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Religious identity consolidation and mobilization among Turkish Dutch Muslims

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Abstract

This paper investigates religious identity consolidation in terms of the endorsement of the rights of Dutch Muslims to publicly express their identity, and identity mobilization in terms of the attitude towards normative forms of political organization. Identity consolidation and mobilization were examined as a function of the content of Muslim identity. A distinction was made between an individualized and a communal interpretation of what it means to be a Muslim, in addition to orthodox belief. Personal meaning and personal certainty as two aspects of an individualized interpretation were found to be positively associated to the endorsement of Muslim expressive rights, but not to the attitude towards political organization. Behavioural involvement and Muslim group interdependence were positively associated with identity organization. Orthodoxy was related to both identity consolidation and mobilization. Theoretical implications of these results are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Muslim fundamentalism in combination with the growing number of Muslims in western countries has triggered an interest in the prevalence and meaning of religion among Muslim immigrants and minorities (Emerson & Hartman, 2006). In Europe, processes of religious revival, political Islam and radicalism have become topics of study (e.g. Buijs, Demant, & Hamdy, 2006; De Koning, 2008; Herriot, 2007; Modood, Triandafyllidou, & Zapata-Barrero, 2006; Roy, 2006). Although there is no scholarly consensus about the meaning of Islam for immigrant and minority groups it is clear that this religion remains important in the lives of many. Religion can be private and personalized, but also public and communal. There are personal religious beliefs and experiences (e.g. revelation), and there are collective rituals and shared practices (e.g. praying in a Mosque, Ramadan). Using an intergroup perspective, this paper examines religious identity among Turkish Dutch Muslims in relation to the endorsement of Muslims’ right to express, and thereby consolidate, their religion and the attitude towards the political organization of Dutch Muslims. The focus is on personal, communal and orthodox interpretations of what it means to be a Muslim and how these interpretations affect the views on the public consolidation of Muslim identity and on normatively acceptable political organization. These relationships are examined in the context of the Netherlands where around half of the population has unfavourable or negative opinions about Muslims (e.g. Pew Research Centre, 2005; Velasco Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008).

IDENTITY CONSOLIDATION AND MOBILIZATION

Anthropologist, sociologists and discourse analysts have argued that social identities depend crucially on recognizable and acceptable social practices (see Verkuyten, 2005). Anthropologist have shown how people use particular behaviours to form and negotiate their ethnic identity in everyday interactions (e.g. Clay, 2003; Song, 2003), work on symbolic
interactionism examines the social processes by which people construct their social world and give meaning to their identities in social life (Hewitt, 2003), and discourse analysts have shown how social identities are accomplished in the exchange of talk (e.g. Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998). All this work indicates that social identities are sustainable to the extent that they are expressed and affirmed in social practices.

Social psychologists have started to formulate similar ideas. Klein, Spears and Reicher (2007), for example, have put forward the notion of ‘social identity performance’ for the public expression of identity-relevant norms. Identity performance can take a variety of forms and serve different purposes. Following Scheepers et al. (2002, 2003) who distinguish between two functions of in-group bias, a distinction between an identity consolidation function and an instrumental function is made (Klein et al., 2007). Identity consolidation defines the place of one’s group within the social structure by expressing the value of the group symbolically. The instrumental function refers to the achievement of collective goals related to the improvement of the position of one’s group in the power structure. Thus, group behaviour can serve to consolidate and bolster a sense of group identity and its worth, and also can promote group success by mobilizing members for political actions. Obviously, the same behaviour may sometimes serve both functions and identity consolidation is not entirely separate from practical outcomes. For instance, wearing the headscarf is for some Muslims an expression of personal matter whereas for others it is a symbolic garment in identity and power struggles. However, there can be a difference between, for example, the possibilities that minority groups have to publicly express and thereby consolidate their identity and the political organization of these groups for specific group projects. It is this distinction that is the focus of the current study.

Research on the functions of intergroup differentiation and identity performance has predominantly focused on the role of structural factors and situational features, like the stability of status differences, group threat and communication context (Klein et al., 2007; Scheepers et al., 2002, 2003). The Muslim minority in the Netherlands face high levels of religious identity threat. Public opinion surveys since the late 1990s have shown clear resistance against the presence of Muslims in Dutch society, which has become widespread in most recent surveys (Phalet & Gijsberts, 2007; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Muslims are singled out by critics of multiculturalism as prototypical outsiders and Islam is presented as incompatible with Dutch norms and values, and as a barrier to socio-cultural integration in Dutch society (see Phalet & ter Wal, 2004). According to some commentators, there is an ongoing ‘Dutch-Muslim cultural war’ (Scroggins, 2005). Furthermore, research has shown that Turkish Dutch Muslims indicate that discrimination of Turkish Dutch people has increased in the Netherlands and that perceived discrimination is positively associated with Muslim identification (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Hence, the perceived acceptance and treatment by the Dutch majority appears to have an impact on the religious identity of Dutch Muslims.

