

University of Groningen

Rethinking the culture-economy dialectic

Brons, Lajos Ludovic

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:

2005

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Brons, L. L. (2005). *Rethinking the culture-economy dialectic*. s.n.

Copyright

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: <https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment>.

Take-down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): <http://www.rug.nl/research/portal>. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.

chapter 3

CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF CULTURE AND ECONOMY

The history of the idea of culture is a record of our reactions, in thought and feeling, to the changed conditions of our common life.

Raymond Williams 1959, p. 295

(...) civilization itself is the most sensational of departures and the most romantic of rebellions. By dealing with the unsleeping sentinels who guard the outposts of society, it tends to remind us that we live in an armed camp, making war with a chaotic world, and that the criminals, the children of chaos, are nothing but the traitors within our gates.

G.K. Chesterton 1901, pp. 122-123

3 / 1 / introduction

The culture - economy dialectic (CED) belongs to the most fundamental categories of social science. It has co-determined the disciplinary divisions within social science and generated a body of theories on causal relationships in either or both directions. Nevertheless, the CED is surrounded by much conceptual contestation and confusion. The meanings of the terms in the CED differ widely among theories and scientific disciplines, but none of these meanings seems to be presented in an explicit and unambiguous form and different conceptualisations and operationalisations are mixed into an incomprehensible mess. Hence, conceptual analysis is necessary to shed some light on the CED. (see also § 1.2)

This chapter presents the first, historical part of the mapping stage of conceptual analysis (CA), as proposed in subsection 2.7.2. The mapping stage entails the specification of two overlapping sets of concepts: one representing the conceptual history of the CED, \mathcal{H} , the second representing the different usages of the terms and concepts (and related terms and concepts) of the CED, \mathcal{S} . As explained in section 2.7, conceptual mapping of a concept or a conceptual pair as is the case here should start with conceptual history \mathcal{H} , which is the focus of this chapter. The specification of \mathcal{S} , the intensional mapping of the concepts, will be dealt with in chapter 4.

In conceptual history, both the onomasiology (focus on meaning) and the semasiology (focus on the term) (see § 2.4.1) are important. Conceptual analysis deals both with concepts having similar meanings but different terms or labels, and with concepts having the same term or label and a different meaning. These onomasiologically and semasiologically related concepts are the key concepts of the CED.

Baring and Cashford (1991) and Barth (1992) have suggested that the human tendency to think in binary oppositions (or 'concept dichotomization' as Barth calls it) is related to the fact that there are two sexes: male and female (see § 2.5.1). In Babylonian mythology, Chinese philosophy (yin and yang) and Western thought, the male and female are closely linked (by connotation) to other concepts. Table 3.1 gives some examples:

table 3.1: *connotations of the male and female (examples)*

<i>male</i>	<i>female</i>
spirit / mind	body
order	chaos
light	dark
active	passive
reason	passion
culture	nature

As explained briefly in subsection 2.5.3 this male - female dichotomy is strongly related to the CED. In fact, there is a direct route from the male - female dichotomy to the CED and to the related culture - nature dichotomy. Several of the connotations in table 3.1 are intermediate stages in this route, as was shown in figure 2.4 (in § 2.5.3). In studying the conceptual history of the CED the best starting point may be somewhere in the middle of that figure. One could start at the male - female dichotomy at the top of the figure (and at the beginning of the chain), but this dichotomy is far too general to be of much interest. The distinct historical development of the CED started with the opposition of *reason* and *passion*. Hence, that is where the historical analysis in this chapter starts.

Besides "reason" and "passion", figure 2.4 points out a number of other key concepts in the CED, of which "civilisation", as an intermediate between reason and economy, and of course, "culture" and "economy" themselves are the most important. The CED, however, is also strongly related to the culture - nature dichotomy, in which "culture" represents the male side of the dichotomy or dialectic rather than the female side. Key concepts in this route, besides "culture" and "nature" are "society" (or more vaguely: "man" or "mankind"; note that the concept of "man" is *not* used to refer to male persons but to people as a collective whole) and "environment". All of these concepts will be analysed in this and the following chapter (but not equally extensively).

This chapter deals with the historical and intensional mapping of the concepts of "culture" and "economy" (and their most important onomasiological predecessors). After this introduction, section 3.2 begins with the reason - passion dialectic (and related dialectics), the rise of social science and the introduction of the concept of civilisation. Section 3.3 gives a brief historical overview of the semasiology and onomasiology of "culture", after which section 3.4 deals with the opposition of the new concepts of "civilisation" and "culture" and the conceptual dissolution thereof. The latter resulted in the introduction of "economy" in the CED, which has as semasiological history of its own. Section 3.5 deals with this semasiological history of "economy", with the introduction of "entrepreneurship" in the CED, and with the late 20th century developments in the psychology of culture. Section 3.6 deals with the culture - nature or man - environment dichotomy, the other, but related, route of figure 2.4. Section 3.7, finally presents some critical comments on the analysis of the CED. (The next chapter attempts to intensionally map and reconstruct the 'conceptual field' (see § 2.7.2).)

3 / 2 / reason, passion and civilisation

The end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th were revolutionary times. A number of strongly interrelated revolutions changed the world and how we see it. These revolutions include the industrial revolution, the French revolution and the conceptual revolution that Koselleck (1979; 1987) refers to as the *Sattelzeit*, and Foucault (1966) as an *epistemic* transformation (see also § 2.4.1 and Heilbron, Magnusson & Wittrock (eds.) 1998; therein especially Wokler 1998). The French revolution and similar political turmoil in other countries brought about a conceptual novelty that can hardly be overestimated: the invention of 'the social'. In feudal and earlier times, philosophers and scientists did not recognise 'the social' as a distinct sphere of reality. There was no society; only the state and its subjects (either households or individuals). (Hence, Thatcher's famous claim that '[t]here is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families' (in *Woman's Own* 31 October 1987), is a truly medieval point of view.) What we would call "society" now was part of the property of a ruler and was studied as such. 'Pre-social social science' was mainly a normative science of the management of the state as a very large household.

Political change at the end of the 18th century gave the state's subjects a voice of their own. Moreover, the Jacobinian destruction of the state in France necessitated the formation and legitimisation of a new state. This resulted in the introduction of a new category besides the traditional state - subject (individual or household) dichotomy: society (see § 3.2.2). Before the invention of 'the social', earlier forms of the CED referred to individuals and individual behaviour rather than to social phenomena. Core concepts in these earlier forms were

"reason" and "passion". The concept of "culture" itself was not yet part of the dialectic: it referred to a process of individual development and education (see § 3.3.1).

The subsections below deal with the birth and development of the CED in these revolutionary times. Subsection 3.2.1 focuses on the reason - passion dialectic and a small number of related concepts ("will" and "habit" especially). Subsection 3.2.2 deals with the rise of the social sciences and the transition of the earlier forms of the CED into a dialectic of theories of social reality.

3 / 2 / 1 / reason, habit and passion

Human behaviour is often considered to be the result of some kind of dialectic of reason and passion. It is difficult to say exactly when this notion was first proposed, but it was already implicitly present in myths and legends thousands of years old (for example in the myth of the Mother god; see § 2.5.1). The first explicit statements on this dialectic can probably be found in Greek Antiquity. For most of the Greek philosophers (but not all!), reason was the highest faculty of man. Plato (*Phaedrus*) likened reason to a charioteer dominating his unruly horses (the passions). The Stoics condemned all passion(s) in favour of reason.

In Medieval philosophy, man was considered to be a rational being. According to Augustine, the human soul is a rational substance made to rule the body. Thomas Aquinas asserted that God has endowed man with reason, which implies that reason has a function and that man is obliged to God to perfect this function. Contrary to Stoic philosophy, the passions were not (completely) rejected. Augustine distinguished two passions, two mutually exclusive drives of human behaviour: self-love and love of God. The latter – of course – being good and producing desirable effects such as virtue or pity.

Generally, reason was awarded the dominant role in the dialectic. Reason should (and could) control the passions. Spinoza, Kant and Hegel claimed that "freedom" means 'acting according to reason' and that acting according to the passions is unfree. In a letter to an anonymous critic, Spinoza (1674) explained his position:

This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and which consists solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined. Thus an infant believes that it desires milk freely; an angry child thinks he wishes freely for vengeance, a timid child thinks he wishes freely to run away. Again a drunken man thinks, that from the free decision of his mind he speaks words, which afterwards, when sober, he would like to have left unsaid. So the delirious, the garrulous and others of the same sort think that they act from the free decision of their mind, not that they are carried away by impulse. As this misconception is innate in all men, it is not easily conquered. (pp. 390-1)

Although 'man is necessarily always a prey to his passions' (Spinoza 1677, p. 194), free and virtuous men are 'led solely by reason' (p. 232); freedom comes from understanding your passions. Hence, while reason should guide our behaviour, it often does not. Hume (1740) took a further step by claiming that the passions not only control reason but that they *should* control it: 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them' (§ 2.3.3 / p. 462).

Passion (or the passions) was (were) not the sole enemy of reason, neither was it the only concept on the 'cultural side' of these early forms of the CED. Reason was also opposed to habit, tradition and authority. For example, by Descartes (1637), who pointed out that habit and example are generally more convincing than knowledge or reason. As a result thereof, there is nothing so outrageous or absurd that some people do not accept it as a standard; and nothing so implausible that some philosopher did not believe in it and assert it. Descartes wanted to free himself from these imprints of habits, traditions and examples by the means of reasonable (radical) doubt. (e.g. Gellner 1992)

The Enlightenment is sometimes dubbed 'the Age of Reason'. Indeed, "reason" was one of its core concepts. The philosophers of the Enlightenment strongly believed in the powers of human reason. They were, however, less clear about the nature of reason. Particularly after Kant – who used the concept of "*Vernunft*" (reason) with a variety of meanings – did the concept become increasingly unclear. However, within the context of the CED, two main lines of thought regarding the meaning of the concept of "reason" can be distinguished. The first relates reason to self-interest, the second to logic.

The notion of self-interest or interest is historically related to Augustine's passion of self-love. Augustine's term "self-love" was replaced by "self-interest" because the first was a religious term. The term "self-interest" appeared for the first time in the work of Guicciardini (1512/30), who noted that human behaviour is driven more by self-interest than by reason or morals. The notion was further elaborated in the 16th and 17th centuries in political theory, natural law and moral philosophy. In natural law theory, two competing theories existed. According to Grotius, men are inclined to social life, while Hobbes and Pufendorf (separately) claimed that men are driven by *amour-propre* (self-interest). In the 16th and 17th centuries, moral philosophers and political theorists asserted that men are driven by passions and interest (see also § 3.2.2 on moral philosophy). Before the end of the 16th century, "interest" became one of the central concepts in political theory (Heilbron 1998). The rise of the concept of "self-interest" in moral and political philosophy, the predecessor of social science (see § 3.2.2) is explained by Heilbron (1998):

The notion of "interest" (...) gained intellectual prominence (...) by suggesting a more realistic conceptualization of human nature and human action; and (...) by providing a conceptual basis for new forms of political, social and economic theory. (p. 77)

In the 17th and 18th centuries, self-interest increasingly became part of reason. Spinoza's free man acts (reasonably) in his self-interest. Similar ideas can be found in, for example,

Hume (1740), Voltaire and the developing economic literature of the (late) 18th century, eventually resulting in the invention of *homo economicus*, whose behaviour is fully determined by reasonable self-interest:

Ceux qui ont dit que l'amour de nous-mêmes est la base de tous nos sentiments et de toutes nos actions, ont donc eu grande raison dans l'Inde, en Espagne, et dans toute la terre habitable (...) (Voltaire 1764, p. 62)

Like, Spinoza, Voltaire regarded rational self-interest as virtuous: 'C'est l'amour-propre bien dirigé qui fait les hommes de bon sens véritablement vertueux' (1770 p. 440).

