlichtingendienst Buitenland (IDB). Both the military intelligence and security agency and the BVD took over the tasks of the dissolved Foreign Intelligence Agency. The then domestic agency BVD also carried out tasks for international security. The agency became responsible for liaisons with foreign sister agencies, the processing of the data obtained, and some foreign operations (BVD, Jaarverslag 1992, 5). The effects of dissolving the IDB were so drastic, new legislation was prepared that came into effect in 2002 – the BVD became the AIVD.} From then on, the BVD monitored the production and export of weapons, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\footnote{Interview with Dick Engelen, 7 March 2001.} The BVD also took part as a National Security Authority in the consultations with the NATO Security Committee and the WEU Security Committee,\footnote{BVD, Jaarverslag 1998, 65.} a field more to do with international security. Until 1990, there was a special branch of the BVD – the Foreign Policy Staff – that produced reports on developments in communist countries and communist parties in non-communist countries. This field is typical for international security (11.3.3).

The BVD did more than gather information. It was a security agency, having preventive and protective security functions. As a part of its tasks, the agency carried out background investigations on individuals who needed a security clearance for a (government) position. In addition, the BVD had to safeguard information. These security tasks were respectively the second and third task of the
agency (section 8, paragraph 2b and 2c of the Intelligence and Security Services Act of 1987).

During the Cold War, communism was the main target of the BVD. In the 1970’s, a new main target stepped into the lime-light: terrorism. In general, the BVD responded to infringements – often physical or psychical – that were systematic, secret, deceptive, or improper. At the end of the 1980’s, there was a shift of emphasis to elements such as corruption, proliferation, and economic espionage.\(^\text{21}\)

The composition of the BVD changed somewhat throughout the years – especially concerning the naming of its different divisions. In the 1980’s, the BVD was organized into directorates, departments, and sections. An overview of the situation in the 1980’s is presented in terms of their tasks, main input, and main output (see also figure 9.1).\(^\text{22}\)

\textbf{Figure 9.1 Main structure of the BVD in the 1980’s (reorganized in 1990 and 2002)}

![Diagram of BVD structure]

Some parts were aimed at primary and others at secondary activities. The Director General’s private Office, called the Cabinet, maintained the national (KVB) and international (KEB) contacts. The Cabinet also had to take care of legal matters (KJA), the preparation of policy reports, and the secretariat for the leadership of the BVD. The organization had just started to function at the end of the 1980’s with the appointment of an organizational adviser. Department F, Finance, was responsible


\(^\text{22}\) Figure 9.1 is based on: Andersson, Elffers & Felix, “Een nieuwe BVD,” 1990, appendix 1; and supplemented with the help of the notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004
for the financial administration, transport and internal security. Section A was responsible for general administration and logistical support.23

The primary activities were concentrated in the Directorates B, C, and Department D. The main activities of Directorate B focused on Dutch left and right wing extremist (sometimes violent) political movements, Dutch anti-societal movements, Dutch terrorism, terrorism related to foreign countries, in addition to liaising with local intelligence units within the municipal and regional police forces, the PID’s and RID’s.24 The input of information was mainly composed of open sources, the PID’s, (military) authorities, sister agencies, agents, informants, and – rarely – citizens who spontaneously delivered messages.

Directorate C was charged with protecting the security of the state against activities by agencies of foreign (communist) states. The prime target was intelligence activities by the Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, by the Peoples Republic of China. This target was supplemented by intelligence activities of Soviet satellite states – such as Czechoslovakia, a country that was very active in the Netherlands, or East Germany (HVA) – and hostile agencies in general. In practice, activities were aimed at intelligence officers in embassies and other representations (rezidentura), illegal intelligence officers, operations by communist countries aimed at Dutch citizens who visited these countries, intelligence activities from Soviet ships, and the recruitment of emigrants. The input of Directorate C was composed of information from sister agencies, agents and informants, observation and surveillance activities, telephone taps and other technical intercepts, the PID’s and RID’s (not very often), and – rarely – open sources and citizens who reported suspect activities. Intelligence produced by Directorate C could be used for the protection of vital objects against hostile foreign intruders, a responsibility of Department D.

Department D was responsible for prevention. Its activities were mainly focused on the security of corporate business, public bodies and organizations, and supervising the positive vetting systems for these bodies. This included security issues such as prevention strategies against the abuse of vital technologies, the violation of automated data systems, and theft of high-tech information. In total, Department D was responsible for about 700 organizations. The input was composed of information from ministers, parliament, NATO, WEU, Euro Control, sister agencies, and colleagues of Directorates B and C.

The Foreign Policy Staff focused on mainly the same states and ideologies as Directorate C (communist). Its brief covered the analysis of phenomena abroad that could have consequences for home security. It produced its information for use within the BVD. In addition, it regularly supplied external consumers with reports. Its main sources of information were openly available information, signal intercepts, and information from allied foreign agencies.

