When we want them to fear us
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When people engage in collective action, they do so in front of different audiences, such as their own group, the authorities, or third parties (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; see also Hornsey et al., 2006). Through their actions, disadvantaged group members typically communicate their discontent about their group’s disadvantage, anticipating that this communication will influence a particular audience (Reicher et al., 1995; van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Such influence can be dramatically different when people protest peacefully or violently in order to influence their opponents. For example, the use...
of violence may communicate to audiences that the disadvantaged group is willing and able to inflict harm on the other side.

The premise of the current research is that collective action can be a tool to bring about change in emotion, such as when mass protests induce fear or regret in the outgroup, which could facilitate change in their policy support and behavior. In line with this, we put forward the idea that engagement in collective action may also be motivated by how disadvantaged group members want the outgroup to feel. This is important because, although previous work identified anger as a core predictor of collective action (for an overview, see van Zomeren, 2013), little is known about the role of emotion regulation in collective action (Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 2016).

In this article, we break new ground by examining how disadvantaged group members, by engaging in nonviolent or violent collective action, try to induce or modify emotions in members of the relevant outgroup. We draw upon research on the instrumental approach to emotion regulation (e.g., Tamir, 2016; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008) to propose that the willingness of disadvantaged groups to engage in collective action can be explained by their motivation to influence the emotions of the relevant outgroup. More specifically, we suggest and test the idea that people’s motivation to induce outgroup fear can lead group members to engage in violent action, because such action promotes their goals toward social change.

Our emotion regulation perspective thus implies that the endorsement of collective action strategies does not reflect any “irrational” outburst of felt impulses, but a rather strategic attempt to influence others in the service of the ingroup’s cause. We thus assume that protesters understand that emotions can influence others’ views and behaviors, and to exercise this influence they can modify their emotions. But the notion that group members are motivated to influence and utilize the emotions of others in collective action has not yet been tested empirically. We report three empirical studies that, together, suggest that whether people engage in peaceful or violent tactics is related to, and may be caused by, how they want the other side to feel.

**Instrumental Emotion Regulation**

Our perspective integrates an emotion regulation perspective (Gross, 2002; Tamir, 2016) with the social-psychological literature on collective action and social change (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Emotion regulation refers to individuals’ attempts to influence their or others’ emotional experiences and expressions (Gross, 1998, 2002). Although emotions reflect a crucial set of psychological processes in the context of collective action (van Zomeren, 2015; see also van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012), emotions have not typically been conceptualized in the literature on collective action as part of an active regulation process in which the individual tries to control and change what him/herself or others feel. Accordingly, an emotion regulation perspective provides an interesting and novel framework to explore (Goldenberg et al., 2016).

Given the strategic aspect of collective action, we use an instrumental approach to emotion regulation, which suggests that because emotional experiences influence behavior and social interactions, people are motivated to regulate their own (intrapersonal; e.g., Tamir et al., 2008) or others’ (interpersonal; e.g., Netzer, van Kleef, & Tamir, 2015) emotions if they stand to benefit from them (Tamir, 2016). That is, emotional preferences depend on the goals individuals pursue in a given context. Anger, for instance, is an emotion that can promote aggression, and can be useful when one pursues confrontational goals (Frijda, 1986; Parrott, 2001).

To illustrate, Tamir et al. (2008) found that when participants prepared to engage in a confrontational task in which anger could enhance performance, they preferred to increase their anger. Furthermore, when they prepared to engage in a nonconfrontational task in which anger would be unlikely to improve performance, they preferred to increase their excitement. This
means that people want to feel an emotion that they believe is personally useful to them (Tamir, Bigman, Rhodes, Salerno, & Schreier, 2015). Similarly, in a study on interpersonal emotion regulation, participants who expected to benefit from the performance of a partner in an aggressive game tried to induce more anger and less happiness or fear in the other. However, participants who were about to benefit from the performance of a partner in a joyful game tried to induce more happiness and less anger or fear in the other (Netzer et al., 2015). Again, this means that people try to regulate the emotions of others in a way that benefits them.

However, emotion regulation research has focused mainly on psychological processes at the individual or interpersonal level, which may not necessarily generalize to intergroup contexts. When emotion regulation is interpersonal, the individual is self-categorized as a separate unit and reacts to situations relevant to the self (Goldenberg et al., 2016; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). However, individuals can categorize themselves also as group members, and thus view situations and act on them accordingly (Ellemers, 2012; Smith, 1993). In this work, we extend the existing line of research by looking into people’s motivations to regulate others’ emotions in group contexts and examining these processes and their impact at the group level rather than at the individual level.

According to the group-based emotion regulation model (Goldenberg et al., 2016), when people categorize themselves or others as group members, they can be motivated to regulate group-based emotions in themselves, in members of their ingroup, or the outgroup to satisfy group goals that lead to collective benefits. Porat, Halperin, and Tamir (2016) demonstrated that what people want to feel is related to their emotional reactions to conflict-related events, which in turn are linked to their political reactions. For instance, they showed that manipulating and decreasing preferences for group-based anger leads people to experience less anger, which results in less support for intolerant political policies. A study by Netzer, Halperin, and Tamir (2018) provides empirical evidence for the group-based emotion regulation model in intergroup contexts. Their study reveals that people have preferences for outgroup emotions, and that they are willing to act on these preferences to facilitate goal-consistent behaviors in outgroup members. For instance, it was found that people who endorsed deterrence goals wanted outgroup members to feel more fear, whereas those who endorsed reconciliation wanted outgroup members to feel less fear and more calmness. The current research extends this line of research, suggesting that such strategic emotion regulation might contribute to collective action.

The Current Research
Disadvantaged group members may be motivated to make their opponents experience certain emotions that they expect would ultimately help them achieve their goals, which can pertain to changing policies, altering opinions and attitudes, or even taking revenge (see Hornsey et al., 2006). Therefore, disadvantaged members may prefer to expose the outgroup to behaviors or strategies that can elicit these emotions among them, such as acting violently or peacefully to achieve the group goals. The collective action strategy that group members endorse depends on the goal of the regulatory process, and therefore understanding what motivates intergroup emotion regulation is important to understand collective action tendencies.

In the literature, scholars have made the distinction between nonviolent (e.g., peaceful protests) and violent collective action (e.g., armed resistance; see Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011; Thomas & Louis, 2014). It was demonstrated that these two action forms are predicted by different emotions—experienced anger predicts nonviolent action, whereas experienced contempt predicts violent action (Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefer, & Halperin, 2016; Tausch et al., 2011). Although there is acknowledgment of the distinction between the different forms of collective action, there is less consensus
about the goals people aim to achieve when they engage in nonviolent or violent action. Although both nonviolent and violent types of collective action are associated with perceptions of injustice, violent action mainly seeks extreme social change and does not imply willingness to preserve social relationships (whereas nonviolent action entails a desire to communicate injustice and repair the relationship with the offender; see Shuman et al., 2016; Tausch et al., 2011).

