A wooden toy from childhood, a song from an old movie or a retro hat we see in a storefront may get us to reminisce about the past. This bittersweet taste might make one feel sentimental or peaceful, while reimagining how good these old days were. Nostalgia refers to “a feeling of pleasure and also slight sadness when you think about things that happened in the past” (Cambridge University Press, n.d.). Research shows that nostalgia promotes a number of positive outcomes including social connectedness (Wildschut et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2008), social support (Wildschut et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2008), strong bonds with relatives (Abeyta et al., 2015; Wildschut et al., 2018), meaning in life (Routledge et al., 2011), belongingness and acceptance with the past generations (Abakoumkin et al., 2019; Sedikides et al., 2015, 2016) and approach motivation (Stephan et al., 2014). 

This individual feeling of missing the good old days recently gained popularity as a collective experience. Many old-fashion products from textile to daily life objects have become popular again. For instance, the popular anime series of the 1990s Pokémon has turned back as an interactive mobile game after over 20 years and Nokia decided to bring back a model of their vintage brick phone. Although remembering and missing either childhood or the past are a quite common feeling for individuals, the collective nostalgia wave might bring people to the past years, even before they were born. Even so, these old days give similar emotions to new generations, and they also remember these days in a good way (Koc, 2018).

Accordingly, collective nostalgia is conceptualised as a group-based emotion that refers to the longing for the good old days of one’s ingroup (Wildschut et al., 2014). Independent from the ingroup characteristic, collective nostalgia can be adaptable for any social group such as nations, ideologies or sport teams. An ingroup member may yearn for the glorious history of their country, emulate the times when their political ideology found the majority in the government or be proud of the season in which their team won an international trophy. Thus,
nostalgic feelings may turn into social support, loyalty and collective action towards ingroup identity. Although these emotional outcomes include several positive ingroup feelings, this may also have detrimental consequences for intergroup relationships. Research shows that collective nostalgia predicts higher national identification (Smeekes, 2015) which is mostly associated with negative outgroup attitudes. According to Smeekes and colleagues (Smeekes et al., 2014), people who are high in collective nostalgia have negative attitudes towards immigrants in the Netherlands. Thus, strong social emotions about ingroup may create an obstacle to building positive intergroup relations. One aim of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between collective nostalgia and outgroup attitudes in Turkey.

On the other hand, positive relationships with outgroups in history may promote positive intergroup emotions and reduce prejudice towards them (Turner et al., 2018). Wohl et al. (2020) suggest that the effect of collective nostalgia on intergroup relations is contextual, and it depends on the content of nostalgia. For this, they investigated American and Poles' blatant prejudice against Muslims and anti-immigrant attitudes. Across four studies using correlational and experimental designs, they showed that longing for a more open and ethnically diverse society predicted less blatant prejudice and anti-immigrant attitudes as compared to longing for a more homogeneous society. This shows that the content of the past remembered affects the valence of the outgroup attitudes. Similarly, one can assume that whether the outgroup is seen as a part of the collective nostalgia might affect the valence of the attitudes towards them. Accordingly, the second aim of this chapter is to investigate if collective nostalgia predicts outgroup attitudes differently for various outgroups that have different historical importance in the context of Turkey.

What else can be an important predictor of outgroup attitudes in Turkey? We argue that affirmation of global values can make differences among individuals. Global identification refers to adopting values about humanity such as humanity is a union, and identifying oneself with all people around the world as ingroup members (McFarland, 2015; Rosenmann et al., 2016). Global identification predicts several positive intergroup outcomes including beliefs in equality between ingroup and outgroup (McFarland, 2015; Buchan et al., 2011), reduced anti-gay bias (Rosenmann, 2016), less hostility towards immigrants (Wenzel et al., 2007), less xenophobia (Ariely, 2016), higher intergroup empathy (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013) and more behavioural intentions to reduce global inequality (Reese et al., 2014). However, Rosenmann (2016) suggests that global culture, if understood as a Western culture, might be associated with different attitudes towards different social groups. For instance, alignment with a globalised-Western culture decreased anti-gay prejudice in Israel whereas it caused exclusionary responses to Arabs, because they were not perceived to be aligned with the Western culture, and decreased support for humanitarian action for Palestinians (Rosenmann, 2016). The third aim of this chapter is to explore whether global identification predicts the attitudes towards different
outgroups in Turkey as the level of perceived Western alignment of these groups may differ.

