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The Process Model of Group-Based Emotion: Integrating Intergroup Emotion and Emotion Regulation Perspectives

Amit Goldenberg1, Eran Halperin2, Martijn van Zomeren3, and James J. Gross1

Abstract

Scholars interested in emotion regulation have documented the different goals and strategies individuals have for regulating their emotions. However, little attention has been paid to the regulation of group-based emotions, which are based on individuals’ self-categorization as a group member and occur in response to situations perceived as relevant for that group. We propose a model for examining group-based emotion regulation that integrates intergroup emotions theory and the process model of emotion regulation. This synergy expands intergroup emotion theory by facilitating further investigation of different goals (i.e., hedonic or instrumental) and strategies (e.g., situation selection and modification strategies) used to regulate group-based emotions. It also expands emotion regulation research by emphasizing the role of self-categorization (e.g., as an individual or a group member) in the emotional process. Finally, we discuss the promise of this theoretical synergy and suggest several directions for future research on group-based emotion regulation.

Keywords
emotion, emotion regulation, group-based emotions, intergroup emotions, intergroup relations

In the past two decades, scholars in the emerging field of emotions have taken up the issue of how emotions are regulated (Gross, 1998, 2014). This work has led to the view that emotions are commonly influenced by individuals themselves to advance specific goals. Examples of emotion regulation serving an individual’s goals include reducing one’s anger or fear to better cope with a certain situation (e.g., an instrumental goal) and increasing one’s happiness to feel better in a given situation (e.g., a hedonic goal). Advances in theorizing about emotion regulation have led to an outpouring of empirical research on the effectiveness of specific regulation strategies (e.g., Gross, 2002; Koole, 2009).

One important gap in the literature, however, concerns the regulation of group-based emotions (Smith, 1993). Group-based emotions are dependent upon an individual’s self-categorization as a member of a particular social group (e.g., viewing oneself as a group member and not just as a unique individual; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and occur in response to situations that have perceived relevance for one’s group (rather than for oneself personally; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993). Group-based emotions may be targeted at an outgroup, an ingroup, specific members of these groups, or even toward specific objects or symbols (see Iyer & Leach, 2008, for a review). For example, Reifen and colleagues (2011) showed that American participants felt anger toward a Syrian leader after reading what they believed was a hostile speech (Halperin & Gross, 2011; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Mackie et al., 2000; Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Other studies have examined group-based guilt and shame (Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer & Leach, 2008; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006), group-based pride (Haslam, Powell, & Turner, 2000), and group-based hope (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014).

The main aim of this article is to integrate these two lines of thought into a model of group-based emotion regulation. Indeed, although research to date has focused on the experience and the implications of different group-based emotions, little is known about how group-based emotions are regulated (but see Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). This is unfortunate because we believe that individuals are active regulators, rather than passive victims of their emotions, including group-based emotions (Gross, 2014; Halperin, 2014; Van Zomeren, Leach, & Gross, 2015).
Spears, 2012). This adds an important aspect to the understanding of how group members experience emotions, shifting from a view of group members as passive victims of their emotions to a view of them as active regulators, which includes different goals and strategies that have hitherto not been examined in this literature. That is, we believe that individuals can regulate emotions that derive from a particular group membership (e.g., anger at being discriminated on the basis of one’s ethnicity) just as they regulate their non-group-based emotions (e.g., anger about personal failure). The presence of this gap in the literature suggests the potential for theoretical development and synergy by linking intergroup emotions theory (Smith, 1993) with the different goals and strategies individuals may have when actively regulating group-based emotions (Gross, 1998).

Scholarship on intergroup emotions theory typically has focused on (a) how self-categorization as a group member and social identification with the group influence emotional experience (Cehajic-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Doosje et al., 1998; Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003) and (b) how specific appraisals and action tendencies are associated with the experience of specific group-based emotions (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Halperin, 2014; Halperin, Porat, et al., 2013; Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie & Smith, 2003; Maitner et al., 2006; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010). Although these are important topics, integrating theory and research on the regulation of emotions could contribute greatly to the understanding of how group members themselves or others in the close or more distant surroundings influence their emotions through a focus on their goals (instrumental or hedonic) and strategies (e.g., situation selection/modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, response modulation). We therefore propose an integrative model for studying the regulation of group-based emotions. We believe that such a model can enhance the understanding of various group processes such as (but not limited to) collective action, stereotype and prejudice reduction, social conformity and deviance, and intergroup conflicts.

In turn, theory and research about group-based emotions may encourage thinking about the role of the process of self-categorization in emotional encounters in general. Thus far, emotion regulation research has focused mainly on regulation strategies in which the individual is (implicitly) self-categorized as a separate, independent unit, thus reacting to situations that have relevance to the personal self (Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Turner et al., 1987). However, intergroup emotions theory suggests that individuals can categorize themselves as group members, in addition to their categorization as unique individuals (Ellemers, 2012; Smith, 1993) and, via this psychological mechanism, experience emotions on behalf of the group. This line of thought suggests many interesting questions, including (but not limited to): do the (instrumental or hedonic) goals people may have in regulating their emotions extend to group-based emotions? Are similar emotion regulation strategies equally useful when it comes to regulating group-based or non-group-based emotions? The main purpose of this article is to outline a new integrative model of group-based emotion regulation to facilitate the examination of these questions.

We see two core points of synergy between theorizing about group-based emotions and emotion regulation. First, in the group-based emotion domain, we extend the analysis of group-based emotion by identifying and specifying the role of regulatory processes. Especially useful for the achievement of this goal, we believe, is identifying and specifying the goals and strategies involved in group-based emotion regulation (Gross, 1998). Second, in the emotion regulation domain, our intention is to incorporate the notion of self-categorization (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993; Smith et al., 2007; Turner et al., 1987) into the existing models of emotion regulation. This fits with insights from a broader literature showing that individuals’ construal of their self in a given situation (e.g., as an individual or as a group member) has a strong influence on how they view that situation and act on it (Van Zomeren et al., 2012; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Taken together, we believe that a synthesis between these two influential lines of thought will deepen our understanding of the role of emotions in intergroup relations and provide a broader view of emotion regulation.

In line with these goals, in the first section of this article, we provide an overview of the modal model of emotion generation (Gross, 1998) and use this model as a framework for discussing the generation of group-based emotions. In the second section, we show the added value of our integrative model by considering the hedonic and instrumental goals that motivate emotion regulation, first in general, and then applied to the regulation of group-based emotions. In the third section, we focus on emotion regulation strategies, and by building on the process model of emotion regulation, we outline our integrative model of group-based emotion regulation. Finally, we discuss implications and possible future research directions that follow from our integrative approach that takes advantage of the synergy between theories about group-based emotion and emotion regulation.

**Emotion Generation**

The history of emotion research is replete with competing definitions and debate about which aspects of emotion are important (Calhoun & Solomon, 1984; James, 1894; Oatley, Keltner, & Jenkins, 2006). However, most theories suggest that emotions are flexible response sequences (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984) that are called forth whenever an individual evaluates a situation as offering important challenges or opportunities (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). According to the “modal model” (Gross & Thompson, 2007), emotion is a temporal, appraisal-based process that involves loosely
coordinated changes across experiential, behavioral, and physiological response systems (Ekman, 1992; Levenson, 1994; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). The modal model offers a framework that facilitates an examination of emotion as a repeated sequence of different stages.

Importantly, the modal model does not represent a one-time process that incorporates all of the individual’s emotional experiences and responses. The different stages in the model represent a cycle that is activated again and again during an emotion. For example, a fear response to a snake may lead one to recoil at first, and then subsequently to look for an object to capture the snake. These different responses, perceptions and actions, are all included in the same “emotional response.” However, they are represented in the model with a few cycles of the situation–attention–appraisal response sequence, each of which may successively influence the situation that gives rise to the emotion in the first place (as denoted by the arrow in Figure 1).

**The Generation of Non-Group-Based Emotions**

The process of emotion generation begins with a situation, either external (e.g., I feel disgust when I encounter a rat in the street) or internal (e.g., I think about a rat and feel disgust). In both cases, a specific representation passes a threshold that leads to the elicitation of a coherent set of responses. Emotions often involve an abrupt increase in intensity that later fades away. This means it is usually easier to identify the situation that elicited the emotion than the factors associated with its termination (Scherer, 2005). Situations are viewed through the lens of an individual’s goals (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013), and emotions often serve as an instrument for the achievement of those specific goals.

According to the modal model, a situation gives rise to emotion only if it is attended to. Focusing first on external situations, many behavioral observations indicate that people have a strong inclination to attend to emotional rather than neutral stimuli (Anderson, 2005; Eastwood, Smilek, & Merkile, 2001). Emotional information is also prioritized and receives privileged access to attention (for a review, see Vuilleumier, 2005), and this is especially true in cases in which attentional resources are limited (Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001). In addition to attention to external events, focus on inner representations such as memories, reflections, and interpretations can also lead to the elicitation of emotions. Whether internal or external, attention to a specific stimulus is a necessary stage in the elicitation of an emotional response.