This line of thought implies that different goals and preferences for outgroup emotions should be associated with nonviolent and violent collective action strategies. First, outgroup fear is an emotion that is associated with low certainty, high threat, and low control over the situation (Halperin, 2016; Roseman, 1984). It has been argued that fear promotes the pursuit of avoidance goals by facilitating flight and escape from threat or avoidance of risk taking (Halperin, 2016; Tamir & Ford, 2009; see also Carver, 2001; Frijda, 1986). In line with the instrumental approach to emotion regulation, people can be motivated to increase unpleasant emotions in others to attain instrumental benefits. Disadvantaged group members could seek to spread fear among the rival group as a way to intensify a sense of threat and loss of control. When outgroup members grow fearful they might become attentive to injustice and reconsider their attitudes and weigh the costs of their behaviors and policies, and hence react to restore their safety. As such, outgroup members and decision makers may be pushed to comply with the demands of the disadvantaged group and take steps toward ending injustice. In more extreme cases, particularly when the groups share the same territory, provoking fear can be used as a strategy for the political end of forcing the outgroup to flee. Accordingly, we expect disadvantaged group members who are motivated to provoke fear among the outgroup to be more likely to support violent collective action strategies, as violence can be a communicative tool to spread fear and intimidate the outgroup to comply with their demands.

The emotion of regret, on the other hand, is associated with appraisals of ingroup moral transgressions and interpersonal or intergroup harm (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosje, & Manstead, 2004; Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012). Such appraisals lead individuals to be motivated to change past behavior and repair the inflicted harm. In line with this, regret follows from taking the victim’s perspective, and it has been shown that in intergroup contexts regret predicts positive attitudes toward the victim, greater openness to contact, and increased motivation to make amends and reparations that are not merely material (Imhoff et al., 2012). From an instrumental emotion regulation perspective, disadvantaged group members can attempt to make the outgroup feel regret as a way to increase their willingness to address the injustice and push them to change their passive or active contribution to the situation. Feelings of regret stemming from the perception of injustice can translate into actions aimed at reducing disadvantage, improving the status of the disadvantaged, and making reparations. From here, we would expect disadvantaged members who are motivated to make outgroup members feel regret to be more likely to prefer peaceful collective actions in order to persuade the outgroup to acknowledge and repair their wrongdoing.

To test these two hypotheses, we conducted three studies among Palestinian citizens of Israel (the disadvantaged ingroup) during periods of mass protests against the Israeli government (the relevant outgroup). Gaining access to disadvantaged groups and minorities is challenging, but particularly so in environments of conflict. These challenges may involve geographical (e.g., distance), political (e.g., oppression), or cultural (e.g., language) barriers and result in a biased representation of majority groups in the literature. To study collective action, however, it was necessary to gain access to disadvantaged groups in the context of an intractable conflict. The political status of Palestinians in Israel and the atmosphere of fear and distrust made it difficult to engage potential participants in a study with political and social contents, such as ours, and resulted in some methodological compromises. However, an important strength of our study is
that we were ultimately able to test our hypotheses in a sample of Palestinians living in Israel.

Studies 1 and 2 were correlational studies that tested the hypothesis that the motivation to induce outgroup fear is associated with violent collective action tendencies, while the motivation to induce regret is associated with nonviolent action tendencies. Study 2 further specified which goals each of these emotions serves to promote: corrective goals that are aimed at correcting injustice without eradicating the relation with the outgroup, or punitive goals that imply intentions to punish and take revenge on the outgroup. Accordingly, we tested whether the motivation to induce regret mediated the relationship between corrective goals and nonviolent collective action, and whether the motivation to induce fear mediated the relationship between punitive goals and violent action. In Study 3, we tested our hypotheses experimentally to demonstrate that corrective and punitive goals lead to the motivation to regulate regret and fear, respectively, among the outgroup by engaging in nonviolent or violent collective action.

Study 1

We conducted a correlational study to test our hypothesis that individuals’ motivation to engage in nonviolent collective action would be predicted by the motivation to induce regret, and their motivation to engage in violent action by the motivation to induce fear. The study took place in Israel during protests by Palestinian citizens against the shooting of a Palestinian youth by the Israeli police. Protests and demonstrations, which spread across several Palestinian villages and cities, called for an end to police and state aggression against Palestinian citizens and demanded justice and accountability. This shooting was at the time the latest in a series of killings by the police that had taken the lives of 48 Palestinian citizens of Israel since 2000. For the Palestinian population, this incident was a consequence of continuous state oppression and police brutality that constituted a direct threat to the existence and the status of a large national minority consisting of 1.5 million citizens. These events, which affected the existence of the entire Palestinian population within Israel, provided us with an opportunity to investigate collective action tendencies and willingness to induce outgroup emotions.

Method

Participants

The initial sample was comprised of 177 Palestinian citizens of Israel that were recruited using social media and snowball sampling. Four participants were removed from the analysis because they were under the age of 17, and 18 for failing to complete the questionnaire, yielding a sample of 155 participants. Seven outliers that fell at least three standard deviations below the mean on the main variables were also dropped from the analyses, leaving a final sample of 148 participants (82 females; ages 17–69, four did not report age, $M_{age} = 31.80$, $SD_{age} = 13.23$). This sample included Palestinians from different areas in the country including populations from peripheral villages. The majority of participants were from low to average socioeconomic status (SES; 48.6% low SES, 37.2% low-middle SES), with relatively high level of education (52% had obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher).

Procedure

Participants completed a questionnaire either online or on paper. The questionnaire included a measure of background variables followed by a text reminding participants of the context of the shooting incident and its impact on the Palestinian population in Israel. The text was followed by items assessing participants’ motivation to take part in different forms of collective action and to induce outgroup emotions.

Measures

Motivation for outgroup emotions was assessed using two different items, the first assessing motivation
for outgroup regret and the second assessing motivation for outgroup fear. Both items were ranked on a 6-point scale (1 = not at all, 6 = very much so), with participants indicating the extent to which they wanted Israeli Jews to feel each of the emotions in light of the murder (“To what extent do you want Israeli Jews to feel [regret over the murder/fear of Palestinians]”).

