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Solidarity with refugees across Europe. A comparative analysis of public support for helping forced migrants

Sebastian Koos and Verena Seibel

Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany; Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands

ABSTRACT

The major influx of refugees to Europe, especially in 2015, has led to immense solidarity, but also hostility among European citizens. In the wake of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ country differences in the willingness to help displaced people have become a salient issue of European integration. In this paper, we explain country differences in the public support for helping refugees across Europe at a critical time-point – spring 2016 – just after the influx of displaced people had peaked. Theoretically, we base our explanation of country differences on economic threat, inter-group contact, welfare state, and political framing theories. Using data from a Eurobarometer survey across the 28 EU member states, we show that solidarity with refugees varies significantly between countries. Controlling for individual characteristics of respondents and utilizing a multilevel design, we find that solidarity with refugees is highest in countries with an extensive welfare state and a historically high share of immigrants, whereas there is no effect of countries’ economic situation or strength of right-wing parties. On the individual level of respondents, however, we find that people with a more precarious economic background, little institutional trust, and a right-wing political orientation express lower solidarity with refugees.

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KEYWORDS

Refugees; crisis; solidarity; attitudes; cross-national comparison; migration

1. Introduction

The major influx of refugees to Europe, especially in 2015, has sparked immense solidarity, but also hostility among European citizens. While many citizens started to volunteer, organize support, and care for forced migrants (Nowicka et al. 2017; Kalogeraki 2018), others voice fear and discontent about the number of people entering the continent (Benček and...
Strasheim 2016; Gattinara 2018). Across Europe, heated debates in the civic and political sphere represent these tensions, shaking the moral foundation of the European Union and redrawing a landscape of solidarity and closure (Börzel and Risse 2018). Strong country differences in support for refugees have thus become a salient dimension of European integration, particularly with regard to the question whether and to what extent European countries should help refugees. Little research has analysed the reasons for the different positions towards forced migrants in Europe. Going beyond individual-level studies of attitudes towards refugees (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2016; von Hermanni and Neumann 2018), we contribute to the literature by proposing a comparative perspective to explain social, economic and political conditions conducive for solidarity with refugees. We thus ask: how can we explain national differences in public support for helping refugees across Europe?

Public or popular support for the notion that a country should help refugees denotes a universal and welfare meaning of solidarity (Bayertz 1999). Thus, we understand solidarity as universal, if the potential delimiting scope of group-solidarity is extended from an in-group to potentially different and distant others. Moreover, the welfare dimension of solidarity is reflected in the willingness to bear some cost to help these others collectively. To explain civic solidarity with an out-group, such as migrants or refugees, we argue that it is crucial to understand the scope of solidarity, i.e. which groups are in – or excluded, ultimately reflected in the general sentiments towards this group. Therefore, we base our explanation of country differences on theories classically used in research on anti-out-group sentiment, such as economic threat, inter-group contact and political framing theories (Pettigrew 1998; Meuleman et al. 2009; Bohman 2011; Zamora-Kapoor et al. 2013), adding a welfare state approach (Crepaz and Damron 2009). Whereas previous studies have applied these theories to study attitudes towards a generic understanding of migrants, we focus on refugees, whose decision to move is involuntary and reactive to unbearable socio-political and economic conditions (Richmond 1988).

The contributions of this article are threefold: first, different from existing studies we apply theories of out-group sentiment to a specific and important subgroup of migrants – refugees – while reflecting on potential group differences in applying these theories. Second, we theoretically add to the debate by developing arguments based on the welfare chauvinism literature, explaining why solidarity with refugees might be higher in certain welfare states than in others. Finally, using a survey among European citizens in 28 EU member states (Eurobarometer 2016), we
contribute a comparative empirical perspective on solidarity with refugees, which thus far has not been explored, despite salient differences in political and public discourses on refugees across Europe.

Our empirical results show that in 2016 the majority of European citizens supported national help for refugees; however, countries differ strongly in the level of support, ranging from 23% in the Czech Republic to 93% in Sweden. Using logistic multilevel regression models and controlling for individual-level determinants, we find that people in countries with a well-developed welfare state and a larger existing migrant population are more likely to support the idea that their own country should help refugees. This finding contradicts expectations based on economic threat and supports inter-group contact theory. We find that the power of right-wing parties did not undermine solidarity with refugees in mid-2016. On the individual level, however, we show that threat perceptions, institutional trust, and political ideology are important predictors for solidarity with refugees.

In the next section, we discuss our theoretical expectations and existing literature, first on the macro and then on the micro level. Thereafter, we present our empirical strategy, followed by the results. A discussion of the findings and implications for solidarity with out-groups in times of crises concludes.

2. Contextual conditions for solidarity with refugees

Existing research suggests a number of contextual conditions that affect anti-foreigner sentiment or out-group solidarity (Zamora-Kapoor et al. 2013). First, we elaborate on the two classics within the anti-migrant attitude literature: economic threat and inter-group contact theory. We then add to the literature by drawing on arguments from studies on welfare chauvinism, discussing several mechanisms through which the welfare state might affect solidarity with refugees. Lastly, we emphasize the importance of the political climate, which was particularly heated in the aftermath of the ‘long summer of migration’.

