Import Sourcing Bias in Manufacturing Productivity Growth: Evidence across Advanced and Emerging Economies

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Import Sourcing Bias in Manufacturing Productivity Growth
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One of the main features of the current wave of globalization is the rise in outsourcing to emerging economies. Manufacturing industries, especially, are at the forefront of this development, sourcing ever more of their materials from emerging economies. The motive for this development is straightforward enough: from the perspective of advanced economies, materials sourced from emerging economies are often considerably cheaper than those from domestic producers or other advanced economies. The consequences for U.S. productivity of the shift from high-cost domestic producers to cheaper imports is the topic of two separate works by Houseman et al. (2010, 2011). As the authors show, many of the cost savings associated with this offshoring of production are not captured in official statistics, leading to what they label “offshoring bias.” This bias results because lower prices for imports from an emerging economy are often fully attributed to differences in quality; such assumptions overlook the possibility of real cost savings. Correcting for this, Houseman et al. conclude that U.S. manufacturing value-added and multifactor productivity growth are considerably biased upwards because input growth is biased downwards.

This chapter provides an international comparative perspective on this topic. In order to achieve such a perspective, I limit the scope of the analysis to the effect on productivity growth of changing the source of imports; thus, I do not take into account shifts from domestic to foreign sources. I will refer to this effect as “import sourcing bias” rather than use Houseman et al.’s (2010, 2011) term of “offshoring bias.” While this is a narrower concept than that of Houseman et al., it can be more
widely applied, since it relies on unit values of imported products from UN Comtrade. This is in contrast to Houseman et al.’s combination of confidential transaction-level prices used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to compile the U.S. import price indexes and U.S. case study evidence. My analysis of import sourcing bias thus allows for a comparison of the import sourcing bias in manufacturing productivity growth across countries.

The import sourcing bias measure is based on comparing two polar alternatives for treating the same product imported from different countries. A product imported from Country A could be treated as being different from the same product imported from Country B, or it could be considered a perfect substitute. In the first case, any observed price differences would be considered quality differences, while in the second case, observed price differences would be considered actual price differences. These two alternatives were also outlined in Diewert (1995, 1998), in the context of dealing with consumer prices from different outlets. I will assume that official statistics treat imports from A and B as different products. Because of this flawed approach, cost savings from switching to cheaper source countries will be missed, and the import price index will be biased.

Whether this bias estimate is correct depends, first, on whether it accurately reflects price (rather than quality) differences across source countries and, second, on whether the “different products” price index is an accurate reflection of the approach in the official import price statistics. Caution is in order on both grounds. First, the trade unit values are available at the four-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level, so there is still ample scope for quality differences within these product categories, as shown in Feenstra and Romalis (2012). When some of the price differences are actually quality differences, the true import sourcing bias is likely closer to zero than the bias estimated here. Second, it almost goes without saying that if statistical agencies already accurately distinguish between price and quality differences in estimating their import price indexes, then there is no import sourcing bias. However, there is reason to believe that statistical agencies would sooner err on the side of ascribing too much of price differences to quality differences, although reliable information on statistics methodologies is hard to come by. These considerations suggest that import sourcing bias is certainly possible in official statistics, but also that the
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The current analysis is likely to overstate any true bias. From that point of view, this analysis is more exploratory regarding the potential scope of this problem, rather than a definitive estimate of its precise magnitude.

The impact of import sourcing bias on productivity growth in manufacturing is computed based on input-output tables. I calculate the bias in manufacturing multifactor productivity (MFP) growth for the period from 1995 to 2008 for 38 economies included in the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). Results show that MFP growth in manufacturing, on average, is overstated by between 0.18 and 0.34 percentage points in advanced economies. Bias estimates for emerging economies are more mixed and include many negative bias estimates as well, which imply shifts toward higher-priced imports. As it would be highly unlikely that manufacturers would willingly switch to higher-cost sources of materials, this suggests that these are actually shifts toward higher-quality products. In the case of the United States, the import sourcing bias found here is between 14 and 33 percent of the offshoring bias of Houseman et al. (2010, 2011). The fact that it is lower comes as no surprise, as import sourcing bias ignores the shifts of sourcing from domestic to foreign suppliers. Even so, it still represents a notable fraction. Howells et al. (2013) have taken a similar approach for the United States as the one I discuss here. Theirs is based on more detailed unit value data, and they find import sourcing bias estimates that are similar to those presented here.

