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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE

Compensating citizens for poor service delivery: Experimental research in public and private settings

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After a service failure, citizens expect a recovery strategy that restores perceived justice and places a reasonable value on their loss. Offering monetary compensation is a strategy commonly used in private settings, but less so in public settings. To date, compensation effects have not been researched in public settings. To investigate citizens' evaluations of perceived justice, negative emotions and post-recovery satisfaction we used a 2 (sector: public, private) by 2 (compensation promised: yes, no) by 2 (compensation offered: yes, no) factorial between-subjects experimental design (student sample), and replicated this in a second study (US citizens sample). Results showed that compensation leads to similar positive effects in public and private settings, confirming earlier private setting research that applied justice theory. Explicitly promising compensation prior to a service encounter had no effect. However, promising compensation and not offering it led to decreased citizens' evaluations, which confirms expectancy disconfirmation theory.

1 | INTRODUCTION

A driving licence that is not available on the agreed date or a citizen who has waited too long at a counter are both examples of operational service failures. They are inevitable and part of daily life (Kim and Ulgado 2012) because services are intangible, hard to standardize and production and consumption happen simultaneously (Murray and Schlachter 1990). They are little studied in public management literature and how citizens recover satisfaction after a service failure (service recovery) even less so (Van de Walle 2016). This article uses service management literature from the private domain as its theoretical base. Here, justice theory (Adams 1965) is the dominant framework to explain customers' evaluations and behaviour after a service failure. It argues that customers evaluate the fairness

of service recovery on distributive, procedural and interactional justice (e.g., Homburg and Fürst 2005; Vázquez-Casielles et al. 2010).

Expectancy disconfirmation theory (Oliver 1993) states that differences between expectations and experiences (e.g., for justice dimensions) can lead to positive or negative disconfirmations, which subsequently influence post-recovery satisfaction (e.g., Van Ryzin 2013). Perceived justice and satisfaction after a service failure are influenced by how organizations operate after a failure; for example, by apologizing, fixing the problem and/or offering compensation. Monetary compensation is a common recovery instrument to improve perceived justice and satisfaction after a service failure (e.g., Wirtz and Mattila 2004). Compensation schemes exist in the private domain (e.g., hotels and airlines) and the semi-public domain (e.g., railways, city transport and energy supply) but are less common in core public organizations. Public organizations also differ in whether they explicitly promise to compensate when a service failure occurs.

To understand public compensation, we researched the effects of promising and offering a small monetary compensation on customers' evaluations of perceived justice, negative emotions and post-recovery satisfaction in public and private settings. We used a between-subjects factorial design across Dutch students (study 1) and replicated this study using a US online panel (study 2) to increase external validity. Our results contribute to theory in two ways. First, by adding to the literature on the research theme. Second, this is the first experimental study to apply justice theory in public service recovery settings. Justice theory emerges as applicable to public as in private settings. The next sections elaborate by reviewing current empirical service management literature on service failures, service recovery, justice theory and monetary compensation to formulate hypotheses. Then the experimental methodology and results are presented. We conclude by discussing limitations and finally suggest future research.

1.1 | Service failures

New Public Management ideas suggest that public organizations increasingly approach citizens as customers (Aberbach and Christensen 2005). Customer satisfaction metrics have become important for public managers (Van Ryzin 2013). Therefore, public management scholars (Osborne et al. 2015) argue for a service-dominant logic approach (Lusch and Vargo 2014) to place customers, rather than products, policy-makers or professionals, at the heart of service research, design and operations. From this perspective, service failures are defined as situations in which customers experience an economic (e.g., money, time) and/or a social loss (e.g., status, esteem) due to a mishap or a problem when experiencing a public service (Kim and Ulgado 2012) regardless of responsibility (Magnini et al. 2007). Service management literature categorizes failures by their type and severity. First, there are process and outcome failures (Tsai et al. 2014). Process failures occur during service delivery and involve how customers receive the service, whereas outcome failures involve what customers actually receive. Outcome failures include delay versus denial failures. A delay requires customers to wait to receive a service, while denial is the total breach of an (implicit) contract (Levesque and McDougall 2000). Second, the severity or importance of a failure depends on customers' perceived cumulated economic and social loss resulting from the service failure. Failures range from unimportant and mildly annoying through to extremely important and very severe (Mattila 2001; Magnini et al. 2007). The type of failure and the severity both affect customers' perceived loss and unfairness.

1.2 | Service recovery and justice theory

Service recovery involves actions organizations take to respond to service failure to make up for the perceived loss sufficient to regain customers' satisfaction (Mattila 2001; Hocutt and Bowers 2005). The larger the loss customers feel, the more recovery they seek (Kim and Ulgado 2012). Justice theory (Adams 1965) sees customers evaluating recovery fairness in interactional, procedural and distributive terms. Interactional justice is the perceived fairness of treatment by employees. Procedural justice is the perceived fairness of the organization's recovery policies and

processes. Distributive justice is the perceived fairness of the outcome, such as a monetary compensation. Many studies show that, depending on the service and service failure context, the relative impact of these three justice dimensions on post-recovery satisfaction is different (Mattila 2001; Del Río-Lanza et al. 2008).

Expectancy disconfirmation theory (Oliver 1993; Van Ryzin 2013) sees customer satisfaction being determined by the difference between customers' experiences and their expectations. This is relevant for service recovery experiences and expectations resulting in post-recovery satisfaction. For most situations in which customers have expectations, these are norms and standards or benchmarks against which customers judge or measure the quality of service they receive (Magnini et al. 2007). Expectations are influenced by factors such as past experiences, word-of-mouth and communication by the organization (Zeithaml and Bitner 1996). Expectations are 'formed in a rich context of remembered and constructed representations of what it could have been, might have been, or should have been' (Kahneman and Miller 1986, p. 136). In the literature, expectations are divided into positive and normative expectations (e.g., Yim et al. 2003; James 2011). Positive expectations are customers' predictive norms concerning what actually will happen. Normative expectations are based on what should happen according to the customer, for example concerning service recovery after a service failure.