Interestingly, self-interest developed from a passion into an aspect of reason. It is, however, nothing more than *an* aspect of reason and moreover, an aspect that can be missed. Self-interest alone does not define reason, and reason can be interpreted and/or defined without reference to self-interest. There are, however, few explicit definitions of "reason". Implicitly, "reason" is generally related to logic. According to Hume, reason is mathematical and logical reasoning, and to Kant, reason refers to understanding (Rotenstreich 1985). One of the most thorough analyses of the concept of "reason" in this tradition is Miró Quesada's (1963) *Apuntes para una teoría de la razón*. Miró Quesada defines reason as 'la facultad del conocimiento lógico-matemático' (p. 208). Interestingly, Miró Quesada shows that this definition, to some extent, undermines the Enlightenment belief in the absolute authority of reason. Miró Quesada explains that 'el conocimiento racional se manifiesta así como un dinamismo coordinado entre la intuición y la formalización' (p. 315). This process (*dinamismo coordinado*) moves asymptotically in the direction of (reason as) logico-mathematical formalisation (or formalisability). The process is necessarily asymptotical, because Gödel's (1931) theorem implies that reason as a formal logico-mathematical 'system' cannot be complete. Hence, reason is limited; there will always remain an intuitive element. (Some two centuries earlier Rousseau (1762) also reached the conclusion that reason is limited. In his opinion, however, the gap was to be filled with sincerity (e.g. Melzer 1996).)

A final key concept in the pre-social history of the CED is that of "will", which is generally understood as referring to the product of the sum-total of drives and motives that determine human behaviour. In a sense, will is an intermediate between drives and behaviour and the different theories about the relationship between reason and the passions are theories about the formation of will. Will is produced by habits, passions and reason. Will is irrational or at least partially irrational, but reason without will is pointless. Reason alone cannot determine a goal for action; will can and does. Hence, every rational choice is ultimately grounded in (irrational) will. (Kant 1788; 1790; Rotenstreich 1985)

Kant's (1790) interpretation of "will" as the faculty of desire and as the ultimate source of action strongly influenced Fichte and Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's (1818/44) will however, is completely devoid of reason. "Will" is a mindless, aimless and non-rational

urge that is both the foundation of all our drives and of the world itself. Schopenhauer's most important student Nietzsche (1872/86) explained ancient Greek culture in terms of a dialectic of (Schopenhauerian) will and reason as creative forces. Originally, Greek culture was Dionysic since it was based on will. However, the Apollonic reason slowly took over. According to Nietzsche, a healthy culture is characterised by a balance between the two forces.

Traditionally, reason is opposed to a number of irrational co-determinants of human behaviour: the passions, habit, tradition, authority, example, and will. While the exact nature of the conception of this dialectical relationship and the dominant factor therein has changed over time, the dialectic itself seems to be rather universal. With the invention of 'the social' in the last quarter of the 18th century, the dialectic was applied to a new subject: rationality and irrationality of and in society.

3 / 2 / 2 / social science, Enlightenment and "civilisation"

While the concept of 'the social' was invented at the end of the 18th century, the term "society" has an older conceptual history and society; likewise, though society became an object of study only in the 19th century (e.g. Wagner 2001), social science has some predecessors as well. Seventeenth century science was divided into natural philosophy, moral philosophy or morals, and politics. Natural philosophy encompassed what we now would call physics, chemistry, biology, and so forth; moral philosophy or morals could be compared to the whole of economics, politics, anthropology and sociology; and politics dealt with laws and all things official. Moral philosophy and politics together covered the whole of social reality. In the 1760s the term "moral and political science" was used to cover the whole of these fields. The term "social science" was coined only in the 1790s in circles around Condorcet (Head 1982).

Moral philosophy and *moral and political science* were, however, not social sciences as we now conceive these. These fields were normative sciences of behaviour and management. French *Moralistes* asked the question how one *should* behave. Most importantly, moral and political philosophers studied the management of households in general and of the state as the supreme household in particular. Moreover, moral philosophy could not be a social science in the modern sense, as the (modern) concept of 'the social' itself was still missing. The onomasiological history of "society" starts at the end of the 18th century. The semasiological history, however, starts at a much earlier date, as the term "society" was widely used before. Before the 18th century the term "society" was applied only to small institutional units between the state and the household. Societies were social circles or (legally instituted) associations. In the middle of the 18th century the term was used in combinations such as "political society" and "civil society" to refer to the state as an aggregate of people with a common goal. "Society" in this sense was more or less the

equivalent of the state from the viewpoint of contract-theory. Only at the end of the 18th century was "civil society" increasingly regarded to be something distinct from the state (and the individual or household) (e.g. Wagner 2001). In the same period, technological and socio-economic change enabled societies in the traditional sense, as social circles, to grow considerably. The term society, therefore, was used to denote ever-larger groups of people. This, combined with the concept of "civil society", was almost enough for the conception of 'the social'; it just needed a catalyst. The political changes at the end of the 18th century were this catalyst. (e.g. Wokler 1998; Wagner 2001; see also § 3.2 above)

Political change at the end of the 18th century not only necessitated the introduction of 'the social' as a new category, but also the study thereof: social science. New political conditions demanded a science that delivered more than suggestions for good management of the state as household. There was a fundamental need to understand society and the effects of policies and politics (Wagner 1998). As a result, there was a transition from moral and political science to empirical social science.

The development of social science and the invention of 'the social' were closely linked to the 18th century Enlightenment. Most of the important philosophers and scientists of the Enlightenment were concentrated in France and Scotland. The Enlightenment was built on the foundations of Natural Law and experimental or natural philosophy (early natural sciences; see above). Its core concepts were "reason" and "civilisation". From Natural Law (e.g. Pufendorf, Hobbes, Mandeville) the Enlightenment inherited the supposition that human nature is the same, whatever the circumstances, and that therefore, there is a 'natural order'. The French Physiocrats (early economists) argued that this (natural) order, the structure of social reality, should and could be explained by application of the methods of the natural sciences (experimental philosophy). This methodological position, however, gave birth to two distinct, but not completely independent, approaches in social science: a strongly rationalist approach, focusing on deductive theorising based on generalisation, logic and mathematics; and a more empirical approach. The first of these flourished in economics, the second was the origin of sociology, but also – to a certain extent – of the Counter-Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment was characterised by an unshakeable belief in progress and the power of reason. These were combined in the concept of "civilisation", which can be regarded as the battle cry of the Enlightenment. In the beginning of the 18th century the concept of "civilisation" appeared simultaneously in both French and English. The term was coined independently by Adam Ferguson, a predecessor of sociology from the Scottish Enlightenment, and the Marquis de Mirabeau, a French Physiocrat (early economist). However, the casual use of the term by Ferguson and Mirabeau suggests that the concept had been introduced in spoken language earlier. (Febvre 1930; Benveniste 1953; den Boer 2001b) "Civilisation" came from the Medieval Latin *civilitas*, meaning (a.o.) political community, humanity, citizenry, city life, or something similar.. The concept of "civilisation", however, developed a far broader meaning. At the end of the 18th century, it

was used to refer to (1) the Enlightenment views of man and society; (2) to (a desirable stage in) the development of societies; and (3) as a comprehensive term for the Christian or Western world.

"Civilisation" in the first sense refers to the Enlightenment view of society as a social structure that is not based on virtue but on 'organised exchange among self-interested individuals' (Heilbron 1998, 95). It is rational self-interest (see § 3.2.1) on a social scale. In this sense, "civilisation" is the social equivalent of reason. In its second sense, civilisation is either a process or a stage therein. Civilisation as a process or project is the *Bildung* (education) of humanity or society as a whole (Reill 1998). It is in this meaning of "civilisation" that the influence of the belief in progress is most clear. In its last sense, "civilisation" does not refer to a stage in this process, but to the part of the world that is on its highest stage: the West. It is the first meaning, that of civilisation as the social equivalent of reason that is most interesting here. Civilisation in this sense would later be opposed to the social equivalent of tradition, example, the passions, will, and so forth (see § 3.2.1): "culture".

As mentioned before, the Enlightenment inherited from Natural Law a 'universalist' view of man and society. In this view, man is a rational being and all men world-wide are alike. In other words: human nature is universal. Likewise, society is a kind of universal natural order (or at least, it should be). These are the views covered by the Enlightenment concept of "civilisation". These are also the views that became the foundations of classical (and neo-classical) economics. The science of economics was born, with the concept of "civilisation", in the 18th century Enlightenment (e.g. Skinner 1990). Scientific specialisation, however, was rather unusual until far into the 18th century. Scholars tended to occupy themselves with numerous aspects of nature and society at the same time. Early social scientific thought was strongly normative, more art than science. Only late in the 18th century did the normative nature of early social science slowly change into a more explanatory approach. At the same time, specialisation started and the first social sciences arose.

The foundations of classical economics were laid by the Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith in his *Wealth of nations* (1776), a synthesis of earlier work by mainly the Physiocrats (Winch 1978; Wittrock, Heilbron & Magnusson 1998). As it was with the Enlightenment in general, Smith's methodology was influenced by both Natural Law and natural philosophy. He used both empirical analyses of historical data and rationalistic arguments based on universal and rational man. After Smith, economics was pushed into a strictly rationalistic direction by his major students Ricardo and Senior. Economics became a science of logical and mathematical constructions on an empirically shaky foundation of universal and rational man: *homo economicus*. Mill (1844) tried to return economics to a broader Smithian methodology, but he had very little success. (e.g. Landreth & Colander 1994) Extreme rationalism still dominates economics.

While economics grew from the rationalist strand in the Enlightenment and slowly became an extreme case of rationalism and universalism, sociology, on the other hand, started off as an empirical investigation of society. The most important predecessor of sociology is Montesquieu, who combined normative and descriptive elements in his famous *De l'esprit des lois* (1748). Although some other scholars attempted to empirically investigate aspects of social behaviour in the 18th century (e.g. Mandeville 1714; Ferguson 1767; see Barnes 1917 for an overview of pre-19th century 'sociology'), sociology became an independent science only in the 19th century in the work of (a.o.) Saint-Simon, Comte and later Marx and Durkheim. As a predecessor of sociology, however, Montesquieu is of great importance, not just for sociology, but for Enlightenment itself, and especially for the reaction thereupon: the Counter-Enlightenment.

Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois* was an empirical study of the interrelationships between social and natural phenomena, morals, habits, social institutions and (most importantly) the laws within different societies. Montesquieu distinguished a number of different *types* of societies. This type or nature of a society is the result of (a.o.) physical geography, psychological nature of the people, cultural patterns, history, religion and economic mode of being. All these factors are part of a nation's culture or character. The equilibrium of the parts in this cultural whole determines the legal and political shape of the society. Hence, the character (*l'esprit*) of a nation determines – to a large extent – the nature of its laws (*des lois*). Montesquieu's empirical work dismissed the universalistic view of man and society, which dominated Enlightenment thought. Strongly influenced by Montesquieu, James Steuart started his *An inquiry into the principles of political economy* (1767) with: 'Man we find acting uniformly in all ages, in all countries, and in all climates, from the principles of self-interest, expediency, duty, or passion. In this he is alike, in nothing else' (quoted in Whitaker 1940, p. 731). At a first glance, this may seem to be a middle position between universalism and anti-universalism or even a defence of universalism, but Steuart claimed that the (combinations of) motives of men are so varied that there can be no such thing as a universal man.

Far less influential (at first), but no less important, was the work of the philosopher of history Giambattista Vico. His major work, *Scienza nuova* (1725/44), was written in Italian, which seriously hampered the initial spread of his ideas. (Later, he greatly influenced early comparative social science and linguistics, cultural psychology and sociology; e.g. Olson 1993.) Vico (1725/44) concluded from an abundance of (empirical) historical data, that history is subject to a number of laws:

The order of ideas must follow the order of institutions. This was the order of human institutions: first the forests, after that the huts, then the villages, next the cities, and finally the academies. (§§ 238-239)

For the nations will be seen to develop in conformity with this division, by a constant and uninterrupted order of causes and effects present in every nation (...) (§ 915)

Societies develop according to a fixed scheme in which each stage involves different problems. Hence, in each stage societies, develop the institutions, values and habits to deal with the problems that are characteristic for that stage. According to Vico, there is no such thing as universal human nature: 'the nature of man is not, as has long been supposed, static and unalterable or even unaltered (...) it does not so much as contain even a central kernel or essence, which remains identical through change (...)' (Berlin 1976, p. xvi). (In fact, Vico thought that men are similar across cultures in only a very small number of respects. He suggested, for example, that all men bury their dead (§ 333). Of course the fact of the matter is that even in this respect there is no universal man.)