My estimates indicate that import sourcing bias is larger in Western Europe than in the United States. This may be due to the integration of many central and eastern European countries into European supply chains, following their accession to the European Union (EU). Sinn (2006) questioned the apparent solidity of Germany’s growth in light of increased offshoring. My findings of lower bias-corrected productivity growth in Germany would seem in line with his argument. But while productivity growth is quite noticeably affected by import sourcing bias, the impact is also not so large that it materially affects cross-country growth patterns. So productivity growth in Germany, after correcting for import sourcing bias, is still quite healthy.

From the perspective of the quality of statistics, my results indicate that import sourcing bias should also be of concern in advanced economies outside the United States. This is certainly not to argue that my unit-value approach would be a superior alternative to import price...
surveys. Instead, surveying prices of inputs directly from firms, as suggested by Alterman (2009 and Chapter 10 of this volume), would be an approach that would solve import sourcing bias as well as the broader offshoring bias.

METHODOLOGY

Import Sourcing Bias

The bias this chapter aims to quantify can best be illustrated using a stylized example, adapted from Houseman et al. (2010, 2011) to the case of switching between importers. Table 6.1 compares the price of a television in two periods from two foreign suppliers. Both suppliers—Sri Lanka and Switzerland—export televisions, and we assume the product is identical. Given the lower price and identical nature of the product, the number of televisions that is imported from Switzerland drops from 75 to 50 units, while Sri Lanka supplies 25 units in the first period and 50 in the second period. For simplicity’s sake, we assume that the price of both suppliers remains unchanged between the two periods, so the price change, shown in the final column, is equal to zero.

We distinguish between two cases: Case 1, where the two suppliers are treated as supplying a different product from each other, and Case 2, where they are treated as supplying the same product. Case 1 is assumed to correspond to current statistical practice (more on that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$t + 1$</th>
<th>Change $(t + 1/t - 1)$ (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swiss price</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan price</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss quantity</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan quantity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import price</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 1: measured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 2: true</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Author’s construction.
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below), while Case 2 is the true input price, given that we are dealing with identical products. Using a Törnqvist price index, the import price change in Case 1 is calculated as

\[
\log\left(\frac{P_t^M}{P_{t-1}^M}\right) = \frac{1}{2}(sl_t + sl_{t-1})\log\left(\frac{P_t^{SL}}{P_{t-1}^{SL}}\right) + \frac{1}{2}(sw_t + sw_{t-1})\log\left(\frac{P_t^{SW}}{P_{t-1}^{SW}}\right)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2}(sl_t + sl_{t-1})\log\left(\frac{5}{5}\right) + \frac{1}{2}(sw_t + sw_{t-1})\log\left(\frac{10}{10}\right)
\]

\[= 0,
\]

where superscript \(SL\) refers to the price of televisions from Sri Lanka, \(sl\) is the share of Sri Lankan televisions in the total value of imports, and \(SW\) and \(sw\) refer to the price and import value share for Switzerland. Since the price of both suppliers is constant over time, the weighted average price change is zero.

In Case 2, the input price in period \(t\) is a weighted average of the price of the two suppliers, so \((25 \times 5 + 75 \times 10) / 100 = 8.75\). Here the (correct) assumption is made that these products are substitutes, and the true import price change is thus a 14 percent drop. This drop will be missed by standard statistical methods, even if all the relevant information is available, simply because the products from the two suppliers are assumed to be different even though they are the same. So if the statistical agency decides (mistakenly here) that the price difference reflects a difference in quality, there will be an import sourcing bias.

In this example, it is assumed that the two suppliers sell an identical product. If this is not the case—because, for instance, the quality of the domestic supplier’s product is higher—then the quality-adjusted price difference is smaller. Adjusting trade-unit values for quality differences is not straightforward, but it is feasible, as shown by Hallak and Schott (2011) and Feenstra and Romalis (2012). However, such adjustments rely on a specific underlying theoretical model. Furthermore, even when adjusting for quality differences, Mandel (2010); Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013); and Feenstra and Romalis (2012) still find substantial deviations from the law of one price. This implies that there is certainly scope for import sourcing bias.