1.3 | Monetary compensation for poor service

Monetary compensation is a financial value customers receive in order to (partly) balance the perceived economic and/or social loss due to a service failure. Authorities and governments have obliged semi-public organizations to offer monetary compensation for poor service. For example, railways and public transport offer compensation schemes for punctuality and reliability (Björlin Lidén and Edvardsson 2003) and energy supply companies for outage and other service failures (Costello 2012). While monetary compensation is common in semi-public and private organizations, it is rare for core public organizations given ethical and legal arguments. Ethically, as public organizations are financed by taxpayer money, this should be spent on the collective and not on individual customers. Also, compensating individuals may increase inequality in service delivery between customers (Fountain 2001; Van de Walle 2016). Legally, national legislation could influence the possibilities to offer compensation. As in private settings, customers can expect quality service without failures and value for money when they pay indirectly through taxes or directly through fees for services. When failure occurs, compensation helps balance the loss. Thus, it makes sense for public organizations to offer compensation for poor service.

Like service failures, monetary compensation can be categorized by type and size. The type and size have to match the type (Roschk and Gelbrich 2014) and severity (Gelbrich et al. 2015) of the failure to be effective. Monetary types of compensation include gift vouchers and coupons, discounts, money back or free products and services (e.g., Lii and Lee 2012). Compensation is offered proactively or reactively after a complaint and on the spot at the time of the failure or delay (Kim and Ulgado 2012). The compensation size varies from no compensation, a small and token compensation not directly related to nor fully compensating for the loss, to equity compensation equal to the loss or even overcompensating customers. Research in private settings shows that compensation size has effects on customers' evaluations (Hocutt and Bowers 2005; Haesevoets et al. 2017). Offering a small compensation that is given as a token or gesture to customers has different effects on customers' evaluations than fully compensating or overcompensating customers (McQuilken et al. 2013; Gelbrich et al. 2015). In our studies we researched the effects of a small compensation after a service failure because being overly generous following a service failure may lead customers to question the reasons behind offering compensation (McQuilken et al. 2013) and having possible problems with spending large sums of public money on compensating for failures (Björlin Lidén and Edvardsson 2003).

What exactly happens when customers experience service failure? First, there is customers' cognitive appraisal of justice dimensions comparing experiences with expectations. The perceived justice elicits a negative emotional reaction (Schoefer and Ennew 2005) such as regret, annoyance, irritation, anger and feeling betrayed (Mattila 2001). Both perceived justice and negative emotions impact post-recovery satisfaction. Research shows that compensation

can have positive effects on post-recovery satisfaction via the increase in perceived distributive justice (e.g., Wirtz and Mattila 2004; Schoefer and Ennew 2005) and the reduction of negative emotions (Del Río-Lanza et al. 2008). The specifics of how compensation is offered relates to procedural aspects which we also study. Previous literature suggests that procedural justice has a positive effect on post-recovery satisfaction (Vázquez-Casielles et al. 2010).

Justice theory has yet to be applied in public service recovery research. However, we believe it is highly relevant for public management research; especially in direct exchange situations when public customers pay directly for the service (Alford 2002). The first hypothesis (H1) about offering compensation after service failures in direct exchange situations is: Perceived justice, emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more positive when compensation is offered (Comp) compared to when it is not offered (NoComp) after a service failure.

To ease interpretation of the results sections we use abbreviations of cell names as presented in the hypotheses; Prom (a compensation is promised) versus NoProm (no compensation is promised) and Comp (a compensation is offered) versus NoComp (no compensation is offered).

1.4 | Promising compensation

Our research also focuses on the effects of explicitly promising compensation prior to a service failure by using service charters (see Thomassen et al. 2014 for an overview of the concept). For example, the parking department of the Dutch municipality of The Hague used a service charter for several years (The Hague 2005). It promised five specific service levels: for example, waiting no longer than 15 minutes at the reception desk and a reaction to customer letters within two weeks. If the department failed to meet promised service levels, customers received compensation by either selecting a gift or by nominating a charitable cause to receive a donation of €12.50. When explicitly promised, compensation acts as a cue increasing customers' expectations when compared with situations where no compensation is promised. According to expectancy disconfirmation theory (Oliver 1993), we could argue that promising compensation has negative effects on customers' evaluations. This leads to H2: In situations where compensation is promised explicitly and offered (Prom-Comp), perceived justice, emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more negative than when compensation has not been promised but is offered (NoProm-Comp).

In H1 we hypothesized that compensating customers would lead to more positive evaluations. In H2 we expect that when compensation is offered, promising compensation leads to less positive evaluations. When combining these hypotheses, the question is whether offering compensation (promised or not-promised) leads to more positive evaluations than when compensation is neither promised nor offered. We hypothesize in H3: When compensation is offered, either with (Prom-Comp) or without prior promise (NoProm-Comp), perceived justice, emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more positive compared to when compensation is neither promised nor offered (NoProm-NoComp).

1.5 | Double deviation: failures in service recovery

Making promises creates a risk when you cannot keep them. Services management research has shown that more than half of all attempted recovery efforts reinforce dissatisfaction because of failed service recoveries (Casado-Díaz and Nicolau-Gonzálbez 2009). The expectancy disconfirmation theory explains this so-called double deviation effect. Explicitly promising compensation increases customers' expectations. Not keeping this promise leads to extremely low levels of customers' evaluation and their criticism damaging the organization (Casado-Díaz and Nicolau-Gonzálbez 2009). Hypothesis 4a is: When compensation is promised, but not offered (Prom-NoComp), perceived justice, emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more negative compared to when compensation is not promised nor offered (NoProm-NoComp). The related hypothesis 4b is: When compensation is promised, but not offered (Prom-NoComp), perceived justice, emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more negative compared to when compensation is offered, both promised (Prom-Comp) and not promised (NoProm-Comp).

