Kant’s Moral and Political Cosmopolitanism

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Abstract

In this essay, I first outline the contexts in which the idea of cosmopolitanism appears in Kant’s moral and political philosophy. I then survey the three main debates regarding his political cosmopolitanism, namely, on the nature of the international federation he advocated, his theory of cosmopolitan right, and his views on colonialism and ‘race’, and I consider the relation between patriotism and cosmopolitanism in Kant’s work. I subsequently discuss Kant’s moral cosmopolitanism. Kant is widely held to be a defender of moral cosmopolitanism, but the terminology of world citizenship is in fact strikingly rare in Kant’s writings on moral theory. I offer a two-part explanation for why this is the case.

1. Introduction

Kant is regarded as a key figure in the history of philosophical cosmopolitanism.1 There is considerable controversy, however, about core elements of his cosmopolitan theory. In this essay, I start with a general introduction explaining the contexts in which the idea of cosmopolitanism, or world citizenship, plays a role in his work, and what the terminology means in these contexts (Section 2). I then survey three important debates concerning Kant’s political cosmopolitanism, namely, on the nature of the international federation he advocates, his theory of cosmopolitan right, and his views on colonialism and ‘race’, and I consider the relation between patriotism and cosmopolitanism (Section 3). In the fourth section, I discuss Kant’s moral cosmopolitanism. Kant is widely held to be a defender of moral cosmopolitanism, but he seldom uses the terminology of world citizenship in his writings on moral theory. I offer a two-part explanation for its virtual absence (Section 4).

2. Contexts of ‘Cosmopolitanism’

In the late 18th-century German intellectual discussion, the terminology of ‘cosmopolitanism’ (and related expressions) had both colloquial and more specific senses, and we find both represented in Kant’s work. Kant uses the term ‘world citizen’ colloquially to refer to a broad-minded (non-parochial) and benevolent person who is a ‘friend of humankind’ (Phil 2:448; Mrong 27:1550). He uses the language of cosmopolitanism in a more specific philosophical sense, too. He gives it a literal meaning in the context of his legal and political philosophy, and he uses it metaphorically in his moral philosophy.

Within the context of his legal and political philosophy, Kant develops the ideal of a global civil condition, which he calls a ‘cosmopolitan condition’. From early on in the Critical period, he argues that right requires that such a condition be established and, hence, that states ought to leave the international state of nature and join an international federation (Idea 8:15–31). During the mid-1790s, Kant additionally develops his theory of ‘cosmopolitan right’, which is to govern the interaction between states and foreign individuals. In each of these contexts, Kant’s legal and political theory has a worldwide scope and designates the establishment of a global legal and political order as a requirement of right (see Section 3 for further discussion).
Within the context of his moral theory, Kant uses ‘cosmopolitanism’ metaphorically. Moral cosmopolitanism is sometimes associated with the denial of local affiliations and obligations, in favor of a deracinated individualism. Kant, by contrast, defends cosmopolitanism in a very different sense, one that dates back to the Stoics, namely, as the affirmation of membership of all human beings (or, more precisely, all rational beings) in one all-encompassing moral community. Kant describes cosmopolitanism as the opposite of ‘moral egoism’: one should not regard oneself as ‘containing the whole world within oneself’ but, instead, as ‘a mere world citizen’, that is, as a mere member of a comprehensive moral community (A 7:130, emphasis added). In the Religion, Kant similarly opposes selfishness to a cosmopolitan attitude. Here, he contrasts the ‘narrow-minded, selfish, and intolerant manner of thinking of humans, especially with regard to matters pertaining to religion’ with the ‘idea of a cosmopolitan moral community’ (einer weltbürgerlichen moralischen Gemeinschaft). This idea of a cosmopolitan community is to inspire a ‘moral disposition of brotherly love’ (Rel 6:200).

Most readers, however, will associate Kant’s moral cosmopolitanism with his claim that we ought to regard ourselves and other persons as members in a moral ‘realm of ends’. Yet, the language of (world) ‘citizenship’ is conspicuously absent from his discussion of the realm of ends, in the Groundwork (G 4:433–440), and from the discussion, in the Critique of Pure Reason, of the ‘moral world’ in which moral agents live together under moral laws (A808/B836). Kant clearly makes metaphorical use of a political model to evoke the ideal of a worldwide moral community of agents, yet only rarely does he refer to moral agents as world ‘citizens’ in such a moral world (see Section 4 for further discussion and possible explanations).

