A social mind: The context of John Turner’s work and its influence

Stephen D. Reicher1, S. Alexander Haslam2, Russell Spears3, and Katherine J. Reynolds4

1Department of Psychology, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland, UK
2School of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
3Department of Social Psychology, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
4Research School of Psychology, the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

We review John Turner’s contribution to social psychology and his ongoing influence on the field. We provide an account of his research and theorising framed by the two major theoretical frameworks which he developed: social identity theory (together with Henri Tajfel) and self-categorisation theory. We elaborate the contribution of his work in developing an understanding of intergroup relations (in social identity theory) and specifying the social nature of the self, the salience of social identities, and of the importance of social identity for social influence, stereotyping, power, and leadership (within self-categorisation theory). We then locate these research programmes within Turner’s broader meta-theoretical goal of addressing major problems, issues, and themes within social psychology. These centre on (a) a critique of the pervasive anti-collectivism within much of social psychology, (b) a normative/political agenda for social change, and (c) a commitment to the social nature of the individual mind. These themes explicitly or implicitly infused his research and continue to inspire much of the work in the theoretical tradition that he pioneered.

Keywords: Social identity; Self-categorisation; John Turner; Prejudice; Social change.

The French surrealist André Breton once wrote of the need to achieve an ever clearer and at the same time more passionate consciousness of the
world (Breton, 1936). The two—passion and precision—he saw as interdependent rather than opposed. In more recent years Game and Metcalfe (1996) have invoked Breton in order to argue for a passionate sociology. They argue that the more we care about the phenomena we study, the more we will be rigorous. The truth will trump careerist aspirations or the pressure to publish at all costs. Passion, they contend, is a necessity for a subject that is serious and which is to be taken seriously. Passion is what will draw people in and thereby build the discipline. Passion, at root, is what will make us and others care about what we do.

He might have been embarrassed if the word was used about him, but John Turner was a passionate social psychologist. Although he took delight in ideas, for Turner psychology was not simply an intellectual exercise. It also related to central issues of society and politics, which were embedded in his own history and his own experience. For, as we related in his obituary published in the Guardian newspaper (Reicher & Haslam, 2011), John Turner’s background was different from that of the typical academic. He was one of eight children raised in a small council flat in Peckham, South London. Though intellectually brilliant—early on, he won a scholarship to Wilson’s Grammar School in nearby Camberwell—he was never comfortable in the mannered world of academia where being “clubbable” is often an important attribute and where it can be seen as impolite to be too sharp in challenging others. As many can attest, John Turner was nothing if not sharp, and his primary loyalty was always to the clarity and progress of ideas.

Very early on in his career John nearly gave up on academia. While an undergraduate at Sussex he dropped out several times. But a turning point came during one of these spells when he got a job in a Fleet Street printing factory, became involved in trades union activities and in political organisations. Here he began to appreciate the power of collective action (Fleet Street was a byword for union strength in those days) and he became interested in the psychological bases of these phenomena.

At last the world of ideas and the world of his experience came together. John had discovered a domain that mattered and he never looked back. He finished his degree at Sussex and went on to complete his PhD with Henri Tajfel at Bristol (from 1971 to 1974). From then on his role in developing social identity theory (SIT) with Tajfel and then subsequently in developing self-categorisation theory (SCT) with his own students is well known. However, in order to understand those theories fully, and in order to appreciate fully what they are seeking to do, it is important to bear in mind the broader issues to which they were oriented. These can be distilled into three overarching themes.

First, Turner was well aware that the potential of groups to challenge the status quo resulted in a fierce anti-collectivism. This anti-collectivism infiltrates every crevice of our culture, including the discipline of psychology.
Within this there is a strong assumption that the autonomous individual is
the seat of reason and of sound judgement. Groups serve only to subvert our
intellectual and moral compasses. They lead to bias in perception, they lead
to mindless conformity, they lead us into conflict and violence, and even
atrocity towards others. What is more, the attack on groups was not
confined to a war of ideas; it led to practical attacks on collective
organisation and collective decision making later enshrined in legislation.

The first major theme that frames Turner’s work, then, involves
challenging anti-collectivism—or rather, to put it more positively, demon-
strating the socially meaningful nature of group phenomena. Here the goal
is to show that group-level understanding is not flawed or inherently inferior
to individual understanding. But rather than conduct this argument at an
abstract and general level, it was here that Turner’s passion and his love of
precision most clearly coincided. For a major part of his work consists in
specifying the processes through which group-level understandings relate to
the structure of social reality rather than being distortions of social reality,
how groups shape the way in which people think rather than destroy
thought, and how group behaviour is always meaningful in context.

Turner’s detailed explication of these processes, far from being dry or
socially irrelevant, is in many ways the most important of his achievements.
It is what allows us to move beyond slogans when contesting anti-
collectivism in psychology and society.

The second general theme framing Turner’s work has to do with the group
as the source of power and of social change. This relates to the well-worn
assertion that the powerless gain power through their combination. But, again,
he was not content with abstract slogans. He sought to elucidate the precise
processes through which groups and group life can be a basis for power. His
starting point was that social identity is what makes group behaviour possible
(Turner, 1982, p. 21). The question of combination and power then becomes
bound up with the twin issues of how social identity is achieved and how social
identity facilitates the coordination of group members.

If the word “power” was rarely used when working on such issues as
group influence, the formation of group consensus, the nature of group
organisation, or leadership in groups, it is not coincidental that Turner’s last
major single-authored paper drew these and other themes together into a
model of power (Turner, 2005). At the heart of this model is the idea that
power is a product of shared social identity and the collectivity it creates,
and that, as a result, the ability of anyone to wield power lies in their ability
to work with and through group members by representing their social
identities.

The link from power to change is most evident in John Turner’s early
work with Henri Tajfel in which, together, they elaborated social identity
theory. As we discuss below, the theory was premised on the fact that
powerless groups have the ability to challenge inequality to the extent that they band together and act collectively rather than seek to manoeuvre individually within the existing system. Subsequently Turner rarely wrote explicitly about change (although it was a major theme in commentaries that he provided on psychological analyses which implied that the status quo was an inevitable outcome of “basic” human psychology; e.g., see Turner, 2006). This was not because change became any less important to him or to his overall project. It was more because, having so clearly and powerfully shown how social identity processes were bound up with processes of social change, the pressing task became to understand the processes that determine the nature and force of the group understandings which provide the psychological engines for change. More particularly, this was a central objective of work on self-categorisation theory that defined a third theme in his work: the socially structured mind. A key goal here was to analyse and explain the all-important interaction between self and society—the way in which understandings of the collective self reflect, but also determine and change, the nature of social organisation and society (Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1997).

This interplay between mind and society is also evident in one of Turner’s unfinished projects—a major restatement of the psychology of “prejudice” (a term he disliked for its intimations of collective irrationalism). Central to his argument was the idea that prejudice can only be understood as part of groups’ struggle for (and against) change. Although social psychologists routinely focus on prejudice as a problem of individual attitudes, socially potent forms of prejudice reflect collective understandings that are grounded in a particular model of social identity—a sense of “us” as different and superior to “them”. Moreover, the very term “prejudice”—where claims are made that some people’s views towards members of a particular social category (e.g., African Americans) are unjustified—denotes a challenge to the views that one group holds towards others. Typically, then, those who support progressive change to the role and function of certain subordinate groups in society claim that more historically discriminatory views towards this sub-group are now prejudiced—that is, invalid, unjustified, and wrong. Agreements and disagreements concern whether members of a particular social category should hold certain roles and functions in society, and therefore are directly linked to the process not just of representing society but also changing it (or else resisting change; Ferguson, Branscombe, & Reynolds, 2012; Reynolds, Haslam, & Turner, 2012). So, even if the ostensible topic was cognitive, the analytic perspective was integrally bound up with groups, society, power, and change. For Turner, to lose sight of this was to lose touch with the reasons for doing social psychology.

In this chapter, however, we do not want simply to summarise John Turner’s work on social identity theory and self-categorisation theory.
This is for the simple reason that there are many existing summaries to which the reader can refer (e.g., Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Ellemers, Reicher, Reynolds, & Schmitt, 2010; Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010; for a compilation and commentary on the classic texts see also Postmes & Branscombe, 2010; Turner & Reynolds, 2011). Nor is our primary aim to evaluate Turner’s work in relation to all the various ways in which others have approached and sought to develop social identity and self-categorisation concepts—or else to comment in detail on how John Turner himself viewed such developments. That would be a much larger project than we have space for here, given the remarkably wide influence that Turner had on the discipline (something we shall touch on later). But, more fundamentally, it would point us inwards, towards debates within psychology, rather than outwards, towards real-world phenomena.

Of course theoretical debates in the discipline are of importance. But if we limit ourselves to such internal reference points—purely measuring our studies and our models against previous studies and models—the very real danger is that we lose sight of our ability to address the phenomena we purport to explain. External referentiality must always be our ultimate yardstick. As Turner (1981) himself argued, the issue is not so much why people behave as they do in any given experiment, but rather whether the models we build to explain that behaviour help us understand what happens outside our experiments. The point is not to understand why people allocate points to each other, but to understand when and why we discriminate or else challenge discrimination.