We believe it is important to investigate collective nostalgia and global identification together for a number of reasons. First, while collective nostalgia explicitly focuses on the past, global identification is more comprehensive in that it encompasses identification with all humanity and can be conceptualised to focus on the present and the future. For instance, global identification was found to be related to engaging in more pro-environmental behaviours to protect the world from future calamities (Reese, 2016; Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). Moreover, global awareness – an aspect of global identification – refers to being knowledgeable about other cultures and promoting tolerance and diversity (Shokef & Erez, 2006), whereas collective nostalgia is more ingroup-oriented (Smeekes, 2015). Therefore, we aim to understand how they each relate to inclusionary and exclusionary attitudes towards different outgroups.

To achieve our aims, we specifically chose four separate social groups: Kurds, Armenians, LGBTQ+ individuals and Syrian refugees, because they are related to Turkish society in different ways. Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Turkey, yet they are not officially recognised as a minority due the existing laws, and they are perceived to share the same religion with the majority of Turkish society. Armenians are both an ethnic and religious minority, and their minority status is recognised (e.g., they can have education in their mother tongue); yet they are subject to high levels of negative attitudes due to the complex relationship Turkey has with the genocide facts and claims. LGBTQ+ community has no legal protections in Turkey, yet being an LGBTQ+ is not a criminal act unlike some other Islamic countries. Notwithstanding, LGBTQ+ individuals face negative attitudes in particular from religious people. And finally, Syrian refugees represent the newest outgroup who are perceived to be at the bottom of the social hierarchy and seen as a threat to economy and social life in Turkey, yet still perceived to share the same religion as the majority of Turkish people. Overall, we expected to find unique patterns of results based on the similarities and differences across the nature of these four outgroups. Below, we elaborate on each outgroup.

Kurds as an Ethnic Minority

Kurds are an ethnic minority in Turkey making up about 20% of the population (KONDA, 2011). The political controversy between the Kurdish groups and Turkish state administration system dates back to the late Ottoman Empire. As a result of the Ottoman’s state centralisation policies, Kurds lost their partial autonomy which they had for centuries. Since then, intergroup relations between Kurds and Turks and the Turkish state has been conflictual (Aktar & Kırımızı, 2013). This tension has exceedingly increased after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Yıldız, 2012). The Turkish state was based on the nationalist ideology and policies such as the glorification of the Turkish race and accepting Turkish as the only formal language. With the emergence of PKK
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in the 1980s as a militant political organisation fighting for autonomy for Kurds in Turkey, the clashes between PKK and the Turkish military resulted in forced displacement of thousands of people flee their homes in 2015 (Dalay, 2015) and casualties (Satana, 2012).

Although there is a lot of contact between Turks and Kurds, this contact does not necessarily lead to reduced conflict (Bagci et al., in this volume). Research suggests that contact between these groups was associated with higher support for the reconciliation for the majority group, and had a sedative effect on the minority group that might undermine their organised efforts to improve their status (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017). Cross-group friendship was beneficial for both groups’ outgroup attitudes when perceived conflict was low (Bagci & Çelebi, 2017a). Positive contact was found to be a stronger predictor of outgroup attitudes among the majority group (Bagci & Turnuklu, 2018). Kurds endorsing the emotion and dialogue themes and Turks endorsing a unity-based construal of reconciliation also predicted higher forgiveness of the other group (Baysu & Coşkan, 2018). National identification was associated with similar conflict construals in line with the official Turkish narrative (Bilali, 2014), lower out-group trust among Turkish participants and higher out-group trust among Kurdish participants (Çelebi et al., 2014). Perceived threat was also found to play a role for the out-group attitudes: The effects of social identity and intergroup contact on outgroup attitudes were mediated by the perceived threat (Çakal et al., 2016). In line with the previous research findings suggesting “Abrahamic religion” can be a superordinate category between Christians and Muslims (Kunst & Thomsen, 2015), Baysu et al. (2018) found that higher religious identification as Muslim was associated with positive intergroup emotions, but not with more support for reconciliation among Muslim Kurdish minorities in Turkey and Belgium.

