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Changing the world together? Exploring motivations and barriers to social change efforts

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DOI:
[10.33612/diss.172155928](https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.172155928)

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:
2021

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):
Aslih, S. (2021). *Changing the world together? Exploring motivations and barriers to social change efforts*. [Thesis fully internal (DIV), University of Groningen]. University of Groningen.
<https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.172155928>

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Changing the World Together? Exploring Motivations and Barriers to Social Change Efforts

Siwar Hasan-Aslih

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Changing the World Together? Exploring Motivations and Barriers to Social Change Efforts

PhD thesis

to obtain the degree of PhD at the
University of Groningen
on the authority of the
Rector Magnificus Prof. C. Wijmenga
and in accordance with
the decision by the College of Deans.

by

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In loving memory of Asel

Acknowledgments

My PhD has been a journey of both personal and professional growth. This accomplishment could not have been possible without the support of my family, supervisors, and friends.

To my absent present brother, Asel, who has been a light that has guided me throughout this journey. I want to believe he would have been happy to see me transform my pain and anger about injustice into research and activism.

I am grateful to my parents, my backbone, Jamelih and Hasan, who have always been a pillar of support and strength and have made countless sacrifices to sustain me and help me make my way in this harsh world. I know they still have trouble deciphering what it is exactly that I do, but I am certain they are proud to see me achieve this accomplishment. To my siblings, Nardin and Baraa, with whom I share the daily struggle of being and thriving in the Israeli society without comprising our identity, I am thankful and hope they find my work meaningful and inspiring. I am also grateful to my spouse, Muhammad, for his love, positivity, and appreciation, and for his willingness to accompany me to the other side of the globe to pursue my career. And to my son, Carmel, who has put me in touch with my biggest weaknesses and strengths. I hope my work will inspire him to fight for justice and be a voice for the oppressed.

I also thank my supervisors, Profs. Eran Halperin, Martijn van Zomeren, and Tamar Saguy, for their unrivaled guidance. I met Eran while I was making plans to escape Israel. He recognized my potential when I was almost ready to give up due to the meritocratic biases and challenges I faced as a member of a disadvantaged group. My relationship with Eran reflects many of the complexities of intergroup relations that were at the heart of my research. Working with him entailed a dialogue between different personal, ethnic, and gender identities: Eran as a supervisor, a Jewish Israeli, a man, and a wounded veteran, and myself as

a student, a Palestinian (a very angry one), a woman, and a bereaved sister of a victim of injustice. Therefore, it was challenging but also empowering and enlightening. I am aware that despite the disparities and the disagreements between us (also politically), we do share pain and hope for change (not harmonious, presumably). I am very fortunate I have had the chance to work with a great person, with a sharp mind and tongue, a pioneer in his field, with wide ranging expertise which has been instrumental in my formation as a researcher.

It has also been an honor to work under the supervision of a great mind like Martijn. I really appreciate the wealth of his knowledge and the depth of his perspective. His guidance showed me how to look at things from different angles and think outside the box, and it often steered me to see the bigger picture. These qualities of a remarkable scientist are embedded in a very kind and caring personality with an interesting sense of humor. It has been an incredible experience working with him. I would also like to extend my warm thanks to Tamar. Working with Tamar often felt like navigating between “harmony” and “tension,” between two women who share common ground but come from worlds apart. I deeply appreciate her invaluable knowledge, expertise, and experience, from which I have learned a great deal.

Finally, I am thankful for the friends I made since I joined the PICR lab, particularly Ruthie Pliskin, Eric Shuman and Hanna Szekeres. I thank them for their companionship and for providing a pleasant working atmosphere that eased my mind whenever I felt unbelonging. I really enjoyed the moments we shared at office, conferences, trips, and fun evenings, and I apologize not for the racist jokes I uttered. I especially owe a debt of gratitude for my first mentor Ruthie who helped me a lot over the past years and who encouraged me to go after career opportunities that I thought I could never earn. Thank you for being there. Finally, my sincere thanks go to Maarten van Bezouw, one of the most kindhearted people I have ever met, who always makes my visits to the Netherlands pleasant and enjoyable.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1	General Introduction	9
CHAPTER 2	A Darker Side of Hope: Harmony-Focused Hope Decreases Collective Action Intentions Among the Disadvantaged	25
CHAPTER 3	With or Without You: The Paradoxical Role of Identification in Predicting Joint and Ingroup Collective Action in Intergroup Conflict	69
CHAPTER 4	The Dilemma of “Sleeping with the Enemy”: A Comprehensive Examination of what (De)Motivates Disadvantaged Group Members to Partake in Joint Collective Action	97
CHAPTER 5	General Discussion	133
References		151

Chapter 1

General introduction

“I can never take the word Israeli off my passport, or the word Arab, which I feel proud of every time I hear it. We can’t change what we are, but we can change the way that we live already, we can take our lives in our hands once again, we can move from a position as a viewer of this game to a player. We are no more asked to watch; we can make a change. We don’t have to be caught; we can lead these two worlds and still keep everything we had.”

- Asel Aslih (1983-2000)

Conflicts between groups remain a pressing and prevailing problem in the 21st century, affecting the lives of individuals across the globe. For instance, the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020, was a consequence of police brutality, which led to mass Black Lives Matter protests against institutional racism in the United States. Such intergroup conflicts can evolve over issues of equality, but also relating to territories, self-determination, identity, and liberation (e.g., in case of the Palestinian-Israel conflict; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012). Moreover, conflicts can endure for years and transform into intractable conflicts that are intense, violent, and difficult to resolve, inflicting severe costs on the individual and collective (Azar, 1990; Bar-Tal, 2000; Coleman, 2003; Kriesberg, 1993). This makes it harder to solve such conflicts across strengthened and solidified intergroup boundaries.

Despite such barriers to conflict resolution and social change, in this thesis we¹ seek to address the question of how groups in conflict can nevertheless be motivated to *work together* across group boundaries, and navigate the conflicting worlds as the above quote suggests. Although social change efforts are often initiated by disadvantaged groups, as they have greater motivation and interest to challenge the status quo (Simon & Klandermans,

¹ Since this thesis is the result of close collaboration with my supervisors, I will use “we” instead of “I”.

2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990), such efforts can potentially benefit from support from other groups as well (e.g., Klandermans, 1997) and might even be more effective in promoting social change (e.g., Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). For example, in the struggle of Black Americans for racial justice, both Black and White Americans in conflict can be motivated to act together by new hope for more positive intergroup relations. Similarly, sometimes Palestinians and Israelis jointly act to promote the peace they hope to see on the horizon. For these reasons, this thesis focuses on the psychology of *hope* and *joint collective action*.

Our focus is on the psychology of members of the *disadvantaged* group, because both envisioning a joint future with the advantaged outgroup and collaborating with outgroup members towards a more equal future, may pose a rather unique *dilemma* for them. On the one hand, they may have much to gain from cooperating with members of the outgroup that is at an advantage in terms of power and resources (Tilly, 2004). On the other hand, collaborating with the advantaged outgroup may also present risks and costs: While collective action is typically driven by adversarial perceptions against the advantaged outgroup (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), such perceptions are paradoxically incompatible with the idea of crossing group boundaries (because of the opposition of “us” against “them”). Put differently, changing the world together requires the disadvantaged to bridge between the perception of the outgroup as oppressive and the perception of outgroup members as friends or allies. As such, one could say that the disadvantaged are confronted with the psychological dilemma of “sleeping with the enemy”.

More specifically, in this thesis we examine two ways in which disadvantaged group members can work across group boundaries to promote social change: *envisioning a shared future together* (i.e., hope), and *engagement in collective action with the outgroup to achieve shared social change goals* (i.e., joint collective action). We focus on these two issues

because one may need a vision for a future together to consider the very notion of joint collective action to change intergroup conflict for the better. Moreover, addressing these two issues has scientific value because it carves out a new avenue of research that contributes to theory and research on hope and collective action, which focused on turning one's vision of the future into collective action (Greenaway, Cichocka, van Veelen, Likki, & Branscombe, 2016; Włodarczyk, Basabe, Páez, & Zumeta, 2017), but as of yet has not focused on hope for a *shared* future. Furthermore, there is plenty of research on motivations for collective action by the disadvantaged (e.g., Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) or advantaged (e.g., van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011) group members (for a review, see Becker, 2012), but only a few works that offer some insights into the potential challenges of allyship (e.g. Becker, Wright, Lubensky, & Zhou, 2013; Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016; Louis, 2009), and none on the specific notion of *joint* collective action. Our research also has applied relevance, as it may enable a better understanding of when and why disadvantaged group members cross boundaries to promote social change, including those marked by a long history of injustice and oppression (e.g., Blacks and Whites in the US; Palestinians and Jewish Israelis).

The remainder of this introduction chapter offers a theoretical framework (Wright & Lubensky, 2008; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, Pratto, & Singh, 2011) that provides an anchor for the three empirical chapters of this thesis, and a preview to these chapters. Together, these chapters document a first examination of the dilemmas, barriers and motivations that explain when members of disadvantaged groups might be (un)willing to cooperate with the advantaged group to promote social change, revolving around the key notions of hope and joint collective action.

Social change through harmony or conflict?

Against the backdrop of intergroup conflict, the psychological literature has differentiated two approaches to social change: the *harmony* and *conflict* approaches (e.g., Wright & Lubensky, 2009). The premise of the harmony approach is that contact and cooperative interaction between groups facilitate social change through reducing mutual prejudice and promoting positive attitudes and common goals (Allport, 1954; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Sherif, Harvey, White, & Hood, 1961). As such, cooperative learning exercises in educational settings have been used based on the idea that cooperation transforms relations between members of different racial and ethnic groups (Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990; Slavin & Cooper, 1999). Likewise, many peace-building programs in Israel/Palestine and in Northern Ireland have consisted of cooperative efforts to promote trust, positive affect and achieve goals important to the parties (Hughes, 2001; Maoz, 2004; Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008). This approach to solving intergroup conflict thus calls for disadvantaged group members to envision living in harmony with the outgroup and develop hope for a better future with them.

Conversely, the conflict approach focuses on collective action (defined as action taken by individuals to improve the conditions of their group, Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990) as a route to social change. This approach is guided by the notion that intergroup comparisons that result in a clear recognition of inequality are constructive in creating pressure and mobilizing the disadvantaged to act to change the status quo (Klandermans, 1997; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). Such injustice perceptions are often amplified when individuals feel a strong connectedness to their group (i.e., ingroup identification), and both processes motivate collective action (e.g., Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon, et al., 1998; Stürmer, & Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren,

Postmes & Spears, 2008; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Recognition of injustice and strong group identification go hand in hand with the conviction that a malicious external force accounts for the ingroup's position. Characterizing the outgroup as the oppressor enhances feelings of a shared fate with other ingroup members, which in turn heightens identification with the ingroup and motivates action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Wright & Lubensky, 2009; Wright & Tropp, 2002). Hence, a collective action tendency usually requires salient group membership, clear intergroup boundaries, and a negative view of the advantaged outgroup.

As conflict is central to the process of collective action, social change efforts that reduce intergroup differences and emphasize harmony and togetherness without addressing core issues of inequality may ironically undermine the constructive tension that can bring about change (Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär, Heath, 2011; Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005; Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, Tredoux, 2010; Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Kteily, Saguy, Sidanius, & Taylor, 2013; Tausch, Saguy, Dovidio, Pratto, & Singh, 2011). Indeed, Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, and Dovidio (2015) demonstrated that enhanced perceptions of common identity between disadvantaged and advantaged group members undermines disadvantaged members' motivation for collective action toward social change. This means that harmony and conflict are often two opposing forces that produce divergent effects on social change. Following this line of thought, feeling hope for a shared future may be incompatible with the conflictual orientation required to sustain collective action, and perhaps even backfire to undermine such orientation.

Joint collective action, however, may reconcile between harmony and conflict as it offers an opportunity to cross intergroup boundaries through acting together to achieve shared social change goals. This is in line with recent theorizing suggesting that successful social change emerges out of a balance between harmony and conflict, and thus change efforts

should provide an opportunity to improve relations between the groups but also promote sensitivity to inequality (MacInnis & Hodson, 2019; Saguy, 2018; Wright & Baray, 2012). More concretely, such efforts could, for example, allow disadvantaged group members to have positive personal interactions with members of the advantaged group, while maintaining conflictive perceptions at the intergroup level (Wright & Lubensky, 2009).

Importantly, because joint action involves both conflict and harmony, it is unlikely to be driven by the same psychological motivations that underlie more traditional forms of collective action (e.g., ingroup action), such as identifying strongly with the ingroup and feeling angry with the outgroup (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Furthermore, joint action is also likely to pose a dilemma to disadvantaged group members who need to find common ground with their “enemy” while maintaining a strong action orientation. Specifically, while cooperating with the enemy can be effective in promoting shared goals (e.g., equality), such cooperation may also entail costs, as obscuring the boundaries between the groups could contribute to normalizing hierarchy.

In sum, the empirical chapters of this thesis examine whether and how disadvantaged group members sustain a collective action tendency when the boundaries between the groups are blurred, either by hoping and envisioning a shared future with the outgroup or by engaging in joint collective action to achieve shared goals. The specific research questions addressed in the empirical chapters are: (1) Does hope for a shared future motivate collective action? (2) Does ingroup identification, as, more generally, a key motivator of collective action, motivate joint collective action? (3) What are, more broadly speaking, the motivations and barriers to joint collective action? We will briefly elaborate on each of these questions below, before offering an overview of the chapters to come.

Does hope for a shared future motivate collective action?

Actualizing social change entails envisioning an alternate future to the present state-of-affairs (Cohen-Chen, Van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2015). In line with this, social change efforts can be guided by hope, which reflects the appraisal that social change is *possible* (Bury, Wenzel, & Woodyatt, 2016; Cohen-Chen & Van Zomeren, 2018; Lazarus, 1991; Van Zomeren, Pauls, & Cohen-Chen, 2019). Psychological research has generated valuable knowledge on the positive role of hope in promoting conciliatory and peaceful attitudes in conflicts (Halperin & Gross, 2011; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006; Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, & Cairns, 2005) and motivating collective action with other ingroup members (Cohen-Chen & Van Zomeren, 2018; Greenaway et al., 2014), but no research has explored hope in relation to joint collective action.

However, hope may not always act as a social change catalyst. Emerging research suggests that hope can alleviate negative feelings or perceptions about the current reality in the sense that individuals downregulate them to feel better about inequality, and in doing so remove the need to act on the social problem (Hornsey & Fielding, 2016; Van Zomeren, Pauls, & Cohen-Chen, 2019). In line with this reasoning, we argue that what could render hope a barrier to social change is the nature of the aspiration, for example, whether it permeates the boundaries of the group to encompass the outgroup. When hopefulness is orientated toward a shared future and harmony with the outgroup it may operate similarly to intergroup experiences (e.g., values, contact) that blur the identities of the groups distracts attention from inequalities (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, Pratto, & Singh, 2011; Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, & Dovidio, 2016). We thus propose that crossing the boundaries between the groups by instilling messages of hope for a shared future may not always be constructive for

social change because such hope is not conflictual enough to mobilize disadvantaged group members and may even undermine their motivation to act for social change.

To test this line of thought, the studies described in Chapter 2 examine the role of hope in de(motivating) collective action and distinguish between *harmony-focused hope* (which reflects aspirations for a shared future), and *equality-focused hope* (targeted at promoting equality and justice). Specifically, we hypothesize that harmony-focused hope can *undermine* motivation for collective action.

Does ingroup identification motivate joint collective action?

Another way to permeate intergroup boundaries without alleviating negativity about the current reality of intergroup relations is to cooperate in collective action to promote shared social change goals --- that is, to engage in joint collective action. One of the main predictors of collective action is individuals' identification with the relevant group (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2008), but it is less clear whether such identification would drive joint collective action as well. On the one hand, collective action usually emerges from strong identification with the ingroup and perceptions of us—the victims of injustice— versus them—the perpetrators responsible for the injustice. On the other hand, however, acting in collaboration with the outgroup requires diffusing the boundaries between the groups, such that “us” comes to include also “them” (Becker, Wright, Lubensky, & Zhou, 2013; Saguy, 2018; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Because it is hard to simultaneously see the advantaged group—and its representatives— as oppressive and as a cooperative ally (Wright & Lubensky, 2009), joint action is likely to pose a dilemma to disadvantaged group members, and particularly to higher identifiers with the group.

When identification with the ingroup is high, the need to maintain clear boundaries from the oppressor group is meaningful in such a way that makes the collaboration with the outgroup unattractive, despite any potential benefits. This is consistent with previous research

suggesting that strong identification is associated with motivations to differentiate one's group from the outgroup, and hence can undermine the willingness to cooperate with them (Brewer, 1996; Kelly, 1988; Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008). Based on this rationale, the research described in Chapter 3 examined the role of ingroup identification in predicting joint collective action tendencies among the disadvantaged. We specifically hypothesized that strong ingroup identification does not predict willingness to partake in joint action—and may even decrease it when intergroup boundaries become more salient.

What are other barriers and motivations for joint collective action?

Because joint action involves both a cooperative and an adversarial relationship with the outgroup, such dilemma of “sleeping with the enemy” is less likely to be driven by core psychological factors as indicated previously, but by distinct psychological barriers and motivations. These barriers and motivations reflect the perceived benefits of collaborating with enemy versus the perceived costs of such.

Acting together with members of the advantaged group can serve the interests of the disadvantaged because it can augment their impact through increasing their numbers and access to resources and decision making (Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). This collaboration can also bridge gaps with the general (majority) public and diffuse opposition to the movement by gaining legitimacy and signaling changing norms among the advantaged group regarding the issues at the heart of the movement (Louis, 2009). In addition, the presence of advantaged outgroup allies can benefit the disadvantaged by discouraging police repression, thereby minimizing the physical and political costs of protesting.

Notwithstanding the benefits of joint collective action, working across intergroup boundaries can also entail risks for the disadvantaged, undermining its appeal. These risks can be linked to issues of trust between the groups, identities, and ownership over the struggle. Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, and Louis (2016) suggest that allies from the

advantaged group, despite their good intentions, may engage in acts of marginalization of the disadvantaged by offering them inappropriate forms of help or taking dominant roles in the movement. Furthermore, collaborating with the advantaged group may alter the movement's identity and the goals to make it more inclusive, thus obscuring intergroup boundaries and obfuscating the oppressive outgroup. To capture the response of disadvantaged group members to these power dynamics, we introduce the novel concept of *normalization*, which reflects concerns that the disadvantaged may have about blurring power disparities between the groups through, for example, acting together.

Thus, moving beyond the notion presented previously that the psychology of joint action is different from other forms of collective action, we argue that the psychological dilemma of such action centers around whether the instrumentality of joining forces with "the enemy" can justify the risk of normalizing the asymmetrical power relations. We specifically hypothesize that perceptions of instrumentality motivate joint action whereas perceptions of normalization undermine it, thus revealing other motivations and barriers that constitute the dilemma of "sleeping with the enemy".

Overview of Chapters

This thesis includes three empirical chapters illuminating the motivations and barriers that disadvantaged groups in conflicts experience in the struggle for social change. Chapter 2 investigates the role of hope for a shared future in social change, while Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the psychological underpinnings of joint collective action to achieve shared social change goals. Below we offer a brief outline of the specific chapters to come, and the studies we conducted to answer the research questions.

Chapter 2 investigates how hope for a shared future affects disadvantaged group members' motivation for social change. We hypothesized that harmony-focused hope which emphasizes a shared future between the groups, compared to hope that reflects aspirations for

equality and justice, can undermine collective action intentions. This premise was tested in three correlational studies (Study 2.1a-2.1c) and one experimental study (Study 2.2). The correlational design in Study 2.1 was employed to determine whether, or to what degree a relationship between harmony-focused hope and collective action exists, whereas the experimental design of Study 2.2 enabled to establish causal connection between these variables.

To determine the generalizability of the relationship between hope and collective action, the studies were conducted in two national contexts that are marked by intergroup tension to a varying degree. Specifically, Studies 2.1a and 2.1b were conducted among Palestinian citizens of Israel during different periods of mass protest against discriminatory policies by the Israeli government, and Study 2.1c was conducted among Black Americans during a period of protests against racial discrimination. In Study 2.2, we experimentally manipulated harmony-focused hope among Palestinians. We found that hope for harmony formed a barrier to social change as it was associated with decreased willingness to engage in collective action. This means that merely envisioning a shared future is not enough to promote social change, which calls for a strategy that crosses intergroup boundaries without mitigating the negative orientation toward injustice.

Chapter 3 examines joint collective action and whether it is linked to ingroup identification (given that this is a key predictor of collective action more generally). Based on the idea that joint action diffuses intergroup boundaries, we hypothesized that, unlike collective action by the ingroup, such action is not predicted by ingroup identification, and that situational increases in identification may even decrease individuals' willingness to participate in joint action. This hypothesis was examined in a three-wave longitudinal study in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This design allowed us to test how general levels of identification predict joint action and how situational changes in identification relate

to changes in willingness to partake in joint action.

The study revealed that higher identification predicts stronger tendencies for ingroup collective action and for joint collective action, but only during periods of relative calm. During conflict escalation, general identification with the ingroup *no longer* predicts joint action. In other words, while strongly identified individuals are more likely to engage in joint action than weakly identified individuals during periods of calm, during escalation individuals are uniformly unwilling to engage in joint action regardless of their level of identification. This implies that the motivation to protect and enhance the interests of the group does not translate into acting collectively with the outgroup and may even pull disadvantaged groups away from participation because joint action may be perceived to entail some risks to the group, suggesting that it is likely to be predicted by cost-benefit perceptions.

Chapter 4 further investigates the notion that joint action poses a dilemma to disadvantaged group members that lies in the tension between a key motivation (joint action's perceived *instrumentality*) and a key barrier (joint action's perceived potential to *normalize* power relations between the groups). We conducted three experimental studies using two different contexts that feature an ongoing struggle for equality and justice (the U.S. and Palestine), characterized by clear inequality between the groups (White and Black Americans, Israeli Jews and Palestinians). Studies 4.1 and 4.2 employed two different methods to test the influence of perceived instrumentality and normalization on intentions to undertake joint collective action. Study 4.3 examined whether the costs associated with normalization may be so high as to also undermine the perceived effectiveness of the joint action.

Studies 4.1 and 4.2 showed that manipulated instrumentality increased motivation for joint action, whereas manipulated normalization decreased this motivation. In Study 4.3,

manipulated normalization decreased perceptions of instrumentality and thus undermined the motivation for joint action, and this occurred mainly among high identifiers with the disadvantaged group, for whom the dilemma should be most salient. This implies that the motivational path to joint action is derived from rational considerations which involve weighing up the costs and the benefits associated with such collaboration.