These findings, together with the dual identity of Dutch Muslims as citizens and minority group members, indicate that the Dutch majority is a powerful ‘other’ for religious identity expression. It is difficult for Dutch Muslims to maintain a positive religious identity without acknowledgment and respect by the Dutch majority. Muslims can see the wearing of a headscarf as expressing and thereby consolidating their religious identity. Yet, in some situations there is public disapproval, or even a legal banning, of the headscarf. Thus, not only the religious in-group but also the wider Dutch society is a relevant audience of identity performance. This has only increased since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that have led to extensive media exposure and increased police surveillance of Muslims and their religious activities. Furthermore, Turkish Dutch Muslims tend to perceive the intergroup situation in the Netherlands as rather illegitimate and stable and the group boundaries as rather impermeable (Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008).

Given this perception of the intergroup context and the identity threat posed by the criticism and negative views of the Dutch majority, Dutch Muslim citizens can be expected to engage in identity expression to consolidate their identity and to change the status quo. Their insecure status leads to the desire to affirm and consolidate their sense of Muslim identity and their powerless position requires organization and collective action to facilitate social change. A small minority of Dutch Muslims might want to use illegal or radical means but the great majority will seek means and ends that are normatively acceptable in the larger polity (Simon & Ruhs, 2008). The willingness to endorse acceptable group practices can be expected to depend on the meaning of the Muslim identity.

**SOCIAL IDENTITIES**

Klein et al. (2007) argue that in-group identification is a critical condition for identity performance to emerge. The more important a given group is for one’s sense of self, the more one should be inclined to consolidate that particular identity and
to achieve group-related goals. Research has indeed shown that compared to low-identifiers, high-identified group members discriminate more strongly for identity consolidation and for instrumental reasons, especially under the condition of group threat (Scheepers et al., 2003). In this research, identification is treated as a general connection to an in-group and specific components of in-group identification are not considered. However, recent studies and reviews have identified and validated several dimensions of group identification, such as ‘importance’, ‘evaluation’, ‘satisfaction’ and ‘belonging’ (e.g. Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Cameron, 2004; Leach et al., 2008; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998).

There is little agreement regarding the number and nature of the dimensions and it is not always clear whether terms such as identity ‘dimensions’, ‘elements’, ‘components’ and ‘aspects’ refer to the same things. Centrality, importance and evaluation are dimensional (attitude-like) properties that are relatively easy to assess and that have been studied extensively. There is much less attention to aspects that refer to content and meaning (see Ashmore et al., 2004). Sellers et al. (1998) propose a model that tries to represent a synthesis of, what they label as, the underground and the mainstream approach of ethnic and racial identity. The latter focuses on more general dimensional properties associated with these identities such as centrality and regard, whereas the former focuses on describing the particular meanings attached to ethnic and racial identities. Within the underground perspective, different frameworks have been proposed to describe the unique cultural and structural experiences associated with, for example, the position of African Americans (e.g. Cross, 1991), and Sellers and colleagues focus on racial ideology. Research on religiosity and religious identity has also argued for ideological beliefs as a core dimension (e.g. Glock & Stark, 1965), in addition to more private or individualized aspects and more public or communitarian aspects of religious orientation.

**MUSLIM IDENTITY**

In the Dutch context and in relation to Muslim identity, individual differences in, for example, identity centrality, importance and evaluation appear not to be very informative. Several studies have found that in-group identification on these dimensions is mostly restricted to the upper end of the scale, distinguishing (quasi-)total from non-total Muslim identifiers. For example, research on Dutch Turkish Muslims has found a mode of 7 on six-item scales measuring the dimensions of private regard and importance, with around 60% of the participants having this maximum score (Verkuyten, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007; see also Dagevos, Gijbsberts, & van Praag, 2003). The individual difference question appears to be not whether one does or does not self-identify as a Muslim or how important it is to be a Muslim, but rather the ways in which one should be a Muslim in Europe (De Koning, 2008). Behind the very strong claims on Muslim identity that these studies find, there can be various forms of attachment to Islam. Social identities do not tend to have single valid interpretations but rather various contents and meanings (Ashmore et al., 2004; Sellers et al., 1998). In relation to Muslims in western Europe, some scholars argue that there is an emerging trend towards individualization and privatization of Islam. In contrast, others argue that Islam continues to be regulated by collective practices (e.g. visiting Mosques, Ramadan) and a community of believers (see Lewis, 2007; Roy, 2006, 2007). Research among Dutch Muslims has shown an increase in individualist interpretations of what it means to be a Muslim, alongside an interpretation in which conformity to Islam as an ethics of public practices and rules is emphasized (Phalet, Gijbsberts & Hagendoorn, 2008). For many Dutch Muslims, religious identity is about finding a way between individual meaning-making and conformist rule-following.