24 Politieke/Plaatselijke/Politie Inlichtingendiensten; in English, Political/Local/Police Intelligence Agencies. They existed locally under all the three different names, and have the same abbreviation in Dutch. Regionale Inlichtingendiensten; in English, Regional Intelligence Agencies.
The Departments E and T were responsible for the secret collection of information outside the domain of human intelligence (running of agents). In the case of Departments E, its activities included observation, surveillance, translation, mostly of intercepts (telephone and microphone), and positive vetting. Department T supplied Department E with the technical means necessary. Their main clients were the Directorates B and C.  

The BVD obtained 70% to 80% of its information through open sources, including free, accessible, oral contacts, that is people and institutions who could be approached without the use of special means of intelligence. The other 20% to 30% was obtained through observation, surveillance, taps, other technical means, and agents.

At the end of the 1980’s, the first stage of BVD’s reorganization began. This was necessary to counter the many organizational problems. The reasons were rather complex. For instance this included redefining the political relationship between the BVD and other government agencies (especially within the ministry of Home Affairs), the motivation had to be improved (many staff felt the agency had become too cautious), the work processes needed to be made more efficient, operations were conducted almost independently from political needs, and more modern managing tools and processes needed to be introduced. A major reorganization was carried out after the management consultation agency Andersson, Elffers & Felix presented a report at the request of the BVD’s new Director General, Arthur Docters van Leeuwen.

On 29 May 2002, a second major change followed as a result of the new Intelligence and Security Services Act. The BVD was transformed into the AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) – the General Intelligence and Security Service, which includes a Foreign Intelligence Directorate to collect intelligence regarding other countries. These activities focus on the international legal order, peace and security, and the position of the Netherlands in the international arena.

As a result of these reorganizations, conclusions valid for BVD-reports of the 1980’s cannot be extrapolated to today.

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25 Andersson, Elffers & Felix, “Een nieuwe BVD,” 1990, 8 - 11, 20; Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004. The names in Dutch are as follows: Leadership of the BVD - Dienstleiding; Cabinet - Kabinet; Personnel Department - Personeelszaken; Organization - Organisatie; Directorates B and C, - Directies B and C; Departments D, E, F, T, and Section A - Hoofdafdelingen A, D, E, F, and T; Foreign Policy Staff – Staf(afdeling) Buitenlandse Politiek.


27 Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

In this case study, the emphasis is on data from Directorate B of the BVD. Most of the information the author was able to collect – from basic data to final reports – is from this directorate. As noted, Directorate B focused on issues related to the political extremist field. In the 1980’s, within the BVD, this was referred to as ‘anti-democratic movements, organizations, and people.’

While access to material from other directorates and departments was more difficult, reports could be collected from the Foreign Policy Staff. Attention is paid to this section in 11.3. Material in this section is used to assess more specifically the factors that contribute to a high or low quality report (13.2).

Now that an introduction has been given on BVD, the following section focuses on the BVD-survey. In the following section, attention is paid to the subjects mentioned in this survey.

9.3 **SOCIETAL CONTEXT OF THE SUBJECTS IN THE SURVEY**

What was the societal setting of the issues reported on in the survey? Some background information is presented to gain an understanding of some of these issues. In the BVD-survey, the main subjects were MANE, Joost van Steenis, and Van Steenis’ past in Red Youth and Red Help. 43% of the text was on MANE, 24% was on the history of Van Steenis before his appearance in MANE, and 21% linked Van Steenis to MANE and his role in MANE. In 10% of the survey, other anti-democratic elements were evaluated – such as specific groups of anarchists and radical squatters (11.1).

This was not the first time that the BVD reported, in its surveys, on issues related to MANE or on Van Steenis. Earlier surveys on MANE concerned monthly surveys 2 and 4 (1977). These surveys described the involvement of the CPN (Communist Party Netherlands) in the demonstration against the enlargement of the UCN (Ultra Centrifuge Nederland) that produced centrifuges to enrich uranium. The BVD reported on Van Steenis and the groups in which he was active, in the monthly surveys 4 and 5 (1977).

In addition, the BVD reported, during this period, on groups and people mentioned in the fourth quarterly survey, such as specific groups of anarchists (quarterly survey 2, 1981) and radical squatters (quarterly survey 3, 1982), or on related groups such as autonomous groups (quarterly survey 2, 1980).

**The Movement Against Nuclear Energy (MANE)**

A large part of the BVD-survey focused on MANE. In the following, an overview is given of the main groups who were active against nuclear energy at

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29 Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.
30 BVD, “Inzagedossier diverse maand- en kwartaaloverzichten, No. 71758,” 1-9. The UCN is the Dutch company producing ultra-centrifuges for Urenco, a Dutch-German-British organization to enrich uranium.
the time the BVD-survey was written. Most of them are mentioned in the BVD-survey. Also attention is paid to the basic principles of MANE, as these are crucial in discussing the BVD-survey.

*Overview of the movement*

MANE was at its peak at the end of the 1970’s and during the first half of the 1980’s. Together with the peace movement, anti-militarists, the feminist movement, the squatters’ movement, and the anti-apartheid movement, it was pre-eminently the left-wing political activism exponent of the 1980’s. These six movements managed time after time to gain the media’s attention through their spectacular actions or mass-activities.