Armenians as Ethnic and Religious Minority

Armenians are one of the three minority groups in Turkey that have been officially recognised by the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923. With the rise of the nationalism ideology in the 19th century, Armenians began to be perceived as the first “others”, mainly because of their religion and their claims over eastern Anatolia (Göl, 2005). Although the number of Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire was thought to be around two million; currently approximately 60,000 Armenians live in the Republic of Turkey (Minority Rights Groups International, 2007). This sharp drop in numbers is attributed to 1,150,000 Armenians losing their lives during the deportation of Armenians that started in 1914 (Aktar & Kırmızı, 2013). Thus, while Armenians generally argue that they have been victims of a systemic genocide Turks contest these claims and “the Armenian issue” is not usually discussed in the public sphere (Cooper & Akçam, 2005; Karasu & Uluğ, 2020; Neyzi & Kharatyan-Araqelyan, 2010).

The negative prejudice towards Armenians is a widespread phenomenon in Turkey (Akçam, 2015). One study reports that 89.66% of the Armenians think that they are portrayed in negative lights in Turkey’s media (Ercetin, 2014).
Hrant Dink Foundation (HDV)’s “Media Watch on Hate Speech Project” carried out between 2009 and 2019 shows that Armenians as well as other minority groups such as Jews, Syrian refugees and Kurds have been systematically exposed to targeted harassment via prevalent hate speech and exclusionary language by Turkey’s media productions. Moreover, 77.39% of the Armenian participants reported that they do not feel secure from the violence towards them as a result of the “enemy image” that the media creates regarding their social identity.

One study suggests that more than 85% of the Armenians living in Turkey reported feeling as the “other” in the country (Ercetin, 2014). On the other hand, there is also evidence that both Turks and Armenians have negative attitudes towards one another in various respects. For instance, one study on the competitive victimhood narratives of Turks and Armenians using public opinion polls and interviews suggest that Turkey and Armenia have been currently very far from the reconciliation on a societal level (Demirel & Eriksson, 2019). In order for forgiveness and reconciliation to happen between groups, Armenians living in Turkey stated that there should be a dialogue and the perpetrators should issue an apology (İslambay-Yapalı & Cingöz-Ulu, in this volume). However, based on their empirical observations, the researchers also argue that when positive interaction between Turks and Armenians is facilitated, competitive victimisation may decrease, at least at the interpersonal level. Moreover, Turkish participants reported more contact and higher perceived conflict with Kurds than with Armenians. However, there were no significant differences in threat and anxiety results for both groups (Bagci & Çelebi, 2017b). Interestingly, religion is found to be an important factor affecting the intergroup relations between Turks and Armenians. Bikmen and Sunar (2013), for instance, compared outgroup attitudes towards Armenians and Kurds among Turks. Turks with stronger Muslim identification were more willing to talk about inequalities with Kurds but not with Armenians.

**LGBTQ+ Individuals as an “Invisible” Outgroup**

Although homosexuality is not considered as a legal crime in Turkey, heterosexual and patriarchal discourse of political authority and hostile attitudes of the media has fostered exclusionary attitudes towards LGBTQ+ (Eslen-Ziya & Koc, 2016; Erdogan & Köten, 2014). Moreover, Islamic beliefs are known to be related to anti-gay attitudes. For instance, Anderson and Koc (2015) showed that Muslims have more negative implicit and explicit attitudes towards gay men in Turkey than atheists, but this was mostly driven by extrinsic religious orientation rather than intrinsic.

Given all the public stigma, LGBTQ+ members experience their identities in the “invisible” sphere mostly because it gives them agency to manage their safety (see Mitha et al., 2021), and they selectively come out as part of their identity management strategies (Koc, 2021). However, all these negative attitudes are also internalised by the LGBTQ+ community, and it predicts lower
well-being among gay men (Bagci et al., 2020). Yet some research shows that global identification may help improve wellbeing for gay men through increased the gay-male identity integration (Koc & Vignoles, 2016, 2018). In this case, global identification might also improve attitudes towards LGBTQ+ people.

