3 EUROPEAN MODELS AND PRACTICES OF CMR

3.1 INTRODUCTION

For about a half century, Turkey has aspired to be a full member of the EU. As one of the most admired Western organizations, the EU sets some strict economic and political conditions in line with its liberal democratic culture, a product of its centuries of experience, to sustain its internal harmony. By virtue of the Customs Union that has been in force since 1996, Turkey has almost met the economic conditions set by the EU. According to World Bank reports, in 2010 its economy was better than that of some of EU’s Balkan members. However, it is widely accepted that although it fundamentally meets the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey’s democracy is not yet stable. One of the significant problems in her democracy is considered to be the far-reaching role of the TAF in the political field. Thus, the EU expects from Turkey a further alignment than her CMR norms currently allow for, so that she may reach the same or at least similar levels of liberal implementation.

To meet this expectation Turkey has taken considerable steps in the past two decades. However, while many, including PM Erdogan, believe that, the Europeanization of the CMR has come to a culmination point in Turkey; those in EU circles do not share this view, since they detect some deficiencies. Correspondingly, many official EU documents have still criticized Turkey on this issue. Nevertheless, they only highlight the insufficiencies in the Turkish system and do not address any specific CMR model, but continually refer to common European practice. Besides, there is almost nothing in the EU acquis delineating the borders of a democratic CMR, which can be used as a checklist by aspiring countries. All these factors make the issue more ambiguous and cause confusion among scholars, politicians, aspiring nations, and even in the EU Institutes, as the various EU countries exercise distinct models.

Furthermore, as this research relies on constructivism as tool, even if a checklist had existed, it would have been insufficient to reveal how CMR actors’ interests and preferences are formed in the first place. Thus, as the research tool obliges, the historical, cultural, and sociological roots of the European identity, which lie at the basis of the present CMR norms, are to be briefly explored to make a better comparison of the EU’s CMR norms with the specific Turkish case. In doing this, it also seems necessary to put a

special emphasis on religion, and especially on the superb European achievement of guaranteeing the separation of church and state. The rationale for this emphasis is twofold.

The first reason addresses the European side. Although almost no one officially pronounces religion as a condition of membership in EU circles, nearly all debates about Turkey revolve around it. Additionally, some scholars believe that Christianity was and has been the primary systemic denominator in the formation of the EU identity. Hurd, for example, claims, “[t]he Turkish case is therefore controversial in cultural and religious terms not only because it involves the potential accession of a Muslim-majority country to an arguably, at least historically, Christian Europe.”

The second reason addresses the Turkish side. Formerly, the interference of the TAF in political domains was rather broad. The TAF was the primary decision maker of Turkey’s crucial interests, such as Cyprus, the Armenian and Aegean disputes, PKK Terrorism, and Political Islam. Recently, there are some indications that the TAF tends to limit its political interference solely to the internal threat originating from Kurdish separatism and political Islam. The latter is considered the last step towards a Sharia-ruled country, as it aims at Islamizing domestic legislation. Regarding the above postulation, Heper argues that the TAF “still think that on some such critical issues as political Islam and ethnic separatism they have a better grasp of those problems than do civilians.” To disclose whether fundamentalist Islam poses a real threat to the secular state I will examine the issue mainly in the fifth and sixth chapters. Accordingly, for the purpose of comparison, in this chapter I will also briefly explore similar processes experienced in Europe.

As argued by Jung and Raudvere, “the image of a Christian Europe is still influential and very useful in the political struggle over the future face of the EU.” On this debate, two influential scholars, Byrnes and Katzenstein suggest, “[t]here is not a religion of the world that has the depth and breadth of relationships with the Roman Catholic Church

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185 Özcan, G., The changing role of Turkey’s military in foreign policy making, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No 23 May / Mayo 2010, p. 2.
which Europe has had.” In fact, in contrast to EU acquis, in which religion is never mentioned as a condition, most opponents to Turkey’s membership started to put special emphasis on religion by claiming that Christianity is an inseparable part of the European culture. They use as evidence the failure of Muslim immigrants in many European countries to integrate well, emphasizing the differences existing in Islam, and they claim that Turkey does not belong to Europe. According to these opponents, “Turkish Muslims - like the Muslim migrants in Copenhagen, The Hague, and Berlin - will never integrate no matter how formal reforms are taken.” By emphasizing this impasse Jung and Raudvere argue, “[t]he contribution of historically deep-rooted stereotypes that make the country’s [Turkey] accession an uphill struggle cannot easily be dismissed.” Besides, because the EU does not seem enthusiastic about Turkey’s membership, some supporters of Turkey “are afraid the country [Turkey] could turn into an ‘Islamist rogue state’ if Brussels refuses.” As for average European people, some “polls suggest that cultural and religiously based doubts about Turkish accession resonate with a much larger proportion of the European population than those who publicly defend the idea of an exclusivist ‘Christian’ Europe. Both secularists and Christian exclusivists (‘traditionalists’) express hesitations about Turkish membership.”

Although almost no one officially pronounces religion as a condition of membership, the core of the debates in Europe about Turkey centers around religion and whether or not it is part of the European cultural heritage and the European identity. Thus, the inclusion in the research of both religions’ shaping effect over EU and Turkish identities is important, even if it lengthens the research and makes it more complex. For although most Western scholars tend to neglect theoretical and systematic studies over the role of religion in politics, religion is still a significant part of the world ‘out there’. Thus, attitudes on both sides lead to academic avoidance and increased difficulties.

In sum, while the EU’s political conditionality and the formal aspect of the CMR will be the primary argument of this chapter, I will briefly examine the roots of European identity. In doing so, while omitting domestic factors, such as nationality, historical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic ties, the I will focus on the analysis of macro-level systemic

191 ibid. p. 4
192 ibid. p. 5
sources, such as religions, shared understandings, and ideologies, as they heavily shaped Europe’s collective identities, and facilitated transnational convergence of domestic values. I will also investigate the traces of constitutive practices of the CMR in the European liberal identity.

Thereafter, because there is no clearly delineated CMR model provided by the EU, I will briefly explore the ways of some prominent EU member countries, as well as Israel, which have developed different democratic models fitting their own peculiarities, to shed light on this ambiguity. The chapter will end with a concluding remark.

3.2 Roots of European Identity

As previously mentioned, because the framework theory of this study is constructivism, as argued by Jung and Raudvere it requires “identifying cultural forms such as myths, languages, religions, or the sciences”\(^{194}\) to discover the ideas behind the existence of European civilizations. Further analysis of these components may yield to the following conclusions: the myths of the EU nations noticeably vary, the EU is a multilingual organization, and science is more common than the European identity. Therefore, except for religion, the components above seem unable to form the common constituting element of European identity. On the same issue Waardenburg asserts, “[t]he normative views that Muslims and Christians held about the others and their identity strengthened the normative views they had of their own unique identity.”\(^{195}\) Thus, the preceding suggestions imply that “the lack of precise cultural denominators lead, it seems, almost automatically to arguments that take up religion as the prime mutual cultural source.”\(^{196}\) Byrnes and Katzenstein’s suggestion underpins this view. To them, “European enlargement, however, is infusing renewed religious vitality into Europe’s political and social life.”\(^{197}\)

While some scholars analyzing identity emphasize that Christianity is the major factor shaping European identity, others argue that the ancient Greeks’ moral reasoning and rational way of thinking are the main historical origins of the European identity. As

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quoted by Klotz and Lynch, Reus-Smit argues, “Thucydides detailed how the Greeks employed moral reasoning and rhetoric in the application of conflict resolution norms. City-states valued arbitration as a way of mediating disputes, thus creating a ‘fundamental institution’ that structured relations among them.”

In fact, the main source of rational thinking was the mathematical science passed down from the ancient Egyptian priests. As is well known, the great Greek philosophers were primarily mathematicians. Throughout the Dark Era, Greece was again under the monopoly of the Catholic monasteries. During the period of the Reformation, mathematics was regarded as one of the most powerful weapons of Protestantism. Then, the Roman Empire assumed the leading role in shaping a common identity by imposing some “influential elements included use of shared language (Latin), administrative and legal system, and cultural attitudes. The Roman Empire also introduced a shared religious world view following the adoption of Christianity as the official religion . . . in AD 391.” In line with the foregoing, Weiss asserts that, “Roman Law would become the foundational law of the Christian world; there would be no distinctively Christian law. The corpus juris civilis of Justinian was the product of Christian compilation and the project of a Christian emperor, but it would not be seen as Christian law.”

After the demise of the Roman Empire in AD 476, the Dark Ages began. They lasted for about 11 centuries, during which Europe suffered from severe inter-continental turmoil and territorial struggles with the Muslim world, due to their religiously oriented worldviews. In this period, Muslims invaded Iberia and seized Jerusalem, thereby launching the Crusades, the effects of which seem continually to have shaped both Christian and Muslim identities. According to Gowland, Dunphy and Lythe, many elites living in that era believed that “‘Christendom’ was cemented by elements of a shared ‘super-culture’ based around lingua franca of Latin, shared adherence to Christianity and shared cultural and symbolic practices originating in these and underpinned by the structures of the Church.” But even more challenging than this statement is the

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suggestion of Perkins, who argues that before the crusades “‘there was no Europe’ since there had been no unifying cause or ideal.”203 In 1555, towards the end of the Dark Ages, as a precursor of toleration for religious minorities, the Augsburg treaty was signed between the Holy Roman Empire and the Alliance of the Lutheran Princes. It “ratified the institutional and sociological imprint of the religious map created by the Reformation and divided Europe into a Protestant north and a Catholic south.”204

Just after the bloody thirty-year war between the major Christian sects, the Europe opened a new era in 1648, with the Peace of Westphalia. The term ‘Westphalia’ is now synonymous with an interstate system that represents the ban on the intermingling of church and state.205 Moreover, “Europeans had to accept that the Almighty, for whatever reason, refused to signal which church teaches the true faith . . .”206 More importantly, “Protestants and Catholics were redefined as equal before the law, Calvinism was legally recognised, and neither pope nor Holy Roman Emperor was permitted to interfere with the administration of independent states.”207 Thus, the scientific revolution, along with idealism, was added to the above-mentioned historical occurrences and the entire historical process concluded with the Enlightenment era, which became another influential factor shaping the European identity. Checkel and Katzenstein’s argument seems to be fully in line with this assumption. To them, the EU “is a project rooted in the European Enlightenment, and an emphatic way of saying ‘never again’ to the disastrous wars of the twentieth century.”208 Therefore, to better analyze the European identity, it seems necessary to look into the details of the occurrences during the Enlightenment era. This will also facilitate comparison with the Ottoman and Turkish modernization movements.

