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Communicating anger and contempt in intergroup conflict

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Chapter 5

General Discussion

General Discussion

Intergroup conflicts often involve and give rise to a range of emotions that people experience on behalf of their group. In this dissertation I focused on the *communication* of such group-based emotions and showed that, contrary to popular opinion, communicating the typical conflict emotion anger (Allred, 1999; Halperin et al., 2011) in intergroup conflict does not necessarily affect the intergroup relationship in a negative way. On the contrary, I proposed that group-based anger in the context of intergroup conflict communicates that the other group is part of a valued relationship that one wants to maintain, which, under favorable conditions, increases empathy and tendencies toward conflict de-escalation in the receiver of this anger (cf. Fischer & Roseman, 2007). This is quite a different way of thinking about the communication of emotions than can be found in most previous work, which focused mostly on strategic ways of expressing individual-level emotions (e.g., Van Kleef, 2009). For one, it implies that emotions such as anger can be viewed as *relational tools* that can send signals to the other party toward intergroup conflict as well as intergroup harmony, depending on a number of conditions.

Indeed, the key questions that I set out to answer in this dissertation was whether and how the communication of *group-based anger* and *group-based contempt* by one group could (de-)escalate the conflict intentions of members of the other group, specifically because I hypothesized that these emotions serve *opposite relational functions* (i.e., communicating anger signals the value of and the desire to maintain the relationship whereas contempt signals exactly the opposite). I approached these general questions by investigating more concretely (a) whether communicating group-based anger has the potential to de-escalate intergroup conflict compared to communicating group-based contempt, or communicating merely that one feels unfairly treated by the other group (Chapter 2 and 4), (b) whether these de-escalating effects are due to group-based

anger's relational functions, as indicated by empathy (Chapter 2, 3 and 4), and (c) which contextual factors determine group-based anger's relative effectiveness (Chapter 3 and 4). This systematic approach already highlights that I do not view the communication of group-based anger as *necessarily* nudging individuals toward social harmony, but that this function will only be able to operate under particular circumstances.

Overview of Findings

Across the eight empirical studies reported in this dissertation, I employed an experimental approach to enable causal inferences from the findings. I thereby made some deliberate choices in the study design to increase experimental control, while keeping the contexts 'real' and credible for the participants (which in most studies were students). In most studies, participants were asked to read an ostensibly real newspaper article or conflict situation that outlined actual conflicts that participants faced. I specifically chose this way of communicating group-based anger and contempt as that is the level at which most intergroup communication takes place: The type of contact people have with an opposing outgroup is not through interpersonal encounters (Marsden, 1987; Halualani et al., 2004), but most often through second-hand information such as mass media outlining intergroup attitudes and behavior (Hargrave & Livingstone, 2009; Postmes et al., 2014). Hence, I chose to realistically recreate such contexts across the reported studies. In addition, to facilitate generalization across contexts, I used a variety of intergroup contexts outlining conflicts ranging from relatively mild annoyances to discriminating attitudes and behavior, and structural deprivation.

Overall, the findings of the dissertation show that the communication of group-based anger by a group that feels unfairly treated in a conflict has an undiscovered potential to de-escalate conflicts. By contrast, their communication of group-based contempt, a "mix" of group-based anger and contempt, or the absence of these group-based emotions all seem less effective in de-escalating

conflict. Additionally, although less strong the findings across the three empirical Chapters suggest that group-based anger's positive effects are due to (i.e., statistically mediated by) increased outgroup empathy, supporting the argument that group-based anger's effectiveness is due to its positive relational function. On the other hand, the opposite findings for communicating group-based contempt fit with anger's opposite, and thus negative, relational function.

These key results are in line with our reasoning that the communication of group-based anger is effective because it does not merely stress a perceived injustice (undesirable treatment by the other group; e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 2001; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), but at the same time emphasizes a desire to create or maintain a positive long-term intergroup relationship (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). The role of empathy for the outgroup is particularly important in this process because it serves as an indicator of anger and contempt's relational functions: On the one hand, anger communicates a desire to approach members of the other group (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), a request to engage in intergroup negotiation with them about the conflict at hand (cf., Van Kleef et al., 2004), and an implicit request for the other party to engage in intergroup reconciliation (cf., Fischer & Roseman, 2007). An ingroup's experience of empathy for the outgroup in response to their anger, then, may be a signal that one cares about the outgroup's plight and is likely to instigate such positive conflict behavior. On the other hand, when members of a group express contempt towards another group, they communicate a desire to avoid members of this other group, thereby by-passing intergroup negotiations, seemingly focused on dealing with the conflict by avoiding it and terminating the relationship with the other group altogether.