Assuming that a situation receives attention, it may give rise to appraisals that will constitute the meaning and relevance of the situation in the eyes of the individual. Many theorists treat appraisals as necessary conditions for the existence of emotions (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1966; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984). Despite differences in terminology, it is possible to identify several appraisal dimensions that are common in the writings of most appraisal theorists (Moors et al., 2013). These appraisal dimensions include pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, perceived obstacles, responsibility attribution (to the self, other, or situation), and relative strength. Appraisal theories seek to define appraisals such that two people who appraise events similarly will also experience a similar emotional response (Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990).

This is the first point of contact between the emotion regulation and group-based emotions literature. An emotional response does not depend on one particular appraisal but rather on a complex sequence of appraisals (Roseman, 1996; Scherer, 1984; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). Thus, the novelty of a stimulus is thought of as preceding other, later appraisals such as pleasantness (Lazarus, 1991; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). Specifically relevant to the focus of this article is the idea that appraisals regarding the relevance of a stimulus are dependent on the individual’s self-categorization. Self-categorization is defined as the process in which individuals define themselves as belonging (or not belonging) to a specific group along various degrees of abstraction (e.g., as unique individuals, as a member of one’s group, of humankind; Turner, 1985). Importantly, the way individuals self-categorize (e.g., as an individual or as a group member) influences what is appraised as relevant. Different levels of self-categorization (as an individual or as a group member) may lead to different levels of appraised relevance and thus different emotional experiences.

The process of self-categorization occurs relatively early in the appraisal process compared with other, more complex appraisals. We assume that the realization that a certain situation has relevance to the individual as a member of a certain group (or as a unique individual) precedes other, more complex analyses regarding that situation. Assuming that a specific situation is not relevant to one’s self-categorization, there is much less need for further investigation (Smith, 1993; Van Zomeren et al., 2012).

The next stage in the modal model is the emotional response, including experiential, behavioral, and biological responses. Arnold (1960) suggested that each emotion is related to one or more specific action tendencies. This idea was modified by Frijda, who suggested that while general motives or goals are inherent components of each emotion,
and thus can be predicted by specific emotions, the transformation of these motives into context-specific response tendencies and actual behavior depends on numerous external factors and is therefore quite flexible (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). The classic example of contextual specificity of responses is seen with fear, which is related to the general emotional goal of reducing threat, but can take the form of either fight or flight response tendencies, depending on the situation.

The Generation of Group-Based Emotions

The idea that emotions can be experienced as a result of one’s membership in a specific group is based on the integration of appraisal theories of emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1991) and self-categorization theories (Turner et al., 1987). Originally developed by Smith (1993) and Mackie (Mackie et al., 2000), intergroup emotion theory suggested that as a result of perceived membership in a group, individuals may react to situations relevant to this group, even if these situations have no direct influence on the individual’s goals. Over the 20 years of its existence, intergroup theory has attracted increasing interest by scholars, and has been applied to a plethora of social processes (Iyer & Leach, 2008). Despite the numerous papers that focus on group-based emotions, few efforts have been made to examine the stages of the actual emotional process. We believe that the modal model serves as a useful framework for considering how group-based emotions unfold and how individuals themselves influence this unfolding process (see Figure 2). Specifically, research and theorizing in that domain have not focused on the goals and strategies involved in the regulation of group-based emotions. This is the second point of sympathy we identify in this article.

The examination of group-based emotions using a general emotional model raises an important question: In what ways can general theories of emotion be extended to group-based emotions? This question is linked to a slightly broader but very similar discussion regarding the difference between interpersonal and intergroup relations. While some scholars have argued that theories of interpersonal processes can be extended to intergroup processes (Lott & Lott, 1965; Mackie & Smith, 1998), others view interpersonal relations as qualitatively different from intergroup relations (Turner & Haslam, 2001). In line with intergroup emotions theory (e.g., Smith, 1993), we endorse the idea that general models of emotion can be extended to group-based emotions. This idea is congruent with the notion that although the appraisal content and the action tendencies of group-based emotions may be distinguished from those of other emotions, in their basic structure, they are not different from other emotions. However, because group-based emotions often target ingroups or outgroups as a whole (e.g., anger against one’s government or against a dominant country), their consequences may differ dramatically (e.g., mass protest or war) from non-group-based emotions.

Group-based emotions begin with a situation that may be either external (e.g., a memorial service on TV) or internal (e.g., a thought about an upcoming memorial service). Situations relevant to group-based emotions occur when one is exposed to experiences of other group members that are relevant to the group as a whole. An example would be a newspaper article about a local scientist who discovered a new gene. This may elicit pride in people who categorize themselves as members of the scientist’s national group (or some other characteristic), although their personal involvement in the story is minimal to non-existent. Usually, reading about a scientist discovering a new gene is not of great personal relevance to the person who is reading the article. Therefore, the emotions elicited in these situations are typically based on how these achievements are relevant to the “group self” (Ellemers, 2012; Turner et al., 1987).
thus have the power to shift individual’s self-categorization, for instance, from a view of themselves as an individual to a group member.

The next stage in the emotion-generative process is the attention that is given to the event. In the case of group-based emotional elicitation, attention is given to situations that resonate with the individual’s categorization as a group member. This attention may be focused on specific cues that also elicit other, non-group-based emotions. For example, I may notice a threatening character walking down the street, which may lead to the elicitation of fear. This could be accompanied by the attention to a flag on the character’s shirt, which may symbolize a rival group and therefore elicit group-based fear.

Assuming that the situation receives attention, it gives rise to appraisals regarding the situation. As mentioned in the section above on the generation of non-group-based emotions, appraisals often occur in sequence, and some later appraisals may depend on other, more primary appraisals (Scherer, 1999). In the case of group-based emotions, the relevance of a specific stimulus is dependent on the individual’s self-categorization as a group member (Smith et al., 2007; Van Zomeren et al., 2012; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Therefore, we can assume that self-categorization occurs relatively early in the appraisal stage. One must perceive oneself as part of a group to be able to experience emotions on its behalf (Mackie et al., 2000). For example, a national celebration of independence may be of meaning only to those who categorize themselves as members of the celebrating nation. Therefore, an unrelated bystander will not experience group-based emotions when participating in a foreign country’s celebration of independence.

This point deserves further explanation, as self-categorization might be thought to precede the attentional deployment stage rather than following it. We see cognition as dependent on attending to a specific representation, which can be either external or internal. Without attention to some representation, later processes of relevance cannot occur. For example, without attention to the national anthem, an individual cannot find relevance in the anthem via a process of self-categorization. This does not mean that the initial attention–categorization sequence is a single instance. On the contrary, the different stages in the modal model represent a constantly repeating loop that readjusts in accordance with changes in the world or in one’s goals.

In addition to self-categorization, intergroup emotions theory introduces another important variable to the domain of emotion regulation, namely group identification. Whereas self-categorization determines whether individuals perceive themselves as members of a group, group identification determines the individuals’ cognitive and emotional valuation of group membership (Tajfel, 1978). Identification is manifested by a certain value for each self-categorization. This value behaves as an amplifier or attenuator for different degrees of self-categorization (Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008).

Assuming that an individual is primed to self-categorize as a member of a certain nationality, this self-categorization is accompanied with a certain good–bad, important–non-important evaluation, which is the degree of identification with the specific group. Assuming that identification is strong, events related to the categorized group may yield stronger emotions. In situations in which identification is weak, we can expect a reduced relevance to the individual and a decreased emotional response. This hypothesis was supported in correlational as well as experimental studies (Doosje et al., 1998; Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006; Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004; Smith et al., 2007; Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, & Miller, 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008).

The final stage in the emotion-generative process is the emotional response, which includes the experiential and action readiness states that later manifest themselves in overt behavior such as facial expression and organized action (Frijda, 1986). Emotional responses serve many functions such as advancing the individual’s goals and explaining the individual’s inner state (Averill, 1990; Ekman, 1992; Keltner & Gross, 1999). As a result of this functionality, people are highly sensitive to others’ emotional responses (Goldenberg, Saguy, & Halperin, 2014). This is important when thinking about group-based emotions, which are almost always related to social contexts. Group-based emotional responses often amplify the social effect of these emotions by influencing others to experience the same emotions (e.g., Smith et al., 2007). One of the best examples of this is the observation that group-based emotions frequently serve as an important engine for collective action (Mackie et al., 2000; Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

In sum, the modal model facilitates a temporal, stage-by-stage examination of emotion generation. As in the case of non-group-based emotions, the modal model does not represent a one-time process but a cycle which is activated repeatedly. This dynamic process includes self-categorization, which implies a shift of self (e.g., from individual to group self) as a function of a shift in the situation. (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & Lowrance, 1995; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Urban & Miller, 1998). Assuming that self-categorization is a dynamic appraisal that is repeatedly assessed and reassessed during the emotional cycle, there is no reason to think that re-categorization or change in identification cannot occur during that cycle. This of course suggests that if desired, perceived self-categorization or group identification can be altered, leading to changes in the emotional response.