3. Political Cosmopolitanism

In contemporary political theory, ‘cosmopolitanism’ is often used to refer to the position that normative criteria of global justice should be developed in abstraction from the institution of the state and state citizenship, instead addressing the needs and interests of individuals directly, as ‘world citizens’. Kant does not use ‘cosmopolitanism’ in this sense. He considers the (just) state to be indispensable to realizing the freedom of individuals. He describes the ‘cosmopolitan condition’ he advocates as a condition in which states have formed a federation. Furthermore, he conceives of ‘cosmopolitan right’ — which grants independent juridical standing to individuals as ‘world citizens’ independently of their membership in states — as regulating the interaction between foreign individuals and states. In other words, the state plays a vital role in Kant’s cosmopolitan political theory.

Individuals, Kant argues, have a duty to submit to the authority of a state. In order to realize and protect the freedom of each, it is necessary that all individuals leave the state of nature and establish a just state (Idea 8:22–23; TP 8:289; MM 6:307). As long as states exist in a state of nature with other states, however, any freedom they have realized internally is threatened from the outside. This is why, from the early 1780s through the late 1790s, Kant maintains that the problem of establishing right within the state cannot be solved independently of a solution to the problem of establishing rightful external relations among states (Idea 8:24; TP 8:310–312; PP 8:349n.). States ought to leave the international state of nature and enter a ‘cosmopolitan condition’ (Idea 8:24; PP 8:358), that is, a worldwide civil condition. There is general agreement in the literature that Kant, in calling for this cosmopolitan condition, does not call for the establishment of a single world state under which individuals would be directly subsumed. Rather, he calls for the establishment of a federation of states. There is substantial disagreement regarding the nature of this federation, however, and regarding the strength of Kant’s argument in support of it. There are further disagreements concerning Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan right and his position on colonialism.

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Furthermore, it is important to address the relation between Kant’s cosmopolitanism and patriotism. I discuss these issues in turn.

3.1. THE NATURE OF THE IDEAL FEDERATION

The difficulties in interpreting the details of Kant’s position and the consistency of his argument are both textual and philosophical. They turn largely on whether his reasoning as to why and how states should leave the international state of nature does or should parallel his reasoning as to why and how individuals should leave the state of nature among individuals. On the one hand, Kant emphasizes the structural similarities between the two cases. In the essay ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’ (1784), he writes that states show ‘the same unsociability’ as individuals, that this leads to ‘precisely the ills that pressured individual human beings and compelled them to enter into a lawful civil condition’, and that states are thus forced to join a federation with a ‘united power’ that enforces the ‘laws of the united will’ (Idea 8:24). This ‘cosmopolitan condition’, he writes, is to ‘resemble a civil commonwealth’ (Idea 8:24–25). These passages appear to be clear evidence that Kant advocates a state-like federation with legislative and coercive authority. On the other hand, however, he writes in Toward Perpetual Peace (1795) that although reason demands that states join a ‘state of peoples’ or ‘world republic’ with ‘public, binding laws’, they ‘do not want’ to do so, and that this is why a mere league is to be put ‘in the place of’ the ideal of a world republic (PP 8:357; cp. MM 6:350–351). This seems clear evidence that Kant advocates a loose and voluntary league, contradicting his statements in the ‘Idea for a Universal History’.

In the literature, one finds at least three – radically different – responses to this contradiction. First, most commentators regard Kant’s defense of the loose federation to be his considered position. They point to the fact that he forcefully rejects a ‘universal monarchy’ as leading to ‘soulless despotism’ and ultimately to anarchy (PP 8:367). They take this to amount to a rejection of any form of world government, on the grounds that any type of global government would be dangerous or ineffective, leading to despotism or internal warfare (e.g., Rawls 1999, 36 n. 40). Furthermore, some authors argue that not all kinds of conflicts that arise in the state of nature among individuals also arise in the state of nature among states, and that this explains why a voluntary league suffices in the case of states: at the international level, only a court of arbitration is necessary (Ripstein 2009, 225–231). Some authors also point out that Kant, in Toward Perpetual Peace, expressed the view that republics (in contrast to despotic states) tend toward peace and that nature tends in the direction of the emergence of republics. They take this to imply that peace can be achieved without a strong federation and that a voluntary league suffices (Doyle 1983, Rawls 1999, 44–54). In sum, on this first line of interpretation, Kant has good reason to defend a voluntary league but his defense of voluntary league is at odds with his advocacy of a state-like federation (in the ‘Idea for a Universal History’) and his endorsement of the theoretical ideal of the strong federation (in Toward Perpetual Peace).