There are many definitions of the enlightenment, but Kontler simply terms it “a pursuit of happiness: material and, no less important, spiritual well-being and satisfaction.

for themselves and others, the one being inseparable from the other.”

Although there is no consensus over the period of the Enlightenment era, it is widely accepted that it began around the 1650s. According to Israel, it was a brand new trend in ideas rising across Western Europe and America “towards secularization, toleration, equality, democracy, individual freedom, and liberty of expression.” The major motivation behind this trend was “‘philosophy’ and its successful propagation in the political and social sphere . . . in the end such ideas were bound to precipitate a European and American revolutionary process, of a type never before witnessed.”

According to Israel, “Spinoza was the chief challenger of the fundamentals of revealed religion, received ideas, tradition, morality, and what was everywhere regarded, in absolutist and non-absolutist states alike, as divinely constituted political authority.” However, there is almost a common consensus that while Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton became pioneers of the scientific revolution, “the roles in the making of ‘modernity’ of such key Enlightenment thinkers as Locke, Hume, and Voltaire” should not be understated. Besides, Bacon, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Kant are also accepted as the influential actors who predominantly shaped the European identity. Descartes, in particular, stands out as a key figure of this era; his scientific contributions aside, his masterpiece, *Discourse on the Method* (written in 1637; while first published in 1665 in Amsterdam, its publication in the Ottoman Territory took place in 1895) opened a new horizon in philosophy and “transformed men’s way of viewing the world.”

“In his *Lettres persanes* (1721), Montesquieu ends up pleading for religious tolerance . . . A few years later, in his *Lettres philosophiques* (1734), Voltaire voices his agreement. ‘If there were only one religion in England, then one would fear despotism; if there were two, they would be at each other’s throats; but there are thirty, and they are living happily in peace . . . Hume is the first to find it not in any one characteristic shared by all, but in the plurality of countries that make up Europe.’

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211 ibid.


214 ibid. p. 5.

This revolution in the scholarly realm turned the focus from the absolute rulers and powerful bishops to the human itself, and human rights became the main pillar of the legal and constitutional principles of Europe. As argued by Klausen, “the divine origin of human rights was an eighteenth-century idea. It inspired the US Declaration of Independence and influenced the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.”

As mentioned above, in addition to the scientific and idealist revolution, one of the leading components of enlightenment is the secularization that began with the Peace of Westphalia, which restrained the Vatican’s systemic power over the Christian World. Many scholars believe that curbing the churches’ influence in social and particularly political fields has been the most significant event in the emergence of strong secularization movements that led to the present modern EU Identity. According to Byrnes and Katzenstein, the primary motivation behind this success “is precisely the triumph of secularism as a teleological theory of religious development.” They also argued that this means that secularism produced some significant systemic outcomes in the Christian world. For Katzenstein and Byrnes, “Secularization as an inherent feature of modernization, he [Scott Thomas] argues, is applicable to European religion but not to the rest of the world.” This argument implies that the ways of European secularization are so distinctive that they cannot be compared with and applicable to the Muslim world.

Thus, having adequately learned their lessons from the bloody sectarian wars, Europeans willingly put a distance between politics and religion and curbed churches’ power in the political and social realms. Consequently, a gradual religious decline took place throughout European society. An important point emphasized by Casanova is that “it is interpreted through the lens of the secularization paradigm, and therefore accompanied by a ‘secularist’ self-understanding that interprets that decline as ‘normal’ and ‘progressive.’ It is therefore seen as a quasi-normative consequence of being a ‘modern’ and ‘enlightened’ European.” The key point, however, is the premise that the more modern and progressive a society becomes, the more religion tends to decline. This premise has assumed in Europe the character of a taken-for-granted belief widely shared.

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not only by sociologists of religion but also by a majority of the population.220 This suggestion implies that starting from ancient Greece, all historical occurrences together with the scientific and economic revolution, as well as the Great Philosophers’ constructing effects over the Europeans, concluded with an outstanding outcome, in which religion was no longer a leading force in state systems and society. For, “since the earliest times, the task of Christian thinkers has been to combine the accepted philosophy of the time with Christian beliefs so as to arrive at a coherent theoretical and practical synthesis.”221

In fact, the major changes in society began with the one of the most significant outcomes of Enlightenment, the French Revolution. On this topic Israel argues, “[s]ocially and institutionally, ancien régime society did not change very dramatically between 1650 and 1789. What did change spectacularly and fundamentally was precisely the intellectual context.”222 Even if it was a continuation of the previous developments and accumulation of some social factors such as popular participation, class antagonism, economic change, cultural shifts, or social pressures, the main distinguishing feature of the French Revolution should not be underemphasized. Referring to Edmund Burke’s monumental book, Thoughts on French Affairs (1791), Israel asserts that the French Revolution was “a revolution of doctrine and theoretic dogma.”223

In addition to secularism, another sine qua non element of European identity, pluralism, finds its roots in Ancient Greece, where states shared the same geography during the same period, but they “retained a high degree of autonomy and refused to recognize the supremacy of the others.”224 However, the main contribution to pluralism was made, maybe unintentionally, by Christianity itself. Until the Augsburg treaty, Catholic Christianity dominated almost all of Europe. As argued by Todorov and Bracher:

“That uniformity brought about a ‘degeneration of every type of knowledge,’ from which the continent was only able to emerge because of the divisions first between Catholics and Orthodox Christians, then between Catholics and Protestants, and finally, between

223 ibid. p. 4.
Christians and freethinkers. Europe thus became the land of pluralism that Greece had formerly been.”

In fact, the power struggle between the church and rulers has not utterly ended, but it has lasted locally and in a lesser degree, depending on sects and other major national peculiarities. For that reason, the difference between European countries with “constitutionally privileged national churches — Lutheranism in Denmark and Norway, Anglicanism in Great Britain, Greek Orthodoxy in Greece, and Roman Catholicism in Portugal — and those that do not formally have a national church is often small.” In France, for instance, as an outcome of the French Revolution, “the demographically dominant Catholic Church placed itself on the wrong side of the ideological divide; the church as a result lost a great deal of its power, privilege and moral authority,” while in Poland, “the church remains (for better or worse) institutionally strong.” On the same token, while Scandinavians seem over secularized, some countries, like Greece, Poland, and Ireland seem to have remained less secularized. The remnants of the bloody sectarian clashes are very fresh in humanity’s memory of Northern Ireland. Yet, unlike in the Muslim world, no one could claim that secularism would be at risk in Europe anymore. An important factor that brings Europe into a more secular state lies in the regular religious practices of the Christianity. Unlike Islam, which requires believers to go to mosques five times every day to reinforce religious ties and solidarities via direct interactions, Christianity requires minimal regular actions, making it as a religion less visible in social life. Despite these minimal requirements, “an increasing majority of the European population has ceased participating in traditional religious practices, at least on a regular basis, while still maintaining relatively high levels of private individual religious beliefs.”

This contrast can easily be observed when one compares the religious habits of Dutch Muslims and Scandinavian Protestants. “Three out of ten Muslims say they go to the mosque regularly [5 times per day], but only one out of twenty Protestants say they go to church regularly [one time per week].”

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225 ibid.
229 Byrnes, T.A. & Katzenstein, P.J., Religion in an expanding Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 65
Some scholars also believe that a noticeable gap exists between the two religions in how they interpret the laws of holy books. While almost all Muslims consider the sharia rules to be non-interpretable, Europeans have bravely concluded that “one of the characteristics of the European tradition is precisely the use of critical thinking: all values can be subjected to examination.” Christian religious actors exhibited a more rigid stance against religious fundamentalism also contributed to this irrevocable process of secularization. Waardenburg, for instance, argues, “in Christianity, clergy and monks paid much attention to doctrine, morality, and ethics. In Judaism and Islam, rabbis and ‘ulama’ devoted themselves to the study of Torah and Shari’a.” To better illuminate the differences, Waardenburg suggests, especially, after WWII, “with the end of the missionary era, a concern with interreligious cooperation and dialogue has evolved. According to its self-understanding, Christianity is completely different from Judaism and Islam.”

The following may be drawn from the preceding: Since Western Europe has experienced a robust reformation and enlightenment progress, due to so many peculiar factors; Europeans have acquired a sui generis identity, divergent from the Muslim identity. Some scholars allege that diversions between identities in Eastern and Western Europe also stem from the different sects of Christianity. They argue that “Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam are transnational religious traditions that each have their own understanding of European identity, European unity, and even of European modernity.” In their research, Berglund, Hellen, and Aarebrot attempt to compare the German and Habsburg Empires with their counterparts, the Russian and Ottoman Empires, and try to discover the constituting determinants of their identities. They argue:

“The Western Group shares traditions of Roman Law, feudalism and relatively early national awakening; the Eastern Group has a Byzantine heritage and lack of strong feudal traditions, enabling ancient local authority relationships such as kinship clientelism to survive longer.”

