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National (Dis)identification and Ethnic and Religious Identity: A Study Among Turkish-Dutch Muslims

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National (dis)identification is examined in three studies among Turkish-Dutch Muslim participants. In explaining national (dis)identification, the first study focuses on ethnic identity, the second on ethnic and religious identity, and the third on three dimensions of religious identity. Many participants show low commitment to the nation, and many indicate national disidentification. In addition, there is very strong ethnic and religious identification. Ethnic and Muslim identifications relate negatively to Dutch identification and, in Study 3, to stronger Dutch disidentification. Furthermore, perceived group rejection is associated with increased ethnic minority and religious identification but also with decreased national Dutch identification. In addition, in Studies 1 and 2 the effect of perceived rejection on Dutch identification is (partly) mediated by minority group identification. The findings are discussed in relation to social psychological thinking about group identification, dual identities, and the importance of religion for intergroup relations.

Keywords: ethnicity; Islam; national (dis)identification

Most immigrants and ethnic minority group members struggle with the question of combining subgroup identities with commitments to the nation-state. Identity hyphenation suggests that it is possible to have varying degrees of identification with the ethnic minority group and the national category simultaneously (e.g., African-American, Indian-British, or Turkish-Dutch). However, many intergroup conflicts within multiethnic societies turn on the (in)compatibility of subgroup and national identities. Some argue that an emphasis on ethnic identity does not have to imply a lack of national commitment (e.g., Parekh, 2000). Others claim that incompatibility and a weaker sense of national, as opposed to ethnic, identity among minority groups inevitably weaken common bonds and intensify intergroup conflict (e.g., Huntington, 2004). Social dominance research has found, for example, incompatibility between ethnic minority identification and national identification, especially in societies with clear group-based social hierarchies (Sinclair, Sidanius, & Levin, 1998). Cross-national acculturation research has found a similar result in nonsettler countries but not in settler countries such as Canada and the United States (Phinney, Berry, Vedder, & Liebkind, 2006).

This article examines national identification among Turkish-Dutch Muslim participants as members of the numerically largest minority group living in the Netherlands. The aim is to investigate whether national and ethnic identity are complementary or competitive. We go beyond existing research in three ways. First, we examined national identification as well as national disidentification. Second, we focused not only on ethnic identity but also on various aspects of religious (Muslim) identification. Some participants show low commitment to the nation, and many indicate national disidentification. In addition, there is very strong ethnic and religious identification. Ethnic and Muslim identifications relate negatively to Dutch identification and, in Study 3, to stronger Dutch disidentification. Furthermore, perceived group rejection is associated with increased ethnic minority and religious identification but also with decreased national Dutch identification. In addition, in Studies 1 and 2 the effect of perceived rejection on Dutch identification is (partly) mediated by minority group identification. The findings are discussed in relation to social psychological thinking about group identification, dual identities, and the importance of religion for intergroup relations.

Keywords: ethnicity; Islam; national (dis)identification

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identity. Third, we considered the role of perceived group rejection.

**Dual Identities**

Dutch society and the majority group have become rejecting and assimilative in their orientation toward ethnic and cultural diversity. In public debates, multiculturalism has been described as a drama and a failure, and assimilation has been proposed, and increasingly accepted, as the only viable option for a stable and cohesive Dutch society (see Joppke, 2004). In addition, the great majority of Turkish-Dutch people are Muslim, and in the Netherlands, as in many Western countries, religious differences have come to the forefront with a focus on Islam. Islam has become the “negative other” and symbolic for problems related to ethnic minorities and immigration (see Ter Wal, 2004). Leading politicians have publicly described Islam as a “backward religion” that seriously threatens Dutch society, have defined Muslims as a “fifth column,” and have argued for the need for a “cold war” against Islam (see Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). According to some commentators, there is an ongoing Dutch–Muslim cultural war (Scroggins, 2005).

In such a national context, a strong ethnic ingroup identification is more likely than a dual identity in which there is also a sense of commitment to the nation-state. From a social identity perspective, it can be argued that an emphasis on assimilation or national commitment creates a distinctiveness threat to which ethnic minority members respond by reasserting their threatened minority identity (Brewer, 1991). Research on the common ingroup identity model and on the mutual intergroup differentiation model has shown that neglecting a valued subgroup identity motivates higher levels of attachment to the subgroup (e.g., Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000).

Among ethnic minorities, an emphasis on assimilation and national identity might also create uncertainty about oneself, others, and the social world. Uncertainty reduction theory argues that people identify more strongly with ingroups when they are feeling uncertain (see Hogg, 2000). Furthermore, minority group identification may also be motivated by self-enhancement (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Members of devalued groups can cope with identity threats by adopting group-based strategies involving increased ingroup identification and a distancing from the majority group. Research within the social identity tradition has observed, for example, a positive relationship between perceptions of discrimination and ingroup identification (e.g., Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). Discrimination presents a threat to group identity, making people increasingly turn toward the minority ingroup.

Minority group identification and a distancing from the national category also depend on the nature of the groups and the content of the group identities. People prefer to identify, for example, with groups that are clearly defined and have high entitativity (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003). When faced with threats about the distinctiveness and value of their identity or when feeling uncertain about themselves, people tend to identify stronger with groups that have clear boundaries, internal homogeneity, social interaction, and common fate (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2006).

Ethnicity and religion are among the most important markers of group identity. Ethnic and religious groups serve many functions, and people affiliate with these groups for many reasons. In addition to a positive identity, feelings of certainty, and a sense of belongingness and inclusion, they provide a cultural worldview and meaningfulness. Religion is an important meaning system for making sense of existence and for buffering against existential anxiety (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Religion is often of profound importance to people’s lives, and religious groups are among the more salient buttresses of identity. The lives of observant believers are organized around their religious beliefs, values, and practices that provide certainty and meaningfulness. These ideas and values involve religious truth claims and absolute moral principles that define what it means to be a believer of a particular religion. Islam is a religion that presents guidelines, referred to in the Quran (1:6) as the “straight way” for living in accordance with the will of Allah. The First Pillar of Islam is the Shahada, or declaration of faith, and has a central place in the lives of Muslims. A person becomes a Muslim with the declaration of the Shahada in front of two witnesses, and either one is a Muslim who is committed to Islam or one is not.

