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The Universal Values of Community

A social dynamical view on culture

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university of
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The Universal Values of Community

A social dynamical view on culture

PhD thesis

to obtain the degree of PhD at the University of Groningen
on the authority of the
Rector Magnificus Prof. C. Wijmenga
and in accordance with
the decision by the College of Deans.

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CHAPTER

Introduction:
The Universal Values
of Community

In the picture on the front of this dissertation you see my daughter on her first day in school. This was her first reading lesson. The first word she learned is 'ik', the Dutch word for 'I' or 'me'. It is not much of a stretch to infer that if the Dutch schooling system thought that 'I' would be a suitable word to learn as your very first one, it must be a very important word. Why is 'I' an important, or maybe even the most important word? The answer seems obvious if you have been brought up with the notion that individuals are the creators of their behavior and the drivers of their fate.

Born in the Netherlands myself, but as a child of migrants, I have been in the position of a relative outsider to both 'host' and 'origin' countries. However, this was also a natural position to observe and compare. And as the human mind is more inclined to see differences, rather than similarities, I noticed how the Dutch people I encountered in daily life would do certain things differently, how they would think differently about certain things, how they *were* different from what I encountered at home with my Turkish parents and the Turkish community we socialized with. And one of the more pronounced differences I noticed was that in the Turkish community 'I' wasn't as important as 'people'. For instance, if I would behave in a manner my parents deemed unacceptable, my mother would say such things as: "What would people say?" ("Millet ne der?")

I know now that her referencing what others would think, whose opinion was apparently relevant, was a part of my socialization as a community member. She tried to make me aware of the fact that I would have to take the judgment of relevant others into account. And I now know that the kind of differences that I experienced, both in behavior and in attitudes, between members from different ethnic groups, are generally ascribed to differences in culture.

This brings us to the question that started this dissertation: to what extent can cultural background explain certain behaviors and attitudes? The reason this proved only an initial question, is that it paradoxically cannot be answered before several other questions are asked. The first being: what behaviors and attitudes? And whose behaviors and attitudes?

To expand (briefly) on our initial questions: I wanted to understand why members of certain cultural minority groups make less use of mental health care than expected, as is consistently shown by statistics on the matter, such as the Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study (Nemesis; De Graaf, Ten Have & Van Dorsselaer, 2010). Specifically, Dutch people of Turkish and Hindustani-Surinamese descent make far less use of mental health care than they are projected to need (e.g., on the basis of their socio-economic status), and when compared to other minority groups

(such as the Creole Surinamese) and the 'indigenous' Dutch. Understandably, it was my assumption that this may have to do with the different cultural backgrounds of these groups.

However, once I started researching the topic more in depth it became clear to me that the existing concepts and operationalizations of culture (which I will discuss in the following sections) are not that well suited to explain such specific and complex questions, such as whether someone seeks help when they have psychosocial health problems. Indeed, these existing notions of culture already have a hard time accounting for more straightforward differences between cultural groups, such as real-life differences between certain societal groups in their attitudes, for example towards sexism or in their political preferences.

Therefore, the focus of this dissertation moved from these initial, specific questions, to more general and fundamental questions - studying what would be a good conceptualization and operationalization of culture, when one is interested in explaining societal attitudes as described before. The key questions that we sought to answer were thus: what is culture? And how does culture, or how do cultural values, exert their influence on our behavior? And what would the answers to these questions imply for how we can best measure such values, and for what types of behaviors and attitudes we can expect to be determined (to a degree) by such cultural values?

In the remainder of this introduction, I will first discuss the most common concepts of culture, and then explain how I have conceptualized culture in order to answer the aforementioned questions. Finally, I will shortly discuss why cultural values as we have conceptualized them can explain differences at a societal level, or in other words, why and how our conceptualization of culture explains fundamental differences between societies.

Culture: concepts, definitions and interpretations

Culture is a key concept in sociology and psychology. Which does not mean that there is a commonly accepted definition of this concept. Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) famously described over 50 different definitions in their landmark work '*Culture: a critical review of concepts and definition*'. Sociologists generally describe it as the characterizing set of ideas and beliefs that social groups share and transmit over time, and thus see culture as the means by which any social group or society defines itself. As such, culture is also a means to identify and explain differences between social groups.

The focus of the field of psychology is to understand behavior, and primarily individual behavior. Through this prism, the definition of the concept 'culture' has proven difficult and even divisive. In the following paragraphs I expand on the most prevalent concepts of culture in the realm of (cross)cultural psychology, starting with the most important one: Individualism-Collectivism.

Individualism – Collectivism

When my mother was telling me to take the opinions of others into account, she was teaching me to adjust my actions to the expectations and the network of norms of "other people". Such adherence to the descriptive (and occasionally injunctive) norms is very characteristic of a collectivist culture (cf. Fischer et al., 2009). Indeed, when we look at my real-life experiences through the lens of cross-cultural psychology, the difference between Turkish and Dutch culture would most probably be explained in terms of Individualism versus Collectivism (IC). IC is still the most commonly used construct to explain cultural differences, although its conceptualization and measurements have been criticized (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Terracciano et al., 2005).

The terms collectivism and individualism also originally stem from the field of sociology. Ferdinand Tönnies in 1887 described the differences between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society), by means of these terms. He argued that the smaller the group, the more communal, or collectivist, it was. Similarly, Max Weber (1930) famously compared the work ethic of Protestants and Catholics on this basis, arguing that the former were more self-reliant and therefore individualistic.

In 1980, the Dutch social-psychologist Geert Hofstede (Hofstede, 1980; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988) rejuvenated IC and incorporated it into (cross)cultural psychology with his groundbreaking work '*Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*'. On behalf of the multinational business firm IBM, Hofstede had studied the values of their employees in 40 countries. His analysis of the vast amount of data he had gathered, identified four cultural dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and individualism. Of these dimensions, individualism (versus collectivism) proved most influential, not least because Hofstede's research showed its remarkable correlations with variables such as the economic development of a country (in this case, the remarkable correlation he found was $r = .82$). As is always the case with such remarkably high correlations between fuzzy variables, they merit very close and critical scrutiny. Hofstede's work is no exception: there is abundant criticism of his scale's psychometric properties and of his statistical methods).

In essence, IC is an expression of the extent to which group interests are prioritized *or* the individual's interests are. Cultures are more collectivist when they prioritize the group above the individual, and more individualist when vice versa. Triandis (1996) suggested four attributes defining collectivism and individualism: a) meaning (and definition) of the self, i.e. more interdependent in collectivist cultures, more independent in individualist cultures; b) goals: in collectivist cultures ingroup goals are prioritized, whereas in individualist cultures personal goals are; c) compliance to norms or attitudes: collectivists determine their individual behavior more by (ingroup) norms, whereas individualists give more weight to their (personal) attitudes; and finally d) ingroup need versus exchange: collectivists attach greater weight to the needs of (members of) ingroups, whereas individualist weigh advantages against costs of relationships in determining their social behavior.

Triandis (1995) also pointed out an apparent paradox: he argued that contrary to Hofstede's definition, collectivism and individualism are not necessarily orthogonal. In other words, cultures can be both collectivist and individualist, which seems at odds with its initial definition. Also, Triandis (e.g., 1995) argued that there seem to be different kinds of individualism and collectivism, as becomes clear from the differences between nations/cultures that are classified in the same category: "...American individualism is different from Swedish individualism; likewise, the collectivism of the Israeli kibbutz is different from Korean collectivism" (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998, p.119).

The original concept was thus not only deemed too inflexible, but also not refined enough. To address this particular flaw, Triandis and Gelfand (1998) added an extra distinction to IC, suggesting both could be horizontal or vertical. Horizontal IC is about equality, vertical IC is about hierarchy. In a further refinement of the concept, Markus and Kitayama (1991) described how IC may relate to how one identifies oneself with regard to others, independent or interdependent. From a similar perspective of self-definition, Kagitcibaşı (1996) proposed a different naming, autonomy and relatedness, and a third category in which both are combined in an 'autonomous-related self'. To conclude this short overview, I would like to mention Singelis, whose contributions to the field include one of the most used scales of IC, in the IndCol'95 (Singelis et al., 1995). The IndCol'95 is a popular and thoroughly validated 32-item scale that measures Horizontal Individualism, Vertical Individualism, Horizontal Collectivism and Vertical Collectivism (Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). There have, however, been doubts about its measurement invariance (e.g., Robert, Lee & Chan, 2006), i.e. its ability to measure equally valid across cultures (and languages).

Almost 40 years after its re-conception, IC is probably still the most used concept of culture, due to its proven utility (e.g., Kagitcibasi, 1997; Robert, Lee & Chan, 2006) and “theoretical parsimony” (Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002, p. 44). At the same time, there are, as previously noted, some fundamental concerns with regard to this concept. Narrowing the criticism down, there are three major points: a) many have pointed out that the IC distinction is too generic and imprecise and this has led to a constant stream of refinements and adjustments (some of which were very briefly discussed in the previous sections), necessitated by the simple fact that although the IC distinction is intuitively plausible it does not capture cultural differences sufficiently, b) the lack of a coherent theoretical account of the origin of IC, and c) a lack of clarity about the level at which IC is supposed to exist, i.e. whether IC is a description of the characteristics of nations or of very large groups or whether IC refers to the values held by individuals. The first point (ad a) I have briefly discussed in the previous section. I will now (again very briefly) discuss points b and c.

To elaborate on the last point, one of the most important critiques to IC was Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelman’s (2002) *‘Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analyses’*, which focused on the question whether European Americans were indeed more individualistic than other cultural groups. They found that there was some evidence for this, albeit not as strong as often claimed. More importantly, they stated that the definition of the construct was too diffuse, and that this may lead to conflating comparisons at the national level with individual behaviors. In other words: categorizing countries as more individualist or collectivist does not necessarily predict how individuals in these countries behave. Related to this point, their final conclusion is that there is great variability at the individual level with regard to IC and that situational factors may make salient the cultural frame that determines the individual behavior. Paraphrasing, what is deemed the proper or adequate behavior in a certain situation is not only determined by the cultural context, but even more by the circumstances of the situation, according to Oyserman and colleagues.

Hofstede was (e.g., 1980) and remained (Minkov & Hofstede, 2012) adamant that culture is shared at the national level. However, Fischer and Schwartz (2011) found that the within-country consensus with regard to values was modest and the variation between individuals regarding the (cultural) values they held, was much larger than between countries. Similarly, Terracciano and colleagues (2005) compared 49 cultures in a very large multi-level study and conclude that the perceptions that people have of their national character are, if one compares it with the actual characteristics of individuals within that nation, unfounded stereotypes. In other words: they found

no evidence that, for instance, the Dutch self-stereotype of being blunt bore any resemblance to actual personality traits of the Dutch. These findings raise questions about whether there is such a thing as national culture, but also whether one could be able to measure it by aggregating individual test scores.

Finally, the *theoretical underpinnings* of the concept have been criticized. Differences in individualism and collectivism have been attributed to ecological factors (e.g., Triandis & Gelfand, 1995), such as the climate and geography of a region or country, but also to whether a group consisted of herders or farmers (e.g., Nisbett, Peng, Choi & Norenzayan, 2001), or what crops they produced (e.g., Talhelm et al., 2014). The underlying idea is that the way people live and the tasks they perform as a group shapes the values they hold. An example would be the so-called Rice Theory, that proposes that rice-farming requires substantially more labor and coordination, because it necessitates a relatively elaborate irrigation system, and is therefore associated with a more collectivist stance. Conversely, groups producing wheat are more individualist, because wheat-farming doesn't require a great deal of coordination between farmers. Talhelm and colleagues (2014) confirmed this hypothesis could explain differences with regard to the degree of independence or interdependence in Chinese regions, that are traditionally rice-growing or wheat-growing. However, several researchers (e.g., Hu & Yuan, 2015; Roberts, 2015) have argued that this conclusion is overly simplified interpretation. In any case, it is hard to determine causality and subsequently its direction, when regarding complex and multi-faceted concepts such as culture. And of course, such explanations are inevitably retroductive, because they start from the assumption that China is collectivist. If one would reverse the causal order, then one could point to the importance of water management in the Netherlands. But this is typically seen as one of the most individualist countries in the world.

The challenge for a theoretical account of the origins of IC is that it needs to explain why these societal structures persist across many generations, even when people stop farming and migrate towards cities. At the same time, these origins need to account for the many different varieties and facets of IC as well as for the huge variations in IC within countries (and it seems that factors such as climate may have difficulty accounting for those).

Tightness versus Looseness

Another broad-brush concept to distinguish between cultures is 'tightness versus looseness' (Peltó, 1968; Gelfand et al., 2011). Originally, this term was used in the field of anthropology (e.g., Peltó, 1968), and it has been re-popularized and introduced into (cross-cultural) psychology by Michele Gelfand (2012) and colleagues

(Gelfand et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011). Gelfand defines tightness versus looseness as “the strength of social norms and tolerance for deviant behavior” (2012, p. 420), which means ‘tight’ nations have strong norms and a low tolerance of deviant behavior, whereas ‘loose’ nations have weak norms and a high tolerance of deviant behavior” (Gelfand et al., 2011). The degree of tightness is a consequence of the ecological threats (such as natural disasters and disease threat) and societal threats a nation (historically) has encountered and the socio-political institutions, and is reflected in the every-day interactions. Therefore, members of such a society, or nation, are psychologically adapted to the strength or weakness of its norms.

Tightness-looseness (TL) is shown to correlate with a wide range of societal characteristics (tight nations are more likely to be led autocratically, for instance) and attitudes, such as towards the death penalty (which is favoured more by tight nations). It is important to note that tightness-looseness and individualism-collectivism are distinct: there are collectivist-tight nations, such as Japan, collectivist-loose nations, such as Brazil, individualist-tight, such as Germany, and individualist-loose nations, such as the Netherlands.

TL has a stronger theoretical footing than IC, but it inevitably faces some of the same conceptual difficulties and empirical hurdles. Firstly, its measures are primarily defined at the national level, whereas intra-national differences are well-established. Although the within-country agreement of TL is shown to be high (with a mean of $r = .85$; Gelfand et al., 2011), one only needs to think of the value divides between industrialized, urban areas and the agricultural countryside, that almost every nation seems to have. TL-researchers have acknowledged this (e.g., Harrington & Gelfand, 2014) and shown that within the USA there is great variation with regard to the strength of norms between the 50 states. However, one could argue that even states are at a macro-level and the variation may very well go deeper, and that tightness may vary between cities, neighbourhoods, families or even generations within families.

At another level of aggregation, there is a similar problem with TL, which I would like to explain with an example and by again comparing Dutch and Turkish cultures. According to the 2011 comparison of 33 nations (Gelfand et al., 2011) the tightness scores of these nations range from 1.6 (Ukraine, very loose) to 12.3 (Pakistan, very tight). In this comparison, the Netherlands are a clearly rather loose country, with a score of 3.3, and Turkey a rather tight country, with a 9.2 score. And at face value that makes perfect sense. But at the same time, it is somewhat superficial: it depends on the norm. For instance, punctuality is a strong norm in Dutch culture. Being tardy for an appointment is considered to be very rude. On this particular norm, the Turks

are very loose, to say the least. Most social appointments are not even scheduled at a specific time, and therefore tardiness is not an issue, let alone an affront. So, with regard to this particular norm the Dutch are tighter than the Turks.

Another example shows that even within a specific domain there may be seen variation in TL: Turkish culture has very strict and socially important norms with regard to the desired cleanliness of one's home. However, this norm only seems to apply to private spaces, whereas the littering of public spaces does not seem to be seen as problematic. The conclusion with regard to this specific issue may be that TL may apply differently to different values or value domains, and that a single measure therefore may be overly coarse. The wider conclusion with regard to TL as a concept of cultural difference however is that it has proven utility. And this implies that the degree to which compliance to norms is enforced may very well be key to understand culture *per se*.

Schwartz Values

Where the appeal of IC and tightness vs. looseness lies in their simplicity, the Schwartz Values Survey (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz et al., 2012; Schwartz, 2012), based on the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values, constitutes a concept of culture that is intricate and describes values in great detail.

Schwartz' Theory of Basic (Individual) Values proposes that values are grounded in (individual) biological needs as well as in requirements for coordinated social interaction, group functioning and group survival (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz et al., 2012). These different mechanisms combined translate into motivational values that individual group members are supposed to live by. Accordingly, the SVS asks respondents to rate values (e.g., honoring of parents and elders; showing respect) for their importance "as a guiding principle in my life". Schwartz' scale is thus, ultimately, a scale that minutely dissects all the values that individuals can possibly possess. Its starting point is the catalogue of possible values that an individual can hold.

The basic and universal values, according to Schwartz (1994; 2012) are: Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence and Universalism. However, in describing the structure of how these values relate to each other, Schwartz divides them into four domains: Self-Enhancement, Openness to Change, Conservation and Self-Transcendence. Furthermore, Schwartz states (e.g., 2006, 2012) that the first two domains serve the regulation of how one expresses personal interests and characteristics and the latter two regulate how one relates to socially to others and affects them. The parallels with individualism and collectivism, at this most abstract level, are evident.

The SVS does suffer from the inherent lack of context (i.e., the setting in which one is asked to act), as all similar scales do, and solely focuses on individual values. This lack is partly circumvented in Schwartz' alternative measure (Schwartz, 2012), developed based on the theory of Basic Values: the Portrait Values Questionnaire. This questionnaire consists of (gender-matched) verbal portraits of 40 different people, with which the respondent is asked to compare themselves.

"Each portrait describes a person's goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For example: "Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way" describes a person for whom self-direction values are important. "It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things" describes a person who cherishes power values."
(Schwartz, 2012, p.11)

The PVQ adds context and thus makes the values being measured easier to relate to (or not). However, the PVQ also focuses on individual values and the way individuals see themselves. The underlying demands that a society can have of the individual, remain implicit. What also remains, is the question whether the aggregation of individual values (of a certain group of people) amounts to the description of a culture. To be clear, Schwartz does not claim it is, and is of the opinion that individual values, that mostly are not a part of a common shared meaning system, are a more important determinant of individual behavior (Fischer & Schwartz, 2012).

The intersubjective approach

As has become abundantly clear from our overview so far, one of the fundamental questions with regard to culture is how cultural values, situated at the macro level of society, are related to the micro level of individual values, attitudes and behaviors. A relatively novel answer to this question, building on existing ideas with regard to social behavior, is the intersubjective approach, introduced by Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg and Wan (2010).

Chiu and colleagues describe their intersubjective approach as consisting of three basic premises: 1) people sometimes act on the beliefs and values they deem widespread in their culture; 2) however, individuals do not only act on the basis of cultural scripts, but actively participate and interpret this intersubjective knowledge; 3) finally, the values and beliefs that are perceived to be widespread in a culture, may not actually be endorsed by the people in this culture. In short, the intersubjective approach boils down to the notion that people have an idea of

what most people in their cultural group believe and value, and that this knowledge is part of what determines their individual behaviors (a form of reasoning that it shares with other theoretical traditions, including pluralistic ignorance and self-categorisation theory, cf. Prentice & Miller, 1993; Turner, 1991).

This approach thus moves away from individual values (and beliefs) and specifically looks at perceived collective values. Such intersubjective perceptions have been shown to influence behaviors (Fu, Morris, Lee, Chao, Chiu & Hong, 2007), blame attribution (Shteynberg, Gelfand & Kim, 2009), and judgments (Wan, Tam & Chiu, 2010), for instance, and serve to coordinate society. According to this approach, members of society know what to expect and what is expected from them in given situations by means of intersubjective perceptions. Also, it gives members of society a platform for communication on the basis of common shared beliefs (Kashima, 2000), as well as for group identification (Chiu et al., 2010).

The intersubjective approach does not only have consequences at a conceptual level, it also applies to the way culture should be measured. Because, if individuals act on what they think other people believe they should do in a given situation, then one needs to measure what individuals think that other people believe is right, to predict and explain individual behavior. It is however the question *what other people*, i.e. what the specific group is that individuals would use as a reference. The group referenced in the first basic premise described by Chiu and colleagues, i.e. *“rather than acting on their personal beliefs and values, people sometimes act on the beliefs and values they perceive to be widespread in their culture”* (Chiu et al., 2010, p. 482), is rather broad, but at the same time presumes people have themselves a clear idea of who belongs to their culture.

My conclusion is therefore that the strenght of the intersubjective approach is that it actively discusses how and at what level cultural values are transmitted. There is however also an issue to be noted: at current it is not very well specified which group individuals would see as their reference.

Culture as a social dynamic

Building on these concepts, our own conceptualization crystallized. In the second chapter of this dissertation, I describe the conceptualization of Community Collectivism and the validation of its scale. This Chapter 2 discusses the details of community collectivism in greater detail, but in the following paragraphs I will give a short overview.

Our own conceptualization is an amalgamation of the concepts discussed up to this point. All have their merit, and all have their scopes, that come with

inherent flaws, which we have discussed in more detail in the previous sections. The intersubjective approach addresses the recurring flaw of treating culture as if it were an aggregation of individual attitudes and values, by operationalizing it as values and beliefs perceived among a reference group, i.e. their culture. Our conceptualization firstly focused on determining the appropriate reference group.

It is, at this point, crucial to clarify what we mean with appropriate in this context. Culture does a great many things and there is no way to capture these things with one way of explaining what it is. Therefore, I have adopted the view that the context of the cultural influence, the workings of that influence in that specific context and the eventual effects define what culture is and what it does for that specific context. It was our aim to answer questions about how (and which) cultural values influence social behaviors and societal attitudes, and so the appropriate conceptualization in this context would involve determining the group individuals would most likely reference when performing such social behaviors and adopting societal attitudes. The process of referencing particular groups in this way, is described in several sociological studies. Merton & Kitt (1950) introduced the term reference group, but Shibutani (1955) pointed out that Merton used the term in a confused way. He suggested there are three different usages of this term. The first is to use groups as a comparison (or contrast). The second is much more aligned with our research. One can aspire to belong to a group, which Shibutani associates with a desire to have that group's status and respect and this encourages group members to behave respectably (eg., especially among newcomers in a group). The third is that the reference group can function as a frame of reference for how one sees the world.

Culture is first and foremost a collective phenomenon. And from a social-psychological viewpoint, it is more than likely that this collective process firstly takes place at the proximal environment of the individual. That proximal environment is the individual's family (e.g., Fischer et al., 2009) and the communal network this family is embedded in (e.g., Kagiticibasi, 1996). In short, the individual's community. We therefore specifically used the term 'community' in our scale as the reference group for intersubjectivity and defined it as "your core family, your extended family and other families (in your environment) that matter to you".

Conceptualizing culture in terms of social dynamics, or in other words group processes, has implications for *how to measure* culture, i.e. intersubjectively (see Chapter 2), but also for *what values* to measure. Similar to Schwartz' theory about the emergence of values, we adopted the view that values derive from their functions for group management and preservation. As further discussed in Chapter 2, we therefore defined a concept consisting of four value domains necessary for

the social regulation of (small) groups: loyalty, hierarchy, honor and agency. We believe that in all groups, it is necessary for there to be a clear understanding of these shared values in order to prevent conflict and foster collaboration. In the next paragraph I will illustrate these four value domains by reference to a specific cultural context: the Turkish-Anatolian culture.

An Example: community collectivism projected on to Turkish-Anatolian culture

When we consider the characteristics of the traditional Turkish-Anatolian family¹, we see a structure which is founded on a strong expectation that one must provide mutual support and care to family, or what one might call a mutual obligation of loving one another, of solidarity and of *loyalty*. Simultaneously there is a clear hierarchical structure in which one's status is determined by gender and age. The individual family members are obliged to act according to this status and transgressions can be met with sanctions. This mutually sustained *hierarchy* is not just about inequality of opportunity: it divides obligations and gives each family member a role and a place. Third, within the family each member has the responsibility to do well, as an individual and as a representative of their family. Kağıtçıbaşı (1996) describes this as agency and interpersonal distance, which explains the co-existence of emphasis on individual diligence and belief in an uneluctable fate (*kader*). This fate includes (patriarchal) cultural conventions. An important part of these cultural conventions is the concept of honor, which requires some elaboration.

The traditional Turkish culture has at least three concepts of honor (some describe even more, cf: Sevrer, 2013). One is *onur* (or *gurur*), best translated as individual dignity. Another is *şeref*, which is roughly analogous to the concept of respectability and is generally used in reference to men. Finally, there is *namus* which is decidedly more difficult to translate. *Namus* refers particularly to the chastity of the (female) family members, and the reflection thereof on the family as a whole. Impurity of male members may also reflect to the family's honor and reputation, but is deemed less grave and less offensive. Transgressions of *namus* or even mere suspicions of a transgression can have severe consequences for the family. The loss of *namus* means a shameful loss of status for families in the bigger community deemed unbearable, and therefore requires 'cleansing', which may involve exclusion or even (extreme) violence (Gezik, 2003; Sevrer, 2005; WODC, 2007). Honor, with all of his aspects, is instrumental in defining the status of the individual within the group, and the status of groups (families) within a larger context.

¹ The term Anatolian is often used as an expression of the ethnic and cultural diversity of Turkey, and to avoid the misinterpretation of the term 'Turkish' as an ethnic label instead of a nationality.

Micro-cultural dynamics defined in four concepts

In sum, in our example of the traditional Turkish-Anatolian families we can see four basic processes at work which regulate social relations within the family and which maintain the standards of behavior of the family so that it remains in good standing: loyalty, hierarchy, honor and agency.