According to them, while there is an identity gap between the Western and Eastern groups, the gap between the North Eastern (Russia) and South Eastern (Ottomans and

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231 Todorov, T., and Bracher, N., European Identity, South Central Review, Johns Hopkins University Press, Volume 25, Number 3, Fall 2008, p. 6.
233 ibid. p. 69.
their descendants, the Turks) groups’ identities is wider than the former. They argue, “[t]he North/South dichotomy is reinforced by the strength and autonomy of political authority versus religious leadership.” 236 Supporters of this view also suggest that numerous historical bloody clashes between the Christian and Muslim worlds have partially contributed to this identity gap. For that reason:

“Western institutions tended to identify Muslims negatively: as enemies (by the Church in the Crusades and later), as adversaries (by colonizing states), as people to be converted (by missionary societies), or as people of lower cultures (by spokesmen of Western civilization).” 237

In his research, Crampton consults the middle ages to analyze the above-mentioned roots of the triple division. According to him, the main grounds of today’s identity diversion “may be traced back to Constantine’s splitting of the Roman empire in 395, or to the great schism of 1054 which separated the eastern or Orthodox church from Western Christendom. The divisions were deepened by the Crusaders’ assault on Constantinople in 1204 and much more so by the fall of that city to the Ottoman armies in 1453.” 238 Especially, the Ottoman invasion of Constantinople and termination of the Byzantine Empire seems to have heavily influenced Christian Europe’s identity. This unforeseen incident forced many Byzantine scientists and scholars to immigrate to Italy, where they played active roles in sparking off the Renaissance movement. 239

As seen above, while many scholars believe that European identity and Christian thought have shaped each other, some seek the origin of the distinctive European identities in the great efforts against the church for secularism and against monarchs for civil freedoms. There are plausible indications that these struggles created a long-term democratic tradition, as well as prosperity. Supporting this view, Dietrich and Raudvere argue that “[p]hilosophical traditions from Antiquity, Renaissance, and the early modern period are emphasized from this perspective as foundations of Western democracy.” 240 Philpott goes beyond this assertion to state that “European integration originated in the

236 ibid.
239 Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/ottomanempire_1.shtml, accessed on 22 May 2012.
post–World War II popularity of European federalism, itself rooted in Christian Democracy and Catholic social thought."  

Within this context, to say that “the spiritual and cultural heritage of Europe is a combination of Greek Philosophy, Roman Law, Christianity, Humanism and Enlightenment” may not be a wrong postulation. In the same way, as argued by Faltin and Wright, “European identity and our community are built on cultural, religious and humanist inheritance. The Judeo-Christian roots of Europe are the oldest and boldest ones.” Thus, as put forward by Checkel, Europe, despite its gruesome and tumultuous history, has been able to transform into a relatively peaceful and flourishing continent. Within this identity, the most crucial features of the community are the rule of law, individual freedom, liberty of expression, equality, plurality, and last but not least, tolerance.

### 3.3 European Culture and its Influence on CMR

In the above-mentioned liberal environment, democratic peace theory has developed, claiming that wars would disappear from the world with the proliferation of democratic states. As a major element of democracy, countless political parties appeared, and the power struggle among them played a significant role in shaping the CMR norms in Europe. While conservative and nationalist parties seem more pro-militarist, liberals and leftists tend to exhibit a more cautious stance regarding the military. In France, for instance, “while the right demanded a professional army that, in its view, could insure domestic order and stability, the left feared that a professional army would do the bidding of the reactionary segments of society, and believed that only militia or reserve forces could guarantee the survival of the French Republic.” In 1928, while the Nazi Party won 14 seats in the Reichstag, in France the central parties’ coalition reduced the length of

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compulsory military service from three years to one year. The Radical Socialist Party’s leader went further, expressing his worries that “a professional army might be more dangerous than one might believe for the security of our nation.” While civilians were apparently making unwise choices in the face of worrying occurrences in France and neighboring countries, the French Army, although worried about those occurrences, preferred not to become involved in the civilian sphere, probably because of past events in their cultural history. On this issue, Kier argues, “[w]ith the recurrent instability of the Third Republic, the rise of the left, and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, the army became increasingly fearful of the republic.” After almost a decade, France paid a big price, as civilians preferred to respond to domestic factors instead of focusing on the international environment, while a neighboring country was becoming dramatically more threatening. Thus, because France failed to establish the vital balance between threats and military power, it was unable to resist the German invasion in 1940.

As a part of the democratization movement, Kant’s prediction in his Third Preliminary Article, “[s]tanding Armies shall be entirely abolished in the course of time” has been a strong motivation for repelling militaries from political and social realms, even if Fordham and Walker found “evidence that democracies may actually have been more militarized than other states before 1914.” Contrary to Kant’s prediction, the world’s bloodiest wars erupted in relatively democratic Europe in 1914 and 1939. However, despite the fact that Kant’s theory was refuted two times, the third trial has found considerable supporters in Europe during the Post-World War II era. As a staple of liberal thought, republican regimes begin to devote less to their militaries, due partially to the dramatic diminution of the Soviet threat. In this context, European countries (except the UK) have turned to drastic downsizing of unit and troop numbers, as well as a reduction in military spending year by year. By doing so, liberals have expected that states would mitigate the security dilemma. According to Fordham and Walker, this expectation finds its roots in the Enlightenment era. They argue that, while overcoming security dilemmas,

246 ibid.
247 ibid. p. 77.
248 ibid. p. 89.
“[t]he primary role is to be played by a reduction in military spending, a central concern of liberals dating back to the Enlightenment.”  

In this brief section, the European Culture and its influence on the CMR are tied together, despite rather few scholarly publications. However, there are plausible indications that the liberal culture, having flourished in almost all social and political realms, has also influenced the officer corps in Western Europe. In addition to liberal cultures, the two bloody World Wars helped the demilitarization process and speeded up a huge marginalization campaign that later concluded with almost a total disappearance of militaries from the political and social realms. However, in addition to these systemic factors, there seem to exist some subcultures that have also influenced CMR and caused distinctions between the European Countries as argued by Kier. According to him, “[s]ome states have only one subculture -- during the interwar period, the British civilians concurred on fundamental questions about the domestic position of the armed forces -- while others have two or more competing subcultures, e.g., during the same period in France. Both show the importance of ideational factors, but they work in different ways.”  

The outcomes of the two different approaches will be examined in the following sections.

### 3.4 EU’s Conditionality

As a democratic formation, the EU opens its doors to all European states without discrimination. As it is also a contemporary and wealthy ‘club,’ there has been an extensive demand for membership, except for a few countries that have their own special grounds. To deal with the new members and candidate countries, the EU has been using the conditionality tool, which aims to incorporate newcomers into the Union and harmonize domestic politics with EU norms and regulations. In reality, conditionality is not peculiar merely to the EU. According to Checkel, it is “a basic strategy through which international institutions promote compliance by national governments.”  

After becoming official candidates, once states guarantee the acceptance of the specific policies of an international institution, they are also entitled to some grants, on condition that they abide by their guarantees. From the EU side, for instance, democratic conditionality has recently played a significant role in the mutual negotiation process. To encourage those states to comply with its human rights and democratic norms, the EU uses conditionality

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251 ibid. p. 7.
253 Checkel, T.J., Compliance and Conditionality, Arena Working Papers, 2000, WP 00/18, Abstract.
mainly through a policy of reinforcement by rewards that could be in the form of association agreements, financial assistance, or EU membership status. Therefore, to become an EU member, candidate countries have to strengthen their democracies, liberalize their economies, make necessary reforms in their state institutions, and adopt the EU’s entire acquis before admission. Since the early years of the Union, like its name and organization, the EU’s conditionalities have also changed, and the more demands the EU has received for membership, the stricter these conditionalities have become.

The EU’s general conditionality can be classified into four articles.

Geography is the fundamental criterion that was preserved in Article 237 of the 1958 Rome Treaty, that states, “[a]ny European country can apply to become a member of the Community.” The article under the Final Provisions (Title VII) in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty includes a similar statement, in which any European state may apply to become a member of the Union.

Despite the simplicity and clarity of the criterion, some EU circles allege that Turkey does not belong to the European continent, by an attempt to redraw the continent’s geographical borders combined with some additional factors. Although the Turkish Trace is geographically an inseparable part of the European Continent, France, for example, accentuates border issues by drawing attention to its cultural dimension. During the French presidential campaign, Sarkozy repeatedly stated his opposition by arguing, “Turkey does not have a place in Europe, claiming instead that Turkey's place was in Asia Minor.” According to France, definition of the EU’s border is a critical step in the formation of the European Identity. Thus, the meaning of ‘Europeanness’ in the context of enlargements is much more difficult to determine. The term European should not be defined only geographically, but should also contain some socio-cultural understandings.

Supporting France’s arguments, some legal scholars also oppose a purely geographical understanding of Europe. The EU is in search of ways to develop a European demos that can move beyond the national attachments of the member state citizens. By the same token, Palmer and Gillespie argue, “the European demos is expected to have a special European identity based upon shared European values and a common approach to

255 Retrieved from the EU’s Official Library on 21 June 2008: ftp://www2.eudor.net/download/.
256 Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sarkozys-policy-on-turkeys-eu-accession-bad-for-france, accessed on 10 September 2019.
universal issues.” Habermas broadens the debate by identifying five attributes common to Europeans. To him the vital elements of the European identity are:

“The neutrality of authority, embodied in the separation of church and state, trust in politics rather than the capitalist market, an ethos of solidarity in the fight for social justice, high esteem for international law and the rights of the individual, and support for the organizational and leading role of the state.”