2.1. Economic threat and inter-group contact

Two of the most prominent theoretical approaches explaining attitudes towards immigrants are economic threat theory and inter-group contact theory. Similar to group threat theory, economic threat theory states that out-groups trigger competition over scarce resources, thereby
increasing prejudice and negative feelings towards them. Meuleman et al. (2009: 354) summarize that according to Blalock (1967) ‘the level of perceived threat is influenced by a context of actual competitive conditions in which inter-group relations are taking place’. Hence, it is important to account for the potential resource competition within a country, when trying to explain country differences in solidarity with refugees. In the literature, the economic situation of a country has been identified as an important factor influencing people’s perception of inter-group competitiveness over scare resources. Semyonov et al. (2008) find that anti-immigrant attitudes are particularly prevalent in countries where economic conditions are less prosperous, a finding also confirmed by Meuleman et al. (2009) and Kuntz et al. (2017).

Refugees, different from economic migrants, often cannot enter the workforce instantly and thus might only be perceived as increasing labor market competition in the long run. However, within the first months, or even years after migration, forced migrants often have to rely on governmental support. Thus, by some citizens, refugees might be perceived as a burden for the welfare state, which should be specifically critical in tense economic situations, where many depend on economic redistribution by the welfare state. Moreover, Reeskens and van der Meer (2019) show that in-group members’ willingness to share welfare resources with outgroups ultimately depends on the principle of reciprocity in receiving and contributing to the welfare state. Therefore, outgroup recipients, whose future contributions to the system are uncertain are more likely to be perceived as violating the norm of reciprocity. In sum, refugees are more likely to be perceived as an economic threat, competing for welfare resources and, in the long run, for jobs, in less prosperous countries with high levels of unemployment. In such situations, solidarity with out-groups can be expected to be lower.

H1a: If the economic situation of a country is dire, solidarity with refugees is lower.

Perceived economic threat can be also triggered by the number of immigrants and refugees within a country. Several studies have found that out-group size, hence the proportion of immigrants within a country that competes for given resources, positively impacts anti-immigrant attitudes (Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006; Schneider 2008). One of the core explanations is that people feel threatened by growing immigrant groups with regard to economic resources as well as values. Schneider (2008), for example, shows that within Europe perceived
threat by immigrants is higher in countries with a larger share of immigrants, particularly if they are of non-Western origin. Hence, solidarity with refugees might be lower in countries who received a large share of refugees due to increased perceived economic threat.

Moreover, due to the mechanisms elaborated above, we argue that not only the number of refugees but also large shares of migrants in general might decrease the willingness to take on ‘even more’ foreigners, in this case refugees. Subsequently, we assume that both, a larger share of immigrants and refugees, leads to lower solidarity with refugees.

H1b: If the share of migrants living in a country is higher, solidarity with refugees is lower.

H1c: If more forced migrants enter a country, solidarity with refugees is lower.

Next, to economic threat theory, inter-group contact theory dominates the debate about anti-migrant attitudes. According to the inter-group contact theory (Allport 1954), people reduce their prejudices towards an out-group, if contact with this group increases. Several studies have found that increasing out-group size positively affects inter-ethnic contact, thereby decreasing prejudices and anti-immigrant attitudes. Wagner et al. (2003), for example, find that people in West Germany have fewer prejudices against immigrants than people in East Germany, where the percentage of foreigners is five times lower. For Europe, Semyonov and Glikman (2008) show that natives living in ethnically mixed communities have more frequent contact with immigrants and fewer prejudices against them.

Inter-group contact might be particularly important for the solidarity with refugees, which are, more than other migrant groups, prone to negative stereotypes (Soehn 2013) and targets of a ‘discourse of suspicion’ (Holmes & Castaneeda 2016). Contact to refugees can thereby ‘tear down’ existing mental walls, reduce prejudices, and help develop an understanding for the difficult situation of forced migrants.

H2a: If the share of migrants living in a country is higher, solidarity with refugees is higher.

H2b: If more forced migrants enter a country, solidarity with refugees is higher.

However, these assumptions contradict the economic threat theory. A potential solution to this puzzle was presented by Havekes et al. (2011) who find a U-shaped relation between out-group size and feelings towards ethnic out-groups. An increase in out-group size first positively
affects natives’ feelings towards the out-group; however, after a certain threshold, a further increase in the immigrant population decreases favorable feelings. Hence, with regards to immigrants’ and refugees’ group sizes both, economic threat and contact theory, might hold: whereas a certain increase in out-group size reduces anti-refugee attitudes due to an increased likelihood of inter-ethnic contact, a further increase might spur resource conflicts and therefore increase out-group sentiment.

H2c: The effect of H2a and H2b is curvi-linear; with an increasing number of migrants living in, or refugees entering a country, solidarity with refugees first increases and then decreases.

### 2.2. The welfare state

Welfare states are inherently linked to solidarity and people’s attitudes. On the one hand, welfare systems are the manifestation of institutionalized solidarity with people in need, on the other hand, these systems, once in place, shape and reinforce peoples’ attitudes (Larsen 2008). With reference to the new institutionalism (Rothstein 1998), Mau argues that ‘the inherent meanings of institutions provide motivations for individuals’ actions and foster a commitment to the norms and values represented by the institution’ (Mau 2004: 60). These norms are directly linked to how people perceive out-group members and their access to resources within the welfare state. Three mechanisms can be distinguished that link welfare systems to solidarity with out-groups. First, welfare states influence people’s material interest by providing different degrees of protection against economic uncertainty; second, they inhibit a varying institutional logic of inclusion and care, depending on the historically evolved welfare system; and third, welfare states vary in their emphasis of deservingness criteria which are directly linked to anti-immigrant attitudes.

