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the *Summa* are insufficient” (224). Sampson contends that the willingness to restructure an authoritative source in order to present a more cogent argument is “the hallmark of legal humanism” (225). We might conclude that the Thomists were Scholastic humanists, or humanist Scholastics.

The book’s focus is somewhat narrow. It says little about the biographies and the historical and religious contexts of the authors discussed. Quentin Skinner and Richard Tuck are among many unmentioned scholars. Tuck argues that Grotius was a revolutionary figure who broke decisively with old Thomist and Aristotelian ideas on natural law. That thesis is not addressed here. The index is thin, with no entries at all under the letters E, J, Q, T, U, X, and Y. Nevertheless, this is a fine, well-researched, and cogently argued work of legal history.

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As the self-proclaimed inventor of the science of politics, Hobbes was often negative about rhetoric, an art that he frequently associated with demagogues, religious fanatics, and seditious people. Yet, at the same time, his political works displayed a wide range of rhetorical strategies. Scholars have therefore often wondered what the role of rhetoric in Hobbes’s thinking was. Was there simply a gap between practice and theory, as in so many other thinkers? Or was there something more fundamental at stake, in the sense that Hobbes began to realize that science and rhetoric, or reason and eloquence, are not diametrically opposed to each other but can somehow live in fruitful symbiosis?

This latter view was developed by Quentin Skinner in an influential book from 1996. Skinner told a thesis-antithesis-synthesis story of Hobbes’s intellectual development: a humanist phase was followed by a scientific period starting with the writing of *The Elements of Law* (1640) and *De Cive* (1642), in which Hobbes banned rhetoric from the pursuit of science. But at the time he was working on the *Leviathan* (published in 1651), he reappraised the value of rhetoric, now “endorsing the very approach he had earlier repudiated” (Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* [1996], 11). Though some scholars were critical about this reconstruction of Hobbes’s intellectual development, it has nevertheless found academic popularity.

In this excellent book, Timothy Raylor argues convincingly for a different picture. Based on an impressive knowledge of Hobbes’s texts and relevant contemporary

sources, as well as the vast secondary literature on science and rhetoric in the early modern period, he concludes that there is much more continuity in Hobbes's views and use of rhetoric than scholars have thought. Neither is there any strict demarcation between a humanist and a scientific phase. The young Hobbes was already interested in natural philosophy (see his Latin poem on the natural wonders of the Peak district) while humanist interests continued to occupy him throughout his life, from his translation of Thucydides in the 1620s to that of Homer in the 1670s. Hobbes could be critical of eloquence and rhetoric, but these disparaging remarks are not limited to the scientific period nor do they imply a rejection of rhetoric *tout court*.

As Raylor clearly demonstrates, rhetoric itself was for Hobbes not the problem but philosophy as it had been traditionally practiced. Here we see quite a change in Hobbes from his early days as a tutor, when he was still inspired by a Baconian view of natural philosophy and history, to his contacts with the Mersenne circle in Paris in the mid-1630s when he began to think deeply about logic and science. Raylor makes the highly plausible suggestion that not only the Mersenne circle but also Hobbes's reading and tutoring of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* led Hobbes to distinguish between the domain of the probable, dialectical, and topical on the one hand, and the domain of certain knowledge and demonstratively inferred truth based on strict definitions on the other hand. Both natural and civil philosophy had for too long been the subject of topical reasoning and opinions; Hobbes's radical idea was to treat politics as a demonstrative science. This meant that rhetoric could never enter in the very fabric of such a science, that is in the construction of knowledge, though of course it could help, if needed, to adorn the truth or to open the understanding. Use of rhetorical devices remained severely limited.

Raylor's book contains excellent discussions of several understudied texts by Hobbes such as the Thucydides translation, Hobbes's Digest and *Briefe* of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and the Latin poem on the Peak district, in addition to analyses of the well-known political works. He shows, e.g., that Hobbes's view of rhetoric was not Ciceronian but Aristotelian (that is, a more pragmatic view with an emphasis on persuasion rather than on morality); that early Hobbes and the Cavendish household were inspired by Francis Bacon in style, literary, and natural philosophical interests; and that this early Hobbes stood in the Tacitist tradition of political history. In each chapter of this superb study Raylor has new things to say, and though several elements of his reconstruction will be familiar to the Hobbes scholar, the overall picture he draws, based on a vast reading also of the secondary literature, is a comprehensive, important, and impressive contribution to Hobbes scholarship.

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