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Europeans in-Between

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Cosmopolitanism.

A way out of the European deadlock?

Cor van der Leemputten

1 Introduction

Europe and its citizens are noticing the consequences of globalization. Faced with increasing and hardly controllable flows of people, capital and goods, European economies and (national) cultures are changing. This transformation is not always welcomed and European integration is under pressure from nationalist and anti-EU forces. This paper argues that there is a more fruitful way of dealing with this globalizing and transcultural world than reconstructing borders and boundaries. While engaging with the problem on a theoretical level, the argument is made that *cosmopolitanism* is an effective way of incorporating today's societal differences. It provides a pathway especially suitable for a diverse territory like Europe that is closer to social reality and more adaptable to future changes. My research question therefore is: to what extent can cosmopolitanism serve as a political theory for understanding Europe?

This paper will start by an elaboration on what kind of crisis Europe finds itself in. Key elements of globalization and the effects it has on people's identities, cultures and nation-states will be outlined. The way Europe is understood and how it has been dealing with these effects will also be explained. After this introduction, the first section will sketch the current European deadlock, related to how some citizen's choose to retreat back to the nation-state. In the second part the concept of cosmopolitanism will be presented. It will be explained why it provides a way out of the status quo by giving citizens a new sense of community and Europe a

sense of direction. The way it differs from alternative political projects will also be explained, next to its possible practical implementation. Having explained cosmopolitanism, the first two sections will be concluded with some critical remarks regarding this concept. In the final section the argument will be made that a further cosmopolitanization of Europe is both necessary and possible for the future development of Europe because it provides citizens with a complementary nexus of identity and culture that is desired, while giving the European project the political vision and strategy it currently needs.

2 Europe in Crisis

2.1 A Globalizing Europe

Globalization has become a catch-phrase for modern changes in past decades and the consequences on the individual and (supra) state level have become clearer overtime. Globalization has significantly altered the ways in which people interact nowadays and without elaborating extensively on the how and what of globalization, I would like to briefly point out some relevant characteristics of today's "information society" as first mentioned by Nick Stevenson.¹ He stated that society now is constituted through a multiplicity of antagonisms in a discursive field without fixity. Globalization has created black holes out of those people who are socially and culturally outside of communication with mainstream society. In other words, some people are both lost and marginalized. Economics, politics and cultures have been impacted in an unprecedented way. Migration and institutional transformations have produced cultural diasporas that are detached from national contexts. Things change fast, and there has been a breakdown in the idea of progress and certainty, which has been replaced by risk and uncertainty since people realize that the welfare state cannot protect them from all possible harm. The point is that nowadays many Europeans are released from the structures of industrial society into the uncertainties of a globalized society. This society is increasingly characterized by individualization and the mixing of identities that both change and overlap. The historical link between nation, culture and citizenship is becoming increasingly blurry. Although recognizing that states, boundaries and differences still matter, I will look at how globalization has translated to the level of Europe and its citizens.

2.2 Modern Identities

An important consequence of globalization for people is the awareness of being involved in open-ended global flows. For some it provides incentives to overcome

¹ Nick Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions* (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2003), 10-15.

their local loyalties and foster trans-national/-cultural connections, while for others it motivates searches for fixed orientation points and generates efforts affirming old and constructing new boundaries.² Defensive reactions to consequences of globalization can be seen in a range of political movements and cultural struggles all over the world; be it Eurosceptic movements or the Occupy demonstrations. The more people and societies are confronted with changes that could threaten their foundations, the more fearfully they cling to what is familiar. Where some embrace it, according to Stevenson, globalization makes others intolerant and longing for unity. These people turn their backs on complexity and become incapable of recognizing differences.³ Such tendencies are reflected in Europe's social and political climate today, where a trend of increasing polarization is visible *en public* and where only between 12% and 38% of the EU population think that their vote counts in the EU.⁴