In addition, Triandis (1992) pointed out that in some collectivist cultures one either is or is not a member of the ingroup. In these cultures, group identification is not so much a matter of degree, and one cannot be more or less identified with a group; group identification is more of a nominal rather than a continuous variable. The orientation and commitment to the ingroup are normative and total rather than optional and differing in strength. In the Netherlands, people of Turkish origin have been found to strongly endorse collectivist values, and the endorsement of these values is positively related to ethnic ingroup commitment (Phalet & Güngör, 2004).

The current intergroup situation in the Netherlands, together with the content of Turkish and Muslim identity, leads to the expectation that Turkish-Dutch participants will show very strong ethnic and Muslim ingroup identification, making both group identifications more like nominal than continuous variables. The central
question is whether these group identifications are negatively and strongly associated with a sense of commitment to the nation-state or even with an active distancing and rejection of the national category.

It is likely that there exists a negative association between ethnic and religious identification on the one hand and national identification on the other. The stronger these in-group identifications are, the more difficult it will be to identify with the Dutch national category. Considering the current political situation, being simultaneously a Turk or a Muslim and a Dutch national is not easy. Hence, in addition to relatively low Dutch identification, we expected Dutch identification to be negatively related to ethnic and religious group identification. However, low Dutch identification or little commitment to the national category does not have to indicate an adversarial stance in which this category is rejected. Low group identification implies that aspects of the national category are not strongly connected to oneself, but it does not have to consist of disconnecting these aspects from oneself (Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). Disidentification is not merely the opposite of identification. The former consists of minority group people reacting against things Dutch and developing a so-called reactive or oppositional identity (Ogbu, 1993; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Therefore, in Study 3 we focused on national disidentification in addition to Dutch identification.

Perceived social rejection and devaluation might not only result in increased minority group identification but also in decreased identification and increased disidentification with the national category (Portes & Zhou, 1993). Hence, these perceptions can result in feeling more African as well as less American, more Indian and less British, and more Turkish and less Dutch. Such a combined effect on group identifications would give a more detailed understanding of the implications of perceived acceptance among ethnic minority group members. Furthermore, it is possible that ethnic in-group identification (partly) mediates the relationship between perceived social rejection and national identification. For example, a Turkish-Dutch person may have a low Dutch national identification because she emphasizes her Turkish identity, and she emphasizes this identity because she experiences social rejection and devaluation of Turks in the Netherlands. The existence of such a mediating role for ingroup identification would help us understand how exactly, or the psychological mechanism by which, ethnic group rejection affects national (dis)identification.

However, a group identity moderator model is also possible (Eccleston & Major, 2006). This model predicts that Turkish identification interacts with perceived rejection to predict Dutch (dis)identification. We also tested this alternative model.

Overview

The first study presented here focused on the relationships between national Dutch and ethnic (Turkish) identification and perceived social rejection. A negative association between Dutch and Turkish identification was expected, and this association was expected to be mediated by Turkish identification. The second study examined the same concepts and predictions but in addition focused on Muslim identification. A strong relationship between Turkish and Muslim identification was expected and, considering the so-called Dutch–Muslim cultural war, Muslim identification was expected to be the stronger negative predictor of Dutch identification. The third study focused on both Dutch national identification and Dutch disidentification. In addition, three dimensions of Muslim group identification were examined: Muslim identity importance, behavioral involvement, and Muslim political organization. We investigated whether an empirical distinction between national identification and disidentification can be made and whether they relate differently to the three dimensions of Muslim identification. Low identification and high disidentification seem more likely when the content of the one (Muslim) identity is considered contradictory to that of the (national) other. Hence, the two content dimensions of behavioral involvement and importance of political organization in particular were expected to be associated with Dutch (dis)identification.

In all three studies, the role of gender, age, and passport nationality were also considered, and in Study 3, educational level was included. Within the Turkish-Dutch community, people have a Turkish passport, a Dutch passport, or dual citizenship, all of which are legally possible in the Netherlands. Having a Dutch passport (with or without a Turkish one) might have more instrumental than symbolic meanings. It allows people, for example, to vote in national elections and to travel freely within the European Union. However, one’s passport identity might also be related to ethnic and national identification processes; therefore, this factor was included in the three studies.

STUDY 1

Method

Sample. In total, there were 104 Turkish-Dutch participants; both the father and mother were of Turkish origin. Of the participants, 41.3% were women and 58.7% were men. The participants were recruited in the Utrecht region through local contacts and associations. They were between 18 and 74 years of age (M age = 28.9). Of the participants, 40.4% were born in the
Netherlands, and for the others, the mean number of years living in the Netherlands was 20.8 (SD = 8.39). In total, 14.4% were Turkish (passport nationality), 21.2% had only a Dutch passport, and 64.4% had dual citizenship. There was no difference in passport nationality between males and females, $\chi^2(3, 104) = 1.56, p > .10$, and between younger (18 to 30 years) and older (> 30 years) participants, $\chi^2(3, 104) = 6.71, p > .05$. However, participants born in the Netherlands more often had a Dutch passport (34.9%) and less often dual citizenship (53.5%) than those born in Turkey (11.5% and 72.1%, respectively), $\chi^2(3, 104) = 9.35, p = .025$. The questionnaire was in Dutch.

**Measures.** Perceived acceptance and rejection were assessed by asking participants to respond to six items (7-point scales) about recent changes in tolerance and exclusion of ethnic minorities in the Dutch society (see Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2006). Three sample items were: “Discrimination against minorities has increased in recent times”; “Indigenous Dutch people are increasingly intolerant towards minorities”; and “In the coming years there will be a further increase in minorities’ disadvantages.” The six-item scale was internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = .76). A higher score indicates a stronger perception of an increase in structural discrimination.

Turkish group identification was assessed by asking participants to respond to six items (7-point scales) that were taken from previous studies in the Netherlands (see Verkuyten, 2005). These items measure the importance attached to one’s ethnic background and are similar to the items on Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) identity and membership subscales. The six-item scale was internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = .89).

Dutch group identification was measured using three items (7-point scales). The items were: “I identify with the Dutch”; “I feel myself to be Dutch”; and “I feel connected to the Dutch” (Cronbach’s alpha = .79). Being the central dependent variable, the measure of Dutch identification was presented last in the questionnaire.