Our focus, then, is precisely on the real-world issues with which Turner was concerned and the ways in which his work sought to address them. That is, we seek to show how social identity and self-categorisation theories are bound up with the three core themes identified above: challenging anti-collectivism; the power of the group and social change; understanding the socially structured mind. We have three reasons for doing so.

The first is to render the body of Turner’s work more intelligible. That is, we don’t simply want to recapitulate what he did, but to explain why he did what he did and how it fits together to tell a larger story. Why, for instance, did Turner emphasise so forcefully that stereotypes are not fixed and immutable but rather sensitive to changes in social context (Haslam & Turner, 1992, 1995)? Why did he contest the idea that social influence is something we rely upon in the absence of objective information about the world (Turner, 1991)? Why did he insist that group polarisation is less a process of distortion and accentuation than an accurate representation of how the ingroup prototype stands in relation to that of outgroups (Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989)? All of these points are technically important in their own right. But their broader significance comes to light when seen as
pieces of a larger puzzle, which is to understand how group-level understanding relates to social reality and that the group member is not intellectually inferior to the solitary individual (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). They are all integral to Turner’s challenge to the prevailing anticolectivism.

Second, by explaining the link between the technical questions that Turner addressed and real-world phenomena, we seek to show why his work matters. Group behaviour is indeed fascinating. It confronts us with many intriguing phenomena and many intellectual challenges. However, like doing crossword puzzles all day, it is hard to motivate people to spend a lifetime on such issues if that is all there is to it. Yet once it becomes clear how the intellectual puzzles relate to fundamental questions of social life—to issues of equality and inequality, to the struggle against injustice, to the ability of people to determine their own fate and to fashion new worlds—then it not only becomes clear why John Turner was passionate about his work, but it also becomes easier to understand why we too might want to become passionately involved in the debate. In this regard it is important to understand social identity and self-categorisation theories as normative as well as analytic. They are concerned with groups and social identities not necessarily because we spend most of our lives acting as group members, but rather because it is only when we do that we have the power to make and remake history. If groups are often at the root of social problems (conflict, discrimination, hatred), they are also the solution to these problems and the drivers of social progress.

Finally, by gauging Turner’s analyses against the broader issues that he sought to address, we provide testing and accessible criteria against which to evaluate his work. We can certainly see how much he achieved. But equally we can see what issues remain, where we still have to go, and what priorities should be set for the future. In other words, rather than seeing John Turner as providing us with a closed corpus of work, we can appreciate this work as part of a larger enterprise. We can see it as mapping out some ground, providing us with some signposts for further exploration and perhaps locating certain impasses. The larger enterprise invites us in rather than closes us out. By placing it in relation to that enterprise, Turner’s work not only motivates us but also guides us in pushing forward along the paths that he opened up.

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY (SIT)

From minimal groups to social identity processes

Social identity theory was formulated to make sense of the findings of the famous minimal group studies (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971) and,
not surprisingly, the two are often conflated. Indeed, although the studies are sometimes regarded as if they were a test of the theory, it is important to appreciate that any such framing is dangerously ahistorical and can lead to serious misunderstandings of the theory—which was originally formulated to make sense of what was found in the studies. Although John Turner arrived in Bristol after the minimal group studies had been conducted, he came just as a social identity explanation of the findings was emerging. Turner’s contribution (Turner, 1975) was then critical to the way in which these social identity concepts were developed.

The path which led to the minimal group studies originated in Sherif’s famous Boys Camp studies (Sherif, 1966). Based on these studies, Sherif suggested that intergroup conflict arises out of intergroup competition. But a series of subsequent studies had picked away at the notion that competition is necessary for conflict and so Tajfel and his colleagues set out to identify the minimal conditions for conflict to arise (see Spears & Otten, 2012, for an overview of the paradigm and its legacy). Their strategy was to start with the very minimum that is necessary for a group—the division of people into two categories without any interaction, any history, or any material interest—and then to layer on more conditions until signs of conflict emerged. But at the very first attempt this project struck gold. Members of previously meaningless, experimentally created groups were found to preferentially favour members of their own ingroup over a comparison outgroup, even when this entailed a cost in terms of the absolute levels of reward that the ingroup received (Tajfel et al., 1971).

At first sight, this finding seemed to give rise to the profoundly depressing conclusion that conflict between groups is natural and inevitable. Indeed, one of the early accounts of the studies was in terms of a “generic norm” of discrimination (see Tajfel, 1978). However this was soon rejected on both empirical and conceptual grounds—in the end it was more a redescription than an explanation of what had happened. Instead Tajfel came to recognise that social categorisation and social comparison (rather than just a sense of similarity) were central to these findings and also, critically, that the effects were underpinned by social identity: “the individual’s knowledge that he [or she] belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him [or her] of this group membership” (Tajfel, 1972, p. 292).

Nevertheless, the broader significance of social identity for social behaviour was still poorly understood and had not yet been translated into a fully coherent body of theory. It was at this point that Turner arrived on the scene. Together, Tajfel and Turner worked closely to formulate their social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. This broke new ground by presenting a theoretical analysis of intergroup relations that explained how particular features of subjectively perceived social structure could lead
people to define themselves in terms of a shared social identity and thereby produce distinctive forms of group behaviour.

As proclaimed in the title of Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) seminal chapter in Austin and Worchel’s The social psychology of intergroup relations, SIT is an “integrative theory” that attends to both the cognitive and motivational bases of intergroup differentiation. In essence it suggests that, after being categorised in terms of a group membership, and having defined themselves in terms of that social categorisation (a point confirmed by Turner’s PhD research; see Turner, 1975), individuals seek to achieve or maintain positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their ingroup from a comparison outgroup on some valued dimension. This quest for positive distinctiveness means that when people’s sense of who they are is defined in terms of “we” rather than “I”, they want to see “us” as different from, and better than, “them” in order to feel good about who they are and what they do.

One critical implication of this analysis is that it removes the aura of inevitability from intergroup discrimination. Rather than reflecting some supposed universal principle of group psychology (an understanding of the implications of the minimal group studies routinely encouraged by textbooks), differentiation instead emerges as an interactive product of human motivations and social realities. Indeed, one of Turner’s distinctive contributions to the theory (again, central to his doctoral research) was to demonstrate that individuals only display ingroup favouritism (a) when the ingroup is central to their self-definition, (b) when it is relevant to compare themselves with the outgroup, and (c) when the outcome of that comparison is in some sense contestable (in particular, because it is perceived to be illegitimate; see Turner, 1975).

One can add to this a fourth factor—one which Tajfel and Turner did not themselves spell out but which is implicit in the notion that people differentiate along valued dimensions of comparison. This is that whether or not differentiation results in negative treatment of the outgroup depends on what is valued within a group’s belief system. A charitable group might just as easily prove its distinctiveness by being more generous to the other as an ethnocentric group might prove its distinctiveness by denying resource to the other.

Already we can see how social identity theorising challenges the notion that people in groups are inherently inclined to act oppressively towards others, and thereby challenges the view that there are fundamental biases in collective thinking. What is more, to the extent that there is bias, its roots are to be understood as lying as much in social structural and ideological realities as inside the head. But still, this is only half the story. For, as we have noted, the process of differentiation was not the end-point of SIT. It was a starting point for the analysis that really mattered.
From social identity to social change: Permeability, legitimacy, and cognitive alternatives

While people may have a general desire for positive self-esteem such that when they define themselves in terms of social identity they want their ingroup to be positively differentiated from outgroups, Tajfel and Turner were at pains to stress that these dynamics do not operate in a social vacuum. In our unequal world many people are consigned to groups that are negatively valued: women in sexist systems, black people in racist systems, old people in ageist systems. How, then, do they respond to such devaluation? When do they accept and accommodate to it and—most particularly—when do they challenge it? In asking such questions, SIT’s concern at a conceptual level is to understand how psychological dynamics operate within differently structured social worlds rather than to abstract the process of differentiation from its social context.

Most particularly, SIT sought to explain when these dynamics lead people to act together in order to try to change their social world. In this regard the concept of social identity was primarily of interest as an intervening variable in the process of social change. Accordingly, the complete statement of SIT—as elaborated by Tajfel and Turner (1979)—focuses largely on the psychology and strategies of low-status groups. When group boundaries are perceived to be permeable (i.e., so that an individual is not “locked in” to a given group membership), an obvious solution is for members of low-status groups to pursue a strategy of social mobility or “exit” in which they try to escape their group and move into one that has higher status.

But when escape is not possible because boundaries are impermeable, different strategies are required. One is to engage in a strategy of social creativity that redefines the meaning of one’s existing (low-status) group position. This can be done in at least three ways: either (a) by seeking to compare the ingroup with other groups that are even more disadvantaged (e.g., “we may not have many luxuries, but at least we have a job”), (b) by evaluating the ingroup on more flattering dimensions of comparison (“we may not be rich but we’re friendly”), or (c) by attempting to redefine the meaning of the ingroup membership (“the poor are closer to God”).