Collective action. Nonviolent collective action intentions were measured using four items assessing intentions to partake in various activities aimed at protesting against police and state violence toward Palestinian citizens in Israel (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004; see also Tausch et al., 2011). These actions were “discussing the events on social media,” “signing a petition,” “participating in a demonstration,” and “taking part in strikes.” Participants indicated to what extent they were willing to take part in collective action on a 6-point scale (1 = not at all, 6 = very much so; Cronbach’s α = .82). Violent collective action intentions were measured using four items: “breaking into the state institutions,” “throwing stones or bottles in the demonstration,” “confronting the police in the demonstration,” “burning tires to attract public attention” (Cronbach’s α = .91).

Control variables. To allow us to rule out alternative explanations for the hypothesized relationship between preferences for outgroup emotions and collective action, we included the prominent predictors of collective action as control variables, namely ingroup anger, efficacy, and identification (see van Zomeren, 2013). We measured individuals’ experience of two ingroup emotions, anger and hatred. We controlled for anger in the analysis of the relationship between motivation for regret and nonviolent action, and for hatred in the analysis of the relationship between motivation for fear and violent action intentions. Finally, we also measured identification with the group with a shortened six-item version of the Multidimensional Group Identification Scale; example item: “I feel strongly committed to Palestinians” (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008; Cronbach’s α = .87).

Results

We examined means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among our variables (see Table 1). As expected, the analysis revealed that individuals’ motivation to have the outgroup feel regret was positively correlated with their motivation to engage in nonviolent collective action (r = .48, p < .001), but uncorrelated with their motivation to engage in violent collective action (r = .06, p = .46). Their motivation to have the outgroup feel fear was positively correlated with their motivation to engage in violent collective action (r = .33, p < .001), but no correlation was found with their motivation to engage in nonviolent collective action (r = .01, p = .85).

We then used linear regression to test whether collective action intentions are predicted by motivation for outgroup emotions above and beyond the experience of anger or hatred, perceived effectiveness of nonviolent action, and group identification. For nonviolent action, the analysis revealed that motivation for regret, anger, beliefs in the efficacy of nonviolent action, and ingroup identification explained 41% of the variance, R² = .41, F(4, 142) = 23.74, p < .001. In line with
our hypothesis, motivation for regret significantly predicted nonviolent action (\( \beta = 0.29, p < .001 \)) beyond anger (\( \beta = 0.13, p = .07 \)), efficacy beliefs (\( \beta = 0.24, p = .003 \)), and ingroup identification (\( \beta = 0.25, p = .001 \)), indicating that disadvantaged group members who are motivated to induce regret among the advantaged group are more likely to endorse nonviolent strategies.

For violent action, the analysis indicated that motivation for fear, hatred, perceived effectiveness of violent action, and ingroup identification explained 46% of the variance, \( R^2 = .46, F(4, 141) = 29.30, p < .001 \). The effect of motivation for fear on violent collective action did not reach significance (\( \beta = 0.09, p = .20 \)) when controlling for hatred (\( \beta = 0.03, p = .70 \)), efficacy beliefs (\( \beta = 0.59, p < .001 \)), and group identification (\( \beta = 0.15, p = .02 \)). This can be explained by the fact that the relationship between perceived effectiveness of violent action and violent action tendencies approached collinearity, as reflected in the high correlation between the variables (\( r = .65, p < .001 \)), which might have reduced the variance and suppressed the effect of motivation for fear. The effect of motivation for fear is significant if we exclude perceived effectiveness of violent action from the analysis (\( \beta = 0.23, p = .009 \)).

**Discussion**

The results of Study 1 are partially consistent with our hypothesis that people are motivated to influence the emotions of the outgroup in collective action. While the hypothesis about motivation to induce outgroup fear was not supported due to a potential multicollinearity problem with the measures, the results do support the hypothesis that the motivation to induce outgroup regret predicts nonviolent collective action tendencies. Notwithstanding this initial evidence, these findings do not provide insight into what explains people’s motivation to evoke fear or regret distinctively among the outgroup in the context of collective action. Predicated on the notion that emotions promote goal attainment, we suppose that people are motivated to evoke others’ emotions in collective action to the extent that they see these emotions as beneficial to attain their social change goals. Disadvantaged group members who are motivated to evoke regret among the outgroup should hold different social change goals and thus different collective action strategies, compared to those who are motivated to evoke fear. More specifically, regret is argued to be an appeasement emotion that promotes prosocial behavior to amend the wrongdoing, and preferring outgroup regret could imply concern with corrective goals, such as recognizing and undoing injustice as a step to fix the relationship with the outgroup. Fear, on the other hand, is an emotion that has been linked to avoidance goals, and preferring outgroup fear could imply pursuit of punitive goals, such as taking revenge or threatening the outgroup.

**Table 1.** Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations among variables in Study 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Motivation to induce outgroup regret</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Motivation to induce outgroup fear</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nonviolent collective action</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Violent collective action</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Anger towards (Israeli) Jews</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Hatred towards (Israeli) Jews</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Efficacy of nonviolent action</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Efficacy of violent action</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Identification (with Palestinians)</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*\( p < .05 \). **\( p < .01 \).
To test these ideas, in Study 2 we measured goals that may shape the emotion regulation attempts to induce fear and regret in collective action. Thus, Study 2 was aimed to add further support to the findings of Study 1 and to move one step closer to understanding what regulatory goals people pursue when they engage in nonviolent and violent collective action. In Study 2, we thus tested the hypothesis that the relationship between individuals’ goals and their motivation to engage in collective action is mediated by their motivation to induce outgroup emotions.

Study 2

We conducted a second study to investigate whether the motivation for outgroup regret would mediate the relationship between corrective goals and nonviolent collective action, and whether the motivation to induce fear would mediate the relationship between punitive goals and violent collective action. Study 2 was conducted prior to the 2015 Israeli elections. These elections were characterized by racist incitement against Palestinians, reflected in a series of threats, intimidations, and attempts to delegitimize them in the eyes of the Jewish population. In addition, the electoral threshold for entering parliament had been raised prior to the elections, in a move seen as designed to make it difficult for the small Palestinian parties to make the cut. This led the three Palestinian-majority parties to form a united list that could both pass the threshold and play a central role within the parliamentary opposition.

Method

Participants

One hundred and eighty-three Palestinian citizens of Israel participated in the study on a voluntary basis. Twenty participants were not included in the analysis for not completing the questionnaire, leaving a final sample of 163 participants (76 females; ages 17–63; \(M_{\text{age}} = 27; SD_{\text{age}} = 8.60\)). The majority of participants were from low to average socioeconomic status (33% low SES, 43.5% low–middle SES), with high levels of education (75% had obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher).