**Results**

**Mean scores and intercorrelations.** Using the 7-point scale, participants indicated that discrimination and rejection of ethnic minorities had increased in the Netherlands ($M = 5.46, SD = 0.99$). The mean score was significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(103) = 15.27, p < .001$. For this measure, ANOVA indicated that there were no statistically significant gender, age (18 to 29 years, and ≥ 30 years), and passport nationality differences.

The mean score for Turkish identification was also significantly above the midpoint of the scale and indicated a relatively high level of ethnic group identification ($M = 5.22, SD = 1.29$), $t(103) = 9.56, p < .001$. ANOVA with gender, age, and passport nationality as factors yielded one significant effect, $F(1, 103) = 5.58, p = .02$. Males had higher Turkish identification than females (males: $M = 5.58, SD = 1.24$; females: $M = 4.87, SD = 1.34$).

The mean score for Dutch identification was around the neutral midpoint of the scale ($M = 4.54, SD = 1.87$). Of the participants, 20.2% had a score below the midpoint, indicating low Dutch identification, and 43.3% had a score above the midpoint, indicating high Dutch identification (36.5% at the midpoint). Pairwise testing indicated that Dutch identification was significantly lower than Turkish identification, $t(103) = 2.67, p < .01$.

Table 1 shows the intercorrelations among the three measures. Perceived discrimination related positively to Turkish identification and negatively to Dutch identification. Furthermore, as expected, Turkish and Dutch identification were significantly and negatively related.

**Dutch identification.** To examine the associations in more detail, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to predict Dutch identification. The effects of gender, age, and passport nationality were entered in Step 1, and the main effects of perceived minority group rejection and Turkish identification were entered in Step 2. Passport nationality was dummy coded into two variables such that the Turkish nationality was the referent group. The model in Step 1 was not significant, $F_{\text{change}}(4, 94) = 0.09, p > .10$. Thus, there were no gender, age, and nationality effects. The addition of the two measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance, $R^2 = .11, F_{\text{change}}(2, 92) = 5.79, p = .004$. The effect for Turkish identification was statistically significant and negative ($\beta = - .25, t = 2.30, p = .024$). Perceived group rejection had no independent significant effect on Dutch identification ($\beta = - .15, t = 1.43, p > .10$).

Mediation and alternative models. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the critical test for mediation is that the relationship between the independent variable (perceived rejection) and the dependent variable (Dutch identification) must be significantly reduced when the mediator variable (Turkish identification) is controlled. Regression analyses indicated that perceived group rejection was significantly related to Dutch identification ($\beta = - .25, t = 2.48, p = .02$) and that Turkish identification was negatively related to Dutch identification ($\beta = - .31, t = 3.03, p < .01$). In addition, in the analysis in which Dutch identification was regressed onto Turkish identification and perceived rejection, perceived rejection was not a significant predictor. This pattern of results suggests that Turkish identification mediates the relationship between
perceived minority group rejection and Dutch identification. The Sobel test for mediation confirmed that the mediational path was reliably greater than zero ($z = 1.98$, $p < .05$). The result of this mediational analysis is shown in Figure 1.

We tested two alternative models. First, an argument could be made for reversed mediation: perceived rejection mediating the relationship between Turkish identification and Dutch identification. However, perceived rejection was not a significant predictor in the analysis in which Dutch identification was regressed onto Turkish identification and perceived rejection. Furthermore, the Sobel test for this reversed mediation was not significant ($z = 1.43$, $p > .10$).

Second, we examined the alternative group identity moderator model that predicts that Turkish identification moderates the relationship between perceived rejection and Dutch identification. In an additional regression analysis, the interaction between perceived rejection and Turkish identification was not significant ($\beta = .001$, $t = .006$, $p > .10$).

Discussion

The results of Study 1 indicate that the Turkish-Dutch participants had a strong ethnic ingroup identification and a more neutral Dutch national identification. In addition, increases in perceived social rejection and devaluation were related to stronger Turkish identification. These increases were also related to lower Dutch identification, and this effect was mediated by Turkish identification. Thus, there was statistical evidence that perceived rejection is associated with stronger ethnic ingroup identification and, via ethnic identification, to more distancing from the Dutch.

We conducted a second study to examine whether these findings were reliable and could be generalized to another sample. Furthermore, in addition to ethnicity, the role of Muslim identification was examined.

STUDY 2

Research has shown that for Muslims living in Western Europe, religion has great importance in the way they live their lives (Haddad & Smith, 2001; Vertovec & Rogers, 1999). Among a representative sample from the city of Rotterdam, Phalet and Güngör (2004) found that Islam was considered “very meaningful and important” in one’s life by 87% of the Turkish population and 96% of the Moroccan population. In addition, around two thirds of the Turks and Moroccans had a very strong Muslim identity. For the great majority of Muslims, Muslim identity was a given and not being, or being somewhat of, a Muslim was not a real option.

The data for the Rotterdam study were collected in 1999, but considering the political and societal changes in the last 7 to 8 years, it is highly unlikely that these percentages have dropped. Islamic groups clearly face increased levels of threat to the distinctiveness and value of their religious identity, and the public condemnation of Islam and the plea for assimilation can lead to strong ingroup identification among these groups (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). Thus, we expected that Muslim identity would be very important for most Turkish-Dutch participants and increasingly so for participants who perceive high levels of social rejection and discrimination. Furthermore, compared with Turkish identification, Muslim identification was expected to be more strongly related to Dutch national identification. The reason is that it is Islam rather than ethnicity that is considered to be contradictory to the Dutch national identity. The Netherlands is one of the most secular countries.
in the world (Te Grotenhuis & Scheepers, 2001), and the so-called Dutch-Muslim culture war does not only exist in public debates but also in the minds of everyday people. A recent nationwide survey showed that 50% of the Dutch and 50% of the Turks and Moroccans consider the Western and Muslim ways of life as opposites that do not go together (Gijsberts, 2005).