The extent to which welfare states protect against economic uncertainty depends to a large extent on their degree of de-commodification (Esping-Andersen 1990). Universal welfare states are characterized by a high level of de-commodification meaning that people’s welfare is secure even in the case of job loss. In residual welfare states, on the other hand, sufficient resources to obtain a certain standard of living are difficult without participating in the labor market (Nagayoshi and Hjerm 2015). Thus, whether people perceive refugees as threats to their economic well-being might depend on the extent to which their government is able to provide an institutional ‘safety-net’ in terms of welfare benefits. Welfare systems safeguard against the dynamics and uncertainties of (labor) markets, buffering
crises and increased competition. In this logic, the potentially increased labor market competition by the influx of forced migrants is absorbed, thereby affecting people’s solidarity with foreigners (Coenders et al. 2005). However, in the short run, the impact of refugees on labor market competition might arguably be limited.

A second mechanism, relating to the institutional logic of welfare states and their repercussions on citizens’ beliefs and preferences, might be more important. According to this argument, welfare arrangements are institutional settlements, which differ in the de-commodification, stratification and the public-private mix of welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990). The resulting institutional logics of universalism and particularism reinforce social boundaries and thereby shape processes of stigmatization and exclusion (Titmuss 1968). Thus, welfare arrangements either follow a moral logic of ‘inclusion’ or ‘exclusion’, which shape attitudes towards solidarity with out-groups (Crepaz and Damron 2009). In universalistic and extended welfare states, benefits are distributed to everyone (logic of inclusion) leading to a sense of ‘equality of control’ over one own’s life opportunities. This, in turn, ‘creates a sense of social solidarity and trust among people that should spill over to include even immigrants (Crepaz and Damron 2009: 10). In less extended welfare states with means testing, however, welfare is associated with stigmatization of the recipient leading to a general feeling of exclusion, thereby decreasing social cohesion and solidarity and increasing anti-migrant attitudes.

Third, welfare states may impact the extent to which people view refugees as ‘deserving’ to enter their country and benefit from the welfare state. According to van Oorshot (2000), groups are considered deserving if they (a) are in need of support, (b) are out of control of their situation, hence not responsible, (c) engage in reciprocal behavior in terms of contributing to the welfare state by paying taxes, (d) share an identity with native citizens, by being considered as ‘one of us’, and (e) hold a positive attitude towards the support in terms of being grateful. Van Oorshot and Uunk (2007) show that immigrants and refugees are perceived as least deserving of accessing welfare benefits compared to other vulnerable groups such as the sick or the unemployed, because they face difficulties fulfilling the deservingness criteria described above. However, this relationship is found to be particularly strong in residual and ‘exclusive’ welfare states where deservingness is more strongly emphasized than in universal welfare states (Nagayoshi and Hjerm 2015). Refugees are particularly unlikely to meet the reciprocity and identity criteria, which the public tends to view as most important (Van Oorshot 2000). Refugees had not yet the
chance to engage in reciprocal behavior as they have not yet contributed to the welfare state and are unlikely to contribute in the near future. Native citizens are also unlikely to perceive forced migrants as part of their in-group, since they often have a different cultural background (identity criteria). We therefore assume anti-migrant attitudes to be more widespread in residual welfare states, where native citizens put more emphasis on these deservingness criteria than in extended welfare states, leading to lower solidarity with refugees.

Hence, we assume that people in more extended welfare states show higher levels of solidarity towards refugees than people in less extended welfare states for three reasons: first, in extended welfare states people feel less economically threatened by the influx of refugees. Second, the institutional logic of ‘inclusion’ characterizing extended welfare states creates a sense of solidarity which includes out-group members such as refugees. And third, ‘residual welfare states increase the importance of deservingness more than universal welfare states, which strengthens citizens’ perceptions of immigrants as a threat to the welfare state’ (Nagayoshi and Hjerm 2015: 144) thereby lowering their support with refugees.

H3: If welfare states are more extensive, solidarity with refugees is higher.

2.3. Political context

Solidarity with refugees is also likely to depend on the political climate, particularly with the Europe-wide uprising of the political right. Several studies have pointed to the importance of contextual political factors in explaining attitudes towards migrants (Rydgren 2004; Bohman 2011). Most political parties articulate an explicit position towards issues of immigration. In recent years, these positions seem to have entered center-stage in political debates, in which right-wing and populist parties take strong anti-immigrant positions in party competitions, framing refugees as ‘criminals’ and ‘illegals’ (Gale 2004). Such political articulations by political representatives are very likely to affect citizens’ perceptions and evaluations and thus their willingness to support refugees. According to Bohman (2011: 459–60), political parties can promote anti-foreigner sentiment in three ways: by constructing group boundaries which emphasize group distance and threat, by increasing the visibility and salience of immigrants in society and finally, by normalizing anti-immigrant positions and thus the mainstreaming of extreme positions. While such strategies are not limited to right-wing and anti-immigrant
parties, we nevertheless expect those parties to be the most prominent proponents of such positions and strategies (Van Spanje 2011). Exiting research shows that support for right-wing parties indeed increases anti-immigrant sentiment (Rydgren 2004; Semyonov et al. 2006, 2008), a finding which is likely to become manifested within the scope of the refugee crisis, as the discourse has switched from anti-migrant attitudes to anti-refugee attitudes in particular.

