Introduction to the Social and Psychological Dynamics of Collective Action

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Collective action is one of the core mechanisms of social change, and thus of major importance to social scientists, practitioners, and policy-makers. Our goal in editing this issue is to bring together recent advances on the social and psychological dynamics of collective action among members of disadvantaged as well as advantaged groups. This article introduces the contributions to this issue after a brief review of the major psychological perspectives on collective action (social identity, relative deprivation, and resource mobilization theories), and a discussion of the considerable diversity in collective action research in terms of contexts, populations, and measures. We hope that this issue contributes to a more multifaceted and integrative understanding of the social and psychological dynamics of collective action in terms of theory, research, policy, and practice.

Social inequality and injustice have been documented in societies around the world. Institutionalized status differences between social groups (based on categories such as gender, race/ethnicity, and sexuality) have created and maintained systemic disparities in wealth, health, and educational opportunities. Moreover, throughout history, groups have perpetrated crimes and injustices against others (i.e., a country may invade and occupy another, or a company may impose harsh working conditions upon its employees). Disadvantaged individuals, however,
do not always accept the status quo. Rather, history shows that under particular circumstances they attempt to challenge social inequality and injustice through collective action.

Collective action is traditionally defined as any action that aims to improve the status, power, or influence of an entire group,¹ rather than that of one or a few individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). For instance, individuals take collective action to challenge systemic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity (e.g., Morris, 1984), gender (e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996), or sexuality (e.g., Stürmer & Simon, 2004). However, collective action can also seek to cease or prevent group injustice (suffered by ingroups or outgroups), as illustrated in ongoing protests against the American military occupation of Iraq and efforts to influence the 2007 G-8 summit. Note that collective actions do not necessarily require actual collectives. What matters is the aim of the action—to change the status of a group—rather than the number of people who are participating. The concept of collective action therefore includes mass political actions such as participation in demonstrations, but also individual-level actions such as signing a petition and voting (Brady, 1994; Klandermans, 1997). Moreover, people may organize and develop a social movement organization (SMO) whose sole aim is to create social change through orchestrating collective actions and recruiting others to join them (Klandermans, 1997).

What are the social and psychological factors that move people to collective action? Scholars have long been interested in this question because the societal consequences of collective action can be enormous: The disadvantaged rise to power, whereas the advantaged lose their high status position, although they may, in time, organize to regain it. Although such struggles may include violent and nonviolent collective actions, the contributions to the current issue all focus on nonviolent collective action. Furthermore, knowledge about when and why people engage in collective action has important theoretical implications for the study of group processes and intergroup relations. Research on this topic can also yield important practical strategies for those who seek to move people into collective action (e.g., union leaders, politicians), as well as for those who wish to prevent them from doing so (e.g., authorities).

The past 10 years have seen a resurgence of interest in the study of social justice efforts within social psychology and sociology. This work has primarily examined collective action by disadvantaged or low-status groups but has recently begun to investigate collective action by advantaged or high-status groups, as well as groups not strictly defined by a status position (e.g., opinion-based groups).

¹We use the terms group status, power, and influence more or less interchangeably in this introduction. One reason for doing so is to acknowledge the use of different terminology in various theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of collective action while remaining neutral toward all approaches in an evaluative sense. Another reason is that collective action is not always based in intergroup status differences, as is illustrated by the papers in the third section of this issue.
This issue of *JSI* brings together multiple lines of theory and research on collective action from Europe, Australia, and North America. Our main aim is to identify the social and psychological factors that motivate collective action among members of low-status groups, high-status groups, or collectives built around a dimension other than status (e.g., political opinion). The issue further promises to translate theoretical and empirical insights to the domains of practice and policy. In this introductory article, we first review theory and research on collective action, and then connect it with the specific contributions to this issue.