A second group of commentators disagree with this assessment, arguing that Kant’s own principles should have led him to defend the establishment of a state-like federation. They point out that Kant’s rejection of a universal monarchy does not imply that he also rejects the ideal of an international federation. Had he been consistent, these commentators argue, Kant would have argued in Toward Perpetual Peace – as he did in the ‘Idea for a Universal History’ – that states should leave the state of nature by forming a worldwide federation with state-like powers. On this view, Kant’s defense of the league is contradictory (e.g., Habermas 1997) or a concession to ‘human weakness’ (e.g., Byrd and Hruschka 2010, 200–203). After all, it appears as if Kant waters down his normative theory on the basis of its alleged impracticality – that is, on the basis of the empirical problem that peoples (in the political sense, in the form of states) do
not want to join a state-like federation. This is exactly the kind of move Kant sternly warns against in ‘On the Common Saying: This May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice’. Therefore, these authors claim, the only consistent position for Kant to defend is the view that states ought to form a state-like federation, given that both individuals and states ought to leave their respective state of nature and that doing so requires a political body with coercive powers.5

A third reading introduces a developmental perspective. On this interpretation, Kant’s unqualified defense of a state-like federation in the ‘Idea for a Universal History’ is his early position, and his later position in Toward Perpetual Peace is the result of his having realized that a people’s wanting to join an international federation has normative importance (Kleingeld 2004, 2012). During the first half of the 1790s, Kant starts to defend active citizen voting rights and self-legislation (via elected representatives). Because he conceives of the ideal state as a ‘republic’ of free and equal self-legislating citizens, and because he justifies this ideal in terms of the individual right to freedom, defending a right to coerce an unwilling state into a federation would paradoxically violate the freedom of the people in the act of trying to secure it. As a result, while the state-like federation remains Kant’s normative ideal, he now realizes that only a voluntary league may be pursued as a matter of international right. This does not mean, however, that Kant rejects the state-like federation as an ideal. Over time, the league may develop itself into a federation with common laws and the power to enforce them. On this third line of interpretation, Kant’s statement, in Toward Perpetual Peace, that reason demands the stronger form of federation can be reconciled with his claim, in the same work, that international right requires merely a voluntary league, for on this reading, the stronger federation remains Kant’s ultimate normative ideal.

The reason why the absence of war is not sufficient to establish peace, on this reading, is the fact that genuine peace requires justice. An international court of arbitration alone does not suffice to bring about justice. For one thing, the laws in accordance with which a court is to judge ought to be public laws, which requires an international legislative body; moreover, without enforcement mechanisms to back up the verdicts of the court, there is no guarantee that states will comply. Therefore, genuine peace, according to Kant, requires an international legal system in which arbitration of conflicts takes place in accordance with public laws that are enforced by a public authority. This is why such a cosmopolitan condition remains the ultimate ideal toward which states ought to strive (MM 6:350), even though the normative importance of the political autonomy of peoples bars its coercive realization (Kleingeld 2004, 2012).

On this reading, then, there is a close connection between Kant’s cosmopolitan theory and his philosophy of history. Kant argues in support of a teleological conception of historical development, according to which innate tendencies in human nature are conducive to the formation of republics, and according to which republics tend toward peace (without either being inevitable in a strict sense). Accordingly, in Toward Perpetual Peace, he expresses the hope that ‘distant parts of the world can peaceably enter into relations with each other, relations which can ultimately become publicly lawful and so bring humanity finally ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution’ (PP 8:358, cp. PP 8:379; see also Guyer 2006, Kleingeld 2012).