As I will discuss in much more detail in Chapter 2, the dimensions of hierarchy and agency regulate social relations between the group and the individual. The two other dimensions (loyalty and honor) appear to be aimed at the maintenance and self-regulation of community and social structure through mechanisms of encouragement (reward) and enforcement (sanction). But important, too, is that within such a social structure, it matters relatively little what the opinions and values of the individual are. The culture is regulated through the social relations within families and between families. This is, again, more reason to adopt an intersubjective approach. If we want to understand the influence of culture on individuals, in other words, we have to ask not just about individual values, but also about perceived values of the community.

At this junction, it is important to note that it was and is our assumption that, considering that the four dimensions of community collectivism are based on universal group processes, our conceptualization should therefore be able to describe cultural differences between all cultural groups. To clarify: when we would compare the characteristics of the traditional Turkish-Anatolian culture with those of the Dutch culture, we would see differences with regard to the extent that loyalty and hierarchy are prioritized, or enforced by honor, or the margins for individuality with regard to these values. These differences would account for what we perceive as 'cultural differences'. But what we would also see is that these differences only refer to *the extent* to which the four basic dimensions are prioritized. Specifically, in Dutch families also, there is a hierarchical structure, support and love towards family members is required, transgressions against rules are met with sanctions, and individuals have their own responsibility and margins to deviate. To make this even more illustrative: it wouldn't be uncommon for a Dutch youth to be punished with house arrest for coming home late after a night out, or for there to be gossiping about such matters, especially in rural areas. In short, only the degree to which differs, not the mechanisms themselves.

How do micro-cultural dynamics relate to macro-cultural values?

On the basis of this, we hypothesized that the cultural orientation that we can discern with CCS may serve to explain behaviors and attitudes: a) not explicitly outlined by the four value domains, but as a consequence of how they regulate groups (specifically sexism); and b) those outside of the realm of the proximal community, i.e. societal and political attitudes. We based this hypothesis on the following idea: individuals take an intersubjective perspective to act in accordance with what is expected from them in their proximal community, i.e. they have an idea of what their direct environment thinks and values, to what extent they can diverge from those communal values, as well as what the consequences might be of non-compliance. We therefore expect that individuals also take their cue from what they perceive to be the communal values of the people they live with in community, with regards to their attitudes, preferences and behaviors with regard to how their society as a whole should be.

In sum, as people are part of groups at multiple levels, their values may not only reflect on their most proximate environment, but also translate to the macro-level of society. Therefore, we deemed that the cultural orientation operationalized at the micro-level may predict one's meso- and macro-level attitudes, in concreto socio-political preferences, gender relations, etcetera. In the remainder of this Dissertation I will report and discuss our findings with regard to these hypotheses.

In Chapter 2, I describe how we firstly tested these hypotheses by comparing indigenous Dutch people, from different sub-cultural groups, Turkish Dutch and Hindustani-Surinamese Dutch people in our validation study, by means of the Community Collectivism Scale.

In Chapter 3, I present our study of the relation between sexism, mistreatment of women and victim blaming, and cultural orientation. For this Study we compared people from Turkey, India and Mexico.

In Chapter 4, I present our study of how cultural orientation may partly explain why people support anti-government protests, and why (others) support repression of such protests by authorities.

Finally, in Chapter 5, the Discussion, all findings are summarized, and conclusions and implications are discussed.

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CHAPTER

The Conceptualization of Community Collectivism and the Validation of the Community Collectivism Scale¹

2

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Abstract

Culture shapes individuals, but the measurement of cultural differences has proven a challenge. Traditional measures of cultural values focus on individual perceptions. We suggest that values are established and maintained within social communities of proximate others, such as the family and its social environment. Within such communities, values serve to maintain collective harmony whilst preserving individual agency. From a social-dynamic analysis of communities, we infer that community values of loyalty regulate individual commitment, values of honor regulate norm compliance, and values of group hierarchy maintain a division of labor. In addition, communities may regulate the ways in which individuals have independent agency. A new scale to measure these values was validated in four studies (N=398, 112, 465 and 111) among Dutch (religious and non-religious), Turkish-Dutch, Surinamese and Turkish groups. Values and practices were measured at the level of the individual ('What do *you* value?') and at the level of the perceived community ('What does your *community* value?'). Results show that, unlike individual-level measures of individualism/collectivism, this scale has excellent reliability, differentiates between cultural groups, and has predictive validity for future (voting) behavior. This approach provides a new way of conceptualizing culture, a new measure of collectivism and new insights into the role of proximate others in shaping culture.

Community Collectivism: A social dynamic approach to conceptualizing culture

Cultural differences are undeniable: people from different cultural backgrounds act differently in a wide range of situations. But it is surprisingly difficult to pinpoint the source of these cultural differences and to measure their underlying causes in cognition and behavior. One reason why existing scales produce mixed results is that cultural difference is often assessed by assuming that “culture” at high level of aggregation (e.g., nations or “east vs. west”), shapes values of individuals. In this paper, we argue that measures of cultural values can be improved by taking into account the more proximate social environment in which people “do” culture. This social environment is often changeable and fluid, but the social relationships within it are relatively stable. This means that within-community cultural behavior is constrained not just by individual beliefs, but also by the (perceived) beliefs and actions of others in one’s cultural group (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg & Wan, 2010), and in particular by those with whom one interacts frequently (Postmes, Akkus, & Stroebe, 2015). This also means that the social dynamics within communities shape the cultural behavior within it, and thus inform the content of the values that regulate within-community behavior.

Accordingly, this paper² develops a social dynamic analysis of how values are established and maintained within communities, which can inform *how* to measure cultural values. This paper will argue that community collectivism is shaped by prevalent values and practices within the community of proximate others. This community environment (rather than abstract social categories such as nationality) should be the most proximate and primary source of cultural differences. This social dynamic analysis also helps to identify the content of the values most likely to be shaped within the community: the focus should be on values essential for regulating members’ community behavior (cf. Schwartz, 1994). Abiding by these values would be a prerequisite not just for the community to live harmoniously, but also for the individual to fit in and be accepted.

The current paper contains an outline of this conceptual analysis, and we develop a measurement instrument from it. This is a measure of Community Collectivism that differs from existing measures in the form of measurement: we measure personal values and practices (personal collectivism or PerCol for short) as well as perceived values and practices within the community of proximate others (community collectivism, ComCol). This scale also differs in its content by focusing on values and practices that are essential to regulating the social behavior within the communities examined: issues of loyalty, honor, hierarchy and agency. Four studies are presented that put PerCol and ComCol to the test, and suggest that ComCol is distinctively effective.

² All research materials are stored by the University of Groningen and accessible via the first author.

Culture: what is it and what does it do?

Although it has proven virtually impossible to define culture (Jahoda, 2012), one dominant definition is that cultures are ‘commonly shared meaning systems’ (Fischer, 2009). These meaning systems are typically translated to values (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Owe et al., 2013), such as those captured by the World Values Survey (Schwartz et al., 2012). Together with the Individualism-Collectivism (Ind/Col)-heuristic (e.g., Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995), such values are among the most commonly used operationalizations of cultural differences. Although they are widely used, existing measures of such values have also been criticized as ill defined (e.g., Fischer & Schwartz, 2011) and as being divorced from the social contexts within which individual thinking normally occurs (e.g., Leung & Cohen, 2011; Oyserman & Lee, 2008).

One of the debates regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of culture hinges on the question at what level culture and the values it is comprised of are supposed to be shared: at a national level, or rather the individual and situational level, or something in between? In defense of a national level approach, Hofstede & Bond (1984) originally argued that distinctions between cultures would only be useful when comparing nations (see also Minkov & Hofstede, 2012). Intuitively, the notion of national cultures rings true: in popular perception ‘national characters’ seem to exist. But empirically, the evidence is not so clear-cut. Terracciano et al. (2005) compared in-group perceptions of national character with aggregated personality traits and concluded that perceptions of national character are “unfounded stereotypes” (Terracciano et al. 2005, p.3). Similarly, for most ‘cultural’ values the within-country consensus is much lower than one would expect if values were indeed heavily influenced by culture *and* if cultures were a property of nations (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). Fischer & Schwartz (2011, p.1137) conclude that “segments of the population emphasize different values because they have different experiences”: large within-country differences exist. Finally, it has been argued that cultural differences cannot be seen outside of the situational context they take place in: culture is primed or even determined by context (e.g., Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002).

One possible resolution to this issue is to make a distinction between personal and intersubjective values (Chiu et al., 2010). This suggests that people assess and perceive reality based on their sociocultural contexts: “rather than acting on their personal beliefs and values, people sometimes act on the beliefs and values they perceive to be widespread *in their culture*” (Chiu et al., 2010, p.482, emphasis added). These intersubjective perceptions of culture are likely to differentiate much better between cultural groups, and may indeed be consequential. The empirical work in this tradition tends to measure cultural values by reference to abstract social categories (e.g., Japanese, Poles, Americans) whose cognitive representations (like stereotypes) are likely to be intersubjective.

Culture within Communities

The National level may not be the only or best level at which intersubjective values should be measured. We argue that culture is likely to be most strongly and most consistently influenced by the community of concrete others with whom a person interacts on a day to day basis, such as one's (extended) family. The national group (e.g., Americans) is a *depopulated* cognitive construct. Several studies have reported a 'dissociation' between personal and cultural values measured at this level (e.g., Chiu et al., 2010; Fischer, 2006; Yamagishi & Suzuki, 2009; Zou, Tam, Morris, Lee, Lau, & Chiu, 2009). The community one lives in is more concrete and known to the individual through personal experience. The community (e.g., family and extended family) is populated by others of flesh and blood. When acting within this setting or when expressing oneself, one has to take account of ongoing relationships and of their perceived values as inferred from, for example, past actions and manifested beliefs.

It is most likely within communities such as these that values are shaped, as they are requirements for coordinated social interaction, functioning and survival for *groups* (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz et al., 2012). Communities need particular mechanisms in order to regulate within-community behavior and to ensure the future preservation and integrity of the community. These mechanisms translate into values that are promoted within the community and that individual group members are supposed to live by. The same mechanism may operate within Nations or larger collectives, but their influence is likely to be much less direct.

If we want to examine what these values are, exactly, and how they are promulgated within the community, one could take different approaches. Like Schwartz' Theory of Basic Individual Values, one could build a taxonomy of universal, personal values, some of which meet community requirements, while others meet individual or biological needs. But one could also take the community and the social dynamics within it as the starting point of such an analysis, because groups also have certain universal features. This is the approach we adopt here.

Cultural Values and their Social Dynamic Origin

If we look for the fundamental features of groups that play a role in their formation and continuity, we may begin by distinguishing certain features of groups that appear to be universal in the sense that they can be found in all groups (and indeed across many species of social animal). All groups have a system of *care*, *roles*, and *rules*. By examining these systems and the social dynamics that sustain them, we can begin to identify the content of the shared cultural values that group members hold in common and that enable these systems to exist and function.

Care and communal cooperation: community values of loyalty. Groups, especially those that are defined by close bonds, display a sense of unity (also referred to as entitativity, see Lickel, Hamilton, Wierzchowska, Lewis, Sherman, & Uhles, 2000). From an evolutionary perspective, the propensity to form cooperative groups is seen as crucial in the survival and thriving of early hominids (Caporael & Brewer, 2000), and the desire to function in groups in order to be loved, valued and respected is considered an intrinsic property of humans (e.g., Bowlby, 1982; Turner & Maryanski, 2012; Yuki & Brewer, 2014). It is therefore not surprising that humans form groups that serve more than just instrumental goals: groups are the prime environment within which belonging and value is established, within which support and love is exchanged, in which cooperation can be expected. To enable this, groups should possess community values that encourage a certain amount of loyalty towards the group from all its members.

At the same time, there are substantial cultural differences in the degree of (un) conditionality and reciprocity of the loyalty that is expected within certain key groups such as the family (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2009; Georgas et al., 2006; Mucchi-Faina, Pacilli & Verma, 2010). In some cultures, groups such as the family provide limited care, love and support (for example because care is institutionalized, because love is provided in friendship networks or because support is provided by the welfare state). Also, there are (most likely) substantial cross-cultural differences in the dimensions along which loyalty within particular groups is expected and disloyalty tolerated (Shariff, 2009). Overall, one would expect more interdependent or collectivistic cultural settings to be characterized by stronger awareness of community values that demand high levels of in-group loyalty. In other words, community values of loyalty should show distinct inter-cultural differences.

Roles and position: community values of hierarchy. Another universal feature of human groups (as well as most animal groups) is that they have a degree of hierarchy and a division of roles. In strategic family therapy, for instance, a balanced and natural hierarchy between parents and children is emphasized as a necessity (Smith, Ruzgyte & Spinks, 2011). Within small groups, members enjoy having a clear division of roles which provide members with a sense of place and individual distinctiveness (Bettencourt & Sheldon, 2001; Kessler & Cohrs, 2008; Vignoles, 2000). A 30-nation comparison of families by Georgas et al. (2006) shows that some form of structure is a universal characteristic and, crucially, that these hierarchical structures are universally translated into (family) values. In sum, hierarchical structures appear to enable the functioning of *any* group. Consequently, all groups have a distinct set of community values pertaining to the hierarchical structure within the group that specify the responsibilities and privileges of position, that regulate interactions between positions and the rules for making the transition from one to the other.

Although the existence of hierarchies is ubiquitous, the way in which hierarchies are displayed and maintained appears to be quite variable between and within cultures. Some cultures have a distinctly “loose” approach to maintaining hierarchies in public settings, but in ‘tight’ countries (i.e. countries where norms are more strictly defined and there is little tolerance for norm violation) it is more likely that one finds autocratic forms of rule and a generic expectation that seniority, a form of hierarchy, is respected (Gelfand et al., 2011; see also Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Triandis et al., 1988). In sum, whilst all groups are characterized by some degree of internal organization or hierarchy, community values of hierarchy should show considerable inter-cultural differences.

Respect for rules and regulations: community values of honor. Care and Roles can be seen as rules for how to behave. But these do not exert influence without a system that ensures rules are followed. It is often assumed that reward and punishment play a central role in this, but in practice group members only resort to these in extreme cases (Koudenburg, Postmes, & Gordijn, 2013). We propose that most of the time, the everyday behavior in communities is regulated by honor. All groups develop a communal understanding of what is ‘honorable’ and what is not. Similarly, in all groups, norm violation is shameful (even if it is not sanctioned, cf. Buckholtz & Marois, 2012).

But even though norm violations are punishable in all groups and cultures, there is considerable variation in the degree of tolerance and the severity of the punishment (Pelto, 1968). There are also strong cultural differences in what counts as honorable and not. For example, Leung & Cohen (2011) distinguish cultures of dignity, of honor, and of face. Ijzerman & Cohen (2011) even divide cultures into ‘honor cultures’ versus ‘nonhonor cultures’. Such cultural differences can appear extreme when comparing the cultural values that underpin so-called ‘honor killings’ (e.g., Van Eck, 2003) with the sexual libertarian values of some modern Western subcultures. But even at the so-called ‘nonhonor’ extreme, we find communities that promote the idea that it is virtuous to be industrious and hardworking (e.g., Giorgi & Marsh, 1990), and shameful to be idle and unemployed (e.g., McFadyen, 1998). Thus, although the norms and sanctions may differ widely, we also see the same mechanism at work: the group prescribes what is virtuous and what not.

In sum, we regard honor as a means of enforcement against norm violation, and we want to disentangle this from the content of the virtues involved. Consequently, we distinguish cultures by the degree to which norm violations are monitored, and the possible punishment would threaten the status of individuals and/or the groups the norm violator belongs to.

Individuality: having personal agency in a community. Values of Hierarchy, Honor and Loyalty are the backbones of a community's system of roles, rules and care. But a communities' members are also unique individuals with agency and a need for personal distinctiveness. The agency of individuals is traditionally considered a key difference between 'Eastern' and 'Western' cultures (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Triandis, 1989) and as such should provide another means of discriminating between cultural groups. But there are good reasons why agency is qualitatively different from community-based regulatory values. Hierarchy, Honor and Loyalty are mechanisms that preserve *relatedness* (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1996; 2005; 2013). By contrast agency preserves autonomy, a basic and universal need of individuals (see also: Wichmann, 2011). Agency may also be one way to achieve *distinctiveness*, which can be found as a motive to establishing identity in all cultures, albeit in very different ways across individualistic and collectivistic ones (Becker et al., 2012; Vignoles, Chryssochoou & Breakwell, 2000).

In sum, personal agency may be part of the values of a group or community and can be considered another means to differentiate between cultures. But there are also suggestions that personal agency is an individual difference variable that is distinct from community-based values.

Putting things together: Outlining a Community Collectivism Scale (CCS)

So far, we have identified four dimensions that are central to the social life of communities: Loyalty, Honor, Hierarchy, and Agency are all prerequisites for the community to live harmoniously, for individuals to fit in and be accepted. In line with the intersubjective approach, these four should not just be assessed by the individual's personal beliefs about them. It is also important to know how community members perceive the beliefs and practices of *others* within their community. It is especially these perceived communal values that should predict culturally distinctive social behavior.

In constructing the scale, we had to ask ourselves what constitutes a 'community'? There are many different ways of interpreting this term (e.g., one's neighborhood or village, one's peer group, etc.). Our conceptual approach looks at the influence of long-term relations on individual values and actions. It is widely accepted that for most people the central hub of socialization and the core relationships within which they anchor their values is the family (e.g., Kağıtçıbaşı, 1996; Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001; Tamis-Le Monda et al., 2008). Indeed, a recent study confirmed that across many cultures, including supposedly individualistic ones, the most important group in people's lives were nuclear and extended family (Fischer, Ferreira et al.,

2009). The family, in turn, is embedded in a network of families (e.g., at schools or in neighborhoods) who reference each other (e.g., Kağıtçıbaşı, 1996a; 2013). Therefore, within the CCS, we operationalized community as the core and extended family, within a wider network of families seen as in-group.

It is important to be clear about how this approach departs from other methods of operationalizing cultural difference. CCS differs from the most often used measures of Individualism/Collectivism such as INDCOL95 (Singelis et al., 1995) and from the intersubjective approach in several ways. First, CCS uniquely distinguishes social dynamics of loyalty, hierarchy, honor and agency. Compared with INDCOL95, CCS distinguishes community and personal values. Compared with the intersubjective approach, CCS is unique in its focus on the community rather than higher-order groups such as the Nation.

It is also important to highlight differences with Schwartz' values scale. Schwartz distinguishes *motivational* values that individual group members are supposed to live by. Accordingly, the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS) asks respondents to rate values (e.g., honoring of parents and elders; showing respect) for their importance "as a guiding principle in my life". Schwartz' scale is thus, ultimately, a scale that minutely dissects all the values that individuals can possibly possess. By comparison, the CCS is much more situated and focused on a specific set of systemic characteristics of *groups* (hierarchy, norms, loyalty, agency). Although inevitably there is some overlap in content between these four and Schwartz's system of values (which after all purports to catalogue all of them) there are marked and striking differences in approach. CCS does not just aim to measure personal values: Community values are promulgated through practices and beliefs as well: what matters is how culture is *done* within the *community*. By contrast, Schwartz' approach is most interested in how individuals see *themselves*.

In sum, we developed a 4-dimensional Community Collectivism Scale (CCS), assessing values of Loyalty, Hierarchy, Honor and Agency. Values were measured at the personal level (the individual's own views and practices) and the collective/communal level (the perceived views and practices of others). We conducted four studies in order to: i) assess the scale's methodological characteristics and validity, and determine the definitive version, ii) assess and confirm the ability to discriminate between cultural groups, iii) assess the types of behaviors and attitudes the scale can predict, and iv) assess how CCS related to existing measures. The results are discussed in the following sections.

Method and Results

Samples

We tested the CCS in four samples: Sample 1 consisted of 398 participants, of which were 183 of Turkish descent (44% women, $M_{age}=31$), and 215 indigenous Dutch (46% women, $M_{age}=46$)³, all inhabitants of the Netherlands and members of an online panel (PanelClix). Fourteen cases were considered multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis distance, $p<.001$), and removed. Sample 2 were 112 PanelClix-members who also participated in the first wave of data collection, of which 55 of Turkish descent (49% women, $M_{age}=34$), and 57 indigenous Dutch (49% women, $M_{age}=49$). Sample 3 were 465⁴ PanelClix-members from four cultural groups (all inhabitants of the Netherlands): (a) non-religious indigenous Dutch ($n=127$, 47% women, $M_{age}=39$), (b) orthodox protestant indigenous Dutch ($n=124$, 65% women, $M_{age}=39$), (c) of Turkish descent ($n=94$, 53% women, $M_{age}=31$) and (d) of Hindustani Surinamese descent ($n=120$, 67% women, $M_{age}=37.5$). Eight cases were identified as multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis distance, $p<.001$), and removed. Finally, Sample 4 were inhabitants of Turkey who were part of a Qualtrics panel. Sample 4 ($N=111$, 44% women, $M_{age}=39$) participated in a two-wave study (first measurement March 2014, second October 2015).

Outline of the studies. Our goal was the construction and validation of a scale that gauges cultural differences, and predicts differences in attitudes and behaviors. Construction and validation of CCS was conducted in the following stages: The first stage consisted of item generation based on our proposed structure (four dimensions at the community and personal level). We then reduced the number of items for each hypothesized dimension, retaining the items most suitable for further analysis (Sample 1). Subsequently, factor analysis across hypothesized dimensions was conducted to ascertain factor structure at the personal and community level (Samples 1 and 3), followed by bifactor analyses in order to explore whether our dimensions are better explained by one underlying (cultural) factor (Sample 1). We then established whether the definitive scale meets the basic criteria for measurement invariance. Also, we determined validity by comparing CCS with existing scales (Samples 1 and 3), looking at whether it differentiates between cultural groups (Samples 1, 2 and 3),

3 We compared the cultural groups on demographical variables (age, sex, occupation and education). Of the Turkish sample 25,7% were students, whereas only 3,7% of the indigenous Dutch sample were. With the exception of age there were no further significant differences ($M_{indigenous\ Dutch}=46$; $M_{Turkish}=31$).

4 We compared the cultural groups on demographical variables (age, sex, occupation and education). Gender was not evenly distributed with the orthodox-protestant Dutch (65% women) and Hindustani Surinamese (67% women) sub-samples. The Turkish Dutch sample was less likely to have higher education than the other groups and had a significantly lower mean age ($M_{non-relig.Dutch}=39$, $M_{orth-prot.Dutch}=39$, $M_{Hind.Sur.}=38$, $M_{Turkish}=31$).

whether it predicts attitudes (toward family, kin and work, Sample 1) and behavioral orientations (measured via behavioral scenarios across the different dimensions, Samples 1, 2 and 3). Finally, to study the predictive behavior of the scale for behavioral outcomes, we report results of a longitudinal study in which participants complete the CCS at time 1, and report on recent behavior (voting, social conflicts) at time 2, one and a half years later (Sample 4).

Choice of samples. The choice of sample was guided by the need to (a) differentiate between cultural or subcultural groups that differ in Individualism-Collectivism whilst (b) keeping the language within which the test was administered constant. Consistent with our group dynamic approach, the idea that communities shape values implies that culture and cultural values can be distinguished within and not just between nations. We thus searched for groups that all use the same language but have different community structures for cultural or subcultural reasons.

In the first three studies, we compared different subcultural groups in the Netherlands which meet these criteria. Indigenous Dutch culture is traditionally considered to be individualistic (e.g., Van Oudenhoven, 2001), and could therefore be contrasted with the culture of a collectivist immigrant group in The Netherlands, the Turks (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2004; Yaman, Mesman, Van Ijzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg & Linting, 2010). Samples 1 and 2 therefore compared these groups. Sample 3 was approached for a study that aimed to further refine our scale, as well as establish whether it can also differentiate between (sub) cultural groups. Sample 3 therefore also compared religious subcultures: secular Dutch versus strict-protestant Dutch. This is important to establish that between-community differences need not be ethnic in origin. Compared with secular Dutch, strict-protestants display a distinctly different community structure (e.g., as evidenced by a birth ratio that is almost double the national average, a tendency to live in close proximity to same-faith others in a specific “bible belt” region of the country, strong community ties, etc.). Sample 3 also sought to generalize findings from Turkish Dutch to Hindustani Surinamese Dutch. The Hindustani Surinamese are migrants (and their descendants) from the former Dutch colonies of Surinam who originally come from India; they are considered to be culturally collectivistic (e.g., Semin, Górts, Nandram & Semin-Goossens, 2002). A further advantage of using Turkish and Hindustani (Surinamese) cultures as collectivist references, is the fact that these cultures are often overlooked in the Ind/Col-research, where generally East-Asian and Northern American cultures are contrasted. Sample 4, finally, consisted of inhabitants of Turkey, all indigenous Turkish. Inhabitants of this country are interesting because of the stark differences between modern secular Turkish communities and more traditionalist ones; this allows us to test CCS’ ability to differentiate between communities within a culture.

Results: Scale Construction

How were items generated? For each of the four hypothesized dimensions (Honor, Agency, Loyalty, Social Hierarchy), approximately twelve items were construed that could be administered at the Community and Personal level. Some items were adapted from existing scales such as the INDCOL95 (Singelis et al., 1995) and the World Values Survey (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). We aimed to capture a broad spectrum of the facets of each dimension. This procedure resulted in a total of 94 items (47 items mirrored on Community and Personal levels). The resulting scale consisted of two separate blocks of Personal and Community items. Community items were preceded by an explanation of the concept of community as “your core family, your extended family and other families (in your environment) that matter to you”. The reference to “other families that matter to you” was included so that participants would focus on the ingroup context of their families, and be less likely to make contrastive social comparisons to families of the “outgroup”. We included a check for participants to confirm that they had read and understood this.

