

University of Groningen

Captivated by fear

Veldhuis, Tinka

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:

2015

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Veldhuis, T. (2015). *Captivated by fear: an evaluation of terrorism detention policy*. [Thesis fully internal (DIV), University of Groningen]. [S.n.].

Copyright

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: <https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment>.

Take-down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): <http://www.rug.nl/research/portal>. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.

Chapter Five

Terrorists in the Inmate Hierarchy²³

The literature on prisoner radicalization largely revolves around the assumption that violent extremist offenders can relatively easily persuade other prisoners to adopt violent extremist ideologies. However, this is certainly not given. At a minimum, to have a radicalizing effect on others violent extremists need to be in a social position that grants them a certain degree of influence on the attitudes and behaviors of other inmates. Whether this happens is likely to depend on an array of situational factors such as characteristics of the terrorists, the other inmates, and the prison context. Research on social influence identified several variables that determine whether a target is susceptible to outside influence (see for overviews e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2012; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Turner, 1991), such as personal characteristics of (Judge, Bono, Ilies & Gerhardt, 2002) and identification with the influencer (e.g., Hogg, 2001), group dynamics (Turner, 1991), the strength and content of the message (e.g., Benoit & Benoit, 2008), and the target's goals (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), personality, and values (Ehrhart & Klein, 2001).

In prison, one factor that may be particularly informative about terrorists' potential influence is their social status within the inmate community. Prison communities are often hierarchically organized, with certain individuals or groups obtaining higher status positions than others (Sapp & Vaughn, 1990). Those with high status positions are respected and can exert stronger influence

²³ This chapter is based on Veldhuis, T.M., Lindenberg, S., Gordijn, E.H. & Veenstra, R. (2014). Terrorists in the inmate hierarchy. Attitudes toward terrorism offenders among Muslim and non-Muslim prisoners in the Netherlands. Manuscript submitted for publication.

on events or the behaviors of other inmates (e.g., Hartman, 2008), whereas inmates with an inferior standing, sex offenders and child molesters in particular (Colwell, 2007; Sapp & Vaughn, 1990), are prone to social rejection, exploitation, and victimization (Ireland, 2002). To understand whether terrorists can exert influence on others, as is often assumed, it is thus important to know where they stand in the broader inmate community and how they are perceived and evaluated by other inmates. If it is indeed true that terrorists can have a radicalizing influence, one would expect them to have a high social standing and to enjoy respect among other inmates. Conversely, a low social standing should be associated with little influence.

In this chapter I take a first step toward understanding terrorism offenders' potential influence, by examining how other inmates see and think about them. In particular, I am interested in attitudes that may be informative about terrorists' status in the inmate community, such as respect, social avoidance, fear, and evaluative stereotypes. In what follows, I examine several factors that may affect terrorists' status position, including a) how dangerous other inmates believe them to be; b) whether they are detained in a specialized terrorism regime (*vis-à-vis* a 'regular' high-security regime or a regular prison regime); and c) whether they are (stereotyped as) Muslim or not. To this end I conducted survey research among both Islamic and non-Islamic inmates in general prison regimes in the Netherlands.

Social Standing of Terrorism Offenders in the Inmate Population

The premise that terrorists convey a risk of spreading violent extremist ideologies seems rooted in the idea that terrorism organizations depend on their ability to mobilize support for their cause (e.g., Wiktorowicz, 2004) and that they rely on incarcerated members to recruit new followers (e.g., CIA, 2002). In the words of one author: "incarcerated terrorists often use their time in prison to mobilize outside support, radicalize other prisoners and – when given the opportunity – will attempt to recreate operational command structures" (Jeswal, 2013, p. 47). In 2008, internal documents of the British Ministry of Justice revealed growing concerns among the Prison Service at the danger of Islamist prisoners seeking to radicalize other inmates (e.g., Ford, 2008). Similarly, in 2011 a British government report referred to "some people" who allegedly "sought to radicalize and recruit other prisoners" (HM Government, 2011, p. 87) but added that although radicalization is an important concern in prison, "it is rarely witnessed" (Ibid.).

Claims about radicalization and recruitment efforts are rarely substantiated by empirical data. In one study conducted in a high-security prison in the UK, Liebling, Arnold and Straub (2012) hint at the potential influence of terrorists when they observe that many inmates convert to Islam and that the growing Muslim population is gaining an increasingly dominant position within the inmate population. Staff and prisoners expressed concerns over a number of extremist offenders who appeared to be “right at the top” of the Muslim inmate hierarchy and aimed to control the attitudes and behaviors of other inmates (Liebling, Arnold & Straub, 2012, p. 88). However, most studies focus on the (real or perceived) attitudes and behaviors of extremist inmates, not on the attitudes of *non-extremist* inmates toward their extremist counterparts. As a result, it is unclear where terrorists stand in the inmate community and how they are perceived by their peers.