Kant fails to address the question whether states have duties to assist each other, or whether the international federation has a duty to assist members in need. He rejects the view that happiness or well-being is the rationale for establishing the state, and this might be thought to explain this omission. On the other hand, Kant argues that states have the duty to support those who are unable to provide for their own maintenance (MM 6:326), and so one would expect Kant at least to consider analogous duties as arising concerning states in need. Some commentators, however, deny that global poverty relief could properly be a matter of right, according to Kant’s conception of it, because states do not have private property (Varden 2014, 262). Perhaps, however, states can nevertheless be called poor when they lack the (public) means
to maintain their public institutions. Another difficult issue that is much discussed in the literature is whether Kant’s position allows for humanitarian intervention, and if so, under what conditions (e.g., Bernstein 2008).

3.2. THE CONTENT AND SCOPE OF COSMOPOLITAN RIGHT

In Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant introduces a new category into his theory of public right, in addition to constitutional right and international right, namely, ‘cosmopolitan right’. This concerns the interaction between states and foreigners: ‘individuals and states, who stand in an external relationship of mutual influence, are to be regarded as citizens of a universal state of humans [allgemeiner Menschenstaat] (ius cosmopoliticum)’ (PP 8:349n.). International right, within Kant’s theory, covers only the interaction among states. It does not address, say, whether foreign companies have a right to enter a state against the latter’s will or whether states have the right to appropriate the territory of non-state peoples. Therefore, the interaction between states and foreigners requires its own category of right.

Kant writes that cosmopolitan right should be restricted to the right to ‘hospitality’ (PP 8:357). This statement is easily misunderstood, because it may sound as if one has the right to be a guest, a right which Kant explicitly rejects (PP 8:358). What he does mean by a ‘right to hospitality’ is the right to request interaction, that is, a right to present oneself and request contact or entry without being treated as an enemy. It does not include a right to enter, except if being turned away would lead to one’s ‘demise’ (PP 8:358). Kant provides an illustration of such a case in his notes, where he argues that shipwrecked sailors should not be chased back into the sea but be allowed to stay ‘until there is a favorable opportunity to leave’ (R 23:173). Just how broad or restrictive this right is depends, of course, on one’s interpretation of the precise meaning and stringency of the ‘demise’ clause.6

Some interpreters regard cosmopolitan right as restricted to business contexts (e.g., Byrd and Hruschka 2010, 207–11). Most commentators, however, take it to cover any kind of ‘commerce’ in the broader sense of ‘interaction’.7 Kant’s examples – such as the stranded sailors mentioned above or the colonial relationships mentioned below – suggest that cosmopolitan right does indeed cover more than business interactions. The latter are an important part of what is covered by cosmopolitan right, however, and Kant emphasizes that businesses do not have a right to enter other states. He defends the right of China and Japan to deny entry to foreign merchants. He argues that they are ‘wise’ to refuse access to the Europeans, because past experience gave them reason to expect a ‘litany of evils’ from letting them enter (PP 8:359).8

3.3. COLONIALISM

One important aspect of Kant’s doctrine of cosmopolitan right is that it unequivocally rules out colonial conquest. Kant sharply criticizes the colonial practices of the European states. He criticizes the ‘inhospitable’ behavior of European states, writing:

[T]he injustice they show when visiting foreign lands and peoples (which to them is one and the same as conquering them) takes on terrifying proportions. America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were at the time of their discovery lands that they regarded as belonging to no one, for they counted the native inhabitants as nothing. (PP 8:358)

Under cosmopolitan right, no state is allowed simply to take foreign territory used by others, and this prohibition also applies when these others have not formed a state (MM 6:353; cp. MM 6:266).
Several commentators have pointed out, however, that many of the texts that are often taken to indicate Kant’s opposition to colonialism can (and in their eyes should) be read differently. For example, Kant’s well-known comment that the ‘Sugar Islands’ are the site of the ‘cruellest and most calculated slavery’ (PP 8:359) does not by itself show that Kant rejected slavery and related colonial practices on the islands: the comment can also be read as indicating his opposition merely to the ‘cruellest and most calculated’ slavery, not to slavery as such. Emphasizing that Kant unambiguously defended racist positions in other texts, Bernasconi (2001, 2002), Mills (2005), and others maintain that ambiguous passages such as the one concerning the ‘Sugar Islands’ should be interpreted accordingly. Their work has increased the scholarly attention given to Kant’s position on race and to its wider implications for understanding his moral and political philosophy.