Which items were selected? Item selection (Sample 1) was based on statistical considerations as well as item content, in conjunction with theoretical considerations. We inspected inter-item and item-total correlations as well as conducting exploratory factor analyses for each dimension separately (Reise, Waller & Comrey, 2000; Russel, 2002). In order to maximize validity, we balanced the need for internal consistency with adequate heterogeneity of item content. Redundant items ($r > .8$), as well as items whose item-total correlation were too small ($r < .4$), were filtered out. Where the characteristics of items conflicted between the levels, priority was given to the Community subscales (i.e., an item loading high on the personal but not community level would be eliminated). We conducted exploratory factor analyses for each dimension separately with Sample 1 (Reise et al., 2000; Russel, 2002) and items with loadings lower than .4 were eliminated. As a last criterion, items with communalities $< .3$ were removed. With this procedure, we retained three to four items per subscale. We aimed to retain negatively as well as positively worded items, in order to check for and prevent acquiescence effects. However, none of the negatively worded items passed the criteria. As a result, we retained 15 items mirrored at the Community and the Personal level (30 items in total) that formed reliable subscales (Table 1).

What is the factor structure? We aimed to ascertain the hypothesized four dimensional structure, first with Sample 1, subsequently with Samples 2 and 3. Because we assume Community Collectivism to be a broad construct we expected high factor loadings to be rare. Furthermore, because at the collective level in particular the 4 dimensions would be interconnected we also expected some cross-loadings. In other words, given the theoretically derived item generation and item

selection strategy it would be *problematic* to find a completely orthogonal factor structure. We performed exploratory factor analysis via Principal Axis Factoring (with Promax rotation) for the community versus personal level separately. Note that this approach (subscales first, then superordinate structure) is conservative with respect to our hypotheses. With regard to the community level we determined the number of factors as four via a parallel analysis on the scree-plot (Russel, 2002). These four factors corresponded well with the four hypothesized dimensions Hierarchy, Loyalty, Honor and Agency (Table 1). We found only one substantial cross loading (i.e. >.25) between dimensions, with SHC1 (Social Hierarchy Community level, item 1) loading -.26 on the Loyalty dimension. Furthermore, the loading of item SHC2 (Social Hierarchy Community level, item 2) was relatively high (.95).

Table 1 *Community Collectivism Scale – Selected items with factor loadings and scale reliability*

Level	Dimension	Item	Subscale α	Factors			
Community	Honor		.80	1	2	3	4
		HC1: In my community it is considered a disgrace if there is gossip about you.		.54			
		HC2: In my community, honor is the most important thing for people..		.80			
		HC3: Our community monitors if people observe the unwritten rules.		.60			
	Agency	HC4: In my community, members of the family feel responsible for preserving and protecting another family member's honor.		.84			
			.67				
		AC1: In my community, you are responsible for the important choices in your life				.76	
	Loyalty	AC2: In my community, everyone is responsible for their own life.				.60	
		AC3: In my community striving for autonomy is considered good.				.60	
	Loyalty		.74				
						.45	
						.65	

Level	Dimension	Item	Subscale α	Factors
	Hierarchy	LC3: People are expected to support their family members, even if they do not want to.	.82	.53
		LC4: In my community you are expected to do what you can when a family member needs you.		.74
		SHC1: In my community, it is generally believed that men have a more important voice than women.		.61 -.26
		SHC2: In my community, your elders' opinions are more important than your own opinions are.		.95
		SHC3: In my community people believe that older people have a higher status than the young.		.81
		SHC4: In my community you are expected to accept that some people in your family have more to say, and others less.		.44
	Personal	Honor	.77	
		HP1: I would consider it a disgrace if there would be gossip about me.		.66
		HP2: Honor is the most important thing for me.		.73
		HP3: I monitor if people (from my community) observe the unwritten rules.		.62
		HP4: I feel responsible for preserving and protecting my family member's honor		.71
		Agency	.72	
		AP1: I am responsible for the important choices in my life.		.74
		AP2: I am responsible for my own life.		.85
		AP3: I consider striving for autonomy as good.		.54
	Loyalty		.73	
		LP1: I experience the problems of family members as if they were my own problems.		.47
		LP2: My ties with my family are very strong.		.77

Level	Dimension	Item	Subscale α	Factors
		LP3: I would support my family members, even if I wouldn't want to.		.63
		LP4: I will do what I can when a family member needs me.		.60
	Hierarchy		.74	
		SHP1: I believe men should have a more important voice than women.		-.28 .38
		SHP2: My elders' opinions are more important to me than my own opinions are.		.79
		SHP3: I think that older people have a higher status than the young.		.86
		SHP4: I accept that certain people in my family have more to say than others		.46

Note: N=393; Principal Axis Factoring with Promax-rotation: pattern matrix; Only factor loadings > .25 are shown, factor loadings > .40 are in boldface.

At the personal level, we also extracted 4 factors. Again, the factor structure was as expected. The order in which factors were extracted differed slightly from the Community level: Honor was extracted first at this level as well, but Loyalty and Hierarchy changed places, while Agency again was extracted last (see Table 1). The only substantial cross-loading was SHP1 (Social Hierarchy Personal level, item 1), which cross-loaded (-.28) on the Loyalty dimension. In order to confirm the factor structure, we also performed the factor analyses on Sample 3. The factor structure that emerged for Sample 1, re-emerged on both levels.

Of the four dimensions, the Agency dimension was the weakest at both levels across both samples. Thus, the concept of agency appears to be rather poorly defined as a distinct factor. Moreover, the factors Hierarchy, Loyalty and Honor are more strongly mutually correlated, than they are with Agency.

To further clarify the factor structure, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with Satorra-Bentler correction, using the Lavaan-package (0.5-15) for R (Rosseel, 2012). CFA of a four-factor model for the Community level indicated a good fit (corrected for 4 cross loadings): $\chi^2(80) = 120.14, p = .002$, CFI = .975, RMSEA = .036, and SRMR = .039. Fit of the four-factor model at the Personal level was acceptable (corrected for 6 cross loadings): $\chi^2(80) = 161.50, p < .001$, CFI = .946, RMSEA = .052, and SRMR = 0.047.

Similar results were found in a confirmatory factor analysis for Sample 3: CFA of a four-factor model for the Community level indicated a good fit (corrected for 4 cross loadings): $\chi^2(80) = 126.15, p = .001, CFI = .971, RMSEA = .038$ and $SRMR = .038$. Fit for the four factor model at the Personal level was again acceptable (corrected for 4 cross loadings): $\chi^2(80) = 152.90, p < .001, CFI = .950, RMSEA = .047$ and $SRMR = .047$. In sum, the findings are consistent with our hypothesized factor structure. Moreover, solutions at the Community and Personal levels were somewhat different. This supports the distinction between cultural norms at the Community versus Personal level, underscoring the necessity to measure these levels separately, especially in the case of the Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy dimensions, as the order of extraction may well reflect differences in the centrality of these dimensions.

Bifactor analysis. We then assessed whether at the Community level, the variance in the sample is explained by a single underlying (cultural) dimension, a Community factor that encompasses the dimensions of loyalty, hierarchy and honor. In order to do so we conducted bifactor analysis (Holzinger & Swineford, 1937; Reise, 2012) on Sample 1 using the Lavaan-package for R. We specified two models, a model with all four factors and a model with only the three specific Community factors (Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy). Both models also specified a general factor predicted by *all* items. We applied the Schmid-Leiman orthogonalization⁵ and thus assumed all factors to be uncorrelated (Reise, 2012).

The (confirmatory) bifactor analysis with Sarot-Bentler correction for the four-factor model at the Community-level reveals a workable fit (specifying four cross-loadings): $\chi^2(72) = 144.29, p < .001, CFI = .954, RMSEA = .051$ and $SRMR = .053$. However, a closer examination of the factor loadings on the general factor (*g*) reveals that in contrast to the other three dimensions there is little relation between *g* and the three Agency items (loadings varying between $-.14$ and $-.10$). A three-factor model excluding Agency considerably improved the fit of the model (corrected for three cross loadings): $\chi^2(40) = 80.3, p < .001, CFI = .972, RMSEA = .051$ and $SRMR = .039$. Importantly, this bifactor analysis allows us to assess the strength of the underlying dimension (the general factor) relative to each individual component. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 2. As can be seen, the general factor explains 56% of all variance (for the three-factor model). Each component explains some additional variance, ranging from 18% to 9%. This implies that there is merit in differentiating between Community-level Hierarchy, Loyalty, and Honor, but that a general 'Community' level factor also explains substantial variance across all three.

⁵ Due to the 'beta' nature of the Lavaan R-package (05-15), the forced orthogonalization of the factors did produce some computational errors, which we managed to circumvent by fixing item HC2 on 0.3. This being the most conservative solution, as it maximizes the amount of variance explained by the Honor factor.

Table 2 *Explained variance for factor structure alternatives*

Factor structure	Factors	Community	Personal
Bifactor: 4 factors			
	Honor	8%	14%
	Loyalty	15%	13%
	Hierarchy	13%	16%
	Agency	15%	15%
	g	49%	43%
Bifactor: 3 factors			
	Honor	9%	11%
	Loyalty	18%	21%
	Hierarchy	17%	16%
	g	56%	52%

Note: N: 393

On the basis of these findings, we took the means of the scores of the Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy subscales for each level as general indexes of ComCol (Community Collectivism score) and PerCol (Personal Collectivism score). Agency is most likely to be seen as a separate factor, and is included in the analyses as such.

Measurement Invariance. A basic premise for using a scale to compare groups, is the ability of the scale to measure the construct regardless of group characteristics that are not relevant within that context (Chen, 2007; Chen & West, 2008; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Milfont & Fischer, 2010; Smits, Dolan, Vorst, Wicherts, & Timmerman, 2011). We analyzed our models (the four factor models separately for both levels) for the two groups in Sample 1 (indigenous Dutch and Dutch of Turkish descent), to examine configural, metric and scalar invariance. We did not consider full scalar invariance (also constraining means) as the purpose of the scale is to measure differences between groups. Specifically, we tested the Goodness of Fit indexes (CFI, χ^2 /df-ratio and RMSEA) when constraining the factor loadings (metric invariance) and intercepts (scalar invariance) for all groups. We performed (I) a Multi Group Confirmative Factor Analysis (MGCFA) to establish configural invariance, (II) then constrained factor loadings to analyze metric invariance, and finally (III) also constrained intercepts to analyze scalar invariance, correcting for cross-loadings and with Satorra-Bentler adjustment, and using R with the Lavaan and semTools packages.

We analyzed the results following the recommendations by Chen (2007), and applying the proposed criteria, i.e. a decline of CFI of less than .10 and an increase of RMSEA of less than .015 when constraining the factor loadings would indicate non-invariance at this level. Subsequently, the Goodness of Fit should not decline more than $\Delta\text{CFI} \leq -.01$ and $\Delta\text{RMSEA} \leq .015$ when also constraining the intercepts.

The MGCFA of both models confirmed acceptable fit, with CFI=.952 and RMSEA=.045 (Collective model) and CFI= .942 and RMSEA=.053 (Personal model). When constraining factor loadings, the decline in Goodness of Fit indices met Chen's criteria for both models: ΔCFI was .007 for the C-model and .001 for the P-model, ΔRMSEA was .001 (C-model) and .004 (P-model), while the χ^2/df -ratio remained below 3 for both models. Further constraining the intercepts resulted in mixed results. Criteria were met for the C-model, with $\Delta\text{CFI} = -.009$ (total CFI= .938), $\Delta\text{RMSEA}=.001$ (total RMSEA=.047). However, criteria were only partially met for the P-model. Criteria for CFI were not met: $\Delta\text{CFI} = -.038$ (total CFI= .905). Criteria for RMSEA were met: $\Delta\text{RMSEA}=.013$, total RMSEA=.062. Again, the χ^2/df -ratio remained below 3 for both models.

In sum, configural and metric invariance were fully confirmed, while scalar invariance was partly. Only the decline in CFI for the P-model for scalar invariance did not meet criteria, all other parameters suggested invariance criteria were met. Mindful of Chen's (2007) final remarks, that these criteria should be used with caution, and the fact that CCS consists of the combination of both Collective and Personal levels, we conclude that the criteria for invariance are largely met, and therefore the comparisons between groups based on CCS-scores reported below, are very likely meaningful and valid.

Results: Validation

How does CCS relate to existing measures? In order to assess the extent to which CCS can be considered distinct from a traditional measure of individualism/collectivism we assessed the correlations between the (reduced) INDCOL95 (Sivadas, Bruford & Nelson, 2008) and CCS (see Table 3). Results confirm our expectations. Correlations between INDCOL95 and the CCS subscales range from .20 (Agency Community) to .45 (Honor Personal). The ComCol index (the average of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at the Community level) and PerCol (the average of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at the Personal level) correlate respectively .48 and .51 with INDCOL'95. Therefore, we can conclude that although CCS and INDCOL'95 converge to some extent, they also tap into distinct enough constructs, as is to be desired from a scale that supplements an existing construct.

Table 3 *Correlations between INDCOL95 and Community Collectivism subscales*

Scale	CCS		Loyalty		Hierarchy		Honor		Agency	
	Com Col	Per Col	Com	Per	Com	Per	Com	Per	Com	Per
INDCOL95	.48	.51	.38	.37	.38	.36	.42	.45	.20	.31
Horizontal Collectivism	.33	.39	.32	.36	.18	.19	.33	.35	.21	.30
Vertical Collectivism	.49	.59	.32	.35	.42	.49	.43	.51	-.14	-
Horizontal Individualism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.40	.45
Vertical Individualism	.38	.35	.26	.20	.34	.29	.33	.31	.13*	.24

Note: n: 390 (Sample 1); $p < .01$ (*: $p < .05$). Com: Community-level, Per: Personal-level.

We also tested (in Samples 2 and 3) how CCS relates to Diener's Subjective Life-Satisfaction Scale (Diener, Emmons & Larsen, 1985; 5-item), and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Schmitt & Allik, 2005; 10-item). We expected that higher scores on Hierarchy (and possibly Honor) would negatively correlate with Life Satisfaction and Self Esteem, whereas higher scores on Loyalty and Agency were expected to positively correlate with both. We reasoned that higher degrees of Hierarchy and Honor would constitute a stricter structure and more control and as such might limit individuals. Conversely, a higher degree of Loyalty would imply that an individual feels more support from his community and is inclined to return support, whereas a higher degree of Agency would imply that the individual feels more in control of their life and fate.

The correlations between CCS subscales and these measures are presented in Table 4. What we find, is that Self Esteem correlates weakly to moderately across all dimensions, as well as the ComCol and PerCol indexes. The correlations with Agency Personal ($r = -.35$, $p < .001$) and Hierarchy Personal ($r = -.33$, $p < .001$) stand out however. This corresponds with our expectations: people who feel they are more in control of their fate have higher self-esteem, whereas people who are more willing to accept a (strict) hierarchy rate themselves lower. Correlations with Diener's Subjective Life Satisfaction Scale are low or non-significant, but do, as expected, point to a weak positive correlation with the Agency and Loyalty subscales. And again: higher agency would mean a higher belief in control over one's life and more satisfaction as a consequence. A higher score on Loyalty in CCS would imply that a person is more willing to provide and receive support, thus feeling more satisfied with life. Overall the pattern of correlations between CCS and the measures of Self Esteem and Life Satisfaction was as expected.

Table 4 *Correlations between Community Collectivism subscales and Self-Esteem, and Life-satisfaction measures*

Scale	CCS		Loyalty		Hierarchy		Honor		Agency	
	Com Col	Per Col	Com	Per	Com	Per	Com	Per	Com	Per
Self Esteem	-	-.18**	.17**	.15**	-.21**	-.33**	-.14**	-.16**	.17**	.35**
Life Satisfaction	-	-	.16**	.17**	-.03	-.05	.01	.05	.18**	.16**

Note: n: 414 (Sample 3); *: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$. Com: Community-level, Per: Personal-level.

Does CCS explain between-group differences? In order to assess whether CCS distinguishes between cultural groups we compared the following groups: Sample 1 compared indigenous Dutch and Turkish Dutch, Sample 3 compared non-religious indigenous Dutch, orthodox-protestant indigenous Dutch, Turkish Dutch and Hindustani Surinamese Dutch.

Comparing the means for Sample 1 (Table 5) we see that means are significantly higher for the Turkish group than the indigenous Dutch group on three of the four subscales (Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy), as well as on both ComCol and PerCol. The exception is the Agency scale, for which there is no significant difference either at individual or Community level. The effect sizes (Cohen's d) of the differences between both groups show that group (cultural) differences between Dutch and Turkish are substantially larger at the Community level (see Table 5). At the Community level the effect sizes of the first three dimensions range from 1.00 (Hierarchy) to .52 (Loyalty), whereas at the Personal level they range from .66 (Hierarchy) to .32 (Loyalty). However, the Agency subscale again shows a different pattern: the effect size on the Community level is .11, but the direction of the effect is reversed: the Dutch mean is slightly higher. On the Personal-level there are virtually no cultural differences ($d=.05$). Clearly Agency does not discriminate between these two groups. Importantly, the effect sizes for CCS subscales, as well as for both indexes ComCol (1.03) and PerCol (.69) are considerably larger than those of the (reduced) INDCOL'95 (.41 for the scale). This shows that CCS does a much better job at discriminating cultural differences than the INDCOL'95.

Table 5 Means (SD) and Effect Sizes (Cohen's *d*) of *a priori* dimensions and aggregate indexes of CCS and INDCOL'95 dimensions

Scale	Factor	Level	NL	TR	Effect Size
CCS					
	Honor	Community	2.83 ^a (.66)	3.56 ^b (.71)	.94
		Personal	2.88 ^a (.71)	3.33 ^b (.73)	.60
	Loyalty	Community	3.33 ^a (.59)	3.66 ^b (.63)	.52
		Personal	3.54 ^a (.58)	3.74 ^b (.64)	.32
	Hierarchy	Community	2.44 ^a (.70)	3.23 ^b (.64)	1.00
		Personal	2.46 ^a (.66)	2.93 ^b (.70)	.66
	Agency	Community	3.99 ^a (.48)	3.93 ^a (.60)	-.11
		Personal	3.77 ^a (.47)	3.80 ^a (.56)	.05
	ComCol		2.87 ^a (.49)	3.48 ^b (.53)	1.03
	PerCol		2.96 ^a (.48)	3.34 ^b (.54)	.69
INDCOL					
	IndCol		3.21 ^a (.37)	3.37 ^b (.41)	.41
	Horizontal Collectivism		3.41 ^a (.53)	3.51 ^a (.51)	.19
	Vertical Collectivism		2.83 ^a (.56)	3.08 ^b (.64)	.41
	Horizontal Individualism		3.55 ^a (.61)	3.58 ^a (.67)	.05
	Vertical Individualism		3.10 ^a (.66)	3.36 ^b (.56)	.41

Note: NL: indigenous Dutch (n: 215), TR: of Turkish descent (n: 183); Negative effect sizes indicate that indigenous Dutch mean is higher than mean of participants of Turkish descent. Subscripts with different indices differ at ($p < .05$)

We also examined whether CCS distinguishes between groups in Sample 3 (i.e., orthodox-protestant indigenous Dutch, Turks and Hindustani Surinamese compared to non-religious indigenous Dutch; Table 6). Again, we found evidence that the CCS distinguishes (sub)cultural groups well. For the Turkish and Hindustani-Surinamese the largest differences were, as in Sample 1, found for Hierarchy and Honor. Not unexpectedly, the pattern of results differed somewhat for the orthodox-protestants where greatest differences were found for Loyalty and the Community level of Agency.

Table 6 *Effect sizes of non-religious Dutch vs other groups on Community Collectivism Scale*

Factor	Level	prot. Dutch	Turks	Hindustani
Honor	Community	.35	.93	.78
	Personal	.20	.62	.38
Agency	Community	-.59	-.47	-.40
	Personal	-.35	-.41	.04
Loyalty	Community	.61	.75	.55
	Personal	.60	.50	.32
Hierarchy	Community	.09	1.04	.92
	Personal	.25	.78	.46
ComCol		.39	1.17	1.00
PerCol		.45	.83	.55

Note: Cohen's D effect size with non-religious indigenous Dutch (n=118) as reference group (mean and sd) versus orthodox-protestant indigenous Dutch (n=116), of Turkish descent (n=81) and of Hindustani Surinamese descent (n=107); Negative effect sizes indicate that non-religious indigenous Dutch mean is higher than mean of participants of compared group.

We note that although Agency did not discriminate between indigenous Dutch versus Turkish Dutch in Sample 1, our findings for Sample 3 suggest that this dimension does uncover group-cultural differences in general. Apparently, the groups compared in Sample 1 (indigenous Dutch and Dutch of Turkish descent) happen to share similar values with regard to this dimension.

Overall, we can conclude that CCS discriminates very well between cultural groups (indigenous Dutch compared to Turkish and Hindustani-Surinamese), as well as between sub-cultural groups (non-religious indigenous Dutch compared to orthodox protestant indigenous Dutch), and across all dimensions.

What behaviors does CCS predict? We assessed whether CCS's predicts attitudes and behaviors with 20 scenarios (two in Sample 1, 18 in Samples 2 and 3) in which cultural differences were expected to surface. The scenarios were devised following the expectation that higher scores on Loyalty, Hierarchy and Honor would predict behaviors and attitudes prioritizing group interests versus personal interests. We expected that Agency would predict the opposite. The rationale behind these expectations was that cultural orientations should show in such everyday events

that touch on social relations. Within the context of CCS, the value domains of Loyalty, Hierarchy and Honor have the function to regulate the community. Scoring higher on these values, should therefore predict attitudes and behaviors that reflect prioritizing group interests above personal interests. While Agency is not the opposite of this, scoring higher on this dimension may predict attitudes reflecting greater margins for individual 'deviation'. However, as Agency also includes an element of 'greater personal responsibility', we expected that the outcomes with regard to this value domain could turn out less straightforward than the outcomes with regard to the other three value domains.

We developed 18 short scenarios⁶ in Samples 2 and 3 that were centered on the CCS-dimensions and on possible transgressions of the underlying cultural values, both in a neutral social context and in a context that involved medical or psychosocial healthcare. Furthermore, we were interested in exploring how participants thought their close relatives would act. Participants were presented with three possible responses that were formulated to be either increasingly prioritizing group interests, or increasingly prioritizing individual interests. An example of a scenario would be: *'Since your father in-law passed away, your mother in-law lives with you and your partner. This has given rise to some tensions, for which you have sought counseling. Your therapist advises you to ask your mother in-law to consider moving to an assisted living facility.'* The possible answers were: *'(a) You don't think that is an option. (b) You talk this through with your partner. (c) You ask your mother in-law to consider this.'* In this case, we also asked participants to assess what they would think other members of their community would do, when faced with the same scenario. We expected those dimensions that are central at the Community level (i.e., Honor, Hierarchy, Loyalty) to be related to a prioritization of group over individual interest. By contrast, we hypothesized that Agency would lead to prioritization of individual over group interests.

We combined the 17 scenarios, after recoding in the 'group priority' direction where this was necessary, to one mean variable 'Scenarios'. We then performed three separate sets of multiple regression analyses, testing four models: the first model (and the first step of all three analyses) specified the cultural identity categories as sole independent variable category. With the second model, we added ComCol (mean of communal levels of Loyalty, Honor and Hierarchy) plus Communal Agency (Com_Ag) in the second step, whereas in the third model PerCol (mean of personal levels of Loyalty, Honor and Hierarchy) and Agency at the personal level (Per_Ag) were added. Finally, in the fourth model we added both ComCol and PerCol, as well as Agency at both levels. The results are shown in Table 7.

⁶ All scenarios and analyses are available from the first author.

Table 7 Regression analysis: Behavioral Intentions predicted by cultural identity and CCS

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B (SE)	β	B (SE)	β	B (SE)	β	B (SE)	β
Cultural identity								
Protestant	.097 (.031)	.166**	.055 (.032)	.096	-.050 (.031)	-.085	.040 (.032)	.069
Turkish	.205 (.034)	.321**	.135 (.036)	.211**	.083 (.033)	.128*	.120 (.037)	.184**
Hindustani Sur.	.186 (.031)	.318**	.126 (.033)	.215**	.098 (.031)	.166**	.128 (.034)	.217**
CCS								
ComCol			.095 (.020)	.230**			.056 (.030)	.134†
Com_Ag			-.038 (.018)	-.100*			-.006 (.020)	-.016
PerCol					.123 (.020)	.275**	.078 (.029)	.178**
Per_Ag					-.062 (.018)	-.153**	-.060 (.021)	-.148**
R ² (Δ)	.10**		.16**(.053**)		.19**(.093**)		.20**(.094**)	
N	458		433		442		420	

Note: Cultural identity represented as three dummy variables with non-religious Dutch as reference group; ComCol (mean of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at Community level), PerCol (mean of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at Personal level), Com_Ag (Agency at Community level) and Per_Ag (Agency at Personal level) centered at their means. ; ΔR² is expressed relative to Model 1.

†: .1 < p < .05, *: p < .05, **: p < .01

What becomes apparent, is that in all cases the addition of CCS(-sub scales) leads to a significant rise in explained variance: both ComCol and PerCol predict behavioral intentions. The addition of CCS does not fully mediate the behavioral intentions for Turks and Hindustani Surinamese, but it does for the protestant Dutch. As expected, values we consider central to the community (Loyalty, Hierarchy, Honor) are related to greater prioritization of group interest, whereas Agency is related to prioritization of individual interest. Results also revealed that behavioral intentions with regard to the scenarios are best predicted by the values at the personal level (PerCol and Per_Ag). This is not wholly unexpected as most scenarios (13 of the 17 scenarios we administered) were concerning individual behavioral intentions. We therefore separately combined and analyzed the individual scenarios (13) and scenarios that concerned the behaviors of other community members (four scenarios, see Table 8). The analyses confirmed that in scenarios in which participants were asked to estimate what their family members would do, values at the communal level were more potent predictors. This is in line with our predictions that people judge the actions of their community members on the basis of what they perceive as the values of that community and not per se on the basis of their personal values.