In fact, there may also be reasons to believe that terrorists are more likely to have a low status position and are viewed unfavorably by fellow inmates (and hence may have little influence on others). Studies among public audiences in the West generally connect terrorism with negative emotional responses like fear and anger (e.g., Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003; Goodwin, Wilson & Gaines, 2005; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich & Morgan, 2006; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischhoff, 2003), rather than with positive responses like identification and respect. If anything, such findings suggest that terrorists may be more likely to arouse negative rather than positive attitudinal responses from fellow inmates. In all, whether terrorists enjoy a high or low social status in the inmate community and which factors may be associated with their status position remains wholly unclear. In the following sections I discuss some situational and individual conditions that might affect how terrorists are viewed and evaluated by other prisoners, and therewith how much influence they may gain.

Perceived Dangerousness

One factor that may determine terrorists’ status position is how dangerous other inmates believe them to be. Different theoretical lines of reasoning may be relevant here, which lead to competing predictions as to whether perceived dangerousness can contribute to higher or lower status. On the one hand, studies in the realm of labeling, stereotyping, and stigmatization often associate perceived dangerousness with emotional and attitudinal responses that indicate rejection (e.g., Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2005; Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006; Link et al., 1999). The underlying rationale is that people prefer to keep ostensibly dangerous individuals at a safe distance and tend to avoid interacting with them, which translates into responses of fear

and social avoidance (Corrigan et al., 2005; Hirschfield & Piquero, 2010; Link, Cullen, Frank & Wozniak, 1987). Following this line of reasoning one would expect that inmates who perceive terrorism offenders as dangerous are in turn likely to respond with attitudes that indicate low social standing (and hence low influence), such as disrespect, fear, desire for social distance, and rejection.

In contrast, however, studies on prison populations often suggest that inmate communities tend to develop subcultures that are based on deviant, hostile norms, where perceived dangerousness may be a source of status. Sykes (1958) for instance stated that among prisoners, being seen as potentially dangerous and willing to respond to threats with violence could be a way to gain respect and avoid being victimized or taken advantage of by other inmates. Those who have a reputation of toughness and aggression, for instance due to extensive detention history, violent criminal record, or opposition against prison authorities may gain status and control over scarce resources or the behavior of other inmates (e.g., Sapp & Vaughn, 1990; Wood, Alleyne, Mozova & James, 2013). If dangerousness is indeed a means to rise in the status hierarchy one would expect that inmates who perceive terrorism offenders as dangerous are likely to respond with responses like respect and the desire to associate, which may indicate high social standing (and influence).

Terrorism Regimes as a Source of Perceived Dangerousness

Arguably, attributions of dangerousness to terrorists are likely to depend in part on whether they are treated as 'ordinary' prisoners, or whether they receive specialized treatments and are concentrated in segregated high-security facilities. At some point during their sentence, inmates in specialized terrorism prisons may be transferred to a regular prison regime where they are integrated into the mainstream inmate population, for instance as part of a re-integration or de-radicalization agenda (see for a discussion on reintegration of violent extremist offenders El-Said & Harrigan, 2012; see also Wong et al., 2005 for an elaboration on graduated release trajectories). Assuming that other inmates may know that they have previously been detained in a separate facility for terrorists (which at least in the Netherlands is quite likely), the question is whether this affects their social standing in the inmate community – by changing how dangerous they are perceived to be.

When people have little information on important characteristics of others, they are likely to use indirect cues in the environment as a basis for evaluation and future action (e.g., Goffman, 1959;

Lindenberg, 2012). For inmates in regular prisons, the notion that terrorists are detained in separate high-security facilities may signal that the authorities consider these offenders dangerous. There is some research on 'supermax' prisons (which are, like terrorism prisons, segregated high-security facilities for violent and dangerous offenders, see for discussions Mears, 2008; Riveland, 1999), which suggests that detention in such facilities can elevate inmates' social standing within the inmate community. Hartman (2008) for example argues that supermax facilities create an 'elite' inmate category that is seen as tough and dangerous and gains respect by fellow inmates. According to Hartman (2008), incarceration in a supermax prison contributes to social status and increases inmates' influence on the attitudes and behaviors of other prisoners. Whether the same may hold for terrorism prisons is unclear. Some have argued that Guantanamo Bay prisoners are seen as heroes and martyrs in the eyes of young Muslims who feel marginalized and discriminated against (e.g., Rutten, 2008), but such claims are unsupported by quantitative data.

(Real or Stereotyped) Islamic Affiliation

Next to perceived dangerousness, religious affiliation – of both the terrorists and the other inmates – may influence how terrorists are perceived and evaluated by other prisoners (and may thereby influence their status and influence position). Muslims are dramatically overrepresented among terrorism offenders, not only in the U.S. (e.g., Hamm, 2013) but also in other countries in the West including the UK and France (Beckford, Joly & Khosrokhavar, 2005), and the Netherlands (Demant et al., 2007; Veldhuis et al., 2011). This raises questions as to whether a) terrorism offenders who are (stereotyped as) Muslim have a different social standing in the inmate community than non-Muslim terrorism offenders, and b) whether Muslim inmates evaluate terrorists differently than non-Muslim inmates.