In contrast to the above approaches, the question ‘what is Europe’ for purposes of the EU enlargement law has already been answered. Turkey has been recognized as a European state, whereas the Moroccan application was rejected based on the responses by the EU to the applicants. As Turkey is also an undisputed member of several European organizations, such as the Council of Europe, Eureka, Eurochemical and the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, Turkey can legally be said to be a European country, according to the EU laws. This criterion has been confirmed many times by the EU institutions, numerous member states, and mutual agreements.

However, even if Turkey is unquestionably considered a European country in official EU institutions, as some nations will ratify the final membership decision, Turkey must take the views emphasizing the European identity into serious consideration. For that reason, the issues of how the European identity has been formed over the years was analyzed earlier, and to what extent the Turkish identity converges with the peculiar EU identity will be touched upon in detail later.

In fact, since there were some differences between the criteria contained in the Rome Treaty and the emerging detailed prerequisites set for applicant countries over time, all membership conditions were consolidated into a single declaration in June 1993 at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen. With the Copenhagen declaration, “EU member states agreed to apply both economic and political conditionality to new applicants,” which means they would have to fulfill several political and economic conditions.

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259 The most objective source for the geographical understanding of Europe is the application of Morocco on 8 July 1987, rejected by the Council on 1 October 1987, and the recognition that Turkey is a ‘European State’ under EU law: see Preamble and Article 28 of the 1963 Ankara Agreement, and the decision of the Helsinki European Council, 10-11.12.1999, Presidency Conclusions, para. 12.
conditions, which are: “Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.”

When talking about political criteria, the exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as association, expression, movement, and religion are paramount. These are the second pre-conditions for a candidate country to be able to open accession negotiations. The EU expects the candidates to adopt not only these principles, but also to internalize and live with them.

The economic criterion is depicted as “[t]he existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.” In other words, the existence of a free and functional market economy requires liberalized trade, as well as having a sufficient amount of human and physical capital. Macroeconomic stability and consensus about economic policy are needed to improve the performance of the market economy. The absence of barriers to market entry and exit, and an efficient legal system are also essential. The economic criteria also require a financially transparent banking system and an independent central bank.

Finally, the acquis criteria are described as “[t]he ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular, adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union.” The primary concern of the acquis criteria is the administrative capacity of the applicant. Fulfilling the acquis criteria requires the creation of a firm legal and institutional structure and the acceptance of earlier agreements made by other member states within the Union, including the political, economic, and monetary union, which also means that all new members have to accept the common currency. The candidate countries’ contribution to and support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFPS) is also another significant factor, especially from the Turkish perspective, as it is considered the strongest aspect of Turkey. The assessment of the candidate country’s ability to assume the obligations of membership is structured by the list of thirty-five acquis chapters.

262 ibid.
263 ibid.
264 For detail info, see my policy analysis. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-turns-cold-to-european-defense-implications-for-Western-security.
Aside from the general accession criteria, the EU has always paid close attention to Turkey’s CMR as a part of the political criteria. Many official EU documents express the EU’s suspicion about the power of the Turkish military in the politics while endorsing the progress having made by Turkey since the beginning of the accession process. However, there is a problem here, because when the EU mentions the CMR, “it is hard to predict and understand its actions, because so little is known about European principles, policies and practices in this area.” Thus, the central question of this section is what should Turkey do about this matter to continue its reform in line with European policies and standards in order to fully satisfy the EU?

Remarkably, I cannot refer to the EU acquis delineating the borders of a typical CMR model to be used by Turkey as a benchmark, because:

“The EU has no authority over its member states in civil-military relations. Even the Solana office, which carries out the European Security and Defense Policy, does not concern itself with the way member states organize their defense establishments. This has remained a national responsibility. Nor are civil-military relations part of the acquis communautaire, the mound of regulations and agreements that states must comply with if they are to join the Union.”

For these reasons, to find a plausible answer to the question of what exactly the EU expects of Turkey we need to scrutinize some official documents between the EU and Turkey.

The primary policy document that delineates the skeleton of negotiations during the accession process is the EU’s Negotiating Framework for Turkey (2005). Nevertheless, it only refers to the importance of the Copenhagen political criteria and does not mention those of the CMR. The only exception is the Agenda 2000, in which the European Parliament endorsed the Copenhagen criteria. The Agenda 2000 resolution necessitates both current and future EU member states to establish “the legal accountability of police,

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266 ibid.
267 Available at: http://www.avrupa.info.tr/fileadmin/Content/Downloads/PDF/M%C7akere%20%C7er%E7evesi.pdf, accessed on 05 February 2013.
In addition to the Negotiating Framework, the Accession Partnership Documents (APD), which constitute the framework for Turkey's preparations and provide guidance for financial assistance, are significant official documents for the accession period. The first was issued in March 2001 and necessitates as the following short-term priority: “improvement of the functioning and efficiency of the judiciary, including the state security court in line with international standards.” The medium-term priority of the same document suggests “the alignment of the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the Government in accordance with the practice of EU member states.” The APD of May 2003 identifies “the adaptation of the functioning of the National Security Council in order to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU member states as a priority.”

In November 2005, the EC released a proposal for a Council decision on principles, priorities, and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey. Under the title of short-term priorities, the document referred to the CMR in the democracy and the rule of law chapter. The proposal stipulates that Turkey should:

“Continue to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU member states; to ensure that civilian authorities fully exercise their supervisory functions, in particular as regards the formulation of the national security strategy, and its implementation; to take steps towards bringing about greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs; to establish full parliamentary oversight of military and defense policy and all related expenditure, including by external audit; abolish any remaining competence of military courts to try civilians.”

The January 2006 APD refers again directly to the CMR and touches upon the following:

“Continuing to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU member states; ensuring that civilian authorities fully exercise their supervisory functions; in particular

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as regards the formulation of the national security strategy, and its implementation; taking steps towards bringing about greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs; establishing full parliamentary oversight of military and defense policy and all related expenditure, including by external audit; abolish any remaining competence of military courts to try civilians.” 273

Under the title of anti-corruption policy, it states, “ensuring of the implementation of the Regulation on Principles of Ethical Behavior for Civil Servants and extending its provisions to elected officials, judiciary, academics and military personnel.”274

Contrary to the previous documents, the EC Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges Report has a rather positive approach to the CMR. Because, despite its April 2007 statement, in which the Turkish General Staff (TGS) declared that the army was against election of a president with an Islamist background, the TAF showed no reaction to the August 2007 election of the President, who was known to have a Muslim identity during his political and academic pasts. The report underlines: “Since the December 1999 European Council granted candidate status to Turkey, the country has achieved major changes . . . the functions and composition of the National Security Council were changed to increase civilian control over the military . . . The President of the Republic was elected in accordance with constitutional rules and democracy prevailed in civil-military relations”.275 The Turkey Annex of the same report also highlights that “[s]ignificant further efforts are needed in particular on freedom of expression, on civilian control of the military.”276 With regard to the civilian oversight of the security forces:

“The outcome of the spring 2007 constitutional crisis reaffirmed the primacy of the democratic process. Nonetheless, the military has taken public positions on issues going beyond its remit and full civilian supervision of the military and parliamentary oversight of defense expenditures still needs to be established.”277

The last document, the Regular Reports, conveys the European Commission’s views on issues regarding the accession progress of Turkey and goes into some detail about bilateral relations. While Turkey’s first Regular Report was issued in 1998, the following ones are mainly repetitions of the previous ones. Moreover, the shortcomings fulfilled by Turkey are always removed from the following reports. For these reasons, only the last report covering 2010 (issued on 12 October 2011) will be examined, as it reflects the

274 ibid.
276 ibid. p. 55.
277 ibid. p. 56.

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present situation in Turkey. Turkey’s CMR problems are depicted under the title of Civilian Oversight of Security Forces, which suggests the following:

In October 2010, the NSC approved a revised National Security Policy. This document is not public. It was reportedly prepared mainly by the civilian authorities. The investigation into the ‘Sledgehammer’ alleged coup case was extended with the arrest of further officers, largely from the Air Force. Hearings of the case continued before the 10th Istanbul Serious Crimes Court in Silivri.

In accordance with the constitutional amendments of 2010, the decisions by the Supreme Military Council concerning the dismissal of military personnel have been opened to civilian judicial review. Military officers dismissed from the army now have the right to appeal against their expulsions and retire with benefits, or to obtain employment at a state institution. A commission was set up within the Ministry of Defense to examine applications and decide within a year. Following a decision by the Military Court of Cassation, the Şemdinli case\(^{278}\) was now tried by the Van Serious Crimes Court, a civil court. During the first hearing in July, the court accepted a lawyers’ request to investigate four high-ranking officers, including a former Chief of Staff.

Good progress was made, in the form of adoption of the Law on the Court of Accounts in December 2010, providing for external ex-post audits of armed forces expenditures. This law also paves the way for examinations of extra-budgetary resources earmarked for the defense sector, including the Defense Industry Support Fund.

The Under-Secretariat for Public Order and Security, established in 2010 to develop and coordinate counter-terrorism policies and affiliated with the Prime Ministry. The number of incidents where the armed forces exerted formal and informal influence over political issues beyond their remit continued to decrease. On the eve of the Supreme Military Council of August 2011, the Chief of Staff, along with the Force Commanders, requested retirement. Appointment of the force commanders to the Supreme Military Council meeting immediately affirmed the government’s control over the selection of top-level commanders. However, promotions continue to be determined by the General Staff with limited civilian control. Further reforms of the composition and powers of the Supreme Military Council, particularly on the legal basis of promotions, still need to materialize.