In the 1970’s, the protest against nuclear energy was growing. There was an increasing number of demonstrations and protesters. During the years, protest transformed into resistance. In 1979, there was a most significant break in this trend by the founding of Breek Atoomketen Nederland (BAN), in English: Break Atomic Chain Netherlands. BAN wanted to apply non-violent direct action to cause delays to the atomic program, and had as its ultimate goal its abolition.

In the 1970’s, before BAN was founded, two types of groups were already active. First, there were Energy Committees. While these were locally organized, they had also a national organization – the National Energy Committee (NEC). This was an amalgamation of political parties and organizations, for instance the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth International, Aktie Strohalm, NIVON, and the Verbond van Wetenschappelijke Onderzoekers. As a result of the participation of political parties, these committees were more oriented towards parliament than the second type of groups, Power Groups, which developed more towards a concept of resistance.

Power Groups were committees of people. The principle was that people joined these groups personally. No political party was allowed to dominate a

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32 At the end of the 1970’s, the CPN played a role in the organization of demonstrations against the UCN at Almelo. Yet, the role of the CPN was less than marginal concerning direct actions, as blockades of nuclear power plants and transports to dump nuclear waste in the sea. The BVD describes the role of the CPN against the UCN in its monthly survey number 2 of 1977 (page 8-10) and its monthly survey number 4 of 1977 (page 6).

33 Before 1979, direct actions were already carried out incidentally. In 1977, activists occupied a drilling rig to protest against test drilling for the storage of nuclear waste. In 1978, activists occupied a lock at Velsen to prevent Makiri Suits – loaded with nuclear waste – to sail (LAKA (Landelijk Kernenergie Archief), *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 1987, 11, 15 en 16).

34 In Dutch: Energie Komitees.

35 In Dutch: Landelijk Energie Komitee (LEK).

36 Nijmeegs Universiteits Blad, 4 November 1977. The last organization – the *Verbond van Wetenschappelijke Onderzoekers* – is characterized as a front organization of the Dutch communist party, the CPN (Olink, *Over communisten, spionnen en saboteurs tijdens de Koude Oorlog*, 2002, 107).

37 In Dutch: Stroomgroepen.
group. In 1974, the National Power Group Stop Nuclear Energy (NPGSNE)\(^{38}\) was founded. From 1977 onwards, the protest gained momentum and the number of local groups grew fast. In the beginning of the 1980’s, the Power Groups of Gelderland started to play a major role. The center of their attention changed from the fast breeder reactor at Kalkar – just across the border in Germany – to Dodewaard, the Dutch nuclear power plant. By 1979, NPGSNE decided to be represented in NEC.\(^{39}\)

During a camp in May 1980, activists discussed – initiated by the Power Groups of Gelderland – the possibilities of direct actions against Dodewaard. This camp coincided with a controversial emergency permit\(^{40}\) for the storage of extra nuclear fuel rods at the plant. An overwhelming majority of the people who were present elected to occupy this site as a first step. The second option was for a non-violent blockade if it became clear that occupying the site could lead to the danger of violence and escalation. Because of the way that the authorities reacted, the activists prepared for a non-violent blockade. Many of them organized themselves into the Dodewaard-Shuts-Down (DSD) grassroots groups.\(^{41}\)

In the beginning, BAN was skeptical about the blockade, but later, joined in the preparations. BAN saw the demands of the ‘Dodewaard-Shuts-Down’ as unrealistic. BAN followed a different strategy – that of actually delaying the atomic program through direct resistance which they hoped would finally result in its abolition. Furthermore, BAN was of the opinion that its own model – in which training in non-violence was a crucial factor – was not widespread enough. The actual blockade of Dodewaard-Shuts-Down 1980 (DSD’80) was a non-violent one.\(^{42}\)

The following year, in 1981, another large mass action took place at Dodewaard. This action had a more vicious nature. In retrospect, an explanation can be given. On one hand, there was a lot of dissatisfaction among activists, because until then there had hardly been any direct success. The demands of the Dodewaard-Shuts-Down were also not met. The dumping of nuclear waste into the sea still continued. This dumping caused tension with international treaties. During the preparation of Dodewaard-Shuts-Down 1981 (DSD’81), some activists placed more emphasis on the extra option of barricades than in 1980. Nevertheless, no clear decision was reached as to what should be the course of the action.

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\(^{38}\) In Dutch: Landelijke Stroomgroep Stop Kernenergie (LSSK). In the beginning, the ‘K’ of ‘Kernenergie’ (Nuclear energy) stood for ‘Kalkar’ (a fast breeder reactor).


\(^{40}\) In Dutch: gedoogvergunning.

\(^{41}\) - , Met je hoofd in de wolken en je voeten in de modder, 1981, chapters 2, 3, and 4. DSD-grassroot groups in Dutch: Dodewaard-Gaat-Dicht basisgroepen.

On the other hand, the response of the authorities hardened. The police acted more viciously during smaller actions that took place between DSD’80 and DSD’81 at Dodewaard and an increasing number of activists were wounded. At Dodewaard, the Acting Mayor Goldberg was installed. Some activists feared the worst, because they saw this mayor as a hard-liner.