Method

Sample. On an open-ended question, 171 Turkish-Dutch participants described themselves as Muslim (Sunni) whereas 38 Turkish-Dutch participants described themselves as Alevis, Christians, or nonreligious. Only the Muslim participants were included in the analyses. All participants had a father and mother of Turkish background and were born in the Netherlands or had moved to this country more than 15 years ago. Of the participants, 26.7% were women and 73.3% were men. They were between 17 and 62 years of age (M age = 29.5). Of the participants, 32.2% had Turkish nationality, 12.3% had Dutch nationality, and 55.5% had dual citizenship. There were significant gender and age differences for passport nationality, \( \chi^2(2, 174) = 10.59, p = .005 \), and \( \chi^2(2, 174) = 13.19, p = .001 \), respectively. Females more often than males had only a Dutch passport (26.1% and 7.8%, respectively). Around one third of both the younger (17 to 29 years) and older (≥30 years) participants had only a Turkish passport. However, compared with the older participants, the younger participants more often had a Dutch passport (3.4% and 21.6%, respectively; for dual citizenship: 62.5% and 48.9%, respectively). The participants came from various cities in the middle and eastern parts of the Netherlands and were recruited through local contacts and associations. The questionnaire was in Dutch.

Measures. In measuring social rejection and discrimination, Study 2 focused on perceived structural discrimination rather than recent changes in the level of majority-group tolerance and acceptance. The participants were asked whether they agreed with statements about structural discrimination toward Turkish-Dutch people by the police and the government and about the labor and housing market. The participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (no, certainly not true) to 5 (yes, certainly true; Cronbach’s alpha = .76).

Turkish group identification, or the importance attached to one’s ethnic background, was assessed by the same six items used in Study 1 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91). Muslim group identification was assessed by items similar to those used for Turkish identification. The six items were used in a previous study (Verkuyten, 2007).

The items were: “My Muslim identity is an important part of myself”; “I identify strongly with Muslims”; “I feel a strong attachment to Muslims”; “Being a Muslim is a very important part of how I see myself”; “I am proud of my Islamic background”; and “I feel a strong sense of belonging to Islam” (Cronbach’s alpha = .96). The order of presentation of Turkish and Muslim identification was counterbalanced.

Dutch identification was measured at the end of the questionnaire and was assessed by the same three items as in Study 1 (Cronbach’s alpha = .87).

Results

Mean scores and intercorrelations. Using a 5-point scale, participants’ score for perceived discrimination was around the midpoint of the scale (M = 3.46, SD = .76). ANOVA showed that perceived discrimination did not differ significantly between males and females, older (≥30 years) and younger (17 to 29 years) participants, and participants with a Turkish, Dutch, or dual passport.

The mean score for Turkish identification (7-point scale) was high (M = 6.13, SD = 1.67), as was the score for Muslim identification (M = 6.35, SD = 1.35). Both distributions were negatively skewed (–1.33 and –2.48), and both modes were 7.0. For Turkish identification, 44.4% of the participants had a score of 7, and for Muslim identification, 59.6% had this maximum score. As shown in Table 1, both group identifications were positively and strongly associated. The two identification measures were analyzed as multiple dependent measures using ANOVA. Gender, age, and passport nationality were between-subjects factors. Only the multivariate result showed a significant effect for Muslim identification but not for Turkish identification. Males had higher Muslim identification than females (males: M = 6.43, SD = 1.11; females: M = 5.98, SD = 1.64).

The mean score for Dutch identification was 3.78 (SD = 1.74). Of the participants, 47.1% had a score below the midpoint, indicating low identification with the Dutch, and 46% had a score above the midpoint, indicating high Dutch identification (6.9% at the midpoint). As expected, Dutch identification was significantly and negatively related to Turkish and Muslim identification and to perceived discrimination (see Table 1). Perceived discrimination was positively associated with Turkish identification and Muslim identification.

Dutch identification. Because of the skewedness of the distributions, median splits were used to distinguish between high (M = 5.23, SD = 1.04) and total (M = 6.96) Turkish identification and between high (M = 5.38, SD = 1.53) and total Muslim (M = 7.0) identification.
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to predict Dutch identification. The effects of gender, age, and nationality were entered in Step 1, and the measures for perceived discrimination, Turkish identification, and Muslim identification were entered in Step 2. The first model explained 8.2% of the variance in Dutch identification, $F_{\text{change}}(4, 166) = 3.72$, $p = .006$. Gender and age were not significant predictors, but participants with Dutch nationality had a higher score for Dutch identification than participants with Turkish nationality ($\beta = .28$, $t = 3.39$, $p = .001$), whereas the difference between dual citizenship and Turkish nationality was not significant ($\beta = .04$).

The addition of the measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance, $R^2_{\text{change}} = .15, F_{\text{change}}(3, 163) = 10.97$, $p < .001$. Perceived discrimination and religious identification were negative predictors ($\beta = -.20$, $t = 2.64$, $p = .009$, and $\beta = -.24$, $t = 2.92$, $p = .004$, respectively). Thus, higher perceived discrimination and total Muslim identification were associated with lower Dutch identification. Turkish identification had no statistically significant independent effect on Dutch identification ($\beta = -.06$, $t = .76$, $p > .10$).

Because Turkish and Muslim identification were strongly related, we did additional regression analyses with these measures separately. In these analyses, both Muslim identification ($\beta = -.27$, $t = 3.61$, $p < .001$) and Turkish identification ($\beta = -.17$, $t = 2.38$, $p = .019$) were significant predictors. Thus, compared with Turkish identification, Muslim identification was more strongly related to Dutch identification, but the difference in association was not significant ($z = 1.36$, $p > .05$).

Mediation and alternative models. Additional regression analyses indicated that perceived discrimination was significantly related to Dutch identification ($\beta = -.30$, $t = 4.14$, $p < .001$) and to Muslim identification ($\beta = .31$, $t = 4.25$, $p < .001$). In addition, Muslim identification was negatively related to Dutch identification ($\beta = -.34$, $t = 4.85$, $p < .001$). This pattern of results suggests that Muslim identification (partly) mediates the relationship between perceived discrimination and Dutch identification. In the analysis in which Dutch identification was regressed onto Turkish identification and perceived discrimination, the effect of discrimination was significantly reduced. The Sobel (1982) test for mediation confirmed that the mediational path was reliably greater than zero ($z = 2.80$, $p = .005$). The result of this mediational analysis is shown in Figure 2.