The main analysis compares import prices for individual products according to the two cases outlined in Table 6.1. The main difference
is that many different foreign suppliers are compared, rather than the simple two-supplier case. For Case 1, the price change for product $i$ from $t-1$ to $t$ can be written as

$$dP^1_t = \log \left( \frac{P^t}{P^{t-1}} \right) = \sum_j v_{ij} \log \left( \frac{P^t_{ij}}{P^{t-1}_{ij}} \right),$$

where $v_{ij} = \frac{V_{ij}/\sum_j V_{ij} + V_{ij-1}/\sum_j V_{ij-1}}{1/V_{ij}}$ is the two-period average share of imports from country $j$ in the total value of imports of product $i$. The subscript for the importing country is omitted to avoid notational clutter. The price of each product is computed using import quantities and values as $P^t_{ij} = V^t_{ij}/Q^t_{ij}$; see also the next section for more details about the data and implementation. The price change for Case 2 is defined as

$$dP^2_t = \log \left( \frac{P^t}{P^{t-1}} \right)^2 = \log \left( \frac{\sum_j V^t_{ij}}{\sum_j Q^t_{ij}} \right),$$

so the weighted average unit value of imports is calculated by summing import values and quantities across all source countries.

If the example from Table 6.1 is the typical case, we would expect to see that $P^t_{ij}$, used in Case 1, would be lower for emerging economies compared with advanced economies and that the share of imports from those countries, $v_{ij}$, would increase over time. As a result, the import price $dP^2_t$ (Equation 6.3) would typically increase by less than $dP^1_t$ (Equation 6.2). The difference between the two price changes, $\Delta_t = dP^1_t - dP^2_t$, is used to determine the import sourcing bias in manufacturing value-added growth.

What is specifically included in this difference, $\Delta_t$, is not immediately obvious when comparing Equations (6.2) and (6.3). However, Diewert and Nakamura (2010) have shown that it is possible to write the true index, $dP^2_t$, here, as a function of the typically observed index $dP^1_t$ and a bias term. In their simplest case, with a new, lower-priced product entering in the second of a two-period example, the bias is equal to the price discount of the lower-priced entrant times the quantity share that this entrant captures in the second period. In the more general case, with many products and arbitrary quantity shares, the expression for the bias becomes more complicated, but it still only depends on the shifts
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in imports and the price difference between different source countries.\(^7\) This implies that the difference, \(\Delta_i\), captures only import sourcing bias and would not be affected by other measurement problems.

There will be a bias if \(\Delta_i\) is different from zero, since in that case the import price measure used by the statistical office, which I assume is well-proxied by \(dP_{it}\), is not the same as the true import price measure, which I assume is well-proxied by \(dP_{it}^2\). In general, I would expect \(\Delta_i\) to be positive, which implies that the price index used to deflate imports is increasing too fast, and thus the quantity of imports increases too slowly.

The “true” import sourcing bias is likely to be smaller (closer to zero) than the bias I estimate here. This is because all true quality differences are considered to be price differences, and it seems likely that sellers of a high-quality product would not charge a lower (true) price than sellers of a low-quality product. To see this, consider a modification of the example in Table 6.1. The assumption in that example is that the Swiss television and the Sri Lankan television are identical, but say that the Sri Lankan product is of lower quality. For instance, assume that 20 percent of the Sri Lankan product is defective, compared with no defects for the Swiss product. The quality-adjusted price of the Sri Lankan product is then 6 rather than 5 because you have to buy 20 percent more of the product to get the same amount of nondefective units. The true price change would then be \(-11\) rather than \(-14\) percent.\(^8\)

The same logic holds for a shift of imports toward higher-quality imports. Bias estimate \(\Delta_i\) would then be negative because quality differences are assumed away. Accounting for quality differences would reduce the observed price differences and thus bring \(\Delta_i\) closer to zero. The estimated \(\Delta_i\) could also be understated if the high-quality product has a lower price than the low-quality product. While this cannot be ruled out, it seems less likely a priori. For instance, the results of Feenstra and Romalis (2012) indicate that estimates of quality and prices based on their model are positively correlated.