DSD’81 showed many features of a battlefield. The authorities used massive amounts of tear gas in addition to employing anti-riot squads. Many hundreds of people were wounded. After four days, the action was broken off early. During the following weekend, there was a massive and non-violent final demonstration at Arnhem.43

MANE was not a monolithic block. It was a collective name for different groups with different backgrounds, strategies, aims, and means. The nature of the groups also differed – from participating on behalf of a political party to personal committees and affinity groups.

Some groups – like BAN, the Power Groups, and the DSD-grassroots groups – were explicitly focused on nuclear energy. For others, this link was less direct. For example, the only thematic link that the anti-militarist Onkruit had concerned its claim that civil nuclear energy also served military purposes. For squatters’ groups, the thematic linkage between squatting and nuclear energy was even more remote.

A factor complicating a clear arrangement between the different groups was that the same people were often members of more than one group. This especially applied to thematic groups, like the anti-UCN-committee, Stop Borssele, and Stop Doodewaard.

At first sight, it seems difficult to gain an overview or to identify a common factor within MANE. Nevertheless, patterns developed and agreements were reached between different groups. Activists developed basic principles for the large mass actions at Dodewaard. The various descriptions of the basic principles of Dodewaard-Shuts-Down – and MANE in general – concerned more or less the following:

1. openness;
2. non-violence;
3. to avoid to be criminated;
4. wide support of the population (national and local);
5. grassroots democracy;
6. right of resistance.44

43 For more: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 147-152.

Concerning nonviolence, there were within the MANE endless discussions on ‘fundamental nonviolence’ (like BAN) and ‘in principle non-violent’ (some of the DSD-grassroots groups). Source: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 152-158.
These basic principles of DSD are helpful in analyzing the relationship between DSD and the authorities. The response of the authorities could be a factor concerning radicalization, for instance formulating the right to resist (BAN). Authorities could directly intervene by employing a particular response. In regards to intelligence, direct intervention could occur when someone is an agent and a provocateur and as a result a cross-fertilization of democratic and anti-democratic concepts of action could be promoted (10.2.1, Cees van Lieshout).

In 1980 and 1981 at actions against the dumping of nuclear waste into the sea, activists simply divided the road into sections, so that each group could carry out its own type of action. The basic principles of the different groups and their particular actions provide a framework for analyzing – and tracing the developments within – multiform movements, like MANE.

**Joost van Steenis**

In the BVD-survey, the agency paid a lot of attention to one person: Joost van Steenis. Van Steenis was in the 1960’s and 1970’s active in various Marxist-Leninist/Maoist groups; Red Flag (Rode Vlag), Red Youth (Rode Jeugd), and Red Help (Rode Hulp).

The BVD had both Red Youth (Summer 1966 – March 1974) and Red Help (– December 1976) under surveillance. From actions ascribed to (members of) both groups, this was not a surprise. In the early 1970’s, Red Youth was involved in several bombings – against Philips and a police officer’s car – in which there were no casualties.

It also had contact with foreign terrorist groups for instance the German Rote Armee Fraktion, the RAF (13.1.2). In 1974, Red Youth ceased to exist and was succeeded by Red Help.

In 1975, during his period in the Red Help, Van Steenis developed the concept of Small Violence or ‘soft’ violence. In this concept those seen as the ruling elite were attacked, rather than goods or the common police officer. Van Steenis did not advocate ‘heavy’ violence against people, like the German RAF did. His concept of Small Violence was to carry out continuous and nerve-racking harassments. This concept of Small Violence differed from those within Red Help who finally elected for the option of terrorism. In 1976, some Red Help-members visited PFLP, a George Habasj training camp in South

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45 Doubts in traditional demonstrations increased after a mass demonstration at the UCN, March 1978. Both the limited demand (against enlargement of the UCN, instead of against the UCN) and the way the parliamentary decision making had taken place, changed attitudes. Actions by BAN were not aimed at the government anymore, but at the right to resist and to delay the nuclear industry. The deeper cause that led to the foundation of BAN was the lack of trust in parliamentary decision making (Van de Laar & Bökkerink, “Geen hiërarchie in beweging tegen kernenergie!”, Vrije, 1979 no. 2, 18-19, Onderstrom, June 1980, no. 30, 4. Interview with Abel Herzberger by the author, 27 May 1993).
46 Vrije, 1980, no. 10, 19.
47 Dekkers & Dijksman, ’n Hollandse stadsguerrilla, 1988, 13, 68, 147.
48 NRC Handelsblad, 26 October 2000.
Yemen. One of them – Lidwien Janssens – was arrested later that year at Tel Aviv airport, Israel, when she carried out a reconnaissance in preparation for a PFLP hijacking action. In 1976, articles appeared in the Dutch media stating that Red Help-members gave support to members of the RAF, who were in hiding in the Netherlands. In 1976, Van Steenis left Red Help. By the end of 1975, there were already clear tensions between Van Steenis and Red Help on the course of action.

Later, Van Steenis was active in different groups. In 1978, he was one of the founders of Stichting Macht en Elite (the Foundation Power and Elite) that issued a paper under the same name. At the end of the 1970’s, Van Steenis was also a candidate at elections with his political party the Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur (the Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule).