Attitudes Toward Muslim Terrorism Offenders

Together, the threat of Islamist violent extremism and rapidly growing numbers of Muslim terrorism suspects may have given rise to stereotypical beliefs that terrorism is inherently connected to Islam. Park, Felix and Lee (2007) argued that repeated exposure to information associating Arab-Muslims with the threat of terrorism might create automatic negative attitudes toward this group. Indeed, studies revealed that citizens in the West appear to hold stereotypical beliefs that terrorism is linked to Islam and tend to believe that terrorism attacks are perpetrated by Muslims (e.g., Cinnirella, 2012). For example, in 2010, a poll in the UK exposed that 58

percent associated Islam with extremism (BBC News, 2010), whereas in the Netherlands in 2013, 73 percent appeared to see a relationship between Islam and recent terrorist attacks in Boston, London, and Paris (PVV, 2013)²⁴. Attitudes toward Muslims, in turn, are predominantly negative (Helbing, 2012). Studies showed that citizens in the West think negatively about Muslims (e.g., Nisbet, Ostman & Shanahan, 2007; Panagopolous, 2006), and that Muslims are being stereotyped as violent and untrustworthy (Sides & Gross, 2013) or as sympathetic to terrorists (Condon, 2011).

The question is whether similar attitudinal patterns prevail among prison inmates. Again, data are scarce. Studies that compare attitudes toward Islamic and non-Islamic terrorism offenders are non-existent, but there is some research on attitudes toward Muslim prisoners. Predominantly, these studies suggest that Muslims are often targets of discrimination and prejudice in prison (e.g., Liebling et al., 2012; Marcus, 2009; Marranci, 2009). A comparative study in French and British prisons concluded that many Muslims reported racist discrimination against them by prison staff and, to a lesser extent, other inmates (Beckford, Joly & Khosrokhavar, 2005). Similarly, in a survey among prisoners in the UK, Muslims expressed frustration about being stereotypically portrayed as violent extremists and reported higher levels of discrimination, social rejection, and physical and emotional insecurity than non-Muslim inmates (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2010). Together these findings suggest that if prisoners indeed see terrorism offenders as Muslims, and if Muslims are in turn negatively evaluated, then it can be expected that prisoners hold negative attitudes about terrorism offenders, especially when they see them as Muslim.

Attitudes of Muslim Inmates Toward Terrorism Offenders

It is likely that (real or stereotyped) Muslim terrorists have a different status position among Muslim and non-Muslim peers, although the literature is again inconclusive as to how Muslim inmates (as compared to non-Muslims) think about terrorists. On the one hand, it has been suggested that terrorist prisoners may become heroes in the eyes of young Muslims (e.g., Rutten, 2008) and that many Muslim inmates are susceptible to Islamist ideologies (e.g., Brandon, 2009b; Hannah, Clutterbuck & Rubin, 2008). Such claims point in the direction that terrorism

²⁴ The poll, conducted by pollster and political analyst Maurice de Hond, was commissioned Populist Party PVV, which is known for its anti-Islam agenda. I have not been able to find similar polls with which to compare the results.

offenders may have a relatively high status position among Muslim inmates and are respected and positively evaluated.

Juxtaposed those claims, however, there are also cues that Muslim inmates may be inclined to distance themselves from terrorists and reject extremist influence. Polls among general audiences often reveal that Muslims denounce violent extremism. For example, in 2007, the vast majority of Muslims in the West (e.g., ranging from 64% in France to 78% in the U.S. and 83% in Germany) said that suicide attacks to defend Islam are never justified (PEW, 2007, p. 53). Using Gallup survey data collected among Muslims in 35 nations, Esposito and Mogahed (2009) found that the vast majority said the 9/11 attacks were unjustified. Only seven percent, defined by the authors as 'potentially radicalized', said the attacks were completely justified.

In sum, the literature offers ambiguous direction as to the role of religious affiliation of both terrorists and their non-extremist peers in determining terrorists' social standing. To shed light on these uncertainties, in this study I not only assessed whether inmates hold stereotypical associations between terrorism and Islam but also measured attitudinal responses toward (real or perceived Muslim) terrorists among both Muslim and non-Muslim inmates.

This Study: Aims and Objectives

With the overarching ambition to gain insight into the social standing (and by implication the influence) of terrorism offenders in the broader inmate community, I aim to examine how terrorists are viewed and evaluated by inmates in general prison regimes in the Netherlands. I sought to tap terrorists' social standing by measuring several attitudinal responses, particularly attitudes that can be interpreted as indicative of a high social standing such as respect, willingness to associate, and general liking (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995). In contrast, responses that indicate social rejection, such as evaluative stereotypes (Link & Phelan, 2001), fear, and social avoidance (e.g., Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006), are interpreted as reflections of low social standing. I also aim to identify and examine several factors that may influence the social standing of terrorism offenders, including a) perceived dangerousness, which may in turn depend on b) incarceration in a separate high security terrorism prison (vis-à-vis a 'regular' high security prison or a normal prison). In addition, social standing may also depend on c) whether terrorists are (stereotyped as) Muslims or not. In addition, I examine whether (Muslim) terrorism offenders have a different social standing among Islamic and non-Islamic inmate populations.