**Syrian Refugees as the New “Other”**

Since the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, millions of people have been forced to leave their country. Currently, about 7 million Syrian refugees have been forcefully displaced and approximately 5.6 million of them have been hosted by neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt (UNHCR, 2022). As of March 2021, Turkey hosts the highest number of Syrian refugees (3.7 million). Turkey had an “open door” policy regarding the Syrians through a “humanitarian discourse” used by the governmental administrates (Koca, 2016) and millions of Syrians entering the border have been given a “temporary protected status” regardless of their social and ethnic identities (Özdemir, 2017). The initial emphasis on Syrians being “guests” in terms of hospitality has now transformed to an exclusionary emphasis that should not be permanent in Turkey (Göksel, 2017). The positive atmosphere that once welcome Syrians soon began to dissipate, and some voices have started to express that Syrians are “overstaying guests” (Akar & Erdoğan, 2018).

In the first years of the war, there was significant international and national media attention on humanitarian ground regarding Syria. However, over the years, the media attention to the war in Syria switched to the negative consequences of the Syrians' presence in the hosting countries. The Turkish media started to focus on how different Syrian refugees are from Turks, implying that integration of Syrians is not simple (Onay-Çoker, 2019).

Currently, Syrian refugees are frequently exposed to hate speech, anti-immigrant attitudes and racism in traditional media and social media. They are consistently portrayed as criminals, and associated with unrest and security problems in the country (HDV, 2019). In another study on digital racism towards Syrian refugees, more than 100k tweets from 2018 to 2019 regarding Syrian refugees in Turkey were analysed and results indicated that the analysed tweets were not only the outcome of personal prejudices but more like the result of systematic antagonism and hatred towards Syrian refugees' identities (Özdüzen et al., 2020).

Despite the prevalence of anti-immigrant and racist attitudes, is the integration of Syrian refugees to Turkey possible? A recent study showed that religion can function as a superordinate identity to bind the Syrian refugees and Turkish natives since most members of both groups identify themselves as Muslims (Şafak-Ayyazoğlu et al., 2021), while the depiction of Syrian refugees as a threat on secular national identity might increase the social distance on the opposite. Another study showed that contact with primary outgroups (e.g., Kurds) increases attitudes towards the Syrian refugee and finally predicts policy support for Syrian refugees only when the perceived threat is low (Ünver et al., 2021). Moreover, one study found that if Syrians are presented as Sunni/
Muslim, Turkish people tend to make more donations for them unless they are reminded that the refugees create an economic burden on the country (Lazarev & Sharma, 2017). Finally, another study showed that Turkish natives display less support to Syrian refugees when the threat-based negative emotions are activated (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2019), as another evidence showing that integration requires emphasis on binding characteristics rather than the differences that might be perceived as threats by the Turkish natives.

Overview of the Study and Predictions
Overall, several factors have been examined in the context of attitudes towards Kurds, Armenians, LGBTQ+ individuals and Syrian refugees in Turkey. However, to our knowledge, no study has examined collective nostalgia and global identification as predictors of attitudes towards these four separate groups in Turkey. Accordingly, together with a number of demographic variables, we will examine whether collective nostalgia and global identification will predict attitudes towards these target groups.

Although the evidence is mixed regarding the effect of religiosity on outgroup attitudes, based on emphasis on shared religion idea (Baysu et al., 2018; Lazarev & Sharma, 2017), we expect religiosity to predict positive attitudes towards Kurds and Syrian refugees as perceptions of Islam as a common identity for Turks, Kurds and Syrians. In a similar vein, religiosity could predict negative attitudes towards Armenians and LGBTQ+ people because they are perceived to be in conflict with Islamic way of life.

Moreover, based on Rosenmann (2016), we expect that global identification will predict positive attitudes towards Armenians and LGBTQ+ individuals because they might be perceived to be more aligned with the Western global culture, whereas we expect global identification to predict negative attitudes towards Kurds and Syrian refugees because they are not perceived to be aligned with the global culture.

Finally, we argue that people tend to see outgroup members as the scapegoat for losing the good old days (Smeekes, 2015). Due to the salience of the Syrian refugee crisis at present, Syrians have become the new “other” in Turkish society, and they are not a part of the good old days. Therefore, we expect collective nostalgia to predict negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees. On the other hand, Kurds, Armenians and LGBTQ+ individuals have historically been a part of Turkish society, and therefore, we expect that collective nostalgia will predict positive attitudes towards these three groups.