Finally, in the **Discussion** chapter we provide an overview of the empirical findings (Chapters 2-4) and discuss their theoretical and practical implications. We conclude that just hoping for a shared future may be too “harmonious” to motivate the disadvantaged for social change, whereas joint action may offer a “harmonious yet conflictual” way to cross group boundaries on the grounds of resistance to inequality. Nevertheless, such collaboration may be harder to generate than typical collective action because having strong attachment and commitment to the ingroup does not always motivate people to participate --- particularly in times of increased intergroup tension and conflict. As such, the pathway to acting collectively together with the outgroup is likely to involve cost-benefit calculus, which pits the benefit of joining forces against the cost of normalizing power relations.

We then discuss how the research described in these chapters moves beyond existing approaches of collective action (such as the “individual economist” and the group identity approaches), suggesting that this work may lay the ground for developing a new model for understanding the psychology of joint collective action. On the practical level, we suggest that ingroup collective action and joint action are less likely to be triggered by the same mobilization messages. For example, we discuss that the messages likely to persuade the disadvantaged are those that highlight the benefits of joint action and address their concerns about the costs that cooperation might entail.

Chapter 2

A Darker Side of Hope: Harmony-Focused Hope Decreases Collective Action Intentions Among the Disadvantaged

This chapter is based on: Hasan-Aslih, S., Pliskin, R., Van Zomeren, M., Halperin, E., Saguy, T. (2019). A darker Side of hope: harmony-focused hope Ironically decreases collective action intentions among the disadvantaged. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 45(2) 209–223

Supplemental materials for this chapter can be found online in the Open Science Framework (OSF): <https://osf.io/b96rg/>

“Hope in reality is the worst of all evils, because it prolongs the torments of man”

~ Friedrich Nietzsche (1878)

Hope can be thought of as the emotional experience associated with the desire for improving existing conditions (Lazarus, 1999; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). As such, the psychological literature has long emphasized the positive role of hope in human functioning, particularly in the context of grave circumstances such as when coping with a terminal disease or loss (Lazarus, 1999). Because hope reflects the belief in at least the possibility of a positive change (independent of whether it is attainable through action), it may motivate people to actively challenge situations by trying to alter them (Lazarus, 1999). In this sense, hope is highly applicable to and relevant for social change processes, particularly when considering the disadvantaged position of some groups. For example, if members of such groups hope for the possibility of change in their disadvantaged position, they are more likely to work towards that goal (Włodarczyk, Basabe, Páez, & Zumeta, 2017). If this line of thought is valid, then the experience of hope can be absolutely pivotal for instigating motivation to act for change towards equality (see Stroebe, Wang, & Wright, 2015).

We propose, however, that the association between hope and motivation to advance change towards equality is more complex. In fact, we specify conditions under which hope can *undermine* individuals' motivation to change their disadvantaged group's position in society. We propose that a key factor determining whether hope would decrease motivation for social change is the *target* of hope (i.e., what is being hoped for). Indeed, disadvantaged group members can focus their hope on a variety of outcomes. In the context of asymmetrical power relations, the disadvantaged side might hope for having better relations with the advantaged outgroup or for advancing the position of one's ingroup. Whereas in both cases the nature of hope is identical, the content of the hopeful aspiration, and we suggest that also its implications, differ considerably.

This is important because hope for better relations with the outgroup (i.e., referred to as harmony-focused hope hereafter) can ironically undermine disadvantaged group members' motivation to engage in social change towards equality. We derive this possibility from theory and research on intergroup contact, which shows that contact that seeks relational harmony lowers individuals' motivation for social change (see Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; Saguy, Schori-Eyal, Hasan-Aslih, Sobol, & Dovidio, 2016). As such, hope for harmony fits well with Nietzsche's statement, quoted in the epigraph, that hope can "prolong the torments of man" (Nietzsche, 1878, p. 45); in this case by providing a promise of better future relations which may go unfulfilled (see Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009), and undermine one's motivation to advance equality by acting in the present. We report four studies that test this darker side of hope.

Hope and social change

The question of when disadvantaged group members try to achieve social change towards equality has been extensively discussed in the collective action literature. In the context of collective disadvantage, group members may feel that their rights, interests, or even values are violated. Such appraisals of injustice provoke emotions like anger, which constitute an emotional pathway to collective action (Guimond, & Dube-Simard, 1983; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). In their meta-analysis, Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) further identified the importance of group identification and group efficacy beliefs in predicting collective action. Specifically, the more individuals identify with their group, and the more they perceive that their group is able to achieve social change, the more likely they are to be motivated to take collective action (Van Zomeren, et al., 2008; for a review, see Van Zomeren, 2013).

Positive emotions have received less attention in the literature of collective action, although several studies have highlighted the role of hope in mobilizing people to act for change (see Aminzade & McAdam, 2001; Pearlman, 2013). For example, Wright and colleagues (1990) found that high hope for improvement of one's position was associated with preferences for collective action, whereas lack of hope was related to inaction. More recently, Włodarczyk et al. (2017) provided evidence that hope for improving the social situation amidst an economic crisis predicted intensity of participation in collective action. This suggests that hope can function as a motivator for social change when it springs from the desire to change the reality of deprivation.

However, hope can sometimes also act as a barrier to collective action aimed at advancing change towards equality. For instance, Hornsey and Fielding (2016) found that messages of hope that focused on positive progress in the context of climate change were less effective in motivating collective action relative to pessimistic messages. The authors proposed that this effect might be due to reducing perceptions of risk and negativity of the current reality. In the current research, we go beyond this finding and put forward the argument that the *target* of hope is critical to consider when attempting to understand the effects of hope on motivation to act for change. In other words, we are not proposing that hope per se undermines action motivation, but that the specific target of hope shapes its consequences, and certain targets may render hope discouraging rather than encouraging action. Specifically, we propose that when disadvantaged group members' hope is focused on better relations with the outgroup (rather than on equality and justice), it can result in reduced motivation for advancing change towards equality.

Harmony-focused hope and collective action

Our line of thought is based on the observation that when disadvantaged group members come to trust and like members of the advantaged group --- potentially a result of

positive intergroup contact, they become less committed to advancing change towards equality (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Saguy et al., 2017). For example, positive contact with Whites in South Africa was found to be negatively correlated with support for egalitarian policies among Black South-Africans (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007), whereas positive contact with Jews was associated with less attention to inequality among Arabs and less support for social change (Saguy et al., 2009). Consistent findings were obtained among Blacks and Latinos in the US, for whom close friendships with Whites predicted a decrease over-time in perceptions of discrimination and support for collective action (Tropp, Hawi, Van Laar, & Levin, 2012). Similarly, a study among Maoris in New Zealand found that having more friends from the dominant group (New Zealand Europeans) was associated with the legitimization of inequality which in turn predicted less support for reparative social policies (Sengupta & Sibley, 2013; and see Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012, for parallel findings among Ethiopians in Israel).

Together, these findings suggest that a positive orientation towards the advantaged group can undermine disadvantaged group members' motivation for social change. The processes that were offered as underlying this effect have to do with the outcomes of positive personal interactions (see Dixon et al., 2005). Specifically, people who developed positive relationships with members of the outgroup tended to focus less on group distinctions, including those pertaining to power inequality, and became more positive not only towards those individuals, but also towards the advantaged outgroup as a whole (Saguy et al., 2017; Wright & Lubensky, 2009).

In the current research, we posit that orientations towards harmony may undermine motivation for social change even in the absence of any contact or bonding between the groups. We put forward the idea that merely experiencing harmony-focused *emotions* can lead to the same effect as actual experienced harmony, such that hoping for better relations

with the outgroup can result in a reduced motivation for social change toward equality. This suggests that contact and close relationships with the advantaged outgroup need not necessarily take place—but rather merely be imagined and desired—for their known effects to shape motivation for change.

Further adding to previous research in this domain, we propose that some disadvantaged group members might be immune to this effect. Specifically, we suggest that enhanced identification with one's disadvantaged group can buffer against the impeding effect of hope for harmony. This is in line with a plethora of research showing that high identifiers are more likely to respond, collectively, to their group's disadvantage (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995) and maintain their commitment to group goals even in face of limited scope for change (Klandermans, 1984; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Indeed, Van Zomeren, Spears and Leach (2008) suggest that higher identifiers are more likely to engage in collective action despite low group-efficacy beliefs or little hope for social change. As such, their motivation to act for changing their status is likely to be more durable and more resistant to influence. This suggests that higher identifiers may maintain their focus on the group's interests and their commitment to advancing their position, regardless of whether they are hopeful (or not) for better relations with the outgroup. Accordingly, the highest identifiers should be less susceptible to the undermining effect of hope for harmony—perhaps even immune to it. We therefore treat group identification as a moderator of the relationship between harmony-focused hope and the motivation to engage in collective action.

Overview of the current research

Our key prediction is that, among disadvantaged group members, harmony-focused hope will be negatively related to the motivation to engage in collective action, but that higher identifiers with the ingroup will be less susceptible, perhaps even immune, to this effect. To test these hypotheses, we conducted three correlational field studies (Study 2.1a-

2.1c), and one experimental study (Study 2.2). The correlational field studies were run in two different contexts that are marked by intergroup tension and collective action, yet vary in the degree of intensity and violence. Additionally, we chose contexts in which citizens of two different groups reside in a single political region marked by clear inequality, both historically and presently, as well as an ongoing struggle for social change by the disadvantaged group. Such circumstances allow for the emergence of hope with various targets, including the improvement of the intergroup relations or the status of the group.

Specifically, Studies 1a and 1b were conducted among Palestinian citizens of Israel during different periods of mass protest against discriminatory policies by the Israeli government, and Study 2.1c was conducted among Black Americans during a period of protests against racial discrimination. In Study 2.2, we experimentally manipulated harmony-focused hope among Palestinians. Across all studies, we measured self-reported harmony-focused hope (hope regarding better future relations with the advantaged outgroup), ingroup identification, and motivation to engage in collective action. We also measured what we term as equality-focused hope, capturing hope for promoting the future status of the ingroup. This additional measure of hope was assessed in order to ensure that the anticipated negative effect of hope on collective action is specific to harmony-focused hope (rather than other types of hope that are likely to play a role in the context of conflict). Finally, we also measured anger and efficacy beliefs to examine whether the hypothesized demotivating effect of harmony-focused hope exists above and beyond other predictors of collective action.

Studies 1a and 1b

We conducted two correlational studies among Palestinian citizens of Israel in two different contexts, both aimed at testing our hypotheses that there would be a negative relationship between harmony-focused hope and collective action, and that this association would be moderated by group identification.

Study 2.1a took place during protests by Palestinian citizens against the shooting of a Palestinian youth by the Israeli police in 2014. Protests and demonstrations, which rippled across several Palestinian villages and cities, called for an end of police and state aggression against Palestinian citizens and demanded justice and accountability. This shooting was at the time the latest in a series of killings by police that had taken the lives of 48 Palestinian citizens since the second Palestinian uprising (termed “Intifada”) in 2000. For the Palestinian population in Israel, the incident at hand was a consequence of continuous state oppression and police brutality that constituted a direct threat to the existence and status of a large national minority consisting of 1.7 million citizens.

Study 2.1b was conducted prior to the 2015 parliamentary elections in Israel. These elections were characterized by racist incitement against Palestinians, reflected in a series of threats, intimidations, and attempts by mainstream politicians to delegitimize them in the eyes of the Jewish population. In addition, the electoral threshold for entering parliament had been raised prior to the elections, in a move seen as designed to make it difficult for the small Arab parties to make the cut. This led the three Arab-majority parties to form a united list that could both pass the threshold and play a central role within the parliamentary opposition.

Both contexts provided us with the opportunity to examine the relationship between harmony-focused hope among Palestinians and their readiness to fight racism and oppression through collective action during periods of intergroup tension. We expected harmony-focused hope, rather than equality-focused hope, to be negatively related to motivation for collective action, especially among those whose identification with the ingroup was not very high.

Method

Participants

One hundred and seventy-seven Palestinian citizens of Israel participated in Study 2.1a. Of these, 141 were recruited through social media and 36 were approached personally.

Twenty-two participants were removed from the analysis for not completing the questionnaire², and other three participants were removed because they were under the age of 17, yielding a final sample of 152 participants (86 females; ages 17-69, $M = 31.6$, $SD = 13.3$). The majority (63.8%) were lower-middle class with high levels of education (51.3 % with a Bachelor's degree or higher).

Study 2.1b included a sample of 183 Palestinian citizens of Israel, who participated on a voluntary basis. Thirty participants were not included in the analysis, among them 27 who did not complete the questionnaire, and three who failed to follow instructions, yielding a final sample of 153 participants (74 females, 1 missing; ages 17-63, $M = 27.1$, $SD = 8.65$). The vast majority of participants were educated (76% with a bachelor degree or higher) and of lower-middle class (61%).

Procedure

A team of two recruiters approached participants at Israeli university campuses and on the social media. Participants completed a questionnaire either online or in paper form, first giving their informed consent. Each questionnaire then included a text describing the events occurring during the periods of the studies and their implications for the Palestinian population in Israel, followed by items measuring all our research variables.

Measures

Hope was measured using two different items, the first assessing harmony-focused hope ("Hope for a better future in relations between Arabs/Palestinians³ and Jews in the country") and the second assessing equality-focused hope ("Hope for strengthening the status of Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel"). On a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much

² All excluded participants under this criterion, in all studies reported in this manuscript, did not complete enough of the questionnaire to respond to the study's key constructs of the study, and we therefore had no choice but to exclude them.

³ We used both terms—Arabs and Palestinian—so as to cater to different sub-identities of Palestinian citizens of Israel.

so), participants indicated to what extent they experienced the emotion in light of the events discussed in the study.

Collective action intentions were measured using four items assessing willingness to partake in various forms of protest against police and state violence in Study 2.1a and against racism in Study 2.1b (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004, and Tausch et al., 2011). In Study 2.1a, these actions were “sharing posts or discussing the events on social media,” “signing a petition to protest police violence” “participating in a peaceful demonstration against police violence” and “participating in strikes to protest police violence”. Participants indicated to what extent they were willing to take part in each action on the same scale used to assess hope (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .76$). In Study 2.1b, the item “participating in strikes to protest police violence” was replaced with the item “launching international campaigns to raise awareness about the issues of Palestinians in Israel” so as to meet the spectrum of collective actions that were most prominent at the time (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.85$).

Using the same scale used for hope, we also measured anger and group efficacy beliefs to ensure that the hypothesized relationships between hope and collective action emerged above and beyond their shared variance with these variables. *Anger* was measured by asking participants to indicate to what extent they experienced “Anger towards the Israeli government.”

Efficacy beliefs in Study 2.1a were assessed by gauging the perceived efficacy of specific actions aimed at advancing change. For each action participants were asked to what extent they thought it can help Palestinians in: “...directing media and international attention to racism against Palestinians in Israel,” and “...challenging the status-quo and the power balance in the country” (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.89$). In Study 2.1b, we opted instead to assess efficacy beliefs about the group, regardless of the specific action employed to achieve the

group's goals (i.e., "I believe that we [Palestinians/Arabs] are capable of advancing change in our situation") (adapted from van Zomeren, Saguy, & Schellhaas, 2013).

Finally, *group identification* was measured using a shortened six-item version of the Multidimensional Group-Identification Scale (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008). The scale used in this study included three dimensions of identity: Importance (e.g., "Being Palestinian is a central component of my identity"), Superiority (e.g., "People of other nations can learn a lot from us"), and Commitment (e.g., "I feel strong commitment towards Palestinians"). Participants were instructed to specify to what extent they agreed with each statement on the same scale used for the above measured (Study 2.1a Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.84$; Study 2.1b Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.87$).⁴

Results

We first inspected the means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among our variables for Study 2.1a and Study 2.1b (see Table 2.1 & Table 2.2). This revealed that harmony-focused hope and equality-focused hope were positively and moderately correlated with each other in both Studies 1a ($r = .60, p < .001$) and 1b ($r = .42, p < .001$), which is in line with the notion of similar yet different constructs. Harmony-focused hope was negatively associated with motivation for collective action in Study 2.1a ($r = -.20, p = .02$) and Study 2.1b ($r = -.18, p = .03$), meaning that generally, people who experienced more of this hope had decreased willingness to engage in collective action. Equality-focused hope, however, was not related to collective action (1a: $r = -.02, p = .77$; 1b: $r = .005, p = .95$).

⁴ The measures were embedded in a larger questionnaire that included items intended for use in another project.

Table 2.1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations Among Variables in Study 2.1a

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. Hope for a better future in the relations between Arabs/Palestinians and Jews in the country	3.03	1.77	-				
2. Hope for strengthening the status of Arab/Palestinian citizens	4.14	1.92	.61**	-			
3. Identification (with Palestinians)	5.24	.84	-.15	-.01	-		
4. Collective action	4.96	1.17	-.2*	-.05	.5**	-	
5. Anger towards the [Israeli] government	5.52	.81	-.2*	.01	.43**	.49**	-
6. Efficacy	4.93	1.01	-.03	.12	.44**	.46**	.43**

* $p < .05$.** $p < .01$ **Table 2.2.** Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations Among Variables in Study 2.1b

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. Hope for a better future in the relations between Arabs/Palestinians and Jews in the country	3.04	1.5	-				
2. Hope for strengthening the status of Arab/Palestinian citizens	3.74	1.5	.42**	-			
3. Identification (with Palestinians)	5.08	.84	-.22**	.1	-		
4. Collective action	4.71	.95	-.18*	.005	.43**	-	
5. Anger towards the [Israeli] government	5.18	1.19	-.05	.15	.37**	.27**	-
6. Efficacy	4.85	1.12	.007	.08	.48**	.4**	.18*

* $p < .05$.** $p < .01$

To test our hypothesis that group identification would moderate the relationship between harmony-focused hope and collective action intentions, we employed Hayes' (2013)

PROCESS command (model 1). In Study 2.1a we found a marginally significant main effect for harmony-focused hope on collective action ($B = -.09$, $SE = .04$, $t = -1.97$, $p = .05$, $CI [-1.8, .00]$). In line with our hypothesis, this effect was moderated by group identification as reflected in a significant interaction between harmony-focused hope and identification on collective action intentions ($B = .16$, $SE = .06$, $t = 2.58$, $p = .01$; $CI [.03, .28]$). An examination of the simple slopes revealed that increased harmony-focused hope was associated with decreased willingness to engage in action among people with relatively lower levels of identification (i.e., individuals one standard deviation below the mean of identification; $B = -.22$, $SE = .07$, $t = -3.06$, $p = .003$; $CI [-.37, -.08]$), but not among those with higher levels of identification (i.e., individuals one standard deviation above the mean of identification; $B = .03$, $SE = .06$, $t = .56$, $p = .55$; $CI [-.08, .16]$) (see Figure 2.1). To confirm that this relationship existed above and beyond other factors that predict collective action, we ran the analysis again while adjusting for levels of anger and efficacy. Equality-focused hope was also included as a covariate to isolate the effect of this hope from harmony-focused hope. The findings of this analysis were also significant (Interaction: $B = .13$, $SE = .05$, $t = 2.27$, $p = .02$; $CI [.01, .24]$, conditional effect at lower levels of identification: $B = -.17$, $SE = .07$, $t = -2.66$, $p = .02$; $CI [-.33, -.02]$). We conducted a similar analysis to predict equality-focused hope in Study 2.1a and found that the relationship between equality-focused hope and collective action was neither significant ($B = -.02$, $SE = .04$, $t = -.55$, $p = .58$; $CI [-.11, .06]$) nor significantly moderated by identification ($B = .01$, $SE = .05$, $t = .25$, $p = .8$; $CI [-.09, .11]$) (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.1. The relationship between Harmony-focused hope and collective action intentions in Study 2.1a, as moderated by identification.

Figure 2.2. The relationship between equality-focused hope and collective action intentions in Study 2.1a, as moderated by identification.

We ran the same set of analyses for Study 2.1b. The first analysis revealed no main effect for harmony-focused hope on collective action ($B = -.06$, $SE = .05$, $t = -1.22$, $p = .22$; $CI [-.15, .03]$). The interaction between identification and harmony-focused hope on collective action intentions also did not reach significance ($B = .08$, $SE = .05$, $t = 1.54$, $p =$

.12; CI [-.02, .2]), but the conditional effects were nonetheless in line with our hypothesis. While there was no significant relationship between harmony-focused hope and collective action among high identifiers ($B = .01, SE = .06, t = .24, p = .81$; CI [-.11, .14]), the relationship was marginally significant among relatively low identifiers ($B = -.13, SE = .07, t = -1.9, p = 0.06$; CI [-.27, .006]). We once again repeated the analysis while adjusting for anger, efficacy, and equality-focused hope, findings that including these variables had only a weak effect on the pattern of results. While the interaction was still not significant ($B = .08, SE = .05, t = 1.39, p = .17$; CI [-.03, .19]), the conditional effect for low identifiers was marginally significant ($B = -.14, SE = .07, t = -2, p = 0.05$; CI [-.28, .000]). These findings, although weaker than ideally would be the case, are largely in line with the findings of Study 2.1a. Taken together, they by and large support our hypotheses.

Study 2.1c

Study 2.1c was designed to establish the external validity of the above findings by testing our predictions in a different national context. To this end, we conducted another correlational study, but this time among Black Americans amidst a period of racial tensions and protests against racial inequality. These rising tensions in the U.S. enabled us to examine hope in a different context of intergroup relations and collective action. We expected to replicate the results of the previous studies, finding evidence that harmony-focused hope, rather than equality-focused hope, is associated with a decreased willingness to engage in collective action, but to a lower extent among highly-identified individuals.

Method

Participants

We recruited 242 Black American participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Seventeen participants were excluded from our analyses for failing at least three of four attention check questions embedded in the questionnaire to ensure compliance (e.g., “For this

particular question, please select ‘(6) strongly disagree’”), yielding a final sample of 225 participants (122 females, ages 18-69, $M = 31.6$ years, $SD = 9.4$).

Procedure

Participants read a text about the racial tensions in the U.S. at the time of the study, followed by measures of all of our research variables.

Measures

Harmony-focused hope, *equality-focused hope*, and *identification* (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.93$ for identification), were assessed using the same measures used in Studies 1a and 1b, but they were adjusted in a culturally relevant form (e.g., “hope for a better future in relations between White and Black Americans”).

Collective action intentions were assessed using a six-item scale comprising three items from Studies 1a and 1b as well as three new items, added to capture other non-violent activities that occurred in the U.S. during this period (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.89$). The new items were “taking part in campaigns against racism,” “Participating in sit-ins,” and “taking part in hunger strikes.”

Finally, Anger was measured using one item: “Anger towards white Americans for denying the existence of discrimination”. *Efficacy* was measured using the same operationalization used in Study 2.1b, but we elaborated on the single item measure by including a four-item scale (e.g., “I believe that Black Americans, as a group, can put an end to racial discrimination”; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .9$) (adapted from van Zomeren, Saguy, & Schellhaas, 2013). All items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much so).