The Enlightenment ideal of progress, which was especially strong in France and Germany, was reflected in the philosophy of history of (a.o.) Vico, Condorcet, Turgot, Hegel and Herder. The empirical confirmation of this ideal – as theory – by Vico and Montesquieu, however, implied a rejection of the (strongly related) universalism of the Enlightenment. In other words: early (empirical) social science dismissed the idea of universal man. The social and human diversity observed by (a.o.) Vico and Montesquieu was later named "culture" (see § 3.3.1). The Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism would make "culture" their core concept. As a reaction to the Enlightenment, the passions were prioritised over reason. Similarly the Enlightenment worldview of universal and rational civilisation was replaced by irrational, traditional and diverse culture. Lovejoy (1941) summarises Romanticism as three ideas: (1) an organic relationship between individuals and the wholes they are part of; (2) the primacy of process (and struggle) over (final) states; and (3) a positive valuation of diversity in opinion, taste, life style, and the like.

The Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism produced new heroes and new ideologies. The new heroes were passionate warriors rather than rational scientists (see for example the works of Nietzsche) and the new ideologies (nationalism, fascism and conservatism) favoured tradition, passion and authority rather than reason. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the Romantic rebellion against the Enlightenment would result in the Second World War, fundamentalist terrorism (both Christian and Muslim) and post-modernism in science.

Chesterton's (1901) claim, that 'civilization itself is (...) the most romantic of rebellions' (p. 122), quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is a nice – but also a bit overblown (!) – illustration of the tension between Enlightenment and its reaction. Enlightenment and the belief in civilisation were a rebellion indeed, a rebellion against Christian dogmatism, traditions and irrationality. Confusingly, Chesterton describes this rebellion as romantic ("utopian" might have been a better term). Note, however, that there is no capital R. The Enlightenment rebellion may have been a romantic rebellion in the sense that its belief in universalism and rationality were hardly realistic; it certainly was not a Romantic rebellion (with capital R). Romanticism itself was the rebellion against the rebellion, a dismissal of reason and civilisation, a return to 'a chaotic world' and 'the children of chaos' (Chesterton 1901, p. 123).

3 / 2 / 3 / summary

Reason was traditionally opposed to the passions. Together they determined behaviour. With the introduction of 'the social' and the concept of "society" and the rise of the social sciences in the late 18th century, the concept of "reason" was lifted to this new level and gave birth to "civilisation". Civilisation was the social equivalent of the Enlightenment ideal of reason. Reason was the Enlightenment's sword; civilisation was its battle cry. Culture, on the other hand, was (and is) the social equivalent of reason's enemies: habit, authority, passion, etc.:

Reason appears as a method, and in effect as the *only* method, of procuring truth. At the same time, Reason is a means of escaping those dread enemies of truth, *custom and example*. It brings liberation from mere non-rigorous and hence error-prone, error-perpetuating accretion and accumulation of ideas, from an unfastidious involvement *in*, and corruption *by*, the world; in brief, from indulgence in mere culture, a set of ideas that is contingent and bound to specific communities and periods. Reason is *purification*. By contrast, culture is corruption-on-earth. (Gellner 1992, p. 55)

While Enlightenment and its counterpart, Romanticism, may seem diametrically opposed, there are, nevertheless, interesting similarities. Both are strongly utopian, as illustrated by Chesterton above, and in both "nature" is a key concept. The perceptions of nature, however, are radically different. While the Enlightenment focuses on nature as regulated by laws that can be discovered by man, the Romantic perception of nature is aesthetic rather than scientific. The Enlightened nature is structured and *reasonable*, while Romantic nature is lush, chaotic and completely *unreasonable*.

The next section (§ 3.3) focuses on the conceptual history of "culture". Section 3.4 deals with the culture - civilisation dialectic as a stage in the historical development in the CED.

3 / 3 / conceptual history of "culture"

The concept of "culture" was introduced at the end of the 18th century in the Counter-Enlightenment to describe the diversity of beliefs, rules and practices among peoples as found and described by some of the predecessors of social science (see § 3.2.2). "Culture" became the opposite of "civilisation" as 'social reason', "culture" came to denote social unreason, it was the social equivalent of tradition, example, passions, will, and so forth (see § 3.2.1). The history of the concept of "culture", however, started well before the Counter-Enlightenment.

Conceptual historians have been researching the conceptual history of "culture" for a long time. Important contributions include Niederman (1941), Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952); Williams (1959); Perpeet (1976); Fisch (1991) and den Boer (2001b) (see also O'Hear 1998; Schweder 2001). The onomasiological history of "culture", however, remains largely ignored. Generally, the only concept related to "culture" that is dealt with by conceptual historians is "civilisation". Nevertheless, there are some strongly related concepts that must be investigated to derive at a full(er) picture of the conceptual history of "culture". Hence, this section deals both with the semasiological history of "culture" (§ 3.3.1) and its onomasiological history (§ 3.3.2) (see also § 2.4.1).

3 / 3 / 1 / the semasiology of "culture"

Contrary to "civilisation", "culture" is not a new word. Its earliest (known) form is the Latin *cultura*, meaning tilling. In English, this meaning of "culture" subsists in "agriculture" and "cultivation". Besides the literal agricultural meaning of the word, it was also used metaphorically in *cultura animi* (e.g. in Cicero's *Tusculan disputations*) as an individual process of intellectual development. This metaphorical use of *cultura* resurfaces in the 17th century in the work of (a.o.) Hobbes and Bacon. Interestingly, "culture" is not the only agricultural analogy related to learning and intellectual development. The verb to "learn" itself comes from old-Germanic *leis* and/or Latin *lira*, both meaning furrow. One of the nicest examples of these agricultural analogies can be found in Bacon's *The advancement of learning* (1605), wherein he uses the phrase 'the Georgics of mind', referring to Vergilius *Georgica*, an ancient handbook on (types of) agriculture (den Boer 2001b).

Throughout the 17th and 18th century, the concept of "culture" was used mainly as an abbreviation of *cultura animi*, as an alternative to German *Bildung* (in the 19th and 20th century it was sometimes still used in this sense). "Culture" in this sense was an individual process of intellectual development, but could also refer to accomplishments in this process. A "cultured man" was a well-educated, erudite man.

According to Guadarrama González (1999), 'a partir de Kant el concepto de cultura (...) se manejaría fundamentalmente como liberación de la necesidad natural' (p. 61). Indeed culture as *Bildung* can be interpreted as such, but this concept is essentially similar to *cultura animi* which predates Kant by nearly two millennia. Moreover, even the traditional agricultural meaning of the concept could be interpreted as a *liberación de la necesidad natural*. While Guadarrama was wrong pointing at Kant as a dividing line, he is right in his assessment that culture has been interpreted as liberation from natural necessity. This includes the late 18th century introduction of "culture" as a social category. As such, the concept was originally an analogy to *Bildung* or *cultura animi*. It was the application of these labels for individual development, for the individual liberation from natural necessity to the – recently discovered – social world (see § 3.2.2).

The introduction of culture as a social category in the end of the 18th century may, however, have been a reintroduction. The very first use of *cultura* as a social category is traced by Hirsch (1925) to Pufendorf (1672). In later German sources (e.g. Niederman 1941; Fisch 1991) this is reproduced uncritically. However, Pufendorf used the concept only in a very limited number of occasions and without any emphasis. Moreover, as Pufendorf's work predates the invention of 'the social' (see § 3.2.2), he can only be credited for the introduction of culture as a social category if he is credited for the introduction of the idea of a separate social world as well. Pufendorf's concept of *cultura* is more political institutional than social, however. He used it to refer to more modern rather than primitive or 'natural' states (or political institutions in general). Furthermore, as it was not the Latin version of his work, but the French translation, in which Pufendorf's dichotomy *cultura - statu naturalis* was translated as *société civile - état naturel*, which was widely read (in the far less influential German translation, *cultura* was translated as *Bürgerlicher stand*), Pufendorf had no influence whatsoever on the genesis of "culture" as a social category (Den Boer 2001b).

The first *influential* use of "culture" as a social category can be found in the work of the German philosopher of history Herder (1784-91), who was strongly influenced by Montesquieu (e.g. Spitz 1955). "Culture" was a key concept in Herder's thought. According to Herder, different peoples have different cultures, which only blossom in the area where that people (that culture), 'belongs'. Cultures develop in stages as 'eine Kette der Kultur' (p. 408), but not as a calm stream, 'sondern vielmehr [wie] den Sturz eines Waldwassers von den Gebirgen' (p. 410). This development can neither be stopped, nor return to its origins: 'Wir schwimmen weiter; nie aber kehrt der Strom zu seiner Quelle zurück, als ob er nie entronnen wäre' (p. 413). It is an inevitable and irreversible process of development to a common higher *Humanität*. Interestingly, in this utopian perspective, the Enlightenment belief in progress returns. Nevertheless, Herder was one of the founding fathers of the Counter-Enlightenment and of nationalism.

The concept of "culture" in the Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism referred to a worldview based on difference, tradition and irrationality rather than universalism and reason. The resulting dialectic of culture and civilisation as worldviews and spheres of social reality is the subject of section 3.4. The terms of "culture" and "civilization" were, however, not universally regarded as referring to completely distinct 'things'. In 1871, Tylor, for example, published the most widely quoted definition of "culture" (see also § 3.4.2):

Culture or Civilisation, taken in its ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. (p.1)

Most later definitions, operationalisations and interpretations seem to be special cases or elaborations of Tylor's definition (see § 4.2); at least, they do not deviate fundamentally

from the Tylerian definition (e.g. Peterson 1979; Brumann 1999). Even fashionable variants of the concept such as "mass culture" and "organisational culture" all seem to be special applications of "culture" in a more or less Tylorian sense.

Besides the use of the concept to refer to an individual's intellectual development (*cultura animi*) or to 'that complex whole' (Tylor), it has also been used to refer to the (fine) arts. "Culture" in this sense is the whole of the artistic repertory of a society. Although this branch of the conceptual tree sprung of the same stem, that of *cultura animi*, it is completely unrelated to the interpretation of "culture" as a social category. Confusingly, however, the field of cultural economics deals with the economics of culture and the 'cultural industry' in this sense, not with the relationships between culture as a social factor and the economy. Similarly, several scholars wrote on economic threats to culture as 'the arts'. These writings and cultural economics, however, are not part of the CED, neither is the concept of "culture" as the (fine) arts relevant to the conceptual history (and analysis in general) of the CED.

Some adherents to traditional interpretations of "culture" as a process of individual intellectual development or as the most profound achievements (in their opinion) of a society (including the arts) are appalled by the modern anthropological notion of "culture". Fairly recently, for example, Lasky (2002), in a hilariously elitist defence of the traditional view on "culture", attacked Tylor's notion of "primitive culture":

Culture by very definition *could not* be primitive; it was among the highest achievements of mankind. It was not merely descriptive but prescriptive; it was evaluative, judgmental. It called attention to standards of tested excellence in art, music and literature, and even to humanist aspirations in social behavior. (p. 74)

Recently, Busche (2000) distinguished four basic meanings (*Grundbedeutungen*) of "culture": (1) 'das *formgebend veredelnde Bearbeiten und Pflegen natürlicher Anlagen*' (p. 70) as in the classical interpretation; (2) culture as the *product* of (good) education and personal development (*Kultur, die man hat*; p. 76); (3) culture as the characteristic traditions, institutions, ways of life and thought in which peoples and periods are different from each other (*Kultur, in der man lebt*; p. 77); and (4) culture as the products of arts, philosophy and science, that can be created and worshiped. Some five decades earlier, Eliot (1948) attempted to reconcile the different interpretations of "culture". He regarded development to be the key aspect of "culture" and distinguished three senses of the concept depending on whether it refers to 'the development of an *individual*, of a *group* or *class*, or of a *whole society*' (p. 21). "Culture" in the traditional sense refers to the first of these, while Herder's concept of "culture" refers to the latter. The different senses of culture are, though irreducible, not completely independent: 'the culture of the individual cannot be isolated from that of the group, and (...) the culture of the group cannot be abstracted from that of the whole of society' (Eliot 1948, p. 24) (see also Sapir 1924).

Until the 1880s in Germany and the 1910s in English-speaking countries (*e.g.* Stocking 1968; Kalmar 1987), "culture" was never used in the plural. Culture was considered to be a more or less singular process of development or as a stage therein. Gradually the evolutionary or developmental aspect of the concept eroded, leaving a bewildering variety of "cultures", all of equal value to the modern anthropologists (see § 3.4.2).