**An Overview of Theory and Research on Collective Action**

The literature on collective action is large and heterogeneous (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, for an overview and meta-analysis), as work on this topic is conducted in different disciplines, including sociology, political science, history, and psychology. Theory and research thus reflect different levels of analysis, including the macrolevel (tapping into the strategic and political forces that facilitate or impede collective action; e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977), the mesolevel (tapping into the general conditions that affect groups and their members within society; e.g., Opp, 1991), and the microlevel (tapping into group members’ psychological responses to collective disadvantage; e.g., Wright et al., 1990). Empirical studies reflect different research methods, such as laboratory experiments with groups created by the researchers (e.g., Ellemers, 1993), surveys of participants in real-world social movement (e.g., Klandermans, 1984), face-to-face interviews with social movement participants (e.g., van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001), ethnographic studies of political movements and SMOs (e.g., Scott, 1985), and analyses of media coverage of protest events (e.g., Koopmans & Statham, 1999). Furthermore, researchers have operationalized collective action in many different ways (Klandermans, 1997). Below, we outline the historical roots of theory and research on collective action.

**Social and Psychological Explanations of Collective Action**

Early work on collective action highlighted objective status variables as predictors of collective action (e.g., Blumer, 1939; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1968; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1968). Such frameworks proposed that structural status differences between groups (as measured by various indicators such as wealth and health) explained low-status groups’ participation in collective action to achieve social equality. In these approaches, less attention was paid to the role of individuals’ subjective perceptions and emotions in motivating efforts to create social change.

However, as Marx and Engels (1848/2002) have suggested, the abstract conditions of historical and social structures do not automatically produce social change.
Indeed, the classic studies reported in *The American Soldier* (Stouffer, Suchman, Devinney, Start, & Williams, 1949) demonstrated that structurally disadvantaged group members do not necessarily seek to improve their group’s circumstances. Why should some cases of social inequality be challenged and not others? To address this question, various frameworks have proposed subjective explanations of collective action participation, which focus on individuals’ psychological motivations to help achieve social equality and social justice. That is, these explanations suggest that how individuals perceive their social world profoundly influences how they respond to it.

Relative deprivation theory (RDT), for example, posits that only when individuals perceive their situation as relatively deprived will they experience anger and resentment, and seek to improve their lot (Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966; for a review see Walker & Smith, 2002). RDT has developed at least two key insights as to why individuals participate in collective action. First, the deprivation must be perceived as group based for this experience to predict collective action (e.g., Kawakami & Dion, 1995). Meta-analytic evidence (Smith & Ortiz, 2002) suggests that when disadvantage is perceived as individual based and unjust, the resulting sense of deprivation does not predict collective action. However, when the same disadvantage is perceived as group based and unjust, relative deprivation is a strong predictor of collective action.

A second insight from RDT suggests that individuals do not simply perceive social injustice or inequality, but are often emotionally aroused by it too (see Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). RD theorists argue that it is this emotional response that motivates participation in collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008). That is, the action-related experience seems most prototypically captured in the affective or emotional component of relative deprivation. This idea has paved the way for applications of group-based emotion (Leach et al., 2002; Smith, 1993) to the study of collective action. For instance, feelings of group-based anger and resentment motivate individuals’ willingness to engage in collective action (e.g., Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Similarly, American and British citizens’ feelings of shame and anger about their countries’ occupation of Iraq has been shown to motivate a willingness to protest the occupation (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007).

Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) offers another framework of collective action, proposing that it is individuals’ perceptions of sociostructural characteristics that determine their identification with the group, which predicts the likelihood of their participation in social change strategies (Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Mummendey et al., 1999; Wright et al., 1990). First, group members should perceive the boundary between their (low-status) group and the comparison (high-status) group to be impermeable, such that they cannot join the high-status group and improve their individual position (Ellemers, 1993). This
hypothesis parallels RDT’s distinction between group and individual deprivation. Second, the group’s low-status position should be perceived as illegitimate or undeserved (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999). This means that people should be able to imagine alternatives to the status quo (Tajfel, 1978). And third, the inequality should be perceived as unstable, reflecting a sense of agency that the social structure can be changed (e.g., Wright et al., 1990). In this way, individuals’ group-based perceptions of, and emotional responses to, inequality and injustice have been identified as important predictors of their willingness to engage in collective action.