In 1979, Van Steenis moved to Amsterdam. He joined a squatters’ group in which he was responsible for the contact with MANE. The BVD feared that the concept of Small Violence might cross-fertilize to the other groups that Van Steenis was active in. This is the underlying reason why the BVD wrote its survey on anti-democratic developments within MANE. This fear provided a legitimate reason to carry out an investigation and to make an assessment on Van Steenis and his perceived influence. During his Red Youth period he had been active in delivering training. In 1972 and 1973, he held weekly evening classes in the theater De Brakke Grond, in Amsterdam, in which he for example, explained how to make simple bombs to people who attended his classes over a long period of time. The Anarchist Cookbook was used for this.

Van Steenis’ concept of Small Violence was characterized by secrecy, to be disconnected from the population, to commit criminal acts, violence, and to carry out actions in small groups. In contrast the basic principles of MANE were openness, gaining wide support of the population, to avoid to be criminated, non-violence, and mass-action. In 10.2.4, the basic principles of DSD and the concept of Small Violence are compared, and the possibility of cross-fertilization is assessed.

In 1982, there was a deep crisis between Van Steenis and left-wing activists. In this year, Van Steenis published his new book De macht van de autonome mens; theorie en praktijk van het aanvallen van personen (The Power of the Autonomous People; Theory and Practice to Attack People). The book naturally focused on his ideas of dealing with members of the elite. In his book, he gave examples of actions of harassment. One example was to use stickers with the text ‘A Fuck? Call Promptly […]’ followed by the private number of a manager. Women groups – but also men from grassroots groups – considered this a sexist action that implied violence against women, because it ultimately

50 Dekkers & Dijksman, ‘n Hollandse stadsguerrilla, 1988, 141-142.
52 Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.
53 Ibid.
54 Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD, 2004, 69.
55 For the tension of earlier data, see: De Valk, BVD en inlichtingenrapportages, 1996, 203.
harassed a manager’s wife. Frustrations about this proposed method of action came to a crisis during a short visit that Van Steenis made to Amelisweerd in 1982 (in Amelisweerd, activists protested against the construction of a new freeway). He was expelled from the camp. This incident signaled the end of his association with MANE.\textsuperscript{56} In the 1990’s, Van Steenis established a website that gives insight into his past and present ideas.

9.4 CASE-SELECTION AND SOURCES

The BVD was selected as the second case study because it is a Dutch public organization. First, it is a relatively large and publicly well known security agency. Of all Dutch agencies, the BVD received the most media coverage and the most attention in parliamentary debates. Military agencies could have been an alternative. During the 1980’s, however, there was a large reorganization in which the three separate military agencies had to merge into one agency. Focusing on four organizations – the military agency and its three predecessors – would have made this study complicated.\textsuperscript{57}

To avoid legal complications and to avoid endangering security, reports from the 1980’s were a better option than recent ones. Furthermore, requests under the Dutch Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) are time-consuming. A lot of BVD-documents quoted in this study took at least a year – and in some cases more than five years – to be released. Finally, it is difficult to obtain recent reports under the Dutch FOIA.

Authentic and complete text

There are several thousand pages of files and reports available from the BVD. Nevertheless, there are limitations to the number of reports that can be analyzed. As noted, a report can only be released following a FOIA-request. The problem with these released reports is that there is no indication as to which parts of a report are not released. In the fourth quarterly survey of 1981 from the BVD, for example, there is a section on anti-democratic developments within MANE. The full version is eleven pages long. The released part following the FOIA-request, is only four pages long. There is no indication as to which seven pages are deleted.\textsuperscript{58} The released parts concerning MANE are those that the BVD explicitly characterized as bona fide. There is no indication in the released section that this survey is 45% complete.


\textsuperscript{57} This reorganization was preceded by the so-called Fatima-affair. This was an infiltration – not allowed by the responsible ministers – into unions of the army. This infiltration became public after the anti-militarist activist group Onkruit unveiled documents that it obtained after a theft at the 450 Counter Intelligence Detachment in November 1984.

\textsuperscript{58} The BVD released only page 29-32 – the first four pages of the report (BVD, FOIA-file 71758).
about Van Steenis, who is perceived as the main anti-democratic element. This practice makes it difficult to take released reports as a starting point in investigating their quality.

In the FOIA-documents there is a practice of deleting names. Having to guess who is involved makes research very difficult and indistinct.

Those reports, therefore, have to be selected based on their authenticity and whether they are complete. Subsequently this limits tremendously the number of reports that can be investigated. In fact, only two (leaked) reports could be obtained that meets both demands — one quarterly survey (1981) and one report on East European manipulation of Dutch peace movement,(1981). But even in the case of this last report, more versions exist (see following heading). Furthermore, knowledge of Russian was necessary to completely check this last report. Parts of the 1981 quarterly survey, on the contrary, could be studied in-depth more easily, in particular to the section on anti-democratic elements within MANE.

Debates in the Lower House showed that the BVD-survey of 1981 was authentic. A further indication of its authenticity is that on 29 April 1987 the BVD informed the chief prosecutor in Amsterdam. The agency explained it concerned its quarterly survey, fourth quarter of 1981. The activities against Bluf! was also based on this BVD information.59 Three different copies of the text on anti democratic elements within MANE could be studied. In the publication Bluf! No. 267, page 35 was missing. However, this page is included in this study.60 The three different copies show that there is only one version of the complete authentic text.