1.6 | Public–private differences

We expected that overall the effects would be similar in public and private settings for all four hypotheses. Citizens have other relationships with public services beyond those of a customer—a user, a voter, a recipient and a taxpayer (Milakovich 2003). Also, as public organizations are often financed by taxpayers' money this will likely influence how customers evaluate public organizations offering compensation (Björlin Lidén and Edvardsson 2003). However, in situations where customers pay directly for services, their money is directly related to the value they receive (Alford 2002). Also, experiences in private settings might influence customers' public service expectations. Finally, increasing marketization of public services, and the introduction of many private management and customer relation innovations, may have shifted customers' expectations to levels similar to those found in the private sector. Therefore, hypothesis 5 (H5) is: The effects as hypothesized in H1-2-3-4 are similar in public and private settings.

1.7 | Overview of experiments

We used two survey experiments involving students and a large and heterogeneous sample of US citizens as proposed by Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen (2016). We first studied our hypotheses in an experiment with a student sample (for an overview of (dis)advantages of using students see Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen 2016, p. 114). We recognize the limitations of a relatively homogeneous and small sample, and to further validate results employed a follow-up replication study with a larger and more heterogeneous sample of US citizens. The similarity of results allowed some theoretical generalization. Both survey experiments used a 2 (sector: public, private) by 2 (compensation promised: no, yes) by 2 (compensation offered: no, yes) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight scenarios as graphically presented in figure 1.

FIGURE 1 Graphical presentation of the (in)dependent variables.

Our aim was not to study types of service failures and recovery, other than the compensation aspect, which we needed to keep constant. Both experiments employed one service failure–service recovery configuration with a delay type of process failure that could be solved later (for a full description of scenarios, see appendix 1). The customer had ordered a product and was informed that it was ready for collection at a pick-up point. At the counter the customer found it was not there, but would be available the next day. Subsequently, we manipulated Promising Compensation by adding in the Prom-vignettes that the customer sees the promise: 'We keep our promises; if not, you'll get a gift voucher worth 5 dollars/euro'. We manipulated Offering Compensation by only offering the gift voucher in the Comp-vignettes. For monetary compensation we used a small and token compensation worth 5 dollars/euro that was given on the spot and proactively offered since the failure could be rectified the next day. It is of note that the way in which employees interact with customers in a recovery situation is important and affects post-recovery satisfaction. However, the focus of our research was on the effects of compensation. We kept aspects related to interactional justice (such as offering an apology) constant in all scenarios. Therefore, interactional justice was not measured as a dependent variable.

2 | STUDY 1: STUDENT SAMPLE

2.1 | Independent and dependent variables

To manipulate Sector, we presented participants with a vignette within a municipality context (applied for a new driving licence after expiry) or an Internet store (ordered a gift). We measured four dependent variables. An overview of the items and Cronbach's alphas is given in appendix 2. Distributive justice was measured using an adapted Lii and Lee (2012) scale. For procedural justice and our proactive compensation offer we created a new three-item scale since current scales are based on situations where customers have to complain to receive compensation. Negative emotions were measured using the Mattila (2001) scale. For post-recovery satisfaction we used the scale applied by Huang and Lin (2011). As control variables, we asked participants to indicate the perceived severity of the failure (Mattila 2001) and realism of the scenario (Magnini et al. 2007). Finally, we asked participants three manipulation check questions verifying participants' understanding of the vignette. We tested and found that the data met all requirements to run factorial analyses of variance—ANOVAs (e.g., Field 2013).

2.2 | Data collection, sample and validity check

A total of 160 undergraduate students from a Dutch university participated for course credits. They visited the research laboratory and completed the online questionnaire in one-person cabins. Two students did not comply with the criterion of being Dutch, and were excluded because of possible national differences in reputations and relationships with public organizations. One participant failed two out of three manipulation checks and was excluded from the dataset. We included participants with one mistake, as the results were similar to exclusion. This resulted in 157 valid cases ($M_{\text{age}} = 21.3$, $SD = 2.0$; 43.9 per cent female). For this initial test of our focal hypothesis, we took an investigative approach to the determination of sample size. An a priori power analysis using G*power (Faul et al. 2009) with a medium effect size ($d = 0.25$) and power of 80 per cent indicated a sample size of 128 participants in total.

2.3 | Results

2.3.1 | Control variables

A full factorial ANOVA on perceived severity of failure yielded no significant main or interaction effects. Also, age and gender had no significant effects on the dependent variables. An ANOVA on perceived realism of the scenario, however, yielded main Sector and Compensation effects. The internet store scenario ($M_{\text{internet store}} = 4.79$, $SD = 1.52$) was perceived as significantly more realistic ($F(1, 149) = 22.53$, $p = .000$) than the municipality scenario

($M_{\text{municipality}} = 3.62$, $SD = 1.79$). Also, not offering compensation ($M_{\text{no}} = 4.88$, $SD = 1.61$) was perceived as significantly more realistic ($F(1, 149) = 30.70$, $p = .000$) than offering compensation ($M_{\text{yes}} = 3.56$, $SD = 1.63$). This implies that realism might explain our effects as well. We also ran ANCOVAs with realism as a covariate as a robustness check. These analyses resulted in similar results as presented below, only with main effects of Sector disappearing in ANCOVAs. But one of the assumptions of ANCOVAs is that the covariates (in this study for example 'realism') should not be dependent on the independent variables (see Miller and Chapman 2001; Gerber and Green 2012). Since this is the case in our study, we cannot use realism as a covariate and therefore we report the results of ANOVAs. We discuss this issue further in the General Discussion.