Arguing against these readings, however, several authors have claimed that Kant changed his views on race and colonialism. They argue that Kant initially endorsed colonialism and later started to criticize it. Muthu (2003, 182–184) has argued that Kant changed his views on the matter around the beginning of the Critical period. Of the basis of Kant’s newly available lectures on anthropology and on physical geography, however, it seems that Kant maintained his defense of colonialism (and the associated views on racial hierarchy) much longer, namely, until the early 1790s, before he radically changed his mind (Kleingeld 2014). Several authors have examined other implications of Kant’s mid 1790s position on colonialism and cosmopolitan right, for example, regarding the question of reparations for past injustice (Niesen 2014) or the rights of non-state peoples (Stilz 2014).9

3.4. COSMOPOLITANISM AND PATRIOTISM

It is sometimes believed that cosmopolitanism rules out patriotism, but many authors have shown that this is a mistake (e.g., Brock 2009, Stilz 2009, Tan 2004). In order to understand the relation between the two, it is important to clarify what exactly is meant by patriotism, and whether patriotism is regarded as permissible or obligatory. In Kant’s case, ‘patriotism’ most significantly refers to a special obligation that citizens have toward their own republic as a political institution (GTP 8:291; cp. Cavallar 1999). This duty can be derived in terms of Kant’s philosophy of right. He argues that it is a duty to join a state, and that the type of state we ought to strive to realize is a republic in which the citizens themselves give laws via elected representatives (see above). If the citizens do not pay any special attention to their own state, as a matter of principle, however, such a republic cannot exist. Therefore, the maxim not to pay any special attention to one’s own just republic cannot be justified in Kantian terms, which entails that it is a duty to pay some special attention to one’s own republic (Kleingeld 2000).

Kant argues that one’s cosmopolitan and patriotic duties are compatible, as both are oriented toward the realization of right. For if the republic is itself required as part of the enterprise of bringing about a ‘cosmopolitan condition’ of right, then doing one’s duty as a citizen of one’s own republic is in line with one’s cosmopolitan duty (Kleingeld 2000). Because this argument is grounded in the notion of a republic, it does not imply that subjects of a ‘despotic’ state have a similar duty of patriotism.

4. Moral Cosmopolitanism

There is plenty of disagreement regarding the details of Kant’s moral philosophy, which I do not discuss here, but there is hardly any controversy about the question whether Kant defends moral cosmopolitanism. It is often regarded as obvious that he does (e.g., Cavallar 2012, 98–99). After all, he regards all humans (and even more broadly, all rational beings) as members of a single
moral community, a community he discusses in terms derived from the political domain. Kant describes this community of moral agents as a ‘realm’ or ‘kingdom’ (Reich) of ends, under common (moral) laws (G 4:433–440), or as an ‘ethical commonwealth’ or ‘universal republic under laws of virtue’ (Rel 6:94, 98). Moreover, the individual members of this realm have ‘dignity’ and are not to be used as mere means, analogous to the prohibition on the use of citizens as mere instruments at the disposal of a despot (MM 6:345–346). In light of Kant’s defense of political cosmopolitanism, it is indeed natural to regard the ‘realm of ends’ as the moral cosmopolitan counterpart to the political cosmopolitan ideal. Yet, one has to look hard to find passages in which Kant actually uses the language of ‘world citizenship’ in a moral context. Why is it so surprisingly rare? Why does Kant not refer more frequently to moral agents as (‘as it were’) citizens in the ‘moral world’, the ‘realm of ends’, or the ‘ethical commonwealth’? To my knowledge, this question is not discussed in the Kant literature.