We examined the reversed mediation in which perceived rejection mediates the relationship between Muslim identification and national identification. Here, the Sobel test was significant ($z = 2.14$, $p < .05$). This indicates that the reverse model also fits the data.

In an additional regression analysis, we further examined whether Muslim identification moderated the relationship between perceived rejection and Dutch identification. The interaction was not significant ($\beta = -.11$, $t = .97$, $p > .10$). Thus, there was no support for the group identity moderator model.

Discussion

The results of Study 2 are similar to those of Study 1 but also go beyond that study by focusing on Muslim identification in addition to Turkish identification. The results show a strong positive correlation between Turkish and Muslim identification, indicating that being a Muslim is a centrally important element of what it means to be Dutch in the Netherlands today. Turkish and Muslim identification were also high, with 44.4% and 59.6% of participants, respectively, having the highest possible score on the six-item scales. This score indicates total group identification, particularly for Muslim identification. Perceived structural discrimination was associated with a stronger Turkish and Muslim identity. Muslim identification was also a significant negative predictor of Dutch national identification, but the independent effect for Turkish identification was not significant. Furthermore, the negative effect of perceived discrimination on Dutch identification was partly mediated by Muslim identification. However, the reverse model in which perceived discrimination mediates the relationship between Muslim identification and Dutch identification also fit the data.
We conducted a third study that focused on different dimensions of Muslim identification and considered the distinction between Dutch identification and Dutch deidentification.

**STUDY 3**

Different aspects of identity can be distinguished, and it is possible that Muslim identification is less high for other dimensions than identity importance and that these dimensions show other associations with national identification. It is also possible that the high score for Muslim identity importance is due to the phrasing of the questions. In Study 2, Muslim identity importance was measured with items that are commonly used in social psychological research. However, the way the items were phrased might have affected the results, and a more extreme phrasing could lead to a different distribution of scores. For example, instead of presenting participants with a statement such as “Being a Muslim is a very important part of how I see myself,” the statement could be phrased as “Being a Muslim is the only important part of how I see myself.” The latter statement is more concerned with the possible exclusionary nature of Muslim identification and therefore can shed additional light on the question of total religious identification. Thus, in Study 3, we used additional questions for measuring Muslim identity importance.

In their organizing framework for social identity, Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) made a distinction between social identity elements such as importance, evaluation, emotional commitment, behavioral involvement, and group-related ideology and action. In Study 3, we focused on behavioral involvement and political organization in addition to identity importance. There were two reasons for doing so. First, considering the high Muslim identification found in Study 2, it seemed unlikely that participants would make a distinction among, for example, the degree of importance attached to their Muslim identity, the positive evaluation of this identity, and the sense of emotional involvement with the religious group. Our thinking was that these dimensional properties would be too closely connected.

Second, Islam is a religion that presents precise rules, practices, and guidelines for living in accordance with the will of Allah. In addition, for “outsiders,” these rules and practices are the most visible markers of Islamic faith and can symbolize the incompatibility of Muslim life with Western values and norms. This is illustrated by the headscarf controversy in France and debates in other countries, including the Netherlands, about Islamic schools, gender differentiation, and other rules and practices.

In addition to behavioral involvement, Study 3 focused on political organization. In their multidimensional inventory of Black identity, Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, and Chavous (1998) identified an ideology dimension that refers to a variety of domains of activity, including the political terrain. Political ideology and political organization might be identifying dimensions of the identity of subordinate groups. Against the background of the Dutch–Muslim cultural war, a politicized Islam in which religion is a powerful tool for political mobilization is more than likely. The focus in Study 3 was not on ideological beliefs but rather on the importance of Muslim political organization.

We expected that the three aspects of Muslim identity—importance, behavioral involvement, and political

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**Figure 2** Results of the mediation analysis for Dutch identification in Study 2.

NOTE: Path weights are standardized. Number in parentheses is the relationship between perceived discrimination and Dutch identification while controlling for Muslim identification.

\*p < .05. **p < .001.
organization—could be distinguished empirically. Furthermore, we had no clear reason to expect that perceived social rejection would be differently related to these three aspects. Hence, positive associations with social rejection were expected. In addition, we examined whether the three aspects have an independent negative effect on orientation and commitment to the Dutch and the Netherlands. To investigate these latter associations in more detail, we made a distinction between Dutch national identification and disidentification.

Studies 1 and 2 used the standard practice of making a distinction between low and high identification. In doing so, participants scoring below the neutral midpoint of the scale (disagree) were considered to indicate low Dutch identification or little commitment to the national group. However, strongly disagreeing with an item such as “I identify with Dutch people” could also indicate disidentification, in which people perceive their identities to be separated from the national category where the Dutch are considered “what we are not” or “not us” (McCall, 2003). National group identification can be resisted or actively rejected, making it more difficult to create or sustain a sense of solidarity across subordinate group lines. Studies among racial and ethnic minority groups have described the development of an oppositional or reactive identity in which people actively separate their identity from the culture and defining aspects of the dominant group (Ogbu, 1993; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Furthermore, studies in organizational contexts have shown that disidentification is a different psychological state from identification (e.g., Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). However, to our knowledge, no research has empirically examined the distinction between national identification and disidentification.

In Study 3, we expected that an empirical distinction between Dutch identification and Dutch disidentification could be made. Furthermore, we examined whether perceived rejection as well as the three aspects of Muslim identity have similar or different relationships with Dutch identification and Dutch disidentification. Disidentification refers to the active rejection and distancing of a particular group, and this seems more likely when the content of the one (Muslim) identity is considered contradictory to that of the (national) other. Hence, the two content dimensions of behavioral involvement and importance of political organization in particular were expected to be associated with stronger Dutch disidentification.

In Study 3, educational level was considered as an additional individual background characteristic. It is likely that education increases the orientation of Turkish-Dutch people toward Dutch society, which may lead to a stronger commitment to the nation-state.

