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Unresolved Questions in the Freud/Jung Debate. On Psychosis, Sexual Identity and Religion

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Chapter III

The Period of the Association Test (1902-1906)

After the publication of his dissertation entitled *On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena*, Jung interrupted his stay at the Burghölzli in order to study with Janet in Paris for a semester.¹ Upon his return to the Burghölzli, he resumed his activities under Bleuler. This marked the beginning of an important period in Jung's work which continued until the end of 1906 when, due to the publication of his book *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, he personally sought contact with Freud.

The content of Jung's work from the period between 1902 and 1906 was well-balanced. The development of the association test, which led Jung to his 'theory of complexes' and which led to his adherence to the theory of psychoanalysis, was the focal point of this period. The articles devoted to this topic were combined in the first volume of his *Diagnostic Association Studies* published in 1906.

In his association experiments, Jung's attention was primarily drawn to the hysterical phenomena. However, within the framework of Bleuler's research, schizophrenia - then known as *dementia praecox* - slowly became his chief interest. Thus, *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox* was an initial attempt to synthesize his own theory of complexes along with Freud's thought into a psychological theory about schizophrenia.

It is relatively easy to delineate Jung's knowledge of the Freudian theory during this period. Of particular interest to Jung were Freud's works *Studies on Hysteria*, *The Interpretation of Dreams* in its first, shorter edition of 1900 and probably *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* as well. It was only in 1906 that Jung became acquainted with a collection of Freud's articles in the *Collected Short Papers on the Theory of Neuroses*. In these articles, Freud explicitly discussed the roles of sexuality and defence. Freud's most important writings concerning infantile

1. We know very little concerning his stay in Paris during the winter of 1902-1903, except the fact that he met Helene Preiswerk, his former medium, who was living there at that time. See ST. ZUMSTEIN-PREISWERK, C.G. *Jungs medium. Die Geschichte der Helly Preiswerk*, p. 99-103.

sexuality date from 1905: *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*.

Thus the development of Jung's theory of complexes predated his exposure to the Freudian sexual theory. Jung perceived Freud as the man who, in an eminent way, expressed the aetiological role of affect. He interpreted Freudian thought in light of Janet's thought which naturally led to a distortion of the former.

Very often, the experiments which Jung performed for his association test are unfortunately overlooked. In the first place, the historical importance of these activities should not be underestimated. Jung was commissioned by Bleuler to undertake this research as part of a broader project studying the phenomenon of schizophrenia. The result of this research led to Bleuler's pioneering work: *Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias*. Also, on the basis of Jung's research, the lie detector was later developed in the United States. Secondly, a closer look at Jung's association experiments reveals those non-thematized presuppositions which unknowingly influenced the interpretation of data acquired through the experiments. Once again, we must notice how, from the beginning, Jung employed a very specific concept of the subject and of the unconscious which eventually brought him to a completely different approach as compared to Freud.

Before we elaborate on this in detail, Jung's works dating from this period need to be briefly situated. Following the publication of his dissertation *On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena*, Jung was requested by the judicial system to research a number of cases which required psychiatric expertise. These studies include the works *A Case of Hysterical Stupor in a Prisoner in Detention* (1903) and *Medical Opinion on a Case of Simulated Insanity* (1904). The focal point of these articles was the difficulty of distinguishing instances of mere simulation from a true hysteric-like state of confusion known as 'Ganser's syndrome', which sometimes occurred in detained suspects.² We also find an article entitled *On Manic Mood Disorder*, which was published in the same period (1903). This article, based on four previously researched cases, intended to demonstrate the role of the affect in instances of mania. In 1904, Jung and Riklin published what is still considered the fundamental work on the association test: *The Associations of Normal Subjects*. This

2. S. GANSER, *Ueber einen eigenartigen hysterischen Dämmerzustand*. In: *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten* 30 (1898) 633-640. An English translation appeared in the *British Journal of Criminology* 5 (1965) 120-130.

work was followed by a series of articles which further analyzed the results of the test and which sought wider applications for these results. *Analysis of the Associations of an Epileptic* (1905) pointed to the fact that the test indicated the amplification and the persistence of the epileptic's emotions. *The Reaction Time Ratio in the Association Experiments* (1905) dealt with the concept of reaction time as being an index for emotional charges. *Experimental Observations on the Faculty of Memory* (1905) introduced the reproduction test as a complement to the association test. Thus the association test received its classical form.

In the meantime, Jung had also written two articles, *On Hysterical Misreading* (1904) and *Cryptomnesia* (1905), in which he referred back to his dissertation as a reply to criticism directed against several points which he had made in that work. Further, there are several articles dealing with the application of the association test in lie detection. *On the Psychological Diagnosis of Facts* (1905), *The Psychological Diagnosis of Evidence* (1905) and *New Aspects of Criminal Psychology* (1908) described how a guilty party could be detected by means of this test. The method of tracing emotions by physiological processes was studied in *On the Psychophysical Relations of the Association Experiment* (1907), *Psychophysical Investigations with the Galvanometer and Pneumograph in Normal and Insane Individuals* (written together with Peterson - 1907) and in *Further Investigations on the Galvanic Phenomenon and Respiration in Normal and Insane Individuals* (written by Jung and Ricksher - 1907).

A new field of application which gradually attracted Jung's attention was psychoanalysis. The association test was seen as possibly replacing the method of free association by tracing suppressed complexes in a quicker and more advantageous manner. This particular application of the association test was the subject of *Association, Dream and Hysterical Symptom* (1906) and of *Psychoanalysis and Association Experiments* (1907).

Two minor articles also appeared in this period. *A Third and Final Opinion on Two Contradictory Psychiatric Diagnoses* (1906), again within the scope of psychiatric expertise, inquired into the influence of hysteria on criminal acts. In *Statistical Details on Enlistment* (1906), Jung expressed his amazement over 'the inferior human material' which he had observed as a member of the medical committee examining future draftees.

Near the end of 1906, Jung's important work on schizophrenia entitled *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, was published. Shortly there-

after, he visited Freud in Vienna. This visit marked the dawning of a new period for Jung.

The Association Experiments

General Framework

Jung's activities at the Burghölzli coincided with the introduction of experimental psychology into the realm of psychiatry. The renowned Kraepelin, a pioneer in the field of nosology, had studied under Wundt and had adopted his experimental approach to psychiatric research. The theory of associationism, which was prevalent at that time, viewed the psyche as one large association process and attempted to uncover the elementary laws of this complex construction one by one.

To this end, a variety of association experiments were undertaken. Wundt's school had performed the first systematic investigations. The principle was very simple. The subject was presented with a stimulus word to which he responded as quickly as possible with the first word that came to mind. Yet it was not very clear what one could do with the acquired results. First of all, how could quantifiable results be derived from the various reactions? Further, what conclusions could be drawn with regard to the psychic state of the subject?

It is an impossible task to even attempt a concise survey of the theory of associationism.³ In the field of psychopathology, the research performed by Kraepelin and his assistant Aschaffenburg was very important, especially the distinction they developed between interior and exterior associations.

Interior associations were for example:

man - boy
 attack - defend
 table - furniture

In these instances, the connection lay in the meaning or conceptual content of a word. When the connection existed in a more exterior bond, one was dealing with exterior associations, as for example:

knife - pocket
 water - fish
 plant - pot

3. Jung himself provided a good survey of the preliminary history of his test in C.G. JUNG, *The Psychopathological Significance of the Association Experiment*, C.W. II, § 863-917.

Along with these two categories, a third could be distinguished: associations based on sound. The relationship between the stimulus word and the reaction was determined by sound:

drive - strive
house - mouse

Attempts to discover certain constants proved to be in vain. Some subjects made a number of interior associations while others uttered more exterior associations. Sometimes, sound reactions were frequent while at other times, they did not occur at all. Yet the origin of these differences could not be explained.

In search of an explanation for these differences, Kraepelin and Aschaffenburg decided to change the psychic state of their subjects. They allowed their subjects to ingest a variety of intoxicating substances. Among these substances were alcohol and tobacco which, even at that time, were considered to be the cause of a number of diseases. By doing this, the researchers attempted to trace the influence of intoxication which they suspected to be at the origin of most psychic disorders. Kraepelin and Aschaffenburg also intentionally fatigued their subjects. Thus they noticed the same phenomenon in all of their subjects. As the degree of fatigue or intoxication increased, the amount of interior associations decreased while the amount of exterior associations, and especially of sound reactions, increased.

Thus the category of associations varied according to the psychic condition of the subject. This discovery was very important. The results suited the researchers' conceptual schemes remarkably well. For indeed, they spontaneously viewed interior associations, where the significance of a word played the key role, as a higher form of association than exterior associations. It was not so surprising that in cases of fatigue or intoxication, the brain was no longer able to function on this higher level and thus it switched to a lower level. The same results were expected when treating mental disorders which, in most cases, were perceived as phenomena of intoxication or degeneration.

Immediately, some interesting perspectives appeared on the horizon. By means of the association experiments, Kraepelin and Aschaffenburg hoped to determine the precise correlation between a defined type of association, a corresponding somatic constitution or disorder and a specific type of mental disease. A very practical application of the experiment, such as an association test with diagnostical value, was expected.

As early as 1901, Bleuler had started his own research on association at the Burghölzli.⁴ He had composed a list of 156 stimulus words which he used in his experiments on subjects suffering from various types of psychoses. He commissioned Jung and Franz Riklin to perform similar experiments on healthy subjects in order to determine criteria for classification and organization. The result of this project was published in 1904 in the work *The Associations of Normal Subjects*.

Jung and Riklin tested 38 subjects using four series of 100 stimulus words. In the first two series, they allowed their subjects to respond with the first word that came to mind, without any further specification. In the last two series, they followed the example of Kraepelin and Aschaffenburg and altered the psychic state of their subjects in order to detect whether or not a shift would occur in the results. The novelty of their approach was that they did not achieve this alteration by administering intoxicating substances or by inducing physical fatigue, but rather by causing a state of lessened attention in their subjects. In the third series, the subjects were asked to pay attention to the image which flashed before their interior eye upon hearing the stimulus word and to react just as quickly as before (distraction by interior cause). During the fourth series, the subjects were to draw lines on a piece of paper following the beat of a metronome (distraction by exterior cause).

The research led to the conclusion that the number of exterior and sound reactions decisively increased in a proportionate manner in those series where the subject was forced to divide his attention while the number of interior associations decreased. Thus the association process shifted and began functioning on a lower level. Apparently, distraction exercised the same effect on this process as did fatigue and intoxication in the study of Kraepelin and Aschaffenburg.

Next, Jung attempted to demonstrate that attention was a specific capacity which could be influenced by certain organic factors such as fatigue and intoxication. Yet he stressed that it could never be reduced to the sum total of a number of somatic processes.⁵ Just as Wundt before him, Jung found himself obliged to employ the notion of an autonomous psychic factor within the conceptual model of associationism. This led to two questions. What exactly was this phenomenon of attention to which Jung designated the characteristic of autonomy? Further, what were the

4. C.G. JUNG, *The Psychological Diagnosis of Evidence*, C.W. II, § 731.

5. C.G. JUNG, *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, C.W. II, § 388-389; 491.

factors that could influence or disturb this attention? Two key words capture Jung's answer to these two questions: affectivity and the complex.