However, none of these options changes the fundamental reality of disadvantage. Indeed, according to SIT, these social creativity strategies tend to be pursued precisely when prospects of changing one’s material condition seem limited. So when will people engage in direct group-level challenges to a high-status outgroup? More specifically, when will they engage in a strategy of social competition—for example, by explicitly favouring the ingroup over the outgroup (as in the minimal group studies),
by engaging in intergroup conflict, or by promoting collective action? According to Tajfel and Turner (1979) such solutions to the problem of low status are more likely to be pursued when members of disadvantaged groups see intergroup status relations as illegitimate and unstable—that is, when they perceive the high-status group’s position to be insecure and potentially changeable. Such insecure social comparisons stimulate counterfactual thinking (an awareness of cognitive alternatives to the status quo) that provide members of the disadvantaged group with hope and scope to mobilise with a view to bringing about social change.

By now the scale of the inversion brought about by SIT should be apparent. An enquiry that starts off looking at discrimination ends up by addressing social change. An analysis that, initially, seems to be distinctive in pointing to the inevitability of intergroup inequality, ultimately points to possibilities for overcoming inequality. An approach that, to begin with, seems to identify the group as the problem, finally identifies groups as the solution.

It should equally be apparent that the three themes we identified at the start of this review are central to SIT and John Turner’s contribution to it. “Groups as the solution” inverts the anti-collectivism that sees groups as the basis of most social problems and the individualisation of social actors as the solution. Equally, the theory presupposes that when people stop acting as isolated individuals and start acting together as group members in order to challenge the dominant group, then together they have the power to bring about change. Finally, the very notion of social identity integrates the social and the individual, and shows how people can define themselves in terms of a cultural and historical product.

The fundamental contribution of social identity theory lies in the way that it seeks to address the dynamic links between social organisation, self-definition, and group behaviour. But if the themes of collectivism, power/change, and the sociality of mind self-evidently frame the theory (even though that is not always recognised; Turner, 1999, 2004; see also Reicher et al., 2010), it is equally true that the analysis of each one remains relatively underdeveloped. Groups may not be inherently mindless and destructive, but how precisely does the group context bear upon the way we think and understand our world? Groups may provide a source of power and thereby be the engines of social change, but what exactly is it that allows people to work effectively as group members—to come together, to plan together, and to act together? Social identity may be the conduit through which social products structure the individual mind, but what exactly are the dynamics of our social self-definitions? It was to answer such questions that Turner set out to develop self-categorisation theory.
SELF-CATEGORISATION THEORY (SCT)

Despite SIT’s richness (particularly in comparison to other social psychological theories which pay little heed to socially structure), it was clear to Turner that there were certain core questions concerning the nature, operation, and purpose of social identity that the theory leaves unanswered. What makes social identity salient? How exactly does it structure collective behaviour? And how do individuals differ in the strength of their social identity and their capacity to embody it?

Efforts to answer such questions started with work on key single-authored publications in the early 1980s (Turner, 1982, 1985), but was then consolidated through collaborations with PhD students at the University of Bristol (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and then with colleagues in Australia (initially at Macquarie University and then at the Australian National University; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994; Turner & Reynolds, 2001).

From the outset SCT had a broader cognitive agenda than SIT and greater explanatory scope. As stated on the dust-cover of Turner et al. (1987), its primary contribution was to present “a new theory of the social group which seeks to explain how individuals become unified into a group and capable of collective behaviour”. In this, the theory presented an alternative to models which see groups merely as aggregations of interpersonally attracted individuals, and it sought to do justice to the interactionist manifesto previously advanced by Asch (1952) and Sherif (1966). It argued that people become a group to the extent that they internalise a sense of shared social identity, and that this process fundamentally changes and transforms both their psychology and their behaviour (Turner, 1982; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Yet, at a more general level, SCT also presented a new theory of the self—one which sought to show how variation in the self-process underpins the many and varied forms of human social behaviour.

Unlike SIT, SCT’s core hypotheses are not targeted specifically to issues of social structure and intergroup relations, but rather ground the analysis of social identity within an expansive consideration of general processes of social categorisation (Turner et al., 1994; Turner & Haslam, 2001). Formative work on SCT focused on the theoretical implications of the notion of social identity itself. In particular, Turner (1982) hypothesised that an individual’s self-concept could be defined either in terms of personal identity or in terms of social identity (a distinction that is only implicit in SIT) and that the functioning of the self-concept is the cognitive mechanism that determines whether people engage in either interpersonal or intergroup behaviour. Turner (1982) argued that social identity is what actually allows
intergroup behaviour to take place. It is only when, and because, people are able to conceive of themselves and others as “us” that they are able to act as “us”.

A further important part of Turner’s analysis was to specify a psychological process that underpinned behaviour in terms of a particular social identity. Turner (1982) called this depersonalisation, referring to a process of self-stereotyping through which individuals come to see themselves as categorically interchangeable with others who are defined as ingroup members in a particular context. In this way he predicted that just as stereotyping of outgroups leads their members to be seen as homogeneous and interchangeable, so social identity salience leads to the ingroup being seen as equally homogeneous. This idea provided the impetus for several programmes of research that supported this prediction and thereby showed that similarity is not just an input into social perception (as many other theorists had observed), but also an outcome of the self-categorisation process (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1995; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Simon, 1992; for a review see Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1996).

Building on the foundations of the 1982 chapter, Turner used another chapter (1985), this time in Lawler’s Advances in Group Processes, to formalise SCT’s core assumptions and related hypotheses—a key task on which he had been working while a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Princeton in 1984. These drew upon, but also extended in important ways, earlier literature on the nature of categories and social entities (e.g., Campbell, 1958; Rosch, 1978). Five of these hypotheses were particularly important:

- **H1.** The self is represented cognitively in terms of self-categories. In this regard the organisation and operation of self is akin to that of other categories which are used not to simplify perception but rather to represent patterns of shared meaning and function that vary with context.
- **H2.** Self-categories exist at different levels of abstraction, with higher levels being more abstract and also more inclusive. Three significant levels of abstraction are (a) personal self-categories which define people’s personal identity in contrast to other ingroup members, (b) social self-categories that define people’s social identity in contrast to other outgroups, and (c) human self-categories that define people as a whole in contrast to other species. Importantly, despite a tendency for psychology to privilege personal self-categories as capturing a primary (or, in Roschian terms, “basic”) dimension of self, SCT suggests that all levels of self-categorisation are equally valid (Oakes & Turner, 1990). Again, in line with SIT’s earlier challenges to anti-collectivism,
seeing the self (and others) in group-based terms was understood to be inherently no less appropriate or useful than seeing the self in individuated terms.

- **H3.** The formation of self-categories is partly a function of the *meta-contrast* between inter-class differences and intra-class differences—such that people define themselves in terms of a particular self-category to the extent that the differences between members of that category on a given dimension of judgement are perceived to be smaller than the differences between members of that category and others that are salient in a particular context. Thus as context extends to include more others, so the boundaries of the self expand (Haslam & Turner, 1992).

- **H4.** Meta-contrast also determines the *internal structure* of self-categories and the *prototypicality* of particular category exemplars—that is, their capacity to represent and embody the category. Specifically, a given exemplar will be more representative of a particular self-category to the extent that it is minimally different from other members of that category (e.g., ingroup members) and maximally different from comparison categories (e.g., outgroups).

- **H5.** The salience of a particular self-category leads to the *accentuation* of perceived intra-class similarities and inter-class differences. As we stress below, in this way accentuation does not distort social reality, but instead serves to represent veridically the status of category exemplars as (more or less) interchangeable (Haslam & Turner, 1995).

The empirical work that was inspired by these ideas focused largely on Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. Moreover, the success of this research owed much to the distinctive contributions that SCT made to the analysis of two important social psychological processes: *social influence* and *stereotyping*.

### Social influence

The concepts discussed in previous sections relate to the explanation of psychological processes (in particular, categorisation, judgement, and evaluation) that are routinely conceptualised as occurring within the heads of individuals. Significantly though, Turner was also interested in the question of how these processes feed into, and are themselves structured by, *social interaction*. The obvious reason for this was that groups are not just ideas in people’s heads; they are also dynamic real-world entities. Indeed, as we have already intimated, Turner understood social psychology as a science of social action and interaction, a subject intimately concerned with explaining how mind and society are made possible by each other (Turner & Oakes, 1986). In these terms, rather than having evolved to perceive and
think in the abstract, Turner argued that *minds are for society*. He also believed that it was by understanding this (and designing studies that spoke to this fact) that one could best appreciate their workings (Turner & Oakes, 1997).

In this regard, Turner saw that one of the limitations of SIT was that it did not have a lot to say about interaction, and, in particular, it did not speak to processes of mutual influence. How and when do people develop common understandings of the world, and how are these a basis for their concerted and coordinated efforts?