Procedure

Participants completed a questionnaire either online or on paper. A team of two recruiters approached participants at Israeli universities, election rallies, and political events. The questionnaire included a text about the elections and their implications for the Palestinian population in Israel, followed by items measuring goals, motivation to induce outgroup emotions, and willingness to participate in different forms of collective action. Subsequently, participants responded to a measure of other background variables.

Measures

Goals were assessed using four items, two items designed to measure corrective goals and two measuring punitive goals. Participants rated the extent to which they supported each of the stated goals. The corrective goal items were “Undermining the status quo and power balance in the country,” “Delegitimizing and changing the Zionist institutions”; and the punitive goals were “Making Israeli Jews suffer like they made us suffer,” “Taking revenge on Israeli Jews over all racist practices.” A principal components factor analysis with promax rotation showed that the four items loaded on two separate factors: the two items of the corrective goals scale loaded highly on one factor (Cronbach’s \(\alpha = .69\)), explaining 26.03% of the variance (all loadings > .81), and the two items of the punitive goals scale loaded on another factor (Cronbach’s \(\alpha = .79\)), explaining 54.58% of the variance (all loadings > .84).

Motivation for inducing outgroup emotions was measured using two items similar to the ones in Study 1. Participants indicated the extent to which they wanted Israeli Jews to feel each of the emotions in light of racist policies and practices (“To what extent do you want Israeli Jews to feel [regret over racist practices/fear of Palestinians]?”).
We performed a second principal components factor analysis with promax rotation to test whether the motivations for outgroup emotions were statistically distinct from the goals, but we did not find the hypothesized two-factor structure for the constructs. Specifically, the three items regarding motivation to induce regret and corrective goals loaded on a single factor, explaining 58.6% of the variance (all loadings > .64). Similarly, the analysis yielded one factor for the motivation to induce fear and punitive goals that explained 70.08% of the variance (all loadings > .78). We return to this limitation in the Discussion section.

**Collective action.** Nonviolent action was assessed using a slightly modified measure examining intentions to partake in various activities aimed at protesting against racism against Palestinians. To this end, the item “Participating in strikes” was replaced with the item “Launching international demonstrations with the police” (Cronbach’s α = .77). The violent collective action measure was modified to include other forms of action, using three items: “armed resistance” “guerrilla warfare,” “confrontational demonstrations with the police” (Cronbach’s α = .89).

**Anger, hatred, and ingroup identification** were measured using the same items and scales used in Study 1. Unlike Study 1, in which we measured the perceived efficacy of collective action, in Study 2 we assessed beliefs about the efficacy of the group using one item (“I believe that we Palestinians are capable of advancing change in our situation”), with participants rating their agreement with this statement on a 6-point scale.

**Results**

The correlation analyses showed that corrective goals were significantly and positively related to preferences for outgroup regret ($r = .34, p < .001$) and to nonviolent action tendencies ($r = .31, p < .001$). Corrective goals were also related to preferences for outgroup fear ($r = .23, p < .01$) and to violent action intentions ($r = .35, p < .001$). Punitive goals were related to preferences for outgroup action ($r = .54, p < .001$) and to violent action intentions ($r = .30, p < .001$), and were also correlated with preferences for outgroup regret ($r = .28, p < .001$), but unrelated to nonviolent action intentions ($r = −.05, ns$). Preferences for outgroup regret were significantly related to nonviolent collective action intentions ($r = .35, p < .001$) and unrelated to violent collective action ($r = .10, ns$). Preferences for fear were not correlated with nonviolent collective action ($r = −.13, ns$), but positively correlated with violent collective action ($r = .37, p < .001$; see Table 2).

A mediation model was examined using Hayes’s (2013) bootstrapping PROCESS for SPSS (Model 4; 5,000 iterations) to determine whether corrective goals were associated with motivation for regret, and thus with higher support for nonviolent collective action, controlling for motivation for fear as a second mediator. The analysis showed that corrective goals predicted motivation for outgroup regret ($b = 0.33, SE = 0.07, t = 4.46, p < .001, 95% CI [0.18, 0.47]) and motivation for regret predicted support for nonviolent action ($b = 0.22, SE = 0.05, t = 3.88, p < .001, 95% CI [0.11, 0.33]$), whereas motivation for fear negatively predicted nonviolent action ($b = −0.12, SE = 0.04, t = −3.1, p = .003, 95% CI [−0.20, −0.04]$). Results revealed that the relationship between corrective goals and nonviolent collective action ($b = 0.23, SE = 0.05, t = 4.08, p < .001, 95% CI [0.12, 0.34]$) was reduced after the motivation for regret variable was included in the model ($b = 0.19, SE = 0.05, t = 3.41, p = .001, 95% CI [0.08, 0.38]$). The indirect effect through motivation for regret was significant ($a * b: .07; SE = 0.02; 95% CI [0.03, 0.14]$; see Figure 1).

When controlling for anger, efficacy beliefs, and ingroup identification, the pattern was weaker such that the overall relationship between corrective goals and nonviolent action was decreased ($b = 0.09, SE = 0.06, t = 1.48, p = .14, 95% CI [−0.03, 0.21]$), but the indirect effect through motivation for regret was still significant ($a * b: .02; SE = 0.02; 95% CI [0.001, 0.07]$). This analysis shows that people who prefer outgroup
regret are more likely to support nonviolent collective action to promote their corrective goals. To examine alternative accounts, we checked the reversed mediation model in which corrective goals lead to nonviolent collective action, which in turn lead to preferences for regret, controlling for anger, efficacy beliefs, and ingroup identification, and we found that the mediation was not significant (b = 0.12, SE = 0.08, t = 1.56, ns; a * b: .02; SE = 0.02; 95% CI [−0.01, 0.90]).

Our hypothesis that motivation for outgroup fear mediates the relationship between punitive goals and violent collective action, controlling for motivation for outgroup regret as a second mediator, was also supported. The analysis showed that punitive goals predicted motivation for outgroup fear (b = 0.67, SE = 0.08, t = 8.20, p < .001, 95% CI [0.51, 0.83]) and motivation for fear predicted violent action tendencies (b = 0.26, SE = 0.07, t = 3.32, p = .001, 95% CI [0.01, 0.41]), whereas motivation for regret did not (b = 0.03, SE = 0.09, t = 0.32, p = .75, 95% CI [−0.16, 0.22]). The relationship between punitive goals and violent collective action (b = 0.33, SE = 0.08, t = 4.04, p < .001, 95% CI [0.17, 0.49]) became nonsignificant when motivation for fear was added to the model (b = 0.15, SE = 0.10, t = 1.50, p = .13). The indirect effect through motivation for fear was significant (a * b: .17; SE = 0.06; 95% CI [0.06, 0.32]), which means that the relationship was fully mediated by motivation for outgroup fear (see Figure 2).