Method

Data²⁵

Data were collected among 117 male inmates in three prisons in the Netherlands ($N = 37$, $N = 15$ and $N = 61$, respectively).²⁶ Respondents were recruited in regular prison regimes and although the researchers were not allowed to ask the inmates about the reason for their incarceration, respondents may have been charged with various offenses including drugs offenses, robbery, shoplifting, violent offenses, and sex offenses. Three respondents had no scores on the dependent variables and one individual was dropped after closer inspection revealed that his answers showed no variation, which produced questionable response patterns. This left 113 respondents for further analysis ($M_{age} = 32.36$, $SD = 10.66$), of whom 29 identified themselves as Muslim, 41 as Christian, 31 as non-religious, six as 'other', and six failed to report on religious affiliation. In terms of religious denomination the sample, by and large, represents the overall inmate population (Oliemeulen et al., 2010). The inmates were approached individually by the researchers and invited to participate in the study. No incentives were offered and research procedures guaranteed that the prison officers were not aware which inmates participated in the study. Inmates who agreed to participate completed the questionnaire individually in their cells.

Research Design

A research design was created to examine the effect of perceived dangerousness, regime type (i.e., terrorism regime vis-à-vis other regime types) and Islamic affiliation on attitudinal responses of regular prisoners toward terrorism offenders. Specifically, a 3 (*regime type*: terrorism vs. high-security vs. regular) x 2 (*terrorist's religion*: Muslim vs. control) design was used, with regime type as a within-subjects factor and terrorist's religion as a between-subjects factor.

²⁵ The data were collected by the author, in some instances with help from student assistants. Therefore, in this section I sometimes refer to the plural 'researchers' to indicate the data collection team.

²⁶ As some inmates left or entered the prison unit while the researchers were present conducting the surveys, it was sometimes difficult to establish whether all inmates had been invited to participate. The number of completed surveys reflects a response rate of approximately twenty per cent of the inmates registered at the prison wings at the time of data collection.

Regime type. To assess whether offenders' social standing within the inmate community is influenced by incarceration in a specialized prison regime for terrorists, I measured respondents' attitudes toward prisoners in three existing regime types in the Netherlands: a terrorism unit, a high-security unit²⁷, and a regular prison unit. I included the high-security unit as a reference category to differentiate between high-security regimes that are especially designed to house terrorists, and 'regular' high-security regimes that house a broader variety of allegedly dangerous (non-extremist) offenders. This way, I aimed to isolate the effect of associations with terrorism on attitudinal responses above and beyond the effect of high-security levels.

Respondents were presented with a questionnaire that contained three separate leaflets, each of which showed an 'ID-card' that semantically described the characteristics of a fictive male offender and the regime type in which he was detained. The offender's personal characteristics were the same on each card (i.e., age 35, convicted of murder and sentenced to ten years imprisonment); the only difference was that one offender was detained in a terrorism unit, the second in a high-security unit, and the third in a regular prison unit. In the Dutch prison system these three regime types apply different security levels and detain inmates with graduated risk profiles. As such they presumably transmit different cues about the respective inmates' dangerousness, which in turn should trigger different attitudinal responses.

Each card briefly described the key features and relevant selection criteria for one of the three prison regimes. Both the terrorism unit and the high-security unit are separated detention facilities designed to concentrate and segregate a specific category of inmates, as specified in the Dutch Penitentiary Principles Act (Article 13). The high-security unit applies the highest security level in the Dutch penitentiary system and houses inmates with an 'extreme' risk profile, like those with extreme risk of flight or who, in case of escape, constitute an unacceptable risk for society in terms of social unrest. The terrorism unit applies an 'extensive' security level, which is one level below high-security, and houses inmates with a 'heightened' risk profile. The terrorism unit detains only inmates who are suspected or convicted of terrorism acts, and/or who adhere to violent extremist belief systems (Veldhuis et al., 2011). The regular regime applies a 'normal'

²⁷ The term 'high security unit' was used to refer to the Netherlands' only supermax facility, which is commonly referred to, within the prison system as well as in public discourse, as a high-security prison (*Extra Beveiligde Inrichting*). See Boin (2001) for a discussion of the Dutch supermax system.

security level, which is again one level below extensive security and is the most common prison regime in the Netherlands.²⁸

Terrorist's religion. To examine whether prisoners hold stereotypes that link terrorism to Islam and whether Muslim terrorists have a different social standing than non-Muslim terrorists, half of the respondents were explicitly informed that, at the time of the study, all inmates in the terrorism unit were Muslim. The other half did not receive information about the offenders' religious affiliation. Previous studies revealed that citizens in the Netherlands hold negative attitudes toward Muslims (González, Verkuyten, Weesie & Poppe, 2008), so I expected non-Muslim respondents to evaluate Muslim terrorism offenders more negatively than non-Muslim terrorism offenders. With respect to non-Muslim respondents previous publications point in conflicting directions when it comes to attitudes toward terrorists, so no specific directions were made for this group.

Measures

To operationalize the relevant variables I adjusted measures used in previous research, in particular Hirschfield and Piquero's (2010) study and the Attitudes Toward Prisoners scale (Melvin, Gramling & Gardner, 1985), to the objectives and constraints of this study. As a consequence of using a within-subjects design, in which participants answered each question three times (once for each regime type), only a limited number of unique items could be included in the questionnaire. I selected items that I believe reflect the essence of the concepts of interest rather than including validated scales, which would have produced unreasonably lengthy and repetitive questionnaires.