Traditionally, social influence research has maintained a distinction between informational and normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). That is, sometimes, particularly under conditions of uncertainty, we rely on others to give us information. But we also conform to others in order to gain their approval, particularly when we are dependent on them in groups. In effect, we trade our autonomy for social rewards and patronage.

Moscovici (1976) had attacked such approaches for their inherent conservatism. He argued that, if normative influence reflects existing relations of power and dependency in groups, it can only ever reproduce the status quo. It can never produce innovation or change. This was the starting point for work on minority influence by both Moscovici himself and his colleagues (e.g., Mugny, 1982). Moscovici’s book was also important for Tajfel, Turner, and others in Bristol. But Turner responded in a rather different way. His radical move was to reject the basic distinction between normative and informational influence. He argued that we rely on others in groups because we believe them to be able to provide us with relevant information about the world. We go along with them not to gain their approval, but because we genuinely believe what they have to tell us—an idea which is simple but also radical and seemingly at odds with some classic studies in the field. This move also undid the Faustian contract whereby one sells out the individual self (or literally self-belief) in the interests of group loyalty.

The starting point for Turner’s argument is already present in early expositions of social identity theory. Thus, in explaining the notion of group social comparison, and contrasting it to classic work on comparison (Festinger, 1954), Tajfel (1978) makes the point that our understandings of the world are always dependent on consensus with others and hence are always dependent on the social processes through which reality is constructed. Turner (1982, 1987) built on this premise and argued that the key question is who exactly we rely on in making sense of the world.

Once more, Turner reasoned that the answer was to be found within the workings of the self-process and the capacity for shared social identity. Turner’s key insight here was that social identity serves to regulate individual cognitive activity by providing a shared perspective on social
reality and also by providing a basis for *mutual social influence* (Turner, 1987). When a group is important to us, we see the world—and expect to see the world—from the perspective of its members. Their views are our views, their judgements are our judgements, their joys are our joys. This means that when people perceive themselves to share category membership with others in a given context, they expect to agree with them on issues relevant to their shared identity. It means that we rely on common category members to resolve our doubts about what to think and what to do in the world (McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993); that our willingness to listen to others depends on their status as ingroup or outgroup members (something which, as in H3, varies with comparative context; David & Turner, 1996, 1999); that our own capacity to influence others is greater to the extent that we and they are acting in terms of the same social identity (McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994); and that both our motivation to coordinate with others and our expectations of being able to do so are contingent upon perceptions of shared social identity (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998).

If it should so happen that agreement with fellow group members on matters of relevance to the group is *not* forthcoming and cannot easily be explained away then we work hard to reach agreement with them and hence to coordinate our behaviours (Turner, 1991). The corollary, as spelt out in the work of Sani, is that if, despite all these efforts, members cannot agree on such group-relevant issues, then they conclude that they do not belong to the same group and so schism ensues (Sani, 2005, 2009).

The end result of successful social influence is that idiosyncratic views become socially organised and consensual (e.g., in ways shown by Sherif's autokinetic studies; see also Abrams et al., 1990). Individual opinions are coordinated and transformed into *shared* values, beliefs, and behaviours. These have particular force because they are no longer experienced as subjective but are instead seen as reflecting a common, objective view (Haslam et al., 1998; Moscovici, 1984). In this way identity-based processes of influence are central to the transformation of individual inputs (e.g., opinions, attitudes) into group products (e.g., shared norms, culture) and constitute the all-important psychological conduit between personal perception and organised action.

**Stereotyping**

Whereas most social psychological approaches to stereotyping focus on this as a process that is grounded in people’s fixed and distorted perception of *others*, SCT’s analysis starts by focusing on the way in which the process is structured by people’s context-dependent and meaningful sense of *self*. As noted in H2, a key point here is that people (both self and others) can be
meaningfully categorised as both individuals and groups. Indeed, it is not just that they can be, but also that they need to be if people are to act effectively in the world. How could one play a football match if one failed to perceive and engage with the reality of the two different teams? How could one give a lecture if one failed to differentiate academics from students? And how could one engage in political action if one only ever related to others in terms of their individual characteristics rather than their party affiliation?

But what determines whether we see ourselves and others as groups or individuals? When do we categorise people (include ourselves) as unique persons (Amelie, Barbara, Cath) and when as members of groups (academics, British, Catholics)? For Turner (1985) the answer to such questions hinged on the process of (self-)category salience that determines both the level of self-categorisation at which a person defines themselves and others and the particular self-categorisation that serves to guide behaviour (Turner, 1985). In a nation, for example, when will citizens see themselves, and act, as individuals, rather than in terms of the region where they live, or in terms of their ethnic background, or in terms of their shared nationality? Answering such questions is extremely important, as the salience process has distinctive implications both for individual behaviour and for group functioning.

In setting about developing a formal analysis of social identity salience, Turner collaborated with Oakes (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991, Oakes et al., 1994) to follow Bruner (1957) in suggesting that whether social identity becomes salient—and, when it does, which particular social identity becomes salient—is an interactive product of the fit of a particular categorisation and a person’s readiness to use it. This means, for instance, that a person is more likely to define him or herself as a trades unionist (sharing category membership with other unionists) (a) if this self-categorisation makes sense of patterns of perceived similarity and difference between unionists and non-unionists in the situation at hand (the principle of comparative fit), (b) if these patterns are consistent with normative expectations about these categories (the principle of normative fit), and (c) if this self-categorisation has been meaningful in other contexts and at other times (e.g., because we were brought up in a union household, drink in the union social club, and are married to a shop steward—the principle of perceiver readiness).

When it comes to an analysis of the stereotypic content of social identities, Turner drew again on fit principles, specifically the notion of comparative fit. That is, as specified in H4, the group stereotype coheres around a position that best defines the way in which the ingroup differs from the outgroup. In everyday language, what we are is what makes us distinct from them. The radical implication of this is that the stereotypes we hold of both our own groups and of others will alter as they are compared to
different outgroups—or, in slightly different terms, as the comparative context changes (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992). For instance, Scots see themselves as relatively cold and hard-working in comparison with Greeks, but as warm and easy-going compared to the English (Hopkins, Regan, & Abell, 1997).

As argued in Stereotyping and Social Reality, which Turner co-authored with Oakes and Haslam, the end-point of all this theorising was to challenge a range of widely held beliefs (both within and beyond psychology) about the nature of groups and group representations. Across diverse branches of psychology there has been a strong assumption that the optimal level of perception is individual. That is, it is thought that it is only when we are impeded from seeing people as individuals that we start to perceive them as category members. Turner, by contrast, argued that different levels of perception are appropriate in different contexts. No one level is inherently better than any other. To suppose otherwise is to dress up a political preference as a psychological hierarchy. This was argued in the final chapter of Oakes et al. (1994; which Turner was primarily responsible for writing) and is, perhaps, his clearest and most forceful characterisation and critique of anti-collectivism in social psychology.

It has also been assumed that whatever group-level perceptions allow us to gain in terms of efficiency, they lose in terms of accuracy. Stereotypes are rigid, they are biased, they are simplistic. Indeed the very word “stereotype”—taken from the term for a solid plate of printing type—implies that one is dealing with something fixed and unchanging. Turner, by contrast, argued that stereotypes are flexible and sensitive to changes in the world. Once again, the hostility to group-level perception is revealed as a political preference dressed up as a cognitive hierarchy. But here we are already beginning to stray from an outline of Turner’s formal analyses to an indication of how these link to his wider concerns about social psychology in society. It is time to give a more systematic account of these links.

**LINKING THEORY TO META-THEORY**

Having outlined the nature of Turner’s theoretical contributions, let us now consider how theory links to the “big” issues that motivated him to spend his life as a social psychologist: (a) How do they address the prevalent anti-collectivism of our discipline and our culture? (b) How do they relate to issues of power and social change? (c) How, more generally still, do they help us understand the irreducible sociality of the human mind?

In addressing these questions we do not limit our analysis of Turner’s contribution to what he himself thought, said, or wrote. Indeed, the mark of a major career often lies as much (if not more) in what one has inspired and enabled others to do as in what one has done oneself. If John Turner
provided his own answers to the various issues we have outlined, he also
sparked discussion and led many others to provide their own answers, some
of which Turner himself endorsed, some of which he viewed more
sceptically, some of which he rejected outright. Much of Turner’s legacy
lies in the way in which, by raising questions that matter, he set an agenda
for social psychology and initiated debates that outlive him. We do not
suggest that there is any final word on these debates, only that they are of
intellectual and social importance and that there is plenty of space for new
contributions. As we stressed above, our hope is that just as the big
underlying issues provided the inspiration for John Turner to turn back to
academia and to social psychology, so they will inspire others to do likewise.