Despite, or maybe because of European integration at governmental, cultural and economic levels, the nostalgic imaginary of national sovereignty reigns strongly in people's minds today.⁵ The "authenticity" of national and local fundamentalisms is being erected against the intensifying global flows of money, people and identity – especially after 9/11.⁶ The emergence of strong right-wing movements in Europe reflects this. From France (15%) to Finland (19%), and from the Netherlands (16%) to Denmark (12%) populists gain support by framing threats to (a static notion of) national culture and outlining a grim future of unemployment, a bankrupt social welfare system and too much immigration.⁷ With growing (counter) parties on the other side of the political spectrum, the moderate pro-European parties are being squeezed out. Both populist politics and extreme nationalism share the same essentialist assumption about the "people" as a monolithic unit with an authentic will of its own. But where populists see their people betrayed by corrupt elites, extreme nationalists perceive their people as threatened "enemies of the nation."⁸ On a European level these sentiments, which differ in size but have a strong influence in multi-party democracies, have translated into an increased po-

² Ibid., 19.

³ Ibid., 181.

⁴ European Parliament, "Europeans and the Crisis," *Eurobarometer* 76.1, summary (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/topics/eb76_europeans_and_the_crisis_analytical_summary_en.pdf (accessed 12 November 2011).

⁵ Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 22.

⁶ Craig Calhoun, "Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 14 (2008): 429.

⁷ Yves Surel, "The European Union and the challenges of Populism," *Notre Europe Policy Brief*, no. 27 (2011), http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Bref27_YSurel_EN.pdf (accessed 12 November 2011).

⁸ Stefan Auer, "'New Europe': Between Cosmopolitan Dreams and Nationalist Nightmares," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 4 (2010): 1165.

licing of external boundaries, now fashionably referred to as “Fortress Europe” – a place where humanistic ideals have come into conflict with the need to exclude.⁹

Globalization, European integration and immigration can all be framed as a threat when perceiving the nation-state as homogeneous or (national) culture as fixed and static. But, even if this had been the case in the past, they are not anymore. Modern democratic states are both multicultural and transnational, and by law committed to tolerating or even encouraging the co-existence of different cultural groups.¹⁰ People increasingly change location and modern identities have become “increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiple across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions.”¹¹

The resulting increase of confrontations with the “Other” makes people aware of their own (cultural) identities and their boundaries become points of reflection and contention. “Anti-Muslim, anti-elite, anti-globalization and increasingly anti-Brussels, populists now count for something in the Nordic countries, among the Dutch and Flemish, in France, Italy and Austria, and in parts of eastern Europe.”¹² These movements indicate a lack of trust (or estrangement) between the collective and the individual. This normally follows political, economic or cultural marginalization, and looking at the way the Euro-crisis is developing we might even say that currently the EU is facing all of them.¹³ Especially when established ties of social cohesion are changing, identity becomes a problem for those who consider it fixed.¹⁴ The appeal to “sameness” for many people provides a way of addressing the anxieties of the global age. This provides European nation-states with a difficult task since they now have “to respond to the twin forces of globalism and localism, while the traditional basis for citizenship is widely reported as being eroded.”¹⁵ The European project has therefore, from its creation onwards, been trying to tackle this problem. But nowadays it faces bad weather. Integrating markets can be done by the stroke of a pen, but the integration of peoples is harder. The trick therefore becomes how to articulate a more fully inclusive society that also recognizes the need to de-centre a national identity through the recognition of the various diasporas and differences within the territory of the nation-state.¹⁶ This is the case because the increased interconnectedness of people

⁹ Bo Strath, “A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 5 (2002): 398.

¹⁰ David Miller, “Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship,” *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 16 (2008): 376.

¹¹ Stuart Hall, *Questions of Cultural Identity* (London: Sage, 1996), 4.

¹² “Beyond the fringe: The rise of populists is a threat both to the euro and to the EU as a whole,” *The Economist*, Special Report, 12 November 2011, 9.

¹³ Anssi Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: considerations of place, boundaries and identity,” *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8 (2001): 22.

¹⁴ Strath, “A European Identity,” 387.

¹⁵ Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship*, 35.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 56.

and cultures has problematized the nation-state's ethical-political boundaries.¹⁷ In a European context the question then becomes whether or not the EU, besides taking over some of the nation-state's traditional steering role, can also replace the sense of identity (of belonging, attachment and community) that the nation-state provides for its citizens.