**Emotion Regulation Goals**

When emotions threaten to “drag down their victim with the weight of stupidity” (Nietzsche, 1889/1998, p. 10), individuals often try to regulate these emotions and change their
trajectories in ways that help them to achieve their goals (Gross, 1998). The term emotion regulation refers to the ways in which an individual intervenes to shape the emotion-generative process (Gross, Sheppes, & Urry, 2011). To understand why a person seeks to regulate emotions in a particular context, we need to learn about that person’s emotion regulation goals (Erber & Erber, 2000; Gross, 2002; Tamir, 2009, 2015). To date, the main focus in this line of work has been on individuals’ personal, rather than group goals. We extend intergroup emotions theory by applying the notion of emotion regulation goals to group-based emotion.

Surprisingly, little research in the group-based emotions’ domain has considered the role of goals in the regulation of group-based emotions. One exception, however, is Maitner et al. (2006), who examined how satisfaction or dissatisfaction of collective goals may lead to the regulation of related group-based emotions. Maitner and colleagues’ assumption is congruent with the general notion that emotion regulation depends on the discrepancy between the current and desired states (Scheier & Carver, 1982; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). Similarly, our working assumption is that goals for regulating group-based emotions are not structurally different from other emotion regulation goals, but that self-categorization as a group member often implies group, rather than personal, goals, which may have different contents.

Our purpose, therefore, is to use a framework that allows an examination of the content of group-based emotion. Tamir’s division between hedonic and instrumental goals is especially useful for this purpose (Ford & Tamir, 2012; Tamir, Chiu, & Gross, 2007; Tamir, 2009, 2015; Tamir et al., 2008). It does not focus on the content of different goals but rather supplies a broad categorization of different types of goals. This facilitates a smooth transformation from the general notion of emotions to group-based emotions. A second benefit of the framework is that it fits well with intergroup emotions theory and the social identity approach it is partially based in—a currently dominant approach in the field of intergroup relations, as we will outline below.

**Goals for Regulating Non-Group-Based Emotions**

One important goal for emotion regulation, and the one which dominates the literature on emotion regulation, is hedonic (i.e., increasing positive feelings and/or decreasing negative feelings; Childers, Carr, Peck, & Carson, 2002; Erber & Erber, 2000; Tamir, 2009; Tamir et al., 2008). For example, it feels good to be happy, and people often take steps to try to prolong or magnify their happiness (Mauss, Tamir, Anderson, & Savino, 2011). Similarly, fear is an unpleasant emotion, and therefore people often try to down-regulate it, decreasing either the magnitude or the duration of a fear episode (Phelps & LeDoux, 2005 for a review).

However, short-term hedonic goals are not the only motives for emotion regulation. People also wish to maximize utility and achieve longer-term goals. These goals, defined as “instrumental” (Tamir, 2009), may or may not lead to immediate pleasure, but are perceived to lead to longer-term benefits (Erber & Erber, 2000; Tamir et al., 2008). An example of such an instrumental goal is the desire to purchase an item during a seasonal sale such as “Black Friday.” For some people, big crowds are associated with negative affect (Childers et al., 2002). However, despite the lack of immediate hedonic benefit that will result from going to a busy shopping mall, it may still be pursued with the intention of getting the desired item at a presumably cheaper price.

People may not only be willing to suffer the negative consequences of standing in lines for hours, but may also be motivated to up-regulate negative emotions hoping that they will help them achieve their goals. For instance, Tamir et al. (2008) found that participants who believed that anger would serve their goals during negotiation were willing to intentionally increase their anger before negotiation by choosing anger-inducing music. This was also demonstrated with fear, showing that participants increased fear before a situation that required alertness (Tamir & Ford, 2009). In both cases, participants’ motivation to increase their experience of negative emotions was due to the belief that these emotional states would help them achieve their goals. The distinction between instrumental goals and hedonic goals should not be equated with the distinction between conscious and non-conscious processes. In many cases, instrumental goals for emotion and emotion regulation are activated without the awareness of an agent (Bargh, 1996; Barrett & Ochsner, 2007). As suggested by Tamir’s works on emotional preferences, participants may choose to hear anger-inducing music before a negotiation, without necessarily being aware of their choice.

We note that, in many contexts, different motivations for emotion regulation co-exist. I may wish to feel good, and thus wish to down-regulate negative emotions related to an upcoming situation. At the same time, I may also wish to achieve other, longer-term goals, and therefore be willing to experience negative emotions, assuming they promote the achievement of these goals. Instrumental goals, to the extent that they lead to negative emotions, often conflict with hedonic motivations. Similarly, hedonic motivations often get in the way of achieving longer-term goals. These “mixed goals” may either lead to one goal overcoming the other (I decide to shop on “Black Friday” and endure unpleasant feelings), or can co-exist with one another (I enjoy the experience of “Black Friday” and get a better deal on my purchase).

Furthermore, mixed goals can also be driven by mixed emotions (Kreibig, Samson, & Gross, 2013; Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001; Schimmack, 2005) in which individuals experience negative and positive emotions simultaneously. In these cases, it is especially difficult to differentiate between hedonic and instrumental goals. Andrade and Cohen (2007) demonstrated this complexity by showing participants horror movies and measuring both their negative
and positive affect during the experience. For participants who disliked horror movies, the experience contradicted both hedonic as well as instrumental goals. Surprisingly, participants who liked horror movies experienced negative emotions at the same level as participants who disliked horror movies, thus not achieving their hedonic goals. However, they also experienced positive emotions during and after the movie. These findings suggest that participants’ preference of horror movies is based on instrumental considerations that compare negative versus positive benefits during and after the situation. Nevertheless, in all of the above examples scholars have focused on personal goals for emotion regulation. In the next section, we explore hedonic and instrumental goals for group-based emotion regulation.

Goals for Regulating Group-Based Emotions

Intergroup emotions theory is rooted in the social identity approach, which includes both self-categorization and social identity theory (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993). According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), individuals seek to generate or maintain a positive self-evaluation, which can be achieved by favorably comparing the ingroup with outgroups. Intergroup emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993) expands social identity theory by arguing that an individual’s social identity and motivation for positive self-evaluation are supported by intergroup emotions.

In its description of a positive ingroup view, social identity theory can be thought of as describing a superordinate goal which relates to more specific hedonic and instrumental goals. In line with this idea, a positive group view is hedonically pleasing, and therefore congruent with hedonic goals for group-based emotion regulation. However, a positive group view also serves longer-term instrumental goals as it leads to important aspects of group membership such as unity and loyalty (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). Indeed, in social identity theory, individuals may identify even with groups that do not reflect positively on the self because there may be hope and scope for improving the conditions of that group in society through collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Therefore, group members may be willing to experience negative emotions to maintain a long-term, positive view of the group.

We believe that the specificity of goals for group-based emotion regulation is driven by two major factors. First, these goals are often group-based goals rather than personal goals (Ellemers, 2012; Maitner et al., 2006). Thus, instead of pursuing individual happiness or success, group members pursue collective success or happiness. These goals may of course lead to some individual benefits; however, they depend on an initial collective improvement (a country wins an economic war which eventually improves the lives of the individuals who make up the group). Second, the motivations include considerations for the individual’s relationship with the group or its members (Mackie et al., 2000; Van Zomeren et al., 2008) such as creating bonding within group members or preserving a tradition. These will be further discussed in this section.

Group-based hedonic goals. One basic motivation for regulating group-based emotions is to increase pleasant emotions and decrease unpleasant emotions (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Thus, group-members like to experience positive emotions such as group-based pride and respect (Haslam et al., 2000) and group-based hope (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014). In contrast, unpleasant emotions such as group-based guilt are often avoided (Wohl et al., 2006). One unique aspect of hedonic goals in the context of group-based emotions is the motivation to feel a positive emotion vicariously through another group member’s success or to avoid negative emotions through another group member’s wrongdoing (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Group members are often motivated to support the pursuit of other group members’ goals with the hope that success in achieving these goals may lead to the accomplishment of collective goals. A citizen’s desire that his or her national athletes will win a sports tournament is an example of this type of motivation.

The pleasure of having the same emotion as other group members is an added benefit of group-based hedonic motivation. The hedonic pleasure created by the sense of identification may at times be the only hedonic goal that group members actually achieve. Being a sports fan of a losing team will not provide hedonic pleasure in winning, yet the experience of feeling sad together with other fans may facilitate bonding and provide some hedonic value (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007). Recent work on conformity using functional neuroimaging shows that conformity is associated with brain regions responsible for subjective positive value (Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 2011). This suggests that merely experiencing conformity in certain contexts may lead to positive emotions. We therefore posit that the negative value of unpleasant emotions is trumped by the positive valuation of conformity. Notable examples for such experiences are collective rituals, public ceremonies, and memorial days (Hochschild, 1979; Kanyangara, Rimé, Philippot, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Radcliffe-Brown, 1993). In these cases, people may be motivated to experience unpleasant emotions to enjoy the sense of connectedness to their group. This argument is in line with the idea of mixed motivations. Driven by these two goals—experiencing pleasant emotions and feeling part of a group—mixed emotions may be experienced more frequently in intergroup contexts than in non-intergroup contexts.