\(^{278}\) The defendant petty officers were accused of a bombing that killed one civilian and injured others in the town of Şemdinli in Southeast Turkey, in November 2005.
After the meeting in August, President Gül briefed the Speaker of Parliament and the leader of the main opposition party for the first time about the content of the NSC. However, on some occasions, the armed forces made comments about ongoing court cases and investigations. Civilian oversight needs to be further reinforced, particularly in relation to the law enforcement duties of the gendarmerie and the military justice system. The gendarmerie does not report to the Ministry of the Interior, and disciplinary offenses are taken to the General Staff, bypassing both the Ministries of the Interior and Defense.

The Law on Provincial Administrations, which provided the legal basis for the annulled EMASYA\textsuperscript{279} Protocol, allowing military operations to be carried out without the consent of local civilian authorities, has yet to be amended. Moreover, there is a lack of transparency and accountability in institutions in the security sector, particularly those with intelligence duties.

The existing legislation, including the Law on the Establishment and Proceedings of Military Courts, which defines the functions and jurisdiction of these courts, has yet to be amended in order to make the new constitutional provisions a legal reality. These new constitutional provisions include matters related to the jurisdiction of military courts, the trial of the Chief of Staff and the commanders of the armed forces by the Constitutional Court for offenses related to their duties, and the trial by civilian courts of offenses against the security of the State. Finally, the lack of judicial review of all decisions regarding career management by the Supreme Military Council and all other military authorities remains a concern.

The exclusion of the Foundation for Strengthening the Armed Forces, which controls significant financial expenditure, from the audit mandate of the TCA [Turkish Court of Accounts] is a major shortcoming of the revised Law on the TCA. Publication of the external audit reports on defense, security, and intelligence institutions will be governed by a regulation that has yet to be adopted by the Council of Ministers.

No change was made to the Internal Service Law of the Turkish armed forces, which defines the duties of the military and contains an article allowing the military significant scope for intervention in politics. The Law on the NSC was not amended, and it continues to provide a broad definition of security that, depending on its interpretation, could cover almost any policy field. The Chief of Staff continues to report to the Prime Minister rather than the Minister of Defense.

\textsuperscript{279} Security, Public Order and Assistance Plans that delineate the use of military units against internal civilian disorders when police forces are unable to control them.
The selective accreditation by the military of certain media has continued. The secondary school curriculum continues to include a national security course given by military officers.

Overall, good progress has been made on the consolidation of the principle of civilian oversight of security forces. Civilian oversight of military expenditure was tightened and a revised National Security Plan adopted. In addition, Supreme Military Council decisions were opened to civilian judicial review. However, further reforms – on the composition of the Supreme Military Council, military justice system and the Personnel Law of the Turkish Armed Forces – are still needed. In several instances, legislation intended to increase civilian oversight of the military (the Court of Accounts Law and the draft Ombudsman Law) was amended in parliament, but actually weakened such oversight. On some occasions, the General Staff made comments on ongoing court cases.280

As seen in the Regular reports, the APD, Council decisions, and Enlargement strategy documented by the EU Institutions carefully examine the CMR in Turkey, particularly the influence channels of the military, the military budget, and the reforms adopted in these fields. In short, upon every opportunity, the EU criticizes Turkey and recommends that she continue with constitutional and legal amendments to ensure full civilian control over the military, by stressing that further steps be taken to bring the Turkey CMR to the standards of the EU.

In the following two chapters, all relevant actors and structures involving the formation of the CMR norms will be investigated in detail to reveal differences that will help us to analyze and compare Turkish and European models. However, as seen above, all official EU documents solely highlight the insufficiencies in the Turkish system by continuously referring to a vague common European practice, but never addressing a precise CMR model. Besides, there is almost nothing in the EU acquis delineating the borders of a democratic CMR that can be used by the candidate countries as a checklist. All these factors make the issue more ambiguous and cause confusion among scholars and politicians, even in the EU institutes, as the various EU countries exercise distinct models. Thus, to shed light on this ambiguity, it seems necessary briefly to cover specific views of prominent international organizations and foundations.

In addition to some notable scholars, some widely regarded international organizations and foundations have also made great efforts in regards to the Democratic CMR. One prominent organization making such efforts, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), has a great deal of expertise on military reform and co-operation realms, and aims to regulate the role of armed forces in democratic societies. In this context, the OSCE adopted some codes of conduct at the 1994 Budapest Summit by enlarging and codifying some important principles of the Helsinki Final Act. Although the codes of conduct aim mainly to arrange relations between states, principally preventing the use of force, they go beyond this presupposed task by adding some additional norms over politico-military conduct within states. In this regard, “its sections VII and VIII detail the commitment by participating States to place their armed forces, including military, paramilitary and security forces, intelligence services and the police, under democratic civilian control.” According to Section VII, each participating State will ensure:

1. democratic political control of military;
2. integration of their armed forces with civil society as an important expression of democracy;
3. maintenance of effective guidance and control of its military;
4. legislative approval of defense expenditures, and provision for transparency;
5. political neutrality of its armed forces.

As for Section VIII, it mainly addresses the provisions of international law and conventions, in which states will guarantee that any decision to assign their armed forces to internal security missions must be performed under the effective control of constitutionally established authorities, and subject to the rule of law. According to Fluri and Cole, the OSCE’s code of conduct “serves not only as an instrument of guidance for inter-state (and therefore an instrument of confidence and stability-building) but also for intra-state relations, touching the very sanctum of state power the armed forces. It further

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281 The OSCE Permanent Council is in Vienna and comprised of 58 states. Turkey has been a member since 1973.
283 Detailed Section VII is summarized in terms of the research topic requirements. Further info can be found at: http://www.osce.org/fsc/41355, accessed on 22 March 2012.
‘establishes a direct linkage between armed forces, political stability, security, and democracy.’”\textsuperscript{284}

Another expert organization that has worked particularly on the CMR issue is an international foundation, the DCAF. Established in Geneva in 2000, it is now comprised of 58 Member States from across the world, including Turkey (joined in 2003). The DCAF has published numerous books, reports, and articles as a contribution to the enhancement of security sector governance through security sector reform. One of the most important publications is a reference work, the DCAF-IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union) Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. \textsuperscript{285} It mainly covers the role of parliamentary control of the security sector and refers:\textsuperscript{286}

(1) In a democracy, the representatives of the people hold the supreme power, and no sector of the state should be excluded from their control;

(2) A state without parliamentary control of its security sector, especially the military, should, at best, be deemed an unfinished democracy or a democracy in the making;

(3) It remains essential that parliament monitor the use of the state’s scarce resources both effectively and efficiently;

(4) Parliaments are to review the draft laws on security issues prepared by the governments and, if need be, propose amendments so as to ensure that legal provisions adequately reflect the new ideas concerning security. Moreover, it falls to parliament to see to it that the laws do not remain a dead letter, but are fully implemented;

(5) Parliamentarians are to act as a bridge to the population and should be placed in a position to ascertain their views. They can subsequently raise citizens' concerns in parliament and see to it that they are reflected in security laws and policies;

(6) Parliamentarians are to be actively involved in all phases of the national security policy-making process;

(7) In addition to parliament, the judiciary, and the executive, civil society makes an important informal contribution to the formulation and implementation of security policy, while the media contribute by informing the public of the intentions and actions of all state actors;

\textsuperscript{285} Available at: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Publication-Detail?lng=en&id=25289, accessed on 22 March 2012.
\textsuperscript{286} The salient issues have been selected by the author.
(8) The security services should be held accountable to each of the three main branches of the state;

(9) As civil society is both important to, and an expression of, the process of democratization and plays a strong and increasing role in the functioning of established democracies, Governments can encourage the participation of NGOs in public debates about national security, the armed forces, policing and intelligence;

(10) The democratic education and attitude of the armed forces needs to be promoted, so that the military can be properly integrated into society and not pose a threat to democracy;

(11) In any consolidated democracy, budget-making activities in general, and arms procurement in particular, must be transparent and accountable to the public.

As seen, the DCAF’s proposal is also fully liberal and evokes Germany’s parliamentarian control model, as it tends to reinforce parliament’s role in CMR.

As the foremost Western security organization, NATO has also set out some criteria for candidate countries, which came into existence in the Alliance’s 1995 Study on Enlargement Document. “These criteria include a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.”287 With the enlargement strategy, NATO expects to “contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military.”288 In Chapter 1, article 5, NATO also requires the new member states to “[a]ccord with, and help to promote, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the safeguarding of the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of all Alliance members and their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. New members will need to conform to these basic principles.”289

As predicted, as with the EU, there is no specific condition specifically defining democratic CMR in the major NATO Document. However, NATO effectively used the conditionality tool as an incentive to the EEC and Balkan Countries that were aspiring to

289 Ibid.
be NATO members. Thus, within a decade they successfully transformed their militaries from communist armies into democratic armies. In doing so, as argued by Edmunds:

“This influence has been exercised in three main ways, all closely connected to the enlargement agenda. The first, and perhaps the most important, has been to tie the incentive of membership to reform conditionality; the second has been through the provision of technical assistance and advice; and the third has been the propagation and reinforcement of democratic norms of behaviour.”

As a high-level NATO Officer, I actively took part in the following technical training and advice phase during my NATO services between 1995 and 2006:

“Conferences and seminars; the provision of advice on specific issues; the placement of advisors from NATO members in key positions in partner states’ ministries of defence and general staffs; the participation of civilian and military personnel from partner states in NATO’s political headquarters in Brussels and in the military Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons; the Planning and Review Processes and the Membership Action Plans, which explicitly require partner states to identify the steps that will be taken to achieve the political goals of each programme, and provide detailed mechanisms for evaluating progress in these; and participation in multinational military exercises.”

3.7 CMR PRACTICES OF THREE EU MEMBER STATES AND ISRAEL

3.7.1 General

In this section, I will briefly investigate the CMR models of some prominent EU members and Israel, which developed in different ways fitting their peculiarities, being shaped by their ideologies, cultures, and histories. This section relating to the three prominent EU member states is based primarily on the official web pages of the respective MoDs and CESS Harmonie Papers, Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU, dated 2008.