In addition, there is a strong debate within west European Muslim communities about the ideological meaning of Islam. In this complex debate about beliefs, there are more orthodox interpretations that emphasize that Islam is about fundamental, essential and inerrant truths that should not be interpreted to fit in with the western world. And there are more liberal or modern interpretations that focus on the development of a European Islam and prefer a belief that is adaptable to modern society (Buijs et al., 2006; Herriot, 2007; Lewis, 2007; Mirza, Senthilkumaran, & Ja’far, 2007).

**THE CURRENT STUDY**

In this paper we focus upon the personal and the communal interpretations of what it means to be a Dutch Muslim, and on the orthodox ideological meaning of Islam. The personal interpretation implies that Islam is understood as having a
personalized meaning and that one’s religion can provide personal certainty. Such an interpretation involves the belief that Islam is a private matter between the believer and God and that one should be religious in one’s own personal way. This interpretation also involves a search for personal religiosity that can result in self-confidence about being a Muslim but also in uncertainty about oneself (Lewis, 2007; Phinney, 1989).

Personal interpretation and personal certainty do not imply a commitment to the societal position of fellow Muslims and therefore were not expected to be related to the attitude towards the political organization of Dutch Muslims. However, exclusion and a lack of recognition in society makes it difficult to consolidate and give a positive and secure interpretation to what it means to be a Muslim. The possibilities for being religious in the way that one wants depend on social conditions and the acceptance by others (Verkuyten, 2005). Social identities are not like private beliefs or attitudes that, in principle, can be sustained without expression and recognition. Muslim identity, in any real sense, implies the ability to claim desired images and self-understandings in a variety of contexts and especially in public spaces. The freedom to be religious in one’s own personal way is limited when in everyday life the symbolic expression of Muslim identity is not accepted, such as with the wearing of a headscarf. Furthermore, expressions and experiences that are supportive of one’s religious beliefs lead people to be less uncertain about themselves (e.g. Van den Bos, van Ameijde, & van Gorp, 2006). Thus, it can be expected that a personal emphasis on being a Muslim and personal certainty derived from Islam are both related to a higher endorsement of the rights and opportunities of Muslims to publicly express and consolidate their religious identity. These rights and opportunities make it possible for every Muslim to express his or her identity in his or her own way.

In a communal interpretation of what it means to be a Muslim, the emphasis is on the psychological and behavioural commitment to the rules of Islam and the community of believers. Rule-following (‘orthopraxis’) and solidarity with other Muslims (‘ummah’) are central. Behavioural involvement and psychological commitment are an investment of the self to the religious in-group which makes religious group-based activities of both identity mobilization and consolidation more likely (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Leach et al., 2008). Hence, we expected behavioural involvement and in-group interdependence to be positively associated with both the attitude towards political organization of Dutch Muslims and also with the endorsement of the rights and opportunities for expressing Muslim identity. An additional reason for the latter relationship is that these rights and opportunities probably will not only have a symbolic, identity consolidating function but also a political one. Political organization and expressive rights are both about the interests of Muslims as a relatively homogenous group.

For the ideological meaning of Islam, we focused on orthodox belief which implies the acceptance of the teachings of Islam and the belief that Islam contains the inerrant and unchanging truths about humanity and deity. Among Dutch Moroccans, this ideological dimension has been found to be an important aspect of their Muslim identity (Kemper, 1996). Orthodox belief can form a steppingstone toward radicalism and extremism (Appleby, 2000). However, for the great majority, this ideological position does not lead to an antagonistic or radical attitude towards Dutch society. Rather, there is much appreciation of the freedoms and rights that Muslims in the Netherlands have (Buijs et al., 2006; De Koning, 2008; Kemper, 1996). Furthermore, the majority of Dutch Muslims is born in the Netherlands and considers this the country where their future is. In addition, a liberal democracy offers the opportunities to practice one’s religion and to organize politically along religious lines. Hence, we expected that a more orthodox interpretation of Islam will be associated with a stronger endorsement of the opportunities and rights of Muslims to express their identity and with a more positive attitude towards the political organization of Dutch Muslims.