Group-based instrumental goals. In addition to hedonic goals, regulation of group-based emotions can also serve instrumental goals that go beyond both the group and the individual’s immediate pleasure. Instrumental goals are often accompanied by short-term negative emotional experiences such as fear, anger, and frustration. In these situations, when
the value placed on longer-term goals exceeds the value placed on short-term hedonic goals, people will choose the instrumental approach. For example, group members may be willing to experience negative group-based emotions and support a war hoping that this will lead to better future outcomes. People may not only be willing to experience negative emotions, but may also be motivated to do so if they perceive these emotions as serving an instrumental goal. For example, Porat, Tamir, and Halperin (2015) have shown that in supporting a country’s battle with another country, citizens may be willing to undergo extreme negative emotions if they believe it will lead to a calmer and better future for themselves, their children, and other members of their group.

The regulation of group-based emotions may also serve the instrumental goal of communicating loyalty or conforming to one’s group (Brewer, 1999). Expressing group-based emotions that are congruent with the collective may strengthen the relationship between an individual and his or her group. Examining the relationship from the point of view of the group, the collective often tries to externally motivate group members to regulate specific emotions to achieve conformity or communal goals (for a review, see Bar-Tal, 2013). For example, a country involved in an intractable conflict needs tremendous resources to survive. Therefore, it is important for it to instill strong positive emotions toward the group such as pride, as well as negative emotions like hate and anger toward the outgroup (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & De Rivera, 2007).

As previously mentioned, the choice between instrumental and hedonic goals is not necessarily the result of a conscious process (Bargh, 1996; Barrett & Ochsner, 2007; Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). In many cases, the activation of a goal may occur without awareness (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Suri, Sheppes, & Gross, 2013). For example, in Porat and colleagues’ work, Israeli participants preferred to read anger-inducing newspaper articles before addressing a negotiation regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. These choices were made without participants’ awareness that their choice may influence their performance in the negotiation.

**Conflict between goals.** Instrumental goals for regulating group-based emotions often conflict with either hedonic goals or other instrumental goals. When thinking about the possible conflicts between these two types of goals, we can broadly divide them into two types: (a) conflicts between goals for regulating different group-based emotions and (b) conflicts between group and personal goals for emotion regulation. Between-level conflicts occur when the personal motivation for emotion regulation contradicts the motivation to regulate group-based emotion. We will address both types of conflicts below.

Starting with conflicts that occur within the group-based level, long-term instrumental goals might include immediate negative emotions such as sadness or anger, which are accepted under the assumption that their benefit will exceed the costs associated with the immediate negative experience. For example, if a person believes that violence is critical to defend the group in a context of intergroup conflict, then she will be motivated to feel group-based anger. The literature on group-based anger shows that it is an efficient emotion in motivating people to support policies that can correct what is perceived as the outgroup’s wrongdoing (Halperin, 2011).

Another example of a negative emotion that is often felt by group members to serve collective goals is of group-based fear, which can increase a group’s preparation for future attacks (Lerner et al., 2003; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004).

In addition to conflicts among goals within the group-based level, goals for regulating group-based emotions may conflict with goals for regulating non-group-based emotions. For example, I may wish to down-regulate fear to better cope with personal difficulties. At the same time, however, I may want to feel group-based fear to experience my group as weak to support the perception of collective victimhood and justifying acts of violence committed by my group (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009). While a soldier may wish to personally feel strong to have the courage to fight, he or she may also want to perceive his or her group as a weaker victim, to morally justify his or her actions. However, when goals at the two levels conflict with each other, they may lead to changes in one emotion regulation strategy at the expense of the other. For example, a motivation not to be fearful on a personal level may interfere with a motivation to feel fear at the group-based level. This conflict may lead to a change in goals at one of the levels, which in turn will change my emotional experience.

One important question is what conditions facilitate the preference of one goal over another. This question should be examined separately for the two types of conflicts: within each level and between the group-based and the non-group-based level. Current empirical evidence may shed some light on the within-level comparison. We now have accumulated data on the situational and personal factors that lead people to prefer immediate rewards compared with long-term rewards. We also know that these choices are triggered by stronger activation in different regions of the brain (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Magen, Kim, Dweck, Gross, & McClure, 2014; McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; van den Bos, Rodriguez, Schweitzer, & McClure, 2014). Within-level comparisons of group-based emotion add a layer of complication to an already complicated system. Positive hedonic reward may also be the result of hedonistically negative experiences that are shared with other group members. However, we assume that the general principles of preference and self-control apply in these cases as well.

Considering the lack of empirical evidence, our consideration of between-level goal conflict must be much more speculative at present. Our assumption is that the preference for one goal over the other is based on two main factors:
salience of level of categorization and degree of identification with the group. When a certain group categorization is salient, individuals will assign high value to emotional goals at that level. For example, after being primed by the national flag, individuals may prefer collective goals over individual goals. Level of categorization is of course amplified by the value of that categorization, meaning by the degree of identification with the specific group. Here also, we assume that stronger identification will lead to preference of collective goals as compared with individual goals.

In sum, the hedonic/instrumental distinction is useful for mapping the goals people have for regulating group-based emotions. This allows us to examine which goals are preferred over others. It also facilitates the examination of conflicts which occur both within the level of group-based emotions as well as between group-based and non-group-based emotions. These constitute promising directions for research both on group-based emotions and on emotion regulation.

**Emotion Regulation Strategies**

Of equal importance to the question of why people regulate their group-based emotions—which we discussed in the previous section—is the question of how they do so. Theory and research on emotion regulation have identified multiple strategies individuals may use to influence emotions that they perceive to be unhelpful for achievement of goals (and therefore seek to decrease), or that they perceive to be helpful (and therefore seek to increase). The emotion regulation strategies that people use may be automatic or controlled, conscious or unconscious, intrinsic (regulating one’s own emotions) or extrinsic (regulating another’s emotions), and may have effects at one or more points in the emotion generation process.

Due to the complex and multifaceted nature of the emotion regulatory process, distinguishing among the various strategies that are part of this process is of great importance in better understanding it. For present purposes, we will zoom in on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction when discussing group-based emotions. We find this distinction especially important when thinking about the social consequences of group-based emotional experiences and regulation (Rimé, 2007; von Scheve & Ismer, 2013).

**Strategies for Regulating Non-Group-Based Emotions**

The process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998, 2008) offers a framework for describing different regulatory strategies (see Figure 3). This model outlines different families of strategies that focus on the regulation of each stage (situation, attention, appraisal, and response) in the emotion-generative process described using the modal model of emotion generation (Gross & Thompson, 2007). The process model provides a broad framework that focuses on individuals’ non-group-based emotion regulation strategies. We extend intergroup emotions theory by proposing the process model of group-based emotion regulation.

At the outset, it is useful to sharpen the distinction between emotion generation (the modal model) and emotion regulation (the process model). The key to this distinction is the idea that each involves a different type of valuation (Gross, 2015; Gross & Barrett, 2011). The first targets the situation and the appropriate emotional response to that situation (emotion generation). The second, higher order valuation system targets the emotional state and whether it is appropriate or not considering the individual’s goal (emotion regulation). In reality, the distinction between these two systems is challenging as they are often activated at the same time and are constantly readjusted in response to changes in the world. However, their differentiation has been supported by some neuroimaging data which map these two systems onto different regions in the brain (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002).
Emotion regulation is often seen as targeting the emotional process once it is already in motion. However, some regulation strategies involve preemptively avoiding situations in which unwanted emotions may occur. Situation selection, the earliest strategy in the process model, involves acting to make it more likely that we will be in situations we expect will give rise to desired emotions (or less likely that we will be in situations we expect will give rise to undesired emotions). This strategy occurs before entering into the emotion-eliciting situation and is the most forward-looking approach to emotion regulation. It does not refer to all of our decisions about future actions, but only to the choices that are taken with consideration, at least in part, of the future consequences of our actions for our emotional responses (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Gross, 2008).

As other emotion regulation strategies, situation selection can be undertaken without awareness of either the strategy choice or the goal activation. One may choose to not participate in a certain event without consciously recognizing that the reason is the negative emotions that may be experienced in that event. A typical example of a situation selection strategy is a person who chooses to avoid watching horror movies to regulate the fear that he or she usually experiences in these movies.

Assuming that an individual has entered into the emotional situation, he or she can invest efforts to modify the situation in a way that will alter its emotional impact. The ability to modify situations, even slightly, can serve as a useful tool to regulate the emotion. Situation modification is a very potent form of emotion regulation as it demands a sense of agency from the individual. Using the example of the horror film, assuming that the person was forced to sit in front of the television, he or she could turn on the light, turn down the volume, or even switch to a different channel. All of these actions may affect his or her emotional response.