Results

An examination of the means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among our variables revealed that, as in Studies 1a and 1b, harmony-focused hope and equality-

focused hope were correlated with each other ($r = .65, p < .001$). Whereas harmony-focused hope was not related to collective action ($r = .00, p = .99$), equality-focused hope was positively related to collective action ($r = .14, p = .04$) (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations Among Variables in Study 2.1c

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. Hope for a better future in the relations between black and white Americans	5.08	1.2	-				
2. Hope for strengthening the status of black Americans	4.91	1.2	.65**	-			
3. Identification (with black Americans)	4.84	1.15	.2**	.38**	-		
4. Collective action	3.63	.13	.00	.14*	.41**	-	
5. Anger towards white Americans	3.62	1.6	-.13*	.06	.27**	.45**	-
6. Efficacy	4.62	1.11	.38**	.33**	.36**	.18**	-.003

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$

We next tested our hypothesis that identification would moderate the relationship between harmony-focused hope and collective action intentions. In line with our hypothesis and with the patterns revealed in our previous studies, we found a significant harmony-focused hope $\times$ identification interaction on collective action intentions ($B = .12, SE = .06, t = 2, p = .046$; CI [.002, .24]). An examination of the conditional effects revealed that increased harmony-focused hope was associated with decreased willingness to engage in collective action among people with relatively lower levels of identification ($B = -.22, SE = .09, t = -2.4, p = .017$; CI [-.4, -.04]). The collective action intentions of highly-identified people, however, were independent of harmony-focused hope ($B = .05, SE = .1, t = .52, p = .6$; CI [-.15, .26]). When the covariates anger, efficacy, and equality-focused hope were included in the analysis, the interaction turned marginally significant ($B = .1, SE = .06, t = 1.77, p = .078$; CI [-.01, .21]), but the direction of the conditional effects was maintained (low identifiers: $B = -.15, SE$

= .1, $t = -1.5$, $p = .13$; CI [-.36, .05]; high identifiers: $B = .07$, $SE = .11$, $t = .63$, $p = .53$; CI [-.15, .3]). The same analysis on equality-focused hope yielded a non-significant interaction ($B = .02$, $SE = .06$, $t = .45$, $p = .65$ CI [-.09, .14]), as did repeating it while adjusting for anger, efficacy, and harmony-focused hope ($B = .05$, $SE = .05$, $t = .92$, $p = .36$ CI [-.06, .16]).

Discussion

Studies 1a-1c conducted across two different national contexts all yielded findings consistent with our hypothesis that harmony-focused hope is associated with decreased motivation to advance change towards equality, but only among relatively low identification with the group. In keeping with much prior work, high identifiers were consistent and high in their action tendencies regardless of their feelings of hope. Importantly, this relationship was observed only for harmony-focused hope, and did not emerge for equality-focused hope, indicating a process unique to hope for harmonious future relations. Together, these findings suggest that harmony-focused hope may diminish collective action intentions, an effect that is buffered for the highest identifiers.

We note that the patterns of the results were weaker in Study 2.1b compared to the those found in the other studies. One possible reason is that the context of elections was not equally important for all Palestinian citizens of Israel, a significant portion of whom perceive the parliamentary presence of Palestinians as less pivotal in determining the fate of their group, or even ideologically object to this presence, viewing it as complicit in their oppression. Accordingly, people who were not concerned with the elections would be less stimulated towards action regardless of their levels of hope and identification. The context employed for Study 2.1a on the other hand, was more relevant to all Palestinian citizens of Israel and their existence, due to its importance in shaping their reality in the state and their relations with the authorities and Jewish society. Perhaps for this reason, Study 2.1a yielded stronger findings. Likewise, the fact that adjusting for potential covariates in Study 2.1c

weakened the central effect may indicate that the phenomenon at hand occurs at varying intensities among different disadvantaged populations, or that our single item measure of harmony-focused hope was overly sensitive to noise. To address these concerns as well as the absence of any evidence to support a causal effect of harmony-focused hope on collective action intentions, we set out to design a fourth study in which we manipulated harmony-focused hope.

Study 2.2

The aim of Study 2.2 was to replicate and extend the correlational findings obtained in Studies 2.1a-2.1c, while at the same time establishing causality by employing a controlled experimental design. We also sought to improve the validity of our findings by introducing more detailed and reliable measures of hope, scaling up the measurement from the single item measures employed in Studies 1a-1c. Single item measures are vulnerable to validity and reliability concerns, as they may simplify a presumed construct and/or exhibit inconsistency. We address this limitation by introducing multi-item measures of harmony-focused hope and of equality-focused hope in Study 2.2. To this end, prior to conducting Study 2.2, we ran a pilot study in which we asked 24 Palestinian citizens of Israel to describe in their own words their feelings of hope in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Participants' responses were then categorized into three themes: hope for positive relations between Palestinians/Arabs and Jewish Israelis, hope for achieving equality and justice, and a lack of hope for any improvement. Based on the content of the free responses, we created multi-item measures of harmony-focused and equality-focused hope.⁵

A wave of Palestinian protests against systematic house demolition by the Israeli authorities that hit different Arab villages and cities in early 2017 afforded us the opportunity

⁵ An additional theme emerged that was related to change on the intragroup level (e.g. changing the ingroup leadership), but it was not specified in the instructions of Study 2.2 as it does not directly address intergroup conflict. See supplementary material for a description of the pilot study.

to test our predictions experimentally. We developed a manipulation designed to induce hope for harmony (harmony-focused hope condition). For comparison, we included two control conditions: 1) an equality-focused hope condition, aimed at increasing the sense of hope for achieving social equality and justice; and 2) a general future outlook condition, aimed at gauging participants' default collective action intentions. We expected the former to generate stronger collective action intentions than the harmony-focused hope condition. As for the latter, we hoped it would be useful in illuminating how collective action intentions in the other two conditions (harmony- and equality- focused hope) compare with the default collective action intentions. As in Studies 1a-1c, we expected the effects of the manipulation to depend on the level of ingroup identification of participants, such that the effect would be weaker or absent among those highest in group identification.

Method

Participants

We recruited 294 Palestinian citizens of Israel at university campuses. Eighteen participants were excluded from the analysis for either failing at least three of four attention checks (ten participants) or failing to complete the questionnaire (eight participants), yielding a final sample of 276 (of which 171 were women and three did not specify their gender).⁶ The majority of participants were from low to average socioeconomic status (37% identified as working class and 36.2% identified as middle class), who had or were pursuing high levels of education (59.8% had a Bachelor's degree and 14.1% had a Master's degree or higher).

Procedure and Materials

Participants were approached on several Israeli campuses and were asked to complete a questionnaire in exchange for coffee vouchers. All participants completed the questionnaire

⁶ Due to human error, details on participants' age were not collected, but as participants were students we assume an age range around 18-30.

online, using their mobile phones or laptops. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: harmony-focused hope, equality-focused hope, or a general future outlook condition. The manipulation described below was followed by scales measuring all research variables.

To induce hope, we employed a procedure of self-reflective writing (see Lerner & Keltner, 2001), instructing participants to describe a hopeful future, focused on either equality or harmony in the context of Palestinian/Arab-Jewish relations. In the first part of the instructions, they read that members of disadvantaged groups in conflicts can experience hope despite the difficult circumstances they face, and that this can vary between people and situations. Participants were then asked to imagine a hopeful future, either for harmony, or for equality. The harmony-focused hope induction presented the following text⁷:

“As difficult or easy as this may be for you, please try now *to imagine a hopeful future with respect to Palestinian/Arab-Israeli/Jewish relations*, and by this, we mean your feelings of *hope about improving relations between the groups*. Specifically, we ask you to *think and imagine a future (near or far) in which Palestinians/Arabs and Israelis/Jews exist and live together, and relations between the groups are more mutual, close, respectful, and friendly.*”

In the equality-focused hope condition, the italicized text above was replaced with the following:

“...please try now *to imagine a hopeful future with respect to the status of Palestinians/Arabs*, and by this, we mean your feelings of hope about *the achievement of the Palestinian cause*. Specifically, we ask you to *think and imagine a future (near or far) in which Palestinians with their struggle and*

⁷ Full instructions and manipulations are presented in the supplemental material.

resilience achieve significant change and progress toward liberation from oppression, justice, and dignified life.”

In the general future outlook condition participants were simply instructed to imagine the future and write about what they think will happen with regard to the Palestinian cause or Israeli-Palestinian relations, without any instructions to feel hope.

Measures

Manipulation check. We first aimed to ensure that participants adhered to the instructions and provided relevant responses to the condition at hand. Thus, three coders who were blind to conditions coded the content of the written responses as containing either, harmony-related content (scored as 1), equality-related content (scored as 2), or neither (scored as 3). Because coders initially identified many responses containing expressions of hopelessness and pessimism, we then instructed them to code for this separately, identifying such responses as “0” and differentiating them from wholly irrelevant responses that relate neither to hope/hopeless or the future, coded as “3”. Final scores were determined based on agreement between at least two of the three coders.⁸

In addition, we included closed-ended measures of hope. Specifically, we measured *harmony-focused hope* with four items: “hope for a better future in the relations between Arabs and Jews in the country,” “hope for coexistence between Arabs/Palestinians and Jews,” “hope for the building of bridges of mutual respect and affection between Arabs/Palestinians and Jews,” and “hope for a shared future between Arabs/Palestinians and Jews.” Items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much so) (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .94$).

Equality-focused hope was also measured using four items: “hope that Palestinians/Arabs will achieve justice and equality,” “hope that Palestinians/Arabs will

⁸ A high degree of reliability was found among the three coders’ ratings: ICC = .9.

promote their status,” “hope that Palestinians will be liberated from all forms of discrimination,” and “hope that Palestinians will end the occupation.” The items were rated on the same scale used for harmony-related hope (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .87$). All eight items were interspersed and presented in the same battery. We performed a principal-components factor analysis with promax rotation to ensure the two types of hope are differentiated. The analysis yielded two factors, with the harmony-focused hope items loading clearly on the first factor and explaining 60.25% of the variance (all loadings $> .87$ and lower than $.1$ on the second factor), and the equality-focused hope items loading clearly on the second factor and accounting for 20.6% of the variance (all loadings $> .78$ and lower than $.17$ on the second factor) (Table 2.4).

Collective action intentions were measured as in Study 2.1a, but the scale was expanded to include another item to reflect the range of actions taking place at the time of the study (i.e., “participating in sit-ins in front the [Israeli] ministry of housing or the parliament”; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .86$). *Anger* and *Group identification* (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .90$) were measured using the same items and scales used in Study 2.1a. For efficacy, we employed the same 4-item measure used in Study 2.1c (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .90$).

Table 2.4. Factor loadings based on a principle components analysis with promax rotation for 8 items of hope in Study 2.2 (N = 276)

Component	Harmony-focused hope	Equality-focused hope
Hope that Palestinians/Arabs will promote their status	-.1	.9
Hope for a shared future between Palestinians/Arabs and Jews coexistence between Palestinians/Arabs and Jews	.94	-.07
Hope that Palestinians/Arabs will achieve equality and justice	.17	.79
Hope for a better future in the relations between Palestinians/Arabs and Jews	.93	.04
Hope that Palestinians/Arabs will be liberated from all forms of discrimination	.17	.8

hope for building bridges of mutual respect and affection between Arabs/Palestinians and Jews	.88	.1
Hope for co-existence between Palestinians/Arabs and Jews	.97	-.09
Hope that Palestinians/Arabs will end occupation	-.15	.92
Eigenvalues	4.82	1.65
Percentage of total variance	60.25	20.6

Results

Manipulation checks

In assessing participants' free responses, we first determined whether they properly adhered to the instructions. Examination of the coders' assessments of participants' responses to the manipulation led us to exclude 13 participants from the analyses for irrelevant responses (scored as 3): six due to meaningless, non-compliant responses (i.e. gibberish), and 7 others because their responses did not clearly pertain to hope or any future outlook regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations (e.g. "*I go to spend the weekend with my friends in Al-Hamra in Beirut and come back to my village in the Galilee in the beginning of the week*"). The remaining sample of 262 participants included 86 participants in the general future outlook condition, 93 participants in the harmony-focused hope condition, and 83 participants in the equality-focused hope condition. Further evaluation of the responses revealed that not all participants complied with the directions of the hope conditions (around 30%), with some participants writing about a different hope than what their condition called for⁹. These participants were also excluded from the analyses below, yielding a final sample of 206: 86 in the general future outlook condition, 65 in the harmony-focused hope condition, and 55 in the equality-focused hope condition. We suppose that this drop-out bias was a result of the

⁹ Some participants in the harmony condition wrote about equality, or vice versa.

difficulty Palestinians have imagining a hopeful future in general, or in a specific manner that was not compatible with their vision.

Importantly, as mentioned above in the measures section, most participants in the general future outlook condition (about 70%) tended to focus on negative and pessimistic future developments related to the continuation or escalation of the conflict (e.g., *“Israel will become stronger and with the support of the western countries, this will lead to the continuation of occupation and injustices, until the displacement of the majority of Palestinians...”*). This confirmed our suspicion that instead of allowing us to assess default levels of hope, this condition actually prompted participants to connect to their pessimism by focusing “objectively” on the future in the context of a scientific study, which is likely to be associated with lower levels of activism. The content of responses in the harmony-focused hope condition reflected hopefulness for better and positive relations between Arabs and Jews (e.g., *“I see a much better future in which peace will prevail, a shared and cooperative life based on love, without fear from the other...”*). Finally, in the equality-focused condition, participants wrote about their hope for equality and justice (e.g., *“I hope for the end of racism and discrimination, equality on all levels, and the return of the Palestinian refugees and the rebuild of the displaced villages in 1948...”*).

We then turned to examine our closed-ended manipulation checks. To test whether the manipulation led to an increase in self-reported harmony-focused hope and equality-focused hope, we conducted two one-way ANOVAs—one for each of the hope scales as the dependent variable. The first analysis revealed that the manipulation significantly affected levels of harmony-focused hope ($F_{(2,203)} = 9.71, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .09$). A planned contrast comparing levels of harmony-focused hope between the harmony-focused hope condition and the other two conditions revealed significantly higher levels of harmony-focused hope in this condition ($M = 4.67; SD = 1.2$), compared with participants in the equality-focused hope (M

= 3.81; $SD = 1.25$; $p < .001$) and future outlook ($M = 3.88$; $SD = 1.24$; $p < .001$) conditions.

The analysis for levels of equality-focused hope revealed a marginal significant effect for the manipulation ($F_{(2,203)} = 2.78$, $p = .06$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$). Nonetheless, the planned contrasts supported our prediction only partially, with levels of equality-focused hope significantly higher in the equality-focused hope condition ($M = 4.8$; $SD = .97$) than in the future outlook condition ($M = 4.38$; $SD = 1.28$; $p = .04$), but only marginally different from their levels in the harmony-focused hope condition ($M = 4.73$; $SD = 1.15$; $p = .07$). These results indicate that the harmony-focused hope condition increased hope for both harmony and equality. Furthermore, hope levels in the general future outlook condition were the lowest compared to the other two conditions, regardless of the target of hope, further confirming our suspicion that this condition generated pessimism.

Collective action

To test our main hypotheses, we used the same procedure employed in Study 2.1, but this time utilizing the multi-categorical independent variable feature of the PROCESS command (Hayes & Preacher, 2014), as the manipulation included three conditions. This analysis created two dummy variables for condition, using harmony-focused hope as the reference condition: D1, comparing the general future outlook condition to the reference category (1 = future outlook, and 0 = harmony-focused hope and equality-focused hope); and D2, comparing the equality-focused hope condition to the reference category (1 = equality-focused hope; 0 = control and harmony-focused hope). PROCESS includes these variables and their interactions with the moderator in the model, allowing a comparison of the harmony-focused hope condition with each of the other two conditions in the same model.

We report the statistics for the interactions as well as the main effects of both dummy variables and identification in Table 2.5 and 2.6. The two-way interaction of D2 (harmony-focused hope versus equality-focused hope) and identification on collective action intentions

was significant ($B_{int_2} = -.54$, $SE = .2$, $t = -2.73$, $p = .007$, $CI [-.94, -.15]$). Analysis of the conditional effects (see Table 2.5) revealed that the harmony-focused hope condition ($M = 3.43$), compared to equality-focused hope ($M = 4.42$), decreased intentions for collective action mainly among those relatively lower on group identification ($B_{D2} = .98$, $SE = .29$, $t = 3.37$, $p = .001$, $CI [.4, 1.55]$).

Table 2.5. *Significant Main Effects on Dependent Variable in Study 2*

	Identification	D1	D2	D1X Identification	D2 X Identification
Collective Action	$b = .68$, $SE = .12$, $t = 5.68$, $p < .001$	$b = -.07$, $p = .92$	$b = 2.97$, $SE = .97$, $t = 3.06$, $p = .003$	$b = .02$, $p = .88$	$b = -.54$, $SE = .19$, $t = -2.73$, $p = .007$

Table 2.6. *Simple Effects and Means for the Dependent Variable in Study 2*

	Low Identification (-1SD)					High Identification (+1SD)				
	Harmony -focused hope	Future outlook	Equality -focused hope	D1	D2	Harmony -focused hope	Future outlook	Equality -focused hope	D1	D2
Collective Action	3.43	3.44	4.42	$b = .01$, $p = .96$	$b = .98$, $p = .001$	4.84	4.9	4.7	$b = .05$, $p = .81$	$b = -.15$, $p = .56$

On the other hand, collective action intentions in the harmony-focused hope condition and the future outlook condition ($M = 3.45$) were not differentiated from one another; ($B_{D1} = .01$, $SE = .22$, $t = .04$, $p = .96$, $CI [-.42, .44]$) (see Figure 2.3). In other words, willingness to engage in action in the harmony-focused hope condition was similar to the condition that we found to have induced pessimism regarding the future, suggesting that harmony-focused hope was as demotivating as pessimism in this respect. Importantly, this effect was found despite the higher levels of hope reported by participants in the harmony-focused condition. We ran the same analysis controlling for anger and efficacy as covariates (as in Study 2.1), and the

results remained similar ($B_{int_2} = -.6$, $SE = .18$, $t = -3.35$, $p = .001$, $CI [-.98, -.26]$; $B_{D2} = .85$, $SE = .27$, $t = 3.1$, $p = .002$, $CI [.3, 1.38]$; $B_{D1} = -.07$, $SE = .2$, $t = -.33$, $p = .74$, $CI [-.47, .33]$).

Figure 2.3. The relationship between hope conditions and motivation for collective action in Study 2.2, as moderated by Identification.

These results support the notion that hope for harmony results in lower intentions for action, as compared to hope for inequality, with levels of activism that resemble a pessimistic state of mind. Unfortunately, the nature of the future outlook's condition impact on participants' open responses and the pessimism contained in them did not allow us to use it as a true control condition, but its undifferentiated effect from the harmony-focused hope condition is thus even more intriguing.

Secondary correlational analysis

Despite these interesting findings, we acknowledge the potential problems posed by the exclusion of participants based on non-compliance with the condition to which they were assigned. While the majority of the sample was retained, the fact that 56 participants were non-compliant implies that it may be difficult in the context of such conflict to force group members to hope and envision a future change that is not congruent with the scope of their

unobstructed imagination. We therefore conducted a secondary analysis on all participants, treating the data as correlational and using our manipulation checks to examine the interaction of levels of self-reported harmony-focused hope (our manipulation check) and identification on collective action intentions, while controlling for the original experimental condition people were assigned to and for self-reported equality-focused hope.

The analysis revealed a main effect for self-reported harmony-focused hope on collective action ($B = -.12$, $SE = .06$, $t = -1.98$, $p = .049$, $CI [-.23, .00]$). Consistent with our hypothesis and with Study 2.1, the interactive effect of harmony-focused hope and group identification on collective action intentions was significant ($B = .09$, $SE = .05$, $t = 2$, $p = .046$, $CI [.002, .18]$), and the conditional effects indicated that levels of self-reported harmony-focused hope were significantly associated with decreased intentions for collective action among relatively low identifiers ($B = -.21$, $SE = .08$, $t = -2.51$, $p = .013$, $CI [-.38, -.04]$), but not among high identifiers ($B = -.02$, $SE = .06$, $t = -.94$, $p = .77$, $CI [-.15, .11]$). The pattern of the results remains similar when we include anger and efficacy as covariates, barring the main effect of harmony-focused hope, which turns non-significant, ($B = -.04$, $SE = .05$, $t = -.76$, $p = .44$, $CI [-.15, .07]$; $B_{interaction} = .11$, $SE = .04$, $t = 2.58$, $p = .011$, $CI [.026, .2]$; low identifiers: $B = -.16$, $SE = .08$, $t = -2$, $p = .046$, $CI [-.32, -.003]$; high identifiers: $B = .07$, $SE = .06$, $t = 1.14$, $p = .25$, $CI [-.05, .2]$).

We ran a parallel analysis to test the self-reported equality-focused hope $\times$ identification interactive effect on collective action, controlling for experimental condition, self-reported harmony-focused hope, anger, and efficacy. This analysis revealed the association between equality-focused hope and collective action to not be significantly moderated by identification ($B = .02$, $SE = .04$, $t = .45$, $p = .65$; $CI [-.06, .08]$). In other words, as in Studies 1a and 1b, we found that the negative effect of harmony-focused hope is unique to this specific target of hope.

Discussion

Study 2.2 demonstrated that harmony-focused hope, compared to equality-focused hope, resulted in decreased collective action among people with weaker group identification. However, relative to the future outlook condition, which we had intended as a default control condition, harmony-focused hope did not decrease or increase collective action intentions. We believe the reason for this is rooted in the nature of this condition, which in effect generated pessimism and despair (as indicated by the coding of the free responses). Thus, our findings indicated that the effect of harmony-focused hope can be equivalent to the state of defeatism that emerged in the general future outlook condition, in the sense that the motivation for action among relatively low identifiers when they feel hope for harmony is similar to their motivation when they are pessimistic about the conflict's development. Importantly, participants in the harmony-focused hope condition also reported experiencing equality-focused hope (as indicated by our manipulation checks), which suggests that harmony-focused hope counteracts the potential positive effect of hope for justice on action.

Moreover, the results of this study support the notion that identification functions as a buffer against the negative effects of harmony-focused hope, such that high identifiers seemed to be uninfluenced by our manipulation and showed the same motivation for action across all conditions. The correlational moderation analysis that we conducted also provides support for our hypotheses, replicating the findings obtained in Studies 1a-1c while increasing their validity by incorporating multi-item measures of both harmony-focused and equality-focused hope.