In summary, we examined Turkish-Dutch Muslims endorsement of the right of Muslims to publicly express and consolidate their religious identity as well as their attitude towards the political organization of Muslims within the Dutch political system. These consolidation and mobilization functions of identity expression were examined in relation to five aspects of Muslim identity. Behind the general very strong claims on Muslim identity among Dutch Muslims (e.g. Verkuyten, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007), it was expected that there are different forms of attachment to Islam and different interpretations of Islam. An emphasis on a personal meaning of being a Muslim and personal certainty derived from Islam were both expected to be related to a higher endorsement of the opportunities for the symbolic expression of Muslim identity, but not to the attitude towards political organization. In contrast, Muslim group interdependence and behavioural involvement were expected to be positively associated with both religious identity consolidation and political organization. In addition, an orthodox interpretation of Islam was expected to be positively associated to the endorsement of the opportunities and rights for the consolidation of Muslim identity and to the attitude toward Muslim political organization.
METHOD

Sample

There were 222 Turkish-Dutch participants describing themselves as (Sunni) Muslims. Of the participants, 39.2% were women and 60.8% were men. All participants had a father and mother of Turkish background. They came from cities in the middle and eastern part of the Netherlands and were recruited via local contacts and associations. They were between 16 and 69 years of age and their mean age was 29.5 (SD = 11.6). The participants lived between 3 and 45 years in the Netherlands and the mean length of time in this country (duration) was 21.4 (SD = 11.96). Of the participants, 37% had Turkish nationality, 17% had Dutch nationality and 46% had dual citizenship. Participants were asked to report the highest completed education level, either obtained in Turkey or in the Netherlands, ranked from low (no diploma) to high (university diploma) across seven levels. Of the participants, 14.9% were educated at the two lowest levels and 27.2% at the two highest levels.

Measures

Independent Variables

Five aspects of Muslim identity were measured: Two for the personal interpretation of being a Muslim, two for a communal interpretation and religious orthodoxy. First, three items with seven-point scales were used to assess the extent to which participants personalize Islam. The items were ‘I experience Islam in my own, personal way’, ‘Islam is a personal matter between the believer and God’ and ‘To me, Islam has predominantly a personal meaning’. Cronbach’s $\alpha$ for these three items was 0.74 and a higher average score indicates a stronger personal meaning.

Second, three items (seven-point scales) assessed the feeling of personal certainty derived from Muslim identity. The items were, ‘My religion is unclear and confusing to me’ (reverse), ‘I am very uncertain about my belief’ (reverse) and ‘Islam gives me confidence about myself’. Cronbach’s $\alpha$ was 0.79 and a higher score means more personal certainty.

Third, Muslim group interdependence was measured with four items (see Ashmore et al., 2004). The items were ‘What happens to other Muslims determines my own life and future’, ‘I feel a strong commitment to the ummah’, ‘My own fate is linked to that of other Muslims’ and ‘Muslims are dependent on each other and have to be strong as a group’. $\alpha$ for these four items (seven-point scales) was 0.92 and a higher score indicates higher interdependence.

Behavioural involvement was measured with three items to assess an individual’s engagement in concrete actions that directly implicate Muslim identity. The items were ‘how often do you visit a mosque’, ‘how often do you do the daily prayer’ and ‘how often did you fasten during the last Ramadan’. Items were measured on scales ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (daily), and the three-item scale was internally consistent with Cronbach’s $\alpha$ .86. A higher score indicates higher behavioural involvement.

Religious orthodoxy was measured with five items (seven-point scales) adapted from Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992). The items were ‘There is only one Islam, and that Islam should remain pure’, ‘Islam has a fixed and unchangeable meaning’, ‘There is only one truth and that is the divine truth’, ‘The Islam is the only right path to follow in life’ and ‘Nobody is allowed to question the Islamic faith’. The five-item scale was internally consistent with Cronbach’s $\alpha$ .93. A higher score indicates stronger orthodoxy.