**Table 2.** Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations among variables in Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Corrective goals</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>−</td>
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<td>2. Punitive goals</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>−</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Motivation to induce outgroup regret</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>−</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Motivation to induce outgroup fear</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>−</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Nonviolent collective action</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>−.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Violent collective action</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>−</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Anger towards (Israeli) Jews</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>−</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hatred towards (Israeli) Jews</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>−</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Efficacy of the ingroup</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Identification (with Palestinians)</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>.48*</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.39**</td>
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*p < .05. **p < .01.

**Figure 1.** Motivation for outgroup regret mediates the relationship between corrective goals and nonviolent collective action.

**Figure 2.** Motivation for outgroup fear mediates the relationship between punitive goals and violent collective action.
A similar but weaker pattern was found when controlling for hatred, efficacy beliefs, and ingroup identification such that the total effect was marginally significant ($b = 0.17$, $SE = 0.09$, $t = 1.77, p = .08$, 95% CI $[-0.02, 0.35]$), the indirect effect was significant ($a \times b = 0.08; SE = 0.05; 95\% \text{ CI} [0.01, 0.20]$), and the direct effect was not ($b = 0.07, SE = 0.10$, $t = 0.93, p = .35$, 95% CI $[-0.02, 0.30]$). Again, this analysis demonstrates that people who prefer to induce outgroup fear are more likely to engage in violent collective action to promote their punitive goals. We checked the reversed mediation model in which punitive goals lead to violent collective action, which in turn lead to preferences for fear, controlling for hatred, efficacy beliefs, and ingroup identification. It was found that even though the total effect was significant ($b = 0.54$, $SE = 0.09$, $t = 5.70, p < .001$, 95% CI $[0.35, 0.73]$), the indirect effect was not ($a \times b = 0.03; SE = 0.02; 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.004, 0.10]$).

Discussion
Study 2 provided converging support for our hypotheses. We were able to demonstrate that disadvantaged group members who seek corrective goals such as ending structural disadvantage are more likely to prefer to induce regret among the outgroup, and thus to support nonviolent collective action. On the other hand, those who adhere to punitive goals such as threatening the outgroup are more likely to prefer to induce fear in the outgroup, and hence support violent collective action. Moreover, we were able to demonstrate these relationships above and beyond other predictors of collective action such as intergroup anger, ingroup identification, and efficacy beliefs. However, these findings are correlational and thus still subject to various alternative explanations. In addition, the factor analysis did not indicate that the goals and motivations to induce emotions are theoretically distinct constructs, which might be due in part to a semantic overlap between the measures. Therefore, we sought to address these limitations in Study 3 by focusing on strategic higher level goals, and employing an experimental design to support causal inferences and demonstrate how goals drive certain emotional preferences for the outgroup, which in turn lead to the endorsement of certain collective action strategies.

Study 3
The aim of Study 3 was to establish causal evidence for the relationship between goals and emotional preferences. To this end, we employed an experimental design in which we manipulated goals and examined how these affect the motivation to induce outgroup emotions and collective action tendencies. The study was conducted among Palestinian citizens of Israel prior to a major collective action event that takes place every year. For practical and ethical reasons, we manipulated appraisals of group goals instead of participants’ own goals. Participants were randomly assigned to read a description of a subgroup in their society that endorsed either punitive goals, revolutionary-corrective goals, or nonrevolutionary-corrective goals, and were asked to rate the extent to which they expected this subgroup to be motivated to elicit certain outgroup emotions and engage in collective action. We anticipated that punitive goals would lead to expectations of violent collective action through perceived motivation to induce outgroup fear. Furthermore, we expected that revolutionary-corrective goals would lead to expectations of nonviolent collective action through the motivation to induce outgroup regret.

Method
Participants
A sample of 307 Palestinian citizens of Israel participated in the study. Forty-nine participants were excluded for either failing to complete the questionnaire (12 participants), being under the age of 17 (three participants), or exhibiting poor attention and effort based on attention check questions and reading time (34 participants), yielding a final sample of 258 participants (158 females, 18 did not report gender; 29 did not report age, $M_{\text{age}} = 25.32; SD_{\text{age}} = 10.08$). The
majority of participants were from low to average socioeconomic status (30.5% identified as working class and 34.9% identified as middle class), but with high levels of education (57.4% had a bachelor's degree and 12% had a master's degree or higher).

**Procedure**

Participants were approached or recruited at Israeli university campuses or through social media by a team of three assistants, in return for coffee vouchers. After giving their informed consent, participants read a short text about the context of the study centering on the Palestinian Nakba and the Return March. The Nakba stands for the catastrophe that Palestinians suffered in the 1948 war that led to the forced displacement of nearly a million Palestinians and the creation of the state of Israel. Every year, Palestinians organize activities in Israel/Palestine and the diaspora to commemorate the Nakba and demand the return of the Palestinian refugees.

After reading this text, we exposed participants to the manipulation of group goals. We adapted the method of imagined responses to criteria-based scenario simulations, which is used in research on emotion appraisal processes (see Fernández, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015). The method consists of constructing scenarios in which specific components of the situation are systematically varied, and participants imagine which emotion the person in the scenario would have felt (Scherer, 1988). In the current study, participants were assigned to one of three conditions to read a description of a subgroup in their society and its goal with regard to the question of the Nakba and the status of Palestinians in Israel. The described goals were derived from the theoretical work of Sweetman, Leach, Spears, Pratto, and Saab (2013), which proposes a typology of social change goals that can be distinguished along the dimensions of perceived legitimacy of the system, perceived capacity to create change within the current system, and the inclusiveness of the social change. For the purpose of the current study, we focused on the three goals (originally termed regressive revolution, progressive revolution, and amelioration) that are most relevant in the Palestinian context and that overlap with the goals examined in Study 2. One of the conditions described a subgroup that endorsed punitive goals as in Study 2, associated with perceptions of injustice committed against Palestinians since the Nakba and with imagining an alternative system that would increase the social value of Palestinians exclusively, such as a Palestinian-Arab state that would replace the Israeli Zionist state (i.e., regressive revolution). Participants in this condition read the following description:

There is a group within the Palestinian/Arab society in Israel who believe that what was done to Palestinians in the 1948 war was unjust, and seeks total liberation from the ongoing discrimination and oppression that still face Palestinians to this day. These people insist on the right of return of the Palestinian refugees and think that Jews should either go back to Europe or live under the sovereignty of a Palestinian Arab state. Further, they believe that Israeli Jews should pay the price and be punished for the historical and current wronging against Palestinians.