Challenging anti-collectivism

We have alluded on several occasions to the widespread assumption that
groups are a corrosive influence on individuals, that they undermine our
ability to think rationally and act reasonably. This takes myriad forms, but
two of the most common expressions of this view are (a) that individuals
think for themselves, but in groups we simply conform to others, and (b)
that group-level perception is a simplification and a distortion of social
reality that is inherently prone to bias. These views were the target of
Turner’s work on social influence and on stereotyping which we have
already outlined. Moreover, we have also shown how Turner linked his
specific critiques with a wider challenge to the notion that group cognition is
inferior to individual cognition (Oakes et al., 1994)

Starting with social influence, self-categorisation theory proposes that, in
collective contexts, we do not agree with others because of their power. We
do so out of genuine conversion based on the premise that members of a
common group should be in agreement. But note that, as outlined by Turner
(1991), this is not an automatic or thoughtless process. We don’t rely on
ingroup members to inform us about just anything, but only matters related
to the group identity (football teams don’t generally tell us what political
party to support, nor do political parties generally tell us which team we
should follow). Moreover, whatever we are told in the instant by our
fellows, it will only be influential if it accords with the broader under-
standing we have of our group identity. Group identities are a guide rather
than an edict and still require reflection and debate (Haslam et al., 1998).
They shape discussion rather than substitute for it. Indeed, if we did not
have group identities to provide us with a criterion against which we can
judge and agree on particular suggestions, discussion and debate would be
impossible.

But if this is so, how do we deal with studies that seem to show that
people will, under the influence of others, deny the evidence that is in front
of their eyes? How, to be more specific, can one explain Asch’s seminal studies on line-length judgements (Asch, 1952)? Recent analyses (e.g., Jetten & Hornsey, 2012) have shown that, when one looks closely at what participants in the study say about their responses, it is clear that they were not blindly and passively conforming. Rather, they were faced with a strange and alarming situation—one where there was a clear discrepancy between what they were seeing and what others were saying—which they had to make sense of. One way of doing so is to assume that what people were doing was trying not to embarrass the first respondent by making their error apparent. Another was to assume that there was something wrong with their own eyesight. Whichever was the case, they responded as they did because they believed that it was the appropriate thing to do in a specific (and bizarre) context. But, critically, whether respondents take the responses of others into account within the Asch paradigm depends on whether or not they are ingroup members. Thus conformity plummets in one of the well-known variants of the paradigm where one confederate dissents from the “incorrect” response. Suddenly the social consensus is fractured and no longer serves as a guide to social reality. However, if the dissenter is an outgroup member, this does not happen. What matters is consensus among “people like me”. It is they who share my perspective on reality and they who are thereby capable of exerting influence (Abrams et al., 1990). Again though, importantly, the definitions of similarity and difference that dictate who is “like me” or “not like me” are variable judgements. Such variability opens up possibilities for new sources of influence to emerge and be impactful in our understanding of the social world.

The notion of perspective is even more critical if we turn to the issue of stereotyping and to the relationship between categorical perception and social reality. The mainstream view, as we have already stressed, is that seeing people as group members is a functional distortion of reality which allows our limited cognitive resources to deal with the huge complexity of the social world—the so-called “cognitive miser” approach (see Oakes & Turner, 1990; Spears & Haslam, 1997, for overviews and critiques). Whenever we can, we view people accurately as individuals. But in groups, it is argued, there are too many people around for this to be possible so we view people as group members, thereby trading accuracy for efficiency (Hamilton, 1981; Lippmann, 1922).

Turner’s retort is that we see people as group members to the extent that they are organised in reality as group members—this, in ordinary language, is what is captured by the principle of comparative fit. Moreover, to the extent that people are organised as group members, it would be dysfunctional to view them otherwise. The photograph on the front of Stereotyping and Social Reality encapsulates this message. It depicts riot police charging at demonstrators during the 1990 Poll Tax Riot in London.
In such a situation the demonstrators could consider what the riot police are like as individuals, how they differ from each other, and what their idiosyncratic characteristics might be. But to do so would be profoundly dysfunctional and would probably leave them bloodied on the street. What matters in this context is what the police have in common and how, as police, they are likely to act. Categorical perception here is neither less accurate than individual perception, nor a distortion of reality. It is a reflection of a social categorical reality.

Correspondingly, Turner also argues that the content of our stereotypic views is a reflection of social reality. This claim may be difficult to understand, not least because it seems to be at odds with the pre-history and history of the social identity tradition itself with its language of over-estimation, of under-estimation and of bias towards the ingroup (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). How can the persistent tendency to view ingroups as better than outgroups be anything but a distortion? More worryingly still, how could one describe such views as racism and sexism as in any way accurate? Surely, far from being part of a progressive agenda, such an approach is pure apologism for the status quo?

In order to understand the argument it is necessary to spell it out in full. Turner argued that stereotypes were contextually valid perceptions. That is, they accurately represent what makes the groups that are salient in a given situation distinctive from each other. The first implication of this is that the accuracy pertains to groups and their inter-relations, not to individuals within groups. The second is that the accuracy of stereotypes is always limited to a specific intergroup context and cannot be asserted in general terms. The third is that accuracy is related to the description of differences, not to their evaluation. That is, Turner draws a clear and strong distinction between stereotypes and prejudice—a distinction which since has come to be widely accepted (e.g., Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).

So Turner is saying that stereotypes make sense given the position and the perspective of the group member and that they can only be understood from this perspective. He is emphatically not making a general claim that such stereotypes are the right way to see the world. Still less is he making a normative claim that any particular stereotype is a good thing. Indeed, rather than trying to rehabilitate racism or sexism or any other oppressive beliefs, Turner’s argument is rather over exactly where the problem lies with such beliefs. If people see the world in racialised terms—for example, according more physical ability to those of African descent (Africans) and more intellectual ability to those of Anglo-Saxon descent (Anglos)—this is the result not of a flaw in human psychology that makes such perceptions inevitable; rather it reflects the fact that we live in a world where people are organised by “race” and where, among other things, Anglo people are more likely to do intellectual work and African people are more likely to do
manual work. If we esteem intellectual labour over manual labour, and hence establish a hierarchy of ethnicity in which Anglos are held to be superior to Africans, then this can be seen to reflect an ideology that layers values (and rewards) on top of differences. And, being rooted in social practices rather than the nature of our cognitive systems, stereotypes and prejudices are to be overcome by challenging the social practices and realities that sustain them. Far from apologising for the status quo, the point of Turner’s argument is to show both that oppression can be challenged and to point us to how it should be challenged.

Turner’s perspectivism provides a powerful corrective to the notion that group-level perceptions are inferior to individual-level perceptions. It provides a way of linking categorisation to social reality. Others within the social identity tradition have sought to extend our understanding of this link, arguing that it works both ways. That is, not only do categories reflect the existing nature of social reality, but they are also deployed in order to mobilise people so as to change social realities. Categorisation, that is, is not just about being, it is also about becoming (Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001). Or, to put it slightly differently, we need to complement Turner’s perspectivism with an analysis of the performativity of categorisation.

In a nutshell, these various arguments build on self-categorisation theory’s claim that social identities shape how group members act. If, then, one is in a position to define group identity, one is in a position to direct how collectivities act—so that, as Reicher and Hopkins (2001) put it, social identity is a world-making resource. Hence those seeking to shape the social world will actively deploy category definitions in their rhetoric so as to mobilise people in support of their projects and policies. But equally, at a more micro level, people will deploy category definitions strategically in order to secure acceptance in the group, to influence others, to avoid sanctions and so on—an emphasis on the strategic dimension of categorisation that is at the core of the SIDE model (social identity model of deindividuation effects; Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995).

The power of this approach is that it sidesteps the issue of “accuracy” entirely. Indeed, the notion of whether a viewpoint is accurate or not only makes sense if we apply it to the present, to how things actually are. In the here and now there is only one reality, and it makes sense to ask if particular representations are more or less faithful to that reality. But once one links categorical representations to the future, then such questions no longer make sense. There are many possible futures, and they depend very much on what we actually do. Hence it makes more sense to ask if a representation is productive (in the sense of enabling people to create the envisaged future) than if it is accurate.
So, for instance, the statement that “our group is better than yours” is more an attempt to produce advantage than a biased assessment of our relative standing. Racism is about producing (and reproducing) the subordination of Black people by legitimating their exclusion from positions of privilege and power. In this regard it is worth noting that, in the minimal group experiments (from which notions of ingroup bias entered into the social identity tradition), differentiation is a performative act whereby, through the unequal distribution of resources, we create actual usable advantage in the ingroup (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006). Far from being a misperception, it is arguably not a perception at all.

Although he did not respond publicly at first, in private Turner expressed considerable ambivalence towards this “performative” and “rhetorical” turn in social identity theorising. His fear was that, rather than extending and enriching our understanding of the links between social identity and social reality, it would decouple them entirely. In isolation, it might create the impression that people can create categories at will and hence produce any social reality they like—a profoundly idealist conception. But in his later writings (e.g., Turner, 2006) he shifted somewhat and acknowledged that there is a performative dimension to social identity processes, particularly in terms of creating and directing the social power of the group. The analytical challenge is therefore to recognise and reconcile these two elements: the way in which social identities reflect social reality and the way in which social identities move people to create social reality.