H4a: If right-wing parties have greater support, solidarity with refugees is lower.

Yet, based on data form party manifestos, Bohman (2011) finds that not merely the articulation of extreme-right wing parties is decisive, but the overall strength of the political articulation of anti-immigrant positions, meaning, that the positions of all political parties on immigration and their relative electorate support determine the political discourse and thus support for or refusal of immigration. We argue that in competing for electorial support, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ has been a particular opportunity for anti-immigration parties to frame refugee immigration as a threat to Western societies, also potentially affecting the positions of moderate parties. Political parties thereby are able to create an anti-refugee atmosphere, influencing individual attitudes towards refugees. Therefore, we expect that the willingness to help refugees will be lower in countries where anti-immigration positions of parties are more widespread.

H4b: If anti-immigration positions are more dominant in a country, solidarity with refugees is lower.

3. Individual-level explanations for solidarity with refugees

While our focus is mainly on explaining national differences in solidarity, we also discuss micro-sociological explanations of solidarity with refugees. Mainly due to data restrictions, we limit ourselves to individual threat perceptions, institutional trust, and political ideology. Similar to the reasoning on the macro-level, fear of economic competition might also be a major source for anti-refugee sentiment on the individual level (Semyonov et al. 2006; Schneider 2008). Kuntz et al. (2017: 394) find that particularly vulnerable social groups of lower socio-economic background fear that foreigners ‘take away jobs, exploit the welfare system, and compete over housing and other social resources’. Thus, we expect people with a more precarious socio-economic background to be more likely to disapprove of helping refugees. In addition, citizens might not only feel economic threat, but also an increased security threat, due to the potential number of ‘strangers’ and
their perceived cultural distance. In public debates, the refugee influx has been frequently linked to terrorist threat (Rheindorf and Wodak 2018). Empirical research indeed shows that perceptions of security threat increase anti-migrant sentiment (Cohrs and Stelzl 2010) and are therefore likely to decrease people’s solidarity with refugees.

Next to people’s threat perceptions, their political orientation and trust in political institutions might matter. Some authors argue that an individual’s political orientation is a fundamental condition for the scope of group solidarity (Rydgren 2004). People with a right-wing orientation tend to ‘fear and resist changes that out-group populations may introduce to society’ (Semyonov and Glikman 2008: 696). Studies indeed show a positive relationship between political right-wing orientation and anti-immigrant sentiment (Rydgren 2004; Semyonov et al. 2006, 2008). Thus, we expect that solidarity with refugees increases, if citizens hold more left or center political and therefore more universal and egalitarian political orientations.

Given our interest is in a collective form of solidarity, referring to a country’s help for refugees, confidence in the political institutions that would be in charge for its realization, seems important. Empirical research has shown that institutional trust on the one hand affects people’s support for governmental actions such as welfare provision (Daniele and Geys 2015); on the other hand, institutional trust is positively associated with pro-social behavior (Taniguchi and Marshall 2014). We therefore assume that higher trust in political institutions will increase solidarity with refugees. In Europe, beside trust in one’s own political system, the assessment of the supra-national political institutions of the European Union could also affect national collective solidarity with refugees. The European Union has played an important role in the discussion on strategies and responsibilities in managing migration flows and helping refugees (Niemann and Zaun 2018). People that have little trust in the EU are more likely to disapprove of its ‘burden-sharing’ (Thielemann 2018) and therefore less likely to support their country’s help for refugees. In contrast, in countries where people hold strong pro-Europe attitudes, citizens might perceive it as the country’s duty within the European Union to support refugees.

4. Data, variables and method

To test our hypotheses we use data from the Eurobarometer survey 86.2, conducted from May to June 2016 in 28 European countries (Eurobarometer 2016). The survey is combined with data on the national economic, social and political context, resulting in a multilevel research design.
4.1. Dependent variable

The Eurobarometer contains a limited set of questions on refugees and migrants, of which some are well suited to address our research question. Our dependent variable is based on the following question and statement: ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (Country) should help refugees’, where country was replaced by the respective country in which the survey was conducted. Respondents were offered four response categories encompassing ‘totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree’ and a ‘don’t know’ option. After deleting missing value we collapsed the item into a dichotomous variable reflecting approval versus disapproval of national help for refugees (support for help = 1; no support of help = 0). This has several reasons: first, we are really interested in who is willing to help compared to who is not. Second, it seems reasonable to assume that respondents draw a sharp line, between approval and disapproval of help, but not between more fine-grained distinctions in strength of support or opposition. Third, the regression results for a binary outcome are easier to interpret and understand. Finally, to address potential biases that result from dichotomizing the dependent variables, we estimated multilevel ordered logit models on the initial coding of the variable and results (reported in the appendix) were consistent. Descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in the appendix.