Internal Meta-Analysis

To examine the robustness of our findings, we conducted an internal meta-analysis, on the studies presented here based on the guideline of Goh, Hall, and Rosenthal (2016). We meta-analyzed all the four studies using fixed effects in which the key effect sizes was

weighted by sample size. In this case, the key effect size was the effect of harmony-focused hope on collective action tendencies. We first converted these simple effect coefficients into Pearson's r values, then Fisher's z transformed all correlations for the analysis stage, and finally converted them back to Pearson correlations for the presentation of general effect sizes. Overall, the interaction effect of harmony-focused hope and identification on collective action was significant ($Mr = .15$, $Z = .15$, $p = .02$, two-tailed). In line with our hypothesis, among relatively low identifiers, harmony-focused hope was associated with decreased motivation for collective action ($Mr = -.24$, $Z = -3.6$, $p < .001$, two-tailed), but this relationship did not emerge among the highest identifiers ($Mr = .03$, $Z = 1.11$, $p = .2$, two-tailed).

General Discussion

The aim of the present research was to examine the role of hope for harmony in undermining collective action intentions among disadvantaged group members. As predicted, the results indicated that harmony-focused hope is associated with decreased motivation for social change among disadvantaged group members, although higher identifiers with the group seemed to be immune to this effect. Study 2.1a to 2.1c, involving two different populations, provided correlational evidence for the relationship between harmony-focused hope and collective action. Both the Palestinian-Israeli and the Black-White American contexts provided us with opportunities to investigate the factors that influence the behavioral tendencies of disadvantaged groups in the context of real-world protests against discrimination. The experimental design in Study 2.2 revealed that hope for harmony indeed results in less motivation for change relative to hope for equality—but collective action intentions in the harmony-focused condition were similar to those in a condition that induced pessimism.

Our work yielded counterintuitive findings that challenge previous assumptions and findings regarding the favorable role of hope in intergroup conflict and in collective action. From a collective action perspective, when hope is aimed at harmony, rather than ending injustice, it can inhibit instead of stimulate motivation for social change among disadvantaged group members. These results are in line with a growing body research demonstrating that nurturing relationships of harmony and affection between disadvantaged and advantaged groups, in this case through hope, can de-motivate disadvantaged group members from fighting for their own cause (Saguy, 2017). As such, we believe we have identified a darker side of hope, at least in the context of collective action and social change towards greater equality (that is, under the assumption that both are positive notions for individuals in disadvantaged groups).

Theoretical implications

The present research holds implications for the literatures on both collective action and intergroup relations and intergroup emotions. Many studies have addressed the role of emotions in motivating collective action, emphasizing anger as the main driving force. Emerging research investigating the outcomes of hope has shown that this emotion promotes willingness to engage in collective action (Greenaway, Cichocka, van Veelen, Likki, Branscombe, 2016; Włodarczyk et al., 2017; Cohen-Chen et al., 2015). The current research questions this singular function of hope by underlining the complexity of this seemingly positive emotion and demonstrating that hope can ironically undermine collective action intentions. These findings are congruent with the work of Hornsey and Fielding (2016) which suggests that hopeful messages can attenuate a sense of negative reality that may be integral to motivation. In line with this work, it is possible that experiencing hope for harmony attenuates perceptions of injustice and accentuates perceptions of positive relations with the outgroup, thereby decreasing motivation for collective action. Critically, our work

underscores the importance of considering the target of hope when assessing the emotion's impact. When hope is for more justice, it does not reduce motivation for change. If, however, one's hope is for more positive relations with the outgroup, it may undermine such motivation.

In this respect, our findings join previous research in highlighting that similar emotions can have different implications on people's behavior, as a function of various factors. The notion that hope can motivate action in certain situation while undermining it in others is consistent with similar patterns identified in research on other emotions. For example, anger has been found to increase support for militant actions in the context of terror attacks, but it can also increase support for compromises within the context of an upcoming opportunity for peace (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Halperin, Russel, Dweck et al., 2011; Halperin, 2015; see also Spanovic et al., 2010). This implies that both negative and positive emotions can have constructive or destructive influences on individuals' intergroup attitudes and behavior.

Within the realm of intergroup relations, our work is predicated on insights from research on the irony of harmony, addressing power differences in the context of intergroup contact (Saguy et al., 2017). This body of work suggests that positive contact contributes to optimistic expectations about the outgroup and can undermine the preconditions for collective action by low-status groups in this interaction (Saguy et al., 2009). Our findings extend these conclusions to apply them to harmony-focused *emotions* and to one's future outlook, suggesting that mere hope for harmonious intergroup relations—even in the absence of any experience of actual harmony—could affect intergroup expectations similarly and therefore diminish willingness to act for social change. In other words, beyond identity representations or contact, some intergroup emotions could also promote harmony perceptions and thus relax concerns about inequality. Adding another significant piece to

prior research on the irony of harmony, our results highlight the moderating role of identification, showing that imagined and perhaps actual harmony does not equally influence the motivation of high identifiers to engage in social change, possibly because personal commitment to the group's interests overpowers these factors (Klandermans, 2002; Van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008). Our study thus affirms that group identification, aside from being an important motivator of collective action, is also a source of resilience that immunizes group members from the ironic effects of harmony-focused hope. To our knowledge, none of the research in this domain has considered identification with the group as a moderating factor, and has thus neglected an important feature of disadvantaged groups in asymmetric conflict. Furthermore, while our findings are generally pessimistic about the role of harmony-focused hope (and harmony in general) among disadvantaged group members, because it demotivates collective action, the buffering effect of high identification may provide clues how this demotivating effect could be overcome. Interventions that increase identification with one's disadvantaged group may therefore hold the key to promoting collective action even in the face of potential naturally occurring demotivators.

Practical Implications

As indicated above, our research also has important practical implications for practitioners who aim to mobilize disadvantaged groups for collective action by emphasizing the need to consider intergroup relations with respect to discrete conflict stages (see Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011). In the reconciliation stage, delivering positive messages of hope might lead to favorable outcomes and could generate intergroup trust, which is crucial for the process of peace building. Indeed, supporting evidence comes from the applied initiative "Messages of Hope" to assist recovery in Rwanda (Lala et al., 2014). However, in the conflict escalation and maintenance stages, it is critical to recognize that promoting messages of hope about relations with the outgroup may not be effective, or even have a boomerang

effect on disadvantaged group members. Thus, messages from political leaders and social agents focusing on improved future relations are likely to fail in the long run, once group members become disillusioned from their hope and optimism when these expectations are not met (Saguy, 2018). Following this line of thought, inducing hope for ending injustice together with anger towards the outgroup or the system should be a more effective strategy to motivate people to address collective disadvantage, especially if augmented with increased identification. It is thus important that social agents become aware of the factors that can interfere with change and mobilization efforts or even undermine them, promoting the preservation of the status quo—particularly because agents of the advantaged group may be able to use these as strategies to maintain their advantaged position. Particularly, it stands to reason that the dominant group can generate a sense of togetherness and hope for harmonious intergroup relations, instead of exercising force, as an attempt to relax concerns about inequality and to eliminate potential collective action with the aim of maintaining hierarchy and protecting its privileges (Jackman, 1994; see also Saguy et al., 2010).

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The present research has several limitations worth noting, which warrant a cautious interpretation of the results and further investigation. Our attempt to manipulate hope in the experimental design of Study 2 was only partially successful, as the manipulation of hope for harmony unintentionally also induced hope for equality. We also had to exclude participants for not complying with our manipulation, highlighting another potential shortcoming of the manipulation employed. Moreover, we suspect that the default condition in Study 2.2 might have re-focused participants' attention on their distress instead of providing a true default, which can explain why the majority of participants in this condition had a pessimistic outlook about the future. Accordingly, future studies may want to include a default condition that is focused on an unrelated topic rather than the future of the group, and perhaps also include an

empty control condition. Beyond these clear methodological difficulties, the above points to the challenge of inducing hope among a population that has experienced prolonged oppression or/and defeat. Future work can attempt to manipulate this type of emotion in less pessimistic contexts to observe its broader effects.

Finally, we recognize that the effect sizes of our findings were small to modest, in one case failing to reach significance, warranting some caution when interpreting the results. Nonetheless, we are confident in the support found for our predictions due to the consistency of this effect across four studies employing both correlational and experimental designs and consistently supporting the notion that harmony-focused hope can inhibit the motivation to act toward social change.

In conclusion, the research in this first empirical chapter of this thesis takes important steps forward in understanding emotional and social processes related to collective action and social change. We shed light on the yet-to-be considered darker side of hope, associated with negative consequences for disadvantaged groups when hope is pinned on optimistic perceptions regarding future intergroup relations. We extend previous insights from research on the irony of harmony by demonstrating that actual harmony between groups is not necessary to attenuate motivation for social change, with hope for such harmony in itself being sufficiently demotivating.

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Chapter 3

With or Without You: The Paradoxical Role of Identification in Predicting Joint and Ingroup Collective Action in Intergroup Conflict

This chapter is based on: Hasan-Aslih, S., Shuman, E., Pliskin, R., Van Zomeren, M., Saguy, T., Halperin, E. (2020). With or without you: The paradoxical role of identification in predicting joint and ingroup collective action in intergroup Conflict. *European Journal of Social Psychology*. 50(6), 1334-1343.

Supplemental materials for this chapter can be found online in the Open Science Framework (OSF): <https://osf.io/5xvwe/>

Palestinians resisting the Israeli occupation and black Americans protesting state violence in the United States are examples of historically disadvantaged groups seeking to overcome prolonged oppression and injustice. Both groups sometimes engage in collective action along with allies from the advantaged group. Such *joint action* may have considerable potential to promote social change, but there is a need to understand when the disadvantaged will be willing and motivated to participate in this kind of action. While research has given us rich descriptions of the motivations of disadvantaged group members to act collectively with other members of their group (ingroup action, see Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) and the motivations of advantaged groups to act on behalf of the disadvantaged (solidarity-based action, see van Zomeren, et al., 2011, Saab et al., 2015), it is unclear if these motivations also apply to joint action.

Indeed, joint collective action requires members of the disadvantaged group to negotiate between intergroup tension and harmony, that is, between the orientation to characterize the outgroup as the oppressor and the orientation to soften intergroup disparity and accept outgroup members as allies (see Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, Pratto, & Singh, 2011). Thus, the psychology of joint collective action likely differs from that of other common forms of collective action, particularly when the groups have a history of conflict. For example, identification with the disadvantaged ingroup has been identified as a key variable driving collective action among the disadvantaged (Simon et al., 1998; Sturmer & Simon, 2004), but it is unclear whether this can be generalized to joint action. The aim of the current research is to examine the potentially complex motivational role of ingroup identification among the disadvantaged in predicting joint collective action in the context of intergroup conflict.

Specifically, we compare the relationship between identification and joint action to the relationship between identification and collective action by the ingroup alone (hereafter,

“ingroup action”). As conflict intensity may impact the intergroup dynamics at the heart of joint action, we also explore how the relationship changes as a function of fluctuations in conflict intensity over time. We do this in a three-wave longitudinal study among Palestinians in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which went through phases of escalation and de-escalation throughout the study’s duration. We propose that identification would predict ingroup collective action but not necessarily joint collective action. The reason for this is that ingroup collective action resonates more with “us” and with the perception that the ingroup shares the same grievances and fate, whereas joint action diffuses the ingroup and “us” comes to include also (some of) “them,” who are to blame for the ingroup’s grievances. Thus, we propose that as a result conflict escalation, situational increases in identification may decrease joint action. This increase in the salience of group identities could set any collaboration with the outgroup in opposition to the identity and the values of the ingroup. Thus, the more one identifies with the ingroup, the less he/she would want to work together with the advantaged outgroup, even in the context of fighting for change.

Group Identification as an Antecedent of Ingroup Collective Action

Collective action has been conceptualized in the literature as an event in which individuals, in their capacity as group members, engage in action “directed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole” (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990, p. 995). Taking this definition into account, a large body of literature has examined the psychological processes underpinning collective action (e.g., Kelly & Kelly, 1994; Klandermans, 1997; Sturmer & Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2008), demonstrating the importance of four core motivations: emotions associated with perceptions of injustice (e.g., anger), efficacy beliefs about the group’s ability to achieve its goals, a sense of identification with the group, and moral convictions (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears & Bettache, 2011). The vast majority of this research has focused on non-

violent or normative forms of collective action, with more recent work considering predictors of other forms of action and finding, for example, that more radical strategies are predicted by contempt or hatred (Tausch et al., 2011; Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, Halperin, 2016). The evidence that non-violent and violent collective action could be explained by distinct emotions notwithstanding, integrative psychological perspectives on collective action such as the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008) suggest that identification with the disadvantaged ingroup is a strong predictor of collective action that also informs and amplifies feelings of injustice and efficacy—a contention well in line with the definition presented above, whereby potential benefits to the ingroup are the main target of any collective action.

Why Group Identification May Not Predict Joint Collective Action

However, the existing literature offers little insight into the role of social identity when the view of “us versus them” conflicts with the potential benefits of collective action, such as when disadvantaged group members act jointly with advantaged-outgroup members. We define joint collective action as any action undertaken by members of the disadvantaged and advantaged group together for the purpose of promoting social change. The term joint signifies that this action is differentiated from other related forms such as solidarity-based action (Subasic, Reynolds and Turner, 2008), which can be undertaken by advantaged group members without the presence of the disadvantaged. This collaboration between disadvantaged and advantaged group members is potentially meaningful as it can bolster the struggle of the disadvantaged by increasing their access to resources and decision-making processes and communicating to the public norms against inequality and injustice (Louis, 2009).

Consistent with the notion that strong identification with the ingroup should in theory, into any collective action that aims to advance the groups goals, hypothetically it should also

be positively linked to joint collective action for social change. Despite such potential, joint collective action appears to be less common than collective action that involves the disadvantaged group alone, and in certain cases it can be controversial, especially when decades of oppression and injustice underlie the conflict between groups. The uniqueness of joint action lies in its conflicting components, namely the collective action component and the component of intergroup contact between groups that vary in power and status and may even be enemies. On the one hand, collective action aims to change the status quo and emerges from perceptions of intergroup differences and strong identification with the ingroup. On the other hand, however, cooperative intergroup encounters are often structured to deemphasize such differences and highlight commonalities between the groups (Becker, Wright, Lubensky, Zhou, 2013; Saguy, 2018; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Thus, joint action encompasses inherent conflicts for disadvantaged group members between their perception of the outgroup as oppressive and the perception of outgroup members as allies, and between their ingroup identity and the common identity that can emanate from collaborating with the outgroup.

This dynamic raises the question of whether joint collective action—like ingroup collective action— is predicted by strong ingroup identification. Specifically, it is plausible that for disadvantaged group members, particularly in the context of intergroup conflict, the need to differentiate their group from the oppressor is so meaningful that it makes it hard to think of outgroup members as partners. In addition, in the context of intergroup conflicts there may be very little trust between the two groups, making such partnership challenging (Celebi, et al., 2014). If so, joint action that, by creating a shared front, involves some de-categorization of the distinction between us—the disadvantaged—and them—the advantaged, may be unattractive to strong identifiers. This is consistent with previous research suggesting that strong identification is associated with motivations for intergroup differentiation and can

thus undermine willingness to cooperate with the outgroup (Brewer, 1996; Kelly, 1988; Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008). Furthermore, joint action involves cooperative contact with the outgroup, which may also be unattractive to strong identifiers (Ron et al., 2017). Accordingly, the present research seeks to illuminate the complex role of ingroup identification in predicting joint collective action tendencies among the disadvantaged.

The question of how a strong identity relates to joint action is particularly important when we consider the dynamics of conflict across time. Conflicts between groups do not develop along a unidirectional path, but rather pass through phases of escalation and de-escalation (Kriesberg, 2007). These changes are also meaningful when considering levels of ingroup identification. The salience of group identities likely increases during conflict escalation because group members feel that their identity is threatened, which contributes to the polarization of identities and feeds a climate of distrust, defensiveness, and hostility (Klandermans, 2014; Fisher, 2006). In keeping with this, during phases of escalation groups are mobilized for intergroup struggle and are more willing to undertake confrontational actions in an attempt to protect the ingroup (Kriesberg, 2007). Thus, intergroup boundaries become firmer, leaving little freedom to blur intergroup distinctions. Under such circumstances, disadvantaged group members may come to see cooperation as opposite to what they stand for, so that strong identification would not promote joint action, and situational increases in identification may even decrease willingness for joint action.

The Current Research

Previous work has emphasized ingroup identification as a driving force for ingroup collective action. Joint action, on the other hand, blurs intergroup boundaries, and involves cooperation with outgroup members of a conflict, and may therefore be met with resistance in contexts in which such boundaries are meaningful. The current research aims to investigate the link between ingroup identification and joint action tendencies, particularly in the context

of intergroup conflict, which heightens the distinction between ingroup and outgroup. We also consider conflict escalation as a potential moderator of the relationship between identification and joint collective action by examining how these relationships change over time. This allows us to explore two different types of effects: both how general levels of identification predict joint action, how this changes over time, and how situational changes in identification within subjects relate to change in willingness for joint action. We propose that in the context of intergroup conflict, general group identification does not predict willingness to undertake joint action with outgroup members, and we expect that this relationship may even become negative during times of conflict escalation. In addition, situational fluctuations in identification should be negatively related to joint action, such that if a person's identification is heightened their willingness for joint action decreases.

To understand the complex relationship between identification and joint action, we analyzed data from a three-wave study we conducted in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in which conflict resolution has been elusive for decades. The origin of this conflict can be traced back to the growth of the Zionist movement and the 1948 War (Kelman, 1999). These led to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and the displacement of 80% of the Palestinian population (referred to as the *Nakba*, meaning catastrophe), which was countered by a rise in the Palestinian national identity and resistance. During the 1967 War, Israel seized what is now known as the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT), a turning point that shaped the conflict and Palestinian struggle for liberation ever since (Badil, 2004; Khalidi, 1997). The lasting experience of Palestinians with oppression and injustice has motivated both strong identification and different forms of collective action, including popular and armed resistance, but also joint Palestinian-Israeli actions. Despite its potential value to advancing social change, such joint actions have become less and less common with the Palestinian-Israeli peace process reaching a deadlock. Palestine/Israel thus offers a unique

context in which to examine joint collective action among a disadvantaged group experiencing prolonged oppression and a conflict that continuously undergoes phases of escalation and de-escalation.

Method

Participants and procedure

Participants were Palestinians living in the city of Ramallah and the surrounding areas in the West Bank, who were recruited by a local survey company (Near East Consulting) for face-to-face interviews. As online polling companies are not available in this region, and due to the sensitive socio-political topics of the study, recruiting participants and maintaining their participation over a long period of time posed a significant challenge. Our past research experiences in the West Bank encountered distrust and lack of cooperation by many of the Palestinians approached, who expressed concerns and fear of being subject to political persecution by the Israeli army or the Palestinian Authority—concerns that are common to marginalized and oppressed groups. To overcome these challenges, the survey company employed convenience sampling, in which survey personnel recruited people in their social network, alongside efforts to obtain population representation consistent with statistics from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. The final sample was generally similar in demographics to the overall population, with similar gender and age distributions (see Table 1 in the supplementary materials).

We administered the first wave in May 2018, during a period of relative calm, allowing us to assess all variables at baseline levels. Four hundred and fifty participants (51% women; ages 18-70, $M_{age} = 33.9$) completed the first wave (T1). The sample size was determined by a generic power analysis, as this survey would be used for a number of research projects. We aimed to be able to detect small changes across time points ($d = .2$) with high sensitivity (95% power at the $p = .01$ level). A power analysis conducted in

G*Power indicated that a sample of 449 was required. We collected data for a second wave (T2) seven months later, during a period of escalation following two drive-by shootings carried out by Palestinians that targeting Israeli soldiers and settlers near illegal Israeli settlements. The Israeli army imposed a military closure on Ramallah, raiding residential neighborhoods and shutting down major checkpoints between it and surrounding cities—all of which meant the escalation significantly affected our participants. Finally, we administered a third wave nine months later, during another period of “calm”.

Our choice of data collection methodology proved effective, as participant attrition was minimal: The vast majority of participants completed all three waves ($n = 420$, 50% women, $M_{age} = 33.7$), and only these were included in the final analyses. In all waves, after obtaining their informed consent¹⁰, the interviewer read to participants the questions and recorded their answers. Each interview lasted around 40-60 minutes, and each participant received an anonymized identification code, allowing us to match responses across the waves.

Measures

Our primary variables of interest (identification and joint and ingroup collective action intentions) as well as other relevant constructs from the SIMCA model (anger and efficacy) were measured at all time points. In addition, we included a measure of tolerance for violence against the other side across time as an indicator of conflict escalation. During periods of escalation, we would expect participants to become more supportive and tolerant of violence, even if they themselves are not actively engaged in violent action. Demographic variables were measured only at T1. Given the small number of missing data points (no variable contained more than 10% missing values), we used a pairwise deletion technique to

¹⁰ The study was approved by a specific IRB committee set up to oversee the research funded by a grant to the last author

handle missing data in our analyses, which is preferred over more complex imputation procedures in this case (Newman, 2014).

This study was a part of a large-scale survey that examined a number of research questions and thus it included additional measures that were not analyzed in the current study. The data obtained from these additional measures will be used in future publications.¹¹ We report the full list of measures in the supplementary materials. Unless otherwise indicated, all items reported below were measured on a 6-point Likert-type scale anchored 1 (*Not at all*) and 6 (*To a very large extent*).

Group Identification. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following statements: “Being Palestinian is an important part of my identity” and “I identify with other Palestinians” ($T1\ r = .82$, $T2\ r = .84$, $T3\ r = .66$) (adapted from Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

Collective Action Intentions. Participants were asked about their willingness to engage in ingroup collective action: “Participating in demonstrations against the occupation,” “Participating in sit-ins against the occupation,” “Acting within social political movements against the occupation”, “Supporting the political and economic boycott of Israel”, and “Organizing campaigns targeting the public and merchants to boycott Israeli products” ($T1\ \alpha = .97$, $T2\ \alpha = .99$, $T3\ \alpha = .96$) (adapted from Van Zomeren et al., 2004, and Tausch et al., 2011); and in joint collective action: “Participating in joint Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives” and “Participating in joint Palestinian-Israeli demonstrations against the occupation” ($T2\ r = .82$, $T2\ r = .84$, $T3\ r = .66$).

Tolerance of Violent Action. Participants rated the extent to which they thought violent collective action was acceptable: “To what extent do you think it is understandable

¹¹ We note that one paper has already been published based on data from only the first two waves of this study (see Hasan-Aslih, Shuman et al., 2020). This manuscript was not included because it addresses a research question that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

that people resort to non-peaceful means of resistance?”, “To what extent do you think it is legitimate that people resort to non-peaceful means of resistance?”, and “To what extent to you understand people who engage in armed resistance” (T1 $\alpha = .92$, T2 $\alpha = .91$, T3 $\alpha = .90$) (Tausch et al., 2011).

Demographics. Participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire in T1. Items included gender, age, education, income, religion, religiosity, and profession.

Results

The code used to analyze the data can be found at <https://osf.io/5xvwe/>. We first examined the means of all study variables at each time point (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1) and tested how these varied across time (through the periods of escalation and de-escalation) using repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Bivariate correlations between main study variables at all time points are presented in the supplementary materials.

Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for measured variable and changes in these across time.

		Time 1	Time 2	Time 3
		<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)
Group Identification	$F(2,838) = 18.12, p < .001$	4.76 (1.28) ^a	5.10 (1.14) ^b	4.71 (1.12) ^a
Ingroup Collective Action	$F(2,838) = 3.58, p = .03$	2.83 (1.54) ^a	3.05 (1.81) ^b	2.98 (1.73) ^b
Joint Collective Action	$F(2,838) = 13.01, p < .001$	2.59 (1.44) ^a	2.20 (1.33) ^b	2.29 (1.48) ^b
Tolerance of Violent Collective Action	$F(2,838) = 35.64, p < .001$	3.85 (1.38) ^a	4.49 (1.31) ^b	4.06 (1.36) ^c

Note. Means with different superscripts denote significant differences at the $p < .05$ level.

Figure 3.1. Change in measured variables across time.

Note. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.

In the first ANOVA, we checked whether our data reflected the escalation generated by the Palestinian attacks and subsequent Israeli military actions that occurred at T2. To reflect an escalation at T2 relative to T1 and T3, we would expect to see a peak in tolerance for violent actions towards Israelis at that time point. Indeed, the analysis shows an increase in tolerance for violence from T1 to T2 followed by a decrease from T2 to T3, which is in line with our understanding of T2 coinciding with a period of heightened escalation. Consistent with our expectations, identification with the ingroup was also significantly higher at T2.

Ingroup collective action also showed an increase from T1 to T2, but remained high at T3, months following the escalation. Conversely, willingness to participate in joint action *decreased* from T1 to T2 and remained low at T3. We also examined the distributions of all variables (see supplementary materials for violin plots), finding that the skewness for all

variables approached an absolute value of .5 or higher. We therefore log-transformed all variables to meet the assumption required for the central regression analyses¹².

The Relationship between Identification and Collective Action Across Time

We investigated the role of identification in explaining both ingroup and joint action at each time point using a mixed-model analysis with the lme4 and lmerTest packages in R. Since our primary predictor of interest, i.e. identification, was measured and also varied across time we employed the methods described by Wang and Maxwell (2015) in order to disentangle within versus between participant effects, by centering and separating identification into within and Between-subject predictors. If such steps are not taken, the meaning of the effect of identification in the model is unclear as it reflects a mixture of two effects: 1) the effect of a person's general level of identification, which remains constant across situations (Between-subject effect) and 2) situationally dependent fluctuations of identification (Within-subject effect). To capture the effect of changes in identification, participant's scores on identification were participant mean centered, and this was entered as a continuous Within-subject predictor. To capture the effect of general levels of identification, participant's mean identification (across time) was centered to the grand mean and entered as a continuous Between-subject predictor. In addition, type of action (ingroup vs. joint) and time (T1 vs. T2 vs. T3) were treated as categorical within-subject variables. Since time was a categorical variable, we dummy coded it so that the period of escalation (T2) was the reference variable, as we were particularly interested in how processes at this time point compared to the other two time points. This yielded two dummy variables: one reflecting the difference between the T1 and T2 (escalation), and the second the difference

¹² We obtain the same results if we use raw values.

between T3 and T2. All variables other than the dummy variables were mean centered for the interpretability of main effects and two-way interactions.

Based on our hypotheses we were primarily interested in two potential interactions. First, we were interested in the interaction between change in identification and type of action, as this would tell us whether situational increases or decreases in levels of identification were linked with increases or decreases in ingroup versus joint action across time. Second, we were interested in the interaction between participant's general level of identification, type of action, and time. This interaction would give us information about whether general levels of identification predicted ingroup versus joint action differently at times of escalation versus de-escalation. Below, we focus our discussion of the results on these interactions, with statistics for all other regression coefficients presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Regression coefficients for the full model predicting collective action

<i>Predictors</i>	Willingness to Engage in Action				
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>Statistic p</i>	
Intercept	1.23 ***	0.02	1.20, 1.26	78.69	<0.001
Time D1 (Time 2 versus Time 1)	0.03	0.02	-0.01, 0.06	1.59	0.11
Time D2 (Time 2 versus Time 3)	-0.02	0.02	-0.05, 0.01	-1.26	0.21
Type of Action	0.28 ***	0.02	0.24, 0.33	12.42	<0.001
General Identification	0.38 ***	0.09	0.20, 0.56	4.16	<0.001
Changes in Identification	-0.01	0.04	-0.08, 0.06	-0.30	0.76
Time D1 X Type of Action	-0.17 ***	0.03	-0.23, -0.10	-5.14	<0.001
Time D2 X Type of Action	-0.05	0.03	-0.11, 0.02	-1.45	0.15

Time D1 X General Identification	0.14	0.09	-0.04, 0.32	1.52	0.13
Time D1 X General Identification	0.33 ***	0.09	0.15, 0.51	3.53	<0.001
Type of Action X General Identification	0.66 ***	0.13	0.40, 0.92	5.04	<0.001
Type of Action X Changes in Identification	0.25 ***	0.07	0.10, 0.39	3.32	0.001
Time D1 X Type of Action X General Identification	-0.36	0.19	-0.73, 0.00	-1.95	0.050
Time D2 X Type of Action X General Identification	-0.15	0.19	-0.52, 0.21	-0.83	0.41

Random Effects

σ^2	0.11
$\tau_{00 \text{ id}}$	0.05
ICC	0.32
N_{id}	421
Observations	2508
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.136 / 0.408

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

As predicted, the interaction between change in identification and action type was significant, $b = 0.25$, $CI = [0.10, 0.39]$, $SE = 0.07$, $t = 3.32$, $p = 0.001$ (see Figure 3.2). Simple slopes analyses reveal that changes in identification were positively related to ingroup action across time, meaning that increases in identification were associated with increases in ingroup action, $b = 0.11$, $CI = [0.01, 0.22]$, $SE = 0.05$, $t = 2.13$, $p = .03$. However, changes in identification were negatively related to joint action across time, indicating that that increases

in identification were associated with decreases in joint action, $b = -0.13$, $CI = [-0.24, -0.03]$, $SE = 0.05$, $t = -2.56$, $p = .01$.

Figure 3.2. The interaction of change in identification and type of action willingness to partake in collective action across time

Note. Shaded areas reflect 95% confidence intervals, and all variables are log transformed.

In addition, the three-way interaction between general levels of identification, type of action, and the dummy variable reflecting the comparison between T1 and T2 was marginally significant, $b = -0.36$, $CI = [-0.73, 0.0004]$, $SE = 0.19$, $t = -1.95$, $p = 0.050$ (see Figure 3.3). However, the three-way interaction between type of action, identification, and the dummy variable reflecting the comparison between T3 and T2 was not significant, $b = -0.15$, $CI = [-0.54, 0.003]$, $SE = 0.19$, $t = -0.83$, $p = 0.41$.¹³ Analysis of simple slopes revealed that at T1

¹³ Even if we add anger and efficacy (the other predictors of collective action in the SIMCA) as well as demographics as covariates, then these interactions remain at the same or increase in significance level, that is .04, and .35 respectively.

general identification was associated with joint action, $b = .37$, $CI = [0.15, 0.59]$, $SE = 0.11$, $t = 3.30$, $p < .001$, and it positively predicted ingroup action, $b = 0.67$, $CI = [0.45, 0.89]$, $SE = 0.11$, $t = 5.93$, $p < .001$. At T2, general identification still positively predicted ingroup action, $b = 0.71$, $CI = [0.49, 0.93]$, $SE = 0.11$, $t = 6.32$, $p < .001$, but was *not* associated with joint action, $b = 0.05$, $CI = [-0.17, 0.27]$, $SE = 0.11$, $t = 0.42$, $p = .67$. At T3 the pattern was similar to T1, such that identification positively predicted ingroup action, $b = 0.96$, $CI = [0.74, 1.18]$, $SE = 0.11$, $t = 8.55$, $p < .001$, but and positively predicted joint action, $b = 0.45$, $CI = [0.23, 0.67]$, $SE = 0.11$, $t = 4.03$, $p < .001$.¹⁴

Figure 3.3. The three-way interaction of general identification, type of action and time on willingness to partake in collective action

Note. Shaded areas reflect 95% confidence intervals, and all variables are log transformed.

Because we were particularly interested on the changing effect of identification on joint action over time, we wanted to ensure that the differences between the effects were

¹⁴ It is worth noting that using a different dummy-coding coding scheme which allows for a comparison of T1 and T3 reveals that there is no significant difference in the pattern of results between T1 and T2.

statistically significant (especially given that the three-way interaction was marginally significant). Therefore, we ran an additional analysis only using joint action as the dependent variable, in which case the significance of the interaction terms between time and general identification only reflects significant differences in the effect of identification on joint action across time. We ran the same analysis but without ingroup action, and thus without action type as a predictor (see Table 3.3). The interaction between general levels of identification and the dummy variable reflecting the comparison between T1 and T2 was significant, $b = 0.32$, $CI = [0.05, 0.59]$, $SE = 0.14$, $t = 2.33$, $p = 0.02$, and interaction between general identification and the dummy variable reflecting the comparison between T3 and T2 was also significant, $b = 0.40$, $CI = [0.13, 0.67]$, $SE = 0.14$, $t = 2.94$, $p = 0.003$. Analysis of simple slopes revealed that at T1 general identification was associated with joint action, $b = .47$, $CI = [0.24, 0.69]$, $SE = 0.11$, $t = 4.12$, $p < .001$, but at T2 was *not* associated with joint action, $b = 0.06$, $CI = [-0.17, 0.28]$, $SE = 0.11$, $t = 0.50$, $p = .62$. The T3 results were similar to T1 and general identification positively predicted joint action, $b = 0.35$, $CI = [0.13, 0.57]$, $SE = 0.11$, $t = 3.07$, $p < .001$. These significant interactions indicated that there were significant differences in the effect of general identification across time, and that the weaker interactions in the prior model were likely due to the stability of identification's effect on ingroup action across time.

Table 3.3. Regression coefficients for the full model predicting joint action only.

<i>Predictors</i>	Joint Action			<i>Statistic</i>	<i>p</i>
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI</i>		
Intercept	1.09 ***	0.02	1.05, 1.13	-1.88	<0.001
Time D1 (Time 2 versus Time 1)	0.11 ***	0.02	0.06, 0.15	4.52	<0.001

Time D2 (Time 2 versus Time 3)	0.00	0.02	-0.04, 0.05	0.12	0.90
General Identification	0.05	0.11	-0.17, 0.27	0.42	0.67
Changes in Identification	-0.13 *	0.06	-0.24, -0.03	-2.45	0.01
Time D1 X General Identification	0.32 *	0.14	0.05, 0.59	2.33	0.02
Time D1 X General Identification	0.40 **	0.14	0.13, 0.67	2.94	0.003

Random Effects

σ^2	0.12
$\tau_{00 \text{ id}}$	0.04
ICC	0.26
N _{id}	421
Observations	1258
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	0.040 / 0.291

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Discussion

Identity is an important driving force that motivates people to take action to promote the interests of their group. While identification can facilitate participation in collective action that emphasizes connectedness and shared fate between members of the ingroup, the current research shows the complicated role of identification in predicting action that includes members of the advantaged outgroup in the collective, especially when the disadvantaged are in direct conflict with the advantaged. In this chapter, we conducted a three-wave longitudinal study to investigate the relationship between group identification among

disadvantaged group members and their joint (vs. ingroup) collective action tendencies in the context of intergroup conflict.

Our results revealed that high identification predicts tendencies for ingroup collective action and for joint collective action, but only during periods of relative calm. During escalation general identification with the ingroup *no longer* predicts joint action. In other words, while strongly identified individuals are more likely to engage in joint action than weakly identified individuals during periods of calm, during escalation individuals are uniformly unwilling to engage in joint action regardless of identification. While we did not find support for our hypothesis that the relationship would become negative during escalation, the relationship did significantly decrease, shifting from positive to a null relationship. In addition, our results did indicate that situational increases in identification, driven by such escalation, were negatively related to change in joint action. In other words, when conflict events lead individuals to identify more strongly with their group, their motivation for joint action decreases, while their motivation for ingroup action increases. Overall, these results suggest that high identifiers, despite their strong commitment to their group, are not always driven to jointly engage in collective action with outgroup allies. In fact, when conflict exacerbates, their strong identification pulls them away from any cooperation with the outgroup, even if such cooperation is designed to promote social change.

The present research offers an important contribution to the literature on collective action, as it demonstrates that the psychological processes underlying joint collective action may be distinct from those underlying ingroup collective action. Established social identity approaches to collective action have thus far focused on how a strong sense of identification with the group drives motivation to engage in collective action on the behalf of the group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008). However, joint action is not

just collective action, but also a form of cooperative intergroup contact with outgroup allies. Thus, issues such as lack of trust, ideological differences, and clashes between identities could be barriers to joint action for high identifiers. Our results reflect this complexity, while identification predicted joint action during periods of relative calm, there was no relationship between identification and joint action during escalation, and situational increases in identification decreased joint action.

Acting together with outgroup members is likely to shift focus away from the identity of the disadvantaged and generate a superordinate identity that includes both the disadvantaged and the advantaged. Especially during times of heightened conflict, high identifiers seem to resist cooperating with the outgroup under a common identity. This could stem from concerns that outgroup allies may not be dependable and might retreat from action during more threatening circumstances. On the other hand, this reluctance to cooperate with the advantaged outgroup may denote that disadvantaged group members believe that inclusion of allies from the outgroup may eventually result in the marginalization of their identity and the domination of the advantaged over the movement. In line with this, the work described in Chapter 4 shows that concerns about normalization of power relations (i.e., obscuring them in ways that make them appear normal) may demotivate the disadvantaged from engaging in joint action with outgroup members, particularly when their group identification is high (see also Droogendyk, Lubensky & Louis, 2016; Louis 2009). High identifiers may be concerned that during such times of escalation, joint action may not be aimed at promoting the goals of their group but rather communicating messages of commonality and harmony which can sometimes distract from inequality (Saguy, et al., 2009).

We acknowledge that the current research was conducted in a context of protracted conflict that is characterized by high intensity and violence, thereby engendering extreme

disparities between identities. Although theory would suggest that the psychological dynamics of joint collective action should apply to other social contexts as well, future research may investigate the relationship between identification and joint action in additional intergroup conflicts that differ in severity. In addition, despite the evidence that joint action is more weakly predicted by ingroup identification than ingroup collective action, and that this identification may even decrease support for joint action, it is plausible that it is driven by a different social identity that was not considered in our study. Future research could thus examine whether motivation for joint action can be promoted by a superordinate identity that encompasses the identities of both groups.

In conclusion, Chapter 3 demonstrates that the tendency to act collectively with outgroup members appears psychologically different from the decision to act collectively with ingroup members. The studies reported in this chapter demonstrate that stronger group identification may be insufficient to motivate group members for joint action, and in times of conflict escalation it may even pull them away from such action. This research alludes to the notion that joint action puts disadvantaged group members, especially higher identifiers, in a unique dilemma about whether one should “sleep with the enemy”.

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Chapter 4

The Dilemma of “Sleeping with the Enemy”: A Comprehensive Examination of what (De)Motivates Disadvantaged Group Members to Partake in Joint Collective Action

This chapter is based on Hasan-Aslih, S., Pliskin, R., Shuman, E., Van Zomeren, M., Saguy, T., Halperin, E. The Dilemma of “Sleeping with the Enemy”: A Comprehensive Examination of what (De)Motivates Disadvantaged Group Members to Partake in Joint Collective Action. *Manuscript submitted for publication.*

Supplemental materials for this chapter can be found online in the Open Science Framework (OSF): <https://osf.io/p9e6d/>

“The Jewish left can participate in the Palestinian struggle, but not as a partner”

- Rami Younis, Palestinian writer and activist

Collective action is typically viewed as involving members of disadvantaged groups, who seek social change to improve their group's conditions (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Yet during struggles against injustice, members of disadvantaged and advantaged groups sometimes join forces to promote social change. This interesting phenomenon can be observed in alliances between, for example, White and Black Americans, Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, and men and women. Researchers have explored the psychology of such *joint action* from the perspective of the advantaged (i.e., solidarity-based action, see Radke, Kutlaca, Siem, Wright, Becker, 2020; van Zomeren et al., 2011), but little attention has been given to the disadvantaged group's perspective on such collaboration (see Chapter 3). We propose, however, that joint action may pose an intriguing dilemma for disadvantaged group members, specifically: while such action may be instrumental toward achieving change, it may also be perceived as normalizing the intergroup power differential, as the quote above suggests. Understanding this dilemma could offer novel and more comprehensive insights into whether disadvantaged groups prefer to act alone, or “sleep with the enemy” to achieve social change together.

We define joint collective action as any action jointly undertaken by members of the disadvantaged and advantaged group that is aimed at bolstering the disadvantaged's status (Hasan-Aslih & Shuman et. al, 2020; Wright, 2009). Advantaged group members are sometimes motivated to participate in action in solidarity with the disadvantaged (e.g., Whites supporting Blacks) — an act that appears to go against the advantaged group's immediate interest (e.g., Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011), thus involving other dilemmas that are outside our present focus. For members of the disadvantaged group, joint

action poses a dilemma stemming from the potential double-edged nature of allyship with the enemy. For instance, demonstrations against police brutality in the United States triggered controversy when White allies adopted a Black gesture and chanted “Hands up, Don’t Shoot” (Kameir & Mayard, 2014), which was perceived as a supremacist attempt to present equivalence between Blacks and Whites. Collaborating with members of a group that is regarded as the “enemy” or oppressor might thus be perceived as entailing certain costs for the disadvantaged.

The present research offers a social-psychological examination of joint action among the disadvantaged that explores a *motivation* and a *barrier* that we believe form the basis for this dilemma: the perceived *instrumentality* of joint action, and the perceived potential for joint action to *normalize* power relations between the groups. This dilemma is qualitatively different from the typical collective action dilemma based in the tension between individual and collective motives, that is, whether to collaborate with others or free ride to enjoy the collective benefits of action (Klandermans, 2002; Olson, 1965). Indeed, participation in joint action itself poses a dilemma between two implications: the instrumentality of joining forces with “the enemy” against the risk of normalizing the asymmetrical power relations.

The dilemma of acting together with the enemy

Instrumentality. Joint action can benefit the disadvantaged group by increasing their leverage and access to power, influence, and decisionmakers, which are all *instrumental* factors that could advance social change. Instrumental motives for participation in collective action stem from the appraisal that some desired outcomes can be achieved at affordable costs through engaging in collective action. This approach assumes that instrumentality-motivated individuals weigh the perceived costs and benefits of participation in collective action (Klandermans, 1984; Sturmer & Simon, 2004), reflecting a social dilemma between individual and collective motives. Thus, the more effective individuals believe participation

in collective action will be, the more likely they are to participate (Louis, Taylor, & Neil, 2004; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013).

We believe that the dilemma underlying joint action is qualitatively different in the sense that it is not just between the individual and the group, but relates specifically to “sleeping with the enemy.” As such, the calculation of potential benefits in the context of joint collective action might be in part shaped by intergroup power and identity dynamics. Perceived instrumentality then refers to whether joining forces with members of the more powerful group will make the action more effective in achieving its goal. There would be good reason to assume that this is not “just” a belief or perception. Resource mobilization theorists suggest that allies can offer resources that turn an otherwise ineffective action or campaign into an effective one (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). When the outgroup has more resources, and more access to financial and logistical support, it also has more influence on authorities, decisionmakers, and the public. Thus, cooperating with outgroup allies may indeed have beneficial outcomes, as it can increase political access and bridge gaps between the ingroup and outgroup-controlled authorities. Accordingly, we expect stronger perceptions of instrumentality of joint action to be associated with increased willingness to participate in joint action.

Normalization. Joint action could have potential negative implications from the perspective of the disadvantaged group, as cooperation with the advantaged group could obscure the salience of intergroup boundaries and contribute to normalizing hierarchy, thereby undermining the efforts to promote social change (see Becker, Wright, Lubensky, & Zhou, 2013). We define normalization as the social process of cloaking inequality and blurring power relations in ways that make disparities between the group seem normal (Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, & Dovidio, 2015); perceived normalization thus refers to individuals’ perception that joint action will have this effect.

Although joint action is aimed at promoting social change, Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, and Louis (2016) identify several challenges that could arise when disadvantaged and advantaged group member act together, and these can illuminate the process of normalization. A process of normalization can take place when the boundaries between the perpetrators and the victims of injustice become less clear as a function of idealizing harmony. Droogendyk and her colleagues (2016), for example, suggest that participants in the movement may seek to define the shared space of activism by highlighting cross-group commonalities in identities, values, and attitudes. While this can create a sense of togetherness, the distinct group identity of the disadvantaged might be compromised in the process of establishing such commonality (see also Louis, 2009). Indeed, the literature on intergroup relations (e.g., Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Sengupta & Sibley, 2013) has provided empirical evidence that highlighting harmony and common identity between the groups can reduce attention to inequality and undermine motivation for social change (Hässler et al., 2019; Saguy, 2018; Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, & Dovidio, 2015). To the extent that disadvantaged group members recognize the possibility that intergroup interactions could neutralize attempts to address power relations, they may be less willing to partake in such interactions (Kteily, Saguy, Sidanius, & Taylor, 2013; Ron, Solomon, Halperin, & Saguy, 2017). Thus, concerns about de-emphasizing the identity of the disadvantaged and intergroup disparities for the sake of promoting commonality and harmony may make disadvantaged group members reluctant to engage in joint action.

Processes of normalization could also occur when the disadvantaged are marginalized by benevolent paternalistic behaviors that are ostensibly meant to do good (Jackman, 1994). Indeed, Droogendyk and colleagues (2016) point out that advantaged outgroup allies may fail to recognize their privileges, taking the role of “saviors” and instructing the disadvantaged on how to conduct their struggle. A number of works (Becker, Ksenofontov, Siem, Love, 2018;

Nadler, 2002; van Leeuwen & Tauber, 2010) suggest that inappropriate forms of help can be driven by a motivation to maintain an advantaged social position alongside a positive identity, all of which under the guise of care and protection. Because such acts maintain the dependency of the disadvantaged on the advantaged, they serve to perpetuate and normalize the power relations between the groups (Jackman, 1994; Nadler, 2002). Therefore, if disadvantaged group members worry that they would be patronized as part of the struggle, they would be reluctant to act jointly with advantaged group allies.

In sum, we argue that joint action potentially carries both benefits and costs to the disadvantaged group. Participating in joint collective action with the advantaged group is based in cost-benefit calculus which weighs the benefit of joining forces against the cost of blurring intergroup boundaries. This decision to “sleep with the enemy” is a dilemma because disadvantaged group members need to estimate whether the instrumentality of joint action justifies the risk of normalizing power relations. Accordingly, we propose that perceptions of instrumentality motivate joint action, whereas perception of normalization undermine such motivation.

The current research

The goal of this research is to examine whether and how perceived instrumentality and normalization influence disadvantaged group members’ willingness to participate in joint collective action. We propose that given the power imbalance between the groups involved, joint action poses a unique dilemma to disadvantaged group members which lies between the instrumentality of joint action and the risk of normalization. We hypothesize that perceptions of instrumentality increase willingness to participate in joint collective action, whereas perceptions of normalization undermine this willingness. To examine these hypotheses, we conducted three experimental studies using two different contexts that feature an ongoing struggle for equality and justice (the U.S. and Palestine), characterized by clear inequality

between the groups (White and Black Americans, Israeli Jews and Palestinians). In both contexts, historical and present-day occurrences of joint collective action between disadvantaged and advantaged group members have given rise to supportive as well as critical voices, citing ideological and/or practical considerations (see Kameir & Mayard, 2014; Younis, 2014). Studies 1 and 2 employed two different methods to test the influence of perceived instrumentality and normalization on intentions to undertake joint collective action. Study 4.3 examined whether the costs associated with normalization may be so high as to also undermine the perceived effectiveness of the joint action.

Study 4.1

To test our hypotheses, we explored participants' imagined responses of a person faced with the option of undertaking joint collective action. Through the use of a scenario experiment (Scherer, 1988), we manipulated appraisals of a collective action situation by another person with regard to our two hypothesized predictors. The strength of this paradigm is that it allows participants distance from the situation, minimizing potential biases resulting from participants' reluctance to share their real opinions. The study was conducted among Black Americans amidst a period of racial tension and protests against racial inequality.

Participants read a hypothetical scenario based on real events that occurred in the U.S at the time of data collection. The text described a university student who is considering partaking in joint collective action with White students. The scenarios manipulated the student's appraisals regarding the joint action, that is, whether he perceived the action as instrumental and normalizing power relations. We also manipulated appraisals of commonality between Black Americans and White allies, because one possible correlate of perceived normalization is the blurring of group boundaries, so and we wanted to isolate differentiate normalization from commonality effects. Participants then rated the extent to which they expected the student to engage in the action. We predicted that the student's

appraisals that joint action is instrumental would increase the perceived likelihood that he will engage in joint collective action, whereas the appraisal that the action normalizes hierarchy would decrease the perceived likelihood.

Method

Participants

To calculate sample size, we performed a power analysis specifying 80% power and an anticipated medium effect size of Cohen's $f = .2$, yielding a sample size of 327. We recruited 376 Black American participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk, oversampling by about 15% to allow for possible exclusions due to the online format. Because the study was conducted online, where attention is less likely to be sustained throughout the study, we excluded participants based on attention checks (Maniaci & Rogge, 2014). Ten participants were dropped from the analyses for failing all three attention check questions, leaving a sample of 366 participants (189 females, ages 18-65 $M_{\text{age}} = 32.87$ years).

Procedure

We adapted the method of *imagined responses to criteria-based scenario simulations*, which is commonly used in the research based on appraisal theories of emotions (see Scherer, 1988). The original method consists of constructing scenarios in which specific components of the situation that imply particular appraisal criteria are systematically varied. The subjects imagine which emotion they or the person in the scenario would have felt if they experienced the same situation and appraised it in the same way. To manipulate appraisals relevant to joint action, participants were presented with a profile of a Black student named Joshua, who is considering taking part in joint Black and White protests. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of several versions of a text that described how Joshua appraised the action. These appraisals varied across three variables in a 2x2x2 design: the effectiveness of the protests (instrumentality), the extent to which Joshua and White allies share values and

goals (commonality), and the extent to which the protest blurs power relations (normalization). Participants then rated the extent to which they expected Joshua to be motivated to partake in joint collective action. The underlying assumption was that the way participants make sense of the dilemma that Joshua faces reflects to a large extent their calculation of the costs and benefits of participation, while distancing themselves from the event.

Measures

Manipulation checks. To check whether participants comprehended the vignette in accordance with the conditions to which they were assigned, three items measured the extent to which they believed Joshua thinks that (1) joint protests would be beneficial for promoting the status of Black Americans (instrumentality); (2) joint protests would blur hierarchical race relations (normalization); and (3) Josh and White allies share common values and goals (commonality).

*Joint collective action tendencies*¹⁵ were assessed with three items asking participants to what extent they thought Josh would be willing to engage in different forms of joint action (e.g., “peaceful demonstrations with other Black and White Americans,” $\alpha = .89$). To assess participants' own hypothetical action tendencies, we also asked them: “If you were in Josh's position, to what extent do you think you would join these protests?”¹⁶

Results and Discussion

Manipulation checks. A series of three-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) specifying the three manipulated appraisals as the independent variables and each

¹⁵ All the surveys reported in this manuscript included additional measures for exploratory purposes and be found on OSF <https://osf.io/p9e6d/>

¹⁶ We also assessed the extent to which Josh perceived joint action to be a dilemma. The analysis yielded three significant main effects, for (1) instrumentality [(no instrumentality ($M = 3.32$, $SD = .86$); instrumentality ($M = 4.03$, $SD = .91$) ($F_{(1, 358)} = 75.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .17$)], (2) normalization [(no normalization: ($M = 3.99$, $SD = .90$); normalization ($M = 3.36$, $SD = .89$) ($F_{(1, 358)} = 59.03$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$)] (3) and commonality [(no commonality ($M = 3.46$, $SD = .91$); commonality ($M = 3.89$, $SD = .94$) ($F_{(1, 358)} = 27.02$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$)].

manipulation checks as an outcome variable revealed that participants in the instrumentality (versus no instrumentality) condition reported higher perceived instrumentality ($F_{(7, 358)} = 96.70, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .21$), and those in the normalization (versus no normalization) condition reported higher perceived normalization ($F_{(7, 358)} = 75.10, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .17$). Participants in the commonality (versus no commonality condition also reported higher perceived commonality ($F_{(7, 358)} = 218.98, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .38$) (see Table 4.1).

The analysis also yielded unintended cross-effects of the manipulations, such that perceptions of instrumentality were also lower in the normalization condition than in the no normalization condition ($F_{(7, 358)} = 18.84, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .05$), which implies that normalization concerns play a part in group members' instrumentality calculations. Furthermore, perceptions of commonality were higher in the instrumentality and no normalization conditions than in the no instrumentality ($F_{(7, 358)} = 8.01, p = .005, \eta_p^2 = .02$) and normalization ($F_{(7, 358)} = 5.33, p = .022, \eta_p^2 = .015$) conditions. This could indicate that perceived commonality is linked to perceived instrumentality and normalization, at least according to people's lay-theories about joint action.¹⁷

Perceived joint action tendencies. To test whether the manipulated appraisals of instrumentality, commonality, and normalization exerted an effect on expected action tendencies, we conducted another three-way ANOVA, this time specifying perceived support for undertaking joint action as the dependent variable. Consistent with our hypotheses, the ANOVA yielded significant main effects for both instrumentality ($F_{(1, 357)} = 31.36, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$) and normalization ($F_{(1, 357)} = 42.09, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .11$). The main effect for commonality was also significant ($F_{(1, 357)} = 13.45, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .036$, see Table 4.1). No significant interactions were found between the factors. These results suggest that the

¹⁷ The analysis also yielded a significant interaction between instrumentality and normalization on perceptions of normalization.

perceived instrumentality of joint collective action and commonality with outgroup members enhance perceived joint action tendencies, whereas perceptions that the action is normalizing weaken these perceived tendencies.

Table 4.1. Means and SDs of instrumentality, normalization, and commonality perceptions, and joint action tendencies in Study 4.1.

	Instrumentality condition	No Instrumentality condition	Normalization condition	No Normalization condition	Commonality condition	No Commonality condition
	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>
Instrumentality perceptions	4.13 ^a (1.34)	2.77 ^b (1.34)	3.17 ^a (1.52)	3.74 ^b (1.48)	3.54 ^a (1.48)	3.37 ^a (1.56)
Normalization perceptions	3.92 ^a (1.46)	3.75 ^a (1.50)	4.44 ^a (1.27)	3.22 ^b (1.43)	3.70 ^a (1.49)	3.96 ^a (1.47)
Commonality perceptions	3.49 ^a (1.60)	3.14 ^b (1.57)	3.17 ^a (1.60)	3.46 ^b (1.59)	4.30 ^a (1.21)	2.35 ^b (1.34)
Josh's joint action tendencies	3.40 ^a (1.2)	4.03 ^b (1.16)	3.34 ^a (1.20)	4.08 ^b (1.12)	3.92 ^a (1.23)	3.50 ^b (1.17)
Participants' joint action tendencies	4.22 ^a (1.29)	3.90 ^b (1.45)	3.91 ^a (1.39)	4.21 ^b (1.36)	4.05 ^a (1.44)	4.07 ^a (1.34)

We repeated the above analysis, this time using participants' own willingness to engage in joint action as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed that own willingness was affected by both instrumentality ($F_{(1, 358)} = 5.35, p = .021, \eta_p^2 = .02$) and normalization ($F_{(1, 358)} = 4.65, p = .032, \eta_p^2 = .01$]. Commonality did not influence own action tendencies ($F_{(1, 358)} = .01, p = .92, \eta_p^2 = .00$). Again, these results support the notion that perceived instrumentality and normalization reflect the core of the dilemma of joint action among members of disadvantaged groups.

In sum, perceived joint action tendencies were consistent with our hypotheses. Nevertheless, the manipulations produced cross effects on perceptions of instrumentality and normalization, such that normalizing joint action was perceived to be less instrumental. This could mean that low instrumentality, rather than normalization, is what undermines joint

action tendencies. Accordingly, further evidence is needed to make causal inferences about the effects of normalization and instrumentality perceptions on joint action tendencies. In Study 4.2 we thus aimed to replicate our findings, this time inducing participants' own perceptions of the instrumentality and normalization of joint action.

Study 4.2

In Study 4.2, Black American participants were presented with an article that described the positive and negative aspects of White and Black joint collective action against racial discrimination. Building on our previous experimental findings, we wanted to again test the causal hypotheses for perceived instrumentality and normalization, which presumably reflect the core of the disadvantaged's dilemma of joint action. Furthermore, we sought to investigate the role of group identification, which reflects the degree to which individuals identify with, and commit to, their group (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997), assuming that this dilemma may be most salient for those disadvantaged group members that identify highly with the group. Indeed, group identification influences one's perceptions of collective disadvantage and thus whether individuals will invest in protecting the group identity in the face of threats (Veenstra & Haslam, 2000; Spears et al., 1997). Moreover, research suggests that people who have strong identification with a group tend to place more weight on consequences for the group when choosing certain actions over others, and thus their decision is shaped by perceptions of collective costs and benefits (Louis, Taylor, & Neil, 2004). A recent work by Hasan-Aslih & Shuman et. al, (2020) (see Chapter 3) provides evidence that group identification may not necessarily be a core motivation for joint action, as high identifiers are not always willing to partake in joint collective action with outgroup members especially when the conflict between the groups exacerbates.

Consistent with this notion, we assume that higher identifiers should experience the dilemma underlying joint action more strongly. Specifically, because high identifiers tend to

be more aware of the societal power struggle, they should be more sensitive than low identifiers to (the lack of) power cues and more concerned with any symbolic consequences of joint action that may perpetuate their disadvantage (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Accordingly, we expected that the effect of normalization on joint action intentions should depend on the level of identification with the group, with high identifiers being more susceptible to the negative effect of normalization on motivation for joint action.

Method

Participants

As in Study 4.1, we performed a power analysis specifying 80% power and an anticipated medium effect size of Cohen's $f = .2$ (for a statistical test of main effects and interaction), yielding a sample size of 366. We included attention checks and oversampled by about 10% to address any necessary exclusions. Overall, 401 Black American were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, of which 59 were excluded based on attention checks ($n = 20$ failed all four attention checks) and the time they devoted to the study ($n = 39$ devoted less than 30 seconds to reading the manipulation and/or less than five minutes responding to the entire survey). The final sample comprised 342 participants (218 females, ages 18-87; $M_{\text{age}} = 32.27$).

Procedure

Participants were instructed to read an ostensibly real article published in the *New York Times* about academic research that examined Black and White joint collective action against racial discrimination, outlining three features (i.e., instrumentality, normalization, and commonality). Participants were randomly assigned to read one of eight versions of the article, featuring variations of the three different variables in a 2x2x2 design: (a) joint action as effective versus not effective in influencing Whites' attitudes and views on racial issues

(Instrumentality); (b) joint action as creating a false sense of equal and harmonious relations between the groups versus exposing discrimination and unequal power relations (Normalization) ; and (c) joint action as almost always reflecting versus not reflecting great commonality in goals and vision between Black and White activists (Commonality). The order in which these aspects were presented in the article was also randomized. The manipulation text was followed by manipulation checks and measures of collective action tendencies and group identification.

Measures

Manipulation checks: Reading comprehension in the different conditions was confirmed using extended versions of measures used in Study 4.1. Three items measured the extent to which joint collective action was perceived as instrumental (e.g., “To what extent do you think Black and White joint protests are beneficial or not beneficial to improving the status of Black Americans?” rated from 1 - *Not at all beneficial* to 6 - *Extremely beneficial*, $\alpha = .82$). Three items measured the extent to which joint collective action was perceived as normalizing (e.g., “To what extent do you think Black and White joint protests blur or expose racial inequality and discrimination against Black people in the U.S.?” rated from 1 - *Obscure very much* to 6 - *Highlight very much*, $\alpha = .90$). Perceived commonality was assessed using two items (e.g., “To what extent do you think you and White allies share many common values and goals?” rated from 1 - *Not at all* to 6 - *Extremely*, $r = .83$).

Joint collective action tendencies were measured using three items based on those used in Study 4.1, assessing intentions to engage in various activities aimed at protesting racism and police brutality against Black Americans (e.g., Participating in joint peaceful demonstrations alongside other Black and White Americans”; $\alpha = .89$).¹⁸

¹⁸ We also measured typical predictors of collective action more generally (anger and efficacy), and found that they did not explain the effects on joint action.

Group identification was measured with six items (e.g., “I feel being a Black American is an important component of my identity”; $\alpha = .93$ (derived from Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008).

Results and Discussion

Manipulation checks. A three-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the instrumentality manipulation ($F_{(1, 334)} = 11.14, p = .001$) on perceptions of instrumentality, with greater perceptions of instrumentality in the instrumentality condition than in the no instrumentality condition. The normalization manipulation also yielded the predicted significant effect ($F_{(1, 334)} = 65.45, p < .001$), such that joint action in the normalization condition was perceived as significantly more normalizing (i.e., as obscuring power relations) than in the no normalization condition. Finally, the commonality manipulation had no effect on perceptions of commonality ($F_{(1, 334)} = 1.09, p = .29$) (see Table 4.2).

As in Study 4.1, the manipulations also produced a cross-effect. Specifically, the normalization manipulation again influenced perceived instrumentality ($F_{(1, 334)} = 19.15, p < .001$), with lower perceptions of instrumentality in the normalization conditions than in the no normalization condition. This replicates the cross-effect found in Study 4.1, signaling that joint action that exposes power relations (not normalizing) is perceived as more instrumental than joint action that obscures power relations (normalizing). No other cross main effects were found.¹⁹

Joint collective action tendencies. To test our hypotheses, we again ran a three-way ANOVA. The analysis revealed a marginally significant effect of instrumentality ($F_{(1, 334)} = 3.46, p = .064, \eta_p^2 = .01$) on joint action tendencies, with participants more willing to partake in joint action in the instrumental conditions than in the non-instrumental conditions.

¹⁹ The analysis further produced an interactive effect of the instrumentality and normalization conditions on instrumentality perceptions. Because this interactive effect is inconsistent with what we found in Study 4.1, we refrain from interpreting it here.

Replicating previous findings, the analysis yielded a main effect of the normalization manipulation ($F_{(1,334)} = 3.95, p = .045, \eta_p^2 = .012$), with participants reporting less willingness to engage in joint action when it was perceived as normalizing rather than not normalizing.

No significant interactions were found between the factors (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2. Means and SDs of instrumentality and normalization perceptions, and joint action tendencies in Study 4.2.

	Instrumentality condition	No Instrumentality condition	Normalization condition	No Normalization condition
	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>
Instrumentality perceptions	4.14 ^a (1.11)	3.70 ^b (1.20)	3.67 ^a (1.20)	4.20 ^b (1.11)
Normalization perceptions	4.21 (1.05) ^a	4.03 ^a (.99)	4.55 ^a (.82)	3.72 ^b (1.03)
Joint action tendencies	4.01 ^a (1.40)	3.70 ^b (1.50)	3.71 ^a (1.50)	4.03 ^b (1.40)

We then turned to explore the moderating role of group identification. We first tested whether the manipulations affected ingroup identification, and the analysis showed that neither instrumentality ($F_{(1, 334)} = .19, p = .66$) nor normalization ($F_{(1, 334)} = 1.48, p = .22$) had an effect. We then employed Hayes' (2013) PROCESS command (Model 1) in two separate analyses to examine whether group identification moderated the effects of the instrumentality and normalization manipulations on joint collective action. The results showed that group identification did not significantly moderate the effect of instrumentality ($b_{\text{interaction}} = .05, SE = .12, t = .38, p = .70, CI [-.19, .29]$), but we did find a marginally significant normalization $\times$ identification interaction effect on joint collective action tendencies ($b_{\text{interaction}} = -.22, SE = .12, t = -1.8, p = .07, CI [-.46, .02]$). An exploratory examination of the conditional effects revealed that the normalization manipulation significantly decreased support for joint action among people with relatively higher levels of identification ($b = -.47, SE = .19, t = -2.6, p = .014, CI [-.86, -.09]$), but not among those with lower levels of identification ($b = .02, SE =$

.2, $t = .11$, $p = .91$, CI [-.36, .41]). This hints at the possibility that people with stronger identification may experience the dilemma of joint action more strongly, particularly when it comes to potential implications such as normalization. Clearly, however, these findings are initial and necessitate replication.

Exploratory analysis. In light of the cross-effects of the normalization manipulation on instrumentality in Studies 4.1 and 4.2, we decided to examine whether the effect of normalization on joint action tendencies is explained, at least in part, by its influence on perceptions of instrumentality (i.e., whether such perceptions mediate the effect of normalization on joint action). To this end, we conducted a mediation analysis using Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 4; 5,000 iterations), with normalization as the independent variable, perceptions of instrumentality as a mediator, and joint action tendencies as the dependent variable. The analysis showed that the effect of the normalization condition on the joint action tendencies ($b = -.32$, $SE = .16$, $t = -2.03$, $p = .043$, 95% CI [-.63, -.01]) became non-significant when perceptions of instrumentality were included the model ($b = -.03$, $SE = .14$, $t = -.22$, $p = .824$, 95% CI [-.32, .26]). The indirect effect through perceptions of instrumentality was significant ($a*b = -.29$; $SE = .08$; 95% CI [-.45, -.14]), indicating support for a model in which normalization leads to decreased perceptions of benefit, which in turn undermine willingness to engage in joint action.

In sum, the results of Study 4.2 replicated the findings of Study 4.1, confirming that perceptions of instrumentality motivate, and normalization undermine joint action tendencies. Interestingly, another consistent finding across the studies so far is that when joint action is perceived as normalizing power relations, it is also perceived as less instrumental. This fits nicely with the notion of perceived normalization as a barrier for joint action—in fact one that seems to dampen individuals' instrumental motivation for it, thus embodying the underlying dilemma of collaborating with the enemy.

We therefore designed Study 4.3 as a focused, confirmatory test of this dampening effect. Study 4.3 manipulated only perceived normalization to observe its effects on perceived instrumentality and joint action. Study 4.3 further tested the marginally significant moderation found in Study 4.2, namely the interaction between perceived normalization and group identification, suggesting that normalization is particularly relevant to those who identify more strongly with the disadvantaged group-

Study 4.3

Study 4.3 capitalized on a joint action event to induce normalization and instrumentality perceptions. The study was conducted in the Palestinian context shortly after Palestinian teenager Ahed Tamimi was imprisoned after confronting Israeli soldiers in her front yard in the village of Nabi Saleh in the occupied West Bank. This incident attracted local and international attention and sparked a series of protests demanding the girl's release, some of which were attended jointly by Palestinians and Israelis.

Method

Participants

A sample of 261 Palestinian citizens of Israel participated in the study. The sample size was determined based on the same power analysis used in Studies 1 and 2 (80% power and Cohen's $f = .2$), but specifying only two experimental conditions, thus yielding a required sample of 200. Again, we oversampled in anticipation of potential participant exclusions. Participants were recruited either through social media or on university campuses, in return for a chance to win a gift card in a raffle. The final sample comprised 240 participants (147 females; 5 missing, ages 18-69, $M_{age} = 26.15$), after 21 participants who failed all four attention checks were excluded. Because the survey was distributed both online and in paper form, the duration of the study could not be used as an indicator for attention as in Study 4.2.

Procedure

Participants gave their informed consent and then read a brief text providing background about a joint Jewish-Arab action in response to Tamimi's imprisonment. After this introduction, participants were randomly assigned to view one of two versions of a contrived Facebook event page, advertising a joint collective action to demand Tamimi's release. We created these event pages based on real Facebook posts and events that were being publicized at the time. The normalization condition included a call for a joint action that contained messages implying equal power relations between the groups.

Following the manipulation, we assessed participants' willingness to engage in joint action, the extent to which they thought the described action was normalizing (manipulation check), instrumental, and reflected commonality, and finally their levels of ingroup identification (included at the very end to ensure maximal distance from the manipulation).

Measures

Manipulation check. The manipulation check for normalization was a simplified and extended version of the measure used in Study 4.2, including new items designed to strengthen the validity of the measure and ensure its sensitivity to the context. The six-item measure assessed the extent to which participants perceived the joint collective action at hand as normalizing (e.g., "To what degree do you think the described action contains messages that overlook the power differences between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis?", $\alpha = .80$).

Perceptions of instrumentality were measured using three items, as in Study 4.2, but adapted to the particular context (e.g., "To what degree do you think this action is effective in shedding light on the occupation practices in the West Bank?", $\alpha = .82$). For consistency's sake, *perceptions of commonality* were measured using the same two items used in Study 4.2, with the addition of a third item ("To what degree do you think you share common values and goals with Jewish Israelis who take part in such actions?", $\alpha = .86$). In this study the

manipulation check was placed after the collective action measure to exclude the possibility that it might reveal the research goal.

Joint collective action tendencies were measured using four items assessing intentions to participate in the described action (e.g., “To what extent are you willing to click “going” in response to the Facebook event?”; “To what extent are you willing to actually engage in such Jewish-Arab joint action?”), rated from 1 (*Not at all willing*) to 6 (*Willing to a very great extent*), ($\alpha = .94$).

Group identification was measured as in Study 4.2 ($\alpha = .93$).

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check. We first tested whether the normalization manipulation successfully affected participants’ perceptions of the action. An independent samples *t*-test revealed that the action designed to appear as normalizing was indeed perceived as higher on normalization than the action designed to appear as non-normalizing ($t_{(238)} = -8.61, p < .001, d = 1.11$) (see Table 4.3).

Perceived instrumentality and commonality. Replicating previous findings, a *t*-test revealed that the joint action was also perceived as less instrumental in the normalizing condition than in the non-normalizing condition ($t_{(238)} = -3.17, p = .002, d = .40$). This provides confirmatory support for the dampening effect of perceived normalization on the perceived instrumentality of joint action. Perceptions of commonality did not significantly differ between conditions ($t_{(238)} = .06, p = .95, d = .008$), suggesting once more that normalization is distinct from commonality.

Joint collective action tendencies. We conducted an independent samples *t*-test to compare tendencies for joint action between conditions. Again, replicating previous findings, we found that willingness to participate in joint action was lower when the action was normalizing than when it was non-normalizing ($t_{(238)} = -2.06, p = .041, d = .27$) (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3

Means and SDs of instrumentality and normalization perceptions, and joint action tendencies in Study 4.3.

	Normalization condition	No Normalization condition
	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>
Normalization perceptions	3.81 ^a (1.15)	2.67 ^b (.88)
Instrumentality perceptions	3.12 ^a (1.29)	3.64 ^b (1.25)
Joint action tendencies	2.86 ^a (1.51)	3.26 ^b (1.53)

Mediation by perceived instrumentality. We then conducted an additional analysis to test whether perceptions of instrumentality mediate the effect of the normalization condition on collective action tendencies, employing Hayes's (2013) bootstrapping PROCESS macro (Model 4; 5,000 iterations). The analysis showed that the normalization condition decreased perceptions of instrumentality ($b = -.52$, $SE = .17$, $t = -3.16$, $p = .002$, $CI [-.85, -.19]$), leading to decreased joint action tendencies ($b = .67$, $SE = .06$, $t = 10.35$, $p < .001$, $CI [.54, .79]$). The total effect of normalization on joint action tendencies was significant ($b = -.40$, $SE = .19$, $t = -2.06$, $p = .041$, $CI [-.79, -.02]$), the direct effect was no longer significant ($b = -.06$, $SE = .17$, $t = -.34$, $p = .73$, $CI [-.38, .27]$), and the indirect effect through perceptions of instrumentality ($a*b$: .35; $SE = .12$, $CI [-.59, -.11]$) was significant (see Figure 4.1). Thus, we found confirmatory evidence for the dampening effect of perceived normalization via instrumentality on joint action.

Figure 4.1. The effect of normalization on joint action tendencies is mediated by instrumentality perceptions in Study 3.

Moderation by group identification. We then conducted a confirmatory test of our hypothesis that group identification moderates the relationship between normalization and willingness to participate in joint action using Hayes' (2013) PROCESS command (Model 1). The analyses revealed significant main effects for both normalization ($b = -.44$, $SE = 0.19$, $t = 2.25$, $p = .025$, $CI [-.83, -.06]$) and group identification ($b = .20$, $SE = 0.09$, $t = 2.25$, $p = .025$, $CI [0.02, 0.38]$), as well as the hypothesized two-way interaction ($b = -.38$, $SE = 0.18$, $t = 2.10$, $p = .037$, $CI [-.74, -.02]$). Decomposition of the interaction (see Figure 4.2) revealed that normalization decreased willingness to participate in the joint action when group identification was high ($b = -.82$, $SE = .26$, $t = -3.1$, $p = .002$, $CI [-1.33, -.30]$), but not when group identification was low ($b = -.03$, $SE = .28$, $t = -.1$, $p = .92$, $CI [-.58, .53]$), replicating the findings of Study 4.2. This suggests that the dilemma underlying joint action is most strongly experienced by higher identifiers within the disadvantaged group, and that the heart of the dilemma seems to involve the perceived normalization of joint action.

Figure 4.2. The effect of normalization on joint action tendencies is moderated by ingroup identification Study 4.3.

Next, to test whether instrumentality similarly mediates the above interaction, we used Hayes' (2013) bootstrapping PROCESS macro to test moderated mediation (Model 8, 5,000 iterations). The analysis first revealed that the interactive effect of normalization and identification on the mediator (i.e. instrumentality perceptions) was significant ($b = -.48$, $SE = .15$, $t = -3.24$, $p = .001$, $CI [-.78, -.19]$), such that normalization led to decreased perceptions of instrumentality among high identifiers ($b = -1.06$, $SE = .22$, $t = -4.89$, $p < .001$, $CI [-1.49, -.63]$), but not among low identifiers ($b = -.06$, $SE = .23$, $t = -.25$, $p = .80$, $CI [-.51, .39]$). The interactive effect on action tendencies became non-significant when perceptions of instrumentality is added to the model ($b = -.06$, $SE = .16$, $t = -.41$, $p = .68$, 95% $CI [-.37, .24]$). Furthermore, the index of moderated mediation for high vs. low identification was significant ($a*b = -.32$, $SE = .11$, 95% $CI [-.58, -.11]$). The indirect effect of the condition $\times$ identification interaction on joint action was significant for high identifiers ($b = -.69$, $SE = .17$, $CI [-1.05, -.40]$), but not for low identifiers ($b = -.04$, $SE = .17$, $CI [-.39, .26]$). Normalization thus detracts from the benefits of joint action from the perspective of high identifiers, which leads to decreased joint action tendencies.

In sum, Study 4.3 provided further causal evidence for the idea that perceptions of normalization undermine willingness to engage in joint collective action, and that one key reason is that perceived normalization decreases the perceived instrumentality of the action—particularly for those who experience the dilemma most due to their high identification with the disadvantaged ingroup.

General Discussion

There is a large amount of research on the psychological factors that affect disadvantaged group members' willingness to engage in action with other members of their ingroup, as well as a fair amount of research that investigates factors that promote solidarity-

based action by advantaged group members (Radke, Kutlaca, Siem, Wright, Becker, 2020; van Zomeren, et al., 2011). However, there has been relatively little research on factors that motivate disadvantaged group members to partake in joint action (see also Chapter 3 of this thesis), in which members of the two groups come together to act to advance social change.

In the current research, we put forward the argument that joint collective action poses a unique dilemma for disadvantaged group members, as the power relations between the groups propel more deliberate thinking about the potential costs and benefits of engaging in joint action. Specifically, the results of Studies 1 and 2 provided support for our hypothesis that perceptions of instrumentality increase willingness to engage in joint action, whereas normalization counteracts this motivation. The results of Study 4.3 replicated the finding that normalization serves as a barrier to joint action, and Studies 2 and 3 both demonstrated that high identifiers are more prone to the influence of normalization. Importantly, Study 4.3 revealed that normalization influenced the motivation of high identifiers to engage in joint action through their instrumentality perceptions. Together, the current findings signify that the decision to partake in joint action is shaped by the anticipated consequences of the action for the disadvantaged ingroup.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

The current findings advance and extend existing literature on collective action in several important ways. Particularly, they highlight the need to treat joint collective action as a distinct form of action that poses a unique dilemma to disadvantaged groups centered on the (materialistic and symbolic) costs and benefits of participation. While decision-making relying on outcome expectancy has long been a part of the collective action literature, it has mainly considered the tension between individual and collective motives (Klandermans, 1984; 2002), overlooking social-structural factors that could influence motivational processes in collective action participation. Our work, which is guided by an integrative perspective on

collective action (see Van Zomeren, 2016), suggests that the dilemma of joint action is shaped by the power relations between the groups that push the disadvantaged to weigh the various implications of their participation. In a reality of asymmetrical intergroup relations, acting collectively with members of the advantaged group could hold benefits in terms of increasing the power of the collective and increasing access to public opinion and decision-makers (Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008); nonetheless, this form of action can come with risks that counteract these benefits (Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016).

The present work also introduces the concept of *normalization*, which reflects the basic idea that unequal power dynamics between groups can become normal while being cloaked in good intentions to promote social change. The above findings demonstrate that disadvantaged group members, especially high identifiers, may have concerns about the potential of cooperative relations to normalize inequality. Such concerns, in turn, plays a significant role in regulating their tendencies to engage with members of the advantaged group, even in the context of collective action designed to advance the disadvantaged group's interests.

Interestingly, perceptions of normalization were found to feed into perceptions of the joint action's instrumentality especially among those individuals who highly identify with their group, undermining their motivation for joint action by making it seem ineffective. Our work sheds light on the different motivational and decision-making processes in joint collective action for low and high identifiers from the disadvantaged group, which is in line with the notion that social identity guides actions and affects how individuals strategically manage behaviors related to the group's interests (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; van Zomeren et al., 2012). We contend that in the case of joint action between rival groups, disadvantaged group members demonstrate an understanding that the action entails potential

risks and negative consequences that could project onto the group level and perpetuate the disadvantage of the group as a whole.

Lastly, our research also has important applied implications for those seeking to mobilize disadvantaged group members for collective action. Activists and leaders should be aware that the classic core motivations for action may not be enough to bring disadvantaged members to take part in joint struggles with outgroup members. Importantly, it is crucial to understand the dilemma inherent in the decision to undertake joint action by virtue of the power relations between the groups. Activists should be especially mindful of certain realistic concerns that disadvantaged group members might have about features of joint action that are perceived as normalizing and obscuring intergroup inequalities, thereby counteracting the potential benefits of such action. Addressing such concerns is crucial to increasing the effectiveness and success of mobilization efforts targeted at disadvantaged group members.

Limitations and Future Directions

Despite these important contributions, the present work has several limitations that should be addressed in future research. The first limitation is that the current research manipulated appraisals and general perceptions of instrumentality and normalization, but it has not identified and empirically examined the specific features that contribute to these perceptions. Future research could explore what features of joint actions make them more or less instrumental or normalizing. Another interesting direction for future research relates to the actual effects and consequences of joint collective action in terms of normalizing power relations and gaining benefits for the disadvantaged group, even though the latter may need to be examined over time. Another avenue for future research is to study the joint action dilemma that faces advantaged group members, which may lie in the tension between maintaining their privileges and adhering to their moral values.

In conclusion, the research in Chapter 4 highlights the complexity of joint collective action and its potential to pose a dilemma of “sleeping with the enemy” for members of the disadvantaged group, especially for those whose identity is stronger. We demonstrate that lower identifiers are driven mainly by instrumentality considerations, but for higher identifiers the dilemma lies in the tension between instrumentality as a catalyst for joint action and normalization as potential barrier. As such, this research implies that the joint action dilemma is different from the typical collective action dilemma because it seems more pronounced among high identifiers rather than low identifiers, and it seems to involve group-based rather than individual-based cost calculations.

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Chapter 5

General Discussion

The aim of this thesis is to understand when and why disadvantaged group members work together with the advantaged group to promote social change. This thesis contributes to a long tradition of social-psychological research that has dealt with the problem of intergroup conflict with the aim of identifying the psychological processes that enhance group members' support for social change (Bar-Tal, 2011; Çakal, Hewstone, Güler, & Heath, 2016; Cohen-Chen, van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2015; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright & Tropp, 2002). Previously, the psychological literature offered two divergent approaches to promoting social change, one emphasizing the pursuit of harmony and social cohesion between the groups, and the second embracing conflict and social justice (Wright & Baray, 2012). Consistent with the integrative approach of Wright and Baray (2012), in this thesis we have considered social change efforts that reconcile, to some extent, these harmony and conflict approaches. That is, we have investigated social change efforts that both cross intergroup boundaries and address inequality between the groups, which could be achieved through working together in collective action.

From the vantage point of the disadvantaged group, this thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of the psychological motivational processes that allow groups to work together across group boundaries by means of hope and collective action. To this end, we conducted eight empirical studies across two intergroup contexts (Israel/Palestine and USA), employing correlational, experimental studies, and longitudinal research designs. Overall, considering the general orientation of the disadvantaged for social change, the findings of these studies suggest that envisioning a shared future, in terms of the emotional experience of hope (Chapter 2), may not be sufficient to mobilize the disadvantaged because it permeates intergroup boundaries in a way that undermines their willingness for collective action. Furthermore, acting together toward shared social change goals such as equality and justice

(Chapters 3 and 4) offers an opportunity to cross boundaries while sustaining negativity about the current reality, but there are psychological barriers that counteract the motivations to engage in such action.

These conclusions illustrate both the potential and difficulty involved in this “harmonious conflict” approach to intergroup conflict. In what follows, we first provide a more detailed overview of the empirical findings of Chapters 2–4, then discuss broader theoretical implications of this research program, and conclude by suggesting directions for future work on hope and joint collective action for both members of disadvantaged groups, and also for members of advantaged groups.

Overview of Key Findings

The first three chapters focused on the social psychology of hope (Bury, Wenzel, & Woodyatt, 2016; Cohen-Chen & Van Zomeren, 2018; Lazarus, 1991; Van Zomeren, Pauls, & Cohen-Chen, 2019) and joint action (Becker, Wright, Lubensky, & Zhou, 2013; Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016; Louis, 2009) from the perspective of disadvantaged groups, with each chapter addressing different specific research questions. The findings described in those chapters contribute in multiple ways to our understanding of when disadvantaged group members are willing to cross group boundaries to promote social change together with the advantaged.

In Chapter 2, for example, we found that creating a future vision for a shared life may permeate the boundaries between the groups and reduce some tension, but it also weakens the disadvantaged’s motivation to engage in collective action. Chapters 3 and 4 examined joint collective action as a form of collaboration that could potentially encompasses both harmony and conflict. The studies in these chapters demonstrated that the relevance of the group to the self is not a key determinant of joint collective action, but rather the degree to which it is perceived as benefiting or costing the ingroup. Below we provide a detailed review of the

findings and discuss their contribution to different literatures, ranging from hope and intergroup contact to collective action and social change. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the studies and directions for future research on the psychology of joint action.

Hope for a Shared Future can be a Barrier to Social Change. In the four studies described in Chapter 2, we found that *hope for a shared future* (i.e., harmony-focused hope) decreases *collective action intentions* particularly among disadvantaged group members whose identification with their group is lower, both in the Israeli-Palestinian and American contexts. These two contexts were chosen because they are marked by intergroup tension and inequality, but also by a shared life between the groups which allows for, at least, the emergence of hope for a better future.

The finding that hope can demotivate collective action is consistent with previous research suggesting that conditions which promote intergroup harmony, such as contact or emphasized common identity, can undermine the motivation for social change because they distract attention from group-based inequality (e.g., Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Saguy et al., 2009; Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, & Dovidio, 2015). The studies described in Chapter 2 extend this line of research by also demonstrating that positive emotions such as hope can have similar negative consequences on collective action to other intergroup experiences and interventions that emphasize harmony at the expense of inequality. In keeping with this finding, the work of Hornsey and Fielding (2016) and Van Zomeren, Pauls & Cohen-Chen (2019) suggests that hope can prompt people to feel more positive about the negative reality and thus attenuate the urge to act against injustice. Put differently, hoping may make us feel better, but may not motivate us to act for social change.

By contrast and beyond this conclusion, Study 2.2 in Chapter 2 in particular, showed that hope for equality is more effective than hope for harmony in mobilizing disadvantaged group members for collective action. This is likely since it resonates more with the identity

and goals of the ingroup and does not mitigate resentment about the current reality by forcing disadvantaged group members to think positively of outgroup members. This finding implies that hope which stems from a vision of equality necessitates invoking or maintaining some degree of conflict between the groups. The idea that hope can function as a conflict-oriented emotion is in line with previous research which illustrates that hope is linked to perceptions of injustice, and it could account for the role of anger in motivating collective action (Włodarczyk, Basabe, Páez, & Zumeta, 2017).

The Psychology of Joint Collective Action is Distinct from other Forms of Action.

Chapters 3 and 4 examined another practice that can diffuse firm intergroup boundaries yet still highlight discrimination: that of joint collective action. In Chapter 3, we examined the relationship between *ingroup identification* and joint collective action, which requires softening intergroup differences. This was tested in a three-wave longitudinal study which followed the experiences of Palestinians living under military occupation over a period of conflict escalation and de-escalation. The results of this study demonstrated that identification with one's group can motivate disadvantaged group members from participating in collective action that emphasizes such identity, but does not necessarily facilitate *joint* collective action with outgroup members, especially when the conflict between the groups is more intense. The finding that identification may *not* necessarily be a core predictor of joint action highlights the complexity of such actions, specifically indicating that psychological processes underlying joint action are likely to be *distinct* from those underlying ingroup collective action.

Results also reveal that when group identification increases, for instance due to situational factors such as conflict escalation, the willingness of disadvantaged members to partake in joint action *decreases*. This is likely because in times of escalation the need to differentiate the group from the enemy and protect its identity becomes stronger, and thus

cooperating with outgroup members may be perceived as detrimental to the group, possibly reflecting some concerns about being marginalized. As such, these findings broaden the scope of collective action research which considers group identification as a predominant force for collective action, usually action that emphasizes the disadvantaged identity (Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). The evidence that high identifiers show more reluctance for collaboration is consistent with previous theoretical work suggesting that preferences for intergroup interactions are shaped by identity needs such as intergroup distinctiveness and empowerment (Ron, Solomon, Halperin, & Saguy, 2017). The work of Saguy, Dovidio, and Pratto (2008), for instance, demonstrates that strong identifiers are more motivated to maintain group boundaries and address power relations. Furthermore, the finding that conflict escalation moderates the relationship between identification and joint action is congruent with research suggesting that identity needs are affected and intensified by contextual factors such as the perceived stability of the status quo (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013).

In conclusion, Chapter 3 demonstrates that the decision to act collectively with outgroup members appears to be psychologically different from the decision to act collectively with ingroup members. The studies reported in this chapter lay the basis for the notion that joint action puts disadvantaged group members, especially high identifiers, in a unique dilemma about whether such cooperation is good for them. Chapter 4 examined what the essence of this dilemma may be.

The Dilemma of “Sleeping with the Enemy”. Building on the finding that joint action is not driven by the same psychological processes as ingroup action, Chapter 4 offered a more comprehensive examination of the psychological antecedents of such action. The three studies in this chapter tested the psychological antecedents of joint action in two countries where such action has been a subject of controversy to a varying degree—the

Palestinian-Israeli and the Black-White American contexts. The findings of these studies showed that the decision to partake in joint action is a function of cost-benefit calculations, and particularly whether the action is instrumental in achieving goals versus whether it normalizes power relations between the groups. This suggests that this rather unique dilemma puts a premium on the need for such calculations, because even if individuals are willing to defray the individual costs of participating in joint action, they must still weigh the costs of participation to the group as a whole. Therefore, disadvantaged group members need to decide whether the benefit of advancing the group's goals justifies the risk of normalizing power-relations between the groups.

More specifically, the studies indicated that perceptions of *instrumentality* (i.e., that joint action can promote the goals of the disadvantaged) motivated willingness to engage in joint action, whereas perceptions of *normalization* (i.e., that joint action obscures power relations) undermined it. This fits an instrumental perspective to collective action which suggests that individuals make rational decisions about collective action whereby they weigh the expected benefits of such action against the costs (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Klandermans, 1984). However, unlike the typical collective action dilemma where the individual is concerned with individual costs, the dilemma of joint action revolves around the collective costs and the implications of this collaboration on the group. In addition, because these costs are group-based, they are more likely to concern those who care deeply about the group, that is, high identifiers (Louis, Taylor, & Neil, 2004).

Indeed, we found that high identifiers were more prone to the influence of normalization, such that normalization undermined their willingness to engage in joint action but not for those who were lower on identification. Furthermore, normalization influenced the motivation of high identifiers through their instrumentality perceptions, which means that concerns about normalization detract from the perceived effectiveness of such action. This

finding implies that high identifiers are not only concerned with how joint action can materialistically benefit their group, but also how it can harm it symbolically. The finding that high identifiers associate normalization with (lack of) instrumentality implies that they recognize the ramifications of normalization on perpetuating their subordinate position.

Such concerns echo the theoretical premise of Jackman (1994) that the status quo is often maintained by means of cooperation and paternalism rather than conflict. The understanding of high identifiers that challenging normalization is instrumental, is in line with the social identity framework according to which higher relevance of group identity makes disadvantaged group members more concerned and committed to their group goals and interests (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Moreover, group members with a more politicized identity have higher awareness of the societal power struggle, which explains why they would attribute more importance to normalization of power relations. It can be concluded that the decision to participate in joint collective action is based on both instrumental and identity considerations, but whether disadvantaged group members' embrace these two considerations depends on the salience or strength of their group identity (see Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009).

Theoretical Implications

Taken together, the findings of this thesis have several implications for theories of hope, collective action and intergroup relations more generally. Firstly, work in the area of intergroup relations has shown that crossing intergroup boundaries by encouraging intergroup interactions, or by creating a sense of common ingroup identity between members of the different groups can relax concerns about inequality and undermine disadvantaged group-members' motivation for collective action (Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux, 2007; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, Dovidio, 2015). Chapter 2 extends this research to the realm of harmonious emotions and demonstrates that it is not only

intergroup interactions and common identity, but hope for a shared future, that also involves psychological processes that hinder collective action among disadvantaged group members. Furthermore, research has emphasized the positive role of hope in promoting collective action and conflict resolution (e.g., Cohen-Chen, Van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2015), with the exception of a few works which suggest that hope does not always motivate collective action (Hornsey & Fielding, 2016; Van Zomeren, Pauls & Cohen-Chen, 2019). The findings described in Chapter 2 indicate that what people hope for shapes their intentions and behavior, such as whether they will engage in collective action for social change or not. Specifically, this work broadens our knowledge on the conditions under which hope can counteract negative feelings about inequality and undermine collective action intentions. This implies that hope for a shared future may soften the conflict between groups, but may not be sufficient to drive disadvantaged group members to collective action (see Cohen-Chen & Van Zomeren, 2018). Rather, we suggest that crossing group boundaries should be founded on co-resistance against injustice which can be exercised through joint collective action.