Method
Participants and Procedure
Data were collected as a part of a project, and the sample comprised 1090 Turkish participants (age range: 18–63 years, $M = 30.61$, $SD = 9.49$). 761 participants identified themselves as female and 296 as male, while 33 participants did not
identify themselves with any gender. Majority of participants reported their ethnicity as Turkish (65.7%), while 6.5% reported their ethnicity as Kurdish and 1.5% as Armenian, respectively. 918 participants were Muslim, 105 participants were not religious and 67 participants did not share their religion. 97% indicated that they were heterosexual while 3% indicated that they were attracted to the same-sex. All the measures were translated and back translated by the authors and administered in Turkish.

**Measures**

**Religiosity**

Religiosity was measured using a single item (Koc & Vignoles, 2018). The item used was, “How often do you think of yourself as Muslim?” (1 = never, 5 = always). Participants responded on 5-point Likert scales, with higher scores indicating higher identification.

**Social Class**

Social class was measured with a single item by asking participants to place themselves on the spectrum of social class as compared to others in Turkish society ranging from 1 to 100 on a slider (1 – very bottom, 100 – top).

**Global Identification**

Global identification was measured using the single-item scale (Postmes et al., 2013) to measure global identification. The item used was: “I identify as a global citizen”. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), higher scores indicating higher identification.

**Collective Nostalgia**

Collective nostalgia was measured with four items (α = 79). One item comes from Southampton Nostalgia Scale (Routledge et al., 2011; i.e., Generally speaking, how often do you bring to mind nostalgic experiences related to Turkey in the past?”) and three items comes from Smeekes (2015) asking participants to what extend they long for the way Turkish people were, the way Turkish society was, and the way Turkish landscape (i.e., surroundings) looked like. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) higher scores indicating more nostalgic experience.

**Outgroup Attitudes**

Outgroup attitudes towards four social groups (e.g., Kurds, Armenians, Syrian refugees and LGBTQ+ individuals) were measured through two items per target
group. The first item used was “Most [target group] are no doubt decent people” taken from Modern Racial Prejudice Scale (Akrami et al., 2000), and the second item was “I would want to have [target group] as neighbours” taken from the Bogardus Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1967). Both items were asked on a 7-point Likert scale (“1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree”). The correlations between two items for each target group was .71 for Kurds, .73 for Armenians, .70 for LGBTQ+ and .64 for Syrian refugees.

Results

Correlations amongst variables, and means and standard deviations for each variable for the total sample are presented in Table 6.1. We analysed the data using JAMOVI software (the Jamovi Project, 2021).

First, we ran a number of one-sample t-tests to examine whether the attitudes towards each outgroup was significantly different than the scale midpoint. Since we had members of each target group in our dataset as participants, while running the analysis for each target group, we excluded the ingroup members from that particular analysis (e.g., we excluded Kurdish participants when we tested attitudes towards Kurdish people as the dependent variable). We found that attitudes were more positive towards Kurds, $t(940) = 7.96, p < .001, d = 0.26$, and towards Armenians, $t(997) = 2.05, p < .001, d = 0.06$; yet they were more negative towards LGBTQ+ individuals, $t(984) = 2.06, p = .036, d = -0.07$ and towards Syrian refugees, $t(1025) = 7.20, p < .001, d = -0.22$.

Next, we ran four separate multiple regression analyses to predict attitudes towards each of the four minority groups, and used majority group members’ age, gender, religiosity, SES, global identification and level of collective nostalgia as predictors. The results are presented in Table 6.2.

In predicting attitudes towards Kurds, the model explained a statistically significant amount of variance, $F(6, 879) = 23.54, p < .001, R^2 = .14$. Being older ($\beta = .13, p < .001$), being male ($\beta = .09, p = .005$), religiosity ($\beta = .09, p = .007$), global identification ($\beta = .30, p < .001$) and collective nostalgia ($\beta = .08, p = .019$) predicted positive attitudes towards Kurdish people. Social status was not significantly related.