The Impact on Value-Added and Productivity Growth

Value-added growth is calculated as a residual, in a process called “double deflation”: the growth in output that is not accounted for by growth in intermediate inputs. Imports make up part of intermediate
inputs, so if growth in the quantity of imports is too low, then growth in value-added is too high. To be more precise, the price of imported materials used in manufacturing will be biased to the following degree:

\[ \Delta_t^{MM} = \sum_i \bar{\Pi}_i^{MM} \Delta_i, \]

where \( \bar{\Pi}_i^{MM} \) is the two-period average share of product \( i \) in the total value of imported materials used in manufacturing. Imported materials are, in turn, part of total materials used, which together with energy and services make up total intermediate inputs. Nominal gross output, \( P^Y \), can thus be written as the following accounting identity:

\[ P^Y_t = P^VA_t + P^I_t = P^VA_t + \left( P^{MM}_t MM_t + P^{DM}_t DM_t + P^{OI}_t OI_t \right), \]

where \( VA \) is value-added, \( I \) stands for total intermediate inputs, \( MM \) signifies imported materials, \( DM \) stands for domestically sourced materials and \( OI \) for other intermediate inputs, and \( P^X \) is the price of \( X \). In national accounts, prices are available for gross output and the different intermediate inputs, and the price of value-added is solved for implicitly. The Törnqvist index for the change in the value-added price is defined as

\[ \log \left( \frac{P^VA_t}{P^VA_{t-1}} \right) = \frac{1}{VA_t} \left( \log \left( \frac{P^V_t}{P^V_{t-1}} \right) - \bar{\Pi}^{MM}_t \left( \frac{P^{MM}_t}{P^{MM}_{t-1}} \right) - \bar{\Pi}^{DM}_t \left( \frac{P^{DM}_t}{P^{DM}_{t-1}} \right) - \bar{\Pi}^{OI}_t \left( \frac{P^{OI}_t}{P^{OI}_{t-1}} \right) \right), \]

where an upper bar denotes a two-period average and a lowercase variable is the share of that variable in gross output—thus, for example,

\[ \bar{VA}_t = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{P^VA_t}{P^V_t} + \frac{P^VA_{t-1}}{P^V_{t-1}} \right) \]

Based on the argument above, the price of imported materials, \( P^{MM} \), is biased by \( \Delta_{MM} \), so using Equation (6.6), the bias in the price of value-added is

\[ \Delta_t^{VVA} = \bar{mm}_t \Delta_t^{MM} = -\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{P^{MM}_t MM_t}{P^VA_t} + \frac{P^{MM}_t MM_{t-1}}{P^VA_{t-1}} \right) \Delta_t^{MM}. \]
Since the bias in prices has no bearing on the growth of nominal value-added, the bias in the growth of the quantity of value-added is equal to the negative of the bias in the growth of the price of value-added, \( \Delta tVA = -\Delta tPVA \). As the bias in the growth of imported materials has no effect on the growth of labor or capital, the growth bias of value-added translates one-for-one into a bias in MFP growth, \( \Delta tMFP = \Delta tVA \).

**DATA SOURCES AND IMPLEMENTATION**

To implement the bias calculation in Equation (6.7), two data sources are used, one with data on import prices and the other with data on the economies’ input-output structure. The import prices are based on the UN Comtrade database, which provides information on the quantity and value of imports by product, importing country, and source countries for each year in the period 1995–2008. There are data for up to 804 products, classified according to the four-digit level of the SITC Revision 2 (SITC Rev. 2) system. The valuation concept for the import value is CIF (cost, insurance, and freight), so it reflects the full price the importer has to pay to get the product into the country.

I undertake two processing steps before implementing Equations (6.2) and (6.3). First, I only keep observations for which the quantity unit is kilograms. This is done to ensure that the unit values are comparable across source countries. Second, I compute the median unit value of a product across all 38 importers and 139 source countries and drop observations for which the unit value is either smaller than 1 percent or larger than 100 times the median unit value, as these are more likely to reflect data errors. (The sensitivity of the results to these trimming criteria is discussed below.) Also included in the data error category are observations for which the quantity is equal to zero while the value is positive. Around 1 percent of observations are dropped as a result.

The price change difference for each imported product then needs to be weighted by the share of that product in imported materials used in manufacturing, as discussed in Equation (6.4). From the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), I have annual data on the composition
of imported intermediates for the 38 countries that are analyzed. However, this composition is only available at a higher level of aggregation, namely, for 14 manufacturing industries that deliver materials to manufacturing. So I first use a concordance of SITC Rev. 2 to the International Standard Industrial Classification Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3) industrial classification to aggregate product-level price-change differences to the level of these 14 manufacturing industries, using the share of each product in total imports by each country. Then Equation (6.4) is applied as described, and the outcome is used in Equation (6.7) to arrive at the estimate of the bias in manufacturing productivity growth.