I would like to suggest a two-part answer to this question, drawing on the fact that Kant’s political theory underwent significant changes during the 1790s. First, during the 1780s, the notion of ‘citizenship’ does not yet play the prominent role in Kant’s political theory that it will assume during the 1790s. In the Naturerecht Feyerabend lectures, from 1784, Kant discusses the normative constraints that a legislator should satisfy when giving laws to his people, arguing that the legislator should give only laws that the people ‘could have’ given themselves (NRF 27:1382; cp. WE 8:39). He does not yet advocate giving citizens a direct influence on political legislation. Perhaps this explains why he uses a different term in discussing the ‘realm of ends’, or perhaps the explanation should rather be sought in the fact that the language of ‘citizenship’ only became more prominent in Kant’s work after the French revolution. However this may be, in the Groundwork, Kant does not refer to the agents in the moral realm of ends as ‘citizens’ but consistently calls them ‘members’. The functional role of these ‘members’, however, is that of active, jointly self-legisrating citizens. According to the Groundwork, one should regard oneself as a legislator in the realm of ends (G 4:433–434). One is to choose one’s maxims as if they are to become laws for all members in this realm. Importantly, one should not regard oneself as the ‘supreme head’ of this realm, nor as its sole legislator. Rather, one is subject to the laws one gives (G 4:433), and one should regard oneself as a member in a larger community of rational beings who are one’s fellow legislators. As Kant puts it, one should consider one’s maxims not only ‘from one’s own perspective, but simultaneously from the perspective of every other rational being as legislating beings (who are therefore also called persons)’ (G 4:438, emphasis added). This description of the way moral agents ought to proceed when adopting maxims is modeled on a political process in which jointly self-legisrating political citizens adopt laws. But Kant does not use the word ‘citizen’ to describe the role of moral agents, and hence there is no language of ‘world citizenship’ in relation to the moral world or the realm of ends. Nevertheless, given the role of the ‘members’ of the ‘realm of ends’, designating them as ‘citizens’ – and hence as ‘citizens in a moral world’ – would not be inappropriate. In other words, the first part of the answer to the question regarding the virtual absence of talk of moral world ‘citizenship’ is that although Kant does not use the term, he could have used it given the functional role of the members in the ‘realm of ends’.

One might perhaps have expected Kant’s use of the terminology of moral world citizenship to increase during the 1790s. During this time, he starts to advocate real citizen self-legislation (through elected representatives in parliament, MM 6:341), even though he restricts ‘active’ citizenship to economically independent males. As before, however, he barely uses the terminology of citizenship to describe the role of moral agents in the moral realm. This time there is a different explanation, as Kant makes explicit in the Religion. Here, he argues – again transposing the political model of the state to the moral realm – that moral agents ought to join a ‘universal republic in accordance with laws of virtue’ (Rel 6:98), or an ‘ethical commonwealth’
(Rel 6:96). He now expressly denies, however, that it would be appropriate to conceive of the members of this community as jointly self-legislating: ‘Should the commonwealth be an ethical one, the people as such cannot itself be regarded as legislating’ (Rel 6:98). The reason Kant mentions is that the laws of an ethical commonwealth are moral laws and as such they ‘cannot be subject to public human laws’ (Rel 6:98, emphasis added). Instead, God is to be regarded as the lawgiver of the ethical community (Rel 6:98–99). Kant conceives of God as imposing no arbitrary statutes but only ‘genuine duties’ based in reason (Rel 6:98–99; note that, on this conception, God is not the author of the content of the law, cf. MM 6:227). In other words, he claims that the model of joint citizen self-legislation in the political realm does not suit the moral realm: the moral legislator should be ‘someone other than the people’ (Rel 6:99).

This is not to say that Kant drops the notion of individual moral self-legislation, but he now writes that the latter is characteristic of the ‘ethical state of nature’. In the ethical state of nature, as in the political state of nature, ‘each individual prescribes the law to himself’ (Rel 6:95). In the civil condition, by contrast, individuals are subject to public legislation, and this holds for an ethical commonwealth as much as it does for a political one (Rel 6:95, 96, 98). In an ethical commonwealth, too, the individuals are ‘subject to a public legislation, and all the laws binding them must be capable of being regarded as commands of a common lawgiver’ (Rel 6:98). Moral laws are not coercive, and they pertain to inner motivation rather than observable action, but this does not mean that these laws cannot be public. It merely means, in Kant’s view, that they are not suitable for public legislation by humans.

Therefore, it seems that Kant now finds the metaphor of citizenship inappropriate for describing the role of the members of the ethical commonwealth. In the mid–1790s, he closely associates political citizenship in the ideal republic with the right to have an active role in public political legislation (TP 8:295, MM 6:314), and he denies that moral agents can or should have such a role in public moral legislation for a moral community. This, the texts suggest, is the second part of the explanation why Kant hardly uses the metaphor of moral world citizenship.