In predicting attitudes towards Armenians, the model explained a statistically significant amount of variance, $F(6, 935) = 45.38, p < .001, R^2 = .23$. Being older ($\beta = .13, p < .001$), having high social status ($\beta = .09, p = .009$), global identification ($\beta = .30, p < .001$) and collective nostalgia ($\beta = .08, p = .032$) were positively but religiosity ($\beta = -0.18, p < .001$) was negatively associated with attitudes towards Armenians. Gender was not significantly related.

In predicting attitudes towards LGBTQ+ individuals, the model explained a statistically significant amount of variance, $F(6, 923) = 48.71, p < .001, R^2 = .24$. Having high social status ($\beta = .08, p = .006$), global identification ($\beta = .33, p < .001$) and collective nostalgia ($\beta = .07, p = .014$) predicted positive attitudes towards LGBTQ+ individuals were positively but being male ($\beta = -0.18, p < .001$), and religiosity ($\beta = -0.27, p < .001$) were negatively associated with attitudes
### Table 6.1 Zero-order Correlations between Predictors and Outcome Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1</th>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>0.06*</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
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<td>0.13***</td>
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<td>1.76</td>
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<td>0.11***</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.73</td>
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Notes
* *p < .05.
** *p < .01.
*** *p < .001.
Table 6.2 Multiple Regression Results for Each Outgroup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Attitudes towards Kurds</th>
<th>Attitudes towards Armenians</th>
<th>Attitudes towards LGBTQ+</th>
<th>Attitudes towards Syrian refugees</th>
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<td>β</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>β</td>
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<td>0.37(0.03) 0.33***</td>
<td>0.23(0.03) 0.22***</td>
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<td>0.13(0.06) 0.06*</td>
<td>0.15(0.06) 0.07</td>
<td>-0.14(0.06) -0.07</td>
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</table>

Notes
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
towards LGBTQ+ individuals. Age was not significantly related to attitudes towards LGBTQ+.

In predicting attitudes towards Syrian refugees, the model explained a statistically significant amount of variance, $F(6, 960) = 26.59, p < .001, R^2 = .14$. Being older ($\beta = .06, p = .036$), having higher status ($\beta = .09, p = .006$), religiosity ($\beta = .25, p < .001$) and global identification ($\beta = .22, p < .001$) predicted attitudes towards Syrian refugees, yet collective nostalgia ($\beta = -.07, p = .022$) negatively predicted attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Gender was not significantly related.

Finally, we also tested whether global identification would moderate the effects of collective nostalgia on outgroup attitudes. To do this, we added an interaction term between collective nostalgia and global identification as a second step into the models for each outgroup, but the added steps did not significantly improve the models compared to those reported here. And no interaction term was significant (all $p$s > .05).

**Discussion**

In this study, we explored the role of demographic factors such as age, gender and social status, level of religiosity and finally the role of psychological factors such as collective nostalgia and global identification in predicting attitudes towards outgroups in Turkey. We specifically chose four separate social groups: Kurds, Armenians, LGBTQ+ individuals and Syrian refugees, because they are related to Turkish society in different ways. Now, we discuss the results and their implications.

In terms of the demographic variables, we found that age was a predictor of positive attitudes towards three outgroups (i.e., Kurds, Armenians and Syrian refugees) and a predictor of negative attitudes towards the LGBTQ+ community. Previous research shows that older people tend to have more prejudice (Henry & Sears, 2009). In this study, older may have more positive attitudes towards Kurds and Armenians perhaps because these groups are perceived to have been historically a part of the society. However, it is not very clear why age would predict positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees. One explanation could be humanitarian reasons, and perhaps older people feel less threatened by Syrian refugees and show more concern for them. This requires further investigation.

The relationship between age and the negative attitudes towards LGBTQ+ individuals are in line with previous research (Anderson & Koc, 2015; Whitley, 2009). Moreover, gender was a significant predictor of attitudes towards Kurds and LGBTQ+ people. Men were more positive towards Kurds whereas they were more negative towards LGBTQ+ people. This is in line with previous research that men have more negative attitudes towards LGBTQ+ individuals (Kite & Whitley, 1996) because they might feel threatened by them (Falomir-Pichastor & Mugny, 2009) or they might think LGBTQ+ individuals violate societal expectations about gender roles (Eslen-Ziya & Koc, 2016). In a similar vein, social status predicted positive attitudes towards all group except for Kurds. Although social status is often equated with social dominance orientation and
hence more negative outgroup attitudes, some research shows that people with lower status tend to strive for stronger social dominance orientation more and therefore develop more negative outgroup attitudes (Küpper et al., 2010). This might explain why people from higher social class were more positive towards Armenians, Syrians and LGBTQ+ individuals in our study.