Table 8 Regression analysis: Individual behavioral intentions and those of other community members predicted by cultural identity and CCS

	Behavioral intentions of other community members		Own behavioral intentions	
	B (SE)	β	B (SE)	β
Cultural identity				
Protestant	.009 (.049)	.011	.044 (.037)	.066
Turkish	.257 (.057)	.267**	.096 (.043)	.129*
Hindustani Sur.	.065 (.052)	.075	.154 (.039)	.230**
CCS				
ComCol	.111 (.046)	.179*	.042 (.035)	.088
Com_Ag	.051 (.032)	.087	-.019 (.024)	-.043
PerCol	-.004 (.045)	-.007	.097 (.034)	.193**
Per_Ag	-.051 (.033)	-.086	-.064 (.025)	-.139**
R ²	.13**		.17**	
N	419		420	

Note: Cultural identity represented as three dummy variables with non-religious Dutch as reference group; ComCol (mean of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at Community level), PerCol (mean of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at Personal level), Com_Ag (Agency at Community level) and Per_Ag (Agency at Personal level) centered at their means; *: $p < .05$, **: $p < .01$.

In order to further assess differences between groups with respect to loyalty towards extended family, we used a scenario in which the respondent's grandparents were advised (by a doctor) to admit themselves to residential nursing care. Note that in this case (Sample 1) we only assessed differences between Dutch and Turkish Dutch. Participants were then presented four items regarding their attitudes towards formalized care (which we considered to be the more individualistic approach) versus care by family members (considered to be the collectivist approach). These items were combined in a scale reflecting endorsement of family care (e.g. 'I think it is a disgrace if elderly people are placed in a nursery home while they still have family that could provide care'; $\alpha = .74$). Item scores ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). Analysis of variance revealed significant effects such that participants of Turkish ($M = 3.07$, $SD = .76$) compared to those of indigenous Dutch descent ($M = 2.38$, $SD = .66$) showed higher endorsement of family care, $F(1, 389) = 91.76$, $p < .001$; partial $\eta^2 = .19$. We then determined whether the attitudes ranging from endorsement of formalized care (low score) to endorsement of family care (high score) can be significantly predicted by CCS, using regression analysis. We entered ComCol, PerCol and Agency at both levels as independent variables. ComCol, PerCol, Com_Ag and Per_Ag explained about 27% of the variance ($R^2 = .27$,

$F(4,388) = 16.32, p < .001$). For a direct comparison, we also examined to what degree INDCOL95 predicted responses on this scenario. The INDCOL95 sub-dimensions (Horizontal Collectivism, Vertical Collectivism, Horizontal Individualism and Vertical Individualism) explained considerably less variance: $R^2 = .07, F(4,385) = 7.31, p < .001$).

We can conclude that CCS predicts behavioral intentions well. For one, ComCol and PerCol predict behavioral intentions that prioritize group interests, whereas Personal and Communal Agency predict prioritizing personal interests. Moreover, communal level scores better predicted scenarios regarding behavior of community members, whereas personal level scores better predicted behavioral intentions in scenarios that related to individual level behaviors. Taken together these results further underline the importance of measuring values central to communities (and the individual) both at the community and the personal level.

Does CCS predict actual behavior over time? In order to consider whether CCS predicts actual behavior over time, we re-sampled a population 1.5 years after they had completed the CCS scale as part of an unrelated study on collective action (in relation to CCS; Akkus, Postmes, Stroebe & Baray, 2019) Since measuring CCS at time 1 (March 2014), there had been national elections in Turkey (June 2015) and we wanted to assess whether CCS (measured 1.5 years beforehand), would affect voting behavior, as a means of affirming predictive validity of CCS. Note that Turkey is a good country to conduct such a study since it contains a mixture of modern and traditional subgroups which are divided not just geographically (e.g., city vs. countryside) but also politically. We predicted that higher scores on Loyalty, Hierarchy and Honor (as expressed in the means ComCol and PerCol) would predict voting for one of the conservative parties. The rationale behind this expectation was that higher scores on ComCol and PerCol would constitute more traditional community values, and since these traditional values were espoused by the conservative AK party of Erdogan, this should result in voting conservatively.

In November 2015, we asked participants if, and for what party, they had voted in the Turkish national elections of June 2015. 111 participants ($M_{age} = 39.4$, 49 women and 62 men) took part both at time 1 (March 2014; measurement of CCS) and time 2 (November 2015, measurement of voting behavior). Participants were provided with a choice between the five main parties (Ak Parti, CHP, MHP, HDP and SP/BBP, for which 79% of the sample had voted) or for 'other' parties, not voting and blank voting (21%). We expected CCS to predict a choice for a Conservative (Ak Parti, MHP and SP/BBP) vs. Progressive party (CHP and HDP). We recoded the voting behavior into a dichotomous variable. Voters who did not vote, or did not vote for a conservative or progressive party were considered 'missing' values ($n=23$).

We conducted a logistic regression analysis with the (dichotomous) voting behavior as the dependent variable and ComCol, PerCol, Com_Ag and Per_Ag as predictors. A test of the full model against a constant-only model proved statistically significant ($\chi^2=12,444$, $p=.014$, $df=4$). The overall explained variance was (Nagelkerke's) $R^2=.177$, while ComCol proved the only significant predictor (Wald=4.849, $p=.028$). The odds ratios, $\text{Exp}(B)=3.265$, indicated that a one point higher score on ComCol raises the chance the respondents vote for a conservative party more than threefold, confirming our predictions.

Importantly, the present study reveals that CCS can predict voting behavior over time – behavior that is quite consequential also at the national level. Moreover, this study once again affirms the ability of CCS to predict within country differences such as a preference for conservative versus liberal parties.

How does CCS relate to social networks? Differences in attitudes towards one's family group are one of the central distinctions between collectivistic and individualistic cultures (Triandis et al., 1988). Family is considered a more integral part of one's group and self-concept in collectivistic compared to individualistic cultures. We therefore assessed to what extent CCS can predict attitudes with respect to social networks (Sample 1). We expected that higher CCS scores would be related to feelings of proximity towards family but not friends or colleagues. This is consistent with the group differences we also expected to find: Turkish group would report more proximity towards family, whereas the Dutch were expected to report more proximity with non-relatives (as well).

Participants responded to the question (*'State for the following people how close they are to you: mother; father; brother; sister; grandparents; life partner; best friend; friends; colleagues; boss'*⁷) by moving a slider between 1 ('Very distant') and 10 ('Very close'). The items 'mother', 'father', 'brother', 'sister' and 'grandparents' were combined into a new measure of perceived Closeness to Kin, while 'life partner', 'best friend' and 'friends' were combined into Closeness to Friends, and 'colleagues' and 'boss' were combined into Closeness to Work, thus delineating three segments of social network. We found expected group differences such that Closeness to Kin was significantly higher for the Turkish group, while Closeness to Friends was significantly higher for the Dutch group. For Closeness to Work there were no group differences. More importantly, a hierarchical regression analysis shows that CCS significantly predicts Closeness to Kin: $R^2=.22$, $F(8, 382)=13.49$, $p<.001$, and the addition of the dummy-coded cultural group to the model does not significantly

⁷ Participants were asked to fill in an answer even when the question did not fully apply to them. They were asked to imagine what they would think in the given situation.

add to the amount of explained variance. In other words, Community Collectivism explains the bulk of the differences between cultural groups on the topic of closeness to family members. With respect to Closeness to Friends, CCS dimensions predict $R^2=.07$, $F(8,382)=3.70$, $p<.001$, while the addition of cultural group slightly adds to the amount of explained variance ($\Delta R^2=.045$, $p<.05$). For Closeness to Work, the proportion of variance explained by CCS is slightly smaller: $R^2=.05$, $F(8,382)=2.71$, $p<.01$. Adding cultural group accounts for an additional $\Delta R^2=.042$ ($p<.05$). We conclude that Community Collectivism is a good predictor of closeness to social relations within one's personal network.

Value Discrepancy: are there differences between the Community and Personal levels? There is reason to believe that individuals might report differences between their individually held beliefs and the beliefs and values of others in their culture (cf. Chiu et al., 2010). We were interested in exploring these differences: experienced discrepancies between ones personally held beliefs and those perceived within one's community might induce a 'value dissociation' and be related to lower levels of well-being.

We found differences between responses on Community and Personal levels across all cultural groups in samples 1 and 2. Interestingly, although we find an overall C-P discrepancy, there are considerable variations in the magnitude of this discrepancy depending on the cultural group (Table 9). The general difference across all four dimensions, termed Value Discrepancy, is not significant for indigenous groups, whereas they are for the Turkish and Hindustani Surinamese groups. In the latter two groups, which are traditionally considered to be more interdependent, the communal level of Hierarchy and Honor are perceived as significantly higher than the individual levels. However, there is a different C-P discrepancy for the dimension of agency: in *all* cultural groups individuals consider themselves to be more 'agentic' than their community.

Table 9 Value Discrepancy: CCS differences between Community and Personal levels

Cultural Identity	Loyalty	Communal level minus Personal level			Value Discrepancy
		Honor	Hierarchy	Agency	
Non-religious	-.11*	-.04	.08	-.31**	-.04
Protestant	-.15**	.07	-.06	-.45**	-.05
Turkish	-.05	.19**	.29**	-.34**	.13*
Hindustani Sur.	-.03	.22**	.45**	-.60**	.21**
Full sample	-.09**	.10**	.17**	-.43**	.05*

Note: N=465; *: $p < .05$, **: $p < .005$; Value Discrepancy: Community level score minus Personal level score.

In order to explore whether the discrepancy between personal and community values is experienced as problematic, we considered correlations between Value Discrepancy, life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985) and self-esteem (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). Unexpectedly, there were no significant correlations with life satisfaction. In addition, self-esteem correlations with difference scores tended to be inconsistent and small (even though the large sample size meant that some were statistically significant). In sum, the results show that the participants can and do distinguish between individual and communal values, which implies that intersubjective measures are qualitatively distinct from personal level measures. However, dissociations between the two levels have no straightforward association with life satisfaction and self-esteem.

General Discussion

The main aim of this research was to develop a reliable operationalization of culture that would differentiate between different cultural groups, and predict attitudes and behaviors. As our results reveal, out of a large pool of items we developed a relatively compact scale, the CCS, which meets all these criteria.

We built our scale on the premise that culture is maintained within people's social networks and the communities that people are part of. These communities, we argued, shape both the types of values people adhere to (i.e., values that are relevant to and maintain communities), as well as determining the level at which culture should be measured (i.e., at the individual and community level). Taking a group dynamic approach, we identified three processes that serve to uphold long-term (group) relationships: the maintenance of group loyalty, of a within-group hierarchy, and of a system of honor by which group members may regulate adherence to certain standards and norms. We also expected individuals to be motivated to maintain a level of personal autonomy vis-à-vis their communities. For this reason, the fourth value assessed was agency. Importantly, we assessed these values at both at the individual and the Community level in four separate samples.

Analysis of scale factor structure confirmed the hypothesized two-level, four-factor structure. Three factors (loyalty, hierarchy and honor) were found to be highly correlated, and could be considered components of a general factor related to group dynamical mechanisms of social regulation—collectivism in other words. The fourth factor, agency (more closely related to individualism), was separate. Each of these factors has good psychometric properties and adequate reliability. This is particularly important because other measures of individualism/collectivism have not always achieved this objective.

The results further showed that CCS could detect sizable differences between cultural groups, both at the Communal and the Personal level. Differentiation between cultural groups was very good in particular for the collectivist dimensions Hierarchy and Honor, as well as for Loyalty. These differences were shown for direct comparisons between indigenous Dutch versus Turkish Dutch (Samples 1 and 2), and between indigenous “secular” Dutch, indigenous strict-protestant Dutch, Dutch of Turkish descent and of Hindustani-Surinamese descent. Notably, the between-group differences tended to be descriptively larger at the Communal level than at the Personal level. There was one exception to this: for orthodox Christians, collective level effects were somewhat smaller, possibly because these communities are more integrated with secular Dutch communities. We conclude that, across the board, Community Collectivism is better at detecting between-group differences than the personal-level measure of collectivism.

Furthermore, the dimensions of Community Collectivism not only differentiate between groups that are generally considered to be very different cultures (e.g., Turkish, Hindustani-Surinamese and native Dutch), but also between other subcultural groups within Dutch society which are more subtly different (strict-protestant indigenous Dutch). This suggests we managed to measure cultural values with a relatively high degree of precision.

By contrast, the agency dimension (which is more individualist in nature) did not differentiate between cultural groups in some instances. This is an intriguing finding: it suggests that one of the reasons why previous work on individualism/collectivism may have struggled to find robust between-culture differences is that it failed to differentiate among psychometrically different dimensions of Ind/Col. It also confirms prior suggestions that individualism and collectivism should not be considered opposite ends of one continuum, but should instead be studied as separate dimension (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1996; Triandis et al., 1988).

Finally, CCS at the communal and personal level predicted behavioral intentions as well as actual behaviors. We tested behavioral intentions and attitudes with a range of scenarios touching on themes such as medical and psychosocial healthcare, family values, and personal freedom, and tested behaviors with regard to voting. Across these themes, CCS boosted the explained variance significantly or proved a potent predictor by itself. More specifically, communal level scores better predicted scenarios regarding behaviors of community members, whereas personal level scores better predicted behavioral intentions for scenarios in which individual behaviors were targeted. At both levels, our scale was a stronger determinant of these intentions than the reduced INDCOL95.

Importantly, CCS also proved a potent predictor of behavior over time: CCS predicted voting behavior 14 months after it was administered. Indeed, a 1-point higher score on ComCol was found to raise the chances of voting for a conservative party by threefold. These findings also speak to CCS' ability to predict within country differences in actual behavior. We feel this provides strong evidence for the predictive validity of CCS.

In sum, CCS (consisting of two subscales ComCol and Percol) is a valuable and distinctive empirical contribution. The empirical value of CCS becomes apparent in comparison with established measures of individualism/collectivism such as INDCOL. This measure has raised various methodological concerns of reliability, measurement invariance and (content) validity (e.g., Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997; Oyserman et al., 2002; Robert, Lee & Kim-Yin, 2006; Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Notably, it has been suggested that validity of INDCOL may be improved by "situating" the measure in a specific context or reference group (e.g., Chen & West, 2008; Wan, Chiu, Peng & Tam, 2007). The current findings support this suggestion. Additionally, the content of CCS (i.e., the 4 dimensions) are closely tied to the functions of these values for the community. In this way, CCS extends and refines the concepts of Individualism and Collectivism, as evidenced by the convergent validity with INDCOL95. More precisely, the value domains of loyalty, hierarchy and honor, are mechanisms that regulate the interests of the group, whereas the value domain of agency is aimed at regulating the margins for individuality. These two axes are similar to what Kağıtçıbaşı (e.g., 1996) calls relatedness and autonomy. The combination of content and form of CCS makes that, compared with INDCOL'95, CCS has superior reliability, superior ability to differentiate between cultural groups and superior predictive validity, at the personal level but particularly at the Community level.

Theoretical Implications

The central conclusion of the empirical work is that CCS is a reliable operationalization of community-based cultural differences, as well as an effective predictor of behavioral consequences. The empirical effectiveness of CCS stems from the conceptual analysis that underpins it, we believe. CCS is not just another attempt to operationalize cultural values. CCS operationalizes what we see as the *twin* core ingredients of the cultural process within communities: the values and cultural preferences within individual minds (e.g., as operationalized by many others, e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012) matter as much as the social dynamics between community members within which they develop, are activated and expressed (this paper).

A distinctive approach to intersubjectivity. CCS operationalizes this cultural dynamic by tapping into community members' perceptions of others' values and practices. In this, our approach builds on the intersubjective approach to culture (Chiu et al., 2010; Fischer, 2012; Shteynberg, Gelfand & Kim, 2009; Wan, Torelli & Chiu, 2010) and further corroborates the merits of this approach. Our research does shed some new light on the issue at what level intersubjective norms are best measured. Fischer (2012) has shown that the consensus with regard to most intersubjective norms tended to be fairly low—so low in fact that it seemed unjustified to claim that these are shared representation of values. But most work on intersubjective norms has hitherto examined norms that are shared *nationally*. The present work not only shows that the operationalization of intersubjectivity within community settings has merit, we are also able to explain why there is strong *within-nation* difference between cultural groups: We are able to demonstrate large differences between subcultural groups (with a median effect size of $d=1.02$). CCS was also able to detect differences between ethnic Dutch groups with different community structure (due to religious orientation) and within Turkish society, where there is a long-standing division between traditional and secular lifestyles that can be witnessed in many other Muslim societies. The presence of sizable between-community differences suggests that it may be fruitful to not just focus on the Nation or on large social categories, but rather to operationalize culture at the level at which it is *done*: within smaller, more homogeneous, subcultural communities.

Our focus on the social dynamics within communities also informed what values we expected to be most influential within the community context. Most intersubjective approaches to cultural values have translated the idea of shared or communal meaning into a distinction into different types of reference groups (e.g., the self versus groups people think are central in their culture, Fischer et al., 2009). We propose that a consequence of intersubjectivity is that we need to measure those values that are likely to be functional at the level at which they are shared and operate. Thus, cultural values that are central to intragroup processes in close-knit communities (i.e., Loyalty, Hierarchy, Honor), should be recognized to exist at exactly that Community level and should (as our results confirm) predict cultural differences and behavior within those communities. It is for future research to test the corollary of these predictions, that these cultural values are less clearly defined at other levels of abstraction (such as the national level) and that they fail to predict behaviors outside of the community context. Moreover, future work on intersubjectivity may adopt a similar approach to ours by asking what types of values would be most relevant to National groups, social categories or groups at any other level of social abstraction.

A distinctive approach to values. CCS assumes that cultural values fulfill a function for the community. In this, our approach builds on Schwartz' idea that values have functions for individual, biological as well as social reasons (e.g., Schwartz, 1994). But Schwartz approaches this issue from the perspective of the individual: it builds a catalogue of possible values that an individual can hold. Our focus is more situated and focused on the systemic characteristics and dynamics within communities. This leads to marked differences in operationalization: CCS explicitly defines the 'social other' as an ingroup member and incorporates only the values and practices directly relevant to the cultural (group) process. Moreover, CCS operationalizes these concepts intersubjectively. CCS is thus different conceptually *and* empirically; there is limited overlap with Schwartz' SVS.

To illustrate this with some examples from the scales themselves, the SVS asks respondents to rate values (e.g., honouring of parents and elders; showing respect) for their importance "as a guiding principle in my life". CCS measures values by reference to the community as well as the individual (e.g., item #2 for measuring honor at the community level: 'In my community, honor is the most important thing for people'). But CCS also measures the practices and beliefs through which these values are maintained (e.g., items 3 and 4 of the same subscale: Our community monitors if people observe the unwritten rules; In my community, members of the family feel responsible for preserving and protecting another family member's honor). In all, this makes CCS a scale which is more descriptive of how hierarchy, honor, loyalty and agency are *done* within the *community*. By contrast, Schwartz' approach is most interested in how individuals see *themselves* across a broader circle of values.

Applications of CCS. Beyond the ability to distinguish between cultural groups, the present research offers some perspectives on possible applications. One of these was that we had expected and hoped to use CCS as a method for examining value conflict. Several previous studies have found a discrepancy between personal and cultural values (cf. Chiu et al., 2010). The current research also finds highly variable differences between communal and personal levels (ranging from large to almost zero), and we expected these discrepancies to be meaningful and consequential; we measured self-esteem and life satisfaction to explore this. But on this point the results were clear, consistent and negative: the magnitude of discrepancy between personal and social values was largely unrelated to measures of life satisfaction and self esteem. Future research might delve deeper into the meaning and consequences of these discrepancies. It could be that they only become problematic in contexts where value discrepancies produce actual relational conflicts, but that integrating the complexities of such discrepancies is a task that humans are normally well equipped for (cf. Tadmor & Tetlock, 2006; Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1998).

With respect to the implications of CCS for within- and cross-community behavior, there are several practical implications of this research. It is rather obvious that CCS should regulate behavior within communities—future work should certainly focus on the ways in which ComCol and PerCol interact in doing so. But our scenarios were also designed to probe the consequences of community collectivism for cross-community behavior. In particular, we designed scenarios to speak to problems of intercultural adaptation and communication within *healthcare settings*. To give one concrete example: in one of our scenarios, participants were asked to consider whether they would ask their mother-in-law, who recently lost her spouse and who lived with the participants' family from that moment on, to move to a home for the elderly. We found that the behavioral intentions for this scenario were strongly predicted by CCS (both at Community and Personal levels) because this scenario presents a dilemma between the within-community collective demands of certain groups and the incompatible services offered by the Dutch healthcare system. Our assessment of behavioral intentions in this domain confirms that the value that certain cultural minority groups attach to their community and, more specifically, to honor, loyalty and hierarchy, may prevent them from accepting healthcare services. This may help healthcare professionals understand why certain cultural groups consistently underuse certain healthcare services (which in the Netherlands are paid for by every taxpayer and thus should be equally accessible to all). More broadly, our scale can inform thinking about systemic interventions, taking into account norms and values of cultural communities as well as the choices of individual clients.

Finally, the behavioral implications of CCS for voting behavior in Turkey point to another implication. The basic values cultivated within communities may be politically consequential at the national level. We confirmed that higher scores on CCS, specifically the domains of ComCol (Loyalty, Hierarchy and Honor) predicted voting for conservative parties. This we explain by the fact that the collectivistic 'family values' within communities are propagated, in Turkey, by several conservative parties. But although a priori we would have predicted both components of CCS to be good predictors, empirically ComCol was a stronger predictor. The implication is clear: political parties may profit from knowing the relational dynamics within communities: the values and practices within them might be as relevant (or more) than the individual values of voters. More broadly, this result points to new avenues for cross-cultural research: intra-cultural variability (in the form of between-community differences within the same overarching culture) is predictive of consequential forms of individual behavior directed at the national level.

Limitations. Although we were able to predict attitudes towards social networks such as family, friends and work as well as behavioral intentions regarding for

example formalized healthcare, not all of the scenarios we used to assess differences in cultural behaviors showed significant effects. We think that the effect sizes in tests of predictive validity were substantially reduced by the fact that participants were presented with three choices, of which the middle option, which was generally nuanced and common sense, proved the most appealing for the large majority.

We also note that the studies reported in this paper, although focusing on a wide range of different cultural groups, assess the scale in one language and one overarching cultural setting (the Netherlands). The paper does report one study conducted in Turkey which shows the scale to be useful in that context and language, too. Moreover, although not reported in this paper, the Turkish translation of the scale has a similar factor structure (Akkuş, Postmes, Stroebe & Baray, in preparation) and we are hopeful that its validity can be generalized across other cultural groups and languages in the future.

Relatedly, the measurement invariance of the scale should be tested further. The Community level scale demonstrated scalar invariance, meaning that it is meaningful to compare the means on this scale across subcultural groups. The Personal level scale met all criteria for the metric level of invariance, two of the criteria for scalar invariance (RMSEA and the χ^2/df -ratio) but not the third criterion (decrease of Comparative Fit Index). Given the fact that CCS consists of both, we think that measurement invariance of CCS was largely confirmed. However, it is possible that measurement invariance can be further improved in future research, possibly by adding or changing items at the Personal level.

Conclusions. The Community Collectivism Scale provides a means to meaningfully and reliably discriminate between subcultural groups. We provided evidence that the CCS can explain part of the inter-cultural variance in particular behavioral choices, and thus conclude that the CCS allows us to better study inter-cultural variability. These cultural values are of immediate relevance for the regulation of the behavior of individuals in their direct community environment. Importantly, the content of these familial values is also relevant for societal values, and as such relate to how individuals and communities think that society as a whole should function. The present research suggests that CCS will prove to be a fruitful lens through which to understand differences in community values both within and between cultures. But more broadly, we believe that the empirical effectiveness of CCS offers a different perspective on the importance of studying the cultural dynamic within communities: the objective should be to study culture as it manifests itself in individual minds as well in tandem with how culture is *done*. In sum, CCS has much to offer to the fields of cultural and cross-cultural psychology.

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3

CHAPTER

How micro-cultural values may extend to attitudes towards women¹

¹ This chapter is based on Akkus, B., Stroebe, K. & Postmes, T. (under review). Cultures of Responsibility and Blame: When Women are blamed for being mistreated. University of Groningen. The authors would like to thank Nuray Sakallı Uğurlu (Middle East Technical University), and Elâ Arıkan (Galatasaray University) for their valuable advice.

Abstract

Although the tendency to blame women for mistreatment and harassment is a world-wide phenomenon, there are huge between- and within-country differences. Can cultural differences in Community Collectivism (honor, hierarchy, loyalty and agency) explain the within-country variation over and above sexism? Two studies in three countries, Turkey (N=110), India (N=263) and Mexico (N=252) showed that honor, loyalty, and hierarchy were strongly related to victim blaming, over and above sexist attitudes. Innovatively, the research also studied the assignment of blame to perpetrators and society, and showed that it was most strongly predicted by individual agency. We conclude that women are blamed in order to preserve the integrity of collectivistic communities. The present work speaks to the importance of cultural differences in understanding between-community differences in the apportioning of responsibility and blame for sexual violence.