I use the Socio-Economic Accounts (SEAs) that are part of WIOD to compute the growth of manufacturing MFP:\footnote{I use the Socio-Economic Accounts (SEAs) that are part of WIOD to compute the growth of manufacturing MFP.}

\begin{align}
\log\left(\frac{MFP}{MFP_{t-1}}\right) &= \log\left(\frac{VA_t}{VA_{t-1}}\right) - \sum \alpha_{it} \log\left(\frac{H_{it}}{H_{it-1}}\right) - \left(1 - \sum \alpha_{it}\right) \log\left(\frac{K_t}{K_{t-1}}\right).
\end{align}

Based on the SEAs, there is information for manufacturing on value-added at constant prices \((VA)\), employment by skill type \((H)\), the total capital stock \((K)\), and the share of labor compensation going to each skill type in value-added \((\alpha)\). Ideally, there should be data on capital stocks by asset type, but this is not available for all countries. As a result, the contribution to growth from changes in the composition of the capital stock is included in this measure of MFP growth.

For my analysis, I assume that statistical agencies treat imports of the same product from different countries as different products. Establishing whether this is actually the case is a much harder challenge. As a general principle, the main concern in official statistics is to avoid ignoring quality differences, and statistical agencies would thus be likely to treat products from different countries as having a different quality, rather than a different price—see, e.g., Eurostat (2001) and IMF (2009). How U.S. statisticians deal with this issue is discussed in detail in Houseman et al. (2010, 2011). Put briefly, unless it is clear that a “new” product imported from a different country is identical to the “old” product, price differences are assumed to be due to quality differences. European countries would have to follow a similar approach as the United States to be in line with Eurostat requirements. Since
separate import price indices are published for imports from euro-area
countries and for imports from non-euro-area countries, this suggests
that products from different countries are not treated as close substi-
tutes. For other countries, information on import prices and the estima-
tion methodology is even harder to establish. For instance, the Reserve
Bank of India (2012) shows import prices for India based on unit val-
ues, but it is unclear what level of detail these are constructed from. If
they distinguish import unit values by source country, then there would
be scope for import sourcing bias, but otherwise, their measure may
be similar to my $dP_2^i$. This paucity of methodological documentation
presents a challenge in gauging the possible scope for import sourcing
bias for most countries outside the United States.\textsuperscript{13}

This might not be a major problem if $dP_1^i$ from Equation (6.2) were
close to official import prices. Using data provided by Eurostat, a com-
parison can be made for nine European countries, and the results actu-
ally show substantial differences. Indeed, $dP_1^i$ is much more similar to
$dP_2^i$ (a correlation of 0.93) than to the official import prices (0.18). The
standard deviation of $dP_1^i$ and $dP_2^i$ is also about three times larger than
that of the official indices. To some extent, this is unsurprising, as $dP_1^i$
will capture many changes that official import prices are designed to
ignore. While both capture the changes in price of individual products
by a specific producer in a particular country, $dP_1^i$ will also capture
shifts between producers of the same product in the same country, shifts
between products within the SITC four-digit category, and changes in
the importance of individual products in the broader category.

However, as discussed above, Diewert and Nakamura (2010) show
that it is possible to express the true price index, $dP_2^i$, as a function of
the typically observed price index $dP_1^i$ and a bias term. This bias term,
$\Delta_i$, the difference between $dP_1^i$ and $dP_2^i$, depends only on the price dif-
fERENCE and shifts in imports across source countries. In other words,
even when $dP_1^i$ is a poor approximation of official import prices, the
import sourcing bias estimate $\Delta_i$ is not “contaminated” by factors unre-
related to import price differences and sourcing patterns.

This discussion implies that caution is in order in interpreting the
results on two counts. First, if statistical agencies adequately account
for price and quality differences across source countries, the method
employed here would incorrectly ascribe a bias to the import price
index of that country. A bias would only occur if the statistical agen-
cies ascribe too much of the price differences across source countries to quality differences. Second, our trade unit values are available at a level of detail at which quality differences will still be a notable factor. As long as the correlation between (true) prices and quality is not negative, the bias estimates are likely to be too large. Given these caveats, the results should be regarded more as indicative of the likely scope of this problem than as the final word on the precise magnitude.