Situation selection and modification focus on influencing the situation that elicits the emotion or the individual’s role in the situation. Other strategies, which refer to later stages of the modal model, focus on regulating emotions by affecting the experience of the individual without changing the environment. Attentional deployment, the strategy associated with the attention phase in the process model, includes a shift of one’s attention to or away from the emotion-eliciting event (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Distraction has been found to be effective in changing an emotional reaction after the emotional response has already evolved (Sheppes, Catran, & Meiran, 2009; Sheppes & Meiran, 2007). Using the previous example, an attentional deployment strategy would be to shift attention away from the television screen during scary parts of the movie, focusing on anything but the scary film one is viewing. It is important to mark the sometimes fluid distinction between attentional deployment and situation modification. Attentional deployment is focused on changing the exposure to a stimulus by shifting attention away from it. Situation modification, on the other hand, involves actively influencing the situation. Turning off the TV or changing the channel is attributed to situation modification, while closing one’s eyes is attributed to the attentional deployment.

Even though the situation received attention, to proceed with the emotional process, the individual must go through a cognitive evaluation of the situation. Cognitive change involves changing one’s thinking to change one’s emotional response. One common form of cognitive change is cognitive reappraisal, which involves thinking about a situation in a way that can change its meaning (Van Zomeren et al., 2012; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). One example of a reappraisal strategy is to try to take an outsider’s view of a situation and analyze it with greater distance. Reappraisal methods have been successfully used to change the way people construe upsetting situations to decrease their aversion (Richards, Butler, & Gross, 2003), and people who use reappraisal more frequently to regulate their emotions report significantly less negative emotions before entering a negative situation (Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson, & Davidson, 2000). Using the example of the scary movie, the person can decrease suspension of disbelief by telling herself that the characters are merely actors and that scary movies will use any possible trick to increase fear.

The next family of strategies, response modulation, has its impact later in the emotion-generative process. These strategies are focused on modifying the emotional responses themselves, once they have arisen. Attempts to regulate the psychological and experiential aspects of emotion include physical relaxation and suppression of the expressive behavior of the emotion. These regulatory strategies seem to have mixed effects on the actual emotional experience and may even increase it (Gross, 1998). Using the previous example of the scary movie, the person can regulate the expressions of fear during the movie and suppress them to the extent that his or her friends cannot detect that he or she is actually scared. Response modulation strategies are more linked to psychopathology than strategies that are used earlier in the emotional process. A growing body of research now shows that frequent use of suppression serves as a stronger predictor for distress disorders and maladaptive behavior than other forms of emotion regulation (for a review, see Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010).

Similar to the modal model, the process model represents only one cycle in the regulatory process. This idea is expressed by the recursive arrow at the bottom of Figure 3. As the regulatory process progresses, individuals may make use of various strategies according to particular goals and abilities during each cycle of regulation. Using the example of the horror movie, I may start a scary scene by reappraising, however as the plot becomes scarier I may decide to distract or even modify the situation by turning off the television. All of these responses are different regulation strategies which are conducted at different points during the same emotional experience.
Strategies for Regulating Group-Based Emotions

Similar to the processes of emotion generation and emotion regulation goals, our working assumption is that, in their structure, regulatory strategies of group-based emotions are not different from regulatory strategies of non-group-based emotions. However, the specification of each strategy can shed new light on that way that these strategies play a role in many intra- and intergroup interactions and contexts (see Figure 4). One specific attribute of group-based emotion, which we believe deserves special attention, is the tendency of group members to regulate other group members’ emotions, thus changing their perceptions and actions regarding group-related situation. Therefore, when looking each strategy, we try to distinguish between intrinsic emotion regulation (i.e., when individuals regulate their own group-based emotions) and extrinsic emotion regulation (when individuals regulate other group members’ emotions).

One important comment is that our current analysis of extrinsic emotion regulation focuses only on ingroup emotion regulation (i.e., group members who regulate other ingroup members’ emotions). Another concept that can benefit from the current approach is the extrinsic regulation of outgroup members’ emotions. There are two main contexts in which outgroup members’ regulation is especially important: intergroup conflicts (Halperin, Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014) and intergroup reconciliation (Brown et al., 2008). In both contexts, group interaction is highly dependent on the emotions being experienced and provoked (or regulated) by one another. In intergroup conflicts, the main goal is to up-regulate previously existing emotions that may improve the strategic standing of the ingroup, such as outgroup fear, despair, and shame. Similarly, hope and pride should be down-regulated (Bar-Tal, 2001). In asymmetrical conflicts, weak groups may also try to elicit guilt, empathy, or compassion, hoping that this will lead to an improvement of their situation. In cases of reconciliation, on the other hand, ingroups may take the opposite route by down-regulating negative outgroup emotions and up-regulating positive emotions (Čehajić, Brown, & González, 2009; Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennett, 2012). These regulation processes can be examined using the process model of group-based emotion regulation; however, they fall beyond the scope of the current article.

Group-based emotions are experienced in response to situations that resonate with a person’s self-categorization as a member of a specific group. Group members’ ability to regulate group-based emotions is dependent on the nature of the emotion-eliciting event. In the case of intrinsic situation selection, individuals usually have rather limited ability to select the situations that may elicit group-based emotions. Emotional experiences are often followed by an inherent need to share these emotions (Luminet, Bouts, Delie, Manstead, & Rimé, 2000; Rimé, Mesquita, Boca, & Philippot, 1991). Therefore, large-scale group-based emotional experiences often are accompanied by strong communal desires for sharing (Middleton, 1989). Individuals can try to avoid communal ceremonies or not take part in group events, but eventually, their avoidance of these situations, assuming that individuals wish to maintain a connection with their group, is rather difficult. Imagine an employee who does not want to be disappointed by his or her company’s stock performance and decides to avoid any news about it. How long can he or she sustain this without either letting go of his or her group membership or being exposed to the news? Aside from avoiding events that individuals know will happen, individuals have a limited ability to identify when group-based emotion-eliciting situations may occur. As group-based emotions can be elicited by the actions of many
different group members, it is even harder to determine when these members will be involved in certain situations.

On an extrinsic level, groups often use communal rituals, collective holidays, and memorial events to elicit emotions that serve their goals (Harris & Sutton, 1986; Hochschild, 1979; Radcliffe-Brown, 1993). These emotion-eliciting situations are implemented in societies to create a cultural mechanism that maintains group goals (Bar-Tal, 2013). An example of such situations is the memorial siren, which is activated every year during the Israeli Memorial Day. The siren reminds people of the significance of the day, eliciting emotions such as sadness and empathy, as well as increasing the sense of unity with the group. Fireworks used in national celebrations can serve as an example of extrinsic regulation of positive emotions. Another form of extrinsic situation selection occurs via education (Bar-Tal, 2007). For example, sending students to a tolerance museum can serve as a positive emotion regulator toward the outgroup. On the other hand, reminding them of threats and danger can have the opposite effect (Bar-Tal, 2001). Such examples of extrinsic emotion regulation are very common in societies and often serve to increase a sense of nationality, unity, and identity, leading to positive emotions toward the ingroup and negative emotions toward the outgroup.

Besides choosing which situations to put oneself in and which to avoid, group members can also modify situations in ways that will change their group-based emotions. When discussing situation modification strategies for group-based emotions, we need to differentiate between two general types. The first type concerns a modification of the actual situation which is the source of the emotion, such as an anger-inducing speech or a collective event. This type is defined in social psychology as collective action (for the integration of emotions in collective actions through a coping perspective, see Van Zomeren et al., 2012). The second type concerns a modification of the source of exposure to the collective event, such as a news outlet or a friend. These two types of strategies differ both in the ways in which they are conducted and in ease of their implementation.

In both cases, the viability of situation modification of the actual events depends on the magnitude of the situation and the size of the group. As described in resource mobilization theory (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977), the success of situation modification is dependent on the number of agents, their level of unity, the availability of resources, and the ability to attract others' support. In a situation of intergroup conflict in which the conflicting groups are relatively small, as in the case of two small families, changing the actual situation may require few resources. In these situations, each individual’s attempt to intrinsically change his or her own emotions may eventually lead to extrinsic emotion regulation of other group members.

However, in situations in which the groups are larger, as in a conflict between societies or states, it is much more difficult for individuals or even groups to gather the appropriate resources to change the dynamic of the collective event itself (Khawaja, 1993). In these cases, situation modification strategies often include symbolic gestures such as choosing to wear a certain outfit in a group rally, or deciding not to hang the national flag outside one’s porch during an independence day. These actions are considered to be situation modification inasmuch as they include the individual’s involvement in actively changing the nature of the situation to regulate group-based emotions. Symbolic gestures may not necessarily influence the collective emotion, although history is full of examples of symbolic gestures by common people which led to wide spread collective action. However, they may regulate the individual’s emotional experiences, and may even extrinsically influence other emotions, in specific situations. Deciding to wear the gay pride flag during a pride parade may contribute to the up-regulation of emotion in the individual who celebrates at the parade and influence the emotions of those surrounding that individual.