Cultures of Responsibility and Blame: When Women are blamed for being mistreated

A recent United Nations report concludes that across the world, women are “subject to physical, sexual, psychological and economic violence - regardless of income, age or education” (United Nations, 2016, p.139). For example, 35.6% of women worldwide have experienced either physical or sexual violence by a partner, stranger, or both. Importantly, the *blame* for such mistreatment is quite commonly attributed to the *victim* (e.g., Krahé, 2016; United Nations, 2016; Flood & Pease, 2009; Burt, 1980). There are substantial cross-country differences in *levels* of violence and of sexist attitudes, but also very large within-country differences. A few studies have suggested cultural factors may explain not just the between-country but also the within-country differences (e.g., Se’ver & Yurdakul, 1999; Lee, Pratto & Li, 2007).

The current paper adds to this literature by zooming in on the cultural factors that can help us understand why there can be such huge within-country differences in sexist attitudes, victim blame and violence. Specifically, we consider whether Community Collectivism (Akkuş, Postmes, & Stroebe, 2017) is related to sexist attitudes and, ultimately, behavioral responses to sexist behavior in victim and perpetrator blame.

Community Collectivism assumes that cultural beliefs are shaped by people’s close social environment, the communities they are part of and the values that are perceived as central to these local communities. Such community values may revolve around the preservation of group honour, the maintenance of hierarchy within the group and the expectation of loyalty of all group members. Their function is to preserve the integrity and structure of the group. The present paper examines whether these cultural values, aimed at regulating social behavior *within* the community, can help explain between-community differences in victim and perpetrator blaming. Moreover, we assess whether they explain perpetrator and victim blame over and above hostile and benevolent sexism (e.g., Connor, Glick & Fiske, 2017).

In order to answer this question, the present paper reports the results of two studies conducted in three different countries (Turkey, India and Mexico) that all score comparatively low on indices of sexual equality (WEF, 2018) and that are known to have large regional differences too (cf. Haj Youssef & Christodoulou, 2018). These three countries are of interest as they have different social, cultural and religious backgrounds, *and* are known to have mixed cultural values within-country towards tradition and self-expression (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), i.e., values relevant to sexist

attitudes towards women. In each country, we measured how respondents reacted to mistreatment of women: did they blame victims, perpetrators and/or society as a whole for this? We measured sexist attitudes with the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and between-community cultural differences with the Community Collectivism scale which has been validated as a measure of between and within country cultural differences (Akkuş et al., 2017). We expected Community Collectivism, in addition to the more proximate measure of (ambivalent) sexism, to predict behavioral responses to the maltreatment of women (e.g., victim blame).

Could sexism have ‘cultural’ origins?

The World’s Women Report (UN, 2015) stresses that violence against women, in its various forms, is a universal problem, but that there are also important regional differences in prevalence. For instance, the degree to which both men and women from different countries and regions find the beating of one’s wife acceptable is “generally higher in Africa, Asia and Oceania, and lower in Latin America and the Caribbean and developed countries” (UN, 2015, p.154).

While these regional differences have been acknowledged and described within sexism research (e.g., Glick, Sakalli, Ferreira & Aguiar de Souza, 2002; Lee, Pratto & Li, 2001), explanations for these differences are scarce. Most likely this is because sexist attitudes are seen as universal, stemming from the extent to which societies are patriarchal (e.g., Heise, 1998; Lerner, 1986). Indeed, currently sexism is almost exclusively studied by means of specific concepts and measures, such as the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Ambivalent Sexism theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 2001; 2011) distinguishes between hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes. Hostile attitudes are those defined by classic theories of prejudice: negative attitudes towards women that directly express female inferiority. Benevolent sexism is based on negative stereotypes about women and the (subordinate) social roles women should occupy, yet is expressed in positive ways, such as by helping behaviors or intimacy. Glick and Fiske (2001; also, Glick et al., 2000) emphasize that these two dimensions are cross-culturally universal.

At the same time, research shows that there are large variations in both levels of hostile versus benevolent sexism and their intercorrelations across countries (Glick & Fiske, 1996, p.492). In some countries (e.g. Cuba) scores on benevolent and hostile sexism are twice as high as in others (e.g., Spain). In some countries, hostile and benevolent sexism showed extremely high intercorrelations (e.g., Spain, $r=.49-.64$), in other countries these concepts did not correlate (e.g., South Africa, $r=.06-.10$). These findings are consistent with the idea that sexism may have cultural origins.

What could these cultural origins be? Much of the cross-cultural literature considers sexism to be quite independent of culture and its development (Kashima et al., 1995). In the sexism literature, however, some research does suggest a cultural origin. Lee and Pratto (2007), in a study considering the relation between social dominance orientation and sexist attitudes, studied the relation between 'deferential family norms' and hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes across two cultures (United States, Taiwan). These deferential family norms referred to beliefs about hierarchical relations within families in which some (e.g., elders, parents, males) are more powerful than others (e.g., younger, children, females). Interestingly, greater endorsement of these deferential family norms was positively associated with hostile and benevolent sexism across both cultures. To us, these results provide a first indication that a better understanding of cultural beliefs embedded in local community dynamics can provide insights into the origins of sexist attitudes and, potentially, behavior.

More generally, culture provides a template for socialization, on the basis of which children (and other 'newcomers' in society) are taught how to conduct themselves and what to value, also in relation to their gender and the roles associated with it (e.g., Arnett, 1995; Leaper & Friedman, 2007). It is therefore inevitable that cultural values inform gendered and sexual acts and how they are responded to. This is not just because cultural values are internalized and therefore express themselves in behavior and in judgments. It is also because in public settings, people act not only based on their personal beliefs and values but also on those they perceive to be widespread in their culture (e.g., Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg & Wan, 2010). In sum, we believe there are good reasons why gender relations are informed by differences in values. But in order to make more specific predictions about sexism and its cultural foundations, we would like to zoom in on the community and how it functions.

Cultural beliefs in relation to communities: the Community Collectivism Scale

In this paper we argue that in order to understand the relation between cultural values and sexist attitudes, it is helpful to consider how beliefs and values are shaped and maintained within the local communities that people live in. Culture is not just a national characteristic that resides in the minds of citizens: it is best studied by considering the proximate social environment, the communities in which people function, interact and essentially 'practice' culture (Fischer, 2012). In other words, the place in which sexist attitudes may be learned and practiced. The Community Collectivism Scale (CCS; Akkuş, Postmes & Stroebe, 2017) is particularly suited to study cultural beliefs at the community level: It measures values and practices both at the level of the individual

(‘What do *you* value?’) and at the level of the perceived community (‘What does your *community* value?’). This means that, in line with an intersubjective approach to culture (e.g., Chiu et al., 2010; Fischer, 2012; Wan, Chiu, Peng & Tam, 2007), it considers culture to be established and maintained within local communities.

Moreover, CCS suggests that the function of important cultural values is to maintain and preserve the community itself. CCS focuses on four values that serve this function, and measures them at the level of the individual and at the level of the (perceived) community. CCS distinguishes three more collectivist values: *loyalty* which serves to preserve commitment to the group, *honor* to maintain norm compliance to the group and *hierarchy* to clarify the division of roles within the group. In addition, an individualistic value: people may differ in the extent to which they seek individual responsibility and agency in their lives, and groups will allocate individual responsibility and determine the margins for distinctiveness. It is important to note that loyalty, hierarchy and honor cluster together at both the personal and the community level, and are referred to as personal collectivism and community collectivism, whereas agency remains a separate factor at both these levels.

CCS has been shown to reliably discriminate between cultural and subcultural groups. Importantly, it predicts behaviors that are central to groups and group functioning such as perceived closeness to kin and friends, perceptions of behaviors that are acceptable within social networks and those that should be considered transgressions (e.g., how to care for elders within one’s community; whether to live unwedded), as well as endorsement versus suppression of group protest in response to inequality (Akkuş, Postmes & Stroebe, 2017; 2018). This means that CCS has the ability to tap into values that shape perceptions of and behaviors within groups. The present work is based on the idea that such cultural values also regulate relations between men and women, such as their relative standing in the group, their power position, types of behavior that are acceptable or unacceptable for men versus women within the group.

The phenomenon of victim blaming

In order to zoom in on the relationship between culture and sexism, we think it is important to study the phenomenon of victim blaming. Victim blaming occurs when victims are held (partially) responsible for their own mistreatment. If victim blaming occurs when women are mistreated, this may serve to maintain existing, patriarchal values. Victim blaming is therefore frequently assessed in studies looking at gender violence in relation to benevolent and hostile sexism (e.g., Sakalli, Salman & Turgut, 2010; Yamawaki, 2007; Abrams, Viki, Masser & Bohner, 2003). Both benevolent and hostile sexism, albeit in different contexts and to different degrees, are shown to be related to blaming women when they encounter (sexual) violence.

That victim blaming can serve to enforce cultural values is also in line with work showing that victim blaming of rape victims increases when people are highly motivated to protect the system (e.g., Lerner & Miller, 1978; Ståhl, Eek & Kazemi, 2010). We believe that there might be a conceptual link with community collectivism here: the CCS dimensions of hierarchy and honor, in particular, also serve to preserve existing social relations. Victim blaming can be an effective way of protecting and preserving existing relations within the community, when community values of honor and hierarchy are under threat. Hence, victim blaming and cultural values may be related because victim blaming serves certain community-related goals.

In the present research, we were also interested in assessing two concepts not generally measured in relation to victim blame: perpetrator and system blame. If, as we hypothesize, victim blaming happens because this serves community related goals, it makes sense that when victims are blamed, perpetrators and the system are at the same time absolved of blame. Indeed, the preservation of the system and the maintenance of the perpetrator's position in the hierarchy could be central concerns for a collectivist community. Conversely, we predicted that an increase in perpetrator blame might be a function of cultural beliefs about agency and individual responsibility.

The present research

The current work studies the relation between cultural values (CCS) and behavioral responses to sexist or sexually oriented behavior such as workplace discrimination (Study 2), sexual harassment (Study 1 and 2) and sexual violence (Study 2). The behavioral responses we studied were victim as well as perpetrator and society blame.

We assessed whether CCS has predictive value over and above a commonly used measure of sexist attitudes, benevolent and hostile sexism of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996). We therefore tested a model in which CCS serves as a distal and the ASI as a proximal predictor of responses to sexist behavior.

In line with previous research, regarding proximal predictors, we expected both hostile and benevolent sexism to be related to increased levels of victim blame (e.g., Sakallı-Uğurlu, Yalçın & Glick, 2007). Regarding the distal predictor, CCS, we predicted that higher scores on those values of CCS, honor, hierarchy and loyalty, that serve to maintain and enforce existing (generally patriarchal) structures would be associated with greater victim blame. Moreover, these values would be associated with lower levels of perpetrator and system. The community collectivism

value of agency, however, controls the margins of individuality. We therefore expected agency to be negatively correlated with victim blame, but positively with perpetrator and society blame.

Importantly, we also expected CCS to be associated with levels of sexism: we hypothesized that higher levels of collectivism would correlate positively with both Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, whereas agency was expected to correlate negatively with Hostile Sexism, and maybe also with Benevolent Sexism. The reasoning behind these expectations was, again, that the collectivist values (honor, hierarchy, loyalty), serve to maintain and enforce (existing) group order, that is generally patriarchal. And although collectivism and agency are positively related (Akkuş et al., 2017), based on the fact that the latter emphasizes individuality, we expect a negative correlation thereof with sexism.

Two studies, three countries

The first Study was performed as part of a larger CCS-validation study in Turkey (Akkuş, Postmes, Stroebe & Baray, 2019). Turkey ranks very low, 131st out of 144 countries, on the Global Gender Gap Index (WEF, 2018), which indicates inequalities between women and men in the key areas of health, education, economy and politics. Studies 2 and 3 were conducted in Mexico and India, both countries in which women have a relatively disadvantaged position, but to varying degrees and ingrained in different cultural contexts. The gender gap in Mexico (81st rank) is somewhat smaller than it is in Turkey and India (108th). However, the gap with regard to 'Economic Participation and Opportunity' is relatively large with a 124th position in Mexico. With regard to the index 'Health and Survival', Mexico (58th) and Turkey (59th) have similar degrees of disadvantage, whereas in India (141th) the gender gap on this area is particularly large. Also, these three countries have quite mixed social, cultural and religious origins (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), which makes comparisons with regard to fundamental cultural values, as operationalized by CCS, possible and relevant.

Study 1

Method***Participants***

Participants were 111 members of a Qualtrics-panel (56% male; $M_{age}=39.41$, $SD=10.13$) who were all inhabitants of Turkey. The present study consisted of two waves and was part of a larger study of the relationship between CCS and attitudes and behavioral intentions (Akkus, Postmes & Stroebe, 2017).

Procedure and dependent measures

The Community Collectivism Scale is an intersubjective scale for cultural orientation (see for the full details its validation study: Akkuş et al., 2017), in which participants are presented items (5-point Likert scale from 'totally disagree' to 'totally agree') on the dimensions loyalty, hierarchy, honor and agency, at both the individual level and the community level (15 items each). For example, an item for the dimension loyalty at the personal level, 'I would support a family member, even if I wouldn't want to', is repeated at the community level as such 'In my community, people support their family members, even if they don't want to'. Based on previous scale validation analyses (Akkus et al., 2017; 2019), we know the dimensions of loyalty, hierarchy and honor cluster together, whereas agency remains a separate factor. We therefore distinguished the dimensions of (personal and community) collectivism (the mean of loyalty, hierarchy and honor) and (personal and community) agency.

In Study 1, CCS was administered during the first wave of data collection (March 2014). In the second wave, which took place 18 months later, participants completed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996), and two versions of the following sexual harassment scenario²: *"You hear from one of your acquaintances that one of their relatives/a foreign woman became the victim of sexual harassment while on holiday in Turkey. A stranger suddenly touched her private parts against her will."* These versions were collapsed for the analyses as they revealed no differences on the dependent measures.

The dependent measures consisted of a 3-item measure of victim blame (i.e., 'women should not wear sexually provocative clothing'; 'Women like her should not venture into unsafe environments'; 'The victim shouldn't tell anyone about the incident. Disclosing would only lead to bad consequences'; $\alpha=.85$), a 3-item measure of perpetrator blame (i.e., 'men should learn to contain their sexual urges'; 'Men should learn to respect all women's honor'; 'The perpetrator should be punished as sexual harassment is illegal'; $\alpha=.94$) and finally a 5-item measure of society blame ('society should stop condoning sexual harassment'; 'Authorities should take

2 We originally included a within-subjects manipulation of target group membership (ingroup or outgroup member) to assess differences in ingroup versus outgroup victim appraisals.

hard action against sexual harassment'; 'The victim should file a complaint'; 'The perpetrator should be punished as sexual harassment is illegal'; 'The authorities should punish the perpetrator'; $\alpha=.78$).

Results

We first conducted a factor analysis using principal axis factoring with promax rotation (because there is no reason to believe that the factors would be orthogonal) to assess whether our dependent measures indeed differentiated victim, perpetrator and societal blame. The factor analysis revealed two factors via the scree-plot and with an Eigenvalue of 1 or higher (Russel, 2002). The first factor consisted of items that referred to victim blame. In the second factor the items that blamed the perpetrator and society clustered together. We therefore collapsed these items to measure perpetrator/societal blame.

Path analysis

In order to determine the extent to which CCS, in relation to ASI, explains both victim and perpetrator/societal blame, we conducted a SEM path analysis using the Lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) in R. We defined a model with both 'Blaming the Victim' and 'Blaming Perpetrator and/or Society' as outcome variables and with benevolent sexism (BS), hostile sexism (HS), as well as personal collectivism (PerCol) and personal agency (PerAg) as predictors (see Figure 1). We only included personal level measures of CCS: preliminary analyses showed that the community level of CCS did not explain significant additional variance. Prior research has shown that there tends to be a strong relation between personal and community levels of collectivism and agency (Akkuş, Postmes & Stroebe, 2017 and confirmed in Akkuş, Postmes, Stroebe & Baray, 2020), and that it is likely that perceived community values are external precursors to one's internalization of those values as personal ones. As a result, personal values are often slightly stronger predictors of several behaviors and other outcomes.

Figure 1. Path-analysis (Structural Equation Model) for harassment scenario Turkey (Study 1)

Note: N=110; Non-standardized estimates; only significant paths included in model; Goodness of Fit: $\chi^2(4)=8.278$ ($p=.082$), CFI=.970, RMSEA=.099, SRMR=.045; †: .1 < p < .05, *: p < .05, **: p < .01

Looking at the ASI as a proximal predictor of victim blame reveals that greater endorsement of hostile, but not benevolent, sexism is related to victim blame. Moreover, personal collectivism, but not personal agency, indirectly predict victim blaming via hostile sexism. Importantly, as predicted, there are also direct effects of both personal collectivism and personal agency on victim blame: Personal collectivism is associated with greater victim blame whereas personal agency is related to lower levels of victim blame. Moreover, regression analyses reveal that CCS explains 7% additional variance over and above the ASI.

Turning to perpetrator/society blaming, we see a similar, yet even stronger pattern of results that confirm the role of people's cultural orientation in predicting sexism. There is a weak relation between endorsement of Benevolent Sexism and (greater)

perpetrator and societal blame. In addition, the indirect path for personal agency through Benevolent Sexism is only marginally significant. BS is strongly predicted by personal collectivism, and only to a minimal extent by Hostile Sexism. Importantly, there is a strong direct path from personal agency to perpetrator & societal blame: stronger perceptions of personal agency are related to greater perpetrator and societal blame. There is no direct path from personal collectivism. Again, regression analyses (see Supplemental Materials) indicated that CCS explains considerable variance (15%) beyond the ASI.

In sum, people's cultural orientations can contribute to our understanding of when victims or perpetrators – and society – are likely to be blamed for sexist behavior (in this case sexual harassment), over and above measures of sexist attitudes. Collectivist orientation is related to increased levels of victim and reduced levels of perpetrator blame. By contrast, those who endorse an agentic cultural orientation are less likely to blame victims and more likely to blame the perpetrator.

Discussion

The path analyses paint a fairly clear picture: ASI, and more specifically hostile sexism, does indeed predict whether people blame women for being sexually harassed. Results also show that ASI is quite strongly related to CCS: ASI appears to mediate the effects of CCS on victim blaming. However, CCS also explains unique variance. With respect to the tendency to blame perpetrator and/or society when women are sexually harassed, ASI is rather a weak predictor. Here CCS, and particularly the dimension of personal agency, explain a considerable amount of variance.

These results are consistent with our predictions. Moreover, we note that the cultural values were measured more than one year before the respondents' reactions to the sexual harassment scenarios (and the measure of ASI). This further underlines the predictive value of CCS. And, although the issue of causation is not entirely solved, given results are still correlational in nature, it makes it less likely that the causal order would be reversed.

In Study 2 we aimed to replicate our findings in different cultural contexts (India and Mexico). In addition, we wanted to consider the extent to which cultural differences serve to explain different types of sexist behavior, regarding both other forms of maltreatment (i.e., domestic violence) as well as a different context of gender inequality: workplace discrimination.

Study 2

Method

Participants

Study 2 was conducted in India and Mexico among members of a Qualtrics-panel (N=557) participants. In order to have ensure representativeness of the sample, we sampled with quota for gender, and age (Table 1). One participant was removed for being underaged, 6 were removed for having an identical ID-number and 14 were removed for not completing CCS. In addition, 19 participants were removed from the analyses for being outliers with regard to their CCS score (Mahalanobis' distance; $p < .001$). Our final samples consisted of 129 (49%) women and 134 men (51%) in India and 126 women (50%) and 126 men (50%) in Mexico.

Table 1 Study 2 – Distribution of age groups (with quota)

Age groups	India (%)	Mexico (%)
18-22 yrs	41 (15,6%)	36 (14,3%)
23-35 yrs	92 (35,1%)	91 (36,1%)
35-55 yrs	90 (34,4%)	90 (35,7%)
56 or older	39 (14,9%)	35 (13,9%)

Procedure

Participants first completed CCS and ASI. We then administered three scenarios to all participants in which they were asked to respond to different types of negative treatment of women³. These included discrimination in the workplace (a woman is fired while her male colleagues are not fired as they have to support a family), domestic violence (a woman is hit by her husband because she embarrassed him) and sexual harassment (as in Study 1). The scenarios are included at the end of the paper (see Appendix A).

As in Study 1, we measured victim, perpetrator and societal blame – in this case across the three scenarios. The dependent measures were combined across scenarios. The first scenario, describing the discrimination of a woman in the workplace, was followed by 13 items measuring victim blame (e.g., "The woman needs this job less than her male colleagues"), perpetrator blame (e.g., "Her boss has no right to fire her instead of less qualified colleagues") and society blame (e.g., "Society shouldn't condone gender discrimination").

³ For exploratory reasons, we also included an ageism scenario and measures of social dominance orientation, Modern Sexism and Pervasiveness of Sexism.

The second scenario, describing a case of domestic violence, was similarly followed by 13 items measuring victim blame (e.g., “The woman shouldn’t have embarrassed him publicly”), perpetrator blame (“The man has no right hitting his wife, no matter what”), and society blame (“Society should facilitate women in testifying against their husband in cases of violence”).

The third scenario, describing a case of sexual harassment, similar to the Study 1 scenario, was followed by 14 items, with the same template with items measuring victim blame (e.g., “Women should not wear sexually provocative clothing”), perpetrator blame (e.g., “Men should learn to respect all women’s honor”), and society blame (e.g., “Society should not condone sexual harassment”).

Extending Study 1, we added 4 new items referring to emotions of anger and shame directed at the victim and the perpetrator. The reason for including these new items was that we wanted to explore whether these emotions would hold up as separate variables in the analysis. However, as we shall see below, they do not form a distinct factor.

Results

We performed a factor analysis using principal axis factoring with promax rotation for the 40 statements (combined) following the three scenarios of Study 2. This analysis revealed four factors (determined with the scree plot and an Eigenvalue larger than 1). Items referring to victim blame all loaded on one factor. Items referring to blaming of the perpetrator(s) and society loaded on three separate factors for each scenario. Items referring to anger and shame also loaded on these factors. When forcing a two-factor solution across the three scenario’s the fit was good and the pattern was the same as in Study 1: there was one victim blame factor and one factor of blame for perpetrator and society.

Path analyses

We performed the same path analysis as in Study 1 through Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) with the use of the Lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) in R. Both personal level measures of CCS (personal collectivism; personal agency) and the ASI (benevolent sexism, hostile sexism) were included as predictors in the model. ‘Blaming the Victim’ and ‘Blaming Perpetrator and/or Society’ were outcome variables. We ran this model across scenarios and countries. The final model (in which non-significant predictors were removed) showed a very good fit, with CFI=.997, RMSEA=.038 and SRMR=.016.

Looking at the proximal predictors (ASI), we see that only hostile and not benevolent sexism is (positively) related to victim blame. Taking into account cultural orientation as a distal predictor reveals that both personal collectivism and personal agency indirectly predict victim blame (respectively, positively and negatively) via hostile sexism. Importantly, as in Study 1, personal collectivism is also associated with greater victim blame whereas personal agency is related to less victim blame.

Looking at perpetrator/society blame, we find weak associations with both benevolent and hostile sexism: there is a weak positive path from benevolent sexism to perpetrator/society blame and a similarly weak, but negative path from hostile sexism. As in Study 1, personal collectivism does not directly predict levels of perpetrator/society blame – although it does indirectly via benevolent and hostile sexism. Personal agency is indirectly associated with perpetrator & victim blame: it negatively predicts benevolent sexism which is subsequently (weakly) related to perpetrator & society blame. Conform our hypotheses, and consistent with Study 1, personal agency is related to higher levels of perpetrator / society blame.

Figure 2. Path-analysis (Structural Equation Model) for three mistreatment scenarios India & Mexico

Note: N=505; Non-standardized estimates; only significant paths included in model Goodness of Fit: $\chi^2(2)=3.489$ ($p=.175$), CFI=.997, RMSEA=.038, SRMR=.014; †: .1 < p < .05, *: p < .05, **: p < .01.

Discussion

The purpose of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1, extending the range of contexts regarding the mistreatment or inequality of women. Results confirmed the hypotheses and were consistent with Study 1: The cultural values of (personal) collectivism are associated with victim blaming, whereas the values of (personal) agency are associated with perpetrator/society blame. Moreover, these cultural values predict responses to maltreatment and discrimination beyond standard measures of sexism.

General Discussion

Worldwide, women are frequent victims of maltreatments such as sexism and violence, but the degree of victimization varies considerably both within and between cultures. The present paper explores cultural foundations of responses to maltreatment. We propose that cultural values shape how such events are interpreted and attributed. The results support this idea: across different cultural contexts, the perceived values of one's community and the values held by the individuals within them, influence how people interpret maltreatment of women across a variety of events such as sexual violence or workplace gender discrimination.

Specifically, we considered the role of community collectivism: cultural beliefs and values that are shaped and held both by individuals and the communities they live in, which function to regulate and preserve that community. Community Collectivism predicts how people respond to maltreatment events across three different cultures: Turkey, India and Mexico. Higher levels of (Personal) Collectivism were consistently related to increased victim blame, whereas the converse was the case for (Personal) Agency.

Importantly, Community Collectivism was a stronger predictor of victim blame than a traditional measure of sexism (ASI). Victim blame, by assigning responsibility to the victim rather than the perpetrator or the society in which maltreatments such as rape takes place, serves to protect one's beliefs about existing societal structures (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Pedersen & Strömwall, 2013). Thus, the function of victim blame is essentially the same as the function of community collectivism: both aim to foster and protect existing community structures and dynamics (Akkuş, Postmes, & Stroebe, 2017). We conclude from this that women are blamed in order to preserve the integrity of collectivistic communities

Innovatively, the present research also examines whether perpetrators and society are held responsible for female maltreatment. There is a considerable amount of research on victim blame, but studies of assignment of blame to perpetrator and society are quite rare (cf., Niemi & Young, 2016; Tendayi Viki, Abrams & Masser, 2004; for important exceptions). We believe that this is a very important topic, however, both for applied and theoretical reasons. Practically, perpetrator responsibility is relevant in legal contexts in which perpetrators of discrimination, maltreatment and violence can be held to account (Tendayi Viki, Abrams & Masser, 2004). Societal responsibility is important for policy decisions and movements towards societal change. From a theoretical perspective, assignment of blame to perpetrators and society may challenge existing ideologies: For one, they signal the world may not be just and fair (Lerner, 1980). More concretely, the ability to empirically join the dots between assignments of responsibility and cultural values supports a theoretical analysis of the system of collective beliefs and practices which operate in patriarchal societies.