Clearly, in order to do so, it is necessary to examine these processes as they unfold over time. On the one hand, the long-term viability of any particular construction of categories depends on the ability to organise social reality in such categorical terms, but on the other hand, the social power generated by deploying these categories is an important element in one’s eventual success (Reicher & Haslam, 2006a). Yet despite the potency of Turner’s (e.g., 2005) ideas on these issues, the dynamics and developmental dimensions of these social identity processes remain to be properly charted. Indeed, this is one clear priority for future research.

Group power and social change

The foregoing discussion alludes to groups as a source of social power with the potential to shape the world and produce social change. What underlies these arguments is the claim that, when people share a common social identity, and have a common understanding of the associated beliefs, norms and values, they are able to act together, to organise, to align their efforts, and hence to summate their individual energies. But how? In what way do social identities facilitate coordination and co-
action? This is an important question and another exciting field of research in which much has been done already—either by John Turner or inspired by him—and in which much more remains to be done. It is another priority area for further research.

Thus far we have concentrated mainly on the cognitive transformations brought about by self-categorisation in group-based terms and the way in which this leads us to see the world in the same way as ingroup members. Of critical importance here is Turner’s insight that members of a group assume that they will agree on issues that are of relevance to the group identity. But, as work on consensualisation shows (Haslam et al., 1998), this is not an automatic or purely intra-psychic process. It is not as if we immediately think alike as soon as we think of ourselves as a group member. Rather, shared social identity shapes the nature of interactions between group members so as to produce convergence. In discussion we focus on points of agreement with those who are perceived to belong to the same group as ourselves. We ignore points of disagreement. Hence, providing we continue to see ourselves as sharing identity, we are able to produce consensus rather than discord over time.

Clearly, thinking about the world in the same way is an important precursor to acting on the world in the same way. But it is not the whole story. Here it becomes important to consider a different set of transformations brought about by self-categorisation. These are less to do with seeing ourselves as group members (social identity) than with seeing ourselves and others as embracing the same group membership (shared social identity). Building on his PhD with Turner, Hogg (1992) emphasised how shared identity may transform the social relations between group members so as to create cohesiveness.

In sum, shared social identity transforms group members from separate individuals into an extension of the self. It transcends and redefines the boundaries of otherness (e.g., Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). It creates a shift towards intimacy. In other words, shared social identity creates social solidarity (for a review, see Reicher & Haslam, 2010). This is critical to acting on our shared beliefs, since we know we can rely on others to back us up. It is also critical in allowing us to develop effective organisation where we can trust those working separately from ourselves to contribute to the common good (see Haslam, 2004; Reicher & Haslam, 2006a; Turner & Haslam, 2001).

When it comes to understanding the organisational effectiveness of groups—and hence their power—clearly leadership is also a critical issue. Although others researched leadership more (see below), Turner wrote much that dealt directly with this topic (Turner & Haslam, 2001; Turner, Reynolds, & Subašić, 2008). The basis for an analysis of leadership, and the importance of group prototypicality, can be found as far back as his original
outline of self-categorisation principles in the 1982 “cognitive redefinition” chapter (see also Turner, 1987, p. 77; see H4 above). Here he describes how group members seek to conform to the group identity, and then argues that those who are in a position to define this identity are able to shape what group members do. In effect, he argued that the ability to direct collective action is a process of social identity management. But, as a corollary, it follows that the ability to direct others (that is, for leadership to emerge) is dependent on the emergence of social identity (cf. Haslam & Reicher, 2007). Those best able to manage social identities are those who best represent what makes us distinctive from other groups in context (Turner et al., 2008). To put it somewhat differently, leadership is not (as traditionally thought) just a quality that inheres in a select few individuals. Nor is it simply a quality of the relationships between leaders and followers. Rather, it is a quality of the relationship between leaders and followers as bound together by their membership in a social group.

**SELF AND THE SOCIAL MIND**

Having dealt with the way in which Turner’s work linked to issues of anti-collectivism, power, and social change, let us now address his broad vision of social psychology as a whole and of the social nature of mind.

Turner’s view of social psychology was very much in the Lewinian mould. He saw our task as being to understand the social structuration of the psychological field (Lewin, 1951). In other words, how does the social world enter into the individual so as to shape our thought and action? Accordingly he would often summarise the distinctiveness of social identity and, particularly, self-categorisation theories by saying that they were concerned with analysing the group in the individual rather than by focusing on the individual in the group.

Turner’s unique contribution was to analyse how the internalisation of the social world occurs through the dynamics of the self. Here he argued that it is through our positioning relative to others and our understanding of that social position that we are constituted as social beings. Identity, and social identity in particular, becomes the fulcrum around which the social and the individual are organised.

However, the true radicalism and scope of this argument was in part obscured (as in the case of Turner’s critique of anti-collectivism) by the very language of the social identity tradition. Indeed the traditional distinction between social and personal identity can be read as suggesting that social identity is not personal and personal identity is not social. Neither of these is true. When it comes to defining who we are, social identities are every bit as important and meaningful to us as personal identities. We are passionate about them, we will kill for them, we will even die for them. But more
importantly, perhaps, personal identities are every bit as social as social identities (Postmes & Jetten, 2006; Spears, 2001). It is here that Turner’s precise characterisation of identity in terms of levels of abstraction becomes important. Identity is always constituted through social relations to the “other”, but these relations can be alternatively defined in terms of how the individual relates to other individuals (the micro level, “I” vs “you”), in terms of how our groups relate to other groups (the meso level, “we” vs “they”), or in terms of how the human relates to the non-human (the macro level, “humanity” vs “nature”).

To reiterate, then, self is always social and personal, it always constitutes our sense of who we are and it is always constituted in social relations. It is too late to go back now and change the terms through which social identity theories are understood, but if one were starting anew it might be clearer to use the term “collective” rather than “social” identity. Such terminology would help clarify that both personal and collective identities are “social” in that they are shaped by higher levels of abstraction in which the self is embedded and socialised (e.g., culture, language, symbols, values). The qualities that are valued in the broader society and within the groups that comprise it (e.g., religious, clan, tribe, culture, society) structure the functioning of the mind and define what is appropriate and inappropriate. Using these terms may make it easier to appreciate how the mind is socially structured and socially produced but also how, through social identity processes, the structures and lessons society offers can be actively endorsed or challenged.

In the last decade or so of his career, up to his retirement in 2008, Turner sought to make the scope of his ideas more explicit by showing the common dynamics of selfhood which operate at all levels of abstraction. In particular, he did this by instigating a line of research on the self-concept and the implications of SCT for understanding individuality and the interdependence between social and personal identity (e.g., Reynolds & Turner, 2006; Turner & Onorato, 1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2010; Turner, Reynolds, Haslam, & Veenstra, 2006).

The self-concept refers to intrapsychic structures and processes that constitute our perceptions and beliefs about ourselves in relation to a number of features such as personality, abilities, skills, and attributes. It is apparent that much of psychology concerns aspects of the self-concept and that the self-concept is considered fundamental to cognition (e.g., attention, memory), motivation (e.g., self-efficacy), and behaviour. Nevertheless, Turner argued that many traditional notions of the self-concept—specifically, where it is defined at one level, the personal, and where the content that defines the self-concept is believed to be stable and fixed—were wrong (e.g., Turner & Onorato, 1999). In such work not only is the psychology of the group ignored, but there is also a broader denial
that human psychology is responsive to the changing nature of our social world.

Explanations of the self-concept that attribute its roots to its stability in an unchangeable past (e.g., evolution, biology, genes, or early passive socialisation and learning) made it extremely difficult to incorporate evidence of continuing variability into the model of psychological functioning. For Turner, any adequate analysis of the nature and functioning of self-concept has to be rooted in the reality of human experience and had to accord with the ever-changing realities of the human experience. Sometimes we confront others as individuals and sometimes as group members (Turner & Oakes, 1997; Turner et al., 2006). The categorical structure of our social world can equally shift from one moment to the next—for example, as we step out of a lecture with our students into a staff-room discussion about the allocation of funds between social- and neuro-psychologists, then go to vote for our preferred party before coming home to watch a football match between our country and another. The fact that self-categorisations vary in line with such changes in contextual factors is a necessary, normal, and adaptive feature of human psychology (Turner & Oakes, 1997). We also change the groups we are members of as a function of development across the life space and through active choices that we make. The meaning of such groups can also change (e.g., the women’s movement changed the stereotype for women) and social and political forces always affect—and are always seeking to affect—norms, values, and structures, and the way we understand ourselves as members of society. When and where they occur, these changes need to be able to be represented through our self-categorisation and cognitive processes. Indeed, a failure to encompass these various forms of variability would make us profoundly dysfunctional beings.