2.3 A post-national union

So the increased movement of people has undermined the previously assumed "cultural" consensus on a national scale. Europe is now, by most of its citizens, seen as a constellation that is able to meet some of their needs and interests (e.g. freedom of travel, study opportunities, global competitiveness etc.).¹⁸ Yet, the notion of a European identity remains contested. Both policy-makers and academics do not seem to agree on what it is, could be or should be. Following Benedict Anderson's argument that nations and cultures are inevitably "imagined communities," I argue that all modern collective identities or solidarity units (especially transnational ones) must be "invented" or constructed.¹⁹ It will be the same imagination that has to move people towards transnational loyalties. With the development of several European symbols since the 1980s, we can recognize intentional European identity politics since the 1980s.²⁰ But symbolic forms alone are insignificant in identity creation, because people must be able to imagine a *meaningful* social world for them to exist in.²¹

For now it is safe to say that the general European citizen is not feeling this European loyalty yet and neither do member states always act in the solidarity that the EU aspires to. Possibly because of the EU's lack of speaking with one voice externally or its drive for uniformity internally, the European citizen feels alienated from the it – as reflected in the low turn-out for European parliamentary elections and the popularity of aforementioned nationalistic politics. The result is disbelief, indifference and hostility with respect to European politics on behalf of its citizens.²² It is a problem that has increased by rounds of enlargements that happened without strong public support.²³

¹⁷ Adam Gannaway, "What is Cosmopolitanism?" (Paper presented at the annual MPSA conference, Chicago, USA, 3 April 2009).

¹⁸ Marco Antonisch, "The Narration of Europe in 'National' and 'Post-national' terms: Gauging the Gap between Normative Discourses and People's Views," *European Journal of Social Theory* 11 (2008): 515.

¹⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imaginary Communities* (London: Verso, 1991).

²⁰ Strath, "A European Identity," 390.

²¹ Gerard Delanty, "The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe: On the Cultural Significance of Europeanization," *International Review of Sociology* 15 (2005): 409.

²² Jos de Beus, "Quasi-National European Identity and European Democracy," *Law and Philosophy* 20 (2000): 285.

²³ Auer, "New Europe," 1169.

Boundaries, territory and identity are often linked together as if overlapping in a harmonious way, forming a “cultural area” – but they do not, and especially not in Europe.²⁴ Although the EU could be seen as some kind of collective medicine for its member states to deal with global capitalism and competition, “capitalism does not create feelings of belonging capable of rivaling the sense of allegiance felt by most people to the state in which they live.”²⁵

Both supporters and critics of the EU have been concerned with this lack of a strong identity and community. Despite, or perhaps even because of transnational and transcultural identities, some have argued that a European society will never even emerge because a European cultural identity simply is weak compared to national ones.²⁶ And when Anssi Paasi argues that a European “home” is vague because of its diversity while Anderson speaks of “new medievalism” to emphasize the characterizing overlaps of authorities and loyalties in Europe, it becomes clear that the EU has to turn its economic, social and cultural heterogeneity into its productive advantage.²⁷

For Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande the EU is incorrectly perceived within the outdated framework of the nation, located somewhere between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Europe represents a unique constellation that is neither state nor society.²⁸ It is a movement in permanent transformation, contradicting the conceptual horizons of national societies and states. It is a place where the transient has become permanent.²⁹ I argue that the inability to recognize this is exactly why EU institutions seem distant, unreal and irrelevant to its citizens. Europe’s political project is characterized by open-ended flows and “liquid” instead of static cultures and identities.

For this reason, Europe, its member states and its citizens, better accept that they are doomed to fail to control their borders, both internally and externally.³⁰ Europe can no longer proceed on the basis of business as usual and should acknowledge that the direction of its change of course is open.³¹ It is this reality they should face instead of turn away from. *Cosmopolitanism* often comes up in times of crisis or in response to globalization. Since in the multiple public spheres of Europe there is evidence of post-national identities and even cosmopolitan

²⁴ Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process,” 22.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁶ Delanty, “The Idea of a Cosmopolitan,” 409.