The second condition described a subgroup that endorsed corrective goals as in Study 2, that were also revolutionary in the sense that they were compatible with perceptions of injustice committed against Palestinians since the Nakba, and with imagining an alternative system that would do justice to both groups, Arabs/Palestinians and Jews (i.e., progressive revolution). Participants in this condition were presented with the following text:

There is a group within the Palestinian Arab society in Israel who believes that what was done to Palestinians in the 1948 war was unjust, and seeks total liberation from the ongoing discrimination and oppression that still face Palestinians to this day. These people insist on the right of return of the Palestinian refugees and believe that Jews need to acknowledge and apologize for the historical
and current wronging against Palestinians. This group seeks to challenge the status quo and the power balance, and aim to change the Zionist character of the state and its institutions and to create an alternative equal and democratic space in which both Arabs/Palestinians and Jews would live together.

We extended the range of goals we had in Study 2 to include a third exploratory condition describing a subgroup who supported corrective goals that were not revolutionary. Such goals were also associated with perceptions of injustice, but with inability to imagine an alternative to the system, and hence aimed at repairing the system rather than changing it, such as improving the Israeli institutions (i.e., amelioration). Participants in this condition read the following:

There is a group within the Palestinian/Arab society in Israel who believe that what was done to Palestinians in the 1948 war was unjust, but they think the realization of the right of return is very difficult and not likely. They believe that the efforts in the struggle should be invested in highlighting the current discrimination issues that still face Palestinians/Arabs in housing, employment and others, and they want Israeli Jews to understand and try to see things from the Palestinian perspective. These people seek to address discrimination and promote better opportunities for Palestinians/Arabs by improving the functioning of the institutions in Israel.

For simplicity, we will refer to the corrective goals as revolutionary versus nonrevolutionary. Following the goal manipulation, participants rated the extent to which they believed the described ingroup members were motivated to elicit outgroup emotions (“If this subgroup had the ability to influence and change how Israeli Jews feel about the issue of the Nakba and Palestinians, to what degree would they want to elicit these emotions among Israeli Jews?”). To strengthen the validity of the measures, each motivation was assessed using two emotion items. Motivation for regret was measured using two items: “Regret [guilt] about what was committed during the Nakba” \( r = .73, p < .001 \). Motivation for fear was measured using two items: “Fear [panic] from Palestinians” \( r = .89, p < .001 \).

Collective action. Perceived nonviolent action intentions were measured using one item: “To what degree do you think these group members will engage in peaceful activities to commemorate the Nakba (e.g., peaceful demonstrations, signing petitions, etc.).” Perceived violent action intentions were measured using one item: “To what degree do you think these group members will engage in confrontational or violent activities to commemorate the Nakba (e.g., confrontations with the police, throwing stones, etc.).”

Results

To test whether the manipulation influenced the perceived motivation to induce outgroup regret and fear, we conducted two one-way ANOVAs—one for each emotional preference as the dependent variable. The first analysis revealed a significant difference between the conditions in the perceptions of motivation to induce outgroup regret, \( F(2, 254) = 15.14, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .10 \). A post hoc analysis comparing the levels of perceived motivation for outgroup regret between conditions revealed significantly higher appraisals of motivation in the revolutionary goals condition \( M = 5.18; SD = 0.86 \), compared with participants in the punitive goals condition \( M = 4.71; SD = 1.47; p = .015 \) and nonrevolutionary goals \( M = 4.14; SD = 1.25; p < .001 \) conditions. For the motivation for outgroup fear, the results showed significant differences between the conditions,
$F(2, 254) = 10.20, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .07$. A planned contrast comparing levels of perceived motivation for outgroup fear revealed significantly higher perceived motivation in the punitive goals condition ($M = 2.92; SD = 1.67$) than in the revolutionary goals ($M = 2.34; SD = 1.41; p = .008$) and the nonrevolutionary goals ($M = 1.95; SD = 1.14; p < .001$) conditions.

We then ran the same ANOVA analysis on the perceived willingness to engage in nonviolent and violent collective action. The results revealed marginally significant differences between conditions in perceptions of nonviolent action intentions, $F(2, 254) = 2.65, p = .07, \eta_p^2 = .02$. A planned contrast comparing the levels of perceived nonviolent action intentions between conditions showed no significant difference between the revolutionary goals ($M = 4.31; SD = 1.32$) and the punitive goals conditions ($M = 4.41; SD = 1.37; p = .64$). Nonviolent action tendencies were perceived to be lowest in the nonrevolutionary goals condition ($M = 3.94; SD = 1.51$), compared with the revolutionary goals ($p = .09$) and the punitive goals ($p = .03$) conditions. As for the perceived willingness to engage in violent collective action, the analysis yielded significant differences between conditions, $F(2, 254) = 14.10, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .10$. The planned contrast analysis showed significantly higher perceptions of violent collective action intentions in the punitive goals condition ($M = 3.80; SD = 1.52$) than in the revolutionary goals ($M = 3.18; SD = 1.38; p = .006$) and the nonrevolutionary goals ($M = 2.63; SD = 1.40; p < .001$) conditions (see Figures 3 and 4).

To test our main hypothesis, we employed the multicategorical independent variable feature of the PROCESS command (Hayes & Preacher, 2014), because the manipulation included three conditions. This analysis created two dummy variables using revolutionary goals as the reference condition: D1, comparing the punitive goals condition to the reference category (1 = punitive goals, 0 = revolutionary and nonrevolutionary goals); and D2, comparing the nonrevolutionary goals condition to the reference category (1 = nonrevolutionary goals, 0 = revolutionary and punitive goals).

**Motivation for Outgroup Regret**

The analysis showed that D1 and D2 negatively predicted motivation for outgroup regret ($D1: b = -0.48, SE = 0.18, t = -2.56, p = .011, 95\% CI [-0.85, -0.11]; D2: b = -1.05, SE = 0.19, t = -5.55, p < .001, 95\% CI [-1.42, -0.67])}, indicating that participants expected more motivation
for outgroup regret in the revolutionary goals condition, compared with those in the punitive goals and the nonrevolutionary goals conditions. Perceived motivation for outgroup regret significantly predicted perceived motivation for nonviolent action ($b = 0.26, SE = 0.07, t = 3.78, p < .001, 95\% CI [0.12, 0.40]$). Contrary to our hypothesis, the total effect of D1 on perceived motivation for nonviolent action was not significant ($b = 0.09, SE = 0.21, t = 0.41, p = .68, 95\% CI [-0.33, 0.51])$, meaning that participants appraised that people who endorse punitive goals would be willing to engage in nonviolent action to a similar degree as those who endorse revolutionary goals. The effect of D2 on the perceived motivation for nonviolent action was in line with our hypothesis but only marginally significant ($b = -0.36, SE = .22, t = -1.67, p = .095, 95\% CI [-0.79, 0.06]$), such that participants perceived people who endorse revolutionary goals as more likely to engage in nonviolent action, compared with those who endorse nonrevolutionary goals. The direct effect of D1 on the outcome variable remained nonsignificant after adding the mediator to the model ($b = 0.22, SE = 0.21, t = 1.02, p = .31, 95\% CI [-0.20, 0.63]$), and the direct effect of D2 was reduced and became nonsignificant ($b = -0.08, SE = 0.22, t = -0.37, p = .70, 95\% CI [-0.52, 0.35]$). Nevertheless, the indirect effects through motivation for outgroup regret were in line with our hypothesis ($a * b: -1.3; SE = 0.06; 95\% CI [-0.29, -0.03]; D2: b = -0.28, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [-0.47, -0.12]$). Participants perceived people who endorse revolutionary goals as more likely to be motivated to induce outgroup regret and thus to engage in nonviolent action, compared with those who endorse punitive and nonrevolutionary goals (see Figure 5).