We performed confirmatory factor analyses (AMOS 7) to examine how well a measurement model including the five latent constructs fit the 18 items of Muslim identification. We compared the fit of the five-factor model with the fit of a one and a three-factor model (personal, communal and orthodox meaning). Items were permitted to load only on the component they were expected to indicate and no item errors were allowed to correlate. The results are shown in Table 1. The absolute fits and the information indices show that the five-factor model fitted the data much better than the other two models (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). Modification indices indicated that allowing the errors of some items of the same latent variable (five parameters in all, one residual covariance for behavioural involvement, one for personal certainty, one for personal meaning and two for orthodoxy) but not for items measuring different latent variables, improved the model further and resulted in a good model fit (Table 1). The z-statistics obtained for all the factor loadings were statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and the standardized factor loadings were between .69 and .89.
Dependent Variables

Five items were used for measuring the endorsement of the rights and opportunities for Muslims to publicly express and confirm their identity. These items have been used in previous Dutch studies (e.g. Verkuyten, 2007). The items were ‘Muslims have the right to show and express their religion in public life’, ‘the right to establish own Islamic schools should always exist in the Netherlands’, ‘some Islamic holy days should become official Dutch holidays’, ‘Dutch TV should broadcast more programs by and for Muslims’, ‘in the Netherlands the wearing of a headscarf should not be forbidden’. Items were measured on scales ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly).

Four items were used that assess the extent to which Muslims should be politically organized in the Netherlands (see Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). The items were ‘It is important for Muslims that an Islamic political party is established in the Netherlands’, ‘Muslims have to start to work together in order to gain political influence in the Netherlands’, ‘Islam must have a voice in political issues, just like other religions’ and ‘In Dutch society, Muslims have to defend their own interests’. Items were measured on scales ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly).

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Confirmatory factor analysis was performed to determine whether an empirical distinction could be made between the endorsement of Muslim expressive rights and the attitude towards political organization of Dutch Muslims. A two-factor model was compared to a one-factor model in which all the items indicate a single factor. In the two-factor model, items were permitted to load only on the component they were expected to indicate. For both models, no item errors were allowed to correlate. Table 2 shows that the two-factor model fitted the data much better than the one-factor model. For the two-factor model, modification indices indicated that allowing some errors of some items (three in all) of the same latent variable to covary resulted in a good model fit (Table 1). The z-statistics obtained for all the factor loadings were statistically significant (p < 0.01) and the standardized factor loadings were between .53 and .87. Cronbach’s α for the five-item scale for the endorsement of Muslim expressive rights was .85 and a higher score indicated a stronger endorsement. The other items were averaged to create a scale for political organization and Cronbach’s α was .89.

### Table 1. Fit of competing measurement models of Muslim identification and of competing measurement models of identity performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>χ²</th>
<th>χ²/df</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>AIC</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1-factor</td>
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<td>14.4</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>2051.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-factors</td>
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<td>8.84</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>1280.3</td>
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<td>5-factors</td>
<td>440.2***</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>568.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-factors and allow (co)variances</td>
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<td>2.76</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>262.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-factor</td>
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<td>.95</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>208.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CFI = comparative fit index; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; AIC = Akaike information criterion. **p < .001.

### Table 2. Intercorrelations and mean scores and standard deviations for all measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
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<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>M</th>
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<td>Personal meaning</td>
<td></td>
<td>.41***</td>
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<td>Personal certainty</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>1.01</td>
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<td>Behavioural involvement</td>
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<td>.24***</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.46</td>
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<td>Group interdependence</td>
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<td>.31***</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>2.08</td>
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<td>Orthodoxy</td>
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<td>.43***</td>
<td>.57***</td>
<td>.61***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim expressive rights</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political organization</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>.57***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All measures are seven-point scales, except for behavioural involvement which has a five-point scale. "p < .01; "***p < .001."
RESULTS

Descriptive Findings

Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients between the different measures. The five Muslim identity measures were positively related. Personal meaning and personal certainty as the individualized components of Muslim identity were relatively highly correlated, and the communal aspects of behavioural involvement and Muslim group interdependence were also relatively highly correlated. Orthodoxy was highly associated with the other four components of Muslim identity. High correlations could lead to problems of multicollinearity. A common method to detect multicollinearity uses variance inflation factors (VIF). According to Myers (1990), a VIF value greater than 10 indicates a serious problem of multicollinearity. The highest VIF statistic with our data was 2.8. Thus, there is no problematic multicollinearity between the independent variables.

The means and standard deviations for the different scales are also presented in Table 2. The mean scores for personal meaning and personal certainty and for religious orthodoxy were above the mid-points of the scale. The mean scores for behavioural involvement and Muslim group interdependence were around the mid-points of their scales. The five Muslim identity measures were analysed as multiple dependent variables using analysis of variance. Gender, age, duration, education and passport nationality were the independent factors. Three multivariate effects (Pilai’s) were significant: For gender, $F(3, 217) = 4.84, p < .01$; education, $F(3, 217) = 2.45, p = .034$ and for age, $F(3, 217) = 2.87, p = .023$. The univariate result showed that compared to females, males had a higher score for Muslim group interdependence ($M = 4.34$, $SD = 1.97$ and $M = 3.83$, $SD = 2.22$, respectively), for behavioural involvement ($M = 3.26$, $SD = 1.47$, and $M = 2.41$, $SD = 1.29$, respectively) and for orthodoxy ($M = 5.75$, $SD = 1.64$ and $M = 5.27$, $SD = 1.88$, respectively), but not for personal meaning and for personal certainty. For age, the univariate results also indicated a significant difference for group interdependence. Compared to the older participants, the younger ones scored higher on group interdependence. Level of education was negatively related to Muslim group behaviour and to orthodoxy.