2.3.2 | General results

Table 1 summarizes the results of the ANOVAs, including all main and interaction effects for all dependent variables. Below we discuss the effects directly related to hypotheses 1–5. Only H1 could be directly tested with these main and interaction effects alone, since the specific mean cell values have to be compared. For example, the double deviation condition Prom-NoComp has extremely low values and influences the overall Prom- and Comp-means tested in the main effects. To compare specific cell means and study hypotheses 2–5, additional simple contrast analyses were used as part of the ANOVAs. For hypothesis 3 (NoProm-NoComp versus Prom-Comp) and for hypothesis 4b (Prom-NoComp versus NoProm-Comp) non-adjacent cell means were tested by separately calculating t -values based on the cell means involved, SD s and N per cell (see Lakens 2013). We used significance levels of .05 and confidence intervals of 95.0 per cent throughout.

2.3.3 | The effects of Offering Compensation (H1)

Results of the ANOVAs show that there are main Offering Compensation effects for all dependent variables. The pattern of means (Comp versus NoComp) moves as we hypothesized (see table 2), concluding that H1 can be confirmed.

2.3.4 | The effects of Promising Compensation (H2 and H3)

As table 1 shows, Promising Compensation had a significant effect on procedural justice, negative emotions and post-recovery satisfaction. Of more interest was the effect of Promised Compensation, which was qualified by Offered Compensation (i.e., the interaction effect was significant) for procedural justice and negative emotions. To

TABLE 1 Summary statistics of four ANOVAs (significant effects in bold)

	Distributive justice		Procedural justice		Negative emotions		Post-recovery satisfaction	
	Wilks $F(1,149)$	p -value	Wilks $F(1,149)$	p -value	Wilks $F(1,148)$	p -value	Wilks $F(1,148)$	p -value
Promising compensation	1.65	.201	21.36	.000	9.85	.002	5.40	.021
Offering compensation	55.58	.000	61.32	.000	22.04	.000	39.76	.000
Sector	0.66	.417	7.35	.008	0.81	.369	6.53	.012
Sector * Promising compensation	0.38	.540	0.00	.977	0.55	.459	2.00	.160
Sector * Offering compensation	0.33	.567	0.30	.584	0.02	.887	2.85	.094
Promising compensation * Offering compensation	1.15	.285	24.80	.000	13.32	.000	0.57	.452
Sector * Promising compensation * Offering compensation	0.03	.873	0.00	.988	0.39	.536	1.75	.188

TABLE 2 Observed means and standard deviations (in parentheses)

Main effects	n	Distributive justice	Procedural justice	Negative emotions	Post-recovery satisfaction
NoProm	77	3.93 (1.33)	4.75 (1.46)	3.64 (1.53)	3.02 (1.16)
Prom	80	3.68 (1.39)	3.78 (1.77)	4.39 (1.69)	2.62 (1.13)
NoComp	78	3.09 (1.10)	3.43 (1.54)	4.60 (1.67)	2.30 (0.97)
Comp	79	4.50 (1.23)	5.08 (1.43)	3.47 (1.44)	3.31 (1.11)
Public	77	3.72 (1.30)	3.97 (1.72)	4.14 (1.68)	2.61 (1.04)
Private	80	3.87 (1.42)	4.54 (1.63)	3.92 (1.62)	3.01 (1.23)
Interaction effect Promising*Offering compensation					
NoProm-NoComp	38	3.32 (1.16)	4.46 (1.25)	3.77 (1.64)	2.57 (0.99)
Prom-NoComp	40	2.88 (1.01)	2.46 (1.09)	5.38 (1.29)	2.05 (0.90)
NoProm-Comp	39	4.52 (1.22)	5.04 (1.60)	3.53 (1.43)	3.44 (1.17)
Prom-Comp	40	4.48 (1.25)	5.11 (1.25)	3.41 (1.46)	3.18 (1.05)
Interaction effect Sector*Promising*Offering compensation					
Public NoProm-NoComp	18	3.22 (1.19)	4.22 (1.34)	3.88 (1.72)	2.83 (0.98)
Prom-NoComp	20	2.93 (0.99)	2.23 (0.97)	5.45 (1.20)	1.90 (0.69)
NoProm-Comp	19	4.34 (1.24)	4.70 (1.86)	3.82 (1.44)	3.78 (1.14)
Prom-Comp	20	4.39 (1.15)	4.77 (1.22)	3.38 (1.64)	3.52 (1.16)
Private NoProm-NoComp	20	3.41 (1.16)	4.67 (1.15)	3.68 (1.61)	2.25 (0.93)
Prom-NoComp	20	2.83 (1.05)	2.68 (1.17)	5.30 (1.40)	2.20 (1.06)
NoProm-Comp	20	4.69 (1.21)	5.37 (1.27)	3.25 (1.40)	3.09 (1.11)
Prom-Comp	20	4.56 (1.37)	5.45 (1.22)	3.45 (1.29)	2.85 (0.83)

better understand this interaction, we used simple contrast analyses to test whether Offering Compensation without prior promises (NoProm-Comp) would lead to more positive evaluations when compared to where compensation is promised (Prom-Comp). The results showed that these two scenarios do not lead to significant differences in distributive justice ($p = .881$; $SE = .264$), procedural justice ($p = .800$; $SE = .292$), negative emotions ($p = .716$; $SE = .330$) and post-recovery satisfaction ($p = .365$; $SE = .225$). Hence, H2 cannot be confirmed.

To verify whether Prom-Comp and NoProm-Comp would result in more positive evaluations than NoProm-NoComp (H3), we used simple contrasts and t -tests. When combined, these reveal that H3 could be confirmed for post-recovery satisfaction, distributive and procedural justice, but not for negative emotions. Distributive justice for NoProm-Comp was significantly higher ($p = .000$; $SE = .268$) than for NoProm-NoComp. Also, Prom-Comp led to a significantly higher level than NoProm-NoComp ($t(76) = 4.24$, $p = .000$). Procedural justice for NoProm-Comp was significantly higher ($p = .048$; $SE = .295$) than NoProm-NoComp. Also, procedural justice for Prom-Comp was significantly higher than NoProm-NoComp ($t(76) = 2.30$, $p = .025$). However, there were no differences on negative emotions between NoProm-NoComp and NoProm-Comp ($p = .467$; $SE = .337$), nor with Prom-Comp ($t(76) = -1.03$, $p = .309$). Finally, both participants in NoProm-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .230$) and in Prom-Comp ($t(76) = 2.64$, $p = .010$) scenarios were significantly more satisfied than in NoProm-NoComp scenarios.