²⁷ Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process,” 10, 25; Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, “Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s Way Out of Crisis,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 10 (2007): 68.

²⁸ Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*.

²⁹ Strath, “A European Identity,” 399.

³⁰ Helen Wallace, “Europeanisation and Globalisation: Complementary or Contradictory Trends?” *New Political Economy* 5 (2000): 375.

³¹ Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, 226.

loyalties, the question arises if it can also serve a social-political strategy in the EU.³²

3 Cosmopolitanism: What and Why?

3.1 Dealing with Diversity

As explained above, globalization has altered social and political reality in unprecedented ways and people have responded to this increased confrontation with the Other by fortifying old and inventing new boundaries. This section will elaborate on what have been the most prominent political avenues of dealing with multiple cultures and identities, as well as explain the concept of cosmopolitanism.

In the strife for unity in any form of differentiated and territorialized collective, the dissolution of differences (or *universalism*) has been and remains an influential concept. Even if the development and recognition of universal norms would foster equal treatment, the problem with this view remains that blind universalism itself represents a *particular* culture.³³ Not being receptive to any kind of difference therefore suppresses unique (or individual) identity formations that characterize globalization.³⁴

In its turn, *nationalism* strives towards the same goal, but standardizes differences in opposition to other nationalities. Although it has served as a powerful way for creating a collective sense of belonging in the past, it often fails to do so in culturally diverse societies. This is the case because by following an either/or logic, nationalism makes a horizontal distinction between the internal and external which, in an age of diaspora and migration, fails to be inclusive at all.³⁵

Multiculturalism, geared to more or less homogeneous groups located in the same national framework, comes closer to the “all-in-one” objective. It aims at the construction of common cultures of difference. It wants to reformulate specific national identities while at the same time building an inclusive community “without social disrespect.”³⁶ But categorizing cultures as collectivities goes against both individualization and trans-nationalization – two consequences of today’s information society.

Now, how does *cosmopolitanism* differ from these concepts? It starts by acknowledging that “sharp” ethnic boundaries and territorial bonds are blurred, fluid and intermingling at all levels. Cosmopolitanism’s uniqueness is therefore found in its *recognition of difference* that becomes the maxim of thought, social life and practice. Emphasis is on participation and inclusion of the marginalized, and on the opening

³² Delanty, “The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe,” 418.

³³ Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, 13.

³⁴ Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship*, 46.

³⁵ Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, 13.

³⁶ Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship*, 47.

of boundaries in this transcultural world. It is a political project aimed at “the transformation of loyalties and identities in a world of multiple modernities [that] has given expression to the utopian aspiration to transcend the immediate context of existence without necessarily rejecting it in the name of an unattainable alternative.”³⁷ It therefore differs fundamentally from all the aforementioned forms that often seek to bring social difference into a hierarchical relation of superiority and subordination.³⁸

Etymologically, cosmopolitanism loosely translates to “citizen of the world.” *Kosmos* refers to a harmonization of many different elements, a unity in diversity. Unity here does not contradict difference since it actually requires this diversity to function. It must account for, promote, and protect difference since suppressing it compromises the integrity of the whole unity.³⁹ *Polis* can be translated to citizen, meaning membership in any form of ethical and/or political association. Based on both principles, cosmopolitanism indicates a belief in a global ethical-political order, constructed by the participation of citizens of the world. Culture and identity are important, since they provide the diversity, but it is the universal human ability to reason and to develop a morality that provides unity. Access to and influence in the political debate then becomes crucial, because if free expression and critique are restricted it becomes impossible to formulate claims for ethical and political justice in such a diverse community as the human race.⁴⁰

In its core, cosmopolitanism means focusing on the world as a whole rather than on a particular locality or group within it.⁴¹ It is a project that reflects our social reality, which is inherently about change, while presupposing the acceptance of disagreement and curiosity.⁴² This open-ended project, of becoming instead of overcoming, is about the recognition of the legitimate interests of others and their inclusion in the calculation of one’s own interests.⁴³ In general, all cosmopolitan theorists agree on the crisis of congruence between the cultural and the political of the nation-state.⁴⁴ Identities and cultures simply cross (territorial) borders. Also the nation is to serve the people and not the other way around because priority is given to the interests of humanity over those of nations.⁴⁵ Essentially, they argue, the nation-state and its sovereignty is responsible for moral mistakes, fosters exclusion and is outmoded as problem-solver in a globalized world. One has to “put right

³⁷ Delanty, “The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe,” 415.