Attention and Affectivity

The foreword of the *The Associations of Normal Subjects* stated as a declaration of program the affirmation that attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*) was indeed the factor which directed and modified the association process. Yet, in the book itself, an explicit elaboration on the way in which attention as a psychic function must be conceived, cannot be found. Of course, we know the central thesis of the work. When attention is disturbed, higher associations disappear in favour of a lower category of associations. Beyond this, when one combines various statements spread throughout the work, the following conclusion can be drawn. The psychic field is seen as a combination of contents of consciousness which can be associated with each other in all possible directions and according to the greatest variety of criteria. Attention gives direction to the process of association. Of all possible associations which could come to mind, the majority are eliminated from the very beginning. Only those associations which lie in the immediate realm of the actual conceptual process are made available. Attention is the function which limits the association process to that which is useful. As soon as attention disappears, the chaos of all possible associations in any possible direction resumes.⁶

In the actual thought process of an adult, the higher category of associations, namely the associations according to significance, are usually employed. Lower categories such as sound reactions are thus limited. These sound reactions did have a function in a person's past when, as a youngster, he was acquiring language skills. Nevertheless, in the normal 'directed' thought process, these reactions are rarely seen. Sound reactions are continuously eliminated since they do not enhance the thought process. Yet as soon as attention is disturbed, sound reactions can again invade and suddenly confound the association process.⁷

We can conclude that the following mechanism is active. When a subject reacts from the focal point of his consciousness, he will not make an association based on sound unless he deliberately intends to do so. Yet, when he focuses his attention on a different activity, so that the association process proceeds almost automatically, these more primitive

6. *Ibid.*, § 384-385.

7. *Ibid.*, § 118.

associations will surface again. In this situation, even an association based completely on sound can occur. A stimulus word evokes another word which - by way of sound - is related to it regardless of the significance of the word.

This notion of the attention's function clearly incorporated several ideas which Bleuler had already expressed and which he would later develop in *Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia* (1906). Jung most likely did not offer a theoretical exposition on the role of attention because he spontaneously wrote against the background of his mentor's concepts. Thus we need to now turn our attention to Bleuler's concepts.

In *Versuch einer naturwissenschaftlichen Betrachtung der psychologischen Grundbegriffe* (1894), Bleuler had defined the role of the ego complex in the association process as favouring certain associations while detaining others. The ego complex functioned in this way by means of paths which had already been carved by the accumulation of similar reactions. It was in this context that Bleuler devoted a short passage to the topic of attention.

First, Bleuler distinguished a more passive type of attention which created few problems. When a certain concept dominated our thinking, representations which were closely related to this concept will also be dominant. Bleuler gave the following example. When someone was watching a wrestling match, all other thoughts which had nothing to do with that activity, faded into the background.⁸

For Bleuler, the problem was located in the arbitrary nature of attention on any given topic and also in the choice that the subject could apparently make between representations, each of which attempted to attract attention to itself. A certain autonomous activity of the ego complex must be recognized here. Bleuler therefore posed that the ego complex, "just as other cerebral stimulus complexes, can influence lower reflexes and can contain the association process within certain limits."⁹ The mechanism of this process was not very clear for Bleuler at that time.¹⁰

This unanswered question apparently intrigued Bleuler and, in 1906, he devoted an entire chapter of his *Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia* to the description of affectivity as the basic dynamism in the human

8. E. BLEULER, *Versuch einer naturwissenschaftlichen Betrachtung der psychologischen Grundbegriffe*, p. 154.

9. "Wie jeder andere cerebrale Reiz-Complex vermag er niedere Reflexe zu beeinflussen, das Spiel des Assoziationen in bestimmten Bahnen zu halten". *Ibid.*, p. 155.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

psyche. In this chapter, Bleuler noted that attention was one of the most important components through which affectivity expressed itself. Although this work was not published until 1906, two years after *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, the link that Bleuler found and described between attention and affectivity definitely influenced the study of Jung and Riklin. It is evident that they had learned about this link from their mentor.

The point of departure of *Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia* was the notion that affectivity essentially consisted of a generalization of a particular reaction to the complete subject in his psychic and organic totality.¹¹ This implied that a reaction of panic for example suppressed all those motivations which might oppose fleeing and made the idea of rescue the only directive. When a person is infuriated, he can beat someone up even if this is not the most favourable solution to the problem. The affect curtails all associations which are inclined to an opposite reaction and amplifies parallel associations. By doing this, the human organism has a greater than normal amount of energy at its disposal for a period of time. Bleuler's example of a despairing person illustrated this fact very well.¹²

Another process within the framework of the affect's mobilization of the whole organism, is the process of transference (*Übertragung des Affektes*). The affect is transferred to neutral representations which have no need of restraint since they do not present an obstacle. This contributes to a reinforced reaction. We loathe a certain place where an unpleasant event occurred or we foster feelings of hostility not only toward someone who has offended us but also toward a coincidental witness. This type of transference, which Bleuler also called 'irradiation' of the affect, had already been indicated by Ziehen. Bleuler, however, viewed it within the framework of the mobilization of all of the organism's efforts,¹³ as an expression of the survival instinct. Moreover, the usefulness of this mechanism was not limited to cases of extreme emergency. Often a small dose

11. "Der Affekt verallgemeinert eine Reaktion - ich könnte wohl eben so richtig sagen: der Affekt ist eine verallgemeinerte Reaktion." E. BLEULER, *Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia*, Halle, Marhold, 1906, p. 15.

12. "Werde ich zornig, so schlage ich drein, auch wenn es nicht gerade angemessen ist, und ich glaube in diesem Momente erst noch, dazu berechtigt zu sein. So werden durch die Affekte alle diejenige Assoziationen gehemmt, die ihnen entgegenstehen, die entsprechenden aber gefördert. Dadurch wird selbstverständlich die momentane Kraft des Handelns erhöht." *Ibid.*, p. 15.

13. "Durch diese Übertragung des Affektes (Irradiation) wird die Wirkung desselben auf das Handeln natürlich weiter verstärkt, und Abweichungen von der eingeschlagenen Richtung werden möglichst verhindert." *Ibid.*, p. 16.

of impatience aids in conquering an obstacle and, in order to obtain an important goal, the one-sidedness of enthusiasm is always necessary.¹⁴

It is not fortuitous that the notion 'organism' has been mentioned so often in the previous pages. Affect belongs to the organization of the individual as an autonomous entity. Affectivity is therefore considered as the dynamic behind the thought and action process. In Bleuler's argumentation, this was not only valid for human beings. As an elementary example of affect, he pointed to the manner in which a unicellular organism such as the amoeba proteus, consumed a grain of food. Not only was there a reaction upon seeing the food, the extension of the pseudopodia and so forth, but this elementary organism even experienced the complete process as a unity.¹⁵

One would tend to conclude by affirming that affectivity creates a higher unity by which the individual comes into being, lives, and reacts as an entity. Yet Bleuler did not wish to address the question of the essence of affectivity. For him, affectivity had only an 'academic' significance.¹⁶

"It suffices for us to know that intellectual processes, psychopetal and intrapsychic association complexes do not only provoke the specific corresponding reaction but that they also control the associations of the complete nervous system (including the vasomotoric nerves). A general reaction which supports the specific reaction, occurs to the advantage of the individual as a whole (excluding exceptional cases where the organism cannot cope)."

Still, Bleuler had not found an answer to the question whether affectivity was ultimately either a special process in the human brain, constituting the substratum of feelings of pleasure or discomfort, or merely the result of 'associative, vasomotoric and secretory inhibitions and courses.'¹⁷ In any case, affectivity was closely related to aspirations, desires and the will. In Bleuler's view, one did best to combine these notions into

14. *Ibid.*, p. 16-17.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

16. "Was die Affektivität ist, können wir nicht sagen. Die Frage hat für unsere Aufgabe ganz akademische Bedeutung. Es genügt uns zu wissen dass intellektuelle Vorgänge, psychopetale und intrapsychische Assoziationskomplexe, nicht nur die spezielle entsprechende Reaktion auslösen, sondern auch die Assoziationen des gesamten Nervensystems (inkl. vasomotorische und Eingeweidenerven) so beherrschen, dass eine allgemeine Reaktion eintritt welche die Spezielle unterstützt, und (abgesehen von Ausnahmebedingungen, denen der Organismus nicht angepasst ist) das Individuum überhaupt fördert." *Ibid.*, p. 44.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

one conceptual unity and to clearly distinguish this unity from intellectual processes which did not encroach so deeply on the human psyche.¹⁸

Bleuler thus avoided taking a clear stance on the autonomy of the psyche. In any case, affectivity, either as a mere result or as an autonomous function, participated in the constitution of the individual as a unity.

With regard to the concept of attention, Bleuler declared that "attention (was) but a special instance of the operation of the affect".¹⁹ For indeed, we only pay attention to those matters to which we are partial. When we force ourselves to direct our attention elsewhere, we do so on the basis of affectivity. The immediate consequence of directing our attention toward something is that certain experiences, associations and movements, responding to the object of our interest, will have free run while others are restrained. Thus, according to Bleuler, this was the same phenomenon as the one encountered in the discussion on affect.²⁰

Attention was thus seen as the consequence of the affectivity's intervention upon the thought process. When a strong content of consciousness dominated the psychic field, related contents were evoked due to association, opposite contents were curbed and neutral contents were annexed by means of transference.

This well-developed exposition on affectivity was not found in Jung's work but only in Bleuler's *Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia*. Yet, in the publication of *On Manic Mood Disorder* (1903), we notice that a similar conceptual scheme appeared, at least in a rudimentary form, in Jung's thought. By means of four cases from the archives of the Burghölzli, Jung intended to more deeply penetrate into the understanding of the manic personality type. Initially, he noticed that manic patients could be quite intellectually gifted. Mental deficiency did not account for their senseless behaviour which often brought them into conflict with society. Mania made it exceptionally clear that a person's actions and thoughts were determined by affectivity. A maniac thus possessed a surplus of feelings and drives defined by his constitution, causing all representations to appear extraordinarily interesting. As a result, the

18. Bleuler demonstrated by means of several psychopathological images how affection affirmed its independence with regard to cognitive functions - See *Ibid.*, p. 22-27.

19. "Die Aufmerksamkeit ist also nichts als ein Spezialfall der Affektwirkung." *Ibid.*, p. 31.