The mean scores for the endorsement of Muslim expressive rights was significantly above the neutral mid-point of the scale, $t = 14.79, p < .001$ (see Table 1) and this was also found for political organization, $t = 6.42, p < .001$. However, the endorsement of expressive rights was stronger than the attitude towards political organization ($t$-pairs = 7.51, $p < .001$).

Muslim Expressive Rights

A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to predict the endorsement of Muslim expressive rights. The effects of gender, age, duration, education and passport nationality were entered on Step 1, and the main effects of the five measures of religious identity were entered on Step 2. Passport nationality was dummy-coded into two variables such that the Turkish nationality was the referent group. Educational level was treated as an interval variable rather than a categorical variable that would reduce the data.

As shown in Table 3, the model in the first step was significant. There was a significant negative effect for age: Older participants were less in favour of Muslim expressive rights compared to younger participants. The addition of the different measures on Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance. Except for behavioural involvement, the different measures for religious identity had independent and significant positive effects on the endorsement of Muslim expressive rights. The effect for orthodoxy was the strongest, followed by the effect of Muslim group interdependence, and personal certainty and personal meaning. Thus, and as expected, personal meaning and personal certainty as two aspects of a more individualized interpretation were associated with the endorsement of Muslim expressive opportunities and rights. In the second step, the effect for age was no longer significant.

Political Organization

A similar hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to predict the attitude towards political organization of Dutch Muslims. On the first step, a significant part of the variance was explained (see Table 2). Again, only the effect for age was significant with older participants being less in favour of political organization compared to younger participants. The addition of the measures in Step 2 accounted for a significant part of the variance in political organization. As expected,
DISCUSSION

Islam has moved to the centre of debates and politics in European countries and is at the heart of what is perceived as a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ (Modood & Ahmad, 2007; Zolberg & Long, 1999). This is illustrated by the national debates about Islamic schools and the place of other Islamic institutions, practices and claims within the deeply embedded secularism of most liberal democracies. Additionally, research has shown that the population tends to have unfavourable or negative opinions about Muslims (e.g. Pew Research Centre, 2005; Velasco González et al., 2008). The Muslim minority in the Netherlands face high levels of religious identity threat which makes it likely that Dutch Muslims are engaged in attempts to express and consolidate their identity and to organize politically. Religious group identification is a critical condition for identity consolidation and organization to emerge (Klein et al., 2007). Dutch Muslims have been found to identify very strongly (quasi-total) with their religious in-group making measures of identity importance, evaluation and satisfaction not very informative for understanding individual differences (e.g. Dagevos et al., 2003; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). However, there are various forms of attachment to Islam and various ways to be a Muslim in western Europe. Our results show that a distinction can be made between individual and communal interpretations of what it means to be a Muslim. On the one hand, there is a personal meaning and a sense of personal certainty, and, on the other hand, there is an emphasis on the behavioural commitment to the rules of Islam (‘orthopraxis’) and the community of believers (‘ummah’). In addition, there are religious beliefs that imply rather orthodox interpretations in which the fundamental, inerrant and unchanging truth of Islam is emphasized, or rather liberal ones that focus on the development of more culturally based religious interpretations.

It turned out that the individualized aspects were positively and independently related to the endorsement of the rights of Muslims to publicly express and consolidate their religious identity. This result indicates that the trend towards