RESULTS

The increased sourcing of materials from lower-cost countries is shown in Figure 6.1 for the three largest European countries and the United States. Between 1995 and 2008, each of these countries considerably increased the share of imported materials from emerging economies. I define two groups of emerging economies. The first group consists of the (mostly) central and eastern European countries that have joined the European Union since 2004, the EU12.14 The second group, “Other emerging,” includes Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey. The advanced economies are the EU1515 and the group labeled “Other advanced,” which includes Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the United States.16 This grouping is informative, as the share of imports from advanced economies went down considerably over this period, while both groups of emerging economies gained considerably in import market share.17

This shift in import market share toward emerging economies is an indication that imports from these economies are cheaper. To illustrate this, we can compare the import price for the same product across countries. To make this more straightforward to visualize, I first compute the median unit value by source country group (advanced/emerging, EU/other), importer, product, and year. These median unit values are then compared with the median unit value of imports from the EU15. Figure 6.2 plots the median price difference relative to the EU15 for each country group over time. The median price for imports from other advanced economies18 was about 20 percent higher than the price for imports from the EU15 throughout the period. To give an indication of the distribution around the median price difference, the percentage of
products that had a lower price than imports from EU15 countries is also indicated. For imports from other advanced economies, only about 40 percent of products are cheaper than imports from EU15 countries. The generally higher prices of imports from other advanced economies could be a “Washington apples” effect (Alchian and Allen 1964). Since most countries in the analysis are EU countries (27 out of 38 countries), imports from other advanced economies tend to come from farther away and would thus need to be of higher quality to overcome higher trade costs.

Throughout the period, and for most countries, importing from emerging economies was much cheaper than importing from EU15 countries. The median difference in 1995 was around 30–35 percent for imports from the EU12 and other emerging economies. The price advantage shrank over this period to about 20 percent for other emerging economies and to about 10 percent for EU12 countries. Most prod-
Figure 6.2 Median Price Difference Relative to EU15 Imports and Percentage of Products That Have Lower Prices than EU15 Imports, by Country Grouping, 1995–2008

NOTE: The lines show the median price difference of imports from a specific country grouping relative to imports from EU15 countries. The percentages indicate the percentage of products with lower prices.

SOURCE: Author’s computations.

...ucts from both groups of countries had lower prices than when imported from EU15 countries. This figure, though, treats all products identically even if they represent only a small part of imports.

We therefore turn to the results from estimating import sourcing bias, where products are weighted by their share in the value of imports. In these results, we focus on how the difference in price levels translates to a different rate of import price change, rather than on the price-level differences in themselves. Table 6.2 illustrates the products and country groups for which the import sourcing bias is most relevant. For each traded product, I calculate the difference between a price index under the assumption products are different when imported from a different country (Equation [6.2]) and a price index under the assumption prod-
Table 6.2 Offshoring Bias across Product Groups and Country Groups, 1995–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of product</th>
<th>Differentiated</th>
<th>Reference-priced</th>
<th>Exchange-traded</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advanced</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emerging</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The table shows the weighted average difference between the price change for a “different products” price index versus a “perfect substitutes” price index over the period from 1995 to 2008. The “different products” price index is defined in Equation (3.2), and the “perfect substitutes” index is defined in Equation (3.3). The price changes for each product are multiplied by the two-period average share of that product in country imports and summed across product groups. The product groups are defined by Rauch (1999) and are used to indicate the extent to which products are homogenous (exchange-trade) or differentiated; both Rauch’s conservative and liberal groupings of products are shown. The differences in price changes for each group are then averaged across countries.

SOURCE: Author’s computations.
priced” or “exchange-traded” categories, rather than the “differentiated” category. The final step is to compute an (unweighted) average of the price-change differences across countries.