20. "Eine der wichtigsten Äusserungen der Affektivität ist die Aufmerksamkeit ... Das Bemerkbare an der Aufmerksamkeit ist gar nichts anderes als eine Bahnung für alle diejenige Empfindungen, Assoziationen und Bewegungen, die den Gegenstand des Interesses entsprechen, eine Hemmung für alle andere, d.h. das gleiche, was wir als Wirkung der Affekte von jeher kennen." *Ibid.*, p. 29.

association process lost all direction leaving the patient in a state of chaos in his attempt to find satisfaction.²¹

In short, we can state that mania is a condition in which all associations are endowed with such a constitutive power, that no similar function remains for the ego complex. Thus the ego complex can no longer exercise its function to curtail. In a maniac's mind, every impression is emotionally charged to such a degree that his attention is drawn to everything.

Returning to the association test, we observe that the importance of the connection between attention and affectivity is not so apparent. The conclusion which we found was that a shift from a higher to a lower category of associations took place when the subject's attention was disturbed. In Jung's and Riklin's experimental procedure, distraction was intentionally caused by 'interior' and 'exterior' diversions in the instances of the third and fourth series of stimuli. Drawing lines following the beat of a metronome cannot be considered as an extraordinary emotional event. Yet it was quite remarkable that even in the first two series, the association process sometimes appeared to be abruptly disturbed from within. For some reason, the subject was being forced from within to divide his attention. Indeed, one sometimes notices in everyday life, outside of the experimental situation, how the association process can suddenly be interrupted by a slip of the tongue, a sudden insight or an abrupt breach of the flow of consciousness. Under a closer investigation, such phenomena appear not to be merely coincidental. One can always demonstrate that, either directly or indirectly, an emotionally charged representation which diverted the person's attention sprang up at that point. There could also be an interior distraction resulting from a group of emotionally charged representations which suddenly occupied the greater part of the psychic field. When this occurred, it acted to the detriment of the guiding power of the ego complex. A disturbing autonomous complex interfered with the ego complex by positioning its own constitutive power in opposition to the ego complex.

21. C.G. JUNG, *On Manic Mood Disorder*, C.W. I, § 220.

The Complex

"By 'emotionally charged complex', we mean the sum of ideas referring to a particular feeling-toned event."²² This was the first provisional definition of the notion of complex to be found in Jung's work.

The ego complex is the principal complex in the human psyche. As far as content is concerned, it refers to that which constitutes an individual's personality. Normally speaking, the entire association process is constructed by the ego complex. It curbs those associations which are of no use for a particular line of thought. Indeed, it is precisely the associative connection between the ego complex and a group of representations which establishes the conscious character of a thought process.

There appear to be other groups of representations or complexes that can interfere with the association process in exactly the same way as the ego complex does. Such interference can take place beyond the awareness of the ego complex and these groups of representations can almost act as a 'second consciousness'.²³ The competitive activity of complexes which pit their proper constitutive power against that of the ego complex is precisely what disturbs the association test.

These disturbances include: prolonging of the reaction time; waning of the association; forgetting the stimulus word which had to be repeated by the researcher; and, finally, mistakes in the reproduction test. When the test was completed, the subject could not recall with which word he had responded to the stimulus word.

Two aspects can be distinguished in these disturbances. First, the autonomy of the complex is expressed by the fact that it absorbs part of

22. C.G. JUNG, *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, C.W. II, § 167. Definitions of the notion 'complex' are also found in *The Reaction Time Ratio in the Association Experiments*, C.W. II, § 602 and in *The Psychological Diagnosis of Evidence*, C.W. II, § 733. The most elaborate exposition is found in the second chapter of *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox*. In Jung's *Collected Works* the translation 'emotionally charged' is used for the German 'affektbetonte' and 'feeling-toned' for the German 'gefühlbetonte'. The distinction between both terms seems to be less important than the theory concerning affectivity which is at the basis of the theory of complexes. When reading 'emotionally charged', one should not forget that it means 'charged by this basic affectivity' in the sense we have seen.

23. "From the figures given, it follows that relatively long reaction times are almost without exception caused by the intervention of a strong feeling-tone. Strong feeling-tones as a rule belong to extensive and personally important complexes. The reaction can be an association belonging to a complex of this nature and take its feeling-tone from this complex, though the complex need not be conscious. The constellation (Ziehen) of an association is mostly unconscious (or not-conscious); the constellating complex here plays the part of a quasi-independent entity - a 'second consciousness'." C.G. JUNG, *The Reaction Time Ratio in the Association Experiments*, C.W. II, § 621.

a person's attention. In other words, the complex expands its constitutive power to the detriment of the ego complex's power. This explains the prolongation of the reaction time as well as the waning of the associations. The ego complex is no longer capable of restraining the lower category of associations.

A second aspect is that the content of the competing complex stands opposed to the content of the ego complex. Influenced by the former, the stimulus word is immediately forgotten and thus the pattern of the autonomous complex has neutralized the pattern of the ego complex. Faults in the reproduction test can be explained in a similar way. The reaction which affected the complex in the same way as the stimulus word, was also forgotten.

Two matters need to be further distinguished: on the one hand, the existing dissociation between the complex and the ego complex; on the other hand, the opposition of these two patterns which presumes a relationship between the complexes. In this context, it is not so surprising that Jung was attracted to Freud's theory of repression.

Yet contrary to Freud, Jung did not attach great value to the unconscious character of certain complexes. The essential characteristic of a complex was that it was emotionally charged. The fact that such a complex could be unconscious was only of secondary importance. The unconscious aspect resulted from the dissociating influence which the affect could exercise on the psyche. A highly emotionally charged group of representations is so closely interconnected that it tends to act as an autonomous entity, without any relation to the ego complex. The fact then that consciousness is not aware of the particular complex, changes nothing fundamentally in the way in which the complex exercises its constitutive power within the psychic field.²⁴

It is remarkable that, at this point, Jung did not comprehend that he had overlooked the essential element of the Freudian discovery, namely the phenomenon of repression. During this period, Jung believed that "Freud (had) offered convincing proof that the chief aetiological role in psychogenic disturbances (was) played by affects."²⁵ Jung did not hesitate to state that Freud's interpretation of the symptom act corresponded precisely to what Ziehen described as the 'constellation'.²⁶

24. C.G. JUNG, *On Simulated Insanity*, C.W. I, § 339.

25. *Ibid.*, § 349.

26. C.G. JUNG, *The Psychological Diagnosis of Evidence*, C.W. II, § 733.

When looking back, we clearly notice in Jung's theory of complexes the same pattern which we observed in the theories of Janet, Ziehen and Bleuler. The psyche consists of elementary psychic cells that were organically combined into a unity. Gradually, the affect assumed a greater role within this unity. One had to state that the usual laws of association did not suffice to explain either the origin of the subject or the dynamic force on which the subject thrived. The theories of affect and transference, as encountered in Ziehen's work, were further developed. In *Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia* (1906), Bleuler treated affectivity as the deepest dimension of the psychic life.²⁷ Along the same lines, Jung described the affect as the dynamic by which individual, basic representations, which were associatively connected, could extend their grip on the entire psychic field.

In this context, the unconscious was interpreted as a flaw. While all representation complexes should have united themselves into one psyche with the ego complex as its centre, certain representation complexes under the influence of an exaggerated emotional charge, isolated themselves from the rest of the psyche. The unconscious was that which escaped the laws of a harmonic development.

The Hidden and the Repressed

In *On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena*, Jung, following Janet, had indicated that dissociation was the essential characteristic of hysteria. It was here that he integrated the theory of the 'complex' for the dissociated contents were seen as autonomous complexes. The association test, in its ability to evoke the interference of autonomous complexes, seemed very appropriate for tracing those contents of consciousness which the subject could not or would not make known.

Jung searched for a connection with Freud's theory on this point. Freud had researched the content of unconscious representations in hysterical patients. He discovered that these representations were related to unpleasant or abhorrent objects or events, often of a sexual nature. It was Freud who had developed the method of free association in order to trace these repressed contents. Yet, could the association test not be a substitute

27. Bleuler also related the affect with finality: "Wir kommen damit auf das, was Paulhan vor Jahren mit dem etwas anspruchsvollen Namen der '*loi de la finalité*' bezeichnete, womit er sagen wollte, dass die gewöhnlichen Assoziationsgesetze nicht ausreichen, das Denken zu erklären, wenn man nicht auch den Zweck, das Ziel des Denken als bestimmenden Faktor mitrechnet." E. BLEULER, *Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia*, p. 31.

for the longer method of free association or, at least, shorten the duration of the process?

It was here that Jung found a connection with the theory of psychoanalysis. However, it must be remarked that, from the beginning, there was no room in Jung's theory of complexes for a notion such as repression.

In the Footsteps of Janet

At the start of his career at the Burghölzli, Jung was entrusted with several cases which required his psychiatric expertise. Within the context of these cases, he was confronted with the problem of hysteria. The cases involved a number of people who were being held in protective custody. At a certain point, they found themselves in such a state of confusion that, when interrogated, they uttered the most senseless statements. It was often very difficult to determine whether a real psychic disorder was present or whether one was dealing with imposters who preferred being sentenced to a psychiatric hospital rather than to a prison. Yet the possibility of a true psychic disorder had to be taken into account. Ganser, who defined this syndrome in 1897, described it as a specific instance of the hysterical twilight state. A classic case of the syndrome developed in the following manner. Patients grew frightened during the period of preliminary detention. They became disoriented. They started hallucinating and their perception was disturbed. The characteristic outcome of this development was the 'senseless answers' symptom. Even the most simple questions elicited responses that were nonsensical, although the type of answers betrayed that the question had been correctly understood. After a while, the patients became more quiet and a quick recovery followed. Nevertheless, the patients often experienced an attack of amnesia concerning the events which took place in this crisis period.²⁸

In *A Case of Hysterical Stupor in a Prisoner in Detention* (1903), the first article after the publication of his dissertation, Jung offered a study of a particular case of Ganser's syndrome. He attempted to prove that this syndrome was in fact a process in which the observed patient's affectivity played an important role. The emotional condition of a person being detained had as a consequence that the memory of the unpleasant events, aroused by the interrogations, was separated from consciousness. The excess of the emotional charge placed on those memories made it

28. C.G. JUNG, *On Simulated Insanity*, C.W. I, § 278.

impossible for them to be integrated within the psychic field in a normal way and to stay connected with the ego complex. The above mentioned separation, however, was not complete because the 'nonsensical' answer contained an element that remained associated with that which should have been the correct answer. When one indirectly interrogated or hypnotized the patient, it became possible to receive a direct answer to the questions. Thus Jung made the fundamental discovery that such dissociation involved only the superficial layers of consciousness. As soon as one was able to reach the unconscious, the integrity of the psychic field was restored.

In order to support this argumentation, Jung referred back to *Studies on Hysteria* in a rather remarkable way, as well as to the Freudian notion of repression. He wrote:²⁹

"Here we have the primary phenomenon in the genesis of hysterical symptoms which Breuer and Freud have termed *hysterical conversion*. According to them, every person has a certain threshold up to which he can tolerate 'unabreacted' affects and allow them to pile up. Anything that exceeds that threshold leads - cum grano salis - to hysteria. In the language of Breuer and Freud, our patient's threshold had been reached and exceeded as a result of her detention, and the unabreacted affect - the 'excitement proceeding from the affective idea' - flowed off into abnormal channels and got 'converted'. Just how it will flow off is 'determined' in most cases by chance or by the individual; that is to say, the line of least resistance is in one case the convulsion mechanism, in another sensibility, in a third the disturbance of consciousness, and so on. In our case, to judge from all the crucial points in the patient's history, the determining factor seems to have been the *idea of forgetting*. Her 'not knowing' turns out to be partly an unconscious and partly half conscious *not wanting to know*."