Relative ranking. Above all, I aimed to gauge the status of terrorism offenders within the overall inmate hierarchy. To that end respondents were asked to indicate on scales ranging from 1 (very negatively) to 7 (very positively) how they thought about eight different offender categories (i.e., shoplifters, bank robbers, terrorists, child molesters, serial killers, drugs couriers, sex offenders, and car thieves). This produced general evaluations of each offender category, so that it is possible to assess how terrorists are evaluated relative to other offender categories and determine their relative ranking in the inmate community.

²⁸ Art 2-6 of the Regulation Selection, Placement, and Transfer of Detainees.

Perceived dangerousness. Perceived dangerousness was measured by combining the items “I believe this inmate is a danger to Dutch society” and “I believe this inmate will commit another crime when he is released from prison” ($.28 < rs < .68$, all $ps < .01$). Items were measured on scales ranging from 1 (absolutely not) to 7 (absolutely). It was expected that attributions of dangerousness differ as a function of regime type and, in turn, predict attitudinal responses toward the respective inmate.

Attitudinal responses that indicate social standing. Five attitudinal dimensions were measured using 7-point scales. First, I assessed the extent to which participants articulated respect for inmates in the three regime types, which was reverse coded into a measure of *disrespect*. Second, religious stereotyping was measured by asking how likely respondents believed inmates in each regime type to be Muslims. To avoid the impression that I expected respondents to have stereotypical attitudes, inmates were also asked to indicate how likely they perceived the inmates to be Christians or non-religious. These extra items were by themselves not of interest to the study and will therefore not be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. Third, fear was measured by asking how fearful participants expected to be if they would encounter the inmates on the streets. Fourth, I followed Hirschfield and Piquero (2010) in measuring *attitudinal social distance* (henceforth *social distance*). Social distance is usually measured in different domains, including the willingness to interact as a co-worker, neighbor, or friend (Link et al., 1999). Here, the desire to distance oneself from the target (“I want to have nothing to do with this inmate”) was combined with fear of identity contamination (“This inmate reflects badly upon me”) into one social distance variable ($.23 < rs < .35$, all $ps < .02$). Fifth, to gauge inmates’ perception of terrorism offenders’ social standing in society at large, respondents were asked to what extent they expected inmates in the three regime types to be rejected by society after release from prison.

Individual characteristics. Some individual characteristics were accounted for, namely respondents’ religion, age, and penitentiary institution (*prison ID*). My main interest was in religious affiliation, specifically in response patterns of Islamic versus non-Islamic respondents. Age and prison ID were controlled for but were not of any theoretical relevance to the study and will therefore not be discussed in detail.

Analytic Strategy

Perceived dangerousness and age were centered on their regime means and grand mean respectively and dummy variables were created for *prison ID*, *terrorist's religion* (1 = Muslim, 0 = control), and *respondents' religion* (1 = Muslim, 0 = else). Multilevel analyses were performed in MLWIN 2.26 (Rasbash, Steele, Browne & Goldstein, 2012) to analyze the data.

Relative ranking. First, I assessed respondents' evaluation of terrorism offenders relative to other offender categories, using a multivariate multilevel design. Respondents' evaluations of the eight offender categories (level 1) were treated as nested within individuals (level 2). Two models were estimated: an empty model that included the eight evaluation scores as response variables (model 0) and a model that included individual characteristics (model 1). As there were too few prisons ($N = 3$) or between-subjects factors to create additional levels, *prison ID* and *terrorist's religion* were both handled as individual characteristics, together with respondents' *age* and *religion*.

Perceived dangerousness and attitudinal responses. Multilevel analyses were also applied to analyze respondents' attitudes toward inmates in the three regime types. The fifteen attitudinal responses (five attitudes for three regimes) (level 1) were treated as nested within individuals (level 2). Possible data dependencies existed on several dimensions. Firstly, the fifteen responses could depend on the respondent. Secondly, responses could be dependent within regime type and within attitudinal dimension. For example, fear-terrorism was expected to be predicted by perceived dangerousness-terrorism, but may simultaneously depend on perceived dangerousness of inmates in other regime types (i.e., high security or regular), which in turn may be mutually dependent. I tested four multilevel multivariate regression models, in which I accounted for these possible data dependencies. First, to examine whether respondents held different attitudes toward inmates in the three regime types, I estimated an empty multivariate model on the attitudinal responses. In this model, perceived dangerousness was also included (yielding eighteen outcome variables), so that I could estimate differences between regimes while accounting for dependencies between attitudinal dimensions (model 0). Second, I tested another empty model on the attitudinal responses, this time without perceived dangerousness (yielding fifteen outcome variables). This model (model 1) served as the baseline model to build the subsequent models, which aimed to test the effect of perceived dangerousness (model 2) and Islamic affiliation of both terrorism offenders and respondents (model 3). The effect of perceived dangerousness was estimated by including all three perceived dangerousness scores as

predictors of each attitudinal response. I expected only within-regime effects, so that dangerousness-terrorism predicts attitudinal reactions toward the inmate in the terrorism regime but not toward the inmates in the high-security and regular regime. However, including all three dangerousness measures as predictors for each response variable allowed controlling for potential dependencies across regime types.