Yet, as long as it is clear that moral agents do not have all the moral analogs of the attributes Kant regards as essential to political citizenship, they can still can be called ‘citizens’ in a broader sense that expresses their membership in the all-encompassing community. And indeed, Kant writes that the members of the ethical commonwealth are not isolated individuals but united into a whole, ‘as citizens (Bürger) of a divine state that is to be represented here on earth’ (Rel 6:198) or ‘citizen[s] in the kingdom of God’ (Bürger im Reiche Gottes, Rel 6:199). ‘Citizen’ is used here in the broader sense of a member of this realm (which Kant also refers to as a ‘church’), not in the more specific sense of a self-legislating citizen in a universal moral republic. It seems that Kant downplayed the language of moral world citizenship exactly to avoid evoking the image of a human community that gives itself moral laws by analogy with the process in which a particular political community of citizens gives itself positive laws. How this view relates to Kant’s theory of moral autonomy is an important follow-up question, of course, but examining this issue lies beyond the scope of this article.

In sum, Kant does use the language of moral world citizenship, but he uses it sparingly, and we should take great care when calling Kant a moral cosmopolitan. It is appropriate to describe the *Groundwork*’s ‘members’ in the realm of ends as collectively self-legislating moral laws (duties), because this is how Kant describes them, and hence, it is not inappropriate to call them ‘citizens’ in this world even though Kant does not do so. Yet, in later works, during the period when he advocated active citizen self-legislation in the political republic, Kant explicitly denies that the members of the ‘ethical commonwealth’ are to be regarded as legislating, while emphasizing that only God is to be regarded as its moral legislator. The few times he calls them ‘citizens’ in this realm, it is, rather, to emphasize their membership in a single, all-encompassing moral community.
Abbreviations

A  Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view (1798)
G  Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals (1784)
Idea  Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim (1785)
MM  Metaphysics of morals (1797)
Mrong  Lectures on ethics, Mrongovius (1774–77)
NRF  Feyerabend lectures on natural law (1784)
Phil  Essay regarding the Philanthropinum (1776)
PP  Toward perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch (1795)
R  Reflexions (notes and fragments, unpublished remains)
Rel  Religion within the boundaries of mere reason (1793)
TP  On the common saying: This may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice (1793)
WE  An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?

Short Biography

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Notes

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1 To mention just one example, the recent Cosmopolitanism Reader starts with a text by Kant and three chapters on Kant (Brown and Held 2010).
2 The German term ‘Recht’, as used by Kant, does not have an English counterpart. ‘Right’ sounds somewhat awkward, but this has the advantage of highlighting the fact that it is an imperfect translation. Right (Recht), in the present context, is the reason-based system of norms relating to the external freedom of persons.
3 For a discussion of contemporary cosmopolitanism, see Brock (2013).
4 For more on this argument, see Ebels-Duggan (2012).
5 On Byrd and Hruschka’s interpretation, Kant returns to what they see as the more consistent position in the Metaphysics of Morals, namely, advocacy of a state of nations. Moreover, they read Kant as claiming that states are permitted to coerce each other into a state of states (Byrd and Hruschka 2010, 195).
6 For a discussion of the current relevance of Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan right, see Benhabib (2004, 25–48).
7 ‘Commerce’ is the usual translation of Kant’s term ‘Verkehr’, which has this broader meaning.
8 For further discussion of Kant’s cosmopolitan right, see, for example, Flikschuh (2000, ch. 5); Williams (2007); Niesen (2007).
The reason Kant gives for his view, namely, that morality is ‘something internal’ (Rel 6:98), invites further discussion. But here, I restrict my discussion to the point at issue, namely, the virtual absence of talk of moral world citizenship in Kant’s ethics.

References to Kant’s texts are to Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. Ausgabe der Preussischen (later Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter, 1900–). Kant’s writings are cited by the abbreviated title, using the Akademie edition volume and page numbers. An exception is the Critique of Pure Reason, for which the page numbers of the first (A) and second (B) editions are cited. Translations are my own, but I have benefited from the translations available in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–).