2.3.5 | The effects of double deviation (H4)

We used simple contrast analyses to test whether a double deviation, that is, Prom-NoComp, would be significantly more negative than NoProm-NoComp. H4a could be confirmed for procedural justice ($p = .000$; $SE = .294$), negative emotions ($p = .000$; $SE = .335$; for cell means, see table 2) and post-recovery satisfaction ($p = .032$; $SE = .229$), but not for distributive justice ($p = .099$; $SE = .266$).

In H4b, we stated that for all four dependent variables Prom-NoComp would lead to significantly more negative evaluations than for NoProm-Comp and Prom-Comp. We used simple contrast analyses to compare Prom-NoComp with Prom-Comp, and separate t -tests to compare Prom-NoComp with NoProm-Comp. The results show that this hypothesis can be confirmed for all dependent variables. Prom-NoComp does lead to a significantly lower distributive justice than Prom-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .263$) and NoProm-Comp ($t(77) = -6.52$, $p = .000$). Procedural justice in the Prom-NoComp was significantly lower compared to both Prom-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .290$) and NoProm-Comp ($t(77) = -8.39$, $p = .000$). Negative emotions for Prom-NoComp were significantly higher than for Prom-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .328$) and NoProm-Comp ($t(77) = 6.04$, $p = .000$). Finally, post-recovery satisfaction for Prom-NoComp was significantly lower than for Prom-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .224$) and NoProm-Comp ($t(77) = -5.93$, $p = .010$).

2.3.6 | Differences between the two sectors (H5)

To study whether Sector made a difference in the hypothesized effects of promising and offering compensation, we looked at the main and interaction effects involving sector. Sector did not moderate the dependent variables by interaction effects with promising or offering compensation, suggesting that H1–4 are true for both public and private settings. We did find significant main Sector effects (see table 1) for procedural justice ($M_{\text{public}} = 3.97$, $SD = 1.72$; $M_{\text{private}} = 4.54$, $SD = 1.63$) and post-recovery satisfaction ($M_{\text{public}} = 2.61$, $SD = 1.04$; $M_{\text{private}} = 3.01$, $SD = 1.23$). However, we must be careful interpreting these effects given that Sector also influenced our control variable. We will elaborate on this in the General Discussion.

3 | STUDY 2: ONLINE US PANEL

3.1 | Independent and dependent variables

As recommended by Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen (2016), we replicated study 1 with a larger, more heterogeneous sample employing the same stimuli, but with one change. Because of differences in the process of acquiring a driving licence between the Netherlands and USA, for the public setting we selected a governmental organization that issues visas (see appendix 1). Promising and offering compensation were manipulated similar to study 1. Also, the dependent variables were identical to those in study 1 (for items and reliability measures, see appendix 2).

3.2 | Data collection, sample and validity check

Based on the findings in study 1, we anticipated a small effect size ($d = .10$). Power analyses using G*power (Faul et al. 2009) for our eight-condition design ($\alpha = .05$ and power of 80 per cent) suggests having at least 787 participants. Because of potential dropouts in participants, we recruited a heterogeneous set of participants ($N = 1,055$) via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online panel. This is a suitable sampling frame for public experiments according to Jilke et al. (2016) and Stritch et al. (2017). The MTurk population (MTurkers) is not a random sample of the US population and hence not statistically representative. However, according to Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen (2016) experiments do not necessarily have to rely on random samples. The population of MTurkers is compared with student samples and standard internet panels very diverse in terms of demographic characteristics (Buhrmester et al. 2011). Also, considerable research has shown that MTurk research replicated in surveys, experimental studies

and behavioural laboratory research found few substantial differences (Jilke et al. 2016). Another criticism is that MTurk workers are paid so little that one may wonder whether they take the experiment seriously (Paolacci et al. 2010). But Hauser and Schwarz (2016) showed in three online studies that MTurkers are more attentive to instructions than student pools.

To tackle the possible effects of this attentiveness problem, to ensure a high reliability of the dataset and increase statistical power, we employed an identical procedure to that used by Jilke et al. (2016). First, we excluded 43 participants based on wrong answers to an instructional manipulation check question. Second, 17 respondents with two mistakes out of three manipulation check questions on the sector, promising and offering compensation were excluded. We included participants with one mistake, as the results were similar to exclusion. The highest and lowest 1 per cent percentile in terms of total survey completion time ($N = 16$) and 33 respondents with an overlapping IP address were excluded. Finally, nine non-US citizens were excluded from the dataset. This led eventually to a sample of 937 valid cases ($M_{\text{age}} = 38.3$, $SD = 12.35$; 47.8 per cent female; US nationality), ensuring sufficient power.

3.3 | Results

3.3.1 | Control variables

A full factorial ANOVA on perceived severity of the failure yielded a main Sector effect ($F(1, 928) = 6.355$, $p = .012$; $M_{\text{visa}} = 5.36$, $SD = 1.46$; $M_{\text{internet store}} = 5.60$, $SD = 1.29$). An ANOVA on perceived realism yielded a main Sector ($F(1, 929) = 13.205$, $p = .000$; $M_{\text{visa}} = 5.61$, $SD = 1.47$; $M_{\text{internet store}} = 5.93$, $SD = 1.14$) and a main Compensation effect ($F(1, 929) = 26.525$, $p = .000$; $M_{\text{yes}} = 5.55$, $SD = 1.47$; $M_{\text{no}} = 5.99$, $SD = 1.12$). Both sector and realism can have a significant effect on the dependent variables. Also for this study we ran ANCOVAs as robustness checks showing only minor differences in Sector effects. The limitations are discussed in the General Discussion. As in study 1, age and gender did not have significant effects on the dependent variables.