Results

Relative Ranking

Table 5.1 shows how positive or negative respondents' were about terrorism offenders. Post hoc interval tests were used to contrast the scores for terrorism offenders with the other offender categories, to assess terrorists' relative ranking. Accordingly, in Table 5.1 (model 0) it can be seen that terrorists were evaluated very negatively ($M = 1.71$) relative to the other offender categories. Only child molesters ($M = 1.04$) and sex offenders ($M = 1.09$) were rated more negatively than terrorists (both $ps < .05$). The remaining offender categories all received more favorable evaluations than terrorists (all $ps < .03$).

The results of model 1 showed that Islamic and non-Islamic respondents evaluated terrorism offenders equally negative. Islamic inmates expressed themselves more negatively about sex-offenders, bank robbers, and hit men than non-Islamic inmates. None of the control variables influenced the relative ranking of terrorism offenders.

Table 5.1. General positive or negative evaluation of terrorism offenders relative to other offender categories.²⁹

Evaluations of Terrorism Offenders					
	Model 0		Model 1		
	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	
Intercept					
Terrorists	1.71 ^b	.13	1.84 ^b	.26	
Child molesters	1.04 ^a	.03	1.10 ^a	.06	
Sex offenders	1.09 ^a	.04	1.14 ^a	.09	
Shoplifters	3.49 ^c	.13	3.54 ^c	.25	
Bank robbers	3.35 ^c	.16	3.55 ^c	.31	
Hit men	2.40 ^c	.15	2.57 ^c	.30	
Drugs couriers	3.89 ^c	.15	4.01 ^c	.28	
Car thieves	3.50 ^c	.14	3.58 ^c	.27	
<i>Respondents' religion</i>					
<i>(Muslim)</i>					
Terrorists			.07	.30	
Child molesters			.01	.07	
Sex offenders			.20	.10*	
Shoplifters			.48	.29	
Bank robbers			-1.04	.36**	
Hit men			-1.12	.35**	
Drugs couriers			.10	.32	
Car thieves			.31	.31	
Deviance (df)	2251.2 (8)		2048.6 (40)***		

Perceived Dangerousness

Table 5.2 shows the results of the multivariate null model in which both perceived dangerousness and the attitudinal responses were included as outcome variables. It can be seen that perceived dangerousness differs as a function of regime type. Respondents perceived inmates in a terrorism unit ($M = 5.12$) as significantly more dangerous than inmates in a high-security unit ($M = 4.45$, $p < .05$) and inmates in a regular prison unit ($M = 3.68$, $p < .001$). In turn, inmates in a high-security unit were attributed higher levels of dangerousness than inmates in a regular prison ($p < .05$).

²⁹ Post-hoc interval tests were performed to compare the estimates for terrorists with the other seven categories. Estimates with superscripts that differ from that for terrorists differ significantly (at $p < .05$). * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests). Model 1 also controls for terrorist's religion, age, and prison ID. None of the control variables affected the relative ranking of terrorism offenders

Table 5.2. Means and standard errors for responses toward terrorism, high-security and regular prison regimes (multivariate null model).³⁰

	Mean	S.E.
Perceived dangerousness		
Terrorism	5.12 ^c	.16
High-security	4.45 ^b	.15
Regular	3.68 ^a	.12
Disrespect		
Terrorism	5.53 ^b	.19
High-security	5.03 ^{ab}	.20
Regular	4.85 ^a	.19
Religious stereotyping		
Terrorism	4.58 ^b	.22
High-security	3.26 ^a	.17
Regular	3.13 ^a	.16
Fear		
Terrorism	3.33 ^b	.22
High-security	3.05 ^{ab}	.21
Regular	2.55 ^a	.17
Social distance		
Terrorism	4.75 ^c	.16
High-security	4.10 ^b	.14
Regular	3.70 ^a	.15
Societal rejection		
Terrorism	6.03 ^c	.16
High-security	5.05 ^b	.18
Regular	4.53 ^a	.17

Perceived Dangerousness as a Predictor of Attitudinal Responses

To begin with, Table 5.2 shows that, like perceived dangerousness, attitudinal responses varied across the three regimes. Overall, respondents expressed stronger negative attitudinal responses (e.g., disrespect, fear, social distance, societal rejection, and religious stereotyping) toward inmates in terrorism prisons than other regime types. The difference between the terrorism unit and the high-security unit reached marginal significance for disrespect ($p = .06$) and was insignificant for fear ($p = .51$), indicating that respondents were equally afraid of inmates in a terrorism unit and a high-security unit.

Table 5.3 presents the results of the baseline model (model 1) and the models that estimated the effect of perceived dangerousness (model 2) and Islamic affiliation (model 3). For reasons of

³⁰ The means are generated from multivariate multilevel analyses and represent the intercepts of the null model. The regime-means that differ significantly (at $p < .05$) within each attitude contain different subscripts vertically (two-tailed tests).

clarity, I present only the results that relate to the research questions. First, only within-regime effects of perceived dangerousness are presented; cross-regime effects, such as the effect of perceived dangerousness-terrorism on attitudinal responses toward high-security inmates, are accounted for but not included in the table. Second, given the focus on attitudes toward inmates in terrorism regimes I present only these results for model 3, whereas the effects for the high-security and regular regimes are omitted.³¹ As can be seen, the results are in line with the conjecture that perceived dangerousness influences attitudinal responses in the direction that indicates low (rather than high) social standing of terrorism offenders. Perceived dangerousness significantly predicted attitudinal responses except disrespect for inmates in the high-security and regular regimes, religious stereotyping-high security, fear-terrorism, and societal rejection-regular.