Method

Sample. There were 191 Turkish-Dutch participants describing themselves as Muslims (Sunni) and 44 participants describing themselves in terms of other religions or as nonreligious. Of the Muslim participants, 39.7% were women and 60.3% were men. All participants had a father and mother of Turkish background. They came from cities in the middle and eastern parts of the Netherlands and were recruited via local contacts and associations. They were between 16 and 69 years of age (M age = 29.8). Of the participants, 38.6% had Turkish nationality, 17.3% had Dutch nationality, and 44.1% had dual citizenship. Participants were asked to report the highest level of education they had completed or were following, using a 9-point scale. In the analyses, four levels of education were used: only primary education (14.9%), preparatory vocational training and lower general secondary education (16.9%), middle general secondary education and professional training (37.3%), and upper general secondary education and university training (30.8%). There was no significant association between nationality and level of education, χ²(6, 191) = 6.39, p > .10. Furthermore, there were no significant gender differences for nationality and level of education. However, there were significant differences for age (16 to 29 years and ≥ 30 years). Compared with older participants, younger participants were more highly educated, χ²(3, 191) = 43.93, p < .001, and they more often had a Dutch passport or dual citizenship, χ²(2, 191) = 28.26, p < .001.

Measures. In Study 3, perceived rejection by the majority group was measured using six items based on the public regard subscale of Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) collective self-esteem scale. The items assess the evaluation that one perceives Dutch society and people to have about Muslims (e.g., “In general, Dutch people are negative about Islam”). The items were measured on 7-point scales (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86). A higher score on the scale indicates stronger public disregard.

Three facets of Muslim identity were measured using 7-point scales. First, Muslim identity importance was assessed by the same items that were used in Study 2 and with three additional items that more explicitly assessed total identification. These three items were: “The fact that I am a Muslim is the most important thing in my life”; “Being a Muslim is the only thing that really matters in my life”; and “In this first place I feel to be a Muslim.”

Behavioral involvement was measured with four items to assess an individual’s general engagement in actions that directly implicate Muslim identity. The items were: “I follow the rules of Islam very closely”; “I live my life...
strictly according to the regulations of Islam”; “Islam is the most important guideline in my everyday life”; and “Islamic practices regulate my daily life.”

The items for attitude toward Muslim organization focused on the domain of political development in the Netherlands. Four items were used that assess the extent to which Muslims should be politically organized. The items were: “It is important for Muslims that an Islamic political party is established in the Netherlands”; “Muslims have to start to work together in order to gain political influence in the Netherlands”; “Islam must have a voice in political issues, just like other religions”; and “In Dutch society, Muslims have to defend their own interests.”

At the end of the questionnaire, five items were used to measure Dutch identification (7-point scales). Three of these were similar to those used in Studies 1 and 2, and the two additional items were: “I feel emotionally involved with the Dutch” and “I sometimes feel proud of the Netherlands.”

Five items were also used to assess Dutch disidentification. These items were: “I would never say ‘we Dutch’”; “I certainly do not want to see myself as Dutch”; “I always have the tendency to distance myself from the Dutch”; “Actually, I do not want to have anything to do with the Dutch”; and “I never feel addressed when they are saying something about the Netherlands and the Dutch.”

Results

Scale analyses. Maximum likelihood estimation with oblique rotation was used to determine the underlying dimensions of Muslim identity. A three-factor structure emerged. The first factor explained 56.2% of the variance, the second factor explained 10.1%, and the third factor explained 9.8%. The eight items intended to measure identity importance had a high loading on the first factor (> .81). The highest loading of these items on the other three factors was 0.25. On the second factor, the four political organization items had a high loading (> .74) with a loading of 0.29 on the other two factors. The items for behavioral involvement loaded highly on the third factor (> 0.69) and < 0.30 on the other factors. Thus, the analysis indicated that a distinction can be made between the different facets of Muslim identification. Hence, the items were summated to compute three scales (identity importance: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95; political organization: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91; behavioral involvement: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79).

It was expected that Dutch group identification would be empirically distinguishable from Dutch disidentification. Maximum likelihood estimation with oblique rotation was used, and for the 10 items, a two-factor structure emerged. The first factor explained 43.7% of the variance, and the second factor explained 23.6%. The 5 items intended to measure Dutch identification loaded highly on the first factor (> 0.74), and the highest load on the second factor was 0.24. On the second factor, four deidentification items had a high load (> .73 and < 0.25 on the other factor). One item loaded on both factors and was not included in subsequent analysis. Hence, for the 9 items, the factor analysis confirmed that a distinction can be made between group identification and deidentification. The items were summated to compute two scales (Dutch identification: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92; Dutch deidentification: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86). Both scales were statistically significant and negatively related (−.26, p < .001), but the correlation indicates that they shared only a limited amount of variance.

Means and intercorrelations. Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for the different scales. On the 7-point scale, the score for public disregard was around the scalar midpoint. ANOVA indicated that for this measure, there were no gender, age (16 to 29 years and ≥ 30 years), education, or passport nationality differences.

The mean score for Muslim identity importance was high. The distribution was negatively skewed (−1.25), and the mode was 7.0. Of the participants, 47.5% had the maximum mean score of 7, indicating total identification. The mean score for behavioral involvement was also high, whereas the mean scores for political organization were around the midpoint of the scale. The three Muslim identity measures were analyzed as multiple dependent variables using ANOVA. Gender, age, education, and passport nationality were between-subjects factors. As in Study 2, only the multivariate effect (Pillai’s) for gender was significant, F(3, 169) = 3.76, p < .01. The univariate result showed that males had a higher score for Muslim identity importance than did females (males: M = 5.74, SD = 1.72; females: M = 5.10, SD = 2.17) and for Muslim political organization (males: M = 4.98, SD = 1.66; females: M = 4.47, SD = 1.86) but not for behavioral involvement.

The mean scores for Dutch identification and Dutch disidentification were also around the neutral midpoints of the scales. Of the participants, 48.9% had a score below the midpoint for Dutch identification, indicating low identification with the Dutch, and 37% had a score above the midpoint, indicating high Dutch identification (14.1% at the midpoint). For Dutch disidentification, 42.8% had a score above the midpoint, indicating high disidentification, and 36.7% scored below the midpoint (20.5% at the midpoint).

The correlation coefficients between the different measures are presented in Table 3. Higher public disregard
was related to stronger Muslim identity importance and to higher Muslim political organization but not to behavioral involvement. Furthermore, public disregard was not related to Dutch identification and to Dutch disidentification. The three Muslim identity measures were all negatively related to Dutch identification and positively to Dutch disidentification. Hence, a stronger Muslim identity goes together with weaker Dutch identification and stronger disidentification with the Dutch. Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine these relationships in more detail.