4.2. Independent variables

Beside the individual level variables pertaining to our hypothesis on economic threat and trust in government, we used a number of control variables that have proven important in existing research on attitudes towards out-groups and solidarity. On the actor level we controlled for the classical socio-demographic variables gender (female = 1, male = 0), age (in years), migration background (nationality, different from host country: 0 = no; 1 = yes), and education. According to the existing literature on anti-foreigner sentiment, we expect females, younger respondents, higher educated and people with a migrant background to be more supportive of helping refugees (Semyonov et al. 2006; Schneider 2008; Zamora-Kapoor et al. 2013). In the Eurobarometer, education is measured by the age, when respondents finished full-time education. We recoded this into three levels of education, roughly reflecting primary (finished education before the age of 15) (base category), secondary (age 16–19) and tertiary education (20 years or older) (all: 0 = no; 1 = yes). The variable
labor market status reflects a set of dummy variables of whether respondents are actively working (base category), retirees, house persons, unemployed, or students (all: 0 = no; 1 = yes). Finally, we controlled for place of residence, as we expect people in cities to hold more cosmopolitan world views compared to people from rural areas or small towns (all: 0 = no; 1 = yes).

The individual economic situation is measured by the self-assessment of the financial situation of the household ranging from very good (4), rather good (3), rather bad (2) to very bad (1). A second variable on the assessment of the respective country’s economic situation was coded analog. Trust in political institutions is an additive index, ranging from zero to five, based on whether respondents tend to trust or not trust in the legal system, the public administration, the local public authorities, the national government and the national parliament. Trust in the European Union is taken from the same item battery and coded as a dummy variable (trust in EU = 1; no trust in EU = 0). In addition, we add a variable measuring the issue salience of terrorism for respondents. If respondents name terrorism as one of the two central issues that the country they are living in, or they themselves personally currently deem important we code terrorism salience as high (0 = no; 1 = yes). Finally, we include political orientation of the respondents on a left-right scale (left = 1; right = 10). Due to a large number of missing values in this measure (~16% of respondents) we recoded a group of dummy variables – left (1–4), center (5 and 6), right (7–10) – including a category for missing values (all: 0 = no; 1 = yes).

On the aggregate or country level, all independent variables have been lagged and refer to the average values from 2013 to 2015, if not otherwise stated. Moreover, variables have been z-standardized, so the reported effects reflect a change by one standard deviation. The economic threat hypothesis has been operationalized by the average unemployment rate and the (logged) GDP per capita (in PPP) (Eurostat 2017a, b). The welfare state hypothesis has been measured by the expenditures for social protection (as a share of GDP) (all 2013–2015) provided by Eurostat (2017d). Group size of migrants and refugees have been taken from different sources. First, we use the (logged) share of migrants (i.e. non-native born residents) as a measure for the existing out-group size (Eurostat 2017c). Second, numbers on refugees have been taken from the

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2In additional models, we use the Muslim population share in each country as a robustness check, which provides consistent results (see Appendix).
UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2015 (UNHCR 2017). This report does not only list asylum seekers, but includes refugees not having applied for asylum yet and thus the ‘total population of concern’ in each country and therefore seems a more adequate measure of refugee influx than the numbers on asylum seekers provided by Eurostat. We make use of two different measures: first, we estimate the share of refugees entering a country in 2015 as part of the total population; second, we estimate the increase of refugees in 2015 compared to the period from 2012 to 2014. Additional models (not reported) use the absolute number of refugees in a country and produce consistent results.

Finally, to analyse the political context in the receiving country, we used two measures: First, the share of seats of right-wing parties in national parliaments in the last elections of each country before 2015 (Döring and Manow 2015); second, we used the size of articulation of anti-immigration positions by all parties in parliament, based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey data (Polk et al. 2017). For the latter, we multiplied the position on immigration issues of each party (ranging from 0 to 10, where 10 refers to ‘fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration’), with their seat share in parliament, to reflect the size of the articulating party (Bohman 2011). Lastly, we control for the social capital of a country as studies have shown that civic involvement increases generosity towards others (Brooks 2005), as well as inter-ethnic contact (Cote and Erickson 2009), both which we assume will increase solidarity with refugees. In this paper, social capital was therefore measured by the share of people per country that are members of at least one civic association (excluding membership in churches, trade unions and political parties) based on data from the European Values Study (EVS 2016). A correlation analysis of all macro-level variables shows that multicollinearity is not a problem (see Appendix).

4.3. Method

Given the multilevel structure of the data, we estimate hierarchical linear regression models (Snijders and Bosker 1999). In the analysis, both, individual level and contextual level variables are introduced simultaneously into random intercept regression models. These models allow to assess which variables at both levels have an effect on the outcome and how

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3We use Döring’s and Manow’s classification of right-wing parties. Other classifications with different cut-off points on the left-right scale provide consistent results. In addition, we have also used the vote share of those parties and again found similar effects.
much of the variation in the dependent variable between countries can be explained by individual characteristics (composition effects) and country-specific factors. Instead of logits or odds ratios, we report average marginal effects, which can be understood as the change in the likelihood of supporting the help for refugees, if the independent variable changes by one unit. In the appendix, we report all results as odds-ratios. To check for the robustness of our findings we also used a two-step estimation procedure, which provided consistent results.

5. Results

In Figure 1, we present the share of respondents that support help for refugees. Generally, 64% of Europeans across all countries support help for refugees, reflecting a rather high solidarity of European citizens with displaced persons. Yet, we see a strong variation in support ranging from 93% in Sweden to 23% in the Czech Republic. Solidarity with refugees is highest in a regionally diverse set of countries from Scandinavia, Southern, and Western Europe. The lowest support can be found in Eastern Europe and Italy. How can we explain these differences in average support? In the next part, we present the results of the multilevel regression models to shed some light on underlying driving forces.