The top row of Table 6.2 shows that, across all countries, there is only evidence of a (positive) import sourcing bias for differentiated products.\(^\text{19}\) For reference-priced and exchange-traded products—i.e., the more homogenous products—there is little indication that a shift toward low-cost sources is biasing import price indexes, especially in Rauch’s (1999) conservative product grouping (which uses a stricter rule for classifying products as homogenous). Indeed, the negative import sourcing bias numbers for some product and country groups imply shifts toward higher-cost sources. Across country groups, only advanced economies show notable positive import sourcing bias numbers, and then only for differentiated products. This group of products is where one would expect products of different prices—but also of different quality levels—to be able to coexist. The positive import sourcing bias numbers in Table 6.2 could then imply that advanced economies are shifting toward lower-quality imports or toward lower-cost imports (at a given quality level). In that regard, the import sourcing bias estimates in Table 6.2 and those that follow are likely to be an overestimate of the true bias.

Figure 6.3 moves to the country level and shows the import sourcing bias in combination with average annual growth in manufacturing MFP for the 20 advanced economies between 1995 and 2008 (ordered by measured MFP growth). The total bar equals manufacturing MFP growth as computed from the SEA (Equation [6.8]), which is divided into the bias calculated from Equation (6.7) and the corrected MFP growth. This illustrates how the bias is substantial in most countries and positive in all but Luxembourg and Greece. For this set of countries, the average bias is 0.34 percentage points, which is 25 percent of the (corrected) average annual MFP growth of 1.38 percent. In other words, measured MFP growth in advanced economies could very well substantially overstate actual growth. At the same time, the cross-country pattern of MFP growth is not much distorted: Though the growth rates are lower, the measured MFP growth and corrected MFP growth rates are very highly correlated across countries (0.98).

The import sourcing bias found for the United States of 0.07 percentage points is smaller than the offshoring bias found by Houseman
et al. (2010, 2011), whose estimates range from 0.21 to 0.51 percentage points over mostly the same period. Since any bias from shifting from domestic to foreign suppliers is not included in my import sourcing bias, this is as expected. It does suggest that import sourcing bias captures a notable share (14–33 percent) of the overall offshoring bias. In countries with smaller, more open economies than that of the United States, my import sourcing bias is likely to be an even larger part of the overall offshoring bias.

To gauge the robustness of these bias estimates, I repeated the analysis with more restrictive criteria for removing outliers in the unit value data. Rather than removing unit values that were 100 times larger or 0.01 times as large, I used parameters of 20 times larger or 0.05 times as large, as well as 10 times larger or 0.1 times as large. The resulting bias estimates are noticeably smaller, indicating that mostly small unit values are dropped from the data set. For advanced economies, the average
bias drops from 0.34 in the 100–0.01 case to 0.28 in the 20–0.05 case and 0.18 in the 10–0.1 case. The cross-country pattern is very similar, though, confirming the finding that the cross-country pattern of MFP growth is not affected by import sourcing bias.

Figure 6.4 shows the bias estimates for the 18 emerging economies. As already shown in Table 6.2, there is no clear positive import sourcing bias: the average bias is −0.06 and varies between −1.89 (Estonia) and +1.37 (Hungary). Taken at face value, the negative bias estimates suggest that measured productivity growth is understated because manufacturers are shifting toward imports of higher-cost materials. This is hard to fathom unless these materials are also of higher quality. These negative biases could reflect an increasing integration of emerging economies into advanced economies’ supply chains, with, for instance, (high-quality) car parts arriving from western European manufacturers for assembly in countries such as Slovakia. From the perspective of productivity measurement, import sourcing bias seems to be less of a problem in these emerging economies.

CONCLUSION

While manufacturers increasingly buy their materials from lower-cost countries, official statistics lag behind this trend. Methods to measure the price change of imported materials miss out on cost-savings that manufacturers achieve by sourcing from lower-cost countries. By overestimating price changes of imports, statisticians underestimate the growth in the quantity of imports, leading to an upward bias in growth of productivity. In this chapter, I quantify this import sourcing bias for 38 advanced and emerging economies and estimate bias-adjusted growth of manufacturing value-added for the period 1995–2008. This relies on data for import unit values across importing countries, so that price changes of import products can be calculated under the assumption that imports from different countries are either different products or perfect substitutes. Treating imports from different countries as substitutes allows for cost savings to be registered in the statistics.

