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The impact of individual differences on network relations

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The Impact of Individual Differences on Network Relations

Social Exclusion and Inequality in Productive
Exchange and Coordination Games

Manuel Muñoz-Herrera

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Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Introduction	1
1.2	Framework	3
1.2.1	Productive exchange vs coordination settings	4
1.2.2	Assumptions	5
1.2.3	Productive exchange networks	6
1.2.4	Coordination games on networks	9
1.2.5	Coordination problems vs coordination games	11
1.3	Approach	12
1.3.1	Overview of the four studies	14
2	How specialization can breed social exclusion: A model of strategic interaction between specialists and generalists in knowledge-intensive productive exchange	17
2.1	Introduction	17
2.2	Framework	21
2.2.1	Exchange and network emergence	21
2.3	The model	24
2.3.1	Types of expertise	24
2.3.2	Strategic link formation	26
2.4	Equilibrium	29
2.4.1	Strategies	29
2.4.2	Nash equilibrium	30
2.4.3	Dyadic interactions: The 2-person game	32
2.4.4	Connectivity in the n-person network	35
2.5	Pairwise stable Nash equilibria	38
2.6	Discussion	42
3	The coordination of exchange relations: Equilibrium and reciprocity in network formation	47
3.1	Introduction	47

3.2	Framework	49
3.2.1	Exchange networks and exchange games	51
3.2.2	Individual rationality: Nash equilibrium	54
3.2.3	Dyadic rationality: The core	56
3.2.4	Empty cores: Reciprocity	58
3.3	The experiment	59
3.3.1	Experimental game	59
3.3.2	Experimental treatments	61
3.3.3	Experimental design and procedures	68
3.4	Results	69
3.4.1	Analytical strategy	69
3.4.2	Description of strategies used	70
3.4.3	Equilibrium: H1 and H2	71
3.4.4	Reciprocity: H3	72
3.4.5	Stability	75
3.5	Discussion	76
4	Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences	81
4.1	Introduction	81
4.2	Framework	83
4.2.1	Individual preferences	83
4.2.2	Network games	85
4.3	The model	87
4.3.1	The 2-person game: Strategic complements and substitutes	89
4.4	Equilibrium: Complete information	91
4.4.1	Strategies	91
4.4.2	Nash equilibrium	91
4.5	Equilibrium: Incomplete information	94
4.6	Discussion	99
5	Conflict and segregation in networks: An experiment on the interplay between individual preferences and social influence	101
5.1	Introduction	101
5.2	Framework	103
5.2.1	Identities and social influence	103
5.3	The model	107
5.4	Equilibrium	108
5.4.1	Network categorization	109
5.4.2	Nash equilibrium	109
5.4.3	Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium	110
5.4.4	Equilibrium selection	111
5.5	The experiment	118
5.5.1	Experimental game	118
5.5.2	Experimental design and treatments	120

5.5.3	Experimental procedures, data and methods	122
5.6	Results	123
5.7	Discussion	126
6	Conclusions	131
6.1	Summary of the findings	131
6.1.1	Results on productive exchange networks	132
6.1.2	Results on coordination games on networks	134
6.2	A general comment on the findings and on further research	136
6.2.1	Theoretical extension: Behavioral rules	138
6.2.2	Empirical extension: Communication	139
6.2.3	Concluding remarks	141
A	Mathematical Proofs Chapter 2	143
A.1	Proof Proposition 1: Best responses in Γ	143
A.2	Proof Lemma 1: Optimal allocations in a dyad	144
A.3	Proof Lemma 2: Optimal connectivity in equilibrium	147
A.4	Proof Proposition 2: Pairwise stable Nash equilibria	148
B	Instructions Experiment Chapter 3	151
C	Instructions Experiment Chapter 5	157
	Samenvatting - Summary in Dutch	161
	Bibliography	165
	Acknowledgments	175
	Curriculum Vitae	187