The intra-class coefficient based on an empty model (not shown) reveals that a statistically significant share of 21.5% of the variance is related to country-level differences. We start by presenting the individual level results (Table 1), before moving to the macro-level models.

Figure 1. Average support for helping refugees across Europe (in %).
In model 1 we only included the socio-demographic variables in the analysis. Model 2 adds the economic variables and model 3 contains the attitudinal measures. We find that gender does not have a statistically significant effect on the support for refugees. Age has a small, yet robust positive statistically significant effect. An age increase of 10 years increases support by 2%. Next, people living in rural areas or villages have significantly lower support for refugees than those living in large towns. People with a secondary education have a significantly higher support for refugees than those with a primary education. Being unemployed has a significantly negative effect on support. Finally, having a positive security threat perception has a significantly negative effect on support.

### Table 1. Average marginal effects of solidarity with refugees (micro-level).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence (Ref.: Large town)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural area or village</td>
<td>−0.03**</td>
<td>−0.03**</td>
<td>−0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small/middle town</td>
<td>−0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.05+</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Ref.: Primary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status (Ref.: working)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House person</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>−0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>−0.06***</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>−0.04**</td>
<td>−0.03*</td>
<td>−0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj. economic situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived economic situation country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political self-placement (Ref.: Center)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>21,774</td>
<td>21,774</td>
<td>21,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>−12,161.61</td>
<td>−11,871.10</td>
<td>−11,511.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>24,349.22</td>
<td>23,772.20</td>
<td>23,064.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>24,453.07</td>
<td>23,892.03</td>
<td>23,232.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: significance levels: * \( p < 0.10 \), * \( p < 0.05 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \), *** \( p < 0.001 \).

(Tables 2 and 3). In model 1 we only included the socio-demographic variables in the analysis. Model 2 adds the economic variables and model 3 contains the attitudinal measures. We find that gender does not have a statistically significant effect on the support for helping refugees. Age has a small, yet robust positive statistically significant effect. An age increase of 10 years increases support by 2%. Next, people living in rural areas or villages have significantly lower support for refugees than those living in large towns. People with a secondary education have a significantly higher support for refugees than those with a primary education. Being unemployed has a significantly negative effect on support. Finally, having a positive security threat perception has a significantly negative effect on support.

### Table 2. Average marginal effects of solidarity with refugees (macro-level).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social expenditures</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants (share pop.)</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees (share pop.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee increase (14’ to 15’)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>21,774</td>
<td>21,774</td>
<td>21,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
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<td>−10,689.25</td>
<td>−10,688.51</td>
</tr>
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<td>AIC</td>
<td>21,430.84</td>
<td>21,430.50</td>
<td>21,429.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>21,638.54</td>
<td>21,638.20</td>
<td>21,636.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: individual level variables of model 3 are included but not reported; significance levels: * \( p < 0.10 \), * \( p < 0.05 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \), *** \( p < 0.001 \).
in rural areas have a lower likelihood of supporting help for refugees compared to city dwellers. Respondents with a migrant background have a 7% higher likelihood of supporting help for refugees, but this effect becomes statistically non-significant when controlling for attitudes. As expected we find higher educated people reporting stronger support for helping refugees. Regarding the employment status of respondents, we see that across all models the retired have a slightly lower likelihood of supporting help for refugees than people in work, while students report a comparably higher level of solidarity. After controlling for the subjective economic situation (model 2), the negative effect of unemployment loses its statistical significance.

Reflecting on the effect of the socio-demographic variables and the subjective economic situation, we can already see that there is some support for the economic threat hypothesis on the level of individual respondents (model 2). A more positive self-evaluation of one’s financial situation by one unit increases the willingness to help refugees by 5% and by 10% for the perception of the country’s economic situation. These effects are reduced in model 3 (3% and 4%), yet remain statistically significant. In model 3 we add the attitudinal measures. Consistent with the security threat assumption we find that respondents that have a higher salience of terrorism are more likely to disapprove of helping refugees (−4%). Affirming existing research, the political orientation of respondents has the expected effect on solidarity with an out-group. People from the political left are more (6%), people from the political right are less (−5%) willing to support forced migrants, than people from the political center. Turning to institutional trust, we find a higher trust in national political institutions increases the willingness to help by 3% per index point (ranging from 0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social expenditures</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants (share pop.)</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parl. seats right wing parties</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant articulat. size</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>21,774</td>
<td>21,774</td>
<td>21,774</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>−10,690.14</td>
<td>−10,689.29</td>
<td>−10,688.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>21,432.28</td>
<td>21,430.58</td>
<td>21,429.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>21,639.99</td>
<td>21,638.28</td>
<td>21,637.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: individual level variables of model 3 are included but not reported; significance levels: * p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Finally, individual trust in the European Union increases the likelihood of voicing solidarity with forced migrants by 11%.4