Others have argued, however, that perceptions of, and even emotions based in, relative deprivation and illegitimacy may not be enough to predict actual collective action behavior (Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Building on SIT, they propose that a strongly developed and politicized sense of identification with a social movement is the best predictor of such behavior (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Research has indeed shown that people are unlikely to engage in collective action when their group means little to them (see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). This is illustrated by the fact that demonstrations typically attract only a tiny fraction of all the individuals who are sympathetic to the cause (Oegema & Klandermans, 1994). Some authors have taken this argument even further to argue that people primarily identify with social groups for the purpose of mobilizing for collective action and social change (e.g., Reicher, 1996). Thus, a second important factor motivating collective action is individuals’ (politicized) identification with their group.

A final perspective proposes that injustice and identity explanations do not take into account individuals’ more instrumental concerns about the perceived costs and benefits of collective action. For example, resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) has been influential in proposing that relative deprivation elicits collective protest behavior only when individuals believe they have the resources to mount an effective challenge to the inequality or injustice. That is, individuals often do not participate in collective action because they do not expect (material or social) rewards for their efforts (Olson, 1968; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Similarly, people may perceive their group to be too weak to enforce social change (in terms of the group’s efficacy to achieve change; Mummendey et al., 1999; van Zomeren et al., 2004). Lastly, individuals may not have sufficient opportunities or networks to join social movements or collective actions, or they may face practical obstacles to actual participation (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Thus, a third important factor motivating collective action is individuals’ instrumental expectations of costs and benefits.

In sum, at least three subjective explanations of collective action can be distilled from the literature: perceptions and emotions of group-based injustice, (politicized) social identification, and instrumental cost–benefit expectations of available resources (van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, at least two points should
be noted that complicate this picture. First, collective action is often operational-
ized in different ways in studies employing a diverse range of methods, which
may potentially produce conceptual confusion. Second, and directly related to the
structure of this issue, collective action has been studied mainly among members
of low-status groups, raising the question of whether the same social and psycho-
logical factors predict collective action among members of high-status groups, or
groups undefined by status. We discuss each point in turn below.

**Operationalizations of Collective Action within a Diverse Range of Methods**

Collective action has been operationalized in different ways by researchers,
including attitudes toward collective action, intentions and action tendencies to
participate in collective action, reports of past participation in collective action, and
actual collective behavior. Most social psychological research on collective action
relies on survey research methods and laboratory experiments. Yet researchers also
use more qualitative methodologies in studying collective action participation,
such as interviews with collective action participants, participatory action, or
observations of protest events. Still others have shifted their analysis away from
individual participants, focusing instead on media coverage of protest events, or
literature generated by SMOs.

As the ultimate goal of the field is to be able to predict actual participation in
collective action, some have argued that behavioral measures are the most valid
and useful dependent measures. However, “true” behavior may reflect only one
aspect of the social and psychological dynamics of collective action. We propose
there is much to gain from studying the social and psychological processes and
constructs that are (at least) one step removed from actual behavior, as they may
still influence behavior later in time.

In this respect Klandermans (1997) offers a useful four-step model to organize
these dynamics (see also Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). In a first step toward
actual participation in a social movement, people become part of the **mobilization
potential** of a social movement by sympathizing with its political and strategic
aim(s). Here only attitudinal support for the social movement is required. In the
second step, people become **targets of mobilization attempts** by the social move-
ment, and in the third step they become **motivated to participate** in specific social
movement activities. It is likely that specific intentions regarding collective action
become relevant at these stages as a consequence of social influence efforts by
others in the social movement. The fourth and final step concerns **overcoming con-
crete barriers** (e.g., time, money, or other responsibilities) to actual participation.
Here the key point is whether intentions will be translated into actual behavior.