³¹ All data and coding instructions are available from the author.

Table 5.3. *Multivariate multilevel means (model 1), posterior means (models 2 and 3), and parameter estimates of perceived dangerousness, terrorist’s religion, and respondents’ religion as predictors of attitudinal responses.*³²

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Intercept	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.
Disrespect						
Terrorism	5.54 ^b	.19	5.53 ^b	.18	5.31 ^a	.38
High-security	5.00 ^a	.20	5.08 ^a	.19	5.26 ^a	.41
Regular	4.86 ^a	.19	4.91 ^a	.18	4.86 ^a	.39
Religious stereotyping						
Terrorism	4.56 ^b	.22	4.63 ^b	.21	4.10 ^b	.41
High-security	3.26 ^a	.16	3.28 ^a	.17	3.14 ^a	.33
Regular	3.12 ^a	.16	3.11 ^a	.15	3.00 ^a	.31
Fear						
Terrorism	3.31 ^b	.22	3.13 ^c	.22	3.44 ^b	.47
High-security	3.04 ^b	.21	2.98 ^b	.20	3.41 ^{ab}	.42
Regular	2.54 ^a	.17	2.53 ^a	.17	2.63 ^a	.34
Social distance						
Terrorism	4.76 ^c	.15	4.77 ^c	.13	4.39 ^a	.26
High-security	4.11 ^b	.14	4.13 ^b	.13	4.32 ^a	.27
Regular	3.70 ^a	.16	3.67 ^a	.13	4.01 ^a	.27
Societal rejection						
Terrorism	6.02 ^c	.16	6.08 ^c	.15	6.23 ^c	.31
High-security	5.06 ^b	.18	5.09 ^b	.18	5.57 ^b	.37
Regular	4.53 ^a	.17	4.49 ^a	.17	4.33 ^a	.36

(Table continues on next page.)

³² Regime means (model 1) and posterior regime means (models 2 & 3) that differ significantly (at $p < .05$) within each attitude contain different subscripts vertically. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests). Parameter estimates for perceived dangerousness reflect within-regime effects; cross-regime effects are accounted for but not presented in the table. For both terrorist’s religion and the respondents’ religion, parameters represent effects on attitudinal responses toward inmates in the terrorism regime. Parameter estimates for the high-security and regular regimes are omitted for clarity. Model 3 also controls for prison ID and age.

Table 5.3 (continued)

<i>Perceived dangerousness</i>					
Disrespect					
	Terrorism	.39	.13**	.37	.14**
	High-security	.22	.16	.20	.17
	Regular	-.07	.16	-.12	.17
Religious stereotyping					
	Terrorism	.56	.16***	.46	.15***
	High-security	.19	.14	.19	.13
	Regular	.39	.13**	.48	.13***
Fear					
	Terrorism	.27	.17	.27	.17
	High-security	.40	.17*	.36	.17*
	Regular	.33	.15*	.33	.14*
Social distance					
	Terrorism	.50	.10***	.49	.09***
	High-security	.50	.10***	.50	.11***
	Regular	.54	.11***	.54	.11***
Societal rejection					
	Terrorism	.37	.11***	.33	.11**
	High-security	.22	.15	.29	.15*
	Regular	.33	.15*	.28	.15
<i>Terrorist's religion (Muslim)</i>					
	Disrespect			-.12	.39
	Religious stereotyping			.35	.84
	Fear			-.05	.47
	Social distance			.53	.26*
	Societal rejection			.20	.32
<i>Respondents' religion (Muslim)</i>					
	Disrespect			-.00	.44
	Religious stereotyping			-.57	.47
	Fear			.44	.54
	Social distance			.53	.30
	Societal rejection			-.63	.36
Deviance (df)		5652.66 (18)	5212.14 (45)***	4838.26 (75)***	

Effect of Islamic Affiliation

Attitudes toward Muslim terrorists. As can be seen under *terrorist's religion* in Table 5.3 (model 3) attitudinal responses toward Muslim and non-Muslim terrorism offenders were comparable, with the exception that Muslim terrorists aroused stronger desire for social distance. Respondents who had not been made aware that the terrorism unit housed only Muslims were nevertheless equally inclined to attribute Islamic affiliations to these inmates as respondents who had explicitly received such information. No significant differences were found with respect to perceived levels of dangerousness and levels of fear, social distance, and societal rejection (all $ps > .39$).

Attitudes of Muslim inmates. Table 5.3 also shows under *respondents' religion* that Muslim and non-Muslim respondents expressed similar attitudes toward terrorism offenders, except that Muslim respondents anticipated marginally less societal rejection for these offenders ($p = .08$). Muslims perceived inmates in a terrorism unit to be as dangerous as non-Muslims and reported similar levels of fear, social distance, and disrespect. They were also equally likely to stereotype inmates in a terrorism unit as Muslims ($p = .26$).