3 / 3 / 2 / the onomasiology of "culture"

While semasiology points out unrelated and often non-relevant concepts with the same label, such as "culture" as the (fine) arts, onomasiology researches concepts with a more or less similar meaning but a different label. There are (at least) four such concepts in the history of "culture". These are the Medieval Latin concepts of *gens* and *natio* and the 19th century derivative thereof: "race"; and the 19th century German concept of *Volksgeist*.

The concepts of *gens* and *natio* were used widely since the early Middle Ages. Both were translated as (a.o.) race, nation, people, tribe, family – sometimes even in the space of a single work. The concepts of *gens* and *natio* were associated with (or even defined as) descent, customs, language and law. While descent was essential in Medieval thought on *gens* and *natio*, there was an important and consistent emphasis on the socio-cultural aspects of the concepts and on the influence of environment thereon (see § 3.6.1). (Bartlett 2001). With the replacement of Latin with the native language of scientific writers, the terms *gens* and *natio* had to be translated. As there were no obvious candidates in most languages, this was a slow and messy process. Several alternatives were used, including "people", "nation" and "race" (*e.g.* Sommer 1984). In the 16th century this led to phrases such as the "Christian race" and the "race of good men" (Sommer 1984, p. 141). After the introduction of "culture", these terms were still used, mainly because they all developed different connotations (including the concept of "culture" itself, which was closely linked to the Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism and to (German) nationalism).

Notwithstanding these different connotations, the concept of "race" was in the 19th century widely used to mean a range of things similar to that what the concept of "*gens*" was used to denote before. The concept referred to (a.o.) people, mankind, class, or any other kind of social group (*e.g.* Schank 2000). In 1839, for example, the newly founded French *Société Ethnologique* distinguished the following elements of the study of race(s): 'l'organisation physique, le caractère intellectuel et moral, les langues et les traditions historiques' (quoted: Conze 1984, p. 157). The concept of "race" was (still) only rarely used in the modern biological (genetic) sense. The concept's closest modern relative is "culture". Indeed, the 19th century concept of race could be best described as 'culture plus descent', in which descent, moreover, seems to be optional.

Ignoring the fact that the meaning of concepts like "race" change results in strange (but often understandable) misconceptions. Moore (1974), for example, concluded that Marx was a racist on the basis of a small number of wrongly interpreted quotes and fragments

including Marx's claim (in volume three of *Das Kapital*) that race co-determines the structure of society (see § 3.4.1). A quick comparison with the terms used in more or less the same claim in other writings of Marx and Engels shows that the concept of "race" was used by Marx in the traditional 19th century sense, as an equivalent of culture. (Possibly Marx used "race" because he wanted to avoid the Romanticist and (German) nationalist connotations of "culture". Of course, he could not foresee the direction in which the concept of "race" would further develop and the misunderstandings that could rise therefrom.) (See also § 3.4.1 and Paul 1981.)

Slowly, the concept of "race" became a biological category. In the work of Nietzsche at the end of the 19th century it still had its traditional meaning (Schank 2000). Thirty years later, Hitler (1925) wrote: 'Die Rasse aber liegt nicht in der Sprache, sondern ausschließlich im Blute' (p. 342). This complete victory of the biological interpretation of "race" and its political counterpart in racism made the concept rather unpopular in social science. At the end of the twentieth century the concept was not just unpopular, but also proven (nearly) irrelevant to social science, as it seems to be the case, that the biological concept of "race" is inapplicable to human beings (*e.g.* Latter 1980; Zuckerman 1990):

Many studies have demonstrated that roughly 90 percent of human genetic variation occurs within a population living on a given continent, whereas 10 percent of the variation distinguishes continental populations. In other words, individuals from different populations are, on average, just slightly more different from another than are individuals from the same population. (Bamshad & Olson 2003, p. 52)

Much earlier, Goldenweiser (1924) argued that most of the peculiarities that are considered to be the effect of race 'are likely to be resolved into purely historical or cultural determinants' (p. 129). Nevertheless, "race" was abolished in social science in favour of the more politically correct "culture" only fairly recently (*e.g.* Teillet Roldán 1997) and seemed to experience a revival in American anthropology in the 1990s (Wade 2002). (This should not come as a surprise as the United States are, and always were, obsessed with race and racial differences. However, in the United States, "race" and "culture" are continuously confused. In many surveys, for example, answering categories on the question of the race of the respondent include "Latino" or "Hispanic", which are clearly cultural, ethnic or linguistic rather than (biological) racial, besides more obvious categories such as "white", "black", "Asian", etc. (*e.g.* Betancourt & Regeser López 1993).)

Despite the fact that the biological interpretation of the term "race" became dominant in the 20th century, the older and broader meaning of group in general is far from extinct. After making insulting public statements on Islam and/or the Arabic world, French writer Houellebecq (in 2001) and English TV-presenter Kilroy-Silk (in 2004) were accused (a.o. by Muslim groups) of being racist, which seems to imply that a religion is a race. For historical reasons, the most amusing use of the term "race" comes from a 2003 letter to Dutch newspaper *de Volkskrant* in which a concerned mother writes that, unfortunately, the

nazis are not an 'extinct race' (Verhoeven 2003). (On the history of the concept of "race" see also Malik 1996; on the relationship between culture and biology in the history of science see also Delisle 2000.)

The concept of *Volksgeist* was introduced by Lazarus and Steinthal in the 1860s and was based on (or, at least, inspired by) the philosophy of Herder (e.g. Spitz 1955). Lazarus and Steinthal founded *Völkerpsychologie*, a predecessor of cross-cultural psychology (see § 3.5.2 / 5.2.1). *Volksgeist* was a very modern concept in the sense that it did not refer to a teleological process of development of nations or persons (see § 3.3.1) but to the law-governed behaviour and development of inner activity (Lazarus & Steinthal 1860). *Volksgeist* included language, thoughts, convictions, mythology, religion, cult, oral literature, writing, built structures, industrial products, and art forms (Lazarus & Steinthal 1860; Lazarus 1865). 'With only minor adjustments it would be quite easy to turn this [the concept of *Volksgeist*] into a thoroughly modern view of culture as an interpretive, symbolic system' (Kalmar 1987, p. 679).

3 / 3 / 3 / summary

The concept of "culture" developed from tilling through the metaphorical *cultura animi*, meaning individual intellectual development, into its modern usage referring to a condition or state of a society. "Culture" as a social category is relatively new, but some similar concepts have been used before. These include *gens*, *natio* and *Volksgeist*. The first two were used in medieval Latin and can be translated as 'culture plus descent'. In the 19th century they were often translated as "race", which at that time was also used as 'culture plus descent'. The 19th century German concept of "*Volksgeist*" was nearly synonymous with the modern concept of "culture".

3 / 4 / culture, civilisation and economy

The relationship between the concepts of "culture" and "civilisation" in the 19th and early 20th century was not just one of dialectical opposition. As mentioned in subsection 3.3.1, in some interpretations the concepts were (almost) synonymous or overlapped at least. During the 19th century, there was a gradual shift in the meaning and connotations of the concept of "civilisation", especially. This shift made the concept increasingly worse-fitting as a label in the 19th and 20th century forms of the CED. Hence, it had to be replaced. One option for replacement was the use of neologisms such as Marx's "base" and "superstructure", but the changing meaning of the concept of "economy" provided a more

acceptable candidate. Around the turn of the century, "economy" started to replace "civilisation" in the CED. However, contrary to "civilisation", "economy" was (like "culture") not a neologism, but a term with a history of its own.

This section describes the development of culture - civilisation dialectic (§ 3.4.1); the merger of "culture" and "civilisation" and the introduction of economy in evolutionary anthropology in the second half of the 19th century (§ 3.4.2); and the semasiological history of "economy" (§ 3.4.3).

3 / 4 / 1 / culture versus civilisation

The culture - civilisation dialectic that appeared at the end of the 18th century was initially a conflict of worldviews. On one side, there was the Enlightenment view of man and society, based on universalism and reason; in the opposing camp, there was the Counter-Enlightenment of (a.o.) Vico and Herder, which was strongly anti-universalistic (and mostly anti-rational). The Enlightenment slogan of progress, rationality and universalism was summarised in the concept of "civilisation". The Counter-Enlightenment, on the other hand, used "culture" as its catchword for tradition, diversity, 'natural' development, and the like. In the 19th century, however, the dialectic would radically change in character. It was no longer a dialectic of worldviews or theories of social reality. Instead, it referred to phenomena, aspects or parts of social reality itself. The culture - civilisation dialectic, however, is far more complex than a simple dichotomy. Whether the concepts were opposed, juxtaposed, overlapping or even synonymous was dependent on their context and – most of all – on their connotations.

As described in subsection 3.2.2, the concept of "civilisation" was – more or less – the social equivalent of reason in the Enlightenment. After the heyday of the Enlightenment, the concept's meaning began to change slowly into a number of interrelated directions. It was most commonly used in a number of ways:

- (1) to describe a process of the social and intellectual development of nations;
- (2) as a label for the stage therein reached by the Western world during the Enlightenment, hence as a label for the institutions, values and practices most common in the West;
- (3) as a label for the Western world itself; and
- (4) to describe the aspects of social reality, most closely associated with reason: technology, economy, and the products thereof.

The distinction between the normative interpretation of the concept (as in 1 and 2) and its more descriptive form (as in 4) is not a very hard one. In most of the attempts to determine what constitutes a civilisation, hence, in the discussion on the application of the normative concept, aspects of civilisation as a descriptive concept play a central role:

Trousers and Bibles – these surely are unmistakable indices of civilization! They are only two, however, of a very long list that could be put together; and each index would reflect, in part at least, the culture in which it was proposed. Among these indices one would find an extraordinary variety, including language, literacy, law, soap, paper, the wheel, money, government, religion, science, agriculture, the city, commerce, print, the domestication of animals, the breeding of cattle, the use of milk, the digging stick, the use of the fork, plumbing, dental caries, and even the dry martini. Another list would contain such moral virtues as kindness, charity, compassion, order, discipline, toleration, and the emancipation of women. Stendhal identified civilization with the invention of love: 'On ne trouve qu'un amour physique et des plus grossiers chez les peuples sauvages ou trop barbares.' Still another list would accent, in reverse, the absence of such vices as war, cruelty, violence, dogmatism, fanaticism, ignorance, and superstition. The sociologist Edward Cary Hayes remarked in one of his books that 'Three meals a day are a highly advanced institution. Savages gorge themselves or fast.' A contemporary historian also prefers to date the dawn of civilization from the time when men first learned to make provision for the future, when they learned to remedy a situation that had hitherto been either feast or famine. (Bierstedt 1965, pp. 488-9)

To the list Bierstedt himself adds:

a simple and yet I think objective criterion that can serve as an index of civilization. It has to do with sophistication in a *sophisticated* sense of the word. It concerns the self-reflection and self-criticism and other-awareness in which it can be said that the members of a civilized society indulge. (...) an uncivilized society has art but no aesthetics, religion but no technology, techniques but no science, tools but no technology, legends but no literature, a language but no alphabet (or ideographs), customs but no laws, a history but no historiography, knowledge but no epistemology, and finally a *Weltanschauung* but no philosophy. (p. 490)

After its introduction in the end of the 18th century, the concept of culture was generally used in three (or four – if the third is split up) different, but related, ways:

- (a) as a label for pre-Enlightened stages in the development of nations;
- (b) as a label for non-Western institutions, values and practices; and/or
- (c) to describe the aspects of social reality most closely associated with spirit rather than reason, the aspects generally considered to be (at least partially) irrational and/or traditional:
 - (c₁) 'ways of life', habits and customs, practices and (traditional) norms and values; and/or
 - (c₂) the fine arts.

These different interpretations and connotations of the concepts suggest a number of dichotomies or dialectics of the concepts, which indeed can be found throughout the 19th century and onwards:

- (i) the Enlightened world versus the pre- (or Counter-) Enlightened world (or society based on reason vs. society based on passion and tradition) (2 vs. a);
- (ii) the West versus the rest (3 vs. b);
- (iii) the rational vs. the spiritual aspects of society (4 vs. c): economy and technology versus tradition and passion; economy versus the fine arts; etc.

Besides these – more or less – dichotomous relationships, there have been (and are) others. One of the most widespread *non-dichotomous* conceptualisations, exemplified in the first quote from Bierstedt (1965) above, makes use of (c₁) and (2). In this view culture is a way of life, while civilisation is a specific level in the development or evolution of this way of life. The difference between this non-dichotomous view and (i) is that in the former, civilised nations have culture too, while in the latter, in (i), nations have *either* culture *or* civilisation.