³⁸ Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*.

³⁹ Gannaway, “What is Cosmopolitanism?” 17.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁴¹ Calhoun, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” 428.

⁴² Delanty, “The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe,” 416.

⁴³ Beck and Grande, “Cosmopolitanism,” 71.

⁴⁴ Antonisch, “The Narration,” 508.

⁴⁵ Robert Audi, “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism in an Age of Globalization,” *Ethics* 13 (2009): 372.

before country and universal reason before the symbols of national belonging.”⁴⁶ Cosmopolitanism advocates the liberal moral features of individualism, egalitarianism and universalism beyond the borders of the state while also insisting that these moral features should act as key regulative principles in reforming transnational institutional structures. While addressing how this might be done later, it is sufficient to say here that further European integration and the development of something like a European cosmopolitan identity can assist in this process.⁴⁷ And as John McCormick has made clear; there is a fertile soil to do so.⁴⁸

In thinking about cosmopolitanism, Judith Brett and Anthony Morgan outlined two versions: political and cultural cosmopolitanism. The first one reflects the development of transnational political institutions that incorporate national sovereignty and develop global political communities. The second version represents the transformation of cultural contexts in everyday life, and the way that alters national identities.⁴⁹ For dealing with both versions in the context of the European project, a so-called *rooted cosmopolitanism* might prove to be the way forward for Europe.⁵⁰ This is because it sees no contradiction between feelings of loyalty and commitment to particular identities and represents an openness towards difference. In other words, it implies a merger instead of a replacement of national cultures and institutions. There is no theoretical reason to suggest that a person can only derive a meaningful existence from one single culture or that holding multiple identities would necessarily render one’s culture obsolete. Rooted cosmopolitanism argues against any attempt of polarizing the national and (cosmopolitan) international levels and, in the context of Europe, speaks of a Europe of nations that must be “cosmopolitized” from within.⁵¹ This kind of cosmopolitanism, that does not confuse unity with uniformity and relies on the principle of tolerance, is the cosmopolitanism I have in mind as a way out from the current deadlock in Europe. It incorporates the nation-state rather than overcoming it.

3.2 Institutionalization

Cosmopolitanism differs from postmodern particularism (that absolutizes otherness) because it values *internalized* and *institutionalized* mutual perspective-taking. A certain institutionalization guarantees collective and individual rights and identities,

⁴⁶ Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship*, 23.

⁴⁷ Peo Hansen, “Post-national Europe – without cosmopolitan guarantees,” *Race & Class* 50 (2009): 27.

⁴⁸ John McCormick, *Europeanism* (Oxford: University Press, 2010).

⁴⁹ Judith Brett and Anthony Moran, “Cosmopolitan Nationalism: Ordinary people making sense of diversity,” *Nations and Nationalism* 17 (2011): 189.

⁵⁰ Beck and Grande, “Cosmopolitanism.”

⁵¹ Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, 16.

while both producing and stabilizing the differences.⁵² Because cosmopolitanism is best served by bringing the Other into the debate, proper representation of the oppressed and excluded groups demands mechanisms that allow them to develop their collective experience, voice their opinions and have them heard.⁵³ Such (transnational) democratic institutions, that deconstruct boundaries and prevent the politicizing of daily life (as explained in the context of Europe's right-wing parties), enable the voice of the individual to be heard, irrespective of its locality. While international law can limit capitalist greediness and state-violence, transnational institutions can offer ordinary people a greater voice.⁵⁴

But if all are equal and everyone different, the protection of minorities becomes nearly essential. But this is easier said than done. While Will Kymlicka recognized that collective rights can be used to oppress individuals, and individual rights can undermine communities, Stevenson argued that minority rights might even lead to a form of cultural apartheid instead of intercultural recognition of difference.⁵⁵ Besides, although minority rights might secure a public presence for previously marginalized groups, they do not ensure that they are respected. After all, to be seen is not to be heard.