If self-definitions or categorisations are possible at different levels of abstraction and can be more or less inclusive of others, how could the self-concept only be personal in nature? If self-definitions are oriented to reality (that itself is potentially dynamic) how could the self-concept exist as a fixed pre-formed cognitive structure (or set of structures)? If all perception (including self-perception) involves categorisation that is inherently comparative, then how could the self-concept not also be the product of social comparison?

These were the issues that preoccupied John Turner in the last phase of his career. His work with colleagues at the Australian National University demonstrated (a) that the self-concept (self-schemata, personality-type structures) should not be equated only with the personal self and could vary depending on the salient identity—personal or social (e.g., Onorato & Turner, 2004), (b) that individuation is also an outcome of categorisation and is context-dependent in the same way as had been
demonstrated with stereotyping and group homogeneity (Mavor, Reynolds, & Skorich, 2012; Reynolds & Oakes, 2000), and (c) that social and personal identity are interdependent such that variability in social identity (as a function of changes in group membership or the meaning of being a group member) could affect aspects of individuality including well-being, personality, and achievement (Reynolds et al., 2010; Reynolds, Turner, et al., 2012).

Cumulatively, the aim of this work was (and is) to demonstrate that the collective self is a precursor to the emergence of the personal self; that “me” is intertwined with the existence of “us” (e.g., Onorato & Turner, 2002; Reynolds & Turner, 2006; Turner et al., 2006). At this point it becomes possible to appreciate the inter-connectedness of all three themes underlying Turner’s work. On the one hand, the ultimate rejection of anti-collectivism lies in showing not only that the collective does not subvert individual rationality but also that the very possibility of individuality derives from our various collective engagements. The dimensions on which we seek to stand out as individuals are those that, consensually, are held to be significant. On the other hand, collective action, which transforms the nature of groups and relations between them, also reconfigures our personal sense of significance and the ways in which we seek to affirm our personal worth.

It is important to emphasise that none of this is meant to suggest that such profound change is a regular occurrence, or to deny the importance of acknowledging, analysing, and understanding social stability. Rather, the issue concerns where the basis for such stability should be located (and hence whether change is even possible). Turner’s argument is that stability, where observed, is not so much a sign of a fixed psychic structure but rather of stability in the structure of individual and group life (a stability that is often reinforced through strictures of psychological method—e.g., practices for assessing personality; Turner et al., 2006). It follows that, however rare and difficult it might be, if change is to be achieved (in both science and society) it is through collective action to transform the “given” structures of everyday life (Reicher & Haslam, 2006b; Reynolds & Turner, 2006; Reynolds et al., 2010; Turner et al., 2006).

Overall, then, Turner and his collaborators offer a socially located, non-reductionist view of the self-concept and functioning of the mind which is radical in its implication for psychology and cognate fields. Once again, though, this project is unfinished, in part as a consequence of Turner’s retirement and untimely death. As in the critique of anti-collectivism and the analysis of power and change, his achievement was not so much to pin everything down as to provide an important new perspective, to ask important new questions, to offer important new insights, and to open up a path of enquiry that helped make the contributions of others both possible and productive.
TURNER’S IMPACT AND INFLUENCE

As we explained at several points in this review, our main focus in this chapter has been on John Turner’s work and its relationship to large real-world issues. As a result we have paid less attention to how his work relates to that of others. Indeed, attempting to map the full web of controversies, debates, and influences would be a daunting task. Nonetheless it has been impossible to ignore entirely the impact of Turner’s work on that of others, and we have already touched on this several times. In many ways such influence is Turner’s greatest legacy and so, without claiming in any way to be comprehensive, it is important to try to give a broader sense of where that influence lay.

Turner’s influence extends from the area of social conflict and social change (the operating theatre of social identity theory) to the broader coverage of social psychology evolving from the development of self-categorisation theory. Sometimes this influence was a matter of people agreeing with his ideas, seeking to develop them and extend them to new areas. Sometimes it was a matter of people disagreeing and devoting their efforts to contesting Turner’s ideas. Sometimes it was a matter of areas simply drying up because of the space that came to be occupied by social identity and self-categorisation theories. In short, in addition to that impact which is direct and apparent, there is a great deal of indirect and latent influence. Let us now try to give at least a flavour of this.

The early research with Tajfel to develop social identity theory as an explanation of intergroup conflict and differentiation has had diverse influences. In the first instance Brewer’s (1979) highly cited paper on the cognitive-motivational basis to in-group bias reflected in part her exposure to ideas developed within social identity theory (indeed this paper resulted from a sabbatical spent at Bristol while SIT was being developed). Brewer’s later work on group distinctiveness, resulting in optimal distinctiveness theory (1991), also owes a debt to the twin themes of group distinctiveness (within social identity theory) and meta-contrast (within self-categorisation theory)—although the emphasis was clearly different, focusing on less obviously social roots (needs) and incorporating principles of numerical distinctiveness that work in the self-categorisation tradition explicitly eschewed (Oakes, 1987). Others have developed the distinctiveness theme from the perspective of social identity theory and self-categorisation theory (e.g., Brown, 1984; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004).

The analysis of discrimination and in-group bias emerging from the minimal group paradigm has also had a profound influence on other theories. One early debate with Turner at the helm centred on a critique of the Tajfel matrices and what they measured (Bornstein et al., 1983a, 1983b; see also Turner, 1981) and this presaged a protracted and ongoing contest
between social identity and interdependence explanations of ingroup bias (Turner & Bourhis, 1996). This continues, but as the dust settles it is clear that ingroup bias is overdetermined and has multiple bases—with the original social identity explanation in terms of group distinctiveness an important and necessary one (Spears & Otten, 2012). In particular this is because interdependence and reciprocity arguments have never been able to explain strategies which entail no benefit for the ingroup and which demand a distinctively intergroup analysis of the form advanced by Tajfel and Turner.

Other key developments within social identity theory emerging from the minimal group paradigm, such as the self-esteem hypothesis, were initiated by Turner and his students (e.g., Oakes & Turner, 1980) and were the catalyst for various programmatic developments in the field. Indeed, in the case of self-esteem, a characteristic pattern was established that exemplifies Turner’s *modus operandi* and influence (and that of many of his collaborators). For having started research that set out the core theoretical underpinnings of the self-esteem hypothesis and then conducting some initial research, he then left the many emerging questions and criticisms to others to address and resolve. In the meantime Turner’s research project had already moved on, opening up new seams to be mined. For those used to the modern mould of careers that centre around programmatic research on a single theme, this approach may be hard to understand. Certainly it militated against any inclination merely to replicate any given set of empirical effects again and again in different domains with a view to securing publications that were data-heavy but theory-light. In truth, though, Turner’s empirical research programme often struggled to keep up with the breadth and depth of the theoretical ideas that were emerging, and the self-esteem theme was only one, perhaps overemphasised, part of the bigger social identity picture that Turner was always keen to pursue. These were pioneering days when whole new explanations and paradigms were opening up, and this meant that Turner and his collaborators were in the business of constantly setting out new empirical stalls to test and promote the theory. Having said this, others have since made impressive programmatic contributions by forensically following up these leads and filling in important gaps. In the case of self-esteem, Hunter’s extensive research comes readily to mind (e.g., Hunter et al., 2005). In the case of core social identity theory predictions, the work of Ellemers (e.g., 1993; Ellemers, van Knippenberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1988) has also proved enormously valuable.

The social identity approach inspired much research that helped to qualify the misreading of social identity theory as proposing a generic ingroup bias, and that further refined the subtle patterns and strategies that social differentiation could take in different contexts and intergroup
relations. Mummendey’s research on the “different but better” differentiation strategy (e.g., Mummendey & Simon, 1989) and also positive–negative asymmetry in reward allocations (e.g., Mummendey & Otten, 1998) were important research programmes in this vein. Research on reactions to, and exclusion of, particular deviant members of the ingroup, such as the “black sheep effect” (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988) is a further example of research that at first glance seems to contradict social identity theory. However, looking deeper, judging deviant ingroup members more harshly is very much in keeping with social identity principle of protecting ingroup identity. Once again the idea of generic ingroup bias, erroneously associated with social identity theory, is far too simplistic (Spears et al., 2001).

More generally, the overall influence of the social identity approach both on the analysis of intergroup relations, and on other theoretical approaches cannot be overestimated, although the research has not always taken on board this more refined analysis of differentiation. Social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) are perhaps two such examples. While claiming to draw on social identity principles in their analyses it is arguable that, by abstracting certain specific tenets from the broader analysis, they are actually at odds with social identity and self-categorisation theories (Reicher, 2004) and have bought into the generic ingroup bias agenda. They are certainly at odds with Turner’s broader defence of collective reason and his concern with the group as a source of change. These approaches have tended to treat in-group bias as if it reflected a universal tendency to discriminate rather than as a contingent form of social differentiation in the way that Tajfel and Turner emphasised, and that the research of Mummendey and others was revealing. For example, within system justification theory, one “distinctive” claim is that social identity theory is unable to explain outgroup bias, but (as we have seen) analysis of the conditions under which this would occur formed a central part of the broad statement of the theory in relation to status hierarchies (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Another important area of impact is in the prejudice reduction tradition. Here different models of group representation and associated strategies for attitude change have been profoundly influenced by the social identity approach (both SIT and SCT; e.g., see Brewer, 1991; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990). In particular, fruitful programmes of work by Gaertner and Dovidio and colleagues (1990) and have shown that emphasising a common in-group identity can be a powerful antidote to prejudice. Moreover, in practical terms, this approach to prejudice reduction has proved to be more successful than previously favoured individual-level and colour-blind strategies.