Jung's explanation went as follows: under the influence of affect, the 'representation of forgetfulness' gained such a constitutive power that, by means of association, it became connected to the major part of the psychic field. The ego complex, which was deprived of its constitutive power, was no longer successful in containing the association process within certain limits which under normal circumstances, it had no problem doing. The representation of forgetfulness thus became all-powerful. 'Forgetting' took on the characteristics of an automatism along the lines of Janet's thought.

29. *Ibid.*, § 298.

In Jung's presentation, the main accent was placed on the emotional charge which, when present, could inundate everything. If this charge flowed toward the representation of forgetting, the phenomenon which Freud described as 'repression' occurred. It is in this rather remarkable sense that Jung typified the nonsensical answer as a 'phenomenon of conversion'. Thus Jung completely overlooked the typically Freudian notion of the symptom being characterized by compromise. Jung explained the meaningful elements present in the nonsensical answers of the patients as a consequence of the fact that the association process affected only the superficial layers of consciousness.

Furthermore, it is clear that Janet, far more than Freud, remained the principal influence on the theoretical framework of Jung's interpretation. This influence became even more clear in two articles which again dealt with cases requiring his psychiatric expertise. These cases involved the simulation of a mental disorder. *On Simulated Insanity* (1903) outlined a number of such cases while a second article, *Medical Opinion on a Case of Simulated Insanity* (1904), elaborated on one of the cases mentioned in the previous article. *Medical Opinion on a Case of Simulated Insanity* concerned a vagrant who had been caught stealing. He intended to simulate being mentally disturbed but he became so carried away with his game that he actually started to hallucinate. Simulation had become a sort of autosuggestion which then automatically followed its course in the unconscious. In order to explain how this occurred, Jung claimed that there must have been a psychic disposition which impeded the integration of affects and new impressions. This disposition caused a state of confusion and of pseudo-mental debilitation.³⁰ Jung went on to say:³¹

"How far this disposition to neutralize affects in a faulty or abnormal way coincides with hysteria is not easy to determine, but according to Freud's theory of hysteria the two are identical. Janet found that the influence of affects is seen most clearly in hysterical persons, and that it produces a state of dissociation in which the will, attention, ability to concentrate are paralyzed and the higher psychic phenomena are impaired in the interest of the lower; that is, there is a displacement towards the automatic side, where everything that was formerly under the control of the will is now set free."

30. *Ibid.*, § 317.

31. *Ibid.*, § 318.

Thus affect caused the process of dissociation. Jung explicitly agreed with Janet and the role he ascribed to affect. He quoted Janet:³²

"Emotion has a decomposing action on the mind, reduces its synthesis and makes it, for the moment, wretched. Emotions, especially depressives ones such as fear, disorganize the mental syntheses. Their action, so to speak, is analytic, as opposed to that of the will, of attention, of perception, which is synthesis."

When he did refer to Freud, it was to indicate that Freud had an exceptionally good grasp on the aetiological importance of the affect.³³ Jung further investigated how the affect made its dissociative influence felt. He concluded that, more than likely, one particular representation was brought to the fore in an exaggerated manner. As a consequence, only a limited amount of attention was left for other psychic activities. It then followed that the more mechanical and automatic processes were released and gradually obtained a certain autonomy to the detriment of the consciousness.³⁴

In the article *Medical Opinion on a Case of Simulated Insanity*, in which Jung discussed the same case, he expressed it as follows:³⁵

As is clear from the respondent's own statement, the development of simulation was attended by strong affects. Affects always have a disturbing influence on consciousness, as they place undue emphasis on feeling-toned thought-processes and thus obscure any others that may be present. ... In our opinion, the initial affects were the source of the overmastering suggestion to simulate that later ensued. That this phenomenon of partly conscious, partly unconscious simulation could come about at all was evidently due to the respondent's hysterical disposition, and the most outstanding feature of this disposition is an abnormal dissociability of consciousness, which, in the moment a strong affect appears, can easily lead to mental confusion and the formation of suggestions which are very difficult to combat."

Thus Jung referred to the patient's disposition as the ultimate cause of mental disorder. Yet the provocative factor was the emotionally charged

32. *Ibid.*, § 318. Source: P. JANET, *L'automatisme psychologique*, p. 457.

33. *Ibid.*, § 349.

34. *Ibid.*, § 339.

35. C.G. JUNG, *Medical Opinion on a Case of Simulated Insanity*, C.W. I, § 423.

representation which defined the content of dissociation.³⁶ The use of the association test for tracing the emotionally charged content seemed very promising.

Toward the Lie Detector

As has been earlier mentioned, the association test not only revealed dissociated contents but also normal, emotionally charged representations which the subject intentionally wished to hide. The idea to design a 'lie detector' was the obvious consequence of this discovery. Jung and Wertheimer independently developed the association test in this direction. There was even some argument over which of the two initially made the discovery.³⁷ In a short preliminary statement made in 1905, entitled *On the Psychological Diagnosis of Facts*, Jung wrote:³⁸

"Readers may be interested to know that today I succeeded for the first time in testing out, on a delinquent, our method of discovering complexes, and with excellent results."

This preliminary statement, written on the night of the experiment itself, was soon followed by the article *The Psychological Diagnosis of Evidence*. An older gentleman had requested Jung's expertise. For quite some time, the man had noticed that objects were being stolen from his house. While his domestic staff was suspected, his foster son was also not beyond suspicion. Because of the latter possibility, the man wished to keep the police out of the affair and thus, he requested Jung to interrogate his son using hypnosis. Although Jung rejected this proposal, he was willing to use his association test in order to discover the truth. Among a series of neutral stimulus words, Jung mingled a number of words which referred to theft and hiding places such as 'drawer', 'linen cabinet', 'being caught', 'police', 'prison', 'pass key', etc.³⁹ The test revealed betraying reactions in the responses to these words so that Jung told the dumbfounded young man that he had stolen. The man immediately confessed. Jung described a similar case of detecting a thief in the article *New Aspects of Criminal Psychology* (1908).

36. A well done summary of Jung's concepts of this period can be found in Jung's conclusion in: C.G. JUNG, *On Simulated Insanity*, C.W. I, § 354.

37. Concerning the discussion on priority with regard to this discovery, see C.G. JUNG, *On the Psychological Diagnosis of Facts*, C.W. I, § 479-480.

38. *Ibid.*, § 481.

39. C.G. JUNG, *The Psychological Diagnosis of Evidence*, C.W. II, § 771.

After an address by the neurologist O. Veraguth at the Second Congress for Experimental Psychology in Würzburg (Germany) from 18 to 21 April 1906, Jung conceived the idea of directly interpreting the operation of the complex, provoked by his association test, by means of the accompanying physiological phenomena. The electrical resistance of the human body, as well as the respiration rate, changed with emotion. This discovery ultimately brings us to the lie detector. The articles that Jung devoted to this topic have appeared in English under the titles *On the Psychophysical Relations of the Association Experiment* (1906), *Psychophysical Investigations with the Galvanometer and the Pneumograph in Normal and Insane Individuals* (written together with F. Petersen in 1907), and *Further Investigations on the Galvanic Phenomenon and Respiration in Normal and Insane Individuals* (written with Ricksher in 1907).

These articles also marked the end of Jung's interest in lie detection. Yet the idea was adopted by others and developed further into the more technical 'lie detector'.⁴⁰

Jung's short-lived fascination with the lie detector proved once again that the question whether the complex was conscious or unconscious was not an issue for him. According to Jung, the affective charge of the complex was of central concern together with the discovery that this affective charge could be detected by the association test. As far as the usefulness of the test was concerned, it was of no importance whether the complex had remained conscious or whether it had separated itself from the ego complex as a consequence of an exaggerated emotional charge.

Association Test and Psychoanalysis

Jung's concept of hysteria at that time has repeatedly been mentioned. In essence, hysteria consisted in the dissociation of intrapsychic representations into two groups. On this point, Jung faithfully adopted Janet's scheme. The affect played the central role while the ego complex lost its controlling function in the process of association. The emotionally charged representations gained a certain autonomy and escaped the control of the ego complex even further. Yet this autonomy was not so far reaching as to cause a radical split of consciousness into two groups. The ego complex, being associated with the body which is its solid substratum, continued to be the principal complex. The 'autonomous' complex, which functioned as a disturbing alien source in the association process, still

40. Concerning this topic, see: BR. KLOPFER et al., *C.G. Jung and Projective Techniques*. In: *Journal of Projective Techniques* (Special Issue), 19 (1955) 225-270.

maintained a certain bond with the ego complex. The link between the two complexes was not direct. If it was direct, the autonomous complex would have entered into consciousness. Nevertheless, there must be some link, even if indirect, in order to explain the interference between the two complexes.

Starting from this scheme, Jung further integrated two of Freud's notions. First, he recognized that the contents of the autonomous complexes were unpleasant to the consciousness and that they often referred to sexuality. Secondly, he adopted the symbolic interpretation which Freud had noted in his *The Interpretation of Dreams*. It should be remarked that Jung's integration of these elements did not occur without some tension.

Jung was primarily interested in the usefulness of his association test in tracing dissociated contents in hysterical patients. The psychoanalytical approach - as it was then known - had been introduced at the Burghölzli at a rather early stage in its development. In his *Experimental Observations on the Faculty of Memory* (1905), Jung presented the results of an association test administered to a patient who 'underwent psychoanalytical treatment'.⁴¹ In this case, he had been consulted by a musician troubled by thoughts of fear and by the obsession that he was unable to perform as a soloist. The analysis showed that a broken engagement and some rather unpleasant love affairs had preceded the symptoms. Nothing more was mentioned about the analysis which the patient underwent. Instead, Jung directed his attention to the association test which, even before the analysis was undertaken, showed critical reactions to certain stimulus words. This had led Jung to suspect something along the lines of an unpleasant love affair to be involved.

In 1906, Jung published *Psychoanalysis and Association Experiments*. This article described a case of 'obsessive-compulsive neurosis' which Jung had treated in June 1905. He began the treatment by administering the association test in order to trace the repressed complex and only afterward did he apply psychoanalysis. The complete analysis lasted for three weeks, with two hour sessions every other day. It is important to understand Jung's concept of the analysis. His main goal was to detect the repressed ideas. How this was accomplished did not matter. The method of free association was one possible method although the association experiment could also help in tracing the repressed complex. The latter method would shorten the analysis and render it easier. Jung did not ascribe the healing process as much to verbal expression or to a venting

41. C.G. JUNG, *Experimental Observations on the Faculty of Memory*, C.W. II, § 642.

of the patient's feelings as he did to the reinforcement of the will. The will power was amplified because the patient was forced to express everything that came to mind, even the more unpleasant thoughts.⁴²

This concept of neurosis becomes completely understandable when read in light of Janet's theory. Janet ascribed neurosis to a psychic deficiency as its ultimate cause. Although Jung demonstrated in his introduction that he clearly comprehended Freud's theories, especially the necessity of going back to the patient's childhood⁴³, we cannot find any reference to this practice in his report of the analysis.