The Communist Party Netherlands (CPN) and front organizations

For this case study, an option could have been to study BVD-reports on the CPN and its front organization. After several FOIA-requests, there are now hundreds of pages of material and reports available on this issue. In the few instances that a report or a survey was likely to be complete, Russian sources could have been consulted for an accurate assessment of their quality. In almost all these cases, however, it was not completely sure whether a report was indeed complete, and sometimes names were deleted. This was a disadvantage compared to the survey on anti democratic elements within MANE.

Of the few reports that were likely to be complete, there was only one that could be used to check both authenticity and completeness — the 1981 report on East European manipulation of Dutch peace movement. From debates in the Lower House, it is clear that the report is authentic.61

There are two different versions of the text. One version was complete and was obtained through a leak – in German, and 26 pages long. Another version

60 This study is based on the complete original text, and not on the text as printed in Bluf! apart from the missing page 35. The names of people have also been removed from the Bluf!-publication.
was obtained following a FOIA-request – with its deletions and without the names of the Dutch people that had secret contacts with East European communists. This version was in Dutch and was 20 pages long. It had a more compact lay-out. The German and Dutch version is largely the same, except for some minor points. The last part of the Dutch conclusion is not present in the German version. It concerns – to a large extent inconclusively – an assessment on the extent to which the Dutch reorientation on nuclear arms could be attributed to a hidden East European manipulation.

According to debates in the Lower House, the leak of this report was unauthorized, and the concerned intelligence officials were confronted with disciplinary measures.

However, it was not because of these differences, but mainly because of Russian sources that needed to be consulted, that it was not selected as the central report of this case study. Nevertheless, it is discussed briefly in 11.3.2.

**Anti apartheid organizations**

Another option could have been to analyze BVD-reports on anti apartheid organizations. As in the case of the CPN and its front organizations, there are – through several FOIA-requests – hundreds of pages with different types of documents available on anti apartheid organizations.

Parts of these files are BVD-reports on organizations such as the AABN, the HCSA, and the predecessor of HCSA, the Angola Committee (6.2). These reports could have been selected as the second case study for reasons of thematic coherence with the first case study (SRB). Moreover, the BVD wrote in a letter during 2001 that HCSA, Kairos and related organizations (including the SRB) were never under surveillance from the agency – only certain people or activities. This would not have been a barrier in selecting these reports as the second case study.

Again, the problem is the completeness of reports. For example, in a 1978-report on the South African sympathy committees, text is deleted on many pages. Another option could have been a report on the Angola Committee – the predecessor of the HCSA – written in 1972 for the Minister of Home Affairs.

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62 The deleted parts in the Dutch FOIA-version could easily be restored with the help of the German version.
64 Proceedings Lower House, 16 December 1982, 1283, 1288; ANP 115 4 bin 173 819-bp. bvd., tk-bvd-vredesbeweging. 271506 jun 83.
65 BVD, letter to Kairos (1758106/01), 29 October 2001, p. 2.
66 Deleted parts are on pages 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18. On pages 13 and 15, it is even unclear whether passages are deleted. Such parts can be of special interest for a quality check, as for example on page 9, which apparently concerns the support of Portuguese refugees and deserters who fled to Sweden with false papers. It may point to the actual topic of the BVD to write the report. Source: BVD, 29 October 2001, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001 (South African communities in the Netherlands 1948-1998), 1 of 6 (HCSA incl. AABN), BVD-analysis of 25 May 1978, “De solidariteitscomité’s m.b.t. Zuidelijk Afrika,” 19 pages.
Again, however, text is deleted on many pages. This absence of completeness made it difficult to assess the exact interest of the BVD. Without having the possibility to assess the focus of attention of the BVD in a clear and unambiguous way, it is difficult to analyze it as an in-depth case study. It would have led to similar problems as encountered with the four FOIA-pages – instead of the full 11 pages – in the 1981 quarterly survey.

In the case of the South African sympathy committees, there is a lot of material in the BVD-files that is helpful in reflecting on the reports. First, this material provides information to assess who the agency was interested in. Communist oriented people from the ANC who visited the Netherlands had the attention of the BVD. For example, the visit of Oliver Tambo to HCSA and BOA on 17 and 18 October 1981 ended up in a BVD-file. His visits to the Dutch minister of Development Cooperation (Jan Pronk), the minister of Foreign Affairs (Max van der Stoel), and the Prime Minister (Joop den Uyl) also ended up in a BVD-file.

Second, this material is helpful to evaluate how the network of the BVD functioned. It gives insights into how information concerning demonstrations, manifestations, and meetings held by the HCSA and Kairos – often in combination with local anti apartheid groups – was collected.

Finally, while other material is useful to assess the width of the collected information, if it is not complete, then it cannot be used for this second case

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67 Deleted parts are on pages 1, 2, 7, and 8. On pages 5 and 6, it is even unclear whether passages are deleted. Source: BVD-archives, BVD, 29 October 2001, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001 (South African communities in the Netherlands 1948-1998), 1 of 6 (HCSA incl. AABN), Letter of Head of the BVD to the minister of Home Affairs, 19 September 1972 + analysis, “Het Angola-Comité,” 8 pages.