These different operationalizations of collective action may correspond to
the different steps outlined in Klandermans’ model. To illustrate, consider the
example of observing and interviewing participants at a demonstration or protest
event (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 1999; Reicher, 1984). Given that participants are already at the demonstration, the conclusions from the obtained data should apply to the fourth step of Klandermans’ model. In a similar vein, survey data about social movement members’ action intentions should apply to the third step of the model (see Simon et al., 1998), because participants are already sympathetic (Step 1) and targeted as potential participants (Step 2). Lastly, some studies focusing on natural groups in the laboratory (e.g., Wright et al., 1990) have asked individuals from a disadvantaged group (e.g., women, or members of an ethnic minority) about their attitudes toward collective action. Such an approach allows for an investigation of the social and psychological processes that operate at, or even before, the first step of the model.

Conceptualizing the different measures of collective action as reflecting different steps of the social and psychological dynamics of collective action makes it apparent that the diversity of methods and operationalizations is actually a strength. Understanding the predictors of collective action attitudes, intentions, and action tendencies provides valuable information about the dynamics that underlie actual behavior later in time. From this perspective, knowledge about how people become sympathizers of social movements, how they are targeted and influenced by social movements, and how they are persuaded to act in the final step are all different but equally important aspects of individuals’ pathways to collective action. Moreover, it is these dynamics (rather than the sole outcome of participation) that should be of considerable interest to activists and social justice organizations, because some collective actions may need to be organized from the grassroots level (e.g., before or at Step 1), whereas others may be more established (focusing more on Steps 3 and 4).

**Structural Position of Collective Action Participants**

As noted, the three social and psychological factors explaining collective action have been examined mainly among members of low-status groups. Indeed, for a long time, the prevailing view in the collective action literature has been that members of high-status or advantaged groups are motivated to maintain and strengthen group-based hierarchy (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright et al., 1990). It is therefore not surprising that the historical focus of collective action research has typically been on the low-status group and its members.

Nonetheless, recent theory and research suggests that advantaged group members sometimes act to promote the outgroup’s interests (e.g., Iyer & Leach, in press; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2002; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). Drawing from work on attributions and group-based emotion, several empirical studies have now shown that emotions like anger, guilt, and sympathy can motivate advantaged group members’ actions to compensate or help the disadvantaged (e.g., Doosje,
Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). This suggests that there is little reason to justify the neglect of advantaged groups in the study of collective action—rather, there lies a great challenge for collective action researchers to think of ways to motivate the advantaged to help the disadvantaged in their efforts for social change. For example, individuals may perceive themselves to be part of a superordinate category or group that has a common goal (e.g., environmentalism).

Therefore, this issue includes articles investigating collective action by members of high-status groups as well as low-status groups. In addition, a number of contributions focus on collective action by groups that may include members of both low-status and high-status groups.

Overview of Contributions to this Issue

All the articles in this issue explore the social and psychological dynamics that encourage (or inhibit) collective action among members of low-status groups, high-status groups, and groups undefined by status. The contributions develop their research questions and hypotheses from solid theoretical foundations (e.g., RDT, SIT, group-based emotion), often integrating principles from various frameworks in novel ways (e.g., Louis, 2009; van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Each article addresses at least one of the three social and psychological explanations of collective action we reviewed, often empirically testing the independent predictive power of multiple factors. Some of the reported studies operationalize collective action as attitudes, whereas others measure intentions, action tendencies, or actual behavior. Several articles offer different methodologies to the study of collective action. Nonetheless, all articles begin from a general psychological perspective on collective action that suggests that how individuals perceive their social world profoundly influences how they respond to it.