Association, Dream and Hysterical Symptom is another article devoted to one of Jung's cases, this time concerning an instance of hysteria. Jung treated this patient from 1 October 1905 through 21 December 1905. The fact that the article is one of the few case studies which Jung published in the course of his life makes it very interesting. Once again, Jung's attention was drawn to the comparison between the results of both the association experiment and psychoanalysis.

The patient, a 24 year old woman, complained of always being extremely warm. An outside temperature of 11 degrees centigrade was unbearable to her so she spent her days in a cellar, continuously refreshing herself with cold water. Further, she refused to eat meat and she was obsessed with the thought that she would be healed if only she could bleed from her nose. Six association tests were administered in the course of the treatment. After each test, the critical reactions were further examined by asking the patient to reveal what came to mind in those instances. During the sessions of analysis, special attention was paid to the patient's dreams. Both the association test and the analysis demonstrated that a sexual problem was involved. Moreover, it seemed that the disorder had begun during puberty and the symptoms, such as seeking cold places, refreshment with cold water, dislike of meat and so forth, were the hygienic prescriptions published in popular magazines of that time for bridling one's sexual urge.⁴⁴

Apparently, Jung approached Freud's thought rather closely here. Jung even regarded technical hints given in Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* when he pointed to cats, dogs and mice as representing passion; when he showed much interest in the minute details that remained unsaid in a first account of a dream; and when he spoke of transposition from a

42. C.G. JUNG, *Psychoanalysis and Association Experiments*, C.W. II, § 724-725.

43. *Ibid.*, § 661.

44. C.G. JUNG, *Association, Dream and Hysterical Symptom*, C.W. II, § 851-853.

lower to an upper part of the body.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Jung understood these elements in light of his own conceptual framework. He was not yet able to completely integrate the implications of a notion such as repression.

When reviewing the above mentioned articles, it is noteworthy that Jung, from the beginning, nuanced his reference to Freud's notion of repression. The first texts in which Jung discussed repression are the previously examined publications involving his psychiatric expertise. In these articles, repression denoted the tendency to fend off an unpleasant situation or representation which in turn could expand itself into a condition where the patient no longer knew anything and appeared to be acting foolish. Jung referred to Freud as the one who had brilliantly expressed the aetiological function of affect but, other than that, Janet's theory continued to be Jung's model of reference. The remarkable manner in which Jung presented repression as a type of conversion in his attempt to integrate the thought of Freud and Janet has already been discussed.

The concept of repression later reappeared in *The Associations of Normal Subjects*. One of the signs by which the interference of a complex could be detected was that a subject, upon hearing a certain stimulus word, would hesitate for a long time and then suddenly ask: "What was the word again?" The patient had forgotten the word and Jung attributed this forgetfulness to repression. The reproduction test explicitly employed the idea of forgetting previously made revealing reactions as a criterion for tracing complexes. When the association test was completed, it was performed a second time to determine whether the subject would react with the same response. The fact that one responded differently indicated the trace of a complex.⁴⁶ Jung devoted a separate article to this phenomenon, entitled *Experimental Observations on the Faculty of Memory* (1905). But even in his *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, he had made the following reflection:⁴⁷

"This not wanting to understand corresponds to a repression of the complex that was to a greater or lesser extent conscious. There is no difference in principle from the cases (hysteria!) where not reacting or falsely reacting occurs involuntarily."

45. S. FREUD, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, S.E. V, p. 387, G.W. II/III, p. 392.

46. C.G. JUNG, *Experimental Observations on the Faculty of Memory*, C.W. II, § 639.

47. C.G. JUNG, *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, C.W. II, § 289.

In *The Reaction Time Ratio in the Association Experiments* (1905), we find this important footnote:⁴⁸

"The concept of *repression*, which I use on many occasions in my analyses, requires a brief explanation. In Freud's works this concept (which in any case the meaning of the word itself indicates) has the character of an active function, frequently a function of consciousness. In hysteria one may, however, get the impression that *repression* equals deliberate forgetting. With normal subjects it might, however, be a more passive 'sliding into the background'; at least here repression seems to be something unconscious, to which we can only indirectly attribute the character of something willed or something *wished*. If, nevertheless, I speak of repressing or, better, concealing, this can be taken as a metaphor from the psychology of the conscious. Essentially it comes to the same thing because objectively it does not matter one way or the other whether a psychic process is conscious or unconscious (Cf. Bleuler, *Versuch...*)."

With this explicit reference to Bleuler as a conclusion, Jung's perception of the notion of repression became clear beyond a doubt. In instances of repression, one found a number of complexes that have separated from the ego complex. It is as though they are repressed by the consciousness, yet this statement is only a metaphor since its point of departure is the psychology of consciousness.

When one rereads these texts by Jung in light of Freud's later work, it is immediately noticeable that Freud and Jung, even before their first encounter, were following different paths. The formation of Freud's theory was primarily based on the phenomenon of resistance which he encountered in his patients. In *Studies on Hysteria*, he explained that this experience of resistance had led him to abandon the belief in a pathological 'disposition' as the explanation for hysteria. Instead, he stressed repression as being the core of hysteria. Freud further raised the question why there was repression. He developed an answer along the lines of the contemporary culture, emphasizing the elements of prohibition and perfection. Jung, on the contrary, never lost faith in the pathological disposition as the explanation for hysteria. When he raised the same question concerning repression, it was directed to the cause of the dissociation. He continued to look for an answer in a deficiency in the individual constitution.

48. C.G. JUNG, *The Reaction Time Ratio in the Association Experiments*, C.W. II, § 619, footnote.

It must be stated however that the distinction between Jung's and Freud's notion of repression has only become completely clear in retrospect. Certain passages from *Studies on Hysteria* could be misunderstood, especially when one spontaneously read them - as Jung did - with Bleuler's conceptual framework in mind. For example, Freud wrote concerning the defence mechanism:⁴⁹

"From these I recognized a universal characteristic of such ideas: they were all of a distressing nature, calculated to arouse the affects of shame, of self-reproach and of psychical pain, and the feeling of being harmed; they were all of a kind that one would prefer not to have experienced, that one would rather forget. From all this arose, as it were automatically, the thought of *defence*. It has indeed been generally admitted by psychologists that the acceptance of a new idea (acceptance in the sense of believing or of recognizing as real) is dependent on the nature and trend of the ideas already united in the ego, and they have invented special technical names for this process of censorship to which the new arrival must submit."

When one reads this text concerning censorship and recalls Bleuler's description of the ego complex as a conglomerate of representations concerning the person proper which, by force of habit, directed the association process along certain favoured lines, one can easily view repression as 'a metaphor from the psychology of the conscious'.⁵⁰ This metaphor indicates the process which - even outside the realm of hysteria - is always valid. Unusual, highly emotionally charged representations tend to lead an insular existence without any ties to the organizing ego complex. Jung did not notice that he had overlooked the essential element of Freud's discovery when he wrote, as he did in the above quoted text, that, objectively speaking, it did not matter whether a psychic process evolved consciously or unconsciously. Along these same lines, in a text dealing with the reproduction test, he remarked that the notions 'repressed' and 'unconscious' did not overlap.⁵¹

"I should like to point out that, as in the association test, so also in the reproduction method, the repressed complex can betray itself in the reaction even though it is unconscious; it does so when it is split off from

49. S. FREUD, *Studies on Hysteria*, S.E. II, p. 269, G.W. I, p. 268-269.

50. C.G. JUNG, *The Reaction Time Ratio in the Association Experiments*, C.W. II, § 619, footnote.

51. C.G. JUNG, *Experimental Observations on the Faculty of Memory*, C.W. II, § 659.

consciousness, as is often the case with hysterical patients. So far as I can see, where repressed complexes are concerned, the same phenomenon occurs with normal, hysterical, and catatonic subjects; in normal cases there is a brief embarrassment or momentary blockage, in hysterical cases there is the well-known arbitrary amnesia, and in catatonic cases there is a complete barrier. The psychological mechanism, however, is the same."

The question of the consciousness or unconsciousness of an autonomous complex was, in Jung's view, only of secondary importance as far as the psychological mechanism was concerned. The essential element was the affective charge of the autonomous complex which was in competition with the power of the ego complex. The association test was thus just as useful in detecting lies as it was in tracing unconscious complexes in cases of hysteria. Whether or not it played a role in the conscious flow of thought was not directly related to the operation of the emotionally charged complex. Jung continued to be a loyal disciple of Bleuler, for whom consciousness was only a secondary phenomenon.

When dealing with hysteria, in order to explain why the complex worked unconsciously and why an amnesic rupture evolved, Jung referred back to the notion of disposition. He illustrated this very clearly:⁵²

"Hysteria is a morbid condition, congenital or acquired, in which the affects are exceedingly powerful. Hence the patients are more or less the continual victims of their affects."

And further:⁵³

"Every psychogenic neurosis contains a complex that differs from normal complexes by unusual strong emotional charges, and for this reason has such a constellating power that it fetters the whole individual. The complex, therefore, is the *causa morbi* (a certain disposition is, of course, presupposed!)."

52. C.G. JUNG, *A Third and Final Opinion on Two Contradictory Psychiatric Diagnoses*, C.W. I, § 464.

53. C.G. JUNG, *Psychoanalysis and Association Experiments*, C.W. II, § 665.

Moreover, at the thirty seventh *Versammlung südwestdeutschen Irrenärzte* in Tübingen on 3 and 4 November 1906, Jung explicitly specified:⁵⁴

"When I speak of the aetiological significance of the affects, I mean to make clear that the traumatic event defines the decisive factors of the symptoms. The disposition is, of course, presupposed."

This opinion had repercussions on the manner in which Jung employed the psychoanalytical method. According to him, the healing process did not consist in the awakening of consciousness or the venting of emotion. What had to be achieved was the reinforcement of the ego complex so that it might defend itself against the force of the autonomous complex. Therefore, one had to rather brutally coerce patients into expressing ideas which they detested. Jung thus aimed at a reinforcement of the will power. He clearly stated:⁵⁵

"I therefore put the emphasis on arousing and strengthening of the will and not on mere 'abreacting', as Freud originally did."

It is not surprising that Jung relied on disposition as the ultimate explanation for hysteria. Freud found himself confronted with similar problems concerning the 'ultimate cause'. Jung however, formulated the problem under a very specific form. He asked why was it possible that the affective charge of a certain complex was so strong that it isolated that complex instead of binding it to other complexes.