Building on the legacy of Jürgen Habermas and the search for non-nationalistic harmony in post-war Germany, Justine Lacroix has tabled something called "European constitutional patriotism."⁵⁶ Mostly based on allegiance to accomplishments and values of a democratic system, Europe could become a post-national society relying on citizens' rationality and engagement in democratic practices and discourses instead of ethnic, cultural or historical alliances: cultural homogeneity is not necessary for democracy.⁵⁷ In other words, a constitution would be enough to unite people in increased (trans)national and (trans)cultural diversity. Although disputable, for now universal human rights seem more useful. Under cosmopolitan law, the bearers of human rights are individuals and not states or nations. Human rights then do not promote a particular Western culture, but provide people of different cultures with the ability to appeal to a higher law. A genuinely cosmopolitan civil society therefore needs to extract support from the framework of a moral universalism, based on a human rights perspective.

Although a solid institutionalization of cosmopolitanism might assist in uniting different nations and cultures, it is rather useless without the "critical" capacities of average citizens: new institutions will otherwise be more technocratic than democratic. The personal capacity to resist cultural fixity is a deeply moral project of

⁵² Ibid., 13.

⁵³ Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship*, 66.

⁵⁴ Cahoun, "Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism," 441.

⁵⁵ Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship*, 51.

⁵⁶ Justine Lacroix, "For a European Constitutional Patriotism," *Political Studies* 50 (2002): 944-58.

⁵⁷ Antonisch, "The Narration," 509; Auer, "New Europe," 1173.

emotional complexity.⁵⁸ One needs to be able to engage with others in new public spaces while being able to position oneself in opposition to “consumerist inclinations, fundamentalism, neo-liberalism and outright cynicism.”⁵⁹ A cosmopolitan individual is able to move within multiple and diverse communities, while resisting the temptation to search for a purer and less complex identity. The overall assumption is that when adopting a more cosmopolitan, therefore less national or parochial, identity, people become more open to difference.⁶⁰

3.3 Practical European Cosmopolitanism

Although cosmopolitanism offers an ethic for globalization, it requires action aimed at states, corporations, markets, and media systems, technologies etc. They simply require politics.⁶¹ Institutionalizing cosmopolitanism is easier said than done. The democratic deficit of Europe is still a defining feature of the European project, despite several attempts to tackle this problem. Here I will briefly outline some practical and institutional examples that could actually “bring the Other into debate” and foster citizen’s participation in European decision-making processes.

First of all, cosmopolitanism is about the recognition of differences so European integration should no longer be concerned with the harmonization of rules and differences: they should respect and embrace Europe’s diversity. Secondly, post-national forms of democracy should be sought in order to empower the EU citizens who feel increasingly alienated from decision-making processes. Beck and Grande have offered us some concrete examples on how to achieve these two objectives.⁶² Concerning European integration they plea for *differentiated integration*, meaning that the EU integration process no longer alters all member states in the same way. Think about the limited amount of members of the Euro- and Schengen-zone, or the specific exceptions that the UK and Denmark have achieved etc. In this way Europe’s diversity is considered the foundation to start from. Also related to the recognition of otherness could be a further implementation of *consensus voting* instead of the majority voting procedures. This is because the latter show no concern for minorities. Furthermore, stimulation of “cross-border” organizations like the Council of Europe can provide participation and involvement opportunities for civic associations, non-member states and other Other’s. In order to empower the EUs smaller nations, the introduction of a *qualified right of veto* could be considered. It is a veto option for a small group of states. Finally, in order to maintain flexibility and open-endedness, introducing a *reflexive loop* is posed as a viable option, meaning, that the rule for arriving at a particular decision

⁵⁸ Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship*, 65.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁶⁰ Brett and Moran, “Cosmopolitan Nationalism,” 189.

⁶¹ Calhoun, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” 430.