68 Tambo visited these ministers on 5 and 6 October 1977. BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, 1 of 6 (HCSA), pages 40, 42-43, and 58 of 132.

69 A lot of this information was presented to the BVD by the intelligence units of the municipal and regional police forces. Especially the police at Arnhem, Deventer, Groningen, Haarlem, The Hague, Heerlen, and Rotterdam appeared to be active in reporting to the BVD. This included information about either a request to hold a demonstration or to make a collection. Such local intelligence units could make use of standard forms to inform the BVD. Other places in which events ended up in BVD-files were Amsterdam, Apeldoorn, Beverwijk, Den Helder, Dokkum, Hengelo, Leiden, Rotterdam, Schimmerts, Tilburg, and Umon. The former state police made its own overview of events, which it handed over to the BVD.

From the BVD-file, it is clear that in 1982 the SRB was not a household name for the intelligence unit of the Amsterdam police forces (BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, 1 of 6 to 6 of 6).

Also the information flow from Foreign Affairs could result in a more complete insight. For example, Dutch Foreign Affairs informed the South African embassy at the Hague when Kairos and the HCSA held a demonstration opposite to its building (Foreign Affairs, Code 9, 1975-1984, 912.1, File 5585, memo of the Protocol Department, 7 June 1983, no. 89. This message was also sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs, O.B.Z.). It was not only the embassy that was informed on such occasions (BVD-archives, HCSA-file available for perusal, no. 2.241.336-75. Miscellaneous reports).

61 Especially during the 1980’s, most events reported on were meant to put pressure on Shell. But issues such as the Paralympics (1980), a visit from George Bush sr. (1989), or articles in national newspapers, as by the spokesman of the HCSA Sietske Bosgra were also reported. Even a speech held by the president-director of Shell – L.C. van Wachem – could end up in the BVD-files (BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, 1 of 6 {132 pp} to 6 of 6 {Kairos 55 pp} {Speech by Van Wachem for the meeting of shareholder at 11 May 1989}).
study. A complete version of these reports – following further FOIA-requests – may result in a good case because of other material that they provide.72

Sources

The focus on MANE was the longest section of the quarterly survey. Subsequently, a lot of information can be investigated. All the facts presented by the BVD could be checked in open sources.73 Openness was a foundational stone of MANE.74 People could easily join MANE, and activists could also easily hold coordinating positions. Furthermore, it was a movement of predominantly young people. This made it comparatively easy to check data and to obtain information – even years afterwards. It was also possible to obtain in-depth data on Red Youth and Red Help, both by information from the BVD and by those targeted by the BVD, Van Steenis, among others.

To carry out this case study, a variety of sources have been consulted. To obtain a balanced as possible picture, information originates from the BVD, ministries, courts, the police, MANE, Van Steenis, and a wide range of media and (academic) publications. A series of interviews were also held with people active in groups mentioned in the BVD-survey, to check the BVD-data. Furthermore, (former) BVD-officials were interviewed, and were asked to comment on drafts of this study.

With the help of other partly released surveys, it is to a certain extent possible to analyze the consistency between several surveys (11.1). In some occasions, the text of these surveys was obtained through sources other than a FOIA-request. In these cases, the reconstructed text is presented, rather than the text received following the FOIA-request. These reconstructions could be achieved through researching archives, and through publications and quotes in Bluf! and De Telegraaf.

72 Although the media interest will be primarily on reports on RARA (Dutch abbreviation of Radical Anti Racist Action), it is not possible to carry out such a case study. RARA carried out a series of arson and bomb attacks in mainly the second half of the 1980’s and the first half of the 1990’s. Only a few documents could be found. At Foreign Affairs, it is found that to cope with such violent actions Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands – asked the British company Control Risks at London to investigate the matter. The BVD, Shell, and the Dutch employers’ organization VNO could be present at such meetings. The Netherlands was seen as ‘the seat of the European headquarters of extremist elements’ (Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 611.7, File 1060; Stockholm, no. 2167 confidential, 21 January 1987; minister Van den Broek, no. 604 confidential, 20 January 1987; Brussels, confidential, 21 January 1987; Madrid, confidential, 26 January 1987).

73 Also a confidential report by Control Risks obtained on this issue was not suited for this study. Only small sections on pages 23 and 57 focused on the Netherlands. Also the contents were not that promising for an in-depth research. On page 57, for example, it is reported that groups such as RARA stem ‘from the Movement – an amalgam of squatters, criminals, drug-traffickers and protesters.’ Apart from the description being indistinct, it is the only source found in which these groups are put together, and are characterized as the Movement. Control Risks is apparently poorly informed about ‘the Movement’ (Control Risks Information Services Limited, “South Africa: The Prospects for Business. A Cris Special Study,” 1986 or 1987).