The analysis for advanced economies shows that there is a shift toward imports with lower unit values for the group of differentiated
products. As a result, manufacturing MFP growth in advanced economies is biased upwards by, on average, 0.18 to 0.34 percentage points, or 10 to 20 percent of measured growth. In emerging economies, there is no clear bias in either direction. The true import sourcing bias is likely to be closer to zero than these estimates, as the method used here ascribes none of the price differences to differences in quality. Furthermore, if statistical agencies already deal well with price and quality differences across source countries, then there is no bias to begin with. From that perspective, it is reassuring to discover that even with the larger estimate of import sourcing bias, the cross-country pattern of productivity growth is not affected. On the other hand, this analysis is limited to analyzing import sourcing bias, and any bias stemming from shifts between domestic and foreign suppliers is not accounted for.

Yet even the current estimates have implications for the reliability of output and productivity statistics. These questions cannot easily

Figure 6.4 Average Annual Manufacturing MFP Growth in Emerging Economies, Bias and Bias-Corrected Measures, 1995–2008

SOURCE: Author’s computations.
be resolved in the standard statistical framework, where price changes are measured separately for inputs from domestic and different foreign sources. Instead, surveying an input price index, as discussed by Alterman (2009 and Chapter 10 of this volume), may hold greater promise, since for such an index firms would provide the overall input price, regardless of source. The earlier experiences of the Bureau of Labor Statistics in surveying margin prices (i.e., the sales price minus the purchase price of the product) in wholesale and retail trade suggest that this would be feasible. Those new prices led to much lower productivity growth, particularly in retail trade (Harchaoui 2012), which points to the importance of accurately measuring not only output but also input prices. From a policy perspective, these findings suggest that some of the offshoring of activities, in particular from western Europe to central and eastern European countries, has led to an overestimation of productivity growth. However, import sourcing bias by itself is not a large enough factor that the cross-country productivity growth patterns are materially affected.

Notes

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1. See, e.g., OECD (2010).
2. There has also been earlier work on this; see, e.g., Schott (2004) and Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2009).
3. In the literature on bias in consumer prices, this is known as outlet substitution bias; see, e.g., Reinsdorf (1993), Diewert (1998), and Hausman (2003).
4. There would still be offshoring bias until prices of domestic and foreign sources of inputs were compared and any price differences accounted for.
5. See IMF (2009) for international measurement guidelines, but also Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark (2008) on the topic of the measurement of industry output prices across Europe in relation to measurement guidelines.
6. See http://www.wiod.org. Taiwan is excluded because of missing trade data, and Malta because of highly erratic unit values.
7. Diewert and Nakamura (2010) show this for a Fisher index, whereas here a Törnqvist index is used. Given the similarity in the structure of these two indexes, there is likely a similar decomposition for the Törnqvist as for the Fisher. Furthermore, import sourcing bias estimates based on the Fisher index are similar in size to the Törnqvist estimates shown in the chapter.
8. The first-period price is now $25\% \times 6 + (1 - 25\%) \times 10 = 9$, and the second-period price is 8, so the price decline between the two periods is 11 percent.

9. More than 90 percent of the unit values are based on quantities in kilograms. Furthermore, the same product could be reported in kilograms by some countries and in another unit (e.g., number of items) by other countries. To avoid mixing prices per kilogram and prices per unit for the same product, only prices per kilogram are used.

10. WIOD distinguishes inputs from 35 industries, but these also include nonmanufacturing inputs.

11. See, e.g., Timmer et al. (2010) for more detail on (industry-level) growth accounts and MFP growth estimates.

12. See also Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) and BLS (1997).


14. These are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

15. The EU15 consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

16. We could not include Taiwan in our full analysis because of missing trade price data.

17. Note that the share of imported materials in total material use also increased, so imports from advanced economies did not decline in the absolute sense.

18. The import price data cover more countries than the input-output data, so there are more advanced economies. All non-EU countries with a 2008 GDP per capita level exceeding 55 percent of the U.S. level are labeled “advanced.” This threshold was chosen because it is the dividing line between the EU15 and the EU12.

19. Results based on unweighted average price changes are very similar.

20. The bias in value-added-based MFP growth is identical to the bias in value-added growth, as was noted in the discussion of Equation (6.7), so I use Houseman et al.’s (2010, 2011) estimate of the bias in value-added growth here.

21. In the 10–0.1 case, the import sourcing bias for the United States drops almost to zero, which would imply that all of the offshoring bias is due to switching from domestic to foreign suppliers.

References