Turning to the contextual factors, which are the prime focus of this paper, we present the impact of macro-level variables on solidarity with refugees in Tables 2 and 3, controlling for, but not reporting the individual level variables of model 3. We start by jointly introducing the variables that reflect the economic threat hypothesis (Table 2, model 4).5 Contrary to our expectations (H1a), the unemployment rate has a statistically significant positive effect on solidarity with refugees. However, this effect is mainly driven by the high level of support for refugees in Spain and Greece, countries that also suffer from the highest levels of unemployment. Excluding Spain and Greece, the effect loses its statistical significance. The social expenditures variable reflects the expectation, that a better buffering against social risks and an institutional ‘logic of inclusion’ will increase the willingness to support outsiders (H3). A one standard deviation increase in welfare state expenditure increases the probability of support for helping refugees by 4%. Thus, more extensive welfare states enable out-group solidarity. We do not find any support for the effect of the economic situation (GDP per capita) of a country on solidarity with forced migrants. Finally, we also tested whether the share of migrants living in a country increases the economic threat and thereby lower the support for refugees (H1b). Our results again point to the opposite direction and are consistent with the inter-group contact theory (H2a). The higher the share of migrants in a country the higher the willingness to help forced migrants. In sum, there is no robust support for the economic threat hypothesis (H1a) on the macro level. Economic threat does not seem to be a driving force of country differences in solidarity with refugees. In model 5 and 6 we added measures of the relative number and flows of refugees to each country. Neither variable turns out to have a statistically significant effect on the willingness to support forced migrants (H1c & H2b). In additional models (reported in the appendix), we analyse the curvi-linear effect of the out-groups size (H2c). We do not find any support for a threshold, which would decrease the level of solidarity, neither for the overall level of migrants, nor for the share of, or increase in refugees. Since average marginal effects do not

4Using the original scaling of the dependent variable and ordered logit multilevel models we find highly consistent results, both in terms of statistical significance, as well as in effect size. The main difference is that we find being female to have a statistically significant positive effect in the ordered logit models.

5Bivariate results, i.e. using only one macro-level measure at a time, can be found in the Appendix.
allow to present curvi-linear relationships we do not present these findings in a result table.

Finally, we turn to the political and civic context (Table 3), where we additionally control for the macro-level variables shown in Table 2, which proofed to be significant. Controlling for the economic situation of the country, we find that neither the share of seats of right-wing parties in the last election nor the articulation size of anti-immigration positions of all parties in parliament have a statistically significant effect on solidarity with refugees (H4a & H4b). Nevertheless, the direction of both effects is negative implying that the overall direction of the expected effects is plausible, but in mid-2016 does not seem to add to the explanation of solidarity with refugees. The effect of our social capital measure is positive, but also fails to reach statistical significance. Thus, we can conclude that in mid-2016 neither the political, nor the civic context is strongly related to solidarity with refugees, but the share of migrants and the level of welfare expenditures and thus social protection.

6. Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, we seek to understand cross-national diversity in the solidarity with refugees. Using data collected among European citizens in the 28 EU member states in 2016, we develop and empirically assess several explanations on both the macro- and the micro-level to explain people’s willingness to help refugees. Following economic threat theory, we expected people in countries with difficult economic situations as well as a high share of foreigners, to express lower support for refugees due to a stronger feeling of competition for economic resources with such groups. However, we find no support for this hypothesis: neither economic deprivation (GDP per capita), nor high unemployment rates decrease people’s solidarity with refugees. Rather, we find a statistically significant positive relationship between unemployment rates and solidarity with refugees. This surprising effect is mainly driven by the high levels of support in Spain and Greece, countries that suffer from the highest levels of unemployment. Yet, even when excluding these outliers, unemployment rates have no significant negative effect on public support for helping refugees.

One reason for this could be that refugees, unlike work migrants, do not pose an immediate threat on the labor market. Another explanation might

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6Additional multilevel ordered logit models, using the original variable scale, provide highly consistent results.
be that economic threat theory does not consider the possibility that people’s willingness to share (scarce) resources also depends on specific characteristics of the out-group. More specifically, refugees might be perceived as particularly deserving. In respect to sharing scarce welfare resources, the perception of deservingness might counteract both the perceived competition with and the uncertain reciprocity of welfare contributions to forced migrants. While we cannot directly test these arguments with our data, the high support for helping refugees in the two Mediterranean countries seems a good test case, given their dire economic situation and the high influx of refugees. For Greece, Lafazani (2018) argues that the discourse on migrants has shifted during the massive inflow of refugees in 2015. The desperate situation of refugees, the mass-drowning of women and children and the widespread spontaneous local help coincided with the election of the pro-migrant Syriza government in 2016, leading to a widespread perception of forced migrants as deserving humans in need (Lafazani 2018). While refugee flows to Spain have been much lower, a strong pro-refugee movement emerged there, which can be partly attributed to specific political opportunities at the local level (Alcalde and Portos 2018). Thus in both cases, deservingness seems to buffer perception of economic competition, at least in the short run.

We also expected that a larger share of immigrants and refugees would fuel perceived economic threat. However, our data shows quite the opposite: a historically higher share of immigrants does not decrease, but significantly increase people’s solidarity with refugees. This provides support for inter-group contact theory, according to which a higher share of foreigners positively affects the chance of inter-ethnic contact, which in turn leads to better mutual understanding and thus increasing support for helping refugees.