Although the three dialectics mentioned are strongly interrelated, not all of them are relevant to the development of the CED. The first and second are side-tracks rather than the main road. The same is true for the economy - fine arts dialectic (see also § 3.3.1). The main road connects the reason - passion dialectic of the Enlightenment with the modern CED and the modern concepts of culture and economy. This road is that of the dialectic of civilisation as (4), the rational aspects of social reality, and culture as (c₁), the spiritual, irrational, traditional, and so forth aspects thereof. This 'main road', however, was a winding road, at many place connecting to the side-tracks and often plagued by conceptual confusion. (Although most of the side-tracks slowly disappeared into the void, sometimes they suddenly reappear. In Kockel (2002b), for example, a variant of (i) (2 vs. a) can be found in the claim that 'peripheries are rich in culture (whereas centres tend towards civilisation)' (p. 234).)

Throughout most of the 19th century, these dialectics, however, were rarely the subject of empirical research or theory formation. There is an extensive literature on the negative influences of the economy on the fine arts, but that is of little interest here. There seem to be three important theoretical developments in the CED in the 19th and early 20th century, all of them German. The first was Marx's and Engels's 'historical materialism' in the middle of the 19th century. The second was late 19th and early 20th century German Romanticism. The third was the publication of Weber's (1905) *Die Protestantische Etik und der "Geist" des Kapitalismus*. The first two of these are dealt with in this subsection, Weber's and similar works are the subject of subsection 3.5.1.

The dominant usage of the concepts of "culture" and "civilisation" in Marx's times were (a) or (b) and (2) or (3) respectively. In other words, "civilisation" mostly referred to (the stage of social and intellectual development of) the West and "culture" to (the stage of development of) the rest. In the *Manifest der Kommunistische Partei* (Marx & Engels 1848,

p. 466) "civilisation" is used in this sense and Mill, for example, used the term more or less as a synonym to "industrialisation" (e.g. Williams 1959). To Marx and Engels, "civilisation" was more or less synonymous to "capitalism", which is nicely illustrated by Engels's (1884) claim that: 'die Grundlage der Zivilisation [ist] die Ausbeutung einer Klasse durch eine andere Klasse' (p. 171). Because of this dominant use and connotation of "civilisation", and the related use and connotation of the concept of "culture", these terms were hardly applicable in a theory on interaction between economy and other aspects of society. Hence, in their theory of *historical materialism*, Marx and Engels introduced new terms: "base" and "superstructure".

Historical materialism was the first grand theory of the CED (Weber's was the second; see § 3.5.1). It grew from Montesquieu's *Esprit des lois* (1748; see § 3.2.2); Hegel's dialectics (1812-6; 1817/30) and philosophy of history (1807; 1837) (itself strongly influenced by Herder); and Saint-Simon's (1817) claim that the development of the means of production determines the political development (e.g. Kolakowski 1976). Montesquieu distinguished a number of (interrelated) aspects of society in what Hegel (1807) later would call a 'totality'. This totality, the nation's character (*esprit*), determines its legal and political shape. Marx elaborated on this idea in his *historical materialism* (not his term). The first statement of historical materialism can be found in the first and second chapter of the *Manifest der Kommunistische Partei*:

Bedarf es tiefer Einsicht, um zu begreifen, daß mit den Lebensverhältnissen der Menschen, mit ihren gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen, mit ihrem gesellschaftlichen Dasein, auch ihre Vorstellungen, Anschauungen und Begriffe, mit einem Worte auch ihr Bewußtsein sich ändert? Was beweist die Geschichte der Ideen anders, als daß die geistige Produktion sich mit der materiellen umgestaltet? (Marx & Engels 1848; p. 480)

According to historical materialism, societies develop through a complex pattern of successive stages into a utopian final state (which is a clear reflection of the rather utopian notion or ideal of *progress* that was central to both the Enlightenment and (parts of) the Counter-Enlightenment (such as in Herder's 'Kette der Kultur', see § 3.3.1)). This development takes place through adaptation to technological and economic changes. Hence, economic and technological change drives socio-cultural change, or in other words: civilisation (or base) determines culture (or superstructure):

In der gesellschaftlichen Produktion ihres Lebens gehen die Menschen bestimmte, notwendige, von ihrem Willen unabhängige Verhältnisse ein, Produktionsverhältnisse, die einer bestimmten Entwicklungsstufe ihrer materiellen Produktivkräfte entsprechen. Die Gesamtheit dieser Produktionsverhältnisse bildet die ökonomische Struktur der Gesellschaft, die reale Basis, worauf sich ein juristischer und politischer Überbau erhebt, und welcher bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bewußtseinsformen entsprechen. Die Produktionsweise des materiellen Lebens bedingt den sozialen, politischen und geistigen

Lebensprozeß überhaupt. Es ist nicht das Bewußtsein der Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondern umgekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewußtsein bestimmt. (Marx 1859, pp. 8-9)

Because economy is the driving force in historical materialism, it is often understood as a form of economic determinism. However, this is a gross oversimplification of Marx and Engels's thought. The core of Marx's philosophy was *dialectical materialism* (not his term either). Marx's materialism, although strongly influenced by Feuerbach's more traditional materialism, did not (primarily) refer to matter in a physical sense, but to social reality. In traditional materialism, the material was primary and the ideal (the mind) secondary, a product of the primary matter; in Marxian (historical) materialism, economy (as social matter) is primary (base), and politics, culture, etc. (superstructure) is its (secondary) product. Thus far, this seems to coincide with economic determinism. However, Marxian materialism is dialectical, which implies that there is some kind of reciprocal relationship between the material (base) and the ideal (superstructure):

Der Hauptmangel alles bisherigen Materialismus (den Feuerbachschen mit eingerechnet) ist, daß der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit nur unter der Form des Objekts oder der Anschauung gefaßt wird: nicht aber als sinnlich menschliche Tätigkeit, Praxis, nicht subjektiv. (Marx 1845/88, p. 5)

Die materialistische Lehre von der Veränderung der Umstände und der Erziehung vergißt, daß die Umstände von den Menschen verändert und der Erzieher selbst erzogen werden muß. (Marx, 1845/88, pp.5-6)

Although indeed the material (matter, base, civilisation) determines the ideal (mind, superstructure, culture), this is not one-way traffic: the ideal also influences the (experience of the) material. In its socio-historical adaptation: economy (civilisation / base) determines culture (superstructure), but culture also determines how a society deals with its economic circumstances and changes. 'Es ist nicht, daß die ökonomische Lage Ursache, allein aktiv ist und alles andere nur passive Wirkung' (Engels 1894, p.206; see also Engels 1890). A number of more concrete clues to the influence of culture (superstructure) on economy (civilisation / base) can be found in the works of Marx and Engels. For example, race as a 19th century equivalent of culture (see § 3.3.2) (Marx 1894, p. 800; Engels 1894, p. 206) and cultural differences in entrepreneurship play important roles in the economic development of a nation:

Es ist ein sonderbarer Übergang von den Staaten nach Kanada. Erst kommt's einem vor, als wär' man wieder in Europa, dann meint man, man wäre in einem positiv zurückgehenden und verkommenden Land. Es zeigt sich hier, wie notwendig zur raschen Entwicklung eines neuen Landes der fieberhafte Spekulationsgeist der Amerikaner ist (kapitalistische Produktion als Basis vorausgesetzt) (...) (Engels 1888, p. 93)

Marx has had a great influence on social science. Historical materialism, however, has been understood in very different ways. The orthodox codification by Plekhanov and Lenin led to a purely mechanical interpretation in which the relation between base and superstructure was seen as a strict mechanical causality in which the base determines the superstructure. A number of (mostly Western) Marxists pointed emphatically at the dialectical character of historical materialism. (In section 7.2 historical materialism will be further analysed.)

Contrary to historical materialism, the use of the terms "culture" and "civilisation" in late 19th century and early 20th century German Romanticism posed no problem. In the Romantic view, these concepts were part of a dialectic that combined (i) and (iii) (see above). In other words: "culture" referred to a 'natural', traditional and passionate way of life (and those who lived such lives) unspoiled by "civilisation", technology, science, economy and other products of the Enlightenment. This was hardly a new idea. Rousseau (1755), for example, claimed one-and-a-half centuries earlier that Enlightened society deformed human nature and alienated people from each other and themselves.

Romanticism was extremely influential in 19th century German thought. Its influence is obvious in Marx's social philosophy, which aims at the dissolution of alienation rather than inequality (as is usually assumed). Alienation, was the result of the transfer from culture to civilisation in the Romantic interpretation of these terms:

Die Bourgeoisie, wo sie zur Herrschaft gekommen, hat alle feudalen, patriarchalen, idyllischen Verhältnisse zerstört. Sie hat die buntscheckigen Feudalbande, die den Menschen an seinen natürlichen Vorgesetzten knüpften, unbarmherzig zerrissen und kein anderes Band zwischen Mensch und Mensch übriggelassen als das nackte Interesse, als die gefühllose 'bare Zahlung'. (Marx & Engels 1848, p. 464)

At the end of the 19th century, the dichotomy became much stronger under the influence of German nationalism. The letter C in "culture" was replaced with K in order to make the term (*Kultur*) look more German, and gradually an ideology was constructed that idolised passionate heroes (see e.g. the works of Wagner or Nietzsche), the countryside, and das Völkische (literally: 'the popular'; the concept refers to traditional folk culture). Civilisation and the things associated with it, such as cities, science and reason, on the other hand, were rejected. After the First World War, this ideology culminated in two important books: Spengler's (1918-23) *Untergang des Abendlandes* and Hitler's (1925) *Mein Kampf*. The latter is the more illustrative (and the more interesting) of the two.

Hitler (1925) used the term "civilisation" less than ten times, while he used "culture" more than a hundred times. He rejected civilisation in favour of culture as the 'true level of spirit and life':

Eine der ersichtlichsten Verfallserscheinungen des alten Reiches war das langsame Herabsinken der allgemeinen Kulturhöhe, wobei ich unter Kultur nicht das meine, was man heute mit dem Worte Zivilisation bezeichnet. Diese scheint im Gegenteil eher eine Feindin wahrer Geistes- und Lebenshöhe zu sein. (p. 282)

As typically representative of German (nationalistic) Romanticism, Hitler rejected cities, science and reason (in one word, Enlightenment) in favour of *das Völkische*:

Der völkische Staat muß dabei von der Voraussetzung ausgehen, daß ein zwar wissenschaftlich wenig gebildeter, aber körperlich gesunder Mensch mit gutem, festem Charakter, erfüllt von Entschlußfreudigkeit und Willenskraft, für die Volksgemeinschaft wertvoller ist als ein geistreicher Schwächling. (p. 452)

The first Romantic rebellion resulted in the introduction of the concept of "culture" by Herder. It also gave birth to nationalism and conservatism. The second Romantic rebellion combined these and resulted ultimately in national socialism and the Second World War. In recent decades, the social sciences experienced a third Romantic rebellion in the form of post-modernism. The similarities between the three rebellions are clearly visible: a focus on difference rather than universalism and a strong distrust of the products of the Enlightenment, most of all of reason and/or modern science and technology. (A very interesting comparison of German fascist and post-modernist views of science can be found in Holton (2000).)

Outside Germany the distinction between "culture" and "civilisation" was far less sharp. In scientific writings the concepts were often considered to be more or less synonymical, although there were very different connotations corresponding to the different meanings at the beginning of this section. Very briefly put, "civilisation" was associated more with the rational aspect of social reality (economy and technology), while "culture" was associated more with the spiritual aspect (values, passions and traditions) (e.g. Merton 1936; den Boer 2001b). The concepts of "culture" and "civilisation" were used most prominently in the rising field of anthropology.

3 / 4 / 2 / culture and civilisation in evolutionary anthropology

The Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment reached a synthesis in 19th century anthropology. The antithesis of Enlightenment *universalism* and Counter-Enlightenment *difference* was dialectically *aufgehoben* (see § 2.5.2) in the notion of evolution or development, itself related to the utopian (or eschatological) belief in progress in both Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. According to *evolutionary anthropology*, the development of *civilisation* was *universal*; *different* nations or cultures (often also labelled

"civilisations"; see § 3.3.1) are merely in *different stages* of this universal development or evolution. The early anthropologists Lubbock, Tylor, and Morgan, in forwarding this theory, were strongly influenced by similar ideas on universal development presented earlier by some philosophers, especially Vico (1725/44) and Herder (1784-91), both representatives of the Counter-Enlightenment.