Furthermore, each article grounds its analytic focus in real-world contexts of challenges to inequality and injustice. Some articles focus their analysis on efforts to dismantle inequality based on social categories such as gender (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009; Iyer & Ryan, 2009), sexuality (Stürmer & Simon, 2009), weight (Stürmer & Simon, 2009), and immigrant status (Postmes & Smith, 2009). Other articles analyze participation in movements to protest perceived social injustice, such as increases in university tuition fees (Stürmer & Simon, 2009), increases in local taxes (Drury & Reicher, 2009), the reduction of retired workers’ rights (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk, 2009), and poverty in developing countries (McGarty, Bluc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). As a result, their analyses and conclusions are well positioned to inform policy and practice regarding ongoing efforts to challenge inequality and injustice.

The organizational structure of this issue reflects a long-standing division in theoretical and empirical approaches to collective action. Conceptual frameworks
typically seek to explain action by members of low-status groups (RDT, SIT) or groups undifferentiated by status (resource mobilization theory), and others are being developed to explain action by high-status groups (e.g., group-based emotion). Similarly, empirical research has typically investigated collective action participation among individuals from only one status group (high or low), or with no mention of status. These distinctions make theoretical and practical sense given that a group’s structural position can influence its members’ experiences of inequality and injustice. For instance, members of low-status or disadvantaged groups typically take collective action in the name of justice to improve their group’s circumstances. In contrast, members of high-status groups contemplating participation in social justice strategies must weigh their group interests against the interests of societal justice. Finally, collective action participants from a range of status positions are likely to have distinct experiences of inequality and injustice that motivate their participation, which may not necessarily mirror the concerns motivating low- and high-status group members’ participation (see Iyer & Leach, in press).

Although status position should influence individuals’ pathways to collective action, it is also likely that some similar factors will operate to facilitate (or inhibit) their participation in social justice efforts. As such, after providing an overview of each section, we consider points of convergence and divergence among the articles. Wright’s (2009) final article offers an integrative commentary on the entire issue, as well as an agenda for future research based on points of convergence and divergence.

**Collective Action by Low-Status Groups**

The articles in the first section focus on collective action by members of low-status or disadvantaged groups who seek to improve their group’s status, power, or position. In a theoretical review article, van Zomeren and Spears (2009) develop a set of metaphors to classify the range of motivations proposed for collective action and, in so doing, identify conceptual gaps in the extant literature. They argue that researchers have traditionally viewed collective action participants as intuitive economists (who weigh the concrete benefits of action for their individual and group interests) and intuitive politicians (who consider whether participation in action will help them maintain a positive social identity). Yet little attention has been given to participants as intuitive theologians, who are motivated to defend threatened moral convictions. van Zomeren and Spears thus propose a new line of research and offer practical guidelines for how SMOs may encourage individuals’ different motivations for participating in action.

The next two articles in this section provide empirical evidence for low-status groups’ motivations to engage in collective action, as well as a key obstacle they
may face in this process. Stürmer and Simon (2009) compare two established psychological pathways to social movement participation (calculation of costs and benefits of participation, and group identification) with a third: anger. Their experimental data show that, unlike cost–benefit calculation and group identification, anger is a relatively weak predictor of collective action participation when there are other less costly means to reduce this emotion. Stürmer and Simon conclude with recommendations for how social justice organizations might more effectively mobilize their participants to take action.

In their article, Ellemers and Barreto (2009) highlight a key obstacle to the development and mobilization of collective action strategies: modern expressions of prejudice that tend to be more subtle and indirect. In their experimental studies, Ellemers and Barreto demonstrate that women who face subtle (rather than overt) expressions of prejudice are less likely to interpret this treatment as group-based discrimination. As a result, these women blame their negative treatment on their own shortcomings, thus helping to maintain the meritocracy ideology. Importantly, the women facing subtle prejudice also experience less anger and are less likely to engage in collective action, compared to those facing blatant prejudice. Ellemers and Barreto offer concrete recommendations to improve the recognition of, and concrete challenges to, modern expressions of gender prejudice.