Conclusion

Thus far, one of the main conclusions of this book has been that little is known about the dynamics by which violent extremist attitudes may spread through the prison population, and thus that it is difficult to estimate what the consequences of concentration models for terrorism prisoners might be. In general, it is assumed that terrorism offenders have a radicalizing influence on other prisoners and that these other prisoners are susceptible to such influence. Whether this is really the case, however, has not been tested. Based on survey research among prisoners in the Netherlands, in this chapter I have aimed to shed some light on these issues by examining whether terrorism offenders have a high social status position within the inmate population, and hence whether they can reasonably be expected to exert influence on the attitudes and behaviors of fellow inmates. Overall, the results offer little support for the assumption that terrorists are easily able to have a radicalizing influence on other inmates, and even point in the direction that concentrating them may do more harm than good.

Firstly, the results provide no indication that terrorism offenders have an influential status position in prison. On the contrary, terrorists appear to dangle at the bottom of the hierarchy in

the broader inmate population, which raises serious questions about their alleged ability to influence other prisoners. The inmates in this study evaluated terrorism offenders almost as negatively as child molesters and sex-offenders, which are universally seen as the most reviled offender categories (Sapp & Vaughn, 1990). This was true for both Muslim and non-Muslim inmates: terrorism offenders appeared to have a very low social standing among both inmate subgroups. As such, juxtaposed studies conducted in the UK, which suggested that violent extremist prisoners may have a high status position among (Muslim) prisoners (e.g., Liebling et al., 2012), these findings suggest that both Muslim and non-Muslim prisoners tend to despise rather than glorify terrorism offenders and are more likely to reject and distance themselves from terrorists than to respect and associate with them.

Moreover, the research showed that inmates held negative stereotypes about terrorism offenders and that they stereotypically linked them to Muslims, a finding that resonates with results from studies conducted among public citizens (González et al., 2008; Helbling, 2012). For inmates, hearing that another inmate is associated with terrorism was enough to assume he is Muslim and to find him dangerous, reject him, and be afraid of him, just as if they had been told that he is a Muslim. This way, negative attitudes toward terrorism prisoners may spill over to Muslim prisoners, who may, as was previously suggested (Beckford, Joly & Khosrokhavar, 2005), face negative stereotyping and prejudice (by non-Muslims) based on stereotypical beliefs that Islam is associated with violent extremism.

Second, in fact the results seem to suggest that incarcerating terrorism offenders in separate prison wings can enhance rejection of these inmates, which could make it difficult for them to integrate into the mainstream inmate population when they are transferred to a regular prison regime (for instance in pursuit of a de-radicalization or rehabilitation agenda). The inmates in this study perceived prisoners in a terrorism prison as more dangerous than inmates in a regular prison or a supermax prison (even though in reality the latter applies a higher security level than the terrorism prison), and responded with rejecting reactions such as disrespect, fear, and social avoidance. Consequentially the only inmates willing to provide violent extremist offenders with the resources to satisfy fundamental needs, such as belongingness and protection, may be those who accept them and share their grievances and ideological commitment. If this is true, this might ultimately drive violent extremist offenders into the arms of likeminded individuals and result in the formation of or intensification of violent extremist groups, which could in turn pave the way for (preparation of) terrorism activities.

Interestingly, the finding that detention in specialized terrorism prisons may erode inmates' social status in prison and induce rejection from other prisoners stands in stark contrast with previous work conducted in the United States, which suggests that imprisonment in a supermax or high-security prison can be interpreted as a sign of toughness and dangerousness and serves as a source of respect and status (e.g., Hartman, 2008). A possible explanation for this difference may be that whether or not perceived dangerousness is status-enhancing differs per country or even per prison, depending on characteristics of the prison culture and the inmate population (see for example Liebling et al., 2012; Liebling & Arnold, 2012). In prisons with strong macho cultures and aggressive social norms incarceration in a supermax or terrorism prisons may lead to a higher social standing, whereas in prisons with conciliatory norms that renounce offensive, aggressive behavior, being seen as dangerous may lower one's status and lead to rejection. However, further attitudinal and behavioral data are needed to examine these propositions in detail.

Of course, it is important to add some nuance to the interpretation of these results with regard to the validity of the underlying assumptions behind concentration strategies. The research presented in this chapter leaves open (and raises) several questions, in part as a result of limitations of the research design. Above all, the study was not designed to assess actual influence processes between violent extremists and other kinds of prisoners, and as such the results cannot give an inconclusive answer to the question of how serious the risk of prisoner radicalization really is. The low levels of respect for terrorism offenders that were found offer a reasonable indication that terrorists are not very likely to gain a strong influence position; yet Chapter Four identified several factors that may influence openness to radicalizing influence which were not included in this study, such as vicarious humiliation and identification with a charismatic leader. To truly understand whether and under what conditions concentration policies may be an adequate way to counter violent extremism, research is needed that scrutinizes actual (extremist) social influence processes in prison.

Overall, the findings presented in the previous chapters suggest that concentration strategies for terrorism offenders are based on unsubstantiated and possibly even flawed rationale, and that there is reason to believe that such policies may produce undesired outcomes like intensified radicalization. This begs the question how such policies are delivered in practice and whether the decision makers' expectations about how they are supposed to function are realized or not. Answering these questions is the main objective of Part Three.

Part Three

Terrorism Detention Policy in Practice: The Implementation of the Terrorism Wing