The importance of empathy for the outgroup in the present dissertation is reminiscent of research on the contact hypothesis, where empathy has been found to be one of the driving forces of contact's positive effects on intergroup prejudice reduction (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). I agree with previous research in

arguing that, in intergroup conflicts, increasing empathy felt for the outgroup might be an important first way to provide the scope for more positive future intergroup relations (Batson, 1991; Stephan, 2008). However, I would also argue that the communication of anger might be an important aspect of such contact because it represents a way by which we can invite others to empathize with us. Indeed, ultimately it is not mere contact between groups in conflict that will lead to improved intergroup relations, but the *content* of that contact, of which emotional communication may be an important and understudied part.

Nevertheless, it should be clear that my dissertation also shows that the communication of group-based anger has clear boundary conditions and thus that particular conditions are required for or conducive to positive effects of anger occur. First of all, the results of Chapter 2 showed that the communication of group-based anger only had empathy-inducing effects that de-escalated conflict when it was communicated as ‘pure’ anger (i.e., devoid of contempt). Moreover, the results of Chapter 3 showed that perceptions of treatment legitimacy and outgroup consensus concerning the communicated anger determine, in part, its effectiveness in de-escalating intergroup conflict. More specifically, I found that the communication of group-based anger was least effective in increasing empathy when the anger was not accompanied by a legitimate claim and sufficient group consensus. These findings mirror previous research showing that anger might only be effective when it is deemed appropriate given the context in which it is communicated (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), and at the same time extend them by testing them in the context of intergroup conflict. Specifically, the Chapter 3 findings acknowledge this in at least two ways. First, it is important for the ingroup to perceive the communicated anger as following from an illegitimate treatment of the other group by one’s own group. If this is not the case, anger could be perceived as inappropriate and the result is a decrease in empathizing with the outgroup and possibly more destructive conflict behavior (see also Lickel et al., 2006).

Second, if the anger is communicated at an individual level, whereas the conflict is on an intergroup level, anger might be ineffective in evoking empathy at the group level (see Smith, Seger & Mackie, 2007).

Indicating the presence of further important boundary conditions, the results of Chapter 4 revealed that the communication of anger might not be effective when communicated as *past* (rather than present) felt anger in the context of intergroup conflicts with a history. These findings provided a direct test for anger and contempt's opposite relational functions and showed that in contexts where anger is most effective, contempt is not; and vice versa. This is in line with our reasoning that anger is best communicated when the target has the ability to do something about it straight away (i.e., present anger) as it is a request for reconciliation and a desire to improve the relationship. When communicated as felt in the past, group-based anger is interpreted as no longer experienced in the here and now and thus no further need to engage in positive conflict behavior in order to improve the relationship between the two groups. Group-based contempt, on the other hand, communicates a desire to avoid and discontinue the relationship altogether. Unsurprisingly, communicating presently felt contempt does not invite empathy and conflict de-escalation. However, when communicated as contempt felt in the past, contempt is interpreted as no longer present and thus as a ghost from the past. As a result, the desire to disengage is no longer present, which paradoxically provides the target with a renewed opportunity to improve the relationship. Thus, the overall picture of studies and findings in this thesis is not one in which the communication of group-based anger *always* increases empathy and constructive conflict intentions and the communication of group-based contempt always does the opposite --- it also identifies clear boundary conditions for this effect. I discuss the implications of my findings and approach below, followed by a discussion of limitations and directions for future research.