The next article, by Drury and Reicher (2009), takes the study of collective action out of the laboratory by analyzing collective action by crowds. Crowd events reflect instances of collective action that are rarely scripted, and thus may quickly evolve in unplanned ways. Thus, research conducted in such contexts is perhaps best suited to observing the dynamics of collective action as it unfolds over time. In studies of crowds ranging from a student protest, to a mass demonstration against local taxation that turned into a riot, to football fans, Drury and Reicher argue that empowerment within these groups enhances the development of widely shared goals, and support for normative action. They conclude that a sense of emerging psychological collective empowerment is crucial in motivating collective action, because it instills a belief that the group can overcome the intergroup power differences that may otherwise seem too great.

In the final article of this section, Louis (2009) investigates another gap in social and psychological work on collective action. Although many have considered how to motivate people to engage in action, few have focused on how collective action might be used to create social change, and whether this is actually effective. Thus, Louis argues, there are few concrete strategies that activists and community organizers might take from the extant literature about how to achieve change (e.g., change social norms or level of identification) and the factors that might moderate the effectiveness of these strategies (e.g., the role of opponents or third-party observers). Building on SIT principles, Louis develops a model to address these shortcomings, discusses its practical implications, and calls for future research on this issue.
Collective Action by High-Status Groups

The second section illustrates two different forms of collective action high-status groups may take in the face of social inequality and injustice. First, Postmes and Smith (2009) investigate how members of privileged groups might act to maintain oppression. They report experimental evidence that ingroup norms—as an intragroup process—serve to normalize and encourage oppression against disadvantaged groups. Individuals in a condition where group norms are consistent with oppression are more likely to engage in oppressive acts. Postmes and Smith consider the theoretical implications of this analysis for the study of oppression and discuss the practical strategies that could be developed for use by those seeking to eliminate such behavior.

Iyer and Ryan (2009) explicitly compare advantaged and disadvantaged group members’ (emotional) responses to a particular instance of gender discrimination (the “glass cliff”). Building on SIT principles and work on appraisal theories of (group-based) emotion, they suggest that men’s and women’s willingness to challenge the “glass cliff” is explained by different perceptions of the inequality (i.e., its illegitimacy and pervasiveness) and different emotional reactions (i.e., anger or sympathy), depending on the gender group to which they belong, and their level of identification with that group. This is because the two groups have different interests (i.e., challenging vs. maintaining the status quo), with higher identifiers more in tune with these interests, and lower identifiers less so. As a result, higher and lower identified men and women are likely to interpret and experience the same situation quite differently. This direct comparison between advantaged and disadvantaged group members’ responses highlights the need for researchers to examine advantaged groups as well as disadvantaged groups in the study of collective action.

Beyond Status: Collective Action around Opinions and Policy Opposition

The last section focuses on collective action among members of groups not strictly defined by their status position, even while the aim of such actions is to further the interests of a disadvantaged or harmed group. For instance, investigations of political demonstrations (van Stekelenburg et al., 2009) include participants who may belong to high-status groups, low-status groups, or third-party observer groups. Thus, the social and psychological factors and processes being considered in such studies are applicable to members of all status groups.

van Stekelenburg et al. (2009) surveyed and interviewed individuals who participated in two large coalition-sponsored demonstrations, thus gaining information about who actually protests, and for what reason(s). They demonstrate that ideological motives are key predictors of participation in collective action, independent of instrumental motives (i.e., cost–benefit analyses). In addition, they find
that the social movement context influences the motivational patterns of individual protesters. Instrumental concerns and beliefs about efficacy are more important for those among a power-oriented movement who are protesting a government reduction to early retirement plans (concrete outcomes), whereas ideological concerns are more important for those among a value-oriented movement who are protesting a more abstract neo-liberal value system. van Stekelenburg et al. close with a discussion of implications for social justice organizations.