When we schematize Jung's theory more clearly than he himself did, we arrive at the following exposition. When an autonomous complex is emotionally charged to the extent that the complete psychic field is inundated by the affect and that the influence of the ego complex is eliminated, we can speak of neurosis. Consequently, we must conclude that the complex was even previously autonomous. If the psychic field had been in a harmonious state, the affect would maybe have modified the ego complex to a certain extent but it would certainly not have eliminated it. There is no reason to presume that the affect would initiate dissociation on its own since in essence, it has a connective function. Thus, the disposition of which Jung spoke must be viewed, in light of Janet's thought, as

54. See the report of the 37th *Versammlung südwestdeutschen Irrenärzte* in Tübingen in: *Centralblatt für Nervenheilkunde und Psychiatrie*, 1907, p. 176.

55. C.G. JUNG, *Psychoanalysis and Association Experiments*, C.W. II, § 725.

a disposition toward dissociation, or, in other words, as a constitutional deficiency.

When reflecting on Jung's thought, this exposition remains very ambiguous. This ambiguity also reflected the difficult position of associationism. Starting from elementary association laws, the theory did not succeed in reconstructing the complete psyche.

Wundt intended to solve the problem by introducing the notion of apperception alongside the association laws. Ziehen rejected this solution but he implicitly re-encountered the same problem under the name 'constellation'. Along the lines of this tradition, in which the higher organism was but a more complex arrangement of the lower organism, it was hard to imagine how the higher could lead to the lower.

Bleuler's notion of the ego complex was an attempt within this conceptual framework to attach a certain role to the ego. On the one hand, the ego complex was, like all other complexes, the result of representations and affect but, on the other hand, it was also a privileged complex which influenced the entire association process. Yet this point of view created some tensions which, although not expressed, made themselves felt when one tried to retrieve Freud's argumentation from this conceptual model. How can the affect, which in itself is only a connective force, create autonomous complexes which are capable of opposing other complexes? Or, to put it differently, why does the affect limit its synthesizing power to only a part of the psychic field? In Jung's presentation of this matter, he would question why the affect created an autonomous complex which competed with the ego complex. Why did the affect not simply modify the complete psychic field, in addition to the ego complex?

In any case, it is clear that Jung and Freud worked from very different approaches. Jung placed himself within the tradition of the Romantic unconscious which questioned how the ego arose from lower processes. This issue of the ego's constitution was not at all foreign to Freud. His point of departure, however, lay with the mere observation of the conflict. His main interest was initially based almost exclusively on the libidinous pole. The problem of the ego drives and of the ego itself would only later - after his break with Jung - receive a place in Freud's thought.

In Jung's attempt to understand Freud's theory of repression, we can clearly observe the implicit opposition between the two different approaches. Moreover, Jung was not completely aware of there even being an opposition. Under the misapprehension that he had well understood and

integrated Freud's opinion, Jung synthesized his own concepts at the end of *Association, Dream and Hysterical Symptom* as follows:⁵⁶

"The complex revealed in the associations is the root of the dreams and of the hysterical symptoms.

The interferences that the complex causes in the association experiment are none other than resistances in psychoanalysis, as described by Freud.

The mechanisms of repression are the same in the association experiment as in the dream as in the hysterical symptom.

The complex has an abnormal autonomy in hysteria and a tendency to an active, separate existence, which reduces and replaces the constellating power of the ego-complex. In this way a morbid personality is gradually created, the inclinations, judgments, and resolutions of which move only in the direction of the will to be ill. This second personality devours what is left of the normal ego and forces it into the role of a secondary (oppressed) complex.

A purposive treatment of hysteria must therefore strengthen what has remained of the normal ego, and this is best achieved by introducing some new complex that liberates the ego from domination by the complex of the illness."

The Language of the Unconscious

The unconscious is the part of the psychic field which had detached itself from the constellating power of the ego complex. It is the realm where all forms of association uninhibitedly intersect with each other since the curtailing power of the ego complex, which runs the association process along a certain course, is lacking. That is why it is overcome with lower categories of associations which are based on the similarity of sound between two words, on the vague similarity between two images or on coincidental connections between two notions. With this in mind, Jung designated the unconscious as the domain of the symbolic.

Jung initially considered the idea of symbol as a lack of meaning. Symbols surfaced only when restraints fell away. They were the products of the coincidental mechanism of the association possibilities. Concerning an association test administered to a respondent immediately after waking up, Jung remarked that he was not surprised by the great number of sound reactions obtained. The respondent's attention was minimal, allowing for

56. C.G. JUNG, *Association, Dream and Hysterical Symptom*, C.W. II, § 858-862.

‘the most primitive linguistic mechanism’ to the observer while uninhibitedly at work.⁵⁷ He further wrote:⁵⁸

"As far as we know, attention is completely extinguished in sleep. If one succeeded in obtaining reactions from a sleeping (but not somnambulant) subject, sound reactions would be the only result."

Jung’s concept of symbolic language as being characteristic of the unconscious was most clearly formulated in his work *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox* (1907). In two chapters where Jung synthetically expounded on the results of his association experiments as well as his concept of the complex, he wrote:⁵⁹

"Here we must interpolate a brief discussion on symbolism. We use the term ‘symbolical’ in contradistinction to ‘allegorical’. Allegory, for us, is the intentional interpretation of a thought, reinforced by images, whereas symbols are only indistinct, subsidiary associations to a thought, which obscure it rather than clarify it. As Pelletier says: ‘The symbol is a very inferior form of thought. One could define the symbol as the false perception of a relation of identity, or of very great analogy, between two objects which in reality are only vaguely analogous’."

Jung applied this concept of dreams in the following manner. Sleep originated in the suggestive imperative of the ego complex which intended to curtail all associations. The autonomous complexes however, were not completely controlled by the direct influence of the ego complex. Even when a person was asleep, the autonomous complexes continued to exercise their disturbing influence. Sometimes they were so strong that they caused insomnia. Normally, they were vented through dreams where the association process again flowed in an uninhibited and thus a more mechanical and accidental manner:⁶⁰

"But suppressing the complex (caused by the sleep-suggestion) means nothing more than the withdrawal of attention, i.e. depriving it of clarity. Thus the thought-complexes are dependent on a small fraction of clarity, for which reason they can manifest themselves only in vague, symbolic expressions and also get contaminated for lack of differentiation. We need

57. C.G. JUNG, *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, C.W. II, § 165.

58. *Ibid.*, § 165.

59. C.G. JUNG, *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, C.W. III, § 136.

60. *Ibid.*, § 137.

not assume an actual censorship of dream thoughts in the Freudian sense; the inhibition exerted by sleep-suggestion is a perfectly sufficient explanation."

Jung's concept of the ego again clearly came to the surface. 'Attention' and 'clarity' were correlative notions. The unconscious was the realm of all possible associations which was no longer enclosed by the ego complex. The unconscious arose when the ego complex fell away. Therefore, Jung did not speak of censorship or 'dream labour'. In his conceptual model, dreams originated in the fact that the ego no longer functioned.

The difference between Jung and Freud was brought to the fore once again when Jung, taking Freud's analysis of 'Signorelli' as his example, analyzed one of his own insights, namely 'Bunau-Varilla'.

In the first pages of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, Freud recounted how, when trying to remember the name of the painter of the Orvieto frescos, the names Botticelli and Boltraffio forced themselves upon his consciousness, although he knew perfectly well that neither of them was involved.⁶¹ The name Signorelli, the artist who painted the work, however did not come to mind. In his analysis, Freud became aware that, by way of association, this name was capable of arousing unpleasant memories. Shortly before this, he had been involved in a discussion about the Turks who inhabited the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the enormous trust they placed in the 'Herr Doktor'. They could accept in a very passive manner the fatal diagnosis of a physician. Yet when suffering impotence, they completely lost their composure. In such a case, they told the 'Herr Doktor' that they preferred death. This last fact had reminded Freud of one of his own patients who, because of his sexual disorders, had committed suicide. Freud had learned of this when passing through Trafoi.

Freud interpreted his inability to call to mind the name 'Signorelli' as the consequence of the tendency to forget this painful incident. The term 'Signor', which reminded him of the patient's trust in the 'Herr Doktor' and of the patient's fear of sexual difficulties, disappeared under the influence of repression. The repressed content however came to the surface by way of detours: in the Turks who lived in Herzegovina (Herr Doktor) and Bosnia and in 'Botticelli' which combined 'Bosnia' with the innocent ending 'elli' of Signorelli. In 'Boltraffio', the repressed content came to the surface even more sharply. Besides the association with

61. The forgetting of 'Signorelli' is first discussed in 1898 in S. FREUD, *The Psychological Mechanism of Forgetfulness*, S.E. III, 287-297, G.W. I, 517-527. It was discussed again in the first pages of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, S.E. VI, p. 1-7, G.W. IV, p. 5-12.

Bosnia, there was also the association with Trafoi, the name of the place where Freud had learned about his patient's suicide. In Freud's view, repression caused him to forget the name. Yet the repressed content reappeared in the names 'Botticelli' and 'Boltraffio'.

In *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, Jung presented the analysis of a similar incident.⁶² He was taking a long journey by train and was smoking a cigar. He also had a good Havana cigar in his pocket to be used later that day. He suddenly remembered that he did not have any matches and that he would do best to light his Havana with the butt of the cigar which he was then smoking. Afterwards, his mind began to wander until he caught himself, a couple of minutes later, quietly and continuously repeating the name 'Bunau-Varilla'. Jung recounted how he immediately applied Freud's method of free association in order to understand what this meant. 'Bunau-Varilla' was the name of a Panamanian agitator in Paris. Then the term 'Varinas' came to mind followed by 'Manila' and 'cigarillo' with a vague feeling of a South American atmosphere. Then he remembered the cigar which was almost gone and with which he immediately had to light his Havana.

According to Jung, the chain of associations went as follows: Havana-cigar / cigarillo (Spanish for cigarette) with a South American atmosphere / Manila (on another trip, Jung had smoked Manila tobacco) / Varinas (Spanish American tobacco) / Bunau Varilla.

Although Jung himself claimed that he had discovered this associative series thanks to Freud's method of free association, he once again overlooked the core of the Freudian approach. In his example, Freud intended to demonstrate that forgetting the name 'Signorelli' was not merely coincidental but rather a purposeful process in which repression and the reappearance of the repressed content could be recognized. Jung, on the contrary, only perceived the phenomenon of distraction in the chain of words that led to Bunau-Varilla. Diminished attention no longer allowed the association process to move exclusively on the level of significance but caused the process to slip down to the level of sound reactions. The association process did not, however, produce mere sound reactions which would be the case if the attention level had fallen to zero.⁶³

62. C.G. JUNG, *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, C.W. II, § 451. Jung briefly referred to the same example in *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, C.W. III, § 110.