Moreover, religiosity was a significant predictor of attitudes towards all groups in line with the expectations. Religiosity predicted positive attitudes towards Syrians and Kurds, because Syrian refugees are also assumed to be Muslim and this might create a common identity (e.g., Baysu et al., 2018, Gaertner et al., 1993). Moreover, recent research shows that Muslim group norms mediate the link between common Muslim identity and acceptance of Syrian refugees (Guler et al., in this volume). This should be further investigated. Contrarily, religiosity predicted negative attitudes towards Armenians because they are a salient religious outgroup, and also towards LGBTQ+ community because they are perceived to be in violation of religious rules and norms (Anderson & Koc, 2015). This shows the complex relationships between one’s religiosity and outgroup attitudes depending on how the outgroup is aligned with one’s own religion. Future research should incorporate the role of social dominance orientation and threat perceptions to further unpack these findings.

In relation to our focal variables, we found that global identification predicted positive attitudes towards all outgroups. However, in line with Rosenmann (2016), we had expected that global identification would predict positive attitudes towards LGBTQ+ community and Armenians and negative attitudes towards Kurds and Syrian refugees. This reasoning was justified because Rosenmann (2016) conceptualises global identification as identification with global-Western culture. Therefore, outgroups aligned with Western norms (e.g., gay people) benefit from this identification but those not aligned with Western norms (e.g., Arabs in Israel) do not experience the intergroup benefit of global identification. However, our conceptualisation and measurement of global identification was more in line with Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013). In their study, they found that global identification is a superordinate identity and it predicts intergroup empathy, value diversity, social justice and intergroup helping. Therefore, it is reasonable to explain our findings along these lines. Higher levels of global identification (instead of national identification) helped Turkish participants to be more accepting towards minorities in Turkey. Further research should compare global identification and Turkish national identification to make stronger conclusions.

Collective nostalgia, on the other hand, predicted outgroup attitudes in line with our expectations. Accordingly, collective nostalgia predicted positive outgroup attitudes towards Kurds, Armenians and LGBTQ+ people, whereas it predicted negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees. As argued by Wohl et al. (2020), that the type of nostalgic past might be related to outgroup attitudes differently. Although we did not manipulate the content of nostalgia, we expected the good old days of Turkey people would remember would entail the days before Syrian refugees arrived in Turkey. Therefore, the outgroups that
were historically a part of Turkey would benefit from collective nostalgia, whereas Syrian refugees as the new “other” would suffer from collective nostalgia. Our findings supported this expectation. Such socio-cognitive division in “old” and “new” minority groups were also found in historical representations of local Kurds and Arabs about Kurds and Arabs fleeing Syria. They used “us vs. them” division when they referred to those coming from Syria, although they also used positive representations such as neighbours (Yalcin et al., in this volume). However, we focused on the perspectives of the majority; so probably this division is even stronger lacking the positive representations. Overall, although our predictions regarding collective nostalgia were supported, our results rely on survey items and people can remember different collective nostalgia content depending on their political orientation (Stefaniak et al., 2021). These findings, therefore, should be substantiated with experimental findings.

Overall, this is the first study to examine collective nostalgia and global identification together and their relationship to several outgroups with unique characteristics in the Turkish context. These findings provide the basis to follow up with experiments to claim causal relationships. Moreover, we know that politicians use a different past of one’s country to drive attitudes towards minorities into different directions (see Mols & Jetten, 2014). Similarly, we can use this information to make people nostalgic about the good old days where Turkish society was more open and inclusive (see also Wohl et al., 2020), and this might help turn exclusionary outgroup attitudes into inclusionary ones. A wooden toy from the past for an individual has benefits for the individual. A longing for a tolerant past of one’s society where people from different religions and ethnic groups lived together as neighbours and where we glorified our hospitality for guests and people in need might help us build a new future where nostalgic experience enhance tolerance and respect for one another.

References