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<th>Expressive rights</th>
<th>Political organization</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>−.18 (.22)</td>
<td>−.02 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−.21* (.11)</td>
<td>−.08 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>.02 (.08)</td>
<td>.01 (.07)</td>
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<td>Dutch nationality</td>
<td>.05 (.13)</td>
<td>.01 (.09)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dual citizenship</td>
<td>.03 (.12)</td>
<td>.03 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.02 (.15)</td>
<td>.08 (.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal meaning</td>
<td>.13** (.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal certainty</td>
<td>.12** (.08)</td>
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<td>Behavioral involvement</td>
<td>.09 (.08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group interdependence</td>
<td>.17** (.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>.35*** (.08)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ change</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ change</td>
<td>2.15**</td>
<td>43.81***</td>
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*p < .01; **p < .05; ***p < .001.
individualization and privatization of Islam among Turkish Dutch Muslims does not imply that they will refrain from claiming opportunities and rights that acknowledge and value their religious identity in public life. Personal interpretation and identity certainty are associated with trying to establish or maintain a positive evaluation of the Muslim in-group (Ashmore et al., 2004; Leach et al., 2008). The freedom to be religious in one’s own personal way is limited when the symbolic expression of Muslim identity is not accepted, and experiences that support one’s religious beliefs make people less self-uncertain (Van den Bos et al., 2006). However, personal meaning and certainty do not imply a commitment to the group of fellow Muslims and a focus on political organization for addressing their disadvantageous social position. Therefore, these components were not expected to be associated with the attitude towards political organization of Dutch Muslims. The findings show that this was indeed the case.

In contrast, behavioural involvement and group interdependence as communal components of Muslim identity were positively and independently associated with the attitude towards political organization, and group interdependence also with the endorsement of Muslim expressive opportunities and rights. These communal aspects imply a commitment to the collective rules and practices and to the Muslim community. Such commitment is an investment of the self in the religious in-group and makes the group-based activities of identity consolidation and organization more likely. An additional reason for the relationship between group interdependence and the endorsement of Muslim expressive opportunities and rights is that these opportunities and rights do not only have a symbolic function but can also have a political meaning.

Third, religious orthodoxy was examined as an important ideological belief of Muslim identity. It was found to be the strongest statistical predictor of the endorsement of identity consolidation and political organization. Participants who more strongly accepted the teachings of Islam as the inerrant and unchanging truth about live and humanity were more strongly in favour for the rights and opportunities for Muslim to express their identity and for the political organization of Dutch Muslims within the larger polity. These findings suggest that an orthodox interpretation of Islam can foster normative acceptable forms of political action. Orthodox interpretations can be a stepping stone towards radicalization and fundamentalism (Appleby, 2000; Buijs et al., 2006) but this is not the path that the great majority of Dutch Muslims favour. They appreciate the freedoms and rights that Muslims in the Netherlands have to practice their religion and to organize politically and these freedoms and rights are more strongly endorsed by orthodox Dutch Muslims. Thus, a more orthodox belief or interpretation of Islam can foster normative actions. In addition, it turned out that participants with dual citizenship more strongly endorsed the political organization of Muslims compared to participants with only a Turkish passport. This effect was found when controlling statistically for the different measures of Muslim identity. Hence, dual citizenship seems to play a unique role in the attitude towards normative political organization. Simon and Ruhs (2008) focused on dual identity and found a similar result among Turkish migrants in Germany. In their study, dual identification as both Turkish and German was positively related to normative political engagement and not to support for Muslim organizations with a radical agenda or a tendency to violent protest.

Theoretically, this paper has tried to make two contributions. First, we argued that social identities are not only subjective but depend on their practical expression and acknowledgment by others. This is a common argument in, for example, anthropology, sociology and discourse studies (Verkuyten, 2005) but tends to be neglected in social psychology. Social identities are not like private beliefs or convictions that, in principle, can be sustained without expression and recognition. Muslim identity, in any real sense, implies that one is able to claim desired images, positions and self-understandings in a variety of contexts and especially in public spaces. And being a Muslim is often a more ‘problematic’ or accountable issue in public than private life. Conceptually a distinction between identity consolidation and identity mobilization can be made (Klein et al., 2007; Scheepers et al., 2002, 2003). The former refers to the public expression and affirmation of the value and worth of one’s group and group membership. The latter is related to the instrumental function of challenging and changing a disadvantageous social position by political action. Following this distinction, we focused on the endorsement of minority rights and opportunities that acknowledge and consolidate Muslim identity symbolically and on the attitude towards the political organization of Dutch Muslims. The findings show that the consolidation and instrumental functions are not independent but that an empirical distinction can be made. Views about rights and opportunities to express and consolidate Muslim identity differ from beliefs that Dutch Muslims should organize politically to gain influence and defend their interests. This result supports the conceptual distinction proposed by Klein et al. (2007) between two general functions of identity performance (see also Scheepers et al., 2002, 2003). However, the relationship between the two constructs indicates that they are not independent. One reason is that the distinction between identity consolidation and mobilization is not always easy to make and that, for example, the endorsement of opportunities and rights to express one’s Muslim identity typically also has political meanings. Thus, the same behaviour may serve to
consolidate the value of group identity as well as organize group members to act politically toward a given collective goal.