3.7.2 The United Kingdom

Although the Queen appears to be the official Commander-in-Chief of the UK, in reality her government commands and controls the UK Armed Forces. While simultaneously strengthening the mandate of the electorate and weakening the position of parliament, the legislative and executive branches are intertwined with members of parliament of the ruling party that maintains a place in the government. The head of the

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291 Ibid. p. 152.
government, the PM, is the ultimate commander of the armed forces. The Secretary of State is the designated minister for defense in the cabinet. The MoD beneath the ministers performs the top management of the MoD, which is headed jointly by the Permanent Under Secretary and Chief of Defense Staff. Their roles reflect the importance of both civilian and military advice on defense matters.

At the core of defense is the MoD head office. It acts as both a department of state and the highest-level military headquarters. The Secretary of State for Defence, supported by three ministers of state, is responsible for the formulation and conduct of defense policy. The formal legal basis for the conduct of defense in the UK rests on a range of powers vested in the Defence Council, the senior Departmental committee. It is chaired by the Secretary of State and comprises the other Ministers, the Permanent Under Secretary, the Chief of Defense Staff and senior Service officers and senior officials who head the Armed Services and the department’s primary corporate functions. It provides the formal legal basis for the conduct of defense in the UK through a range of powers vested in it by statute and Letters Patent.292

The UK has a fully transparent decision-making process that allows many institutions, including outside experts, to participate in the planning process, especially in preparing the Strategic Defense Review. This policy document is always open to revisions according to the requirements of the time, and always seeks broad support. This does not necessarily mean that the debate on the review could truly affect the contents. The PM, backed by the MoD, has the final rule over all suggestions, securing political direction. From this point forward, the UK Government regularly publishes a national security strategy by creating an NSC. This replaces the current ministerial committees and “coordinate military, policing, intelligence and diplomatic action and also to win hearts and minds in this country and round the world.”293 The Prime Minister presides over the NSC, which operates with the participation of relevant ministers and civil servants.

3.7.3 Germany

In an attempt to avoid another painful national-socialist period when political leaders have abused the army, Germany has an army without a general staff. CESS

Harmonie papers highlight the power of the Parliament over the army. As argued by Drent and Volten:

“It is often called a parliamentary army because it is under the strict control of parliament and its missions abroad need the approval of the Bundestag. The parliament appoints out of its midst a Wehrbeauftragter (Pain delegate) or parliamentary commissioner whose task it is to function as a kind of ombudsman for the armed forces and to assist the parliament in executing its civilian control over the armed forces by serving as a liaison between the parliament and the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces).”294

The MoD is the Commander-in-Chief during peacetime but still answers to the Bundestag. During war or national emergency (to be declared by the President), the Chancellor would assume the position of Commander-in-Chief. Permanent institutional mechanisms are in place to guarantee that opposition leaders and members of parliament actively participate in the creation and structuring of civil-military institutions. This not only eases their approval of funding and deployment but also ensures that they share the responsibility for the armed forces.

In addition to the Bundestag, the Government and the MoD are two other key players in the German defense planning process. These three elements are unified and influenced by German society. The Bundestag is the sovereign body that determines the fundamental features of policy and enacts the necessary laws. In practice, it does so through the existence of some parliamentary committees, most significantly the Budgetary and Defense Committees. The role of the cabinet is supportive; it prepares and discusses bills before their submission to the Bundestag and coordinates the fundamental features of long-term and current policy. The establishment of long-term goals is particularly important to the German defense planning process. These goals are developed on the basis of political policy documents, which provide for planning predictability, permit-coordinated planning, and preparation for short-term political events. An annual planning cycle permits short-term corrective action at any time, thus providing flexibility to react to changes in the security situation or resources. Finally, the MoD is responsible for the implementation of military policy, the defense budget, and other tasks undertaken by a civilian defense administration. After long-term policies are finalized by the institutions mentioned above and the armed forces service staff, the ministerial directorates become responsible for implementing the plans, while the chief of staff exercises planning control, and the service chiefs exercise implementation control.

The German system is best characterized by political control and cooperation. This approach ensures that defense planning corresponds to political premises and does not develop into a self-contained, independent process. Additionally, through their engagement with defense planning, German parliamentarians have deep insight into current projects and are thus sufficiently qualified to use the powers or legislative oversight available to them.

3.7.4 France

What we saw in the UK also seems to be the case in France: centralization of civil direction as a way out of the indecisiveness of multi-institutional decision-making, which leaves too much room to the professional military.295 In France, foreign and defense policy organization is more complicated and tends to be led by dual executives. According to the constitution, the president holds full authority and informs parliament when required. This prevents legislature from having direct involvement in the security policies.

The chief of general staff in France “has been strengthened vis-à-vis his subordinate chiefs, the Secretariat-General of National Security, as well as the minister of defense in 2004, through his direct access to the president. Informal or formal tête-à-tête does not foster coherence, in any case. They cannot replace a political will, the lack of which was, according to the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHDEN), the main shortcoming of French defense policy during the 1990s.”296 On the other hand, the French president is seen as the single person to legitimize decisions, which allows him to force the military to comply with measures that are contested and need a political solution. In France, there is a consensus among the polity and society over the role of the armed forces, and an even greater understanding of security. As highlighted by Drent and Volten:

“Whereas the French elite is still mired in a strictly defense-related understanding of the role of the armed forces, the Germans – and the British to a somewhat lesser degree – agree about the civil direction towards political-strategic objectives, rather than in maintaining the traditional military-operational tasks of the armed forces.”297

A problem seems to exist in relations between the military and executive branches, depending on the accord of politicians. If the relationship between the president and the government is harmonious, and the PM takes full responsibility in the parliament, there may not be a problem. However, if the president and PM are from opposite parties, clashes are unavoidable. In this circumstance, the decision-making process is not only

295 ibid.
296 ibid. p. 30.
297 ibid. p. 34.
tainted but is also likely to present an internal standoff, allowing all sorts of political games and bureaucratic maneuverings. For example, the chief of general staff or the chiefs of the services are likely to use their direct access to the respective leaders and play one against the others according to what fits best.

3.7.5 Israel’s CMR Model

In fact, as this thesis examines relations between the EU and Turkey, the models to be followed by Turkey should more or less resemble the EU countries. However, while seeking the best model for Turkey, one of the most significant parameters of the CMR should not be overlooked: the level of threat arising from geographical factors. The fact that the above three EU countries’ borders are entirely secure because their neighbors are governed by liberal democracies is undisputed. For this reason, replication of the EU model will most likely not meet Turkey’s requirements. Besides, Turkey is under no obligation to fully replicate a specific EU model for a democratic CMR. Thus, the inclusion of another model from outside the EU, serving both sides’ requirements, will provide a sound opportunity for comparison while examining the research question. From this perspective, the first country to come to mind is Israel. Because, despite its heavily securitized politics and society, due to its historical hostility with neighboring countries, it is governed by a consolidated democracy. It is astonishing that while Israel takes the first place in the Global Militarization Index; its rank in the 2010 democracy index is higher than nine EU Countries. Thus, adding a section to examine Israel’s CMR model becomes almost an obligation.

One of the foremost CMR scholars, Lasswell, posits that states experiencing the condition of constant war will eventually have to become garrison states. This strong statement implies that a state constantly at war can hardly be ruled by a liberal democracy. Peri tends to disagree with this assumption by indicating Israel’s case. To him, even if democratic theory necessitates undisputed civilian supremacy over the military, Israel disproves this approach by adopting a hybrid model -- namely a political-military partnership, instead of instrumentalist CMR models. In other words, Peri implies that

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democratic consolidation can be achieved even if the military has some excessive roles in a state’s politics and society, and the West’s CMR model may not be uniquely a democratic one. Thus, whereas the Israeli Army’s exorbitant political and societal roles do not harm its democracy, the question why and how Israeli was able to achieve democratic consolidation while Turkey seems unable to do so, leads us to examine the conditions that have made the Israeli model unique. In this context, Kamrava analyses both countries and labels them ‘military democracies’ due to their many similarities. To him, while Turkey and Israel have “regular, meaningful elections, vibrant party systems and genuine input by the electorate into the political process,” in their political histories both have suffered from many troubles emanating from CMR.

In fact, disproportionate roles of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in social and political realms have their roots in the establishment period of Israel. During that era, numerous army officers filled many governmental posts after resigning from the Israeli Army. Besides, “in the early years of the state, the IDF also played a critical role in the processes of state-and nation-building in the country, functioning as an ostensible civilian institution.” In addition to fulfilling military tasks while defending the state, the IDF served “as an educational and pioneering center for Israeli youth.” In this respect, the IDF has many other extended roles that “would normally be considered civilian responsibilities, to include: 1) education, 2) engineering and infrastructure, 3) medicine, and 4) culture.”

Regarding security structures, in contrast with the EU model, the Israeli MoD functions “more accurately as a liaison to the military vice [sic] its civilian leader.” As for institutional confidence, there exists a “universally negative opinion of/disdain for politicians among the Israeli population.” For that reason, in Israel “the legitimacy of the military’s political influence is seldom questioned by the electorate.”

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302 Kamrava, M., Military Professionalization and Civil-military Relations in the Middle East, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 1, Spring, 2000, p. 70.
304 ibid.
306 ibid. p. 35.
Other differences with the EU are Israel’s heavy reliance on the conscription system and its lack of civilian expertise to balance the military, although in Israel some progress has recently been signaled on the limited civilian capacity to acquire knowledge on security matters. The fact that Israel’s defense industries are run mainly by retired officers is another aspect, in which Israel differs from the models in the EU. Finally, yet importantly, as argued by Cohen, “Israeli generals play a major role in public debate and openly express their viewpoint even when it differs from the prime minister’s. The chiefs of staff can criticize government decisions without being reprimanded.” However, as later posited by the same author, “the great freedom of expression used by Israeli generals in no way detracts from the authority of the civilian government to make final decisions.” As will be seen in the following chapter, the similarities between the roles of TAF and IDF are striking, except for the point made in the last citation.