TABLE 3 Summary statistics of four ANOVAs (significant effects in bold)

	Distributive justice		Procedural justice		Negative emotions		Post-recovery satisfaction	
	Wilks $F(1,929)$	p -value	Wilks $F(1,929)$	p -value	Wilks $F(1,929)$	p -value	Wilks $F(1,929)$	p -value
Promising compensation	1.88	.171	16.72	.000	0.09	.767	0.58	.446
Offering compensation	407.37	.000	655.85	.000	122.55	.000	299.129	.000
Sector	0.74	.391	1.34	.237	5.00	.026	1.44	.230
Sector * Promising compensation	1.89	.196	6.15	.013	0.19	.663	0.21	.645
Sector * Offering compensation	0.89	.345	0.31	.578	0.67	.412	0.85	.357
Promising compensation * Offering compensation	6.66	.010	60.12	.000	2.66	.103	2.41	.121
Sector * Promising compensation * Offering compensation	2.39	.123	5.09	.024	0.05	.821	0.05	.816

TABLE 4 Observed means and standard deviations (in parentheses)

Main effects	n	Distributive justice	Procedural justice	Negative emotions	Post-recovery satisfaction
NoProm	470	3.20 (1.69)	3.77 (1.66)	5.55 (1.43)	2.43 (1.42)
Prom	467	3.07 (1.80)	3.42 (1.92)	5.52 (1.48)	2.37 (1.38)
NoComp	469	2.18 (1.27)	2.47 (1.38)	6.03 (1.17)	1.71 (0.94)
Comp	468	4.09 (1.62)	4.72 (1.43)	5.03 (1.54)	3.09 (1.45)
Public	476	3.21 (1.78)	3.68 (1.83)	5.42 (1.50)	2.47 (1.44)
Private	461	3.06 (1.70)	3.50 (1.78)	5.65 (1.39)	2.33 (1.37)
Interaction effect Promising*Offering compensation					
NoProm-NoComp	236	2.36 (1.24)	2.98 (1.41)	5.97 (1.21)	1.80 (1.00)
Prom-NoComp	233	1.99 (1.29)	1.95 (1.14)	6.09 (1.13)	1.62 (0.86)
NoProm-Comp	234	4.04 (1.67)	4.56 (1.52)	5.12 (1.52)	3.06 (1.50)
Prom-Comp	234	4.15 (1.57)	4.88 (1.32)	4.95 (1.56)	3.12 (1.40)
Interaction effect Sector*Promising*Offering compensation					
Public NoProm-NoComp	115	2.59 (1.28)	3.27 (1.34)	5.80 (1.31)	1.90 (1.03)
Prom-NoComp	116	1.94 (1.30)	1.81 (1.01)	5.98 (1.16)	1.69 (0.96)
NoProm-Comp	119	4.03 (1.80)	4.60 (1.61)	5.05 (1.60)	3.10 (1.59)
Prom-Comp	126	4.16 (1.62)	4.90 (1.39)	4.90 (1.60)	3.11 (1.41)
Private NoProm-NoComp	121	2.14 (1.15)	2.70 (1.41)	6.13 (1.09)	1.71 (0.98)
Prom-NoComp	117	2.05 (1.28)	2.08 (1.24)	6.19 (1.08)	1.54 (0.76)
NoProm-Comp	115	4.05 (1.53)	4.52 (1.42)	5.20 (1.42)	3.02 (1.41)
Prom-Comp	108	4.15 (1.53)	4.86 (1.24)	5.00 (1.53)	3.14 (1.39)

3.3.2 | General results

Table 3 summarizes the results of the ANOVAs including all main and interaction effects for all dependent variables. As in study 1, we discuss these effects directly related to hypotheses 1–5. Similar to the first study, we used additional simple contrast analyses and separate *t*-tests to compare means of different scenarios. For all our analyses, we used significance levels of .05 and confidence intervals of 95.0 per cent.

3.3.3 | The effects of Offering Compensation (H1)

ANOVAs for the dependent variables yielded significant main effects on all dependent variables (see table 3). The pattern of means was as expected by the hypothesis (see table 4), concluding that H1 can be confirmed.

3.3.4 | The effects of Promising Compensation (H2 and H3)

As table 3 shows, there is a main effect of Promising Compensation on procedural justice. However, we also see that this main effect is qualified by an interaction effect of promising and offering compensation on distributive and procedural justice. Simple contrast analyses to test whether NoProm-Comp would lead to more positive evaluations than Prom-Comp (H2) showed that these two scenarios do not lead to significant differences in distributive justice ($p = .393$; $SE = .134$), negative emotions ($p = .173$; $SE = .126$) and post-recovery satisfaction ($p = .576$; $SE = .113$).

However, there is a significant difference for procedural justice ($p = .010$; $SE = .125$). Hence, H2 can only be confirmed for procedural justice.

In H3 we hypothesized that both compensation scenarios (Prom-Comp and NoProm-Comp) would lead to more positive evaluations than NoProm-NoComp. As in study 1, additional simple contrast analysis and specific t -tests were used to compare means of these three scenarios involved. These confirm H3 for all dependent variables. Distributive justice for NoProm-Comp is significantly higher ($p = .000$; $SE = .134$) than for NoProm-NoComp. Also, Prom-Comp leads to a significantly higher level than NoProm-NoComp ($t(468) = 13.72$, $p = .000$). Procedural justice for the NoProm-Comp scenario is significantly higher ($p = .000$; $SE = .124$) than NoProm-NoComp. Also, procedural justice for the Prom-Comp scenario is significantly higher than NoProm-NoComp ($t(468) = 15.08$, $p = .000$). For negative emotions, NoProm-Comp leads to significantly fewer negative emotions ($p = .000$; $SE = .126$) than NoProm-NoComp. This is also the case for Prom-Comp ($t(468) = -7.92$, $p = .000$). Finally, both NoProm-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .113$) and Prom-Comp ($t(468) = 11.77$, $p = .000$) lead to significantly higher levels of post-recovery satisfaction than NoProm-NoComp.