The main works of evolutionary anthropology (e.g. Lubbock 1870; Tylor 1870; 1871 Morgan 1877) were all published within two decades after the publication of the other important influence on the field: Darwin's, *the origin of species* (1859). The evolutionary anthropologists, however, were no strict adherents to Darwinian evolution. They preferred the term "development" over "evolution" and were more inspired than influenced by the theory of biological evolution. Only Lubbock referred to Darwin in rare occasions. It seems that Darwin's main contribution to evolutionary anthropology was the fact that he made public opinion ripe for other evolutionary theories (Murphree 1961). The other great theorist of evolution, Spencer, on the other hand, wrote extensively on the evolution of culture and institutions (e.g. 1876), but only after the important works of evolutionary anthropology were published. In this respect Spencer was probably influenced by evolutionary anthropology more than he influenced it (see also Tylor 1877).

Evolutionary anthropology was based on the convictions that all men are biologically and psychologically the same and that all cultural groups are subject to the same evolutionary development, which cannot be reversed. To the evolutionary anthropologists, progress was inseparable from cultural evolution (Murphree 1961). This was nicely summarised by Lubbock and Tylor:

[D]ifferent races in similar stages of development often present more features of resemblance to one another than the same race does to itself, in different stages of its history. (Lubbock 1870, p. 7)

[T]he wide differences in the civilization and mental state of the various races of mankind are rather differences of development than of origin, rather of degree than of kind. (Tylor 1870, p. 372)

In evolutionary anthropology, "culture" and "civilisation" were synonymous. As the field was heavily influenced by Enlightenment universalism, the concept of "civilisation" was widely used to describe the whole of practices, values, institutions, and so on of different nations or societies. Tylor's definition of "culture" and/or "civilisation", quoted before in subsection 3.3.1, describes these synonymous concepts as 'that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society' (1871, p.1).

Of the evolutionary anthropologists, Morgan is by far the most important in the history of the CED. Morgan claimed that the 'complex whole' of culture was built on an economic

foundation. In *Ancient society* (1877), Morgan described how economic circumstances determine cultural development. The economic circumstances themselves were mainly determined by technological development; hence, in the end, technology drives cultural progress. Morgan explained the introduction and evolution of forms of government, the family and (private) property all as consequences of economic and technological changes. Morgan strongly influenced Engels, who more or less rewrote *Ancient society* in historical materialist terms as *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats* (1884).

In the late 19th century, the evolutionary anthropologists' use of the terms of "culture" and "civilisation" as synonyms became standard practice in Western science (except in Germany). Hence, "civilisation" as the catchword of the rational aspect of society, as culture and economy, had to be replaced. "Economy" was an obvious candidate. However, "economy" has a semasiological history of its own, which shows that it gained its current (dominant) meaning only fairly recently.

3 / 4 / 3 / the semasiology of "economy"

According to Say (1803), classical antiquity was utterly ignorant of the nature, origin, distribution and effect of wealth. More to the point, classical antiquity lacked the concept of "economy". The term "economy", however, was used since the 4th century BC at least, but its meaning has changed considerably in the almost two-and-a-half millennia thereafter. The term was introduced in Greek Antiquity as "οικονομία", a contraction of the noun "οίκος", meaning (a.o.) house, room, family and household, and the verb "νέμειν", meaning (a.o.) to organise, distribute, manage and use (e.g. Finley 1973; Spahn 1992). (It is often wrongly assumed that the last part of the term comes from the noun "νόμος", meaning habit, custom, tradition or rule (and often translated as law), which is obviously wrong as the Greek οικονομία was used to refer to the management (νέμειν), rather than to the rule (νόμος), of households (οίκος).)

Zenophon used a variant of the term: "οικονομικός", usually translated as household, as a book title in the middle of the 4th century BC. This book was a guide to the gentleman landowner about the proper management of his estate. Similarly, the book *oeconomica* that, although written by two of his students was included in the 1921 edition of the works of Aristotle, consisted of two parts: the first dealing with the establishment and management of a household (including tips on how to pick a wife), the second dealing with (a.o.) the management of the state (Whitaker 1940). "Economy" then meant management or organisation. The concept was applied to the household and the state, the only two levels of social organisation recognised (see § 3.2.2). The application to the management of the state, however, was (still) relatively rare. The part on economy in this sense in the pseudo-Aristotelian *oeconomica*, for example, was only six paragraphs long (Finley 1973).

Throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the concept of "economy" was used almost exclusively to describe good management and/or organisation of the household (*e.g.* Finley 1973; Oexle 1992; Burckhardt 1992). The concept was, however, sometimes also used as a general synonym for "organisation". In the church, for example, the concept was used to refer to the order or organisation of hymns and psalms during a mass, and Quintilian used it to refer to the plan (or organisation) of a poem. Both these meanings of "economy" persisted. In 1736 Quesnay published his *Essai physique sur l'économie animale* on the organisation of the animal kingdom. In 1742 Hutcheson published his *Short introduction to moral philosophy* (the English translation was published in 1747). Book 3 hereof, 'the principles of oeconomics and politics', dealt with marriage and divorce, the obligations of parents and children, the management of a household or family in general, and with politics. The topics of property, contracts and money were discussed in book 2, 'Elements of the law of nature', and clearly had nothing to do with "oeconomics" (Finley 1973). (Interestingly, Quesnay later became a physiocratic economist and published a book titled *Tableau économique* in 1758 and Hutcheson was probably the most important teacher of Adam Smith.)

The first use of the term "economy" as the management or organisation of the state after the six paragraphs in the – before mentioned – pseudo-Aristotelian *oeconomica*, was in 17th century France. It was, however, solely used in the compound term "political economy" and referred to the political organisation of the state only. Influenced by the growing literature on trade, money and national wealth, in the second half of the 18th century the term "political economy" came to mean something more specific: the management of state affairs regarding money and wealth. (*e.g.* Finley 1973; Burckhardt 1992)

Under the influence of the late 18th century social, political and conceptual revolutions (see also §§ 3.2 and 3.2.2), the invention of 'the social' specifically, the concept's meaning evolved further in the nineteenth century. "Political economy" no longer primarily referred to the management of the state, but to the economic institutions and organisation of society. Say (1803) was probably the first to state that politics and political economy are independent sciences with different subjects. Only at the end of the 19th century, however, the adjective "political" was dropped. (Later, the compound "political economy" became more or less a synonym of Marxism.) The first influential use of "economy" in this sense was Marshall's (1890) *Principles of economics*. Nevertheless, the 19th century interpretation of "economy" as a specific part of the institutional arrangement of society remained dominant until the Second World War:

The word "economy" has become one of the most elastic in the vocabulary of science. It means the whole system of industry and business whereby a modern population sustains existence. It means the production and distribution of wealth. It also means the total phenomena of wants and satisfactions. (Giddings 1903, p. 449)

In modern usage the term "economy" rarely refers to this 19th and early 20th century meaning as institutions regarding production, consumption and distribution (a division of the economy first proposed by Say (1829)), it is mostly used to refer to the whole of productive, consumptive, and so forth *behaviour* (or in case of "the economy", to the set of actors that can execute these types of behaviour). Most obvious expressions of "economy" in this modern sense can be noted in the fact that the size of an economy is measured by GDP, and an economy's growth by the growth of GDP. GDP itself is defined in the *System of national accounts* (SNA) as 'the final result of the production activity of resident producer units' (ISWGNA 1993, 2.171). SNA implicitly defines "economy" as aggregate monetary transactions or behaviour.

Mitchell (1998) describes the last stage in the conceptual evolution of "economy". It started with the introduction of terms as "economic society" (Keynes 1936), "economic life" and "economic community" (Tinbergen 1937) to refer to the complex whole of relations, networks and types of behaviour related to production, consumption, and so forth. From these new terms, in the 1940s and 50s the new concept of "economy" evolved. Most important catalyst therein was the Second World War. After the war, nations needed a new way to grow. As the territory of the world was completely divided, territorial growth was impossible without military conflict, which was (more or less) banned. A new notion of "economy" solved the problem: nations could grow economically. This, however, required the reconceptualisation of "economy". The economy as institutional organisation cannot grow; the economy as aggregate productive (and consumptive) behaviour can.

The new notion of "economy" had profound influence on politics. In the millennia before the Second World War, kings, lords and politicians were primarily concerned with political power; the first two with their own, the last also with their nation's. After the war, the economy became the prime concern of the politicians. Politics was and is no longer primarily about national (political) power, but about national wealth and the increase thereof by means of economic growth.

The development of "economy" from synonym of "organisation" to its modern meaning(s) slowly made it a much more fitting label for the rational side of the CED. In the 19th century, "political economy" still referred to the institutional organisation of a part of society. Hence, Marx, for example, could not use the concept in historical materialism, the first grand theory of the CED. Instead, he used the neologism "base". Nevertheless, as the science of "political economy" was built on Enlightenment universalism and rationalism (see § 3.2.2), this institutional organisation was considered to be the product of reason. Hence, the (political) economy was part of civilisation.

With the change in meaning of "civilisation" in social science (see § 3.4.2), it moved away from its Enlightenment origins and from its meaning of the rational part of social reality. "Economy", on the other hand, evolved in the opposite direction, especially after the Second World War. Already in the 19th century it was heavily influenced by rationalism, but after the war, "economy" became almost synonymous with 'aggregate (rational) productive, consumptive and distributive behaviour'.

3 / 4 / 4 / summary

In the 19th century the concepts of "culture" and "civilisation" developed from opposites to near synonyms. In the beginning of the century, the CED was interpreted in a number of ways ranging from the West against the rest to the rational or material versus the spiritual parts or aspects of society. The latter interpretation gave rise to the first grand theory of the CED: Marx and Engels's historical materialism. The most basic (but not the only) claim of historical materialism is that the economic institutions determine the political institutions within a society.

In the second half of the 19th century, the concepts started to grow together, especially in English-speaking countries and in scientific language. In the CED a new concept was introduced: "economy". This concept developed from "organisation", through "political economy", meaning organisation of the state (regarding national wealth), to the modern concept of "economy" as the aggregate of productive, consumptive and distributive behaviour.

3 / 5 / entrepreneurship and dimensions of culture

The beginning of the 20th century was a time of rising interest in the figure of the entrepreneur and in entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship and the CED were quickly connected in theories and studies on cultural influences on entrepreneurship. This section deals with the introduction of theories of cultural influences on entrepreneurship and economic growth and the history of the concepts of "entrepreneur" and "entrepreneurship" (§ 3.5.1); and with the introduction of 'dimensions of culture' into the CED in the late 20th century (§ 3.5.2).

3 / 5 / 1 / culture and entrepreneurship

The second grand theory of the CED and the *locus classicus* for the influence of culture on entrepreneurship was Weber's (1905) *Die Protestantische Etik und der "Geist" des Kapitalismus*. Most of Weber's book is on Protestant theology and the concept of "*Beruf*" (profession) and its etymological relation (in German and Dutch) to *rufen* and *berufen* (to call or to appeal). According to Weber, Protestant asceticism favours a rationalist and systematic approach to life. Moreover, a *Beruf* (profession) is an assignment from God. (More or less similar in etymology and meaning are the English concepts of "vocation" or "calling".) This resulted in the Protestant work ethic and a strong inclination to self-employment and entrepreneurship.

Tawney (1926) argued that it was not Protestantism, but individualism that produced the 'spirit of capitalism'. Individualism, not Protestant doctrine, led to the rationalisation of industries and markets. Tawney's rather than Weber's theory seems to be confirmed by the historian Macfarlane (1978). Thirteenth century sources suggest that the English were much more individualist than the people(s) on the European continent. It was this individualism, which produced English wealth and ultimately the industrial revolution. The Reformation did not take place in England until the 16th century. Hence, Protestantism, like capitalism, seems to be a product of individualism rather than its cause. (On Weber, Tawney and similar theories, see also § 7.3.)