⁶² Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, 234-240.

is left open. This means, regarding the decisions at hand, that priority can be given to either legitimacy or effectiveness of the decision-making process. Asking all possible national parliaments for permission to send a peace-keeping mission abroad, for example, might take too much time.

The initial method of European unification, in which “enlightened elites pursued ambitious integrationist projects on the assumption that ‘ordinary people’ would eventually appreciate their advantages,” no longer applies.⁶³ In search of something like a post-national democracy, Beck and Grande state that since even a European Parliament with full powers will be insufficient for that goal in a system of such highly dispersed power, direct intervention is the key to democratization. In a cosmopolitan unity in diversity, a plurality of voices is expected and in fact demanded.⁶⁴ Offering *European-wide referenda* might therefore strengthen Europe from the bottom up, empower its citizens and develop community creating potential.⁶⁵ The recently implemented Citizens Initiative is a start in the right direction.

All these institutional mechanisms can help to empower citizens, marginalized collectivities and others. Countering the either/or logic that is apparent so often, they help to overcome the fear of “cultural suicide” and acknowledge Europe’s diversity and multiple identities. This will therefore help bridging the gap between Europe and its citizens. A more open-ended, direct and institutionalized cosmopolitanism helps, since the more successfully EU policy has operated under the principle of uniformity, the more grass-roots resistance it inspired.⁶⁶

3.4 Criticism

Taking into consideration the text above, cosmopolitanism and its implementation on a European level seems to be a viable solution for the crisis that the EU and its citizens find themselves in. It could both serve as a direction for integration and a base of belonging. However, the pro’s and con’s of cosmopolitanism are currently debated and before coming to a conclusion, some of the criticism directed at it deserves to be mentioned. Unfortunately, the limited scope of this paper does not provide me with an opportunity to actually counter these critics – something which has been done already.⁶⁷

Most of cosmopolitanism’s critiques aim at its *assumed* moral universalism, its institutional feasibility or its lack of political capability. Others argue that it is an elite theory, which is in sharp contrast with processes like Balkanization and therefore of little help when faced with nationalist forms of cultural closure and violence; that it are especially those who have a leftist political preference and are

⁶³ Auer, “New Europe,” 1179.

⁶⁴ Gannaway, “What is Cosmopolitanism?” 12.

⁶⁵ Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, 78.

⁶⁶ Paasi, “Europe as a social process,” 24.

⁶⁷ Garrett Brown and David Held, *The Cosmopolitan Reader* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).

highly educated who advocate a cosmopolitan Europe.⁶⁸ Another element of criticism of a more cosmopolitan Europe is that it is not so worldly or benign at all. Instead of the concept of an overarching Europe that should be inclusive and overcoming boundaries, Europeans often just seem to position themselves as a whole in *opposition* to Others like Edward Saïd's Orient or, more surprisingly, the United States.⁶⁹ Surveys found that for European citizens, the EU represents what the USA does not (i.e. multilateralism, soft-power, welfare capitalism etc.). This means that Europeans do not yet fully overcome the either/or logic which is what cosmopolitanism strives for.⁷⁰ Also, as Hansen has argued with the examples of asylum and foreign policy, there are no guarantees that more integration leads to more humane policies.⁷¹ It is even argued that populism and ethnocentric nationalism have emerged in Europe not *despite* the cosmopolitan agendas, but to a large extent in response to them.⁷²

What is important to recognize is that there is criticism from nationalists, communitarians and feminists alike which can be strongly countered. A prominent component of the cosmopolitan vs. anti-cosmopolitan debate is about when it is that the principles of justice apply. It involves issues of common humanity, our identification with this common humanity, and whether this cosmopolitan identity is strong enough to provide the foundations for a cosmopolitan order. A state-centric would argue that the state is a necessary entity involved with defining the scope of egalitarian distributive justice, while for cosmopolitans like myself it is hard to argue that we have a special moral duty towards unknown fellow countrymen above unknown people from other countries. Without elaborating on such criticisms here, I argue that they remain unconvincing and that it is possible to generate a more compatible balance of loyalties that maintains the normative importance of the state while also increasing its active role in constituting a condition of cosmopolitan global justice: rooted cosmopolitanism.