Second, research has shown that in-group identification is a critical condition for identity consolidation and mobilization (see Klein et al., 2007). In addition, it is commonly argued that group identification is a multidimensional construct and that different dimensions might be related differently to perceptions and behaviours. Hence, various dimensions of group identity have been identified, such as importance, evaluation and self-stereotyping (see Ashmore et al., 2004; Leach et al., 2008; Sellers et al., 1998). These attitude-like dimensions are relatively easy to assess and most research focuses on individual differences in, for example, identity centrality and private regard. But these dimensions do not take the nature of the group and the content of the group identity into account. This, perhaps, is a reason why in addition to the term ‘dimension’ terms like identity ‘elements’ and ‘aspects’ are being used and why identity models are sometimes described as multicomponent (e.g. Leach et al., 2008). Furthermore, these dimensions are not very informative for Dutch Muslims because several studies have found that for most of them Muslim identity does not seem to be optional or a matter of strength of identification on these dimensions (Dagevos et al., 2003; Verkuyten, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007).

What might differ more is the interpretation that is given to what it means to be a Muslim. For many Dutch Muslims, religious identity is about individual meaning-making and conformist rule-following, and about the right interpretation of Islam. There is a trend towards individualization and privatization of Islam, but Islam also implies conformity to precise rules and commands and a commitment to the community of fellow believers (e.g. Phalet et al., 2008; Roy, 2006, 2007). Thus, the study of Muslim identity makes a contribution to our thinking about the important processes of group identification and the different aspects that can be distinguished. Some of the aspects discussed have been put forward in other studies. For example, the role of group interdependence has been conceptualized in terms of common bond (Cameron & Lalonde, 2001), common fate (Gurin & Townsend, 1986) and solidarity (Leach et al., 2008). In addition, however, it seems important to focus on the different meanings of being a Muslim living in a western country, on how these meanings are related to social experiences in the intergroup context and on the ways in which these meanings affect processes of identity consolidation and mobilization. This argument is similar to the underground approach of ethnic and racial identity that emphasizes the particular meanings attached to these identities (Sellers et al., 1998). These approaches try to describe the cultural and structural experiences associated with, for example, African Americans and the ways in which these experiences translate in racial ideology. Furthermore, work on religious identity and religiosity emphasize qualitative differences in religious interpretations (e.g. Buijs et al., 2006; Glock & Stark, 1965; Mirza et al., 2007). The current findings indicate that it is the ideological, more orthodox belief of Muslim identity that has the strongest relationship with the attitudes towards identity consolidation and organization. In addition, however, the findings show that the individualized and communal aspects of Muslim identity play unique roles in these attitudes.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, by focusing upon Dutch Muslims we have tried to make an empirical contribution to the question how Muslim identity is related to the support for opportunities of Muslims to publicly express their identity and to political organization. This question is much debated and increasingly important in Europe. In answering this question, it turned out that it is important to make a distinction between individualized and communal understandings of what it means to be a Muslim, in addition to orthodox beliefs. Many European Muslims are struggling with finding a balance between individual meaning-making, conformist rule-following and orthodox understandings of Islam (Phalet et al., 2008).

The support for social actions emanating from the different understandings of one’s Muslim identity have implications for the way that the intergroup relations in society will develop. Moreover, these actions will also further shape Muslim identity (Klein et al., 2007). Our data are correlational and we examined Muslim identity as influencing identity consolidation and organization. However, the idea that social identities are maintained by others’ acknowledgedgment implies that the reactions from others to one’s identity expression can fuel changes in self-understandings. Furthermore, it is important to consider both in-group and out-group others. One’s sense of Muslim identity is enabled or constrained by the way Muslims are defined and treated in the broader society. Dutch Muslims are citizens as well as minority group members which makes the Dutch majority an important ‘other’ for religious identity consolidation and mobilization. In addition, however, Muslim identity is fundamentally shaped by interactions with religious in-group members and leaders.
and by discourses about religious sincerity and purity (Buijs et al., 2006; De Koning, 2008; Leach & Smith, 2006; Roy, 2006). Muslim identity and identity expression involve critical issues of in-group acceptance and support as well as in-group obligations and pressures. Thus, future studies should not only examine expressions oriented to the majority group but also to Muslim in-group members.

In addition, future studies could examine different Muslim communities and in different European countries because there can be important differences in the historical and current positions in the society in which they live, and in their religious beliefs. The current study focused on Turkish Dutch Muslims and their situation might differ, for example, from British Muslims who came originally from India or Pakistan or from French Muslims who have their historical roots in Algeria or Morocco. These communities do not only live in different countries and have different migration histories but there are also religious differences between Sunni, Shi’ite and Alevi Muslims living in west European countries (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009).

REFERENCES