3.3.5 | The effects of double deviation (H4)

Testing whether Prom-NoComp (double deviation) would lead to significantly more negative evaluations than NoProm-NoComp (H4a), analysing the interaction effects with simple contrast analyses reveals that this could be confirmed for distributive justice ($p = .005$; $SE = .134$) and procedural justice ($p = .000$; $SE = .124$), but not for negative emotions ($p = .345$; $SE = .126$) and post-recovery satisfaction ($p = .102$; $SE = .113$).

Simple contrast analysis and specific t -tests revealed that hypothesis 4b can be confirmed for all dependent variables. Prom-NoComp leads to a significantly lower distributive justice than Prom-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .134$) and NoProm-Comp ($t(465) = -14.84$, $p = .000$). Procedural justice for Prom-NoComp is significantly lower than Prom-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .125$) and NoProm-Comp ($t(465) = -20.98$, $p = .000$). Negative emotions for Prom-NoComp are significantly higher than for Prom-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .127$) and NoProm-Comp ($t(465) = 7.82$, $p = .000$). Finally, post-recovery satisfaction for Prom-NoComp is significantly lower than for Prom-Comp ($p = .000$; $SE = .113$) and NoProm-Comp ($t(465) = -12.72$, $p = .000$).

3.3.6 | Differences between the two sectors (H5)

To study the Sector effects we looked at the main and all interaction effects involving Sector (see table 3). As table 3 shows, there is a main Sector effect on negative emotions. The private scenarios ($M = 5.65$, $SD = 1.39$) lead to significantly ($F(1, 929) = 5.00$, $p = .026$) more negative emotions than the public organization ($M = 5.42$, $SD = 1.50$). Overall, the data suggest that Sector did not seem to affect customers' perceived distributive justice, procedural justice or post-recovery satisfaction, thus confirming H5 for these dependent variables. However, we also see that there is an interaction effect ($F(1, 929) = 6.15$, $p = .013$) of Sector and Promising Compensation on procedural justice. A simple contrast analysis shows that not promising compensation leads to a significantly ($p = .010$; $SE = .124$) higher level for the public ($M = 3.94$, $SE = 0.088$) than for the private scenario ($M = 3.61$, $SE = 0.088$). The scenarios promising compensation do not lead to significant differences ($p = .360$; $SE = .125$). Finally, for procedural justice there is an interaction effect between Sector, Promising and Offering compensation ($F(1, 929) = 5.09$, $p = .024$). A close inspection of the pattern of means (see table 4) shows that within the private setting there is only an effect of offering compensation: People perceive lower procedural justice when there is no compensation ($M = 2.70$ and 2.08 , respectively) than when there is compensation ($M = 4.52$ and 4.86 , respectively). However, this pattern is different within the public domain. Promising compensation, but not offering it (Prom-NoComp), leads to much lower perceived procedural justice ($M = 1.81$) compared to NoProm-NoComp ($M = 3.27$). There is no difference between NoProm-Comp ($M = 4.60$) and Prom-Comp ($M = 4.90$). Compared to study 1, these results seem to suggest that Sector might moderate some of the effects of offering and promising compensation. We do need to emphasize,

TABLE 5 Results of the two studies

	Study 1	Study 2
H1: Comp leads to more positive evaluations than NoComp	Confirmed: all dependent variables.	Confirmed: all dependent variables.
H2: Prom-Comp leads to more negative evaluations than NoProm-Comp	Not confirmed: all dependent variables.	Confirmed: procedural justice. Not confirmed: distributive justice, negative emotions, post-recovery satisfaction.
H3: Prom-Comp and NoProm-Comp lead to more positive evaluations than NoProm-Comp	Confirmed: distributive and procedural justice, post-recovery satisfaction. Not confirmed: negative emotions.	Confirmed: all dependent variables.
H4a: Prom-NoComp leads to less positive evaluations than NoProm-NoComp	Confirmed: procedural justice, negative emotions and post-recovery satisfaction. Not confirmed: distributive justice.	Confirmed: distributive and procedural justice Not confirmed: negative emotions and post-recovery satisfaction.
H4b: Prom-NoComp leads to less positive evaluations than Prom-Comp and NoProm-Comp	Confirmed: all dependent variables.	Confirmed: all dependent variables.
H5: Results of H1–H4 are similar for public and private settings	Confirmed (but with caution): all dependent variables.	Confirmed (but with caution): all dependent variables, except for interaction effects with Promising and Offering Compensation on procedural justice.

though, that similar to study 1, the conclusions of these findings need to be treated with caution given the effect that Sector had on our control variable.

3.4 | Summary of the two studies

The results of both studies are summarized in table 5 showing that hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4b and 5 have many similarities. For H4a the results of both studies are mixed.

4 | DISCUSSION

Two experiments among Dutch students (study 1) and US citizens (study 2) investigated the effects of promising and offering a small monetary compensation after a service failure in public and private settings. Eight scenarios were used to determine the effects of these independent variables on customers' evaluations of distributive and procedural justice, negative emotions and post-recovery satisfaction. The results let us conclude that offering compensation after a service failure significantly improved customers' evaluations. Promising compensation explicitly before a service failure had no effect on these evaluations. When compensation was promised, but not offered, this led to significantly more negative evaluations than when it was offered. Finally, the sector (public vs. private) did not seem to moderate the effects of promising and offering compensation on customers' evaluations (with one exception in study 2).