4 Conclusion

This paper has outlined the anxieties that globalization has brought to the European continent and how people are dealing with them. In opposition to (re-)occurring nationalism, the popular but vague term of cosmopolitanism was coined as a solution to this deadlock and subsequently explained. Having elaborated on some critiques as well, it is time to see to what extent cosmopolitanism provides a workable strategy in transcultural Europe.

⁶⁸ Antonisch, "The Narration," 514; Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship*, 61.

⁶⁹ Saïd, Edward, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979).

⁷⁰ Antonisch, "The Narration," 512.

⁷¹ Hansen, "Post-national Europe," 31.

⁷² Auer, "New Europe," 1168-9.

The attraction of the cosmopolitan idea is clear; it relates to facts about the world in globalizing times, while offering a desirable response to them. Globalization continues to produce various sorts of “both/and” identities. Neither universalism nor essentialist nationalism deals with such multiplicities and overlaps well. Universalists imagine all claims to group solidarity as particular (national) closure, while nationalists imagine all suggestions of multiple identities as “rootless cosmopolitan” challenges to the integral whole.⁷³ In other words, as reflected in the debates surrounding the constitutional referenda in the Netherlands and France, between supporters and opponents of the “European Constitution”, you are either with the enlightened European cosmopolitans or with the bigoted nationalists.⁷⁴ Such dichotomy does not reflect social reality, which in times of immigration, globalization and general increased interconnectedness over borders of nations and boundaries of cultures, is much more complex.

The academic discourse on cosmopolitanism seems to rely on a vicious circle. On the one hand, Europe might not survive without a “we” feeling among its citizens. The lack of classical national elements like a common language, history, traditions, etc. prevent a true European demos for now. On the other hand, this “we” cannot be born as long as Europe does not integrate further because only then the cultural and political spheres will emerge as open and post-national Europe becomes a territorially vague and governmentally multilayered space, filled with cosmopolitan values.⁷⁵ We have also seen that Europeanization is the cause or consequence of integration and globalization, as well as the cause or consequence of disintegration and localization. European identity seems to stimulate satisfied and dissatisfied nationals alike who all reflect upon new modes of identity.⁷⁶ It has become evident that cosmopolitanism is not equally available to everyone, nor is it equally empowering for everyone. That is why the cosmopolitanism of some has sparked the resentments of others.⁷⁷ These paradoxes and nuances specifically reflect reality much better and can only be dealt with by acknowledging them.

Recognizing Europe’s diversity, its composition of nation-states and the paradoxical realities that I just mentioned, *rooted cosmopolitanism* provides a good way for Europe and its people to free themselves from the current deadlock. European reality is one in which identity, culture and sovereignty has inevitably developed from the national framework onwards. In trying to make the world thrive and be more just, which in my opinion is a responsibility the rich world has; we need to recognize the ways that national and other solidarities work for people. If some of us are among those privileged to transcend national or cultural identities etc., they

⁷³ Calhoun, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” 438.

⁷⁴ Hansen, “Post-national Europe,” 28.

⁷⁵ Antonisch, “The Narration,” 506.

⁷⁶ De Beus, “Quasi-national,” 299-300.

⁷⁷ Calhoun, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” 434.

should nonetheless be attentive to the social conditions of those who do not share that privilege.⁷⁸

A union of 27 national states is logically heterogeneous, diverse and difficult to govern. Cosmopolitanism in Europe would mean that its inherent diversity is exploited as an opportunity, for the simple fact that more disputes would bring on more politics.⁷⁹ If Europe wants to develop further into the future and face internal and external challenges successfully, a more cosmopolitan outlook at the heart of decision-making processes is desirable. Reinventing democracy on a post-national scale can decrease Europe's democratic deficit and bridge the gap between the rulers and the ruled. Europe stops being perceived as a threat or non-issue to its citizens as soon as they are empowered and their differences are acknowledged.

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⁷⁸ Ibid., 445.

⁷⁹ Auer, "New Europe," 1179.

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