After Weber, the concepts of the "entrepreneur" and "entrepreneurship" became central concepts of and in the CED. As is the case with "culture" and "economy", there are no universally accepted definitions of these concepts, but there is a long and complex conceptual history (e.g. Jaeger 1990). The French noun *entreprendre* was already used in the 12th century and from it, in the 15th century, the concept of "entrepreneur" evolved. In the 16th century an *entreprise* usually was some kind of violent or war-like action. Hector and the Trojans were called "entrepreneurs" (Hoselitz 1951; Jaeger 1990). In the late 16th and early 17th centuries the term gained new meaning as 'a person who entered into a contractual relationship with the government for the performance of a service, or the supply of goods' (Hoselitz 1951, p. 194). An important aspect of this newer use of "entrepreneur" was that it was used to refer to someone whose activities imply some kind of risk (to himself). This notion of risk became the key aspect of Cantillon's concept of the "entrepreneur" in the early 18th century (Redlich 1949; Hoselitz 1951). Cantillon was also the first to divide the population into entrepreneurs and employees (*gens à gages*) (Redlich 1949).

In English, a number of alternative translations of "entrepreneur" coexisted. Most widely used were "undertaker" and "projector", but "adventurer" or "merchant adventurer" was also often used (Hoselitz 1951; Jaeger 1990). Before the industrial revolution, people we would now call entrepreneurs were mostly called "projectors". Projectors were regarded to be adventurers, schemers, cheats or speculators and were widely distrusted. However, this started to change at the end of the 17th century (Redlich 1949; Hoselitz 1951). In the 18th century "undertaker" became the more common concept to refer to a businessman (Hoselitz 1951). Adam Smith (1776), for example used the concept to refer to investors of capital. (Nowadays the English concept of "undertaker" is used almost exclusively for the arrangers of funerals, while the originally French term "entrepreneur" took its place in English.)

Theorists of entrepreneurship have distinguished a number of aspects of the "entrepreneur", which were differently emphasised by different theorists (e.g. Casson 1982; 1987; Gartner 1990; Morisson 1998; van Praag 1999). Three of those – risk, profit and management – clearly derive from its conceptual history: entrepreneurs took risks in order to get profit and entrepreneurs were managers. What they did manage, however, changed considerably: war-like actions in the 16th century, building projects in the 17th century and businesses in the 18th century and later. Smith (1776) added the use or investment of capital as a further

characteristic. A fifth aspect of entrepreneurship, the creative or innovative aspect, is often attributed to Schumpeter (1926), but was already present in the late 18th century writings of Jeremy Bentham (*e.g.* Redlich 1949). It seems, that for any combination of these five aspects of entrepreneurship, there is at least one theorist who claims that these are its basic characteristics.

3 / 5 / 2 / dimensions of culture

The two grand theories of the CED, historical materialism and the influence of religious ethic on entrepreneurship, provided the starting point for an explosion of theories of the CED, especially after post-modernism (the third Romantic rebellion; see § 3.4.1) and its focus on diversity rooted in social science. The resulting late 20th century 'cultural turn' made it fashionable to point at culture whenever traditional theories and explanations failed (for an overview, see chapter 7). What needs to be explained here is the 'final' development of the concepts of the CED, especially of "culture".

The most influential late 20th century theories and research on the CED are based on Hofstede's (1980) measurement of cultural differences between fifty-three (groups of) countries. These measurements themselves are based on the conceptualisation of "culture" in cross-cultural psychology as basic values. Inkeles and Levinson (1954), for example, discuss three dimensions of culture: (1) self-image, which is about both male - female and individual - group relationships; (2) how people deal with authority; and (3) how people deal with conflict and emotion. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) distinguish five dimensions: (1) human nature orientation; (2) man - nature orientation; (3) time orientation; (4) activity orientation; and (5) relational orientation. In his empirical research, Hofstede (1980) found and constructed (how much he found and how much he constructed is open for debate) four dimensions, which seem to be most similar to Inkeles's and Levinson's: (1) power distance; (2) individualism; (3) masculinity; and (4) uncertainty avoidance. Later, Hofstede (1991) added a fifth: (5) long-term orientation. (See § 6.2.1 for a more extensive review of the history of and dimensions proposed and measured by cross-cultural psychology.)

Whatever the number of dimensions distinguished, the basic idea stays the same: culture is a relatively small set of basic value orientations that can be measured and mapped. This interpretation is interesting for at least two reasons. First of all, it is far more restrictive than the anthropological definitions of culture, that, like Tylor's (quoted above) seems to cover (almost) everything. Because it is more restrictive, it is also far less ambiguous. Secondly, the interpretation of culture as basic values opens up a whole new way to interpret the CED. The CED then is no longer just about the rational versus the non-rational aspects of social reality: it is or may be also about actual behaviour (remember that "economy" can mean aggregate productive and consumptive behaviour; § 3.5.1) versus the values, rules, and the like that guide behaviour. Section 5.2 further investigates this idea.

3 / 5 / 3 / summary

Rising interest in entrepreneurship gave birth to the second grand theory of the CED: that of cultural influences on entrepreneurial behaviour. In the second half of the 20th century especially, empirical research herein grew quickly under the influence of new ideas on the measurement of culture. These ideas and measures originated from cross-cultural psychology. The best known and most widely used were (and are) Hofstede's measures of four dimensions of culture in fifty-three (groups of) countries. These 'dimensions' are – according to cross-cultural psychologists – the most basic characteristics of culture.

3 / 6 / culture, nature and geography

In Houellebecq's (1998) novel *les particules élémentaires* one of the two main characters, not coincidentally with the same first name as the author, Michel, suggests that

(...) prise dans son ensemble la nature sauvage n'était rien d'autre qu'une répugnante saloperie; prise dans son ensemble la nature sauvage justifiait une destruction totale, un holocaust universel – et la mission de l'homme sur la Terre était probablement d'accomplir cet holocauste. (pp. 47-48)

What disgusts Michel about nature is its complete lack of reason. Like his creator, Michel believes in reason and Enlightened civilisation and he is repulsed by the lack thereof in nature, in the quotation above, or in religious fundamentalism, in *Plateforme* (Houellebecq 2001).

Houellebecq's quotation clearly links the culture - nature dichotomy to the 19th century culture - civilisation dialectic. However, the terminology is completely different. "Culture" here refers to 'that complex whole' as in anthropology (§ 3.3.1 / § 3.4.2), but its focus is not on the spiritual, the traditional, the irrational but rather on the practical, material and/or rational aspects. "Culture" is used here as in Barth (1897) as the domination of man over nature, and hence, it explicitly includes economy and technology. The culture - nature dichotomy is a dialectical opposition of two sets of terms or concepts, some more ambiguous than others:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{culture} \\ \text{man (-kind)} \\ \text{society} \end{array} \right\} \text{ vs. } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{nature} \\ \text{environment} \end{array} \right\}$$

Terminologically different versions of this dialectic (or dichotomy) are used in different fields, but all refer to the same basic distinction: that of "nature" as the non-human (or untouched by man), non-rational world that surrounds us, and that of "culture" as the world of man. The field that more than any others made the dialectic of culture and nature, of man and environment its prime subject is (human) geography. In classical geography, there was no room for the CED as "man" or "culture" covered both sides. One could argue that the CED is a minor dialectic within a man - environment (or culture - nature) dialectic (hereafter abbreviated MED). However, in the 20th century the geographical mainstream forgot its intellectual history, forgot about the man - environment dialectic and became a sterile discipline about abstract space(s). The late 20th century cultural turn re-introduced culture in geography. This time, however, the CED conquered the field and the traditional man - environment dialectic (MED) became its subordinate at best.

This section deals with the development of thought on the MED from Classical Antiquity until classical (with a lower case c) geography in the 19th and early 20th century (§ 3.6.1) and with the recent (re-)introduction of "culture" and the CED in geography (§ 3.6.2).

3 / 6 / 1 / the two histories of geography

Textbooks on the history of ideas in geography (e.g. de Pater & van der Wusten 1996; Sutcliffe 1999; Holt-Jensen 1980/99) all reveal an almost complete lack of actual (theoretical) ideas (which rather contradicts the term "history of ideas") until the beginning of the 19th century. The history of geography as a discipline is represented as one of exploration and description of other countries and regions, not as a history of theoretical ideas. Often regarded as the first geographer, Strabo wrote his *Geographika*, an encyclopaedic description of the rituals, means of survival and military strength of all the known peoples in and outside the Roman Empire around the start of the Christian era. Other early predecessors often mentioned include Erathostenes, Chang Ch'ien and Ptolemy (e.g. Sutcliffe 1999). After Classical Antiquity, the history of geography continues with explorers such as Al-Idrisi (12th century), Ibn Battuta (14th century) and dozens of European explorers in the 15th and 16th centuries (e.g. Sutcliffe 1999). Only in the early 19th century did there seem to awake some theoretical thought in human geography (in physical geography, theory took off in the 17th century) in the work of Ritter (1817), who claimed that the environment determines man, but that man can struggle out of nature's grasp. What the textbook writers (usually) ignore is that Ritter's theory had many predecessors.

There seem to be two histories of geography. The first is the textbook history of explorers and encyclopaedic descriptions of countries and regions, which Ptolemy called 'chorography'. This is the history of geography as an art more than as a science. The second is the often neglected history of ideas and theories on the relationship between man

(people) and his (their) environment, between culture and nature. This is the history of the MED. This is the true history of geographical ideas.

The first (known) theorists of the MED, probably were Hippocrate (5th century BC) and Aristotle (4th century BC). Hippocrate (*Airs, waters and places*) and Aristotle (*Politics*) believed that the physical geography of a place determines the characteristics, the way(s) of life, of the people in that place (e.g. Bartlett 2001). Hippocrate wrote that 'in general you will find assimilated to the nature of the land both the physique and the characteristics of the inhabitants' (quoted in Bartlett 2001, p. 45). This was the birth of physical (or environmental) determinism that would dominate the MED until the end of the 19th century. Hippocrate, often credited to be the father of medicine, therefore, could also be credited to be the father of scientific (as opposed to descriptive) geography.

Physical determinism influenced Medieval Christian and Islamic thought. In the 7th century Isidore of Seville (*Etymologiae*) claimed that 'human beings vary in appearance and colour, in size of body and quality of mind, according to the skies above them'; and Albertus Magnus wrote in his *De natura locorum* (13th century), one of the first systematic treatises on the MED, that 'everything generated in a place derives its natural properties from that place' (both quoted in Bartlett 2001, p. 47). The general idea in Medieval Christianity was that the natural environment determined the *gens* (see § 3.3.2 on the concept of *gens*).

Although some early Medieval Christian scholars, such as Isidore of Seville, wrote on the MED, the main historical route from Antiquity to more modern times goes through Medieval Islamic philosophy, especially the works of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Kaldun (e.g. Goldenberg 1999). Many of the works of Greek Antiquity, including those by Aristotle, were unknown to the early Medieval Christian world. Only in the times of the crusades and through the dissemination of Spanish Islamic philosophy did Europe learn about these. This strongly influenced Western philosophy and gave birth to empiricism and ultimately the Enlightenment. On the Islamic Enlightenment, on the other hand, the crusades had a severely negative impact. (The downfall of Islamic civilisation cannot be attributed to the impact of the crusades alone, however, but was also caused by internal events such as Al-Ghazali's (1095) influential attack on philosophy and rationalism.)

During his travels through Arabic countries Chardin (1680/6) came in contact with Ibn Kaldun's (14th century) thought on the MED. He wrote about it on his journal, which was published in 1680 (second revised edition 1686). Montesquieu read this and was strongly influenced by it (Goldenberg 1999). As explained in subsection 3.2.2, Montesquieu in his *De l'esprit des lois* (1748) forwarded the theory that the nature or spirit of a society (or culture) is the result of (a.o.) physical geography, psychology, traditions, history, religion and the economic mode of being. Several chapters of his book are devoted to the influence of, for example, climate and soil on the character of the people living in these climates and on those soils.