Motivation for Outgroup Fear

We ran the same analysis on motivation for outgroup fear and violent collective action and found that D1 positively predicted motivation for outgroup fear (D1: $b = 0.64, SE = 0.22, t = 2.92, p = .004, 95\% CI [0.21, 1.07]$); such that participants believed that people who endorse punitive goals are more motivated to induce outgroup fear than those who endorse revolutionary goals. On the other hand, even though marginally significant, D2 negatively predicted motivation for outgroup fear ($b = -3.60, SE = 0.22, t = -1.62, p = .10, 95\% CI [-0.79, 0.08]$), implying that participants expected more motivation for outgroup fear among people who endorse revolutionary goals, compared to nonrevolutionary goals.
In line with our hypothesis, results revealed that the total effect of D1 on violent collective action (\( b = 0.55, SE = 0.22, t = 2.50, p = .013, 95\% CI [0.12, 0.99] \)) was reduced after the motivation for fear was included in the model (\( b = 0.47, SE = 0.05, t = 2.10, p = .037, 95\% CI [0.03, 0.91] \)). The indirect effect through motivation for fear was significant (\( a \cdot b : 0.08; SE = 0.06; 95\% CI [0.01, 0.25] \)). The effect of D2 on violent action (\( b = -0.59, SE = 0.22, t = -2.60, p = .009, 95\% CI [-1.03, -0.15] \)) was also reduced after adding the mediator (\( b = -0.54, SE = 0.22, t = -2.43, p = .016, 95\% CI [-0.98, -0.10] \)), but the indirect effect did not reach significance (\( a \cdot b : -0.05; SE = 0.04; 95\% CI [-0.15, 0.001] \); see Figure 6).8

**Discussion**

By manipulating appraisals of group goals in Study 3, we were able to provide experimental support for our hypothesis and confirm that goals drive emotional preferences and collective action tendencies. Our first hypothesis about the motivation for outgroup regret was largely supported. Even though group members who were described as supporting corrective revolutionary goals were not perceived to be higher on nonviolent action tendencies, our results indicated that the relationship between the endorsement of such goals and nonviolent action was mediated by the perceived motivation to induce regret among the outgroup. Moreover, perceived
motivation for outgroup regret did not mediate the relationship between nonrevolutionary-corrective goals and nonviolent action, which means that this mediation is specific to corrective goals that are revolutionary.

Our second hypothesis regarding motivation for outgroup fear was fully supported, such that endorsement of punitive goals was perceived to lead to violent action through motivation to elicit fear among the outgroup. These results suggest that people who support punitive goals are more motivated to make the outgroup feel fear, which in turn predicts higher tendencies for action that is more violent. Nevertheless, even though our findings provide support for our hypothesis and mitigate the likelihood of alternative explanations, they should be treated with some caution. Our conclusions are drawn from people’s beliefs about social change goals, emotional preferences, and collective action, and these beliefs may not overlap entirely, which can explain why nonviolent collective action tendencies in Study 3 were perceived similarly in both proponents of punitive and revolutionary goals. We discuss this limitation further in the General Discussion section.

General Discussion

The aim of this research was to expand current knowledge on collective action by exploring emotion regulation motives underlying violent and nonviolent collective action. We thus examined how violent and nonviolent collective actions are predicted by disadvantaged group members’ motivation to evoke emotions in their opponents (Study 1), and how this motivation depends on the group goals individuals pursue through collective action (Studies 2 and 3).

Consistent with the instrumental approach to emotion regulation (Tamir, 2016; Tamir & Ford, 2009), the current studies demonstrate that group members who want the outgroup to feel fear are likely to support violent collective action in their pursuit of punitive goals. Group members who prefer outgroup regret tend to prefer nonviolent action to promote their corrective goals. Our findings underscore the importance of considering the motivation to influence outgroup emotions when thinking about endorsement of social change goals and collective action strategies people use to achieve these goals.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

Although previous research has examined the role of emotions in predicting collective action, it has neglected emotion regulation processes in such contexts. By bringing together the literature on collective action with work on emotion regulation, our research contributes to the understanding of the antecedents to collective action. Thus, the current work extends past research on collective action by examining other predictors related to people’s motivation to influence others’ emotions, and which have specific implications for action.

Our research is consistent with the approach that views individuals as active actors who make strategic choices in collective action in terms of goals (see Goldenberg et al., 2016), tactics, and communication with target audiences. Our research suggests that individuals hold assumptions about how to influence their target, how emotions can be utilized to promote their cause, and which tactics can be used to induce these emotions among the outgroup. For example, we demonstrate that disadvantaged group members consciously prefer outgroup fear over regret (or vice versa), and they understand that violent strategies, rather than nonviolent ones, can induce this emotion, which would influence the group and promote their goals.

Furthermore, incorporating emotion regulation processes into collective action is useful for understanding the goals people pursue toward their desired change. Hornsey et al. (2006) indicate different goals for collective action that relate to intergroup concerns (e.g., decision makers), intragroup concerns (e.g., building opposition), and broader societal concerns (e.g., third parties). Our study was focused on intergroup concerns but it shows that disadvantaged group members can be motivated to influence members of the outgroup who are not necessarily
decision makers, and that the social change they seek can be broken into more specific goals. Despite the distinction between nonviolent and violent strategies in the collective action work, social change has been treated as a general thing that the group as a whole aspires to, irrespective of individuals’ collective action tendencies. Our findings shed light on the notion that social change holds different meanings for individuals who are more supportive of violent strategies, compared with those who favor nonviolent ones.