74 There was only one minor exception. This was the comment on Van Steenis being unemployed. See: quarterly survey, 37; and interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

75 This even applied to internal discussions. See, for example: -, Met je hoofd in de wolken en je voeten in de modder (1981). See also: Onderstroom, June 1980, no. 30, 18 ff.
In this case study, the conclusions are restricted to the limited BVD-material available only. A different sample of material may have led to different conclusions about the BVD. This, therefore, does not provide an overall picture of the state of affairs at the agency.

As a final comment, it may be helpful to have an overview of the main events of importance for the issues mentioned in the BVD-survey and its setting. A chronological overview is presented in the following table 9.1.
Table 9.1 Facts and dates in relation to issues in the BVD-survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>BVD</th>
<th>Van Steenis, Red Help/Red Youth</th>
<th>MANE</th>
<th>Society &amp; Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972: most (bomb) attacks by Red Youth</td>
<td>1973: in article IDOC-NORTH AMERICA, April 1973, no. 52, pp. 61-67: plea is held for non-violent, international campaign against nuclear energy (inspires Dutch activists)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1975: paper by Van Steenis and Tom de Booy on Small Violence</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>Van Steenis leaves Red Help</td>
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<td>Media report Red Help helps RAF</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Red Help members visit PFLP training camp in South Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monthly survey 4: Small Violence</td>
<td>Monthly survey 5: Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Van Steenis, De Booy and Rietveld found Foundation Power and Elite</td>
<td>4 March: mass demonstration against UCN</td>
<td>Report Ministry of Health claims no death caused by nuclear waste on KEMA site</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources are mentioned in this case study, or are from: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, chapter 5 (especially the parts in the column Society & Politics). This overview is not meant as a balanced picture of the developments, but to support the analysis of this case study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>BVD</th>
<th>Van Steenis Red Help/Red Youth</th>
<th>MANE</th>
<th>Society &amp; Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arrest of Capelse Group</td>
<td>2-4 March: Klinefelter trains first BAN-group in non-violence</td>
<td>March: accident at Harrisburg (USA)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Van Steenis moves to Amsterdam and joins local squatters group</td>
<td>12 May: first BAN-action (at UCN, Almelo)</td>
<td>April: customs officer tries to confiscate from a journalist documents on a German hearing on nuclear energy</td>
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<td>16-17 June: BAN and Power Group Haarlem/IJmond blockade transport of nuclear waste</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>October: attempts to occupy Seabrook (nuclear site USA) inspires the Dutch MANE for DSD’80 action; one BAN-member is present at Seabrook</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Quarterly survey 2: autonomous, anarchist &amp; squatters scene (Queen’s Birthday 1980)</td>
<td>Van Steenis present at DSD’80</td>
<td>16/17 March: 8 activists wounded at non-violent action Borssele</td>
<td>January: commotion in Lower House on leaked German report: possible dangerous flaws at Dodewaard</td>
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<td>May: anti-riot squad officer expresses reserves to act again MANE-activists</td>
<td>beginning 1980: changing answers to local politicians on security measures at Dodewaard</td>
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<td></td>
<td>24/25 May: Whitsun-camp: plan for blockade or occupation of Dodewaard, start of DSD-grassroots groups</td>
<td>24 March: Dodewaard accused of having too many nuclear fuel rods in basin; no emergency storage left</td>
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<td>9/10 June: different groups with different methods claim their own part of the route during actions against dumping of nuclear waste</td>
<td>28 March: without interference by Lower House, minister gives a more elastic permit for storage nuclear fuel rod storage at Dodewaard</td>
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<td>26 September: BAN occupies site of interuniversity nuclear reactor at Delft</td>
<td>April: KEMA-employee admits death of children caused by KEMA-waste</td>
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<td>5 October 1980: MANE decides to blockade (and not to occupy) Dodewaard</td>
<td>Spring 1980: press publishes that Netherlands may import Namibian uranium contrary to the 1974 UN General Assembly decree</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>19/20 October: DSD’80</td>
<td>second half 1980: commotion in Lower House on secret contracts between Borssele and Cogéma</td>
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<td>1980: Dodewaard-employee forced to quit job after criticism on hasty servicing; 38 incidents at nuclear plants of Borssele and Dodewaard, three times power reduction/cut needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Van Steenis</td>
<td>MANE</td>
<td>Society &amp; Politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Quarterly survey 2: anarchists and left wing activism</td>
<td>20 April: 7 activists wounded at action Dodewaard</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Quarterly survey 4: anti-democratic elements within MANE</td>
<td>17 May: preparation of DSD’81</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May: Van Steenis enters press group of DSD’81</td>
<td>18/20 June: many activists wounded at blockade UCN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>September: Van Steenis present at DSD’81</td>
<td>2/3 September: actions against dumping nuclear waste</td>
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<td>5 September: board labor party (PvdA) publicly supports upcoming blockade Dodewaard</td>
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<td>9 September: emergency by-law against barricades at Dodewaard issued by actions mayor Goldberg</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19-22 September: DSD’81: only on Saturday afternoon (19/9) over 130 activists wounded during riots</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Quarterly survey 3: squatters, MANE &amp; anti militarists</td>
<td>Van Steenis publishes <em>The Power of the Autonomous People</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Activists expel Van Steenis from camp at Amelisweerd because of views expressed in <em>The Power of the Autonomous People</em></td>
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