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New Problems for Moral Anti-Realism

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1. The metaphysical argument from queerness does not support a moral error theory.
2. Focusing on negative moral fixed points allows realists to avoid many of the objections to positive conceptual moral truths.
3. Expressivism cannot easily explain why certain considerations appear morally irrelevant as a matter of conceptual fact.
4. Relativism cannot be reconciled with conceptual moral truths without incurring a substantial amount of objectivity.
5. Rejecting conceptual moral truths is more problematic for relativism and expressivism than moral error theory.
6. The first-order argument for moral error theory does not avoid an impasse between moral error theorists and moral realists.