In most cases, however, the individual’s ability to modify the actual situation in ways that will alter his or her group-based emotions is limited. Therefore, situation modification strategies are often focused on influencing the communication of the information regarding events, rather than on changing the events themselves. As group-based situations are often not directly experienced by the individual, but rather mediated by various means of communication, the individual has the ability to modify the sources of information to meet his or her needs. An example of such attempts is described in Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) idea of the spiral of silence. According to this theory, group members aspire to stop the flow of certain information by influencing other group members not to express it. By censoring information, people are not only regulating their own emotions, but also extrinsically regulating others’ emotions. The regulation of negative group-based emotions by modifying information flow is especially salient when regulating unpleasant group-based emotions such as group-based guilt (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Wohl et al., 2006) and shame (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010). Group members not only have the tendency to censor interpretations that may elicit unpleasant emotions, but also tend to punish individuals who expose such information (Schachter, 1951; Sears & Funk, 1991). These actions create a reality in which certain opinions and information are more easily expressed than others.

The next family of strategies in the process model, attentional deployment, involves shifting attention to or away from emotional stimuli. The idea that individuals constantly deploy their attention in a way that facilitates feeling positive about their group derives from social identity theory (Turner, 1975). According to the theory, a common strategy used by individuals to maintain a positive sense of the group is defined as “social creativity” (Turner & Reynolds, 2001) in which individuals focus their attention on aspects of the group which emphasize its positivity. While some of these strategies are implemented by cognitive reappraisal strategies and will be...
discussed further below, others are a result of the individual’s attention to specific, positive ingroup validation, and avoidance of other negative contexts.

Similar to the case of situation modification, intrinsic attentional deployment strategies can focus on either the situation or the channels of communication regarding the situation. Focusing first on attentional shifts from the situations themselves, distracting oneself from emotional situations may be very challenging in the case of group-based emotions. For example, shifting attention away from a memorial day in Israel is almost an impossible task, considering the fact that it is a national holiday during which a siren is heard all over the country. Focusing on certain channels of communication regarding a situation—and not others—is often an easier form of attentional deployment. Choosing to get one’s news from a certain media outlet is an example of such attentional deployment. Social networks are another excellent example of the information structures that people construe to receive the interpretations they desire (Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010).

In extreme cases, some forms of attentional deployment can be strong enough to almost eliminate the existence of evidence of certain events. One example of such attentional deployment is denial (Lazarus, 1983). In this case, the distraction is achieved by ignoring facts that prove the existence of a certain event. The best example is the denial or interpretation of events that occurred in the past. Holocaust deniers, for example, may oppose the facts of the Holocaust to decrease group-based guilt (Edelstein, Nathanson, & Stone, 1989). The Turkish government, which refuses to publicly acknowledge the Armenian genocide, is another example (Hovannisian, 1999). The denial of events also serves as an extrinsic emotion regulation, executed by leaders or other agents of the government. These processes of denial can often serve the construction of narratives and ethos for societies involved in long-term intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007). Furthermore, denial of past events may serve as a motivation for distraction in the context of future events, especially ones that may indicate or reference the denied event.

The distinction between situation modification and attentional deployment may seem hard to draw in relation to group-based emotions. We differentiate between the two by limiting situation modification to actions that are intended to influence the nature of exposure to the situation or the situation itself. Attentional deployment, on the other hand, does not include acting to eliminate the exposure to a certain situation, but merely shifting one’s attention within a specific situation away from the emotion-eliciting stimulus. The distinction becomes especially hard in cases of indirect exposure to the situation, such as watching a news report that describes a collective catastrophe. In these cases, we differentiate between acting to change the exposure by switching the channel (situation modification) and ignoring the report by thinking about something else (attentional deployment). However, it is clear that these strategies can often be activated at the same time in the service of the same emotion regulation goal.

In general, attentional deployment is a commonly used mechanism by groups and group leaders to change others’ group-based emotions (Bar-Tal, 2007; George, 2000). Extrinsic focus of attention can be toward specific events. A good example of such extrinsic attentional deployment is when group leaders elicit emotions in response to a specific event and not from another event (Brown, 2003). For example, in response to accusations of personal or governmental corruptions, leaders often attempt to shift the public’s attention to external threats. In addition, extrinsic attentional deployment can be instantiated merely by focusing group members’ attention on their group membership. We know from accumulated work on group-based emotions that increasing participants’ attention to their group membership leads to increased emotional experiences (Gordijn et al., 2006; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Therefore, it seems likely that leaders and group members often use this strategy to elicit other group members’ emotions.

The next family of strategies in the process model involves cognitive change. As in attentional deployment, cognitive change resonates well with the strategy defined by social identity theory as “social creativity,” in which the individual finds interpretations that will maintain positive emotions toward one’s group. When applied to group-based emotions, it is important to differentiate between two possible targets of cognitive change: the situation itself versus one’s level of categorization. Focusing first on changing the meaning of a situation, one may take a broader, more objective view of a certain media report and reach the conclusion that it only presents one angle of the story (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012). Cognitive change has recently been found to be effective in reducing negative group-based emotions in the context of violent conflicts (Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2013; Halperin et al., 2013). Israeli participants who received reappraisal instructions or brief reappraisal training (Halperin, Porat, et al., 2013) responded to emotion-eliciting event related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict with less negative emotion toward the Palestinians, and also expressed higher support (compared with a control group) for conciliatory political actions targeted at the Palestinians. Interestingly, in the study in which participants received reappraisal training, the reduction in emotion was still evident even 5 months after the reappraisal training.

In addition to targeting the meaning of the situation, changing one’s self-categorization can serve as a useful regulation strategy. As mentioned in the section on emotion generation above, self-categorization is a relatively early appraisal that is necessary for the elicitation of group-based emotions. The idea that changing the individual’s self-categorization with the group can serve as a useful regulatory strategy is well supported by the literature on group-based emotions (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993; Smith et al.,...
Effectively regulating negative emotions by altering one’s self-categorization can be executed by perceiving oneself as an independent individual (as indicated by the example in Figure 4), or by shifting the salience of one’s self-categorization to a more inclusive level (which is called re-categorization). This idea was exemplified by Wohl and Branscombe (2005) who showed that changing participants’ categorization from a national to a universal level influenced their willingness to forgive outgroup inequities. Although these findings did not focus on group-based emotions, they did suggest that outgroup attitudes are dependent on one’s self-categorization. These findings emphasize that people are members of various groups and have the ability to re-categorize themselves according to different contexts (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Turner et al., 1994). These shifts can be horizontal (shift among different groups within the group: American, academic) as well as vertical in both time (a Y generation, a teenager) and space (i.e., the size of group, such as American or human).

Cognitive change that focuses on re-categorization may also be achieved by altering one’s view of the nature of the connection between the individual and the group. Shifting the individual’s role in the group can also have a substantial effect on the nature of group-based emotional reactions. One can perceive himself or herself as a leader of a group, which in turn influences the motivation and ability to regulate group-based emotions. Similarly, perceiving oneself as a common, uninfluential, group member can lead to changes in the individual emotional responses. Other cognitive reappraisal strategies that influence the individual’s nature of group membership include perceiving oneself as a moral compass or an opposition to the norm. While these cognitive reappraisal strategies do not necessarily change the degree of self-categorization with the group, they may influence the individual group member’s emotional experience.

At the extrinsic level, cognitive change is often used by group members to regulate others’ emotional responses. The most obvious example is reinterpretation of situations in ways that give a different meaning for a specific situation (Niven, Totterdell, Stride, & Holman, 2011; Rimé, 2007; Zaki & Williams, 2013). For example, leaders often attribute malevolent intentions to other group’s unintentional behavior in ways that lead to elicitation of negative group-based emotions. Such cognitive change processes are very common in cases of racism in which the victim is being portrayed as having malevolent intentions to gain power or destroy the strong group (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). For example, as part of the Nazi propaganda, Jews were presented as evil schemers who were the cause for the outbreak of the Second World War (Herf, 2009). In addition, the extrinsic regulation of group-based emotions can occur by changing other’s self-categorization in ways that lead to the regulation of different emotions. Inclusion and exclusion of others in a specific group have been found to have a crucial effect on these people’s motivation regarding their group (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005). We suggest that one of the implications of exclusion is the extrinsic regulation of group-based emotions.

The final type of emotion regulation strategy described by the process model is response modulation. Here the individual tries to directly control behavioral and physiological responses during emotion. Due to the fact that response modulation is mainly focused on changing physiological and facial responses, our assumption is that the act of response modulation is quite similar in group-based versus non-group-based emotions. Although the emotional experience might be different between group-based and non-group-based emotions, the emotional expression of the two is very similar. However, the implications and effects of emotional responding can be very different in group-based versus non-group-based contexts. Emotions serve a very important functional role in communicating an individual’s thoughts and intentions (Ekman, 1992; Kelner & Gross, 1999; Le Bon, 1960/1895; Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). In group-based emotion, this function is extremely important as it facilities group unity and leads group members to act together (Bar-Tal, 2007). Group-based emotional responses also serve as communication to outgroups regarding the intentions of the group as a whole (Kamans, Van Zomeren, Gordijn, & Postmes, 2014).