63. C.G. JUNG, *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, C.W. II, § 450.

Nowhere in Jung's exposition do we find the notion of repression which in Freud's thinking was considered as the dynamic behind the entire process. The idea of the repressed content's reappearance, which Freud had pointed out in the words 'Botticelli' and 'Boltraffio', was equally unknown to Jung. Jung even presented his analysis of 'Bunau-Varilla' as an explicit repudiation of Piéron. The latter had defended an opinion concerning chains of associations which was not so far removed from Freud's ideas. Piéron claimed that an association which only became comprehensible if one presupposed a number of unconscious intermediary terms - as was the case in 'Bunau-Varilla' - had first of all to be interpreted as a consequence of the importance of the final term to the subject in question. The essential element was not to be found in the intermediary terms, which had fallen away and could only be retrieved by reconstruction. Rather, the essential element dwelled in the significance of the final term of the process, namely the word that consciously came to mind, in which one could always find a reference to something to which the subject was very partial.⁶⁴

It was precisely the importance of the final term of the indirect association that was rejected by Jung, although he did make an exception for cases in which a strong emotional complex dominated the subject's consciousness. In those instances, Piéron's theory offered some attractive insights. Concerning the analysis of 'Bunau-Varilla', he opposed the opinion of Piéron which considered the final word as an expression of a special subjective interest. What occurred, according to Jung, was merely a condensation formed by the combination of several, very weak intermediary connections. This involved a "linguistic-motor automatism as often occurred in normal subjects".⁶⁵ According to Jung, we observe the

64. "Consequently, what actually occurs in the process of mediated association? One idea acts upon the subconscious field and tends to evoke another element in the subconscious. This second element, in its action, brings along yet another element (i.e. lifts up another idea) which, because it is more interesting, is strongly attracted to the personal synthesis. Only this last element enters consciousness. What are the conditions necessary for the second element to appear to the exclusion of the first? The answer to this lies in the far greater interest of the second term for the ego, from among the other terms that could be evoked by a content of consciousness. The determination of one of the ideas is achieved by the proper attraction of the conscious or unconscious personal synthesis. In the first case, one is conscious of choosing. That is why Féré's patient associated Joan of Arc with biscuits, without thinking of the intermediary terms (stake, stack of biscuits) because of the far greater interest of this last term." H. PIÉRON, *L'association médiate*. In: *Revue Philosophique de France et de l'Étranger* 28 (1903), p. 146-147 (own translation).

65. C.G. JUNG, *The Associations of Normal Subjects* C.W. II, § 451.

usual association process as it operated when the ego made its influence felt only weakly or not at all.⁶⁶

"The subconscious association-process takes place through similarities of image and sound; in fact all associations taking place in the subconscious, i.e., outside the range of attention, do so (with the exception of certain somnambulant processes)."

It could not be put any clearer. Jung completely opposed Piéron who had emphasized the influence of the ego in the indirect association and who, in that sense, was probably closer to Freud than Jung himself was. Jung viewed the unconscious as a somewhat cluttered domain beyond attention's reach, even when qualifying hysterical phenomena. In those instances, he probably conceived that the secondary dissociated personality had become so powerful that it directed the association process in the same way the ego complex did in normal circumstances.

A Remarkable Text

Jung's works in the period between 1902 and 1907 continuously focused on the association test and on the experimental approach which was its basis. This was indeed in sharp contrast to his earlier interest during his years as a student and in his dissertation *On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena*. Had Jung truly become an unemotional scientist?

A remarkable text dated in 1905 proved that Jung did not completely abandon the interest of his youth. This text dealt with 'cryptomnesia', namely the phenomenon of occasionally remembering something without recognizing it as a memory. The article returned to the analysis of Nietzsche's so-called plagiarism in Zarathustra, which Jung had dealt with at the end of *On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena*.

Jung began by pointing out that emotionally charged representations possessed a certain autonomy by which they could force themselves upon the consciousness under the guise of a sudden insight. This could even occur when attention was turned to something else. He further offered several more general observations with regard to the unconscious as being the basis for the creativity of individual artists and groups. Creativity was

66. *Id.*

hereby defined as the 'search for new combinations'.⁶⁷ In the process of seeking out new combinations, a differentiation occurred. Old elements were reorganized into a new whole. For the human psyche was not so rich that it could constantly rebuilt everything anew from its foundation up.⁶⁸

"Our psyche is not so fabulously rich that it can build from scratch each time. Neither does nature. One can see from prisons, hospitals, and lunatic asylums at what enormous cost nature takes a little step forward; she builds laboriously on what has gone before."

Thus the unconscious was presented as the fertile ground of consciousness. It was considered to be the realm of unlimited possibilities, the domain of crazy games. Some of these possibilities were ingenious combinations, while others were useless or even monstrous attempts at combinations. That was why the genius and the mentally disturbed appeared to be so similar. Both surrendered to the rule of the unconscious.⁶⁹

"... what kind of people seek these new combinations? They are the men of thought, who have finely-differentiated brains coupled with the sensitivity of a woman and the emotionality of a child. They are the slenderest, most delicate branches on the great tree of humanity: they bear the flower and the fruit. Many become brittle too soon, many break off. Differentiation creates in its progress the fit as well as the unfit; wits are mingled with nitwits - there are fools with genius and geniuses with follies, as Lombroso has remarked."

Jung's concept has thus been clearly explained. The limitation imposed by consciousness on the range of possible associations hidden in the unconscious field, was to the ordinary person's advantage. While the unconscious might bring forth something ingenious, it could also lead to insanity in many cases.

Compared to the unconscious, Jung pointed to consciousness as being something secondary. He not only implied that the unconscious expressed itself with such power that consciousness was no longer able to control it - as Freud would confirm - but he also viewed consciousness as secondary, meaning that it was brought forth by the unconscious. He presented the unconscious as being foundational when he wrote:⁷⁰

67. C.G. JUNG, *Cryptomnesia*, C.W. I, § 175 and 178.

68. *Ibid.*, § 178.

69. *Ibid.*, § 175.

70. *Ibid.*, § 172.

"It is to this unconscious that all those who do creative work must turn. All new ideas and combinations of ideas are premeditated by the unconscious."

In this context, Jung referred to the history of religions, to mass psychology and to the conscious life of "all those who ever hoped for or strived after something".⁷¹ Poignant examples of the changing combinations by which fantasy created new things from old elements could be found everywhere.

Thus the Romantic view on nature continually made its influence felt throughout Jung's thought. Such a view was permitted at the Burghölzli. Bleuler himself had written along the same lines about the kinship between the genius and the lunatic.⁷² For him however, the ultimate explanation for the distinction between the two was to be found in coincidence.

Jung's Understanding of Freud

We must now turn our attention to a critical investigation of Jung's understanding of Freud. As was mentioned above, Jung was only familiar with Freud's *Studies on Hysteria*, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (or, more likely, *On Dreams*) and *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* during the period which we are examining.

The difference between their particular points of view becomes even more apparent when we place Freud's main works known to Jung in the context of the former's articles in which he further specified his own views. Jung only became acquainted with these articles in 1906, when he received the *Collected Short Papers on the Theory of Neuroses* from Freud.

When one compares Freud's concepts with Jung's, it first of all becomes obvious that Jung continuously referred to Janet with regard to his conceptual framework for the understanding of hysteria. Freud, on the contrary, moved away from Janet early on. Although Freud's and Breuer's preliminary statement of 1892, was completely in line with Janet's

71. *Ibid.*, § 174.

72. "Genie und Geisteskrankheit haben das gemeinsam, dass ihre Ideenassoziationen von den durch die Erfahrung gegebenen Bahnen in erheblicher Weise abweichen. Bei unsern jetzigen Kenntnissen müssen wir es als Zufall bezeichnen, wenn bei solcher abnormen Kombinationen etwas Rechtes herauskommt. Dadurch erklärt sich die Seltenheit des Genies gegenüber der Geisteskrankheit." E. BLEULER, *Versuch einer naturwissenschaftlichen Betrachtung der psychologischen Grundbegriffe*, p. 161.

thought, Freud quickly diverged from Janet. The concept of defence determined all his later work. Freud was apparently partial to opposing the notion that hysteria was merely a phenomenon of degeneration. In his article *Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses* (1896), he explicitly attacked Janet on this point.

According to Freud, hysteria was in essence the consequence of fending off an unbearable representation.⁷³ Concerning this, two questions arose. First of all, why was a certain representation unbearable? Secondly, in what manner was this representation avoided and what was the result? During the period which we are now studying, Freud only attended to the last question. As a preliminary reply to the first question, he merely stated that a representation was unbearable since it referred to a previously unbearable situation which de facto simply shifted the problem.

In the works *The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence* (1894) and *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), Freud outlined the detours by which a defence mechanism succeeded in neutralizing a painful representation. This was where the theory of the affect appeared. A painful representation carried with it an affective charge. This implied that its neutralizing consisted in either removing the affective charge or relocating it. Neutralization could occur because the affect was converted into a somatic condition. The consequence of this conversion was hysteria. Freud however, at this stage of his thinking, postulated that one had to possess a specific disposition toward conversion in order for it to occur.⁷⁴ The affect could also be relocated on other, less unbearable representations causing obsessions or phobias.⁷⁵

Using several case studies, Freud demonstrated in *Studies on Hysteria* how symptoms referred to original representations which were later neutralized. The method of 'pressure' was developed in order to trace the original representation and to thus restore the affect to its proper place. Only afterward could the affect be either vented or allowed to flow into the associative correctives of the thought process.

Symptoms both hide and represent an emotionally charged representation or representation groups. It was Freud who made this discovery in his psychoanalytical practice. In order to explain this double nature, he

73. The theory of hypnotic conditions to which Breuer adhered, was not abandoned by Freud. Traumatic neurosis continued to exist as an autonomous entity although there were links to the psychosexual constitution.

74. S. FREUD, *The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence*, S.E. III, p. 50, G.W. I, p. 65.

75. *Ibid.*, S.E. III, p. 51-52, G.W. I, p. 65-66.

developed the theory of the affect which, for him, was intrinsically connected to his experience of the defence mechanism.

Along these lines, he wrote at the end of *The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence*:⁷⁶

"I should like, finally, to dwell for a moment the working hypothesis which I have made use of in this exposition of the neuroses of defence. I refer to the concept that in mental functions something is to be distinguished - a quota of affect or sum of excitation - which possesses all the characteristics of a quantity (though we have no means of measuring it), which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and which is spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric charge is spread over the surface of a body."

Here we are confronted with a totally different approach to the affect than that of Jung or Bleuler. For them, the affect was a 'generalized reaction of the organism'. They considered the affect to be a dynamic force connected to loose representations which enabled them to be combined with related representations. The affect created higher entities and, ultimately, the supreme unity which was known as the 'ego'. Jung was following Ziehen's line of thought, which had defined transference as an overflowing of a representation's charge into related groups of representations. Jung also based himself on Bleuler who, in *Suggestibilität, Affektivität, Paranoia*, had clearly posed the affect as the fundamental dynamic of the human psyche's unity.