Physical determinism was well established in 18th and 19th century thought. There is no reason to assume that Ritter read Montesquieu, Aristotle or any of the other earlier theorists of the MED. (He was, however, strongly influenced by Herder (*e.g.* Birkenhauer 2001), who *did* read Montesquieu; see § 3.3.1.) He did not have to; the influence of the natural environment on man was obvious to every learned man. Ritter, however, was not a physical determinist in the strict sense. Indeed, he claimed that man is 'ein lebendiger Spiegel der Natur von welchem ihre Geheimnisse zu seines Gleichen noch einmal wiederholt und verständlicher ausgesprochen werden' (1817, p. 19), but he also wrote that civilisation makes man ever more independent from nature:

So ergeben sich diese und andre Resultaten über den innigsten zusammenhang der Völkergeschichten mit der lebenden Natur, indem von der einen Seite eine unabwendbare Abhängigkeit von derselben sich zeigt, die um so fesselnder, je näher der Mensch noch dem bewußtlosen Zustande steht und die Völker als Horden leben. Von der andern Seite dagegen zeigt sich ein immer fortschreitendes Freiwerden der Culturvölker von den in gleicher Progression immer mehr und mehr zurücktreenden Bedingungen der vaterländischen Naturen. (pp. 18-19)

Sixty-five years after Ritter, Ratzel (1882), the founder of modern geographical physical determinism, almost literally copied the determinist element of his thought. Culture, according to Ratzel, is a reflection of nature in the human mind (or spirit). However, in the second half of the 19th century, increasing industrial pollution gave birth to the opposite of physical determinism. Marsh wrote *man and nature* (1864) as 'a little volume showing that whereas [others] think that the earth made man, man in fact made the earth' (quoted in Lowenthal 1964, p.ix). In his book, Marsh described the enormous influence of man on the face of the earth:

But it is certain that man has done much to mould the form of the earth's surface, though we cannot always distinguish between the results of his action and the effects of purely geological causes; that the destruction of the forests, the drainage of lakes and marshes, and the operation of rural husbandry and industrial art have tended to produce great changes in the hygrometric, thermometric, electric, and chemical condition of the atmosphere, though we are not yet able to measure the force of the different elements of disturbance, or to say how far they have been compensated by each other, or by still obscurer influences; and, finally, that the myriad forms of animal and vegetable life, which covered the earth when man first entered upon the theatre of a nature whose harmonies he was destined to derange, have been, through his action, greatly changed in numerical proportion, sometimes much modified in form and product, and sometimes entirely extirpated. (p.18)

Although Marsh had some influence, for example on the geographer Réclus (1869), by the turn of the century physical determinism dominated geography. Ratzel's most important

students were Semple and Huntington. Semple (1911) asserted that people are a product of their environment and Huntington (1915) researched the influence of climate on a people's level of civilisation.

Rejecting physical determinism, Hettner (1907) claimed that environment or nature does not determine man but offers him possibilities. This idea was elaborated on by (a.o.) the historian Febvre, who coined the term "possibilism":

Et ce dogme, c'est un dogme ratzélien: "Si l'espace considéré est limité et peu différencié, le type physique et la civilisation qui s'y rencontrent sont monotones." – Nous disons, nous, tout différemment:

Cadres régionaux, au sens large du mot, soit. Mais, dans l'ensemble de conditions physique qu'ils représentent, ne voyons que des possibilités d'action. Et, ajoutons-le tout de suite, pour prévenir une objection qui se présente d'elle-même: ces possibilités d'action ne constituent pas une sorte de système lié: elles ne représentent pas dans chaque région un tout indissociable: si elles sont saisissables, elles ne sont pas saisies par les hommes toutes à la fois, avec la même force dans le même temps: autrement, à quoi tendrait le procès que nous prétendons instituer contre le déterminisme? et, sous une autre forme, la valeur déterminante des régions géographiques n'apparaîtrait-elle point comme très réelle? – En fait, dans ce domaine comme ailleurs, la vieille formule leibnizienne est utile à retenir – que tous les possibles ne sont pas compossibles. (1922, pp. 206-207)

Possibilism replaced determinism by reciprocity. Hettner (1927) and Vidal de la Blache (1921) argued that man and nature cannot be separated. 'Zur Eigenart der Länder gehören Natur und Mensch, und zwar in so enger Verbindung, daß sie nicht von einander getrennt werden können' (Hettner 1927, p. 126). To Vidal de la Blache these strong reciprocal ties between man and environment or nature were especially relevant in relatively small regions: *pays*. Each region has a *personnalité géographique*, a specific and characteristic pattern of culture, mentality, means of subsistence and landscape, which is the product of centuries of reciprocal relations between a group of people and their environment. The *genre de vie* of this group determines which of the possibilities offered by the environment is chosen. This choice in turn influences the landscape (and the *genre de vie* itself):

Un genre de vie constitué implique une action méthodique et continue, partant très forte, sur la nature, ou pour parler en géographe, sur la physionomie des contrées. (Vidal de la Blache 1911, p. 194).


One more geographer (besides Hettner and Vidal de la Blache) took part in the possibilist turn of early 20th century geography: Sauer, who was strongly influenced by Schlüter, introduced 'cultural landscape geography' (1925). The key concept thereof was the "cultural landscape", the product of reciprocal relations between man and nature:

The cultural landscape is fashioned from a natural landscape by a culture group. Culture is the agent, the natural area is the medium, the cultural landscape the result. Under the influence of a given culture, itself changing through time, the landscape undergoes development, passing through phases, and probably reaching ultimately the end of its cycle of development. With the introduction of a different – that is, an alien – culture, a rejuvenation of the cultural landscape sets in, or a new landscape is superimposed on remnants of an older one. The natural landscape is of course of fundamental importance, for it supplies the materials out of which the cultural landscape is formed. The shaping force, however, lies in the culture itself. Within the wide limits of the physical equipment of area lie many possible choices for man, as Vidal never grew weary of pointing out. This is the meaning of adaptation, through which, aided by those suggestions which man has derived from nature, perhaps by an imitative process, largely subconscious, we get the feeling of harmony between the human habitation and the landscape into which it so fittingly blends. But these, too, are derived from the mind of man, not imposed by nature, and hence are cultural expressions. (Sauer 1925, p. 343)

Interestingly, in these early 20th theories of the MED, not only the MED itself but also the CED is dissolved. In Vidal de la Blache's "*genre de vie*" and Sauer's "cultural landscape", culture and economy are merged into a single concept. Most explicit is Sauer's claim that the cultural landscape 'is the geographic version of the economy of the group, as providing itself with food, shelter, furnishings, tools, and transport' (Sauer 1941, p. 358).

Taking the "*genre de vie*" and the "cultural landscape" back apart and combining them into a single framework may either result in two dialectics in which the CED is a dialectic within the "man" or "society" aspect of the MED (with entrepreneurship somewhere in the middle; see § 3.5.2) or in a trichotomy of economy, culture and environment (or nature). Figure 3.1 can (and may) be interpreted in both these ways.

figure 3.1: *a triangle of combined dialectics*



In 1953, Schaefer's article 'exceptionalism in geography' was published posthumously. It was an attack on the regional geography or chorography (see above) that grew from the works of (a.o.) Vidal de Blache and Hettner and a call for a more 'scientific' (here meaning more nomothetic rather than ideographic) approach in geography. Economic geography especially was heavily influenced by Schaefer's criticism. New approaches, such as regional science and spatial analysis, constructed mathematical models of the influence of distance on location, for example. Space was conceived of as an isotropic plane and man was replaced by *homo economicus*. There was no more place for the traditional key concepts of geography, "landscape", "environment", "culture", and so forth. In fact these new approaches had very little to do with geography (or with classical geography at least).

The geographer no longer needs to ponder whether he should study human phenomena just as thoroughly as physical phenomena, but increasingly he will be faced with a question just as ridiculous. One can foresee the time when a geographer who thinks in terms of the landscape and the real earth's surface will be considered very old fashioned. With the increasing interest in horizontal interaction, in systems, in spatial relationships, and the use of models and mathematics to analyse them, the landscape is becoming just a nuisance to some new geographers. Many of the hypotheses, simple models and even complex formulae will only apply to a flat, featureless surface. Time and again an isotropic surface is postulated at the beginning of the work. (Minshull, 1970, pp.55-56)

3 / 6 / 2 / the CED in modern geography

In the 1970s, criticism on the non-geographical geographies of the 1950s and 60s grew steadily. Under the influence of Marxism and humanism, and later post-modernism, new approaches in geography arose. "Culture" was re-introduced in geography. However, with it came the CED. Traditionally there was no strong line of demarcation between culture and economy in geography. The distinction was irrelevant and hence ignored. The re-introduction of "culture" in geography was not a return to classical geography, however. Instead it was heavily influenced by theories and philosophies from outside geography. One of the strongest influences in the 1970s (*e.g.* Crang 1997) and especially one of the most important theoretical foundations of the CED in modern geography came from Marxism. In the following decades Marxist approaches (often called "political economy") almost took over the field: 'By 1990 political economy was the dominant discourse of human geography influencing debate, research and the very sociology of the discipline' (Barnes, 1995, p.423). And 'political economy became hegemonic; it became human geography's official culture' (p. 424). With Marxism, historical materialism, the first grand theory of the CED, entered geography; with it came the associated conceptual framework. Within a few decades, geography experienced two conceptual revolutions. The first reduced environment (the "E" in the MED) to an isotropic plane, effectively removing it from the

MED; the second divided "man" (the "M" in the MED) into "culture" and "economy". Hence, although classical geography was mortally wounded in the 1950s, it was Marxism, which delivered the final blow.

The founding father of Marxist geography was Harvey, who developed a geographical version of historical materialism in which, besides culture (in general), places, landscapes and regions are the products (or superstructure) of the economic base of society (Harvey 1982, 1989). Initially, Harvey's work (1973) was purely Marxist, but slowly this changed. In later work (1989; 1996) his philosophy became increasingly *post-Marxist*. (Harvey's later dialectics, for example, was no longer based on Marx and Hegel but on Leibniz and Whitehead (Harvey 1999).) Similarly, Soja (1989) developed from Marxism to post-Marxism, which in his case is an attempt to mix Marxism and post-modernism. In the 1990s, post-Marxism, as a mix of post-modernism and Marxism, was the main source of inspiration for a new approach in economic geography, alternatively named the cultural turn (Crang 1997), the new economic geography (Thrift & Olds 1996), or the Californian school (Sunley 1996). Some of these names are rather misleading. The first also refers to a far broader development in social science that, moreover, started well before the 1990s. The second is better known as a field in economics based on the work of Krugman (1991; 1995). Krugman's new economic geography is nothing but a return to 1950s spatial analysis. Hence, it has little to do with geography. It is a nice example of economic imperialism (e.g. Caldwell 1986) and is heavily criticised by (some) geographers (e.g. Martin 1999).

Post-Marxist economic geography's influences are wider than just Marxism and post-modernism. A third major influence that should be mentioned involves *heterodox* currents within economics such as institutional and evolutionary economics (e.g. Brons & Pellenbarg 2003). Especially influential was Granovetter's (1985) notion of "embeddedness" (see also § 7.5.1). Scott and Storper (1992), for example, argue that the economy is embedded in a socio-cultural context. Other key concepts include "learning" (e.g. Florida 1997; Morgan 1997; Storper 1997) and "network" (e.g. Saxenian 1994).

Marx's historical materialism was not the only grand theory of the CED that entered geography after the rejection of spatial analysis. The second grand theory, that of the influence of culture on economic development, slowly established itself in the discipline, but has hardly been empirically researched. This may be related to the fact that "culture" as an explanative factor of regional differences in entrepreneurship is only called for when more traditional explanations fail. On one of the last pages of a geographical study on new firms, Bleumink *et al.* (1985), for example, suggest that less tangible factors, such as mentality, might be important. Almost twenty years earlier Tamsma (1967) claimed that cultural differences play an important role in the (re-) production of regional economic differences.

Regional differences in entrepreneurship in the Netherlands have been studied since the beginning of the 1980s. Wever (1984), for example, studied regional differences in the

number of new entrepreneurs, while Kleinknecht and Poot (1990) focused on regional differences in innovation. In both cases and in later studies on the same subject (*e.g.* van Praag 1996; Bruins *et al.* 2000; see also § 7.4.2) traditional explanations were insufficient. Brons (2002; 2004) was probably the first attempt to empirically verify cultural influence on entrepreneurial behaviour in the Netherlands. This study, however, resulted in more questions than it answered.

3 / 6 / 3 / summary

Figure 2.4 (§ 2.5.3) showed that the CED is closely linked to the culture - nature or man - environment dialectic (MED). The latter is the defining question of the field of (human) geography. From Greek Antiquity until well into the 19th century it was generally assumed that environment or nature determined *gens*, national character, culture or society. Only at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th did this change. Possibilism asserted that there is a complex reciprocity between man and his environment that – more or less – comprehends the CED.

In the 1950s and 60s geography became explicitly abstract, mathematical and non-cultural. This started to change in the 1970s and led to the 'cultural turn' of the 1990s. This cultural turn, however, was not a return to the traditional conceptual and theoretical framework of (classical) geography; instead geography adopted the framework of the other social sciences and with this, adopted the CED.