Implications

Throughout my dissertation I focused on the relational functions of communicating group-based anger and contempt in intergroup conflict. I took as a starting point the interpersonal analysis of anger and contempt, which suggested these emotions convey information about the quality of the underlying relationship (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). I have extended this analysis to the intergroup domain and suggest that the group-based emotions of anger and contempt can be used as communicative devices in intergroup conflict as a means to stress and regulate the value of the intergroup relationship. I defined this as the relational function of anger and contempt and have shown these to be polar opposites. Although both emotions share a negative valence, I found the communication of anger to be relationship-affirming, whereas the communication of contempt was found to be relationship-undermining. Moreover, whereas the communication of anger had the potential to de-escalate conflict, the communication of contempt was more likely to escalate it. The notion of a relational function of the communication of group-based anger and contempt implies a view of emotions as not only communicating ‘social information’ (Van Kleef, 2009), but also ‘social intentions’ – they signal whether the social relationship between the groups should be maintained, and thus whether the psychological distance between the groups in conflict should become smaller or larger. They are about the relationship between the groups in conflict.

In this respect, my analysis shares an emphasis on the positive effects of communicating anger with an analysis derived from the Emotions As Social Information model (Van Kleef, 2009). However, these analyses differ to the extent that the latter focuses more on the *strategic* use of anger (i.e., anger as a signal that one is not likely to budge easily) in conflict settings, whereas the focus of this dissertation is on the *relational* function of anger (i.e., anger as a signal of having suffered unjust harm by the target group, combined with an

implicit request for reconciliation). Whereas the strategic use of anger seems to emphasize personal gain at the expense of the other, the relational use of anger emphasizes a mutual gain and a focus on improving the intergroup relationship as a whole. Future research should consider integrating these different aspects of the communication of the same emotion in conflict settings. For instance, under which conditions does the strategic function outweigh the relational function of communicating group-based anger? And under which conditions does the opposite take place?

My thesis research further points to reasons why anger is often, perhaps unjustifiably, regarded as a destructive emotion (Berkowitz, 1989; Lickel et al., 2006). Throughout my dissertation I have identified a range of contextual factors that are important for anger's positive effects to occur in practice. First of all, by differentiating between 'pure' and 'mixed' communications of anger, it becomes clear that the communication of anger is only effective when it is communicated in the absence of other emotions (here: contempt) with less constructive relational functions. In real life, however, it is often hard to communicate such a 'pure' anger, as it is often infused with other, perhaps more destructive emotions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Even if an outgroup succeeds to do just that it is not difficult to imagine that, especially in conflicts defined by a history of animosity, the ingroup's predisposition towards the outgroup might color their perception or interpretation of the emotion, with perhaps destructive consequences. In line with this, I showed in the second chapter that when people focus on their ingroup's perspective in the conflict, this undermines the capacity to additionally take the outgroup's perspective and empathize with them. Therefore, an openness towards the outgroup perspective seems vital for positive effects of anger to be able to materialize.

Furthermore, I identified and investigated two additional antecedents in the third Chapter. If the communication of anger is to be successful in increasing outgroup empathy, the outgroup's treatment (by the ingroup) needs to be

perceived as illegitimate, and their group-based anger as consensual. Our perception of whether an outgroup was treated badly by our ingroup is of course heavily colored by ingroup favouritism, which might prevent us from responding positively to anger even if it is appropriate. Additionally, consensus information regarding the outgroup's communicated anger is often absent, which makes it easier for an ingroup to discard potentially ingroup harming attitudes to be disregarded as 'just a lone voice'.

To illustrate the importance of treatment illegitimacy and consensus, let's apply them to an analysis of a conflict, broadly covered recently (autumn 2014) in the Dutch media. This intergroup conflict is between proponents (mostly white Dutch) and opponents (mostly non-white Dutch) of the character "Zwarte Piet" (Black Pete), who features prominently in an annual piece of Dutch folklore (a children's feast where Sinterklaas comes to bring presents to all children in the Netherlands). Opponents point to the racist characterization of Zwarte Piet (i.e., black-face, large earrings, curly hair), whereas proponents stress that he is merely covered in chimney-soot and dressed up to take part in a harmless children's celebration with no racism at all involved.