Previous research has shown that people may regulate their own emotions or the emotions of others in interpersonal contexts. The present research extends the existing literature on emotion regulation by examining how people try to regulate the emotions of others in group contexts (see Netzer et al., 2018). Emotion regulation in these situations is different from the intrapersonal and interpersonal counterparts because it carries with it the connotation of group membership. Under circumstances that make group membership salient, such as when people experience collective disadvantage, individuals’ behavior can be understood in terms of concerns and goals that are group-based, rather than individual-based (Smith & Mackie, 2008). The social goals that motivate emotion regulation in group contexts target the ingroup and the outgroup as a whole and have consequences for the relationship between the two groups, which are different from the consequences of regulating others’ emotions in personally relevant interactions (Goldenberg et al., 2016). Provoking outgroup fear or regret through collective action both aim to improve the position of the group and to undo injustice, but they entail different implications for the relations between the disadvantaged and the advantaged groups. Whereas wanting the outgroup to feel regret may reflect the desire to make outgroup members take the perspective of the disadvantaged, acknowledge the wrongdoing, and to persuade them into corrective attitudes without communicating threatening messages, inducing fear signifies otherwise. It can be argued that making the outgroup feel fear, as compared with regret, stems from less willingness to fix or improve the relationship with the outgroup. Rather than seeking to encourage the advantaged group to take the perspective of the disadvantaged one and become aware of injustice, we suppose that the motivation to provoke fear through violent collective action is intended to communicate capability to inflict harm on the outgroup, which is expected to curb their behaviors and force them to weigh the consequences and costs of their actions.

On the application level, the current research has implications for activists and participants in collective action who wish to understand the motivational sources of different forms of collective action. Understanding the potential role of emotion regulation can help activists make strategic and selective use of emotions to influence their outgroup (or other target audiences) and promote their goals. It should be noted, however, that the preference to induce certain emotions among the target audience depends on the goals that individuals endorse, which is what determines their perceptions regarding the effectiveness of regulating these emotions (Tamir, 2016). When attempting to influence people’s preferences for outgroup emotions, collective action activists might intend to affect people’s goals or their perceptions about the utility of regulating certain emotions.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

Our studies have some limitations that need to be highlighted. Our reliance in Study 3 on people’s beliefs about emotional preferences and collective action behaviors may carry certain disadvantages. There is an underlying assumption that beliefs about others’ intentions influence people’s behavior toward themselves and others, such as guiding their emotional and collective action preferences. However, these beliefs may or may not fully overlap with people’s own emotional preferences and collective action tendencies. Particularly, it is possible that what motivates people to induce outgroup emotions and engage in collective action is somehow different from their beliefs about what drives other people. In
addition, contexts of protracted violent conflict such as the Palestinian–Israeli one can exacerbate this limitation. As we have indicated earlier, such contexts raise ethical and practical concerns about manipulating people’s goals and emotional preferences, especially when these motivations are aimed at punishment and vengeance. Future research could address this limitation by manipulating goals in less violent contexts. Another possible criticism of this study is that it is focused on collective action intentions rather than actual behavior. Notwithstanding previous research that confirms that intentions predict behavior (see van Zomeren et al., 2008), future work could investigate behavioral measures such as actual decisions and participation in collective action. Another possible avenue for future research could examine other social change goals that are not necessarily linked to the motivation to induce outgroup regret or fear. Beyond the scope of the current work, future research might focus on different target audiences such as third parties or sympathizers, and explore how the disadvantaged group members’ goals and emotional preferences change accordingly. Relatedly, the nature of the Israeli–Palestinian context may limit our ability to generalize our findings to other social contexts. Particularly, we speculate that nonviolent collective action could be associated with other emotional preferences in other contexts. Specifically, in contexts where revolutionary goals are less relevant, group members may be motivated to elicit other emotions, depending on the social change they are seeking. For instance, it would be interesting to investigate in future research nonviolent action with regard to the emotional goal of outgroup sympathy.

In sum, the current study applies emotion regulation processes in collective action and demonstrates that disadvantaged group members can be driven by the motivation to influence the emotions of the outgroup to promote their group goals. The evidence from Studies 1 to 3 supports the notion that motivation for outgroup regret predicts nonviolent collective action tendencies, and motivation for outgroup fear predicts violent action tendencies. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that disadvantaged group members want to induce outgroup regret to promote corrective goals such as changing the illegitimate system, and outgroup fear to promote punitive goals such as revenge on the outgroup. These findings suggest that group members make strategic decisions in collective action about how to employ emotions and collective action to promote their goals.

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Supplemental material

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Notes

1. Throughout the paper, we use the terms nonviolent and violent, rather than normative and nonnormative, based on the notion that norms are a function of the power dynamics between groups. We took into account that the collective action norms of the low-power group and the high-power group can be different and even contradictory. Particularly, the norms of the dominant group might legitimize or delegitimize collective action according to its interests, and thus collective action that is completely peaceful can be considered nonnormative and delegitimized if it is perceived to violate the ethos of the dominant group.

2. The work of Imhoff et al. (2012) differentiates between the emotions of regret and guilt. It is argued that both guilt and regret can be associated with appraisals of moral transgression but they differ in their degree of self-focus: guilt is an aversive and self-focused rather than other-focused
emotion, whereas regret follows from taking a victim's perspective.

3. The participants that were removed did not respond to any of the main measures of the study.

4. Two outliers were 3.33 SD below the mean in non-violent collective action, and five outliers were at least 3 SD below the mean on motivation to induce outgroup regret.

5. This differentiation is drawn from previous work on the functional differences between anger and contempt in intergroup contexts. This body of work suggests that anger is a more constructive emotion that seeks to address injustice with the ultimate desire of reconciliation. Contempt, which is similar to hatred, are both associated with dehumanization and attribution of a negative nature to the offender, thus leading to support for extreme and violent actions (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Halperin, 2008). This approach received further support in the collective action literature, which demonstrated that anger is related to normative collective action (referred to as nonviolent action in this paper), whereas non-normative action (referred to as violent action) is driven by contempt (see Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011).

6. Participants who did not respond to any of the main measures.

7. We also included a measure of general activism, and participants reported moderate levels of involvement in activism ($M = 3.27; SD = 1.35$).

8. To provide further support for the assumption that participants believe that inducing outgroup emotions promotes social change goals, we included a measure of utility beliefs. Specifically, participants were asked “To what degree do you think that making Israeli Jews feel each of the following emotions could promote the goals of the group described above.” A correlational analysis revealed that utility beliefs about inducing regret and fear were positively correlated with perceptions of others’ motivation to induce outgroup regret and fear, respectively ($r = .48, p < .001; r = .64, p < .001$).

References