In sum, the process model of group-based emotion regulation allows us to match strategies to the different stages of the emotion-generative process. This facilitates a systematic examination of group-based emotion regulatory strategies. It also allows us to examine the differences between group-based emotion regulation and non-group-based emotion regulation. Key differences include the relative efficacy of different strategies, preferences for one strategy over another, and the specific content of cognitive change. Notwithstanding these differences, research on non-group-based emotion regulation suggests several directions for future research. For example, accumulated work suggests that attentional deployment is more efficient than reappraisal in high-intensity, avoidance-related, situations (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross, 2011). This idea should be examined for group-based emotions by exposing participants to group-based emotion stimuli of varying intensities and by examining which regulation strategies they choose to implement. Another domain of interest is the recent emphasis on situation selection and modification as demanding less energy in self-control than later strategies (Duckworth, Gendler, & Gross, 2014; Magen et al., 2014; Wyper, Maroba, Patel, & Ariely, 2014).
people who limit their exposure to negative group-based emotions actually succeed in experiencing decreased emotions? How does this lack of exposure influence their level of identification with the group and the experience of other, hedonically pleasant, group-based emotions? Future studies should use the process model to divide and conquer these important questions. In the following section, we suggest a few domains that we believe could especially benefit from such a strategy.

Implications and Future Directions

In this article, our goal was to investigate the notion of regulating group-based emotion by drawing jointly upon theories about group-based emotions and emotion regulation. For theory and research on group-based emotions, we suggest extending intergroup emotions theory by focusing on how individuals actively regulate these emotions, with a specific focus on emotion regulation goals and strategies. For theory and research on emotion regulation, we suggest incorporating the notion of self-categorization in the appraisal phase of the modal model. On this basis, our framework raises new and interesting questions about group-based emotion regulation.

Throughout, we have focused on two key questions regarding the regulation of group-based emotions: Why group-based emotions are regulated and how they are regulated? We addressed the “why” question by mapping the division of hedonic versus instrumental goals (Tamir, 2009) into the intergroup domain. We found that two main differences exist in the motives to regulate group-based emotions versus non-group-based emotions. The first is that regulation of group-based emotions is often motivated by the individual’s desire to be a part of the group. The second is that goals for the regulation of group-based emotions can coincide with or contradict other motivations for emotion regulation. Describing conflicts within each level and between the two levels is another unique contribution of this article, which was afforded by our integrative approach. Furthermore, we addressed the “how” question by using the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998) and expanding it to the realm of group-based emotions. In addition, we argued that the regulation of group-based emotion is not only a mechanism for changing one’s emotional experiences, but also an instrument used to define the nature of group membership. All of this suggests new directions for research on group-based emotion regulation.

We believe that our integrative framework will make it easier for social psychologists to incorporate the notion of group-based emotion regulation into their work, and with it the assumption that individuals are not passive victims of their emotions, but active regulators. In particular, we believe that this framework may be helpful for those interested in intergroup conflict, collective action, and culture—key domains in which group-based emotions are important and thus their active regulation may play a major role. Indeed, group members regulate group-based emotions to advance the achievement of collective goals, or to change their relationship with their group. They also extrinsically try to regulate other group members’ emotions to facilitate others’ goals, lead group members to act, or influence the nature and characteristics of the group. Therefore, research domains that focus on group behavior in the context of goal pursuit (e.g., intergroup conflict, collective action, and culture) can especially benefit from the current framework. Furthermore, personality psychologists may find our framework useful because repeated emotion regulation may represent an important individual difference variable. For example, chronic attempts to down-regulate one’s guilt about a transgression may lead to changes in mood and eventually come to define the character of the person (John & Gross, 2004). Similarly, repeated down-regulation of group-based guilt may affect the nature of behavior of group members which, if prevalent, may lead to changes in the group’s culture.

Implications for Intergroup Conflict

Group-based emotions play an important role in intergroup conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Halperin et al., 2014; Peterson & Flanders, 2002; Staub, 2005). They lead to the formation of intra- and intergroup attitudes (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 1985) and bias group members’ interpretations of situations (Cole, Balcetis, & Dunning, 2013). Importantly, many studies show that the effect of intergroup emotions on aggressive and conciliatory intergroup attitudes goes above and beyond the effects of other prominent factors such as ideology (Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011; Maoz & McCauley, 2008) and socioeconomic conditions (Maoz & McCauley, 2008). Recognizing that the regulation of group-based emotions is pivotal in advancing harmonious relationships between groups, researchers have attempted to regulate individuals’ group-based emotions in intergroup conflicts. These attempts can be divided into direct and indirect emotion regulation strategies (Halperin et al., 2014).

Direct emotion regulation involves deliberately changing the emotional trajectory by using one of the strategies described by the process model (Gross, 1998, 2014). For example, work by Halperin, Porat, and colleagues (2013) and Halperin and colleagues (2014) has demonstrated that reappraisal is effective in reducing group-based emotions in the context of violent conflicts. More specifically, the reappraisal instructions used in these studies have used the classic reappraisal instructions (Gross, 1998; Richards & Gross, 2000) and targeted only the situations which elicited these emotions. One possible addition for addressing the specific appraisals of group-based emotions is to target participants’ relationship with their group. This can be done either by signifying the importance of individuality compared with group membership, or by shifting participants’ preference of one
identity over the other. Reappraising one’s sense of identification is potentially advantageous due to the fact that it can serve as a potent solution to a variety of situations. In addition, future interventions which are aimed to down-regulate unhelpful emotions could expand beyond cognitive reappraisal and examine other regulatory strategies and their influence on outcomes such as concessions and compromises. For example, future studies might assess how strategies such as situation selection and situation modification can serve as interventions for down-regulating group-based emotions. This might be done by manipulating participants’ exposure of social network content or other situations, and examining its effects on responses to other emotion-eliciting events.

Despite the possible potential of direct emotion regulation interventions in improving intergroup conflicts, some challenges may occur in these methods due to a potential lack of motivation to down-regulate negative emotions in these contexts. This may occur as other motivations such as appearing strong in front of the enemy (Bar-Tal, 2007), self-justifying one’s group (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), or conforming to the group (Bar-Tal, 2007; Ridgeway, 1978) may trump the motivation to regulate one’s own emotions.

To deal with some of these motivational limitations, scholars have tried to identify indirect paths that may also lead to emotion regulation. The idea behind indirect emotion regulation is that specific appraisals that crucially affect emotions are facilitated by general beliefs (Dweck, 2012; Sandler, Kim-Bae, & MacKinnon, 2000), and that changes in these beliefs can have a downstream effect on the emotional experience. One specific set of beliefs which were found to be extremely useful in changing individuals’ appraisals in a way that leads to improvement in intergroup conflicts are beliefs about group malleability. Indeed, Halperin and colleagues (Halperin et al., 2011) have shown that changing Israelis’ and Palestinians’ perception of group malleability leads to increased positive attitudes toward the other side, as well as increased willingness to make concessions.

Interestingly, the information participants received regarding group malleability did not include any specific data on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Yet, by merely changing participants’ general beliefs regarding group malleability, participants’ emotions and attitudes toward the other side were influenced. This aspect of indirect emotion regulation shows potential to be effective in confronting the motivational limitation of the direct emotion regulation approach. As participants are unaware of the connection between these general perceptions of group malleability and their consequences to negative appraisals of the other side, they are much less likely to resist these ideas. This makes the indirect emotion regulation approach a powerful instrument in reducing negative emotions in conflict, especially in situations in which motivational limitations are salient. Further studies should examine these indirect strategies and try to capture other beliefs which may be crucial in indirectly regulating emotions in conflicts.

One key challenge in using indirect emotion regulation is to find beliefs that are both relatively malleable and highly influential. One possible example is perception of time horizons, which may have an effect on individual positive emotions (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Group members who perceive their group as long lasting may have different responses to collective challenges than those who perceive the future as uncertain. Stereotypes are another example of malleable beliefs that may serve an important role in the experience of group-based emotions (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993). Stereotypes are accessible appraisals that are easily activated in interaction with the stereotyped group. Stereotypes often lead to the interpretation of events in ways that portray the stereotyped group as weak, unimportant, dangerous, which in turn may lead to increases in negative emotions toward that group (Schaller & Neuberg, 2012). Changing stereotypes can therefore serve as an indirect emotion regulation strategy that may improve positive emotions and decrease negative emotions. These ideas should be examined in future research.