Interestingly, only the share of immigrants, not of refugees, seems to matter. One explanation could be that countries with a high share of migrants have a history of regular migration. Their citizens have therefore experienced a socialization of inter-ethnic coexistence and solidarity with out-group members. The massive inflow of displaced people especially since 2015, and the often isolated living situation in camps and emergency accommodations has left little time and opportunity for inter-ethnic contact, something that might change over time, when asylum seekers increasingly participate in daily life. With reference to our data, governments seem well advised to support opportunity structures, which facilitate contact between natives and foreigners such as inter-ethnic buddy programs or opening the labor market for refugees.
With reference to the welfare state, we find that higher social expenditure indeed increases people’s support for refugees. This finding underlines the importance of the welfare state for social solidarity and inclusion in modern open societies (Crepaz and Damron 2009). We provide three explanations for the impact of welfare states on solidarity with refugees: First, by providing a ‘safety-net’ to its residents, extended welfare states weaken people’s perception of economic threat by refugees which in turn positively impacts their solidarity with out-groups. If people feel they are being taken care of by their government, they seem more willing to share collective resources with out-group members. Second, extended welfare states transmit embedded norms of solidarity and generate a collective feeling of inclusion. Third, deservingness criteria such as reciprocal behavior and shared identity are more strongly emphasized in residual welfare states (Van Oorshot 2000), which are often not met by migrant groups (Nagayoshi and Hjerm 2015). Generally, governments’ investment into their welfare states seems to pay off by facilitating social inclusion, also of out-groups (Nagayoshi and Hjerm 2015). This notion is particularly relevant today as uprising populist parties, such as the German ‘Alternative fuer Deutschland’ (AfD), demand less government involvement in providing welfare.

Related to that, the political context in which out-group solidarity unfolds was expected to play an important role, specifically with respect to the power of right-wing parties and the articulation size of anti-refugee positions. Yet, we do not find support for a statistically significant negative effect of either on support for helping refugees. Foremost, this is a reassuring result, as it indicates that populist parties in 2016 seem not overly successful in framing anti-refugee attitudes. Though, another reason for the absence of a right-wing framing effect could be the counter mobilization of left-wing parties (Koopmans and Rucht 1995). In addition, it might matter how public media ‘translates’ and presents claims by political parties might vary between countries, providing some ground for future research. A final aspect that should be taken into account is the short time period between the migration wave in summer 2015 and the survey in 2016. Arguably, anti-refugee sentiment might gain more traction, if populist parties have more time to construct an image of the distant and threatening other.

On the micro-level, we find that people’s solidarity with refugees is higher, if people perceive their own, as well as their country’s economic situation as positive and if people express little fear of security threats. Hence, whereas we find only limited support for the economic threat hypothesis on the macro-level, we do find evidence on the individual level. This empirical
paradox suggests that for most people *subjective* perceptions of their own or their countries’ economic situation are more important when evaluating out-group members than objective economic conditions (Schneider 2008). In addition, people with right-wing orientations show less solidarity with refugees than people who are center, or left-wing oriented, confirming existing research (Rydgren 2004; Semyonov et al. 2006). Lastly, we find that the more people trust their national as well as EU institutions the greater their solidarity with refugees. Our interpretation of this finding is that national institutional trust reflects peoples’ believe that their country is up to the challenge of helping refugees. Similarly, trust in the European Union might reflect a general support for the European integration and the notion, that the refugee crisis should be ‘solved’ by all member states collectively, including the own country.

Several limitations of our study need to be addressed in future research. First, due to a lack of suitable measures, our study does not address underlying normative motives of what is perceived as right and appropriate in dealing with forced migrants. Thus, future studies need to address, whether support or denial of helping refugees is based on instrumental or normative reasons. Second, using more fine-grained measures of out-group solidarity, distinguishing between individual and collective as well as between low- and high-cost solidarity, could inform a more encompassing understanding of solidarity. Third, a longitudinal perspective would help to better understand the temporal unfolding of specific discourses and perceptions, specifically with regard to the impact of political parties’ anti-immigration articulations. Finally, richer qualitative and quantitative case studies of individual countries or small-N comparisons could help to understand the complex interrelations of the different underlying forces driving solidarity with refugees.

In sum, we show the importance of inter-group contact and social protection for out-group solidarity. Future research needs to explore whether the unique momentum of strong solidarity with refugees that we find in 2016 can persist despite widespread populist movements across Europe. The economic threat paradox, i.e. the contradictory effects of the subjective individual and the objective contextual economic situation on solidarity with refugees, seems a potential dangerous gateway for populist parties. Confronting such populist threats and up-holding solidarity with out-

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7In additional models (not reported), we tested whether the effects of the subjective individual perceptions of the own or the country’s economic situation is systematically linked to the objective economic situation of the country, but did not find any support.
groups thus becomes critical not only in meeting Europe’s humanitarian ideals but also in securing European integration.

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Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Sebastian Koos is an assistant professor of corporate social responsibility at the University of Konstanz. He works on corporate social responsibility, political consumerism, industrial relations, solidarity and pro-social behavior. His research has been published in two books and multiple journals, such as Acta Sociologica, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Policy and Society or Socio-Economic Review.

Verena Seibel is an assistant professor at the University of Groningen. Her academic interests include structural and social integration of immigrants, immigrants and the welfare state, and gender. So far, she has published in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, and the Children and Youth Services Review.

ORCID

Sebastian Koos http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6739-1649

References