**Dutch identification.** In predicting Dutch identification, the effects of gender, age, nationality, and education were entered in Step 1, and the measures for public disregard, Muslim identity importance, behavioral involvement, and political organization were entered in Step 2. Similar to Studies 1 and 2, the skewedness of the distribution led to the use of a median split to distinguish between high (M = 4.13, SD = 1.87) and total (M = 6.97) Muslim identity importance. For the other measures, continuous centered scores were used.

As shown in Table 2, the first model explained 3.1% of the variance in Dutch identification. Gender, age, and nationality were not significant predictors. However, participants with higher levels of education indicated stronger Dutch identification than those with lower education. The addition of the measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance. Educational level remained a significant predictor. Public disregard, behavioral involvement, and political ideology had no independent significant effects. Muslim identity importance was, however, negatively related to Dutch identification. Participants with total Muslim identity had a lower Dutch identification than participants with high Muslim identity importance (M = 3.71 and 4.27, SDs = 1.37 and 1.73, respectively).

In additional regression analyses, we found no support for the group identity moderator model. All three

### TABLE 2: Hierarchical Regression Analyses With Dutch Identification and Dutch Deidentification as Dependent Variables: Standardized Regression Coefficients (β) and Standard Errors in Brackets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dutch Identification</th>
<th></th>
<th>Dutch Deidentification</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.11 (.26)</td>
<td>.05 (.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.06 (.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.08 (.31)</td>
<td>.01 (.31)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.07 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch nationality</td>
<td>.02 (.29)</td>
<td>.02 (.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.05 (.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual citizenship</td>
<td>.17 (.20)</td>
<td>.15 (.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.05 (.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.24*** (.14)</td>
<td>.22*** (.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.21* (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public disregard</td>
<td>.06 (.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.03 (.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity importance</td>
<td>-.33*** (.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.20* (.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral involvement</td>
<td>-.04 (.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.26*** (.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology</td>
<td>-.04 (.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.36*** (.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² change</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
<td>.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F change</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.42***</td>
<td>6.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>2.96*</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.19***</td>
<td>4.73***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

### Table 3: Intercorrelations and Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for All Measures in Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Public disregard</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2. Identity importance</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Behavioral involvement</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Political ideology</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.53***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>5. Identification</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.31**</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Deidentification</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
interactions between public disregard and the three aspects of Muslim identity were not significant predictors \((p > .10)\) of Dutch disidentification.

**Dutch disidentification.** The results for Dutch disidentification are given in Table 2. In Step 1, no significant part of the variance was explained, but level of education had a negative effect. Higher education was related to less disidentification. The addition of the measures in Step 2 accounted for a significant part of the variance in Dutch disidentification. Public disregard had no significant independent effect. However, the three Muslim identity measures were significant independent predictors. Disidentification with the Dutch was higher for total Muslim identifiers, for participants with a high Muslim behavioral involvement, and for participants scoring highly on Muslim political organization.

A further regression analysis with Dutch identification as an additional predictor in Step 2 was conducted. Dutch identification was negatively related to disidentification \((\beta = -.24, t = 3.06, p = .003)\), but the three Muslim identity measures remained positive independent predictors.

Additional regression analyses showed that the three interactions between public disregard and the three aspects of Muslim identity were not significant predictors \((p > .10)\) of Dutch disidentification.

**Discussion**

The findings of Study 3 indicate that an empirical distinction between Dutch identification and Dutch disidentification can be made. Thus, a low sense of belonging and commitment to a group does not appear to be the same as rejecting and distancing oneself from that group (Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004).

Similar to Study 2, Muslim identity importance was very high, with almost half of the participants having the maximum score of 7 on the nine-item scale. Thus, although three items were included that more directly measured total identification (e.g., “Being a Muslim is the only thing that really matters in my life”), the percentage of total identifiers was high and not much lower than in Study 2. Participants who considered their Muslim identity to be a centrally important part of their self again reported lower commitment to the Netherlands as well as stronger distancing and rejection of the Dutch.

The results also show that an empirical distinction between three aspects of Muslim identity could be made: Muslim identity importance, behavioral involvement, and political organization. It is interesting that the regression analyses showed that the latter two aspects were not independently associated with Dutch identification. They were, however, significant predictors of Dutch disidentification. Dutch disidentification was higher among participants that were more strongly involved in actions and practices that directly implicate Muslim identity and among participants that more strongly endorsed Muslim political organization. This suggests that it is not so much identity importance but rather the content and meaning of Muslim identity that makes Muslim and national identity more incompatible.

Public disregard was positively related to Muslim identity importance and political organization but not to behavioral involvement. Thus, in agreement with the social identity perspective, and similar both to Studies 1 and 2 and to previous research (see Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002), perceived rejection and devaluation of one’s minority identity was associated with increased minority group identification. That this association was not found for everyday involvement in Muslim-defining actions and practices suggests that this identity aspect is not so much dependent on outsiders’ perceived evaluations and reactions but more on ingroup norms and internalized ingroup-defining rules and regulations. Unexpectedly, public disregard was not related to Dutch identification and Dutch disidentification. Thus, in contrast to Studies 1 and 2, one of the preconditions for Muslim identity mediating the relationship between public disregard and Dutch (de)identification was not met.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

Ethnic minority group members as well as societies struggle with the question of combining minority identities with national commitments. Identity hyphenation suggests that a combination is possible, but research on hyphenation has not taken religion into account, has made no distinction between national identification and disidentification, and has predominantly been carried out in immigrant countries such as Canada and the United States. The current research was conducted in the Netherlands, in which the principle and practice of multiculturalism has been replaced by an emphasis on assimilation.

In three studies among Turkish-Dutch (Sunni) Muslims, Dutch national identification was around the neutral midpoint of the scale, and between 54% and 63% of the participants indicated low or neutral Dutch identification. Furthermore, the findings of Study 3 show that 63.3% indicated neutral or high disidentification. Low national identification, and particularly disidentification, suggests clear conflicts between the individual and society. The lack of commitment and support and the active distancing and rejection of disidentified ethnic minority individuals can be considered problematic for the stability and cohesion of society. Low identification and disidentification also
have psychological implications. They can be useful in defining a distinctive, secure, and positive minority identity, but they may also have negative consequences for sociocultural adjustment and societal participation (Ogbu, 1993).