Until democratic consolidation, Israel’s CMR fluctuated according to the needs of the era and the nature of the civilian leadership. During his combined services as PM and MOD, Ben-Gurion for instance, took all significant decisions about the army himself, while the army chiefs were responsible only for purely military matters. Ben-Gurion was even personally involved in the promotions and appointments of officers above the rank of lieutenant colonel. For that reason, he was constantly accused of being partisan, as he filled in top army posts with officers from among migrating Eastern European Jews who supported his Labor Party. During the post-independent war period, the situation changed in favor of the military, as his successor, Eshkol, lacked Ben-Gurion’s determination and charisma. However, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000 became a turning point in Israeli CMR history. “For the first and only time in its history, an ex-parliamentary grassroots movement played a key role in reshaping the national security agenda in defiance of the state’s potent military establishment, despite its practical monopoly on shaping the national security policy.” Nevertheless, in spite of the civilian progress since 2000, today there are still many retired generals filling various high-level political posts, and the role of the IDF in politics and society is quite stronger than that of its European counterparts. However, this strange situation does not seem to

310 Ibid. p. 255.
have hamstringed Israeli society’s democratic evolution. In his article, Goldberg attempts to explain some democratic progresses in the following paragraph:

“The role of the Supreme Court, the State Comptroller and the mass media is on the rise. Legislation ensures that the rights of the individual are expanding. The political processes are more open and transparent. Criticism of the political system, politicians, and even the army, is increasing. The state penetrates less and less into the lives of its citizens.”

Israel’s strong civil society is also considered to have a significant balancing effect on the political power of the IDF. In fact, during the foundation phase, Israeli society had a collective identity shaped by the state elites. However, between the 1970s and 1990s, due to global liberal political and economic movements, Israeli society started to polarize, and many individual identities surfaced. Competing individual identities transformed the role of society from a passive into a very active one, and made society’s voice a dominant part of the political system. Besides, “the proliferation of privatized media, the mushrooming of think tanks, human rights associations, NGOs, and organizations of intercultural dialogue, in addition to long-term protest movements, all contributed to an open and critical public discourse.” Some believe that the free media has also played a pivotal role in this transformation. As argued by Peri, for instance, “when the deferential media changed their style and became critical and confrontational, they continued with political socialization of the masses, this time perhaps less consciously, not always openly, but more subtly.”

Thus, it may not be wrong to posit that, while Israel is the first militarist country of the world, its pluralism, its strong civil society and media, internalization of democratic values by civilian and military elites, and lack of clear-cut internal boundaries between civilians and military domains makes Israel’s model unique in terms of CMR. It is evident that the first three parameters need a plausible correlation with a democratic culture stemming from the origins of Israelis. For, although Israel was officially founded in 1948, its roots go back to the 15th century, when Jewish communities were expelled from Spain and arrived in the Ottoman territory. Migration resumed during the late Ottoman era, but the bulk of migration occurred during the British mandate after WWI, and even more so during WWII. These facts imply that the roots of democratic culture may lie within the

315 ibid., p. 71.
cultural origin of the migrating Jews, almost all of whom originated from European countries whose societies had experienced the Renaissance and Reformation long before their immigration. For that reason, “throughout the nation-building era, Orthodox Judaism had been quite insignificant on Israel’s political-cultural map, a marginal minority tolerated by the secular Zionist majority.”  

In this context, as one of his crucial tasks during the foundation phase, Ben-Gurion successfully eliminated the underground Irgun movement aiming to found a religious Jewish State. Moreover, resisting Judaism’s strongly defining power on Israeli society, the IDF managed to remain pro-secularist because the Ashkenazi Jews, known as secular middle-class group had constituted the backbone of the IDF since 1973.  

Thus, this process seems to be worthy of further examination since it ended with the secularization and consolidation of the Israeli democracy, while Turkey’s did not. For, like Islam, the influence of Judaism over Jews is considered stronger than that of Christianity. Furthermore, by the time of the founding of the State in 1947, like Islam, Judaism had not experienced a battle like that experienced long before in the West to separate state and church, and form precedents and traditions for the separation of institutions.  

Despite the above difficulties, Ben-Gurion managed to build a solid wall between religion and politics. As argued by Bronner, during his service to his nation, providing “leadership of the Jewish Agency in 1935 to his retirement in 1970, Ben-Gurion was the dominant figure in Zionist and Israeli politics. He served as prime minister for fourteen of the state’s first fifteen years, leading its military forces to victory during the 1948 War of Independence and then unifying them under the rubric of the Israel Defense Forces.”  

Under his principle of ‘etatism’, the new state also “attempted to impose new norms in education, political institutions, the management of the economy, defining the national culture and other vital areas.” Thus, as Ben-Gurion’s worldview has heavily

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320 He is the Jerusalem bureau chief of the New York Times and Israel-Turkey Project Coordinator for Mitvim (the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies).
shaped Israeli society, it will be useful to examine the conditions that shaped his personal identity to better illuminate the issue.

According to some Israeli experts, as an Ottoman citizen who studied law in Istanbul, Ben-Gurion was inspired by the Young Turks revolution that had begun in the mid-19th century, accelerated in the early 20th century, and came to a peak when Atatürk was in power. Bronner, for instance, underlines Ben-Gurion’s admiration for Atatürk and points out striking similarities of both founding leaders. For him, Ben-Gurion “modelled himself on Ataturk, seeking to build an instantly modern society of like-minded and ‘ideal’ citizens with few deviations in language or culture. Both saw religion as a deviation and ethnicity as a problem.”

As argued by Özdalga, the Young Turks were clearly deeply influenced by one of the foremost French sociologists, “Gustave Le Bon’s idea on the physiology of the masses, and fear of the irrational behaviour of the people who were not led firmly by an intellectual elite.” Besides, “the Young Turks, such that much of the youth, Mustafa Kemal included, were disciples of the German philosophy of Vulgärmaterialismus, an intellectual influence that was most apparent in their rejection of religion and commitment to an extreme form of secularism.” These two assertions may explain why both states’ leaderships had to employ Jacobin methods to build a nation from top-down, and applied strict control over religions. As argued by Bronner, “like his Turkish counterpart, Ben-Gurion rejected the notion that Judaism’s religious tenets should dominate Zionist identity.” However, despite many similarities in both nation-building endeavors, only Ben-Gurion “led his country down a more democratic path.”

First, due to its European origins, Israeli society was relatively familiar with pluralism and a culture of compromise. For that reason, as several entities were competing for the leadership of the Zionist movement, during his rule Ben-Gurion had to seek coalitions. “As a result, Ben-Gurion made numerous concessions to the country’s religious

327 Ibid.
and ethnic minorities, granting exemptions from military service to ultra-Orthodox and Arab men, as well as overseeing the establishment of separate secular and religious courts.

As difficult as it was for him personally, Ben-Gurion’s acknowledgment of the limits of his power allowed Israel to develop a nation-state with a rich democratic tradition.”

The second democratic gap between the countries, but the most important from the CMR perspective, is that Ben-Gurion successfully kept the IDF away from daily political debates. While “many prominent former generals entered politics by capitalizing upon their successful military careers,” Ben-Gurion “stressed the subordination of the military to the civilian leadership and prohibited the activity of the political parties within the IDF.”

The third difference could be the lack of a written constitution, resulting in an imprecise internal boundary between civilians and military domains in Israel. While it totally contrasts with the instrumentalist western way, some experts believe that the vagueness of this boundary has facilitated a power shift between civilians and the military, according to the requirements of the era and the identities of civilian and military leaderships. According to Sela, Israel’s inescapable external conditions obliged it to adopt a nation in arms concept, “in which the civil-military interface is marked by permeable and floating boundaries.” To him, this hybrid model has made the military an organic part of society by ensuring civilianization of the military, instead of militarization of society. As argued by Lissak, this way “prevented the military from becoming a separate caste which feels itself alienated from, and in conflict with, the values represented by the civilian elites.” Heper summarizes this factor by arguing that, “due to lingering political threats, the boundaries between military and civilian affairs remained permeable, with officers being politicized and politicians to some extent staticized, because of their close working relations with commissioned and retired officers.”

328 ibid.


330 ibid.


332 ibid. p. 68.


military plays the role of a protector, whereas the Turkish military serves as a political arbitrator.”

The fourth democratic gap is that, in spite of his dominant and authoritarian personality, Ben-Gurion exhibited full respect for individual freedoms and fundamental rights, and he personally reinforced the legal oppositions inside and outside his party, all the way. Moreover, while his charisma and leadership were commonly endorsed even by his rivals, Ben-Gurion never fell into the trap of the irresistible temptation of power, into which Turkish leaders fell after 1950. Furthermore, as Ben-Gurion’s pluralism was institutionalized in Israeli politics, his successors could not deviate from the path he laid out.

Finally, yet importantly, “the history of Israel is full of examples of disputes between the prime minister or the defense minister and their CGSs that ended to the detriment of the latter,” and the IDF has never conducted a coup.

In brief, the case of Israel tends to refute a widely accepted liberal postulation that if “a democracy [is] facing continuous war, the military is likely to be a significant political force in its own right.” Because, although the IDF still holds some excessive power and influence over security policies, particularly in an epistemological context, “there has never been an overt or expressed desire by IDF leadership to subsume control from their elected government.” Thus, we may conclude that Israel’s powerful military does not constitute an impediment to the stability of Israeli democracy. Another general conclusion that can be drawn from the preceding is that regional peculiarities might be compelling ME Countries to adopt sui generis CMR Models to survive in the world’s most problematic region. To achieve this, “civilian-military interactions are cemented either by institutional devices (the National Security Council in Turkey) or international geopolitical realities or tradition (retired Israeli officers becoming politicians).” However, although both Israel and Turkey originated from the Ottoman Empire and experienced a strikingly similar nation-building process, there are remarkable differences between the two countries’

335 Kamrava, M., Military Professionalization and Civil-military Relations in the Middle East, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 1, Spring, 2000, p. 73.
present democracies. The causes behind this democratic gap will be elucidated after an examination of Turkey’s distinctive characteristics in the following chapters.

The preceding suggests that the form of CMR in a country varies depending on historical and cultural factors, and democratic CMR are not stereotypical. However, for a consolidated democracy, full acceptance by the military of their subordination to the civilian authority is considered to be one of the minimum requirements, while an equally important requirement is that elected officials take the military’s experiences on internal and external security matters into serious consideration.\textsuperscript{340} For that reason, especially during the decision-making process on waging war, the view of the military should be taken more seriously because civilians may not assess the limits and capabilities of an army as well as its commanders can. Besides, armies may not always be in favor of hard power and war, as argued by Kier, who states that “military organizations do not inherently prefer offensive doctrines.”\textsuperscript{341} In the same way, Cohen argues, “the history of Israel— and also that of the United States and France— provides ample proof of the fact that civilians are not necessarily ‘doves’ and the military systematically ‘hawks.’”\textsuperscript{342} In Israel, for instance, the most significant steps for peace were taken by three prime ministers who were retired generals: Rabin, Barak, and, Sharon.\textsuperscript{343}

3.8 SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although the Westernization project of the Turks is rooted in the late Ottoman era, its real efforts speeded up following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Since then, the number of the people embracing a Western identity has increased, especially among the elites, and as their Western identity has shaped their interests, Turkey has actively taken part in all major Western organizations. The term ‘Westernization’ has recently turned into ‘Europeanization’ and Turkey has intensified her efforts to be a member of the EU. However, during this effort, Turkey has encountered an impediment, as the EU has always put particular importance on civilian control of armies to prevent the military from posing a threat to civilians. For the EU was founded to settle intra-Europe disputes peacefully in order not to suffer from another world war, and this

\textsuperscript{340} Interview with Gregory D. Foster, Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 12 October 2007.
\textsuperscript{342} Cohen, S., Civilian Control over the Army in Israel and France, In Sheffer, G. & Barak, O., Eds, Militarism and Israeli Society, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, USA, 2010, p. 256.
objective undeniably calls for an entirely democratic CMR structure by eliminating the role of armies from the political sphere. In line with this objective, as a supranational organization, the EU sets some strict political conditions for candidate countries, maintaining that no country can join the EU unless they meet all conditions. Thus, the EU conditionality, especially from the CMR perspective, was the main argument of this chapter. However, instead of generating a checklist, the historical, religious, and sociological roots of the European identity, in which its CMR norms were formed, have been examined in detail, to objectively compare the EU’s CMR conditionality with the Turkish case.

The chapter reveals that there is a *sui generis* European identity, whose roots can be found in ancient Greece. With moral reasoning and rational thinking as two of its founding stones, the Roman Empire is also accepted a dominant actor that shaped the European identity by imposing prominent elements like a shared language (Latin), administrative and legal systems, and cultural attitudes. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the Dark Ages spanned several centuries, concluding with the Enlightenment era, in which some influential thinkers performed as strong actors and shaped the collective European identity, while religious actors gradually and dramatically lost their influencing powers in society. Especially with the Peace of Westphalia, the tolerance for other religions and sects flourished, and the role of religious rules in social life started to diminish. In addition to the scientific and idealist revolution, the main components of the Enlightenment, crucial steps were taken in this era to secularize states and modernize devout and illiterate peoples. As Europeans learned their lessons from the gruesome religious wars, they established political distance from religion. More importantly, not only thinkers but also the majority of the population willingly accepted the secularization process as normal and progressive. During this process, the roles of Christian clergymen and monks who were focused on doctrine, morality, and ethics rather than dogma, should not be underemphasized.

In addition to the natural outcome of these historical and sociological occurrences, the French revolution is considered the culmination point of the reforms in doctrine and theoretical dogmas. Thus, after the devastation caused by endless bloody wars, a continent divided by national and religious-sectarian hatred, lacking any tolerance, transformed into an increasingly peaceful, wealthy, and confident European society. This constant evolution came to fruition with an official paper signed by nine European countries just after the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN, in September 1973. With the declaration, issued in December 1973, and called the Declaration on European Identity:
“The nine wish to ensure underlined that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity. The Nine believe that this enterprise corresponds to the deepest aspirations of their peoples who should participate in its realization, particularly through their elected representatives.”  

As quoted earlier, Habermas summarizes the main components of the European demos: the neutrality of authority embodied in the separation of church and state, trust in politics rather than the capitalist market, an ethos of solidarity in the fight for social justice, high esteem for international law, and the rights of the individual and support for the organizational and leading role of the state. These are *sine qua non* elements of the European demos.

As has been observed, CMR structure has been formed in the course of the evolution of the European identity to come to its present liberal state. Not only the EU’s official documents but also common practices, views of foremost scholars, as well as suggestions by expert organizations, address the main components of liberal democracies, in which CMR have been formed. Despite the lack of official EU criteria and single practice among the EU countries, the following common norms can be drawn from this chapter:

1. The armed forces are unambiguously controlled by elected civilians;
2. The authority and autonomy of the military on defense policy-making, planning, and programming are strictly restricted. They have limited freedom even in operational matters;
3. Leadership of armed forces has no voice in public affairs beyond its professional domain;
4. When power legitimately changes hands, armed forces continue to serve the new political masters;
5. The military’s purpose is not to secure regime, but to safeguard national security, in both its external and internal dimensions;
6. Military budgets and spending are strictly controlled and audited by the civilians. Especially parliamentary oversight and accountability is a *sine qua non* element of CMR in Europe.

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In this general framework to reveal common EU practices, models of three primary EU countries were briefly examined, because:

“There are no rigid prescriptions concerning civil-military relations in either the EU’s principal treaties (Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, Lisbon) or any secondary legislation. Hence there are none in the formal acquis communautaire to which would-be members must subscribe prior to accession.”

The relevant section revealed that the three EU models generally share common normative parameters, although their ways of tackling military power vary because they employ different models, shaped by their histories and cultures. In France, for instance, the president is the boss of the army, while the PM takes that same function in the UK, but there the queen is the official commander-in-chief on paper. Germany differs from these two countries with its strict parliamentary control.

Apart from formal appearances, the countries naturally vary in the political and societal roles of their armies. The UK Army, for instance, is known to become overly involved in civilian spheres, contrary to its liberal-democrat setting and traditional accountability to civilian authorities. Even, “[s]enior officers have even been known to ‘revolt’ against impending defense cuts.” In fact, in the UK “civilians have sought for centuries to avoid the creation of an efficient and centralized army that could threaten parliamentary sovereignty.” In France, during the establishment of the Fifth Republic, CMR experienced severe crises, even witnessing an army revolt in Algeria in 1961. Today “the military of France has been subjected to varying degrees of legal and constitutional control and... French armed forces and the Ministry of Defense are almost completely subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the president.” More explicitly, “in France, foreign affairs and defense are the reserved domain of the president of the republic, in the UK, the executive is headed by a powerful prime minister and has

considerable leeway.”349 In Germany, the army has almost no political and societal roles. As argued by Eekelen, “Germany is an example of influential parliamentary committees, not only in budget matters, but also in policy decisions, including the participation in peace support operations.”350 Briefly, the German armed forces seem designed to guarantee their citizens that the new armed forces would not become a state within a state. To the contrary, the military is to foster the ideals of democracy by respect for human and individual rights and the rule of constitutional law.

In spite of some differences in the implementations, one can easily see the obvious power of the civilians in all models. As summarized by Young: “Since the end of World War II, European ministries of defense, and particularly general staffs, have seen their previous positions of influence and prestige diminished through limited budgets and closer governmental oversight.”351 This has resulted in a gap between liberal society and a distinctive military ethos under which the liberal EU still suffers.

However, although its democratic grade in the democracy league is higher than that of nine EU member states, the Israeli CMR model seems not to be in full harmony with the common practices of the three major EU Countries. Instead, at first glance it exhibits many similarities with Turkey, especially from the viewpoint of the historical missions of both armies. The prominent difference is that although the IDF still holds excessive power in politics and society as a result of the militarized state-society nexus, it has not constituted a barrier to Israeli democracy. With its various peculiarities, Israeli practice seems to be in line with Schiff’s concordance theory by forming a sui generis national CMR model, in which the military became a political player due to Israel’s history and culture. This chapter has also revealed the reasons behind Israeli exceptionalism. In this context, internalization of democratic values by civilians, as well as military elites (due mainly to their European origins), such as tolerance and pluralistic compromise cultures; existence of stable civil society and media; and the lack of robust internal boundaries between civilian and military domains seem to make Israeli’s model unique from the standpoint of CMR. As noted, the first two factors necessitate internalization of a well-rooted democratic culture.

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350 ibid.
The Israeli case leads us to draw another general conclusion that regional peculiarities seem to be compelling Middle Eastern countries to adopt *sui generis* CMR models to survive in the world’s most problematic region. To achieve this aim, while Turkey employs some institutional devices, Israel utilizes retired officers as politicians. However, although both countries originated from the Ottoman Empire and followed a similar nation-building process, there seems to be a big gap between the two nations’ present democracies. The grounds behind this variance will be interpreted after the analysis of Turkey’s peculiarities in the following chapters.