In line with our predictions, collectivist community values were strongly related to assignment of responsibility to the perpetrators of mistreatment and to the society that harbours such mistreatment. First, it was an interesting finding that assignment of blame to perpetrator and society clustered as one factor. This provides initial evidence that, in the minds of respondents across three very different cultures, perpetrators and the broader society are not seen as independent entities (even though for logical and conceptual reasons, individual and systemic responsibility cannot and should not be equated). Second, community collectivism was related to less assignment of blame to perpetrators and society. This finding is consistent with the functional explanation suggested above. Third, agency values, according to which persons are autonomous and responsible for their own actions, were strongly related to increased assignment of blame to perpetrators and society. This finding is interesting because it suggests how cultural change may be promoted. We conclude from this that the community-based acknowledgement of individual agency may be a prerequisite for holding sexual misconduct to account.

Interestingly, Hostile and Benevolent Sexism were relatively weak predictors of perpetrator and societal blame. And only hostile sexism predicted victim blame. Because hostile sexism revolves around the negative assessment of women as a group, it makes sense this would be related to blaming of specific women. However, the fact that sexism did not extend to blaming of society and perpetrators suggests that whereas cultural values are relevant to a systemic response in which blame is shifted between victim and perpetrator/society, sexism is not.

In sum, the present results indicate that community-based values help us to understand the systemic foundations of who is blamed when rape and other maltreatment of women occur. Patterns of blame are not explained by sexism—even though we confirmed its relation to blaming of the victim. However, in order to understand why female victims are blamed and why perpetrators and society are absolved of blame, we need to look to the collectivist values that preserve community integrity: values of honor, hierarchy and loyalty. Whilst such community may be problematic with regard to victim blaming, other community values may offer solutions: community values of personal responsibility and agency are associated with blaming of perpetrators and society. Thus, community-based values can also offer solutions

Theoretical and practical implications

The results are valuable from a theoretical and practical perspective. Theoretically, the present work reveals the added value of studying cultural values, and the communities they originate from, in relation to responses to sexism, harassment and violence. These have, as far as we know, not been studied within cross-cultural research, presumably because the emergence of cultural differences is thought to be unrelated to the emergence of sexism (e.g., Kashima et al., 1995). The field of sexism research, generally spoken, acknowledges the regional differences and its relation to cultural differences: the literature describes variations in gender related beliefs about women, such as individually held (oftentimes culturally shared) stereotypes that predict attitudes and behaviors towards women (e.g., Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). However, we are not aware this literature provides any explanations for this variability. Conversely, other theories that take into account the societal context surrounding sexism frequently aim to understand the nature of intergroup relations such as feelings of relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972) or identification with one's own group and ingroup bias (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flamant, 1971). These approaches have been valuable in understanding prejudice and sexism but they do not explain cultural variations in levels of maltreatment and sexism. Our work advances understanding by focusing on the community dynamics which cultural values aim to promote.

We expected to find clear relations between cultural orientation and sexist attitudes, based on the rationale of community collectivism. The core idea here is that cultural values support group mechanisms (i.e., loyalty, hierarchy, honor and agency) that, when integrated, preserve a certain social structure and which regulate within-group interactions. Different groups prioritize and promote these mechanisms differently (e.g., they might be more or less hierarchically structured) and this amounts to what we can identify as cultural differences.

Crucially, these mechanisms and the values that promote them have a self-preserving function. By 'protecting' women and limiting their room for maneuver, both literally and figuratively, the community maintains its hierarchy and minimizes the chances they may be hurt or 'blemished'⁴. Similarly, patriarchal values may serve a self-preserving function when victim blaming occurs: the hierarchy and honor of the community are preserved (and weigh more importantly than the fate of individuals).

The insight that cultural values are a strong predictor of perpetrator and societal blame to a greater extent than a measure of sexist attitudes is important for both applied and theoretical reasons. In interpreting events of female maltreatment, the extent to which victims are blamed is only half of the story, in fact oftentimes perpetrator blame may be a very essential part of this 'story'. For example, judicial systems, responsible for evaluating cases of discrimination, maltreatment and violence, are guided by perpetrator rather than victim blame in determining sentences (Viki, Abrams & Masser, 2004). The present work shows there may be cultural differences in the extent to which people are likely to assign blame to victim versus perpetrator.

In the context of potential societal change, holding societies responsible for mechanisms of maltreatment may be a first step in instigating change. There are multiple historical examples in which such assignment of responsibility has occurred and perpetrators have been held to account: recent examples are the Arab Spring and the East and West German reunification. This is in line with a theoretical perspective, in which perpetrator and society blame may challenge existing ideologies to varying degrees: For one, they signal the world may not be as just and fair as we would like to believe (Lerner, 1980). The present work adds the insight that when individuals and communities come to endorse values of personal agency, perpetrator and societal blame becomes more likely.

The present work also has important practical implications: The past years have witnessed a series of (collective) rape incidents in India that initiated worldwide media attention due to the frequency and severity of the attacks. The present work offers some insights into the potential reasons why such events occur, and how to potentially prevent them. In our view it would be helpful to consider the level at which such rape incidents can be addressed. We point to the importance of cultural values that are held within communities: these ultimately determine who is perceived as responsible. This means that an important part of preventing rape, and mistreatment of women in general, may lie in involving those communities in

4 The latter notion is reflected in certain interpretations of honor (e.g., Pitt-Rivers, 1966).

dialogue about the potential consequences of principles related to honor, loyalty and hierarchy. Importantly, such collectivist community values do not prevent communities from also embracing values of agency and personal responsibility. Communities need not shed their collectivism in order to prevent maltreatment of women from occurring: they only need to underscore that such actions are autonomous individual choices that one will be held to account for.

Limitations and future directions

The main purpose of our research was to establish relations between cultural orientation and sexism. We therefore sampled three countries which have a relatively high 'gender gap'. It would be interesting to confirm whether the relation between cultural orientation, as operationalized by CCS through communal group processes, will also hold up in countries with lower gender gaps and with more 'subtle' forms of sexism (cf. Swim, Aikin, Hall & Hunter, 1995). If so, this may shed a light on the question whether more overt and subtle displays of sexism are in essence variations of the same phenomenon. For future research, it would therefore be interesting to also study countries with lower reported degrees of inequality and sexism.

In the present we report the impact of personal level CCS on responses to sexist attitudes and maltreatment and conclude that it is important to study cultural values in understanding these responses. One could query to what extent gauging people's personal values reflects cultural beliefs within a community (e.g., Fischer, 2012). Importantly, both in this and other studies (Akkuş et al, 2017; 2019), we find that personal and collectively held values correlate very strongly (in both Studies 1 and 2: $r = .71$, $p < .001$). Moreover, analyses with community level measures reveal the same patterns as reported here. For this reason, we feel confident that our measures of personal collectivism capture community level values in relation to sexist behavior and maltreatment.

Conclusions

The present work reveals that people's cultural orientation is related to responses to sexism, harassment and violence across cultures that differ in levels gender inequality: We find that cultural values, over and above a common measure of sexist attitudes, predict the extent to which victims or conversely perpetrators and/or society are blamed for these occurrences. These findings introduce a novel link between cultural values – and the group processes that take place within communities – and sexist behavior. The phenomenon by which victims are blamed for their wrongdoing may be intricately related to people's need to preserve the integrity of communities. Moreover, cultural values focused on the agency of individuals shift the responsibility for mistreatment of women to perpetrators and the societal context. Thus, different aspects of community cultural values are in very distinct ways related to holding women themselves responsible or holding the perpetrators and society responsible. An important conclusion of the present research is that the cultural process in communities may explain responses to sexist behavior and maltreatment, but may also, potentially, provide the key to addressing such problems.

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Appendix A: Scenarios Study 2

- Workplace discrimination: "A woman/ a close female relative was fired recently because of budget cuts, while less successful and less experienced male colleagues were allowed to stay. Her boss didn't fire these male colleagues, because they had families to support."
- Domestic violence: "In a divorce case, a woman testifies that her husband has hit her during their marriage. The man doesn't deny these charges, but declares that he did so, because his wife embarrassed him publicly by saying he couldn't provide for their family."
- Sexual harassment: "A woman/One of your female relatives becomes the victim of sexual harassment while she returns from a night out. A stranger suddenly touches her private parts against her will."

4

CHAPTER

How micro-cultural group dynamics translate to macro-cultural and societal dynamics: The case of the Gezi-protests¹

¹ This chapter is based on: Akkuş, B., Postmes, T., Stroebe, K. and Baray, G. (2019), Cultures of conflict: Protests, violent repression, and community values. *British Journal of Social Psychology*. doi:10.1111/bjso.12328

Abstract

What are the cultural origins of societal conflicts that revolve around democratization, women's rights, and modern libertarian values? We propose that deep-seated differences in community-based collective values (at the micro-level) may be related to why people support anti-government protest *and* why they support repression of such protests (at the macro-level). The hypothesis was examined among residents of Turkey (N = 500). Cultural values, measured at the individual level and community level with the community collectivism scale, correlated with political orientation and emotions, as well as with subsequent support for anti-governmental protest or its repression. The main conclusions are that both support for protest and for repression are related to the cultural values people hold and their subsequent political orientations and emotions. Micro-level cultural values in local communities may thus play a role in explaining macro-level socio-political divides.

Cultures of Conflict: Protests, Violent Repression and Community Values

Since around 2010, many countries in the world have experienced a sharp increase in major nationwide protests (Banks & Wilson, 2016). The Arab Spring, mass protests in India against sexual violence, the women's march in the USA triggered by Donald Trump's policies and statements, and the Gezi-protests in Turkey are examples of a subset of these protests that primarily seem to revolve around democratization, women's rights, and modern libertarian values. The present paper's starting point is the observation that protests often coincide with deep-seated societal divides (e.g. Kriesi, 2010) which may revolve around cultural values. We take this one step further by proposing that the cultural values associated with social and political conflicts stem from local communities and that they are potent influences because they perform an important function in within-community group dynamics. The present paper therefore focuses on values of individualism and collectivism in relation to one's *proximate* community (so, at the micro-level) and examines to what extent these values are related to societal protest against a conservative government and to the violent repression of those progressive protests (at the macro-level). The question is whether micro-level cultural values are related to macro-level political support.

We study this by focusing not just on support for protests, but also on support for the (violent) repression of these protests. Traditionally, studies of protest and movements focus on disadvantaged groups in inter-group settings (e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Only few studies (e.g., Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, & Heath, 2011; Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, 2018; Milesi & Alberici, 2018) have focused on what might motivate support for activism on both sides of a political protest—both in support of progressive or libertarian principles (in the current study: protests that challenge the status quo) and in support of authoritarian or conservative principles (in the present study: the repression of those protests). In the present paper we focus on what we conceptualise as proximate determinants of such support (political orientations, emotions) as well as more distal predictors (community-based values of individualism and collectivism). We thus focus on cultural divisions *within* society that, we assume, may be related to proximal predictors. We examine these processes in Turkey where we expect such community-based values to be associated with large-scale clashes. The specific protest, the so-called Gezi protest, as well as the context of Turkey, we believe makes an interesting case-study of a within-society conflict with cultural origins.

Distal determinants of conflict: clashing cultural values. In studies of political conflict and collective action, culture has often been identified as a relevant factor. For example, cultural characteristics can sometimes enhance the likelihood of inter-cultural conflicts, by encouraging inter-cultural misunderstandings (Triandis, 2000; Williams, 2004). Moreover, speaking to the relevance of studying ‘culture’ in relation to collective action (e.g., van Zomeren & Louis, 2017), cross-national differences have been shown to affect the relation between determinants of collective action and collective action itself (Stewart, Pratto, Bou Zeineddine et al., 2016), as well as beliefs about social change (Bain, Kroonenberg, & Kashima, 2015). These perspectives implicitly build on the assumption that cultures are broadly shared within a society and not themselves contested. However, in the current paper we take the perspective that cultural values may also become a source of disagreement *within* a society: the question of which culture is or should be dominant may itself be the subject of political contestation (see also Jasper, 2017). Indeed, various societal tensions currently witnessed across the globe (e.g., Brazil, Iran, Turkey, perhaps also the USA) can be explained as intra-societal conflicts over basic cultural values: women’s rights, democracy and self-determination. This is indirectly confirmed by research that shows that liberal voting tends to coincide with cultural values such as universalism, benevolence and self-direction, whereas conservative voting is associated with more conservative cultural values of security, power, achievement, tradition and conformity (Caprara, Schwartz, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2008). Therefore, there is reason to believe that differences in cultural values may have political consequences.

Assessing within-country cultural variation. It is widely accepted that culture can be considered the template for socialization for (new) members of a society (e.g., Schwartz & Ros, 1995) and as such serves to instill a shared understanding of how a society works and should work. There is, however, debate about at what level such common understanding is shared.

Many existing measures and conceptualizations of cultural values such as individualism vs. collectivism (e.g., Minkov & Hofstede, 2012), tightness vs. looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011) or basic human values (Schwartz, 1999) are measures of individually held values. With respect to examining the differences between cultural groups, these measures have one shortcoming: one can only make inferences about the group by aggregating across *individual*-level measures (cf. McCrae et al., 2013), which conceptually seems at odds with the commonly accepted definition of culture as *shared* meaning system (e.g., Fischer, 2012). When examining within-culture differences (which is particularly important in heterogeneous societies), this problem is compounded by not knowing what particular community or subcultural group an individual’s responses should be attributed to.

A recent approach attempts to solve this problem by focusing on the intersubjectivity of values (e.g., Chiu et al., 2010) suggesting that people attach special importance to cultural values that they perceive to be widely shared within their cultural group. In most implementations thus far, researchers have tended to measure what individuals perceive to be the cultural values held by the majority of "their country" or "their culture". This approach is well suited to examining between-national or between-cultural differences in intersubjective values, however, it is less well-suited to examining within-nation differences, such as the clashing cultural values between subcultural groups or communities that the present paper is focused on.

Community Collectivism. Extending the intersubjective methodology, Akkuş and colleagues recently developed the concept of community collectivism (Akkuş, Postmes & Stroebe, 2017). The core idea is that some cultural values serve the purpose of regulating social interactions within communities such as one's (extended) family². These tend to be tight knit communities in the sense that members are connected by strong ties such as family bonds and they tend to be relatively close proximity, characterized by frequent contact and longevity (e.g., networks of close kin, cf. Bian, 1997). Within such tight-knit communities, we propose there are values that serve the purpose of keeping the group's structure intact and managing intra-group interactions.

These values help the community to achieve clarity about expectations, obligations, group interactions and transactions. These core values perform four functions that keep the group tight-knit: (a) provide loyalty and support, so bonds remain strong; (b) divide labor and responsibilities, so group members know their roles and position; (c) enforce norms and expectations, so group members know what is honorable and shameful; and (d) encourage agency and autonomy, so group members know when to act and think for themselves (see also Postmes, Akkuş, & Stroebe, 2015). Accordingly, the central collectivist values should be concerned with loyalty and support, hierarchy and structure, and with honor and norm enforcement. Individualist values are concerned with agency and autonomy. Intersubjective agreement about these community-based values benefit group efficiency and keep social relations intact: they inform every member of the community about who they are and about how to act in relation to others.

This concept of community collectivism has implications for how values of collectivism and individualism should be measured. These values are held by individuals, but they originate from the community and are normative. In line with this concept

2 Community is defined in the Community Collectivism Scale as: "your core family, your extended family and other families (in your environment) that matter to you".

of community collectivism, a 30-item community collectivism scale was recently developed and validated (CCS, Akkuş et al., 2017). The CCS measures collectivist and individualist values held at the personal level and perceived to exist within one's self-relevant community (i.e., one's family and the immediate social network around it). In order to measure community values, for example, the scale assesses perceptions of common social practices within one's community (e.g., "In my community, members of the family feel responsible for preserving and protecting another family member's honor"). The assumption is that individual values are grounded in the values of one's community. Akkuş et al. (2017) validated the scale and showed that it distinguishes between personal collectivism and community collectivism, as well as between personal agency and community agency.

Prior research has shown that CCS explains behavioral intentions and attitudes within the community (e.g., whether one should care for the elders in one's family, or how people of different genders should behave, Akkuş et al., 2017). Relevant for the present paper is that Akkuş et al. (2017) also showed that CCS predicted voting behavior: higher scores on collectivism were strongly related to voting for a conservative party³. In the current research, we study whether values of community collectivism can also be related to support for collective action against a conservative government and in favor of it. We thus propose that values originating from local tight-knit communities may play a role in the broader political context of society. In particular, the varying degrees to which communities promote collectivist values of honor and hierarchy and the subsequent sub-cultural differences can become intimately connected with national-level politics. As Jasper (2017, p. 298) puts it: "Small groups are precisely the kind of interactive context that creates understandings, in which decisions are made and actions initiated, where emotions are generated and displayed, with impacts on others [...] They are the kind of local setting where politics unfolds". Whilst we believe that this connection between community values and political movements is relevant in multiple societies today, we do not know of any research that has addressed this specific point. What is interesting and novel about this approach, we believe, is that it implies that macro-level political conflict may ultimately stem from the desire to preserve and protect local communities.

³ It is important to note that this finding was a follow-up study in which the sample used in the present paper was resampled.

Support for activism and repression in conflict situations: Proximal determinants

What are relevant proximate predictors of support for anti-government protest and for government oppression? Given the constraints of conducting a short survey we decided to focus on two key predictors that should, according to prior research, account for a considerable amount of variance: political orientation and negative emotional reactions (including moral condemnation of the out-group).

In general, people's political orientation is the strongest predictor of whether they support a government policy or not (Lau & Heldman, 2009; Sears et al., 1980). In situations of a "hot" conflict between government and its opponents, it makes sense that this effect of political orientation is also strong, if not stronger: Intergroup conflict tends to accentuate ingroup favoritism (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and so in a conflict situation those who take the government's side should, if anything, support the governing party's actions to suppress a protest even more (e.g., Brewer, 2001). This reasoning can be extended to predictors of support for protests against the government. A large literature shows that commitment to activism is predicted by identification with the activist cause (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2008). By extension, defining oneself as a government opponent should coincide with support for government opposition. In the current study, since we are dealing with protest against a conservative government, we reason that this protest would be supported by those who categorize themselves as liberals (or progressives), while government repression would be endorsed by those who self-categorize as conservatives.

In addition, we were interested in the role of moral emotions in support of protests or its repression. One reason for this is research showing that, particularly in conflict situations and particularly among those who are ideologically involved, collective emotions may run high and may play a role in motivating (support for) action (e.g., Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Sternberg, 2005; Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, 2015). Research on collective action and mobilization has often focused on injustice-based anger—a prime motivator for disadvantaged groups. But for high status groups who support suppression feelings of entitlement and superiority may also play a role (cf. Postmes & Smith, 2009). Accordingly, we decided not to focus solely on specific emotions involved in politicized conflicts such as anger (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011) or hatred (Bar-Tal, Halperin & De Rivera, 2007), but on a range of emotions, including the overarching moral condemnation of the outgroup that is common to both feelings of injustice-based anger (cf. Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012) as well as superiority-based emotions (Postmes & Smith, 2009).

The present research

Research context. The current study took place against the background of the Turkish protests of 2013 and its backlash. Amid increasing tensions between the conservative government and people with a more secularist outlook, a small and peaceful protest took place in Gezi Park, Istanbul. This escalated into unprecedented nationwide protests, initially against police brutality but later against the government's socially conservative politics. This development split the country into supporters and opponents of the government (the conservative AKP of then prime-minister Erdogan). Opponents of the government accused it of authoritarian leadership with disregard of libertarian values and civil rights. This political conflict echoes divisions within Turkey that historically stem from the country's founding secularist principles, but increasingly transcend socio-economic class and ethno-cultural differences (Gumuscu, 2010). The underlying cultural values are visible, to some extent, in neighborhoods and communities which have very distinct lifestyles (Turam, 2013). In public life, they are signaled among others by women's involvement in society and style of dress (e.g., Arat, 2010; Vojdik, 2010).

In this context, the present research examines what variables are associated with support for anti-government protests and support for repression of those protests. It identifies proximal variables (emotions towards the protests and towards protest repression and political orientation) and more distal variables (cultural values that are community-based, see Figure 1). We tested this model in the context of an explosive political conflict between a conservative government and a sizable progressive opposition, in a situation where entire communities appear to be taking sides (Göle, 2013). We compared it with a closely related alternative model, in which these emotions were proximate predictors and in which cultural factors are both assumed to be distal predictors that are uncorrelated. We expected the fit of the alternative model to be inferior to the fit of the preferred model.

Figure 1. Two models of support for protests and support for repression of protests: theoretical model (top) and alternative model (bottom).

Choice of variables. We focus on political orientation because prior research showed that although the protests were initially quite diverse (Baysu & Phalet, 2017; Bilgiç & Kafkasli, 2013; Konda, 2014), they quickly developed into a conflict between liberals and conservatives (Özkirimli, 2014; Öncü & Koçan, 2014). The choice of emotions with regard to the protest and to protest repression (a.o., hate, anger and moral condemnation) was partially based on prior research but also informed by the way the press and social media legitimized the widespread (sometimes excessive) use of violence: protesters were referred to as traitors and heathens (e.g., Corke, Finkel, Kramer, Robbins & Schenkan, 2014; Tastan, 2013, also cf. McLeod & Detenber, 1999; McLeod & Hertog, 1992).

We believe that this political conflict stems from opposing values with regard to the freedom to make personal choices in life versus traditional community-based values. Rather than operationalizing this with personal or national-level values (e.g., Caprara et al., 2008; Vecchione et al., 2010), we operationalized this with the new measure of community collectivism which we believe meshes well with the grounding of these conflicts in local tight-knit communities.

Predictions. Regarding proximate variables, we expected support for protest to be predicted by political progressiveness and negative emotions about government handling of the protests. Conversely, we expected support for the violent repression of protests to be predicted by politically conservative views, and by negative emotions towards the protests. Regarding distal predictors, we expected conservative political orientation to be predicted by more community collectivism, at the level of individual and community-based values, and progressive political orientation to be positively correlated with agency. More specifically, we expected collectivism to be positively correlated with a more conservative political orientation and therefore also with repression, as a consequence of prioritizing social hierarchy. For agency we expected the opposite, because of its expression of personal autonomy.

Method

Participants and procedure

Previous research (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008; Vecchione et al., 2005) suggests a small to medium relationship among various predictors of collective action, i.e. political orientation, emotional reaction and cultural values. According to G*power, an a priori power of .90 can be achieved with 377 participants if a bivariate correlation $r = .15$ (or larger). We decided to recruit a slightly larger sample of 500 participants (50% women, $M_{\text{age}} = 34.47$) because of concerns we might not attract enough conservatives. Respondents completed an online questionnaire programmed in Qualtrics. All lived in Turkey and were recruited from the Qualtrics panel (and compensated by Qualtrics). Six were identified as multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis' distance, $p < .001$), and were replaced by six additional cases by Qualtrics, such that said numbers and proportions remained intact, i.e. 500 participants and 50% women. There was an oversampling of city residents and highly educated respondents. 52% of participants lived in Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir although only 30% of the population does. Almost 70% of participants were highly educated or students, which is above the country average of 10.7% (TÜİK, 2015). Importantly, a sizeable number of conservatives participated: 38% indicated being right wing, 45% left wing, and 17% neither left nor right.

Measures. We administered a questionnaire (in Turkish) that measured both CCS and attitudes and emotions towards the Gezi-protests, as well as general (societal) attitudes. In this section we will describe the measures relevant for the present study⁴.

Community Collectivism Scale. The 30-item community collectivism scale (CCS; Akkuş et al., 2017) is an intersubjective scale of cultural values. CCS measures both collectivism (the mean of the loyalty, hierarchy and honor sub-dimensions) and agency. All items are assessed at the level of the person (to what extent do the following sentences apply to you personally) and the community (to what extent do the following sentences apply to your core family, your extended family and other families (in your environment) that matter to you). This means that a personal level collectivism-item such as “I would support my family members, even if I wouldn’t want to” is twinned with a community level item “In my community, people are expected to support their family members, even if they do not want to”. Similarly, the personal level agency item “I am responsible for the important choices in my life” is twinned with “In my community, you are responsible for the important choices in your life”.

CCS was validated in a Dutch version and with inhabitants of the Netherlands (Akkuş et al., 2017), and has been shown to discriminate between (sub)cultural groups. In the current study, CCS was translated to Turkish and maintained a high reliability: Cronbach’s alpha for the honor sub-dimension was .88, for loyalty $\alpha = .71$, for hierarchy $\alpha = .83$ and for agency $\alpha = .75$. We also replicated the factorial structure⁵ by means of CFA (using the Lavaan-package for R). We therefore conclude that CCS’ methodological characteristics are stable in this translation and with this sample from a different country.