In addition to these findings for national (dis)identification, the results show that for most participants, Turkish and Muslim identities are closely related and very important. The meaning of being Turkish is strongly associated with being Muslim (Phalet & Güngör, 2004). Furthermore, across the three studies, about half of the participants had the highest possible score on the identification measures, indicating total ingroup identification. Hence, for many participants, ethnic, and particularly Muslim, identity does not seem to be optional or a matter of strength of identification. This is not specific to the three current samples because other Dutch studies have found similar results (Phalet & Güngör, 2004).

This total group identification is probably related to global and national developments. For example, in the Netherlands, the public condemnation of Islam and the pressure to assimilate have increased the salience and importance of Muslim identity (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). Participants identified more with the Turkish and Muslim ingroup when they perceived more rejection from the dominant outgroup. Hence, recognition of rejection is associated with increased ingroup orientation and commitment, and minority group identification can be seen as a strategy by which disadvantaged groups cope with uncertainty and the costs of ingroup devaluation and rejection (Hogg, 2000; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002).

Perceived group rejection can have a combined effect of strengthening minority identification and weakening national identification. In Studies 1 and 2, perceived rejection was related to less Dutch identification, and this association was (partly) mediated by Turkish-Muslim identity. This shows that perceived rejection is associated with stronger ingroup identification, which in turn is associated with less commitment to the nation-state. However, in Study 3, perceived rejection was not related to Dutch (dis)identification. One reason might be that Study 3 assessed public disregard or beliefs about attitudes of the majority group, whereas Studies 1 and 2 focused more on perceived discrimination or patterns of differential treatment. The latter are more explicit and visible expressions of rejection that can affect people’s orientation toward the majority group more strongly. In addition, the fact that the perception of actual disadvantage is necessary to prompt rejection of the national category seems consistent with realistic group conflict theory. Discrimination, more than public disregard, has direct negative consequences for the interests of the minority ingroup, making it less likely that minority group members develop a national commitment. Furthermore, an interpretation in terms of the fairness of decision-making procedures is also possible. Discrimination implies unfair treatment, and such treatment tells people that they are not equal members of society and that society itself is less valuable (Tyler, 2001).

The findings indicate that not only the social context but also the meaning and content of the group identities are important. For example, religious identity was stronger than ethnic identity, and only the former was independently related to national identification. In addition, in Study 3, an empirical distinction between three aspects of Muslim identity could be made. Whereas identity importance was significantly related to Dutch identification and disidentification, behavioral involvement and political organization were only positively related to the latter. This suggests that the content and meaning of Muslim identity makes Muslim identity and national commitment more incompatible.

Furthermore, the total religious identification found is probably related to the nature of monotheistic religions in general and Islam in particular. Very strong Muslim identification among Western European immigrants was found in the 1990s when the intergroup tensions were less strong (e.g., Modood et al., 1997). Muslim identity can be a core self-defining dimension because Islam provides a worldview and meaning system that buffers against uncertainty and existential anxiety (Greenberg et al., 1997; Hogg, 2000). In addition, being a Muslim implies a normative group commitment that is related to Islamic religion. For many Muslims, the declaration of faith symbolizes one’s belief and commitment to Islam: One either is a believer or one is not. Religion is about convictions and divine truths, and for most observant believers, the core of their religious identity is non-negotiable, making the idea of religious changes or adaptations an oxymoron.

In evaluating the present results, three points are discussed. First, the findings indicate that Turkish and Muslim identities are negatively related to Dutch identification and that Muslim identity is positively related to Dutch disidentification. However, the associations found in the three studies were not very strong (see also Phinney et al., 2006). This indicates that a total ethnic or Muslim identification does not necessarily imply that people would not be interested in developing a sense of commitment to the nation. Hence, there is no strong evidence that a strong Turkish or Muslim identity is clearly contradictory or antagonistic to Dutch national identification.

Second, our research was correlational, and group identification plays a complex role, for example, in how members of minority groups construe and cope with being a target of rejection and discrimination. For example, ethnic and Muslim identification imply a
stronger group-focused orientation that can increase the likelihood that individuals perceive rejection or attribute ambiguous events to discrimination (e.g., Eccleston & Major, 2006). Thus, social rejection could also mediate the relationship between minority and national identification. We found evidence for this possibility in Study 2 but not in Study 1, in which the strongest mediation was found. In all three studies, we also found no evidence for the group identity moderator model that predicts that minority group identification interacts with social rejection to predict national (dis)identification. Future research should examine the causal impact of perceived rejection and discrimination on ethnic and religious identification and on national commitments.

Third, we focused on the level of Dutch (dis)identification because we were interested in the strength of attachment and commitment to the nation. However, for understanding whether and when dual identities are (in)compatible, not only is the content of the minority identity important but so is that of the national identity. Self-defined multicultural and immigrant countries offer more opportunities for immigrants and minorities to develop a sense of national belonging than do nonsettler countries with a long history of an established and dominant majority group (Phinney et al., 2006; Sinclair et al., 1998).

In conclusion, our research has contributed to the increasing interest in the social psychology of multiple social identities. Both minority identification and national identification are important for understanding how ethnic minority group members react to disadvantage and exclusion, and how they define and position themselves in society. Furthermore, existing research has focused on how strongly people identify with a group or on quantitative differences, and little attention has been paid to processes of disidentification. Furthermore, social psychology has not paid much attention to religious identity. This is unfortunate because religion is an important dimension for developing a positive social identity, and religion is an important factor in social divisions and conflicts in many societies around the world. In addition, a study of religious identification can make a contribution to our thinking about the important process of group (dis)identification. For example, such a study can question the standard practice of assuming that group identification is a continuous variable or a matter of degree. Future studies on both the origins and consequences of ethnic, religious, and national identifications, and studies among various ethnic and religious groups, including Muslim subgroups, should contribute to a further understanding of identification processes in relation to the nature of the groups and the intergroup context.

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