

University of Groningen

Reasoning with Defeasible Reasons

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DOI:
[10.33612/diss.136479932](https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.136479932)

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Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:
2020

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):
Pandzic, S. (2020). *Reasoning with Defeasible Reasons*. University of Groningen.
<https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.136479932>

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Propositions accompanying the thesis

Reasoning with Defeasible Reasons

by Stipe Pandžić

1. Reasons are logical entities in themselves that cannot be reduced to propositions or inference rules. (Chapter 2, Chapter 3)
2. Default justification logic models defeasible arguments as object-level formulas. (Chapter 2, Chapter 3)
3. The idea of rebutting reasons is well understood in the non-monotonic reasoning community. Undercutting reasons, however, introduce an intricate opposition among default reasons that cannot be adequately represented without reasons as terms of a logical language. (Chapter 2)
4. Default theories in justification logic are logical counterparts (“realizations”) of abstract argumentation frameworks that make structures of arguments explicit in a logical language. (Chapter 3)
5. Undermining defeaters are intuitively understood as attacks on premises of arguments. Their logical interpretation in justification logic requires using belief revision operations that result in removing premises of a default theory. (Chapter 4)
6. Classical logic is normative for human reasoning. Although rules of classical logic are non-defeasible, the norms they give rise to are defeasible. (Chapter 5)
7. After you acquire a belief in the statement “At least one of my beliefs is false”, this belief by itself does not cause joint inconsistency of your beliefs. (Chapter 6)
8. Marcus Aurelius wisely claimed that “the opinion of 10,000 men is of no value if none of them know anything about the subject”, but things dramatically change when one of them is assigned as your reviewer.
9. Given the trends in academia, platitudes about “originality of research” are best replaced with proverbs praising “like-mindedness”. The next *linguistic victim* is the phrase “academic authorship”.