4 The questionnaire was part of a larger study and also included a number of exploratory questions not relevant for the present study. These were questions about: the communal level of the items (e.g., ‘My community fully supports the Gezi protests’), two questions to determine religiosity (“What role does religion play in your life?”) and traditionalism (“How important is it for you to lead a life in accordance with traditional norms and customs?”) on a 0 to 10 slider, from “Not important at all” to “The most important thing in life”. Both items were also repeated for their community and the government; a question measuring attitude towards individual autonomy (“Do you believe that everyone should be able to make their own choices in life without interference of others?”); four items concerning attitudes towards the 17-25 December corruption case (e.g., “I believe that the corruption charges were a plot against the government”), on a 5-point scale from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”, and repeated for community and government attitudes; the Subjective Life Satisfaction scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985) and Psychological well-being scale (Rhyff, 1989) to explore whether attitudes were related to general well-being.

5 CFA (using the Lavaan-package for R) showed an excellent fit for the one factor model with CFI = .996, RMSEA = .040 and SRMR = .015 (with Satorra-Bentler correction).

Other measures. Four items assessed *political orientation*. Respondents were asked to indicate their position, on a 10-point bipolar slider, on the dimensions liberal versus conservative, progressive versus traditional, left versus right, and egalitarian versus authoritarian. Higher values indicated a stronger endorsement of a conservative, traditional, rightwing and authoritarian political orientation. This operationalization of political orientation was found to be reliable ($\alpha = .79$) and all four items converged on a single factor⁶.

Respondents were asked to answer one item determining *opposition or support for the Gezi-protests* on a 0 to 10 slider, from “I fully oppose the protests” to “I fully support the protests”. They were subsequently presented a question measuring support for *violent government repression* (“Do you believe that authorities are entitled to use force and violence against protests they deem unjust?”), on a 5-point scale, from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”.

The respondents were then asked to indicate to what degree they felt six *emotions* (anger, grief, anxiety, fear, moral condemnation, and hatred, by responding to the question “what you felt (emotionally) about *the protests and responses to it*” followed by statements, such as “I felt angry regarding to the government’s reaction to the protests” (1 = fully disagree, 5 = fully agree). Finally, we asked for age, gender, education, birthplace and residence.

Analytic strategy. The aim of our study was to examine predictors of support for the Gezi-protests and predictors of support for repression of protests (in general) in one integrated model. We predicted that both tendencies would be strongly related to proximate predictors (participants' political orientation and negative intergroup emotions). These proximate predictors would, in turn, be predicted by CCS. To test these hypotheses, we performed a path analysis by means of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).

6 The community level four factor model showed a good fit (with Satorra-Bentler correction and corrected for three cross-loadings), with CFI = .975, RMSEA = .033 and SRMR = .041. For the individual level model, the fit (with two cross-loadings) was also acceptable: CFI = .953, RMSEA = .052 and SRMR = .044.

Results

Preliminary analyses

As preliminary analysis of the relations among the variables in the model⁷, we inspected the correlations between all variables (Table 1). As expected, conservative political orientation correlates negatively with support for the Gezi-protests and positively with the endorsement of violent repression. Unsurprisingly, the emotional reactions towards the Gezi protests and against the violent repression by the government covary as expected with support for either protest or repression. However, also clear is that the emotions of anger, moral condemnation and hate correlate most strongly and consistently with both outcome variables (consistent with the literature on intergroup emotions, e.g. Smith & Mackie, 2015). In the supplementary materials we further analyze the separate emotions and among others show that fear, sadness and anxiety are more relevant with respect to support for government repression than for protests.

⁷ We controlled for gender, education and place of residence, and found some correlations and effects in regression analyses. However, these effects were all mediated by political orientation, emotional reaction and CCS, and were therefore not included in the integrated model.

Traditionalism and religiosity were not included for a similar reason: these variables (which we combined into one) had such a high degree of covariance with political orientation, that they did not contribute significantly to the model. In view of this and the fact that this protest turned into a political one, we chose to focus on political orientation and drop traditionalism and religiosity from the integrated model.

Table 1 *Correlations between Support for protests and for repression and various predictors: Political Orientation, Emotional Reactions and CCS.*

	Support for Gezi-protests	Endorsement of violent repression of protests
Political orientation	-.586**	.477**
Anger regarding protests	-.772**	.549**
Anger regarding government reaction to protests	.661**	-.527**
Moral condemnation regarding protests	-.738**	.565**
Moral condemnation regarding government reaction to protests	.620**	-.454**
Hate regarding protests	-.539**	.410**
Hate regarding government reaction to protests	.710**	-.528**
Sadness regarding protests	-.465**	.286**
Sadness regarding government reaction to protests	.599**	-.548**
Anxiety regarding protests	-.240**	.092*
Anxiety regarding government reaction to protests	.537**	-.452**
Fear regarding protests	-.265**	.111*
Fear regarding government reaction to protests	.461**	-.380**
Community collectivism score	-.205**	.240**
Personal collectivism score	-.303**	.287**
Community agency	.120**	.003
Personal agency	.135**	-.107*

Note: N: 500; *: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$; Political Orientation: higher values indicate conservatism.

We then examined the question of *how* these three emotions should be included in the model. Confirmatory factor analysis assessed a two-factor model predicting that emotions towards the protests and emotions about their repression loaded on two separate factors. In this model, the residual variances of the two hate items and of hate and anger towards the government were allowed to be correlated because this significantly improved fit. Model fit was excellent, $\chi^2(6) = 9.80$, $p = .13$, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .036, and significantly better than the single factor equivalent, $\chi^2_{diff}(1) = 63.99$, $p < .001$. In the final model, it proved not possible to include these emotions as latent variables, because the covariance between the negative emotions towards the protest and support for protests was very high indeed⁸. To solve this problem, we ran the final model with the extracted factor scores for the emotions, instead of with the latent variables themselves.

⁸ The covariance table is included in the Supplemental Materials of the original publication: Akkuş, B., Postmes, T., Stroebe, K. and Baray, G. (2019), Cultures of conflict: Protests, violent repression, and community values. *British Journal of Social Psychology*. doi:10.1111/bjso.12328

A final preliminary analysis considered the relation between CCS and action types (repression versus protest). In line with expectations, support for the Gezi protests was negatively correlated with community collectivism and personal collectivism, and positively with community agency and personal agency. For the support for violent repression of protests, we see the same pattern of correlations but in the opposite direction. These results provide a first confirmation of our predictions that community-based cultural values, as operationalized by CCS, may be closely related to political affiliation and societal stances.

Path Analysis: Linking CCS, Political Orientation and Emotions to Support for Protests and Repression

On the basis of the preliminary analysis we tested an integrated model in which both 'Support for protests' and 'Support for violent oppression' were outcome variables. The direct predictors were the factor scores of the two latent variables 'Emotions towards protests' and 'Emotions towards the government response.' Political orientation was included in the model as a predictor for support as well as for both emotions. The model further specifies that emotions and political orientation are predicted by personal collectivism and personal agency. In the last layer, personal collectivism and personal agency are predicted by community collectivism and community agency.

As becomes clear from the fitted model (Figure 2), the results are in line with our expectations: support for the Gezi-protests is positively related to negative emotions towards government repression, and it is negatively related (and more strongly) to negative emotions towards the protests. It is also negatively related, albeit to a lesser degree, to political orientation (i.e. higher degrees of conservatism).

Figure 2. SEM path analysis of support for protests and support for repression of protests; Political Orientation: high values indicate conservatism; N = 500, CFI = .993, RMSEA = .046, SRMR = .034; * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$.

The model results also confirm that the negative emotions, either towards the Gezi-protests or the repression of protests, are strongly related to political orientation. Higher scores on this predictor indicate higher degrees of conservatism, which are associated with less negative emotions towards government repression and more negative emotions towards the protests themselves. More interestingly, the emotions are also predicted by personal collectivism and personal agency, both directly and indirectly, via political orientation. This confirms our predictions: political orientation is positively (and strongly) predicted by personal collectivism, and negatively by personal agency.

The fit of the theoretical model was good: CFI = .992, RMSEA = .047, SRMR = .031 with $\chi^2(15) = 31.53$ ($p = .007$). The fit of the alternative model in which political orientation and cultural variables were specified as uncorrelated distal predictors was inferior, as becomes evident from its Goodness of Fit measures: CFI = .971, RMSEA = .081, SRMR = .092 with $\chi^2(17) = 93.62$, $p < .001$.

In sum, it is clear that there are strong relations between whether people support protests or their repression, emotions towards these events and their political orientation. And in turn there are clear and strong relations between that political orientation and their (basic) cultural orientation, as expressed with the community collectivism scale. We can therefore conclude that the basic cultural values measured with CCS help explain which side people might pick in socio-political conflicts between progressive protesters and a conservative government.

Discussion

What cultural processes underlie political divides that cause tensions within countries around democratization, women's rights, and modern libertarian values? Integrating insights from cross-cultural research, political psychology and collective action research, we proposed and found support for a conceptual model that is based on the idea that people's support for anti-government protests and support for the government's repressive response to these protests is ultimately grounded in cultural values whose function is to preserve the integrity of local communities. As predicted, the results suggest that the relationship between community-based values of collectivism and agency is mediated by proximal predictors: political orientation and emotions with regard to the conflict. Two things are novel about these findings. One is that it suggests macro-level political conflict may stem from efforts to maintain or preserve local tight-knit communities. The second is that the same factors that predict support for protest also predict support for governmental repression.

We took the Gezi-protests in Turkey as an example of a mass protest that divided a country into those supporting the protests and those supporting its oppression by the government (e.g., Odağ, Uluğ, & Solak, 2016). Whereas most collective action research has looked at determinants of (peaceful) societal protest (for overviews see van Zomeren et al., 2008; Wright, 2010), we reasoned that the same factors (emotions, political orientation) might also be related to support for (violent) repression of protests. This is in line with previous work showing that predictors of such societal protests are similar, even if the nature of the associations may differ, both for parties who would want to challenge versus defend the status quo (e.g., liberals vs conservatives, Black vs. White students; Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Cakal et al., 2011; Milesi & Alberici, 2018; Osborne et al., 2018). Indeed, we find that emotions directed respectively at government reactions to protest or at the antigovernment protest and political orientation, liberal versus conservative, were respectively related to support for societal protest and for its repression. This shows that, in the context of a political divide between a conservative government and non-conservative protesters, the same factors that motivate action to achieve social change, such as people's political orientation and the emotions they experience, may also explain support for actions to maintain the status quo.

We also sought to understand what might underlie such emotions and political affiliations that have the potential to divide a nation. In the case of the tensions within Turkish society (and potentially others as well) we reasoned that one important factor may be that communities in Turkey lead their lives in very different ways and embrace very different basic cultural values. To capture this, the current research measured community-based cultural orientations (CCS). Results show that as predicted, CCS is associated with support for protest as well as repression via political orientation and negative emotions: Endorsement of collectivist values is associated with conservatism and with negative emotions towards protests, which in turn is associated with greater support for repression. Conversely, endorsement of values of personal agency is related to more liberal political affiliation and more negative emotions about government actions. And this in turn is associated with greater support for protest. As predicted by the cultural collectivism perspective, the research also showed that personal values (of individualism as well as collectivism) were strongly related to perceived community values. Putting things together, the statistical model suggests that proximate predictors of support and opposition of government are related to personal values of collectivism and individualism, respectively, which in turn are related to community values of collectivism and individualism. In sum, the findings confirm that cultural values that are specific to local tight-knit communities are a major source of personal values and thereby may also inform more macro-level political views.

Theoretical Implications

The present work illustrates the value of integrating (cross-)cultural, political and collective action perspectives. At the theoretical level, it indicates that predictors of action may be similar whether we consider the pursuit of social change or the preservation of the status quo (cf. Osborne et al., 2018). The fact that these predictors mirror each other, underscores the dynamic nature of political divides: in order to understand the emergence and consolidation of such divides, research needs to take into account the attitudes of both parties. Being able to predict, both proximally, via political orientation and emotions, and distally, via cultural values, to what extent a more powerful group is willing to repress social protest, is essential to understanding the mechanisms underlying political divides.

More generally, the present research shows that political divides that can instigate societal conflicts (e.g., Gezi Park protests; Arab Spring), are thus not only based on power imbalances and social class *per se* (cf. Kriesi, 2010; Saeri, Iyer, & Louis, 2015). To illustrate this with current tensions in the USA: the political divide between supporters of president Trump and (more liberal) opponents is not only based on social class and a power imbalance, but also on a fundamental disagreement on values, that are essentially cultural. Similarly, more right-wing movements striving for change (e.g., PEGIDA in Germany) seem to be based on cultural rather than political values, on the clash between modern/liberal and traditionalist/conservative values. Such cultural differences can be described by means of personal values, such as the Schwartz-values, but in many cases, they may also be anchored in the particular values that people share within their communities, as described by the CCS. As such, our proposed model provides the means to understanding political and societal divides from a collective action and cultural value perspective.

Limitations and Future Directions

Our model provides the means to unpack the cultural components of social and political conflict and to look into the contents of the values concerned. The model provides a template to study the origins of societal and political divides in other societies (e.g., USA, Germany, India). However, replication across other political conflicts and different cultural settings would be of added value. Having said this, we would argue that the concepts we put forth, cultural values and more proximate determinants (emotions, political orientation), are likely to predict support for protest versus repression across cultural contexts. Yet, the relative strengths of these concepts and their subsequent associations may vary (see also Stewart et al., 2016): For example, in countries that are more liberal, personal agency and political orientation may be more strongly related than in the present study.

Also, we note that our analyses are all essentially correlational in nature. While it makes sense to consider cultural values as underlying political orientation, emotions and political action, more dynamic models are also plausible: for example, engaging in, or witnessing societal protests over time may affect communities and the cultural values these communities come to hold. In other words, cultural values and political orientations may also be dynamic and subject to change. Future research could speak to this question by taking a more longitudinal approach in which the dynamics of cultural values and political action are studied over time. At the same time, in line with the idea of culture as a shared meaning system (e.g., Fischer, 2012), it would be of interest to use multi-level models as a means of modelling the impact of community level on individual level values and vice versa over time (see also Christ, Sibley & Wagner, 2018).

Conclusion

The present work reveals that in order to understand the positions people take in political divides, such as supporting societal protest or, *conversely*, supporting the repression of such protest, it is important to consider not just individually held political attitudes but to also consider the local community structure as a possible origin of intra-societal conflict. Both support for protest and repression can be related to cultural values that originate in people's local tight-knit community, which may inform their political orientations and emotional responses to political events. As such the present work contributes to our understanding of why deep-seated political views are held, maintained and if necessary protected.

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CHAPTER

General Discussion

5

General Discussion

As a child of migrants, I have been an observer of cultural differences all my life. An additional layer to my 'observations' emerged from my marriage with an indigenous Dutch woman, my Elnie, and our two 'mixed-heritage' children we introduced to this world. Both my wife and I, as well as our children, have to navigate through two cultural contexts, posing us numerous pitfalls with their different, and sometimes contradicting expectations. I feel I have been afforded another perspective to study those questions. The answers that I have found will help to better understand culture from both the researcher's perspective, as well as in every day life.

The essential question of this dissertation was how culture can be defined (and operationalized), in order for it to explain societal attitudes. The studies discussed in the previous chapters show that we succeeded in defining a concept that varies systematically between cultures, as one would predict. Accordingly, it can explain cross-cultural differences. More importantly, it can also predict attitudes and behaviors, such as sexism, political preferences, authoritarianism, and healthcare.

To summarize the main results of this dissertation: Chapter 2 describes how we conceptualized cultural differences in terms of the social dynamics of (small) groups. Based on this reasoning and the conceptualization of cultural difference that it informs, we constructed the community collectivism scale, which we subsequently validated. The results of Chapter 2 demonstrate the reliability of the community collectivism scale, which consists of 30 items, evenly divided over the personal level and the communal level, covering the dimensions (the value domains) of loyalty, hierarchy, honor and agency. With respect to the validity of the scale, Chapter 2 shows that the CCS is able to discriminate between several groups, both of different cultural and sub-cultural backgrounds, and that it can differentiate among groups both between and within countries. More importantly, it confirmed the underlying notion that the four value domains that regulate groups can explain the differences between cultural groups. Moreover, the differences on the basis of which we were able to discriminate, also enabled us to explain certain attitudes, behavioral intentions, as well as (self-reported) behaviors, for instance with regard to voting preferences.

Where we conceptualized culture in terms of social dynamics within small communities in Chapter 2, in Chapters 3 (and 4) we studied implications of such conceptualizations of culture for studying a (wide) range of behavior. We chose to study how gender roles and relations are managed by the mechanisms of loyalty, hierarchy, honor and agency. Specifically, we looked at what role these CCS value domains play in allocating blame and responsibility when women are mistreated.

We showed that cultural orientation, measured with CCS, predicted to what degree women were blamed for their own mistreatment and to what degree responsibility was allocated to the perpetrators of such mistreatment and to the society in which it occurs. In this chapter, we were able to establish the predictive validity of CCS with regard to the apportioning of blame for sexual mistreatment in three different countries, i.e. Turkey, India and Mexico. The value of the CCS and the conceptual approach it represents, was evident from the fact that it predicted apportioning of blame considerably better than the most often used sexism scale, i.e. the Ambivalent Sexism Scale, that usually is assumed to capture sexism. In other words, we were able to explain and predict both victim blaming and perpetrator blaming with a measure of cultural orientation, and did so better than a measure of sexism, which should normally have a much closer relationship with such outcomes (i.e., it would be logical if a measure of sexism is the strongest predictor of sexist apportioning of blame). I feel that by unearthing some of the cultural correlates of the treatment of women, our research has contributed to our understanding of sexism and more importantly how to battle it.

Explaining sexism in terms of cultural values can be viewed as a social mechanism to manage a community. However, in Chapter 4, we took a further step, from the micro-cultural level of the community to the macro-cultural level of the society as a whole. With our study of the cultural bases of the Gezi-protests, we were able to predict and explain attitudes towards protests aimed at an authoritarian government, *and* attitudes towards the (violent) repression of such protests, again on the basis of one's cultural orientation as measured with CCS. This is not only innovative, because motivation for collective action in the political domain is more commonly explained in terms of political attitudes and group affiliation (e.g., Van Zomeren, 2015), but more importantly because we were able to tie together communally held values with key political attitudes, both in favor of progressive protests and authoritarian oppression thereof. I am convinced our findings shed more light on the relations between culture and politics, thus furthering our insight on culture's role in how societies are shaped.

Theoretical Implications

Our findings have several theoretical implications, which I will discuss in this paragraph on the basis of our three main conclusions: a) cultural orientation can be defined and operationalized in terms of basic group dynamical mechanisms, that regulate interaction between group and members; b) the cultural orientation thus measured may predict attitudes towards social interaction beyond these basic mechanisms, such as sexism; and c) the influence of one's cultural orientation as it

is shaped within the realm of one's proximate community with whom it is shared and maintained, may extend to one's perspective on matters and affairs outside of that community, and so predict attitudes within and towards society.

To start with the theoretical implications of our way of conceptualizing culture. The foundation of our work was to reflect on the group dynamics that operate within different cultural contexts. While I had set out to research how culture influences attitudes and behaviors, specifically with regard to the interaction between society and its members, it quickly became clear that I first had to determine what definition of culture to use to answer this question. As I have described in the Introduction, culture can be considered as a manual, a rulebook, for how to live in one's "home" community. Building on that premise; if we would assume -only as a thought experiment and in order to clarify- that if culture was afforded to a community for a purpose, it would be to enable people to live together, i.e. to enable the peaceful and productive cohabitation that provides the foundation for communities, and by extension the community of communities, which is society. Of course, culture does not have intentionality (cf. Searle, 2008), and the reverse is more likely to be true, with which I mean that culture evolved as a consequence of the needs groups of people had in order to preserve and maintain their communities. The mechanisms that we identified in the community collectivism concept are those necessary for the group to exist and to keep existing, i.e. are fundamental for group preservation and management. This is very much in line with Schwartz' assertions regarding the origins of cultural values (e.g., Schwartz, 1994; 2012).

The interpretation that cultural values are, *or at least have been at some point in history*, functional in essence, is also consistent with the notion that "culture evolves according to similar Darwinian principles as do biological species" (Mesoudi, 2011, p. 22). The cultural values that groups adhere to can be interpreted as the translation of how they, in a larger historical context, adapted to the demands that their environment had posed them. Moreover, one could even argue that the development of culture itself is part of the human evolutionary process (e.g., Richerson & Boyd, 2008).

I believe it is important to point here out that my view of culture as a collective phenomenon leads to a specific take on how humans have developed. I would propose to look at the evolutionary development of humankind from the perspective of the collective, rather than from the individual viewpoint. To clarify: when studying human evolution, which hinges on the key assumption that the survival of humans depended on their adaptation to their environments, it is crucial to acknowledge that they didn't face that outer environment alone. There was also an *inner environment*,

i.e. their family, community, tribe, in short, a group of individuals they lived together with and were most probably born into. So, it may be more accurate to speak of a 'survival of the fittest group' instead of its individual pendant.

This assertion has several logical consequences. First, it poses questions with regard to the characteristics of any groups, that may have made them more adapted, or 'fit' than the ones that (obviously) did not survive. Also, it implies that characteristics of individuals that facilitate cooperation and prosocial behavior may be especially relevant for both individual *and* group survival.

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation (and perhaps beyond the scope of any scientific research) to answer these specific questions about the fitness-enhancing characteristics of groups, but the nature of these questions is revealing in itself: they are undeniably social-psychological questions, and group dynamical questions in particular. Human evolution and survival per se may have depended on our ability to self-organise, with the help of the 'right' group processes. As discussed in Chapter 2 in more detail, we have identified loyalty, hierarchy, honor and agency as four basic mechanisms that can be found in all groups. In our analysis, loyalty regulates the reciprocity of support for members of the groups; hierarchy regulates the social order and subsequent division of labor and responsibilities members have to respect; honor serves to enforce compliance to the group's rules and values, ensuring the group's standing in relation to other groups, as well as the individuals' standing within their groups; and finally, agency regulates the margins for distinctiveness as well as individual responsibility. These are four basic dimensions which communities should have consensus about in order to preserve peaceful and productive cohabitation. And based on the findings reported in this dissertation, we can conclude that it is not only possible to discriminate between groups with the measure derived from this conceptualization, but that the differences found are meaningful in the sense that they can serve to explain various between-community differences. Thus, our findings are consistent with the theories discussed in this paragraph, that assume that values have derived from their functions for the preservation of groups.

The findings described in Chapter 3, may shed light on the issues surrounding social change. As you will recall, we reported about our study of victim blaming and showed that community collectivism predicted the extent to which people were inclined to apportion blame to women that had been the victim of mistreatment. And interestingly, CCS explained these outcomes better than a measure that was specifically designed to measure sexist attitudes. Bearing in mind that CCS consists of 30 items, evenly divided over the personal and communal levels, of which only two

(one per level) contain the word 'women', we can conclude that our scale predicts sexist attitudes at a different, and presumably more general level. To clarify this: whereas those with a higher degree of agency blamed the perpetrator more, and also blamed society, presumably for not effectively preventing such mistreatment, those with higher degrees of the collectivism pendant, i.e. loyalty, hierarchy and honor were more inclined to blame the (female) victim. So, sexist attitudes may be a part of a more general 'traditional' or even 'conservative' cultural orientation, which is expressed in mainly the aforementioned collectivism pendant. Delving deeper, it became clear that honor and especially hierarchy were the drivers behind this relation. This is not surprising as hierarchy can be seen as the mechanism with which a community defines its social order and honor the mechanism that guards the compliance of all rules, including this social order.

There are parallels to be drawn here with the patriarchy and modernization literature: from these perspectives, patriarchal attitudes are often linked to tradition (e.g., Lerner, 1986), that may even have evolutionary roots (Smuts, 1995), and are questioned when societies modernize (e.g., Moghadam, 1992; 2014). Our approach, via community collectivism, may help clarify why these traditions were in place, through which mechanisms they were preserved and how a potential decline of their influence may be linked to increasing levels of individual agency. Presumably, patriarchal values may have arisen as a means to manage and preserve communities, especially under harsh and demanding circumstances (cf. Tybur et al., 2016), where they may have been eroding (albeit slowly and not completely), because of the generally less demanding circumstances in modern times and the societal tendency towards individualization.

However, it is also possible to interpret the slow decline of now presumably atavistic values on another level, without precluding the idea that they once emerged to perform a function. In essence, the (value) mechanisms may not only function to preserve the community in which they work, but also to preserve the values themselves. This may be a more important explanation for why CCS, specifically collectivism, predicts the tendency to blame the victim for their own mistreatment, alongside or even instead of the actual perpetrators of that mistreatment, or the society in which it took place. Similarly to how Just World Beliefs (Lerner, 1980) predict victim blaming (Sakallı-Uğurlu, Yalçın & Glick, 2007), higher degrees of (community and personal) collectivism may serve to self-preserve cultural values held in a community, even when they have negative effects. Community collectivism may share with JWB this notion of circular self-affirmation (the values must be right even when they seem wrong), where the difference may only lie in the fact that the 'justness' of community collectivism value domains (i.e., the mechanisms) is merely

implicit. This implies that social change may be difficult, if this self-preserving quality of culture is not taken into account. I will explore this implication further when discussing the practical implications of my work.

Addressing the third conclusion I drew from our findings: Our study of the Gezi protests that took place in the summer of 2013 in Turkey, made clear that the political rift it uncovered, was not only based on ideological, but also on cultural differences. This may apply to political conflicts in other places as well. For instance, the political rift in the USA seems to revolve around ideological differences (e.g., Carmines, Ensely & Wagner, 2016; Conway & McFarland, 2019), on face value: People on the opposite sides of the political spectrum are assumed to have opposing ideas with regard to such socio-economic issues, such as regarding how involved a government should be in regulating society and (related to that) how much wealth should be redistributed. And it is commonly assumed that there are underlying values that are cultural in essence, such as self-reliance, prioritizing security and tradition (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2016; 2017; Gorski, 2019; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009).