In the next article, McGarty et al. (2009) propose that many instances of collective action are expressions of a specific (political) opinion held by the individual, rather than the social or demographic groups (e.g., based on race, gender, or nationality) they belong to. Similarly, other examples of collective action by groups cannot be equated to either social categories or institutions (e.g., rallies against the 2003 invasion of Iraq). As such, McGarty et al. consider the factors that motivate members of an opinion-based group (defined by a shared opinion or political position) to take collective action on behalf of this opinion. In arguably the best example of translating theory and research into practice and policy, they discuss an intervention aiming to create psychological commitment with various opinion-based groups (e.g., groups who disagree with the government). This intervention is reported to have long-term effects on participants’ political consciousness and behavioral intentions, thus nicely demonstrating the key point that collective action research is not only theoretically relevant, but can also be socially consequential.

Points of Convergence and Divergence

As noted, this issue includes a range of empirical work on the social and psychological factors that motivate individuals from groups to engage in collective action. For example, some articles focus on the experience of group-based injustice (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009) and group-based emotions (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Stürmer & Simon, 2009; van Stekelenburg et al., 2009), whereas others focus on the strength of identification with one’s disadvantaged group (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Louis, 2009; Stürmer & Simon, 2009; van Zomeren & Spears, 2009) or advantaged group (Iyer & Ryan, 2009), and still others focus on individual cost–benefit analyses (Stürmer & Simon, 2009; van Stekelenburg et al., 2009; van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Various articles also introduce novel variables that should contribute to participation in collective action, such as moral conviction (van Zomeren & Spears, 2009), ideology (van Stekelenburg et al., 2009), perceived pervasiveness of inequality (Iyer & Ryan, 2009), ingroup norms (Postmes & Smith, 2009), opinion-based groups (McGarty et al., 2009), as well as empowerment and positive emotion (Drury & Reicher, 2009).

Many articles converge on the importance of social identity in collective action, be it based on group status or not. For example, Stürmer and Simon (2009) argue that social identification with a group or social movement is a key
predictor of collective action participation among low-status group members, whereas McGarty et al. (2009) and Drury and Reicher (2009) argue that self-categorization and identification processes are key to opinion-based groups and crowd events, respectively. Iyer and Ryan (2009), as well as Postmes and Smith (2009), contend that even members of high-status groups may engage in collective action on the basis of their group membership.

However, there is also an important point of divergence across contributions, which concerns the role of group-based emotions in collective action. For example, van Stekelenburg et al. (2009) and Iyer and Ryan (2009) demonstrate that emotional responses to inequality and injustice predict individuals’ willingness or intentions to take collective action. Drury and Reicher (2009) also argue for the importance of positive group-based emotions among crowd members. However, Stürmer and Simon’s (2009) findings suggest that while emotions like anger may spark motivation for collective action, they do not necessarily translate into behavior at a later stage. Such divergence offers an opportunity for healthy scientific debate and offers a strong pointer for future research. Such research can identify, for example, the specific conditions under which emotions like anger predict collective action, and why they do so.

Concluding Remarks

Whether from the perspective of low-status groups, high-status groups, or groups undefined by status, the articles in this issue of JSI present theory and research on the social and psychological dynamics of collective action. Theoretically, the contributions consider which established and emerging factors (such as identity, instrumentality, and injustice) motivate collective action among these different groups. Methodologically, the contributions use different quantitative approaches (such as experiments, longitudinal studies, and field studies), and different operationalizations of collective action. And from a perspective of practical relevance, each article offers recommendations for the application of its findings and analysis in policy and practice. More generally, our aim was for these articles to contribute to a more multifaceted and integrative understanding of the social and psychological dynamics of collective action, in all its many shapes and forms.

We also hope that the present collection of articles will inspire new ways of thinking about the study of collective action. To date there have been too few attempts toward theoretical and methodological integration in the literature, leaving many apparent theoretical contradictions and unanswered questions. And, perhaps more importantly, there has been very little collaboration between scientists and practitioners in developing models of collective action that are valid in both theoretical and practical terms. We hope that this volume may serve as a rallying call for some scientific and practitioner “collective action” to start developing such frameworks.
References


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