Implications for Collective Action

The notion of group-based emotion regulation may be of particular interest to those studying collective action, defined as action taken by group members with the goal to improve the conditions of the entire group (Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Typically, studies of collective action focus on collective protests, such as demonstrations, strikes, and the like. Although theory and research on predictors of collective action suggest that self-categorization as a group member facilitates individuals’ motivation to engage in collective action and identifies group-based anger as a key predictor of collective action, little attention has been paid to regulation processes (but see Van Zomeren et al., 2012, for a coping approach to collective action). As a consequence, this literature focuses on the experience and behavioral consequences of group-based anger, but neglects the emotion regulation goals and strategies that individuals have available and actively put to use.

As an example of how theory and research in this field may use our integrative framework, we suggest a focus on instrumental and hedonic goals. Indeed, one way to perceive the experience of group-based anger in relation to collective action is as a spontaneous emotional response to a state of objective disadvantage. However, instrumental motivational theories have shown that people also tend to be motivated to up-regulate emotions like anger when thinking this could improve their chances of achieving their goals (Tamir, 2009; Tamir & Ford, 2009). Therefore, in certain cases group-based anger may be instrumentally up-regulated to achieve certain goals (see Hornsey et al., 2006, for a variety of goals). In addition, group unity can also serve as an instrumental goal for the up-regulation of anger. As individuals realize that other group members are experiencing group-based anger, they may be motivated to increase their degree of
anger to match that of others (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2004). This implies that understanding instrumental motivations can change the interpretation of group-based anger from merely a spontaneous response as passive victims of the social structure to a more active, regulatory act to achieve social change in the long run.

Assuming that people have the motivation to experience anger, an additional area of research should focus on the strategies that people use to achieve desired states of anger. One example of such work could focus on situation selection. People often choose situations that will elicit desired emotions. Going to a demonstration, watching news on specific channels, and spending time with certain friends are all ways in which individuals may up-regulate their group-based emotions to facilitate collective action. Attention to specific situations rather than others is an additional strategy that can help to explain how people up-regulate group-based emotion to advance collective action. Group members may shift their attention to or away from specific situations or other group members to up-regulate their anger. In addition to eliciting anger directly, attentional deployment can also help individuals to increase their efficacy beliefs and facilitate the ability to express anger.

Furthermore, cognitive change may be another important mechanism for mobilizing people to advance collective goals. Theory and research suggest, for example, that appraisals of group-based unfairness and outgroup accountability underlie the experience of group-based anger. Furthermore, group efficacy beliefs are important determinants of whether group members believe that their goals can be achieved through collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2012). Such appraisals can be targeted by cognitive change processes to more effectively mobilize people for collective action. For example, changing people’s perception of their relative deprivation compared with other groups may contribute to the motivation of collective action via group-based anger. Furthermore, group members may willingly change their degree of identification with their collective in a way that facilitates collective action. For example, the decrease in identification with a certain larger group (e.g., being an American) in exchange to an increased identification with a smaller sub-group (e.g., being a Black person) may allow the up-regulation of anger and the desire to act.

Finally, the idea that the perception of the collective emotional response (i.e., what fellow group members are feeling) can serve as an appraisal that may lead individuals to act has recently been explored in a series of studies (Goldenberg et al., 2014). In these studies, participants were led to experience group-based emotion (guilt or anger) by reading a newspaper report, and their perception of the collective emotion (guilt or anger) was manipulated. In one condition, Israeli participants read that 81% of Israelis who read the article reported experiencing strong emotion. In a second condition, Israeli participants read that 81% of Israeli who read the article did not feel any emotion at all. In cases in which it was clear that guilt was the appropriate emotion, participants responded with stronger guilt when learning that others did not share their emotions. This increased sense of guilt was mediated by negative emotion toward the ingroup (as suggested by the social identity model of collective action) as well as participants’ sense of obligation to express emotion to promote action. Furthermore, an increased sense of guilt led to higher willingness to support conciliatory actions. These research findings suggest that people’s perception of the collective emotion is used as an internal source of motivation for the up-regulation of emotion leading to collective action. Shifts of attention may play an important role in these appraisals, as individuals whose emotional responses are incongruent with the collective may use attentional deployment mechanisms in regulating their reference to the collective. These ideas should be empirically examined in future studies.

Implications for Cultural Differences

Emotion regulation shows cultural differences, which are typically defined as the group ideals that are manifested by societal structures and interactions among group members (Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2007; Matsumoto, Yoo, & Nakagawa, 2008). This is true both because the motivation to experience certain emotions rather than others is culturally dependent (Eid & Diener, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006), and also because preferences for different emotion regulation strategies vary across cultures (Butler et al., 2007). Expanding our understanding of the relationship between regulation of group-based emotions and culture can improve our ability to explain the behavior of groups from different cultures.

Cultural ideals have an immense impact on individual motivation to regulate emotions. Ideals can refer to the role of an individual in a family or a larger group, to behavioral norms or to general perceptions about the nature of the world. These ideals can also be related to the types of emotions people should experience and express in each situation and the possibility to deviate from these collective norms (Eid & Diener, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Tsai, 2007). While some societies may be more receptive to a variety of group-based emotions, others may be more rigid in the ideal emotions they allow group members to experience. Institutions and interactions among group members often serve as the facilitators of group-based emotional goals. For example, collective rituals influence the individual’s motivation to regulate some group-based emotions instead of others. While in some cultures, cultural practices such as collective ceremonies encourage the individual to up-regulate high arousal states and down-regulate low arousal states; in other societies, the opposite may be the case (Tsai, 2007). These ideals, institutions, and interactions that individuals experience impact the meaning assigned to different events (Bruner, 1990).
The choice of regulatory strategies is also culturally dependent. Various cultural comparisons focused on emotion regulation have already established the fact that preferences for emotion regulation strategies differ across cultures (Butler et al., 2007; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Matsumoto et al., 2008; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998). In the context of group-based emotions, the choice of emotion regulation strategies can be influenced by different types of social interaction tendencies. For example, in cultures that value directness and extraversion, group members may have a higher tendency to use regulation strategies which publicly expose the individual’s internal state. In these cases, for example, situation modification strategies may be more common than in cultures which value introversion. This may also affect the way regulation strategies are used to extrinsically influence others’ emotions. Future studies should examine how the decision to use different regulation strategies differs across cultures.

Cultural differences in choice may be strongly related to the differential efficacy of various strategies across cultures. One specific strategy which was discussed in the current article and may be especially influenced by cultural context is the individual’s ability to cognitively reappraise his or her relationship with the group in a way that reduces group-based emotions. The success of this strategy is dependent on the individual’s perception of himself or herself as an independent entity. The ability to differentiate oneself from the group is derived from the nature and strength of intragroup connections. We can assume, for example, that in more interdependent societies, the use of such reappraisal strategies demands more degree of energy. For example, an interdependent group member may find it more difficult to think of himself or herself as independent being, separated from society. On the other hand, in more dependent societies like the American society, this may be very useful in reducing unhelpful group-based emotions. These ideas should also be examined in future research.

Concluding Comment

The notion of group-based emotions was developed as a result of an integration of two previously separate domains: intergroup relations and emotions. While the theory of intergroup emotions significantly advanced knowledge in both domains, the interpretation of group-based emotions was mainly as spontaneous, uncontrolled responses to collective events. This approach does not emphasize group members’ desire and ability to influence their emotional experiences in line with collective goals. Therefore, most of the work on group-based emotions has addressed the conditions in which certain emotions are experienced (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Halperin & Gross, 2011; Haslam et al., 2000; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003).

In this article, we have tried to expand the understanding of group-based emotions by arguing that these emotions are also a result of the attempt to regulate them in line with specific collective goals. This idea has important implications for the perception of groups in general. Groups are often perceived as reactive and driven by internal forces of spontaneous emotional responses. We would like to argue that groups can also be perceived as regulated entities that are constantly being influenced by internal regulated processes.

The regulation of group-based emotions serves a very important role not only in facilitating the advancement of collective goals but also in defining the relationship between group members and their group. We hope that the current framework will serve as a useful tool for explaining how and why group members regulate their emotional responses to establish different types of relationships with their group. This may be especially useful in illustrating the role of emotion regulation in the formation of different intragroup dynamics.

In the past 20 years, emotion regulation has been used to explain issues in physical (Gross, 1998; Kemeny et al., 2012) and mental health (Gross & Muñoz, 1995), life span development (Crockenberg & Leerkes, 2004; Opitz, Gross, & Urry, 2012), interpersonal relationships (Rimé, 2007; Zaki & Williams, 2013), and many other domains. At the same time, most of the work on group-based emotions in this period have addressed the conditions in which certain emotions are experienced (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Halperin & Gross, 2011; Haslam et al., 2000; Iyer et al., 2003), but not how and why they are regulated. We hope that our integrative model of group-based emotion regulation will generate new avenues of theory and research, for instance, by focusing on various intra- and intergroup processes such as conformity (Asch, 1956), deviance (Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004), radicalization (Kruglanski et al., 2014), parochial altruism (Batson, 1987), and the establishment of sacred values (Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007), among others.

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