Jung developed his theory of affect in order to reconstruct how the psyche's unity originated as the result of single representations. The affect was the binding force of the psychic organism. His approach differed greatly from Freud who had employed the notion of affect as an auxiliary representation in order to conceptualize the phenomenon of defence which consisted in the neutralization and isolation of certain representations within the whole of the psyche.

The question with which Jung approached these phenomena hampered for a long time his understanding that the notion of defence was of central importance in Freud's thinking. The concept of defence, especially in the form of a shift, was hard to integrate in Jung's conceptual scheme. That the affect could detach itself from a representation was inconceivable to Jung. What, to the observer's eye, seemed to appear as defence was in

76. *Ibid.*, S.E. III, p. 60, C.W. I, p. 74.

fact a deficiency, a lacking of the natural tendency toward an ever higher integration and organization of the numerous contents of the psyche. To speak of 'defence' and 'repression' was, for Jung, merely figurative language employed to indicate a deficiency as the cause of a representation's exclusion from the total synthesis of the psychic field.

It must be noted that Jung was initially convinced that he had understood Freud correctly, even when he interpreted the notions of 'repression' and 'defence' as 'metaphors from the point of view of the conscious'.⁷⁷ If Jung based himself only on the above-mentioned text from *Studies on Hysteria* which dealt with censorship,⁷⁸ the misunderstanding could, to a degree, be comprehensible. Yet, from the time of the publication of Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) onward, censorship became such a central notion that it would have been difficult not to grasp its correct significance.

In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud built his argumentation on the fact that a dream could appear as a meaningful unity when interpreted as a symptom. Dreams appeared to be the hidden fulfilment of wishes. The reason that a wish had to be concealed was found in the tendency to ward off that particular wish. This explained the censorship applied to that wish and the distorted depiction of its content in the dream.

Because of this distortion, Freud concluded that dreams were the products of two opposite psychic forces or systems. On the one hand, there was the tendency to express a wish through the dream. On the other hand, censorship impeded the blatant expression of that wish.⁷⁹ Thus censorship appeared to be an organism which had the privilege to either allow or deny access to consciousness. Freud defined this consciousness in a very peculiar manner:⁸⁰

"We see the process of a thing becoming conscious as a specific psychical act, distinct from and independent of the process of the formation of a presentation or idea; and we regard consciousness as a sense organ which perceives data that arise elsewhere."

The gap between Freud and Jung is very apparent here. Censorship could no longer be understood as the purposeful activity of the ego com-

77. C.G. JUNG, *The Reaction Time Ratio in the Association Experiments*, C.W. II, § 619, footnote.

78. S. FREUD, *Studies on Hysteria*, S.E. II, p. 269, G.W. I, p. 268-269.

79. S. FREUD, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, S.E. IV, p. 143-144, G.W. II/III, p. 149.

80. *Ibid.*, S.E. IV, p. 114, G.W. II/III, p. 150.

plex which suppressed useless and lower categories of associations. Censorship was to be considered as one of the two tendencies in the psyche which stood in opposition to each other. The directive role of consciousness was reduced to a merely observing role which could only add a second and more enhanced adjustment to the fundamental auto-regulation of the two conflicting systems according to the principle of displeasure.⁸¹

Freud and Jung also viewed the notion of the unconscious differently. For Jung, the unconscious consisted in the unbridled game of associations that came to the surface as soon as the curbing influence of the ego complex fell away. In Freud's view, the unconscious was the consequence of repression. As early as in the writing of *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud stated that a repressed representation had originally been conscious since only a conscious representation could be unbearable to consciousness and cause a conflict.⁸²

"Consciousness, plainly, does not know in advance when a incompatible idea is going to crop up. The incompatible idea, which, together with its concomitants, is later excluded and forms a separate psychical group, must originally have been in communication with the main stream of thought. Otherwise the conflict which led to their exclusion could not have taken place."

The fact that a representation became unconscious was thus the consequence of an act which solved the problem by neutralizing the affective charge of the unbearable representation. This was effected either by a shift or a conversion. Yet this was not a definitive solution to the problem. The symptom occupied the place of the original conflict, while the original conflict moved to the unconscious field where it sat bottled up with a non-diminishing intensity. Freud's goal was to bring the unconscious back into consciousness. Only then could the conflict be realistically solved. For Freud, there definitely was an important distinction between the conscious and the unconscious. One aspect of this distinction was that the unconscious remained unspent and timelessly active.

Therefore, in *The Aetiology of Hysteria* (1896), when Freud pointed out that seduction scenes stemming from childhood derived their activity from their unconscious character⁸³, he was diametrically opposing Bleu-

81. *Ibid.*, S.E. V, p. 615-616, G.W. II/III, p. 620-621.

82. S. FREUD, *Studies on Hysteria*, S.E. II, p. 167, G.W. I, p. 234-235.

83. S. FREUD, *The Aetiology of Hysteria*, S.E. III, p. 211, G.W. I, p. 448.

ler's and Jung's positions which considered the conscious character as something concomitant. Freud explicitly remarked that philosophers had performed little preparatory work toward understanding precisely why the unconscious character guaranteed the continuous activity of old memories.⁸⁴

Generally speaking, the difference between Freud and Jung evolved to this: Freud's starting point was the fact that both the symptom and the dream referred to something unbearable in a concealed manner, which he interpreted as the consequence of a conflict between a desiring and a restraining body. The dream and symptom came into existence as a compromise. Their essential function was to capture the affective charge which was then withdrawn from the unbearable representation. Basically, it involved a defence mechanism which was conceived of as an energetic model of investment and divestment.

Jung viewed things differently. Under normal conditions, the affective charge which was related to each representation, strove to communicate with other representations. This was where the unity of the psyche originated with the ego complex being its centre. However, when a certain group of representations was excessively emotionally charged, it became an independent unity. In other words, it became an 'autonomous complex' which competed with the ego complex. Hence, dissociation originated. Jung therefore offered the same presentation of affairs as Freud did in an article written in 1893 which dealt with hysterical paralysis: the affect immobilized the representation. Yet the notions of conflict, of repression and of the unconscious being characterized by indestructibility which distinguished it from consciousness, were not mentioned.

The different ways in which Jung and Freud viewed the matter also determined their further questioning. Freud later wondered why the phenomena of defence and censorship were present which ultimately led him to the theme of prohibition and the Oedipus complex. Jung's questioning, why an affective charge in some cases operated associatively while in other cases dissociatively, did not take him beyond the concept of the disposition. In Freud's view, the unconscious was the consequence of a tendency to conceal. He further traced the inherent laws of this tendency. For Jung however, the unconscious proceeded from a decomposition of the ego, a regression into the non-organized. His further concern was to investigate how the ego emerged or re-emerged from this unconscious realm.

84. *Ibid.*, S.E. III, p. 218-219, G.W. I, p. 456.

From a superficial point of view, it might appear as if Freud and Jung shared the same opinion. Emotionally charged contents formed the core of neuropsychoses and the unconscious had its own language of vague comparisons and metaphors. Yet what made the distinction between Jung and Freud immediately clear was Jung's attitude toward the phenomenon of displacement. While for Freud, the distinction between hysteria and obsessive-compulsive neurosis was essential, the problem was not touched upon by Jung.⁸⁵ (Until 1906, Jung based himself exclusively on Freud's *Studies on Hysteria*, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* and, perhaps only partly, *The Interpretation of Dreams*.) Yet in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (and in the shorter *On Dreams*), Freud frequently pointed to the importance of displacement. He recoiled from a merely symbolic interpretation. The dreamer had to articulate his associations and, in this way, one could verify how the dream combined both recent and indifferent material. According to Freud, a universal key to the interpretation of dreams did not exist.⁸⁶ Only when the line of associations did not lead anywhere, did Freud allow some space for symbolic interpretation which he described as 'typical dreams'.⁸⁷ For Jung, on the contrary, dreams demonstrated that the unconscious was saturated with symbolism. It was the kingdom of inferior thought which operated with vague analogies.

To conclude this confrontation between Jung and Freud, we must point out some themes in Freud's work which Jung did not discuss at all. First of all, there was the connection which Freud made with childhood years and the important role played by sexuality at that time. He clearly emphasized this connection from *Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence* onward. Further, elements of the Oedipus complex could already be found in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Finally, there was the complete psychological substructure which Freud developed in the seventh chapter of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. These three insights seem to have been of little or no importance to Jung.

Concerning the theoretical substructure, Jung himself claimed that his theory of complexes was more far-reaching than Freud's vision.⁸⁸ Yet

85. Jung mentioned obsessive-compulsive neurosis one time in *Psychoanalysis and Association Experiments*. Yet the distinct difference between hysteria and obsessive-compulsive neurosis was not noted.

86. S. FREUD, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, S.E. IV, p. 99-105, G.W. II/III, p. 104-110.

87. *Ibid.*, S.E. IV p. 241-276, G.W. II/III, p. 246-282. In the first edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, the section on symbolism in chapter 6 did not appear.

88. C.G. JUNG, *The Associations of Normal Subjects*, C.W. II, § 198.

he did not offer any further explanation for this claim. Jung's overlooking Freud's view concerning sexuality was understandable. Although in *Studies on Hysteria*, sexuality was mentioned frequently and, in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, traces of Freud's concept of infantile sexuality could already be found, the central place these notions would occupy in Freud's thought would only appear more clearly in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* and in the articles of the *Collected Short Papers on the Theory of Neuroses*. When Jung became aware of these concepts in 1906, he had difficulties accepting them. Yet he himself had written in *The Associations of Normal Subjects* that "the majority of complexes operative in the association experiment relate to direct or transposed sexuality."⁸⁹ He had also noted that an "overwhelming number of the complexes we have discovered in our subjects are erotic. In view of the great part played by love and sexuality in human life, this is not so surprising."⁹⁰

What Jung did not comprehend was that, for Freud, sexuality was more than the frequent, factual content of unconscious formations. Jung's most outspoken stance with regard to this issue can be found in the foreword of *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox*. This was written in 1906, at the beginning of his collaboration with Freud. Jung situated himself with regard to Freud as follows:⁹¹

"Fairness to Freud, however, does not imply, as many fear, unqualified submission to a dogma; one can very well maintain an independent judgment. If I, for instance, acknowledge the complex mechanisms of dreams and hysteria, this does not mean that I attribute to the infantile sexual trauma the exclusive importance that Freud apparently does. Still less does it mean that I place sexuality so predominantly in the foreground, or that I grant it the psychological universality which Freud, it seems, postulates in view of the admittedly enormous role which sexuality plays in the psyche. As for Freud's therapy, it is at best but one of several possible methods, and perhaps does not always offer in practice what one expects from it in theory. Nevertheless, all these things are the merest trifles compared with the psychological principles whose discovery is Freud's greatest merit; and to them the critics pay far too little attention. He who wishes to be fair to Freud should take to heart the words of Erasmus: 'Unumquemque move lapidem, omnia experire, nihil intentatum relinque'."

89. *Ibid.*, § 198.

90. *Ibid.*, § 381.

91. C.G. JUNG, *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, C.W. III, foreword.