This research adds to public management literature. It is the first study to apply justice theory (Adams 1965) in public service recovery settings and proves itself relevant. The results show that monetary compensation is a powerful instrument to restore customers' perceived loss and contribute to the restoration of satisfaction after a service failure; an effect already found in private settings (e.g., Wirtz and Mattila 2004) and now confirmed in public settings. However, from an ethical and legal perspective, offering individual customers compensation may not always be desirable or possible. One reason is that such compensation has to be paid from general tax revenues. This benefits individual citizens and could lead to inequalities and stimulate a claim culture. Also, customers as taxpayers could object to public organizations using tax money to compensate customers.

Second, based on expectancy disconfirmation theory (Oliver 1993) we expected that explicitly promising compensation prior to the failure would lead to more negative customer evaluations compared to when it had not been promised. This is based on the effect that expectations increase, while experiences stay the same. Our results show that this is not the case. From a service recovery perspective, promising compensation has no effects on customers' evaluations. However, expectancy disconfirmation theory is clearly supported in the case of a double deviation where the promised compensation is not offered. When expectations of receiving compensation are set and, subsequently, not fulfilled, this leads to very negative evaluations. From a managerial perspective, the question is: what sense does it make to promise compensation explicitly? Where no second failures are made, it does not lead to better evaluations. In the case of a double deviation, it leads to extreme negative evaluations. Finally, we expected that, in the direct-exchange scenarios where customers pay directly for services, there would be no difference in customers' evaluations between the public and private settings. Although we found some main and interaction effects involving sector, we can conclude that the sector has no mediating effects on customers' evaluations.

Our study also has some limitations, which could lead to new lines of future research. First, while we tried to develop realistic scenarios with similar failures with a similar severity, participants of both studies perceived the private scenarios to be more realistic than the public scenarios; probably because offering service charters and monetary compensation are not yet common public practices. This scenario could be re-examined when service charters and monetary compensation do become more common to see whether the difference in perceived realism will disappear. Also, because we did not anticipate this effect on perceived realism, we did not disentangle whether the impact of positive and normative expectations (see James 2011) on customers' evaluations are related to realism. For now, we need to interpret the significant effects of Sector with caution, because they could be partly explained in terms of perceived realism rather than Sector itself. We therefore also cannot draw strong conclusions regarding H5 (difference in effects between private vs. public). Second, we intentionally kept the interaction with the employee (interactional justice) constant in order to focus on the effects of compensation and the pay-out process. In follow-up studies the effects of employees' behaviour on the effects of compensation could be researched.

Third, we simulated using one type and level of severity of service failure and one type and size of monetary compensation. Future research could investigate whether different types of failures and compensation, different severity levels of failures and different sizes of compensation influence customers' evaluations. It could also look for the specific effects of promising compensation on customers' expectations (e.g., could size of compensation moderate the effect?) to better understand the impact of expectations. To expand knowledge on the effects of compensation, future research could study public services (other than governmental visa organizations and municipalities issuing driving licences) with a broad spectrum of all public customer segments. Finally, research could be conducted in non-direct exchange situations where public services are paid with taxpayers' money. Despite these limitations, our research has given early insights into the effects of promising and offering monetary compensation in public service recovery situations.

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APPENDIX 1

Vignettes for manipulations of dependent variables

Sector	Vignettes
Municipality (study 1)	'In one month your driving licence will expire. You have been to the municipality office to apply for a new one (costs approximately 40 euro). After a couple of days you receive a message that it is ready for collection and you go to the municipality office.'
Visa governmental organization (study 2)	'In one month you need to be in another country for which a travel visa is required which costs you approximately 40 dollars. You have ordered it on the internet. After a couple of days you receive a message that it is ready to collect at the office (about 20 minutes' drive from home) and you go to the office.'
Internet store (studies 1 and 2)	'You have made an online order on the web shop of the only store that offers this product (costs approximately 40 euro/dollars). It is a gift for a friend's birthday next month. You have indicated that you want to collect the parcel at a pick-up point. After a couple of days you receive a message that it is ready to collect and you go to the pick-up point (study 2: about 20 minutes' drive from home).'
All scenarios	Followed by ... 'Now you are at the desk, and the employee informs you that the driving licence/package/visa (dependent on study and scenario) is not there. The employee checks the system and informs you that it is still on its way. It will be available tomorrow.' Only in the four 'compensation promised' scenarios was a service charter

with explicit compensation visible behind the desk: 'We keep our promises, if not, you'll get a gift voucher worth 5 euron-dollar'. Only in the four 'compensation offered' scenarios did the customer proactively receive a gift voucher. The scenario ends with the customer leaving the hypothetical building. Participants then answer a number of questions related to the dependent variables.

APPENDIX 2

Scales for dependent variables

Severity of failure	(1) How would you rate the importance of the service failure? (1 = unimportant 7 = extremely important)
Distributive justice (study 1 $\alpha = 0.76$; study 2 $\alpha = 0.91$)	(1) The compensation for the inconvenience is fair. (2) I did <i>not</i> receive what I deserve. (R) (3) The outcome I received was <i>not</i> fair. (R) (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
Procedural justice (study 1 $\alpha = 0.88$; study 2 $\alpha = 0.89$)	(1) The organization used a good procedure to solve my problem. (2) If I were an employee of that organization, I would have acted similarly. (3) I felt taken seriously. (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
Negative emotions	(1) How annoyed would you be?
(study 1 $\alpha = 0.90$; study 2 $\alpha = 0.95$)	(2) How irritated would you be? (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely so)
Post-recovery satisfaction	(1) Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied did this experience make you feel? (1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = very satisfied)
(study 1 $\alpha = 0.75$; study 2 $\alpha = 0.94$)	(2) How well did this service experience meet your needs? (1 = not at all, 7 = absolutely yes) (3) Overall, I am very satisfied with this experience. (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
Realism of scenario	(1) To what extent do you think this was a realistic situation? (1 = not at all realistic, 7 = very realistic)