In this conflict, it can be observed that one group communicates anger about "Zwarte Piet", emphasizing that they feel discriminated against. Although this could be perceived by the other group as a signal of perceived unfairness while working toward a collaborative solution to maintain a positive relationship, this is clearly not what has been happening in this conflict. Rather, for the most part, the pro-Piet group seems to perceive the anti-Piet group's anger as *inappropriate* and responds defensively. Interestingly, individuals that perceive the anger merely as a criticism of the depiction of Zwarte Piet, rather than of the group wishing to celebrate the tradition, appear more likely to accept this treatment as being unjust and subsequently show stronger empathy toward the outgroup while being supportive of at least some change. Furthermore, clear consensus information concerning the non-white Dutch position on Zwarte Piet

is mostly absent, whereas plenty of anecdotal evidence broadcasted by the media shows non-white Dutch people to in fact be proponents of Zwarte Piet. Hence, the lack of clear consensus information among non-white Dutch allows proponents of Zwarte Piet to perceive the opponents' viewpoint as mere 'lone voices'. As I have shown in Chapter 3, this combination of one group's refusal to acknowledge the other group's treatment as illegitimate, and their perception of a lack of the other group's consensus, is responsible for lowered empathy and as a consequence impedes constructive conflict resolution.

The third contextual factor important for anger's positive effects to occur concerns the temporal framing of anger. My dissertation findings show that, in present-day conflicts, anger can be an effective means to increase outgroup empathy and constructive conflict intentions, whereas contempt is not. The same holds true for conflicts where the conflictual event occurred in the distant past. However, an outgroup communication of anger as felt in the past does not suffice to evoke empathy and constructive conflict intentions because it can be interpreted as an emotion which is no longer present today, and hence a need for reconciliation no longer exists. Thus, it seems crucial to 'contemporize' the conflict by communicating anger as still experienced to this day, and thus pertaining to the *present* relationship. In doing so, a past conflict is psychologically transformed into a conflict with contemporary relevance. Consequently, an outgroup communication of present anger about a past conflict offers the ingroup a renewed opportunity to make amends. In this sense, and contrary to conventional wisdom, it can sometimes be a good thing to open old wounds, as long as anger is used as the knife.

Of course, this list of factors is not meant to be exclusive. For example, one factor that I have not investigated, but that might affect anger's effectiveness is power differentials between the in- and outgroup. In the studies in this dissertation, the outgroup communicating anger was almost exclusively a (minority) group with less power than the ingroup. In such a situation, anger

might more easily be deemed appropriate, given that the outgroup lacks the power to change its own predicament. On the other hand, majority groups with high power tend to possess abundant resources (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), such that their reliance of anger's relational function as a plea for reconciliation, might be perceived as less appropriate. In fact, their anger might be more easily misconstrued as a strategic enforcement of power. This could potentially lead to the same short-term outcome (i.e., restoration of justice), but the relationship as a whole might suffer (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). This is corroborated by recent findings showing that a (Turkish Dutch) minority communication of anger in a conflict situation increased (Dutch) majority empathy, whereas in the reverse situation, the communication of anger did not prove beneficial (Jans, Gordijn, Van Zomeren, & Postmes, 2015). In this sense, the communication of anger may really be a weapon of the weak.

A second yet unexplored factor that may influence anger's effectiveness is the (desired) prior existence of an intergroup relationship. Because I argued that anger emphasizes the importance of *maintaining* a positive long-term relationship, this seems to suggest that when there is no basis whatsoever for any desire to maintain a positive relationship, it is unlikely that the communication of anger will be effective. Future research should investigate this possible boundary condition, for instance in the context of intractable intergroup conflicts (e.g., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Halperin et al., 2011). However, based on the research presented in this dissertation I would argue that anger is first and foremost a signal that something is unfair within the intergroup relationship that one wants to solve while wanting to maintain the relationship. This points toward an approach behavior conveying the message that individuals care about the outgroup, at least to some extent, to bring this to their attention and give them the opportunity to resolve this. Anger might thus provide scope for the creation of a positive intergroup relationship, even if that relationship was not so positive to begin with. Moreover, the results described in Chapter 4 on the