At the same time, though, critiques of this “first wave” of research based on common group identity have also emanated from the roots of the social
identity approach. For example, Hornsey’s research programme (e.g., Hornsey & Hogg, 2000) showed that superordinate identity needs to be accompanied by maintained subgroup identity (see also the earlier work by Hewstone & Brown, 1986), and has a firm grounding in the group distinctiveness and status-based analyses of the broader social identity theory. The Jena group’s programme of research on the ingroup-projection model (e.g., Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) has also contested the idea that inclusion in a superordinate category would always have favourable outcomes, especially to the less-prototypical subgroup, and these ideas are explicitly derived from self-categorisation theory. Thus, although these various developments were conducted independently of Turner, they clearly benefited from the theoretical building blocks that his work provided. Likewise, recent critiques of the prejudice reduction approach *sui generis*, and the prejudice problematic more broadly, which argue that such programmes often undermine the collective action strategies that can confront disadvantage directly (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Saguy, Tausch & Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Wright & Lubensky, 2009) do not emerge from outside the social identity approach, but very much from within it.

Turning more explicitly to self-categorisation theory, the influence on others’ research has been equally profound. As noted earlier the model of social influence this fostered (referent informational influence) challenged and transcended the classical informational/normative distinction and provided new ways to explain puzzling phenomena such as group polarisation. However, it is possible to detect a second kind of impact here as it is notable that research on group influence has somewhat waned since its heyday. One explanation for this is that because self-categorisation analyses had proved successful in making sense of many group influence phenomena (e.g., the closely related research of Wetherell and Mackie on group polarisation and group influence generally; Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 1990; McGarty, Turner, Hogg, David, & Wetherell, 1992; Wetherell, 1987) it was not always clear where further to go.

A similar argument can be made for a range of core group processes from work on deindividuation (Reicher, 1987; Postmes & Spears, 1998) to research into a range of stereotyping effects (e.g., illusory correlation, outgroup homogeneity; e.g., see Haslam et al., 1996; McGarty, 2012; Oakes et al., 1994; Simon, 1992). Self-categorisation explanations may not command universal consensus but they do seem to have shaped the conclusion to long-running debates.

A number of researchers, inspired by SCT, have also begun to address the various relational transformations which result from shared social identity. The work of Tyler is noteworthy here. Tyler has shown that we tend to accord more trust and respect to ingroup members and that this is crucial in
making cooperation possible (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2000). It has even been shown that shared social identity leads people to seek greater physical (as well as social) proximity to each other (Novelli, Drury, & Reicher, 2010). Work on helping has also been transformed by the insight that the way we react to victims, perpetrators, and bystanders depends on our categorical relationship to them (Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). In particular this work has questioned the classic “bystander effect” (i.e., the notion that increased number of witnesses leads to a decreased probability of intervention) and shown that numbers can promote intervention when we think of fellow bystanders as fellow group members and where, in addition, intervention is normative for the group (Levine, 2012; Levine & Crowther, 2008; Manning, Levine, & Collins, 2008).

Equally, over recent decades, work on leadership has been transformed by self-categorisation researchers. Perhaps the most active pioneer in this area, Hogg, coined the term “social identity theory of leadership” (Hogg, 2001), although the ideas, and especially the role of prototypicality, owe as much to SCT as to SIT. Earlier we argued that a model of leadership was implicit in the basic principles of the theory, and Hogg and many others have developed this theme (e.g., Duck & Fielding, 1999; Ellemers, de Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2004; Platow, Hoar, Reid, Harley, & Morrison, 1997; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005).

Turner’s work opens the way to understanding how social identity both creates social power and enables the effective deployment of social power through both cognitive and relational transformations. But there is one further set of transformations—emotional transformations—that are important, and on which Turner stayed largely silent in print but which also bear the legacy to his work. In conversation, Turner himself seemed wary of the turn to intergroup emotions in intergroup relations—perhaps out of a fear of the traditional use of collective emotionality to deny collective reason and/or because there was a risk that emotion (like needs or drives) would be studied in an asocial way divorced from self and social processes. He certainly never wrote on the topic. But even so, this was a development that owed a huge legacy to Turner’s work with Tajfel on social identity theory and also self-categorisation theory. Thus intergroup emotion theory, developed by Smith (1993), explicitly credits social identity and self-categorisation theories as foundational for this approach, and many other researchers working on group-based emotions accord similar credit to Tajfel and Turner’s ideas. Inspired by these insights over the last decade or so, researchers have become increasingly interested in the emotional dimension of groups (for reviews see, e.g., Tiedens & Leach, 2004; Yzerbyt & Kuppens, 2008). Research has shown that people can feel emotions about things done
by or done to the group even if they themselves were not personally involved, and possibly not even born (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998).

Group emotions, such as anger and contempt, are also central to explaining collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Tausch et al., 2011) and clearly tie up with the social identity based explanation of such behaviour (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). As well as those working within the group emotions tradition, the social identity approach more generally has had an enduring impact on research on collective action, particularly through the research of Reicher and Simon (e.g., Reicher, 1982, 1987; Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

There are many researchers and lines of research that we have doubtless failed to credit in this section, but this would deserve a whole festschrift on the influence of John Turner and his work rather than a single chapter, and we do not pretend to have given more than a flavour of this. What is more, we have deliberately limited ourselves to Turner’s impact in psychology, and thereby ignored one of the most striking features of his work, namely its impact across the social sciences in sociology, political science, economics, and beyond (see Haslam et al., 2010). To give just one example, the field of Bible studies has recently been transformed by analysis of the gospels as texts of influence aimed at creating and consolidating a Christian community. The basis of this analysis is self-categorisation theory (e.g., Esler, 2004).

All in all, the extent of John Turner’s impact and influence clearly marks a particularly important and arguably unique contribution of a career that cannot be judged on its own merits alone but also though its living legacy; through the research of others.

CONCLUSION

Our emphasis in this piece has been very much on the content of John Turner’s ideas. As we explained, our focus has been on the relationship between Turner’s theoretical contributions and the issues of collective reason, collective power, and collective change which both motivated and organised this contribution. In the foregoing sections we have sought to provide a framework for understanding Turner’s work, to communicate his passion and (ambitiously, perhaps) to generate passion in others to study these same issues.

But passion is not enough to succeed. It is also important to understand how to achieve an impact. Here too, in terms of the process of developing and communicating ideas, John Turner’s career is highly instructive. We have said much about Turner’s influence. However if one simply looked at the conventional indices of influence, he would not seem to have achieved
anything special. As can be seen from Table 1, Web of Science reveals that he published a relatively modest 58 articles over 37 years—and very few in so-called high-impact journals. Here he was only cited just over 3000 times and he only had an h-index of 34. Good, but not spectacular for a whole career. However, if one turns to Google Scholar (which is not limited to journal articles), a very different picture emerges. This reveals that Turner has been cited nearly 30,000 times (a figure still growing rapidly). This is predominantly due to his books and chapters. Seven of his ten most cited outputs are in this form (see Haslam, Reicher, & Reynolds, 2012). As we write, the top two (his 1979 chapter with Henri Tajfel on social identity theory and *Rediscovering the Social Group*) have more than 12,000 citations between them with the numbers rising by around 1000 citations a year.

The point we are trying to make by providing these numbers is that John Turner did not simply “play the game” and tailor his outputs to current notions of prestige. He was not obsessed by publishing in “flagship” journals. Rather he used outlets that were best suited to the messages he sought to convey. And in so doing he inverted conventional hierarchies of academic value. That is, while Turner published ample empirical studies in journals, he saw them less as an end than as a means. They provided the pieces of a jigsaw. But the ultimate aim was to combine these into an extended argument revealing the bigger picture—and this could only be achieved in chapters and books. Indeed he expressed concern that a discipline which is overly dominated by the empirical journal article is likely to become one which is a fragmented field of small points, rather than one in which big and integrative frameworks can develop.

John Turner demonstrated that it is possible to succeed despite (or perhaps even because of) not playing the game. He did not court short-term popularity, but rather was one of the few to have a disciplinary vision. He

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aData abstracted 24 September 2012.

bh-index is the largest number h such that h publications have at least h citations.

ci10-index is the number of publications with at least 10 citations.

dGoogle Scholar (unlike Web of Science) includes citations to, and in, books and book chapters.
bequeaths to us not only the substance of that vision, but a model of how long-term impact can be achieved. His invitation, and ours, is to join in the collective enterprise of understanding the social mind and advancing a transformational social psychology.

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