Secondly, notwithstanding the potential of joint action to present an opportunity to cross group boundaries, this research project indicates that it puts disadvantaged group members in a unique psychological dilemma. The work described in Chapters 3 and 4 advances the existing literature by offering a first examination of when and why disadvantaged group members might be willing to collaborate with outgroup members in collective action. The finding that joint action involves conflict between the instrumentality of the action and its potential to normalize power relations, implies that the decision to act alongside outgroup members may be harder to take because it requires overcoming more barriers, as compared for instance to acting alongside ingroup members. As such, the decision to “sleep with the enemy” may be one that requires careful calculation.

One key implication of these findings is that the psychology of joint action is different and not accounted for by existing models of collective action. The typical collective action dilemma lies in the tension between individual and collective motives, namely, whether to cooperate with others or free ride to enjoy the collective benefit of action (Olson, 1965). Contemporary social identity approaches (e.g., Van Zomeren, Leach & Spears, 2012), theorize that the individual cost-benefit calculus occurs when identification with the group is weak, and that identification can help overcome such dilemma (Klandermans, 2002; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Consistent with such integrative approaches, this work indicates that instrumental and identity considerations are both important in the decision to engage in joint collective action. While we do not rule out the possibility that low-identifying disadvantaged members deliberate over the decision to participate or not in joint action, our findings could imply that their instrumental motivations stem from individualist rather than collectivistic reasons. Moving beyond existing models, however, we put forward the notion that the dilemma of joint action is qualitatively different and more pronounced for high-identifying group members, as it centers around the costs and benefits at the group level. Because high identifiers are concerned with the interests of the group, their calculations are less likely to be individualistically orientated. As such, this work suggests scope for the future development of a new model for understanding the social psychology of joint collective action, one which outlines the motivational pathways for both low- and high-identifiers.

Lastly, another implication of this thesis is that disadvantaged group members may hold concerns about prosocial behavior by the advantaged group. It has been suggested that dominant groups can sustain unequal intergroup relations through subtle paternalistic ideologies, which offer protection and affection to disadvantaged group members (Jackman, 1994). Previous research has examined paternalism in intergroup helping relations (Becker,

Ksenofontov, Siem, & Love, 2018), but not in collective action (see Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016). In the current research, we shed light on concerns about normalization, which reflect the perception that advantaged group members define the identity, goals, and dynamics of joint action in ways that sustain the status quo, under the guise of good protective allies. Although such paternalistic behavior is harder to identify when it is “sugar-coated” with collective action for social change, our research suggests that high-identifying disadvantaged members may be more sensitive to paternalism of outgroup allies that could contribute to normalizing power relations. Such concerns lead the disadvantaged to reject joint action because they believe that challenging normalization is instrumental to promoting social change.

Practical Implications

The findings reported in this thesis have a number of practical implications for understanding the motivations and barriers that facilitate or hinder social change within contexts of intergroup conflict. Activists and social agents should be aware, for example, that inducing hope for a shared future between the groups, in the absence of a shared platform to act collectively and jointly, may not be effective because it demobilizes collective action (see Chapter 2). In fact, the findings of this research suggest that communicating hope for equality between the groups is more effective than hope for harmony in motivating the disadvantaged to engage in collective action.

In addition, our findings suggest that mobilization messages that facilitate collective action with ingroup members may not necessarily be beneficial in motivating disadvantaged group members to act collectively with the advantaged (see Chapter 3). This means that these two forms of action are unlikely to be afforded, motivation-wise, at the same time. If true, then joint action mobilization messages should be framed around the costs and benefits of collaborating with the advantaged group (see Chapter 4). To persuade disadvantaged group

members to partake in joint action, activists should aim to maximize the benefits of such collaboration and tailor it to the interests and goals of the disadvantaged group who usually seek to achieve equality and justice.

Furthermore, it is important for agents of social change to address concerns about normalization by ensuring that the identity and voice of the disadvantaged are not compromised in the process of establishing a shared collective action front. To this end, addressing normalization issues requires advantaged group members to become aware of their privileges and consider the consequences of their presence and actions (see Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016). In addition, those who aim to mobilize the disadvantaged to joint action should be mindful that the dilemma of joint action is experienced by disadvantaged group members to a varying degree, depending on individual's level of identification (see Chapters 3 and 4). One practical recommendation that follows from this finding is that attempts to motivate low identifiers should focus on instrumental concerns, but for high identifiers joint action should be both instrumentally and symbolically appealing.

Lastly, the same knowledge about the factors that (de)motivate joint action can offer insights into how to *prevent* social change. For instance, because low identifiers rely on instrumental reasoning in their decision to partake in joint action, this can make them an easy target for representatives of the system who may try to persuade them into collaborations that ostensibly serve their interests but in fact maintain the status quo. Following the same reasoning, representatives of the system could try to prevent joint action from occurring by downgrading the benefit of joint action and/or raising concerns about normalization. As such, the knowledge gained from this thesis can be utilized by both those who want to promote or hinder social change.

Limitations and Future Directions

Additional psychological factors that affect the dilemma of joint action. One limitation of the studies in this thesis is that, even when considered together, they reflect only a first step in examining the psychology of joint collective action. Whereas the current project focused mainly on identification, instrumentality, and normalization, future research should expand on the factors that affect participation in joint collective action – for example, on the role of *emotions* or the role of *superordinate identity* (see Louis, 2009; McGarty, Blüch, Thomas, Bongiorno, 2009). As for emotions, the studies reported in Chapter 2 tested the role of hope in motivating collective action with the ingroup and demonstrated that hope for a shared future functions like intergroup harmonious interactions. But could hope for a shared future nevertheless motivate the disadvantaged to take collective action that includes both groups? Likewise, could hope for equality motivate collective action that defuses the boundaries between the groups? We believe that to the extent that joint action is framed as promoting the status of the disadvantaged group, it should be driven by hope that is equality- rather than harmony oriented. Future research needs to address these questions to unfold the relationship between hope and joint collective action.

Furthermore, there are other factors that can contribute to the dilemma of joint action. For instance, disadvantaged group members may be motivated to collaborate with advantaged allies thinking that their presence can deter repression and violence by the authorities. Continuing this line of thought, identification with a *superordinate identity* may also be an antecedent of joint action (see Radke et al., 2020). Although two of the studies in Chapter 4 offer preliminary evidence that perceptions of common values and goals do not increase willingness to engage in joint action, future research can investigate whether identifying with a *politicized identity* (i.e. a collective identity that underlies motivations in a power struggle within the wide societal context; Simon & Klandermans, 2001) as a superordinate identity

can motivate joint action (Radke et al., 2020). Indeed, we believe that forming a superordinate identity based on values and goals such as equality and justice could allow disadvantaged and advantaged group members to come together to achieve such goals (see McGarty et al., 2009). Including such new variables should also help developing a new model that captures the instrumental and identity motivational paths to joint collective action, with scope for emotions such as hope and politicized identities. Such a model can conceptualize identification with the group as a determinant of how cost-benefit calculations are initiated. Whereas low identifiers are likely to be driven mainly by individualistic instrumental considerations, high identifiers are likely to be motivated by group-based paths of cost-benefit calculations, politicized identity and perhaps emotions.

Joint collective action in other intergroup contexts. Another limitation of this set of studies is its external validity. Indeed, most of the reported studies were conducted in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is characterized by intense and violent intergroup relations. Although this makes the studies unique, future research may wish to test the generalizability of the findings to other intergroup contexts that vary in intensity or are based on different social identities such as race or gender. For instance, Black-White relations in the post-slavery era in the United States or the post-apartheid era in South Africa seem less violent and hostile than the Palestinian-Israeli relations currently. Although some of the studies reported in this thesis provide evidence that Black American participants also weighed instrumentality against normalization in pondering their willingness to engage in joint action, further research is needed to investigate the nature of the joint action dilemma in post-conflict contexts. Concerns about normalization may be less significant or manifest differently in societies where the groups are less polarized and can share a superordinate identity. In addition, in post-conflict societies, solidarity with the disadvantaged is likely to be more normative and common, and hence joint action might be almost inescapable, which

could render concerns about normalization less detrimental to the decision to collaborate with the outgroup. Accordingly, future research should examine the contextual factors that shape the dilemma of joint action and its strength, such as the intensity of the conflict and the normativity of joint action (see Chapter 3).

The dilemma of joint action from the perspective of the advantaged. Although less of a limitation than a matter of perspective, the framework of this thesis was centered on the psychology of the disadvantaged group. Obviously, joint action also includes the perspective and preparedness of the advantaged group. Therefore, future research should consider the dilemma that faces advantaged group allies when collaborating with the disadvantaged. In this respect, research has demonstrated that violations of moral convictions against social inequality motivate advantaged group members to collective action (Zomerén, Postmes, Spears & Bettache, 2011). On the other hand, some advantaged group members, especially high identifiers, are concerned with their social image and the costs that could result from violating the rules of the system (Radke et al., 2020; Teixeira, Spears, & Yzerbyt, 2020). It is thus possible that advantaged group members weigh the benefits of adhering to their moral values against the costs of going against the mainstream, or the costs of losing their privileges to the sake of promoting equality. As the salience of group identity determines whether disadvantaged group members embrace instrumental and/or normalization considerations, it is plausible, for example, that the dilemma experienced by high-identifying advantaged members is based on both moral and instrumental concerns. Accordingly, future research should test what considerations feed into the dilemma of joint action of the advantaged and what factors affect their cost-benefit calculations. Examining how the dilemma of joint action manifests among advantaged group members will contribute to developing a more comprehensive framework for understanding the psychology of joint action, which could facilitate efforts to mobilize both groups for social change.

Conclusion

Much social psychological work has sought to bring together groups in conflict to find common ground and promote social change. The strategies proposed to reduce conflict include intergroup contact, common identity, and cooperating toward superordinate goals, all of which are meant to reduce mutual prejudice, cross group boundaries, and improve attitudes (Allport, 1954; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, Rust, 1993; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Sherif, Harvey, White, & Hood, 1961). Such strategies, however, can be counterproductive to the efforts of social change, because they can distract the disadvantaged party from inequality issues and undermine their motivation for collective action (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, & Dovidio, 2016; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Adopting an integrative approach that attends to power relations and reconciles intergroup conflict and intergroup harmony, this thesis addressed the question of how groups can work across group boundaries through collective action efforts.

Focusing on the perspective of the disadvantaged, this thesis suggests that messages of hope for a shared future, which are not embedded in a framework of resistance to inequality, may not be effective in promoting social change that benefits the disadvantaged. Furthermore, we put forward the notion that joining forces in collective action can have great potential for promoting social change, but the decision to “sleep with the enemy” can constitute a major dilemma. In contrast to ingroup collective action which is typically driven by adversarial perceptions against the advantaged outgroup (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Wright & Lubensky, 2009), joint collective action requires softening such perceptions and the “us” also comes to include “them”. Therefore, the core psychological predictors derived from and fed by ingroup identification are insufficient to drive disadvantaged group members for joint action. Joint collective action is likely to be based on calculations of the benefits and costs of cooperating with the outgroup. Whereas low-identifying individuals are concerned

mainly with the benefits of joint action, high-identifiers need to perceive that the instrumentality outweighs the cost of normalization for them to take part in this collaboration.

All in all, this thesis thus highlights the distinct psychology of joint collective action and the challenge that comes with this harmonious conflictual interaction. We hope that this work will stimulate future research to test the generalizability of our findings to other contexts, and offer a path towards developing a comprehensive model that outlines the instrumental and identity pathways to joint collective action. Such knowledge offers important insights as to how disadvantaged group members can, within prolonged conflict, shift from a feeling of being "caught" between identities to a position of "leading" social change, as the epigraph suggests (see page 5).

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Dutch Summary

Veel theorie en onderzoek uit de sociale psychologie heeft gezocht naar manieren om groepen samen te brengen die in conflict zijn met elkaar, om zo een gemeenschappelijke basis te vinden en sociale verandering te bevorderen. Hierop zijn strategieën gebaseerd die worden gebruikt om conflicten tussen groepen te verminderen, zoals intergroepscontact, een gezamenlijke identiteit opbouwen, en samenwerken om overkoepelende doelen te bereiken. Zulke strategieën zijn bedoeld om wederzijdse vooroordelen te verminderen, over groeps grenzen heen te stappen, en gedrag te verbeteren. (Allport, 1954; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, Rust, 1993; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Sherif, Harvey, White, & Hood, 1961). Deze strategieën kunnen echter contraproductief zijn met het oog op sociale verandering. Zo kan de focus op sociale harmonie de benadeelde groep afleiden van bestaande sociale ongelijkheid en dit kan de motivatie om mee te doen aan collectieve actie tegen zulke ongelijkheid ondermijnen. (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, & Dovidio, 2016; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Door een integrerende benadering te hanteren die oog heeft voor de onderlinge machtsverhoudingen en zowel een conflict- als harmonie-benadering combineert, onderzoekt dit proefschrift twee manieren waarop achtergestelde groepen over groeps grenzen heen kunnen samenwerken om sociale verandering te bevorderen: door samen te werken aan een gedeelde toekomst (d.w.z. *hoop op een gezamenlijke toekomst*), en betrokkenheid bij *gezamenlijke collectieve actie* met de “outgroup” om zodoende gedeelde doelen m.b.t. sociale verandering te bereiken.

De onderzoeksvragen die in dit proefschrift aan de orde komen zijn: (1) Motiveert hoop op een gedeelde toekomst traditionele collectieve actie? (2) Motiveert groepsidentificatie, als een belangrijke motivator van collectieve actie, gezamenlijke collectieve actie? En (3) Wat zijn, meer in het algemeen, de motivaties en obstakels m.b.t. gezamenlijke collectieve actie? Om deze vragen te beantwoorden, hebben we acht empirische

studies uitgevoerd binnen twee verschillende intergroepscontexten (het Israël-Palestina conflict en rassendiscriminatie in de VS), waarbij we gebruik hebben gemaakt van correlatieve studies, experimentele studies en longitudinaal onderzoek. Hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht de rol van hoop op een gedeelde toekomst bij sociale verandering, terwijl Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 de psychologie van gezamenlijke collectieve actie onderzochten om gedeelde doelen m.b.t. sociale verandering te bereiken.

In Hoofdstuk 2 toetsten we het uitgangspunt dat *harmonie-gerichte hoop* (wat de nadruk legt op een gedeelde toekomst voor beide groepen), vergeleken met hoop dat het streven naar gelijkheid en rechtvaardigheid weerspiegelt, de intenties van mensen om tot collectieve actie over te gaan kan ondermijnen. Gebruikmakend van drie correlatieve onderzoeken (studie 2.1a-2.1c) en een experimenteel onderzoek (studie 2.2) ontdekten we dat hoop op een gedeelde toekomst (d.w.z. harmonie-gerichte hoop) de collectieve actie intenties vermindert van die leden van benadeelde groepen wiens identificatie met de eigen groep zwakker is. We vonden dit zowel in de Israëlisch-Palestijnse context als in de Amerikaanse context van rassendiscriminatie. Daarnaast onthulde vooral Studie 2.2 dat hoop op sociale gelijkheid effectiever is dan hoop op harmonie bij het motiveren van leden van benadeelde groepen om tot collectieve actie over te gaan. De studies beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2 laten daarmee zien dat ook positieve emoties zoals hoop negatieve gevolgen kunnen hebben voor collectieve actie, zoals dit ook het geval is bij andere harmonie-georiënteerde intergroepservaringen en interventies (bijvoorbeeld intergroepscontact, en gemeenschappelijke identiteit). Dit suggereert dat hoop ons wellicht een beter gevoel kan geven, maar dat het ons niet altijd motiveert om sociale verandering na te streven via collectieve actie. Hoop op sociale gelijkheid resoneert juist met de identiteit en de doelen van de benadeelde groep en vermindert de wrok over de huidige realiteit niet door achtergestelde groepsleden te dwingen positief te laten denken over outgroup-leden. Dit impliceert dat hoop,

voortkomend uit een visie op sociale gelijkheid, het noodzakelijk maakt om een zekere mate van conflict tussen de groepen in te roepen of in stand te houden.

In Hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we de relatie tussen *groepsidentificatie* (een belangrijke voorspeller van collectieve actie) en *gezamenlijke collectieve actie* --- een vorm van actie die vereist dat mensen over groepsgrenzen heen stappen. We testen dit in een longitudinale studie met drie *waves* waarin we de ervaringen volgden van Palestijnen die onder een gemilitariseerde bezetting leefden tijdens de periode van conflictescalatie en de-escalatie. De resultaten van deze studie tonen aan dat identificatie met de benadeelde groep groepsleden kan motiveren om deel te nemen aan collectieve actie die een dergelijke identiteit benadrukt, maar dat het niet noodzakelijkerwijs gezamenlijke collectieve actie met outgroup-leden mogelijk maakt, vooral wanneer het conflict tussen de groepen erg intens is. De bevinding dat groepsidentificatie niet noodzakelijkerwijs een voorspeller van gezamenlijke collectieve actie hoeft te zijn, benadrukt de complexiteit van dit type actie, en geeft specifiek aan dat psychologische processen die ten grondslag liggen aan gezamenlijke collectieve actie hoogstwaarschijnlijk verschillen van de processen die ten grondslag liggen aan traditionele collectieve actie. De resultaten lieten verder zien dat wanneer groepsidentificatie toeneemt, bijvoorbeeld door situationele factoren zoals conflictescalatie, de bereidheid van benadeelde leden om deel te nemen aan gezamenlijke actie afneemt. Waarschijnlijk gebeurt dit omdat in tijden van escalatie de noodzaak om de eigen groep van de “vijand” te onderscheiden en de groepsidentiteit te beschermen sterker wordt, en daarom samenwerking met outgroup-leden kan worden gezien als schadelijk voor de groep. Al met al laten deze bevindingen zien dat de beslissing om collectief op te treden met leden van de outgroup psychologisch verschilt van de beslissing om collectief op te treden met leden van de eigen groep. De studies die in dit hoofdstuk worden gerapporteerd leggen daarmee de basis voor het idee dat gezamenlijke collectieve actie leden van benadeelde groepen, met name de hoge identificeerders met de

groep, voor een uniek dilemma plaatst over de vraag of een dergelijke samenwerking eigenlijk wel zo'n goed idee is.

In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzochten we het idee dat gezamenlijke collectieve actie een dilemma kan vormen voor leden van benadeelde groepen, wat veroorzaakt wordt door het spanningsveld tussen een belangrijke motivatie (de waargenomen instrumentaliteit van gezamenlijke collectieve actie) en een belangrijk obstakel (het waargenomen potentieel van zulke actie om de machtsverhoudingen tussen de groepen te normaliseren). We hebben drie experimentele studies uitgevoerd binnen twee verschillende contexten waarin een voortdurende strijd voor gelijkheid en rechtvaardigheid plaats vindt (rassendiscriminatie in de VS en het Israël-Palestijns conflict), en die gekarakteriseerd worden door sociale ongelijkheid tussen de groepen. Studies 4.1 en 4.2 gebruikten twee verschillende methodes om de invloed van waargenomen instrumentaliteit en normalisatie te testen op de intenties van leden van de benadeelde groep om gezamenlijke collectieve actie te ondernemen. In studie 4.3 is onderzocht of de prijs die men betaalt in het geval van normalisatie zo hoog kan zijn dat dit ook de waargenomen effectiviteit van de gezamenlijke actie ondermijnt. De bevindingen van deze onderzoeken laten zien dat de beslissing om deel te nemen aan gezamenlijke collectieve actie een kwestie lijkt van kosten-batenberekeningen, met name of de actie instrumenteel is bij het bereiken van doelen of dat het de machtsverhoudingen tussen de groepen normaliseert. Meer specifiek tonen deze studies aan dat percepties van instrumentaliteit de bereidheid tot gezamenlijke actie motiveren, terwijl percepties van normalisatie deze ondermijnen. Bovendien wijzen de studies erop dat groepsleden met een hogere groepsidentificatie gevoeliger zijn voor de invloed van normalisatie, zodat het hun bereidheid tot gezamenlijke collectieve actie ondermijnt. Dit geldt echter niet voor degenen die zich minder sterk identificeren met de groep. Bovendien beïnvloedt normalisatie de motivatie van sterkere identificeerders door hun instrumentaliteitspercepties, wat betekent dat

zorgen over normalisatie afbreuk doet aan de waargenomen effectiviteit van een dergelijke actie. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat gezamenlijke collectieve actie een dilemma vormt waardoor kosten-batenberekeningen belangrijk worden, want zelfs als individuen bereid zijn om de individuele prijs te betalen voor deelname aan gezamenlijke collectieve actie, dan moeten ze nog steeds afwegen of de risico's voor de groep het waard het zijn. Een dergelijk dilemma is sterker van toepassing op degenen die zich sterker identificeren met de groep, die zich niet alleen bezighouden met hoe gezamenlijke collectieve actie hun groep instrumenteel ten goede kan komen, maar ook hoe het de groep symbolisch kan schaden. De bevinding dat hoge identificeerders normalisatie associëren met (gebrek aan) instrumentaliteit geeft aan dat ze normalisatie erkennen als iets dat hun benadeelde positie in de hand werkt.

We concluderen dat alleen hopen op een gedeelde toekomst wellicht te “harmonieus” is om leden van de benadeelde groep te motiveren tot collectieve actie voor sociale verandering, terwijl gezamenlijke collectieve actie een “harmonieuze maar conflictueuze” manier kan zijn om over groepsgrenzen heen te stappen op grond van een gezamenlijke afkeer van ongelijkheid. Desalniettemin kan een dergelijke samenwerking moeilijker te genereren zijn dan traditionele collectieve actie, omdat het hebben van een sterke identificatie met de eigen groep mensen niet altijd motiveert om deel te nemen aan zulke gezamenlijke actie, met name in tijden van verhoogde spanning en conflict. Als zodanig komt samenwerken via gezamenlijke collectieve actie neer op een kosten-batenanalyse, waarbij het voordeel van de krachtenbundeling afgewogen moet worden tegenover de prijs voor het normaliseren van machtsverhoudingen. Terwijl individuen met een zwakkere groepsidentificatie factor zich voornamelijk bezig lijken te houden met de voordelen van gezamenlijke collectieve actie, zullen sterkere identificeerders afwegen of de instrumentaliteit wel opweegt tegen de kosten van normalisatie. Dit proefschrift belicht daarmee de distinctieve psychologie van gezamenlijke collectieve actie, en de uitdaging die gepaard gaat met de beslissing om "met de

vijand in bed te stappen". Een belangrijke implicatie van onze bevindingen is dat de psychologie van gezamenlijke collectieve actie anders is en niet wordt verklaard door bestaande modellen van collectieve actie. We hopen dat dit werk toekomstig onderzoek zal stimuleren om de generaliseerbaarheid van onze bevindingen te testen met het oog op andere groepscontexten, en dat het een richting biedt voor de ontwikkeling van een nieuw model dat zowel instrumentele als identiteitsroutes naar gezamenlijke collectieve actie kan uitstippelen.