conflict between Moluccan-Dutch and native Dutch showed that even in conflicts with less than positive intergroup relationships, anger's relational function can still operate (under the right conditions). Additionally, circumstantial evidence is provided by research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has shown that Israeli's felt anger, rather than hatred, toward Palestinians motivated their approach-related behaviors towards making concessions in intergroup negotiations (Halperin et al., 2011). Inducing anger, rather than hatred, even in such an intractable conflict, thus seemed to facilitate relational considerations. Although these findings obviously do not pertain to the *communication* of group-based anger, they do suggest that anger might provide an impetus for the construction of a positive intergroup relationship, even in a conflict as entrenched as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Two final unexplored factors refer to additional characteristics of the treatment, beside (il-)legitimacy, that give rise to the anger. Prior research has shown that when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality (Gutierrez, & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). It follows that the more harm is inflicted and the more intentional it is perceived to be, the stronger anger is felt and hence is likely to be communicated. The target of the expressed anger then might need to assess the extent to which actual harm is inflicted and the extent to which their treatment of the outgroup was intentional or not. As with legitimacy, the perception of these factors might influence the extent to which the communication of anger facilitates conflict de-escalation.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

There are certain limitations to the set of studies that comprise my dissertation. For one, most of the reported experiments employed university student samples, rather than samples of people with a more diverse socio-economical background. In addition, I used scenarios and newspaper articles to introduce or remind participants of a specific conflict, rather than submerge

individuals into the real-life dynamics of intergroup conflict. The reason for this is that in conflict situations, it is hard to control for extraneous factors that might influence the communication of anger and how (well) it is received. This would make it hard to answer the questions I set out to answer. Thus, my consistent use of student samples, as well as employing scenarios and newspaper articles in which I could carefully control the communication process, allowed me greater experimental control and internal validity. Nevertheless, this of course comes at the expense of external validity (i.e., how to generalize these findings to other contexts). At the same time, it is important to note that I took care to design studies in contexts that were psychologically realistic and credible for participants, and actually reflected the type of intergroup conflict communication that most people have experience with (i.e., through second-hand information delivered through mass media; Hargrave & Livingstone, 2009; Postmes et al., 2014). Finally, I note that a recent study showed that, in the context of multiculturalism conflict in the Netherlands, a Turkish-Dutch minority communicating anger about unfair treatment by a Dutch majority positively influenced the latter's constructive conflict behavior, whereas this was not the case when the majority communicated anger (Jans et al., 2015). Although these findings seem promising, future research needs to investigate the question of external validity further.

Additionally, across the reported experiments I focused on conflict intentions as the main dependent variables, rather than actual conflict behavior. This means I should be cautious in interpreting whether the communication of group-based anger will lead to actual conflict de-escalation. I am reassured, however, by findings from meta-analyses testing the intention-behavior relation (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheeran, 2002; Webb & Sheeran, 2006), that show intentions have a significant effect on behavior. Future research is needed to test whether the communication of anger can indeed positively change conflict behavior. Similarly, a critic may argue that the current set of studies

focused on relatively ‘low-stake’ conflicts, thus raising the question whether my findings can be expected to apply to ‘higher-stake’ conflicts. Indeed, in conflicts with a long history of contention and thus involving a mutual lack of trust, empathy might not be the ingroup’s first response when faced with an angry outgroup member. Nevertheless, results from Chapter 4 on the more contentious conflict between Moluccan-Dutch and Dutch inhabitants in the Netherlands do suggest that, even in such ‘high-stake’ conflicts, the communication of group-based anger may lead towards less defensive conflict responses when it refers to the *present* intergroup relationship. Moreover, as mentioned before, there is some indication that even in intergroup conflicts as extreme and intractable as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the experience (and by extension the communication) of group-based anger might provide an impetus for conflict de-escalation (Halperin et al., 2011). Future research can further investigate the efficacy of the communication of group-based anger in such ‘high-stake’ conflicts.

Another potential limitation is that I focused in this dissertation on ‘just’ two emotions: anger and contempt. I did so in order to investigate to what extent their communication would either help or hurt the intergroup relationship. I chose contempt as a comparison for anger because, on the one hand, they share a negative valence as well as discontent about the status quo, while on the other hand, they serve opposite relational functions: Whereas anger communicates a desire to improve the relationship, contempt communicates a desire to dissolve the relationship. However, emotion communication in intergroup conflicts is of course not restricted to anger and contempt. A case can be made for the importance of communicating *positive* emotions such as love and care, which may share with anger the same positive relational function of wanting to maintain the intergroup relationship. However, in times of conflict, the communication of such emotions may be less effective as they do not address perceived injustices, which make them unlikely to promote a positive change in

the conflictual intergroup relationship. This may be akin to the notion of ‘irony of harmony’ observed in the intergroup contact literature (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009), which suggests that particularly higher-status or – power groups prefer to be friendly towards lower-status or power-groups during intergroup contact, which does not address intergroup inequality and thus maintains the status quo.

One could also argue that, for this reason, communicating other emotions that share the negative valence of anger might yet prove beneficial, such as sadness and disappointment. First, although sadness signals displeasure, it is associated with internal orientation and withdrawal and is therefore less socially oriented and influential on others (Watson, Clark, McIntyre, & Hamaker, 1992). Although the communication of sadness might sometimes serve as a plea for help, it also implies that the communicator is weak and needy and as such the target might be more likely to show pity (Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982) rather than empathy, and respond with dependency-oriented help (see e.g., Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014) rather than by solving the problem in order to improve the relationship. Put differently, communicating group-based sadness may, if anything, signal to others the need for comforting without solving the issues at hand.

Second, the communication of disappointment has been shown to facilitate cooperation, but only when it succeeds in evoking feelings of guilt in the target. Through inducing guilt, disappointment can improve relationship quality, reduce competition, and facilitate reconciliation (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998). Recent research has shown, however, that the effect of the communication of disappointment differs depending on whether it is communicated by an outgroup member or an ingroup member (Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2013). When communicated by an ingroup member, disappointment evokes feelings of guilt, but when communicated by an outgroup member, such as in all studies in this dissertation, it does not. In fact,

the communication of disappointment by an outgroup member was perceived as a sign of weakness and reduced cooperation. In short, there appears to be something special about the communication of anger. The key reason for this is that the communication of group-based anger appears to be uniquely empathy-evoking, which is directly related to its relational function. However, more research is needed to show this unique feature of anger in contrast to other negatively valenced emotions.

A final limitation of the studies in this dissertation is that I focused on unidirectional communication. I chose this approach because in many real-life conflicts, often one or more pivotal events in the relationship between two groups can be identified that create an enduring basis for intergroup conflict (Fisher, 2000). This unidirectional approach allowed me to investigate the immediate effects of the communication of group-based anger on empathy and intentions to de-escalate the conflict. However, this approach fails to capture the emotional *dynamics* present in dialogue groups (e.g., contact between Israelis and Palestinians) or in media debates in which representatives of two parties in conflict use emotions as communicative devices to or about one another. This is also the main reason for why I cannot make substantial claims about the long-term benefits of communicating group-based anger in intergroup conflicts. Hence, future research is needed using interaction and longitudinal designs to capture these emotional dynamics and to test for long-term benefits of communicating group-based anger.

Conclusion

In the past, anger has received a bad reputation (Berkowitz, 1989; Lickel et al., 2006) for being a destructive force in intergroup conflict. In my dissertation, across three empirical chapters that report multiple studies per chapter, I have shown that the communication of ‘pure’ group-based anger appears to have the potential to *de-escalate* intergroup conflict by emphasizing the importance of maintaining a positive intergroup relationship and inducing empathy for one’s

situation in the other group. This relational function of the communication of group-based anger implies that inviting empathy for one's group through the communication of group-based anger may be a key factor in de-escalating intergroup conflict. Throughout this dissertation, I contrasted the relational function of anger with that of contempt, which is aimed more at avoiding or escalating the conflict. Additionally, I identified several boundary conditions of anger's relational function, showing that the communication of anger was most effective (1) when the ingroup perceived their treatment of the outgroup as illegitimate, (2) when the ingroup perceived high consensus in the outgroup regarding the communicated anger, and (3) when the anger was communicated as felt at present, rather than in the past. Thus, the communication of group-based anger in intergroup conflict does not *always* have empathy-inducing effects, but it for sure has more potential in this domain than previously thought. In this respect, I hope that my dissertation has provided a first step toward developing a better understanding of the relational function of communicating group-based anger as a means of de-escalating intergroup conflict.