However, what our studies have shown is that basic group dynamical principles may explain why groups promote and promulgate particular values, such as self-reliance. This is implied by our finding that higher scores on (community and personal) collectivism are predictive of a preference to vote for a conservative/right-wing party (see Chapter 2): our results suggest voters choose who they vote for in part on the basis of the alignment of their cultural orientation with those of the available political parties. So, our finding that higher scores on the collectivist value domains of loyalty, hierarchy and honor predicts a significant preference for right-wing and conservative parties, may very well come down to the fact that such parties prioritize hierarchical social order, more so than on their socio-economic ideology.

My conclusion would be that the cultural values that stem from the mechanisms that function to manage (small) groups, i.e. communities, may well translate into societal attitudes and political preferences: prioritizing hierarchy is apparently not confined to one's own community, and the same goes for honor (compliance), loyalty and agency. This may provide an explanation for the phenomenon of voters voting against their own interests (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Gorski, 2019), from a rational perspective, because these own interests may not be defined solely as individual interests, but also as collective/communal, and even to preserve certain values. It also would imply that political parties may have to consider themselves not only as ideological organizations, but also as *cultural brands*, and could therefore campaign more effectively by emphasizing cultural values over socio-economic ideology.

An interesting example of this is provided by the so-called ‘alt-right’ movement, that interprets a perceived threat in terms of ‘emasculatation’ (e.g., Heikkilä, 2017; Kimmel, 2017). In their (frankly warped) logic the European identity is under threat, because its demography is changing through immigration and patriarchal norms are rejected, because of women’s rights (e.g., Garcia-Favaro & Gill, 2016). It isn’t hard to connect their emphasis on social order and (male) status with the value domains of hierarchy and honor, just as traditional left-wing positions with regard to social security and self-determination could easily be interpreted in terms of loyalty and agency.

Finally, our findings also confirm the merits of the intersubjective approach, that is the notion that people may adhere to values that they perceive to be widespread within their culture (e.g., Chiu et al., 2010). However, we have taken a further step by also taking a closer look at the conceptualization of the reference group. For, I do not believe the reference is the nation, but that it is the community within which one is socialized. For this reason, CCS is measured both at the personal (individual) and community levels. Indeed, our results show that, firstly, these measures are not identical: people do differentiate between their own values and those held by their communities (in their assessment). Secondly, the differences between cultural groups are greater at the community level than at the personal level. This may point to the fact that individuals self-categorize and/or have some level of self-stereotype (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987). A different interpretation would be that communities *are* actually more ‘traditional’ (in the sense that the scores on the value domains are more pronounced) as a consequence of the self-preserving mechanism discussed in the previous paragraphs. This would also indicate that the communal values (again: as perceived by individual members) may dampen and slow down cultural change initiated by individual members.

The third and potentially most important point with regard to the intersubjective approach would be that the community and personal levels predict the attitudes and behavioral intentions we researched to different degrees. In other words, we cannot only discriminate between the individually held values and those perceived to be held by one’s community, but this difference is actually meaningful in the sense that it may speak to different mechanisms and cover complementary facets of the topics we looked at. In other words, what people think their community values, may explain their own attitudes towards certain things, most notably in prioritizing group interests, such as voting behavior. More importantly, by measuring values at the community level, one can begin to understand and explain between-community variability *within* a country. For other topics, such as whether to provide family care to one’s elders or commit them to a nursery home, our data

shows that what people value themselves better explains attitudes and behavioral intentions (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation).

What final conclusion to draw from these implications? Culture has been acknowledged as a possibly crucial factor in determining behavior. Our conceptualization on the basis of social dynamics shows that personal and communal values at this micro-cultural level may predict and explain attitudes and behaviors at both micro and macro levels. In other words, if one wants to study the role culture plays in how societies function, community culture is a good place to start.

Limitations and some future directions

The conceptualization, construction and validation of a new scale for cultural orientation is a lengthy and intensive project. Within the constraints of time and resources, we have had to make some necessary choices that can be improved upon. The most important limitation of the research on which this dissertation is based, is the fact that we have had to make use of self-reports primarily. We have tried to alleviate the problems commonly associated with self-reports and therefore did not make use of students as respondents, but used professional panels (Qualtrics and PanelClix) that can more easily provide more diverse samples of respondents. For our studies in Turkey, Mexico and India we asked for samples with respondents from urban areas as well as rural areas, and sampled as representatively as possible with regards to the gender, education degrees and age for instance. However, in ideal circumstances CCS should be tested with actual behavioral data as well. For future research, I would recommend a longitudinal study of refugees that have recently come to Europe. In this study, longitudinal CCS measures could be cross-referenced with such data as school success, the attainment of paid work, among other real-life data. Such a study would not only yield valuable knowledge, but would also help to prevent problems associated with failed integration of minorities.

The second limitation I would like to touch upon is how we have formulated and operationalized the value domains of CCS. In its current form, there may be a slight imbalance towards the more traditional values, i.e. hierarchy, honor and, to a lesser extent, loyalty. As we could see, agency covers the more progressive or modern ground, with its negative relation to police violence and victim blaming. The merits of a further refinement of this non-collectivist side of the equation could be researched. This would also open up space for a distinction between the interpretation of agency as 'self-reliance' and the interpretation as 'independency', that I would argue does exist. To clarify, 'self-reliance' emphasizes individual

responsibility, whereas 'independency' emphasizes the freedom to make individual choices, in my opinion. Also, although we tried to do so, we were not able to include many reversed items in our scales. For reasons of methodological nature and because of the possibility of acquiescence bias (e.g., Welkenhuysen-Gybels, Billiet, & Cambré, 2003), it would be desirable to address this issue.

Practical Implications and Future Directions

The findings I have reported have implications for practical use as well. First and foremost, we have been able to contribute a thoroughly validated measure to the field that has been established to predict a range of behaviors and attitudes relevant to the fields of social and cultural psychology, as well as sociology and political science. CCS can be put to use within these research fields on a plethora of topics, but I will highlight a few specific implications here.

The first implication I would like to discuss brings us back to the beginning of this dissertation: how can we explain the differences in use of mental health care between ethnic groups (in the Netherlands)? Considering that the under-treatment of mental health issues may lead to escalation and exacerbation, this is matter of great societal relevance. And I would argue that community collectivism can help research and understand this issue. To begin, if we consider the under-use of mental health care may be caused by a mismatch between the care provided and the care sought after (e.g., Mladovsky, Rechel, Ingleby & McKee, 2012), as well as that the care provided is less effective for said groups (Renner & Berry, 2011), it becomes clear what role cultural differences may play here.

To clarify, the groups that are recorded to make less use of mental health care services in the Netherlands, are those of Hindustani-Surinamese and Turkish descent (e.g., Nemesis; De Graaf, Ten Have & Van Dorsselaer, 2010). This may very well be related to our finding that these groups have generally higher scores on community and personal collectivism, seeing that this may entail more pressure from their communities to comply with a higher degree of social hierarchy, loyalty and honor. And to further complicate matters (cf. Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001), the differences with regard to collectivism in comparison to the indigenous Dutch are considerable: as I reported in Chapter 2, the effect sizes (Cohen's D) for community collectivism are 1.17 for Turks and 1.00 for Hindustani-Surinamese compared to (not-religious) indigenous Dutch.

Such differences with regard to cultural values are known to be reflected in the way members of these groups construe their self concepts (Markus & Kitayama, 2010), as

more interdependent with their families and communities. One possible consequence may be that one of the key assumptions of Western psychotherapy (e.g., Beck, 1991), that consist of the idea that individuals should be helped to autonomously restructure their cognitions, are not entirely applicable to patients with such an interdependent self-construal. It is, for example, proposed that psychotherapeutic methods should provide a more sociocentric perspective for people with a collectivist background (Kirmayer, 2007). I believe that this is a matter that needs further research, and that CCS could provide the framework for as well as the utility to do so.

The second practical implication I will discuss is related to the topic described above. The immigration of substantial numbers of people, be it as refugees of war and persecution, or people 'simply' seeking a better future, has recently caused major upheaval in the 'receiving' countries. It has also led to the rise of nativist political movements who thrive on the message that the cultural differences between such migrants and the 'natives' are unsurmountable and will inescapably lead to problems. The implicit, underlying assumption is that the values that migrants have, cannot be changed. CCS can help to tackle such misconceptions, because contrary to most other measures, it does not only measure at the national level and is therefore able to discriminate among minority cultures. As described in Chapter 2, we managed to discern between inhabitants of the Netherlands with different cultural backgrounds, including migrants of Turkish and Hindustani Surinamese descent, as well as 'mainstream' indigenous Dutch and orthodox Protestant, indigenous Dutch. This goes to show that a more fine-grained measure like CCS, compared to for instance Individualism-Collectivism, is able to differentiate at a more nuanced level and can show similarities between groups, as well as differences. In casu quo, the orthodox Protestants were in some aspects more culturally alike the migrant groups, as their scores of the hierarchy dimension were similar to the Turkish and Surinamese groups and differed significantly from the non-religious Dutch.

Also, with its established predictive validity with regard to attitudes towards violence against women, an issue frequently related to migration by nativists in an oversimplified manner, CCS provides a more nuanced and factual insight in this issue. The cultural underpinnings of sexism are not drawn along ethnic lines. More importantly, our research shows how cultural orientation is founded in proximal within-community social dynamics. Changes to these dynamics, for instance because of emigration or because of a changing family structure and a changing context in which families are embedded, may well change the cultural orientation of groups and individuals in that new context. Therefore, by measuring CCS scores longitudinally, the cultural change as an effect of integration into the majority culture of society could be studied more effectively, clarifying questions with regard to how to effectively facilitate such integration.

Besides these two specific practical implications, I would like to shortly discuss the more general implications of our findings with regard to cultural change. What our work shows, is that it would be wrong to view cultural change as the aggregation of individuals changing their values. Individuals have an environment, a community, from which they take their cultural cues to some extent. They are able to distinguish between their own values and those they perceive to be the collective's values. And although they would in theory be free to have altogether different values, we find a strong correlation between the cultural orientation of the community and the person, with $r \approx .79$ across our samples. In other words, the values of the individual tend to be strongly anchored in those of their communities. The conclusion I would draw from this is that when attempting cultural change, for instance with campaigns to eradicate unwanted traditions, such as female genital mutilation, it would prove difficult to achieve this when only focusing on individuals. Even if individuals would want to change their attitudes, the collective's values would at least hold them back, and maybe even prevent them from changing (or force them to make a choice between accommodating their personal views or exiting the group). Based on our findings, I would conclude that campaigns aimed at cultural change focused on collective (community) values, have a better chance at success.

I will conclude this dissertation with a few final remarks. The primary goal of this dissertation was, as it is with any dissertation, to acquire a doctorate degree by demonstrating the qualities commensurate with such a degree. Whether that goal has been reached is of course for others to judge. For me personally, there were two additional goals. My first goal was of a personal nature, and I have discussed in my Acknowledgments.

My second goal was to contribute something to our common understanding of how human behavior, both individual and collective. And I don't think it is immodest to say that I have been able to do so. Our conceptualization of culture in terms of social dynamics is not only innovative, but it is also very useful. It provides a(nother) bridge between social psychology and (cross-)cultural psychology, and maybe even between cultural psychology and sociology. I hope and think that CCS provides an instrument to study many themes that involve both individual choices and collective outcomes. As such, my most important goal has been achieved. With that I conclude this dissertation, thanking all those that deserve to be thanked and especially so the reader.

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Samenvatting

Menselijk gedrag, zowel van individuen als van groepen, wordt bepaald door vele factoren. Dat één van die factoren cultuur is, staat buiten kijf. Maar wat houdt dat nu precies in? Hoe definiëren we cultuur dan en op welke wijze wordt ons gedrag beïnvloed? In dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd deze vragen, in ieder geval deels, te beantwoorden.

De vragen die hierboven worden gesteld zijn fundamenteel van aard. Dat was niet het eigenlijke beginpunt van deze dissertatie. De aanleiding voor het onderzoek was de constatering dat bepaalde migrantengroepen in de praktijk minder gebruik maken van geestelijke gezondheidszorg en psychosociale hulpverlening dan ze waarschijnlijk nodig hebben. Waarom zou dat zo zijn?

Die concrete praktijkvragen brachten en brengen ons bij de werkelijke onderzoeksvraag: hoe kunnen we cultuur definiëren en meten op een zodanige wijze dat culturele achtergrond en gedrag aan elkaar te koppelen zijn? In dit proefschrift ga ik in op onze definitie en operationalisatie van cultuur, alsmede het meetinstrument dat we op basis daarvan hebben ontwikkeld, namelijk de Community Collectivism Scale. Daarnaast beschrijf ik de studies die we hebben uitgevoerd om te onderzoeken welke attitudes en gedragingen met deze schaal kunnen worden voorspeld.

Het probleem was namelijk (zoals besproken in Hoofdstuk 1) dat de bestaande concepten en meetinstrumenten voor cultuur niet voldoende geschikt bleken om deze concrete praktijkvragen te beantwoorden. Waarom was dit het geval? Allereerst zijn er verschillende definities van wat 'cultuur' überhaupt is. De uit de sociologie afkomstige term betekent intuïtief zoiets als 'het geheel van regels en normen dat een samenleving definieert' en is vanuit de (cross-)culturele psychologie vervat in verscheidene concepten. Zo is daar Individualisme-Collectivisme (IC). Kort gezegd drukt IC (zie bijvoorbeeld: Hofstee, 1980; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995) uit in welke mate de belangen van de groep worden geprioriteerd (in collectivistische samenlevingen), danwel de belangen van het individu (in individualistische samenlevingen). IC bleek een verklaring te bieden voor vele in het oog lopende verschillen tussen culturen en is tot op de dag van vandaag het meest gebruikte en invloedrijke concept voor cultuur. Maar er zijn ook kanttekeningen te plaatsen bij dit concept. Allereerst is IC een tamelijk grofmazig onderscheid en daarom al aangevuld en verfijnd met bijvoorbeeld de mate van hiërarchie (horizontaal en verticaal). Daarnaast zijn er vragen rondom de invloed van de context van gedrag: kort gezegd kan iemand uit een individualistische cultuur zich ook collectivistisch gedragen, als de situatie daar om vraagt. Een concept zoals IC,

dat cultuur en daarmee de invloed ervan los van context beschrijft kan dit niet goed verklaren. Maar het meest interessante kritiekpunt is wat mij betreft dat Hofstede culturen als kenmerken van landen definieerde. Daarmee verdwijnt de facto de mogelijkheid om cultuur als verklaring aan te dragen voor verschillen en attitudes binnen samenlevingen en landen.

Een tweede concept dat besproken wordt in dit Hoofdstuk 1, is het vooral door Michelle Gelfand geïntroduceerde concept van Tightness versus Looseness (TL), vrij vertaald strengheid versus losheid, waarin de mate van tolerantie voor het afwijken van de normen in samenlevingen (of onderdelen daarvan) wordt uitgedrukt (zie bijvoorbeeld: Gelfand et al., 2011). Ook dit concept is eerder grofmazig te noemen, maar heeft wel een sterkere theoretische basis dan IC. Ook TL is zeer bruikbaar om verschillen tussen culturele groepen te duiden en verklaren, zoals bijvoorbeeld de uiteenlopende attitudes ten aanzien van de doodstraf. En ook TL was in eerste instantie gedefinieerd als een eigenschap op nationaal niveau, maar is in de afgelopen jaren verfijnd naar bijvoorbeeld regio's. Niettemin heeft ook TL zwakke punten, die voornamelijk te herleiden zijn naar de eerder genoemde grofmazigheid: zo zijn culturen niet noodzakelijkerwijs even streng of tolerant voor elke normoverschrijding. Om een voorbeeld te noemen: laat komen voor een afspraak is in de als streng gekenmerkte Turkse cultuur niet een overschrijding waar zwaar aan getild wordt, terwijl dat in het nominaal 'losse' Nederland juist als een zware overtreding zou gelden.

Een voorbeeld van een fijnmaziger conceptualisatie, is Schwartz' Theory of Basic Values (zie bijvoorbeeld: Schwartz et al., 2012). Schwartz stelt dat individuele waarden voortkomen uit biologische behoeftes en de noodzaak voor het coördineren van sociale interactie. De meetinstrumenten die voort zijn gekomen uit deze theorie zijn zoals gezegd (zeer) fijnmazig, maar zijn vooral bedoeld om de waarden van het individu te meten, zonder dat daarbij de eisen van de samenleving aan het individu noodzakelijkerwijs aan de orde komen.

Tenslotte is er de intersubjectieve benadering. Deze benadering is, zoals het woord al zegt niet zozeer een vastomlijnd concept of een visie op de inhoud van cultuur, maar een uitwerking van het idee dat mensen hun gedrag en keuzes niet zozeer bepalen aan de hand van individuele waarden, maar (ook) op basis van de waarden die (in hun perceptie) algemeen gedragen worden in hun cultuur (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg & Wan, 2010). Deze benadering sluit nauw aan bij sociaal-psychologische verklaringen voor gedrag. Ook hier zijn er echter kanttekeningen te maken: wie ziet het individu dan als referentie? De samenleving als geheel? Of kijkt het individu in kleinere kring naar de waarden en normen die anderen hanteren? En welke waarden zouden dan centraal staan, in die verschillende sociale verbanden?

Wij kozen er in dit onderzoek voor om op die intersubjectieve benadering voort te borduren. In Hoofdstuk 2, gebaseerd op ons in 2017 gepubliceerde artikel 'Community Collectivism: A social dynamic approach to conceptualizing culture', beschrijf ik hoe wij cultuur hebben gedefinieerd en op basis daarvan een meetinstrument hebben ontwikkeld. Met ons eigen concept probeerden we de bezwaren die kleven aan de bestaande concepten zoals IC te adresseren. Deze bestaande concepten zijn namelijk allereerst gebaseerd op het idee dat cultuur het kenmerk van landen is, waarmee de interne verscheidenheid *binnen* landen uit het zicht blijft. Het tweede bezwaar is daaraan gerelateerd, namelijk dat bestaande concepten uitgaan van individuele waarden, daar waar mensen hun gedrag juist (ook) baseren op wat ze denken dat hun samenleving van ze verwacht. Dit laatste punt is tevens voortgekomen uit de intersubjectieve benadering. Maar daar waar die benadering vaag blijft over de referentiegroep (aan wiens waarden het individu zich meent te moeten aanpassen) en de inhoud van waarden (welke waarden zijn in dit sociale verband relevant), is het onze analyse dat men zich aanpast aan de eigen gemeenschap en de waarden die het sociaal verkeer binnen die gemeenschap reguleren.

Want wat is cultuur, anders dan gemeenschappelijke regels en waarden die een individu gebruikt als referentie voor het eigen gedrag en attitudes, en die een gemeenschap nodig heeft om het verband te bewaren? Het is dus ook de directe leefomgeving die in eerste instantie de normen en waarden bijbrengt en er vervolgens op toeziet dat je als individu je houdt aan die waarden. Het overtreden van de normen en regels kan tot afkeuring of zelfs erger leiden. Maar wanneer je je aan de normen houdt van de mensen om je heen, dan is de beloning dat je erbij hoort en op steun mag rekenen wanneer je daar behoefte aan hebt. Daar waar het individu leeft en zich concreet 'gedraagt' zal het de consequenties van dat gedrag kunnen ervaren en zich daarom aanpassen. In deze optiek is cultuur dus wat het individu denkt dat de gemeenschap vindt en van haar wil. Het individu weet wat zijn gemeenschap, de groep mensen die zij als referentie beschouwt, vindt en wil doordat het met die regels is grootgebracht in de kerngroep van elke gemeenschap: het gezin in brede zin (zie bijvoorbeeld Georgas et al., 2006). Dat is waar cultuur in eerste plaats wordt doorgegeven en uitgedragen. En op basis van het voorgaande hebben we deze gemeenschap gedefinieerd als 'je gezin, je familie en andere gezinnen (in je omgeving) die van belang zijn voor je'.

Wij kozen er dus voor om de directe leefomgeving als het bepalende referentiekader voor culturele invloed te bestuderen. Die keuze heeft bepaalde consequenties, namelijk voor welke waarden er relevant zijn én voor hoe deze gemeten moeten worden. Hiermee wordt duidelijk waarom ik heb gekozen voor de ondertitel 'Een sociaal-dynamische kijk op cultuur': mijn definitie van cultuur is gebaseerd op de

groepsdynamische mechanismen die we kennen uit de sociale psychologie en die relevant zouden moeten zijn in dat betrekkelijk kleine sociale verband van de nabije gemeenschap (het gezin, de familie en enkele nabije families eromheen). Die mechanismen zijn zo relevant omdat ze een rol spelen bij het ontstaan en in stand blijven van groepen. Want waarden zijn relevant in mijn interpretatie, omdat ze relevant zijn (of in het verleden waren) voor het voortbestaan van de gemeenschap en voor het in stand houden ervan.

Wat weten we van de sociale dynamiek van groepen? Groepen blijven niet zonder reden bestaan: groepen bieden liefde (of neutraler geformuleerd: loyaliteit en ondersteuning) en structuur (men zou kunnen zeggen een gedeeld beeld van wat de hiërarchie is). Die structuur moet gerespecteerd worden (zie bijvoorbeeld: Smith, Ruzgyte & Spinks, 2011) en de liefde is niet (geheel) onvoorwaardelijk (zie bijvoorbeeld: Georgas et al., 2006; Shariff, 2009): het groepslid dient zich aan de gemeenschappelijke regels te houden, en zal bij overtreding gestraft worden (zie bijvoorbeeld: Leung & Cohen, 2011). Het handhavende element wordt (mede) verzorgd door wat we als 'eer' (of status) kunnen betitelen. Ten slotte dient de groep vast te stellen wat er van het individu verwacht mag worden en wat de individuele bewegingsruimte is (zie bijvoorbeeld: Becker et al, 2012). Dit element kunnen we vatten onder de noemer 'agency' (een goed Nederlands woord hiervoor is er niet, maar het gaat om de bewegingsruimte, handelingsvrijheid en individuele verantwoordelijkheid die het individu krijgt van zijn of haar omgeving). De kernwaarden die wij in ons onderzoek nader bestudeerd hebben noemen wij dus loyaliteit, hiërarchie, eer en *agency*.

Een tweede consequentie van het definiëren van cultuur in termen van waarden die relevant zijn voor gemeenschappen betreft de manier waarop deze waarden gemeten zouden moeten worden. De meeste bestaande meetinstrumenten voor culturele verschillen meten in hoeverre het individu het eens is met bepaalde waarden en aggregeren die individuele waarden voor groepen. Wij kozen voor een andere aanpak, omdat we niet alleen wilden meten welke waarden het individu heeft, maar ook welke waarden de gemeenschap heeft, in de ogen van het individu. Op basis van deze conceptuele analyse ontwikkelden wij de Community Collectivism Scale (CCS), met vier dimensies Loyaliteit, Hiërarchie, Eer en Agency die worden gemeten op het individuele niveau en op gemeenschapsniveau. Deze CCS bestaat uit 15 stellingen op basis van de vier dimensies over de individuele waarden. Diezelfde stellingen zijn vervolgens ook gesteld op gemeenschapsvlak. Een voorbeeld van een dergelijk koppel uit de deelschaal over *agency* is: 'Ik ben zelf verantwoordelijk voor belangrijke keuzes in mijn leven' en 'In mijn gemeenschap zijn mensen zelf verantwoordelijk voor belangrijke keuzes in het leven.'

Na de constructie van de lijst volgde de validering: dat wil zeggen het vaststellen van de methodologische kwaliteit en kenmerken. Uit de valideringsstudie bleek dat de voorgestelde structuur van vier dimensies op twee niveaus bevestigd kon worden. Het bleek echter ook dat de scores vereenvoudigd weergegeven konden worden, omdat loyaliteit, hiërarchie en eer samen geclusterd weergegeven kunnen worden, als Community Collectivism op het gemeenschapsniveau en Personal Collectivism op het individuele niveau. Agency blijft een afzonderlijke dimensie, wederom op persoonlijk en gemeenschapsniveau.

De belangrijkste eigenschap van een meetinstrument voor cultuur is uiteraard de mate waarin deze in staat is om onderscheid te maken tussen culturele groepen. Uit de valideringsstudie bleek dat CCS betrouwbaar en valide onderscheid wist te maken tussen autochtone Nederlanders en Turkse Nederlanders. CCS deed dat bovendien beter dan de veelgebruikte INDCOL'95 waarmee we onze schaal vergeleken. Maar we wilden een stap verder gaan en wisten aan te tonen dat de schaal niet alleen tussen culturen met een groot te verwachten verschil onderscheid wist te maken, zoals de sterk individualistische Nederlandse en sterk collectivistische Turkse cultuur, maar ook naar verwachting subtielere verschillen zoals tussen gelovige en niet-gelovige autochtone Nederlanders, en zoals tussen Turkse en Hindoeistaans-Surinaamse Nederlanders. Dit is een belangrijke bevinding. Het resultaat dat we niet alleen culturele verschillen tussen 'allochtone' minderheidsgroepen kunnen beschrijven met deze schaal, maar ook verschillen tussen gelovige gereformeerde Nederlanders en de minder gelovigen, is bijzonder inzichtrijk. Hiermee laten we namelijk zien dat er ook binnen naties culturele verschillen bestaan én dat ze door middel van CCS meetbaar zijn en beschreven kunnen worden.

Onderscheid maken tussen groepen is één ding, maar belangrijker nog is dat de verschillen die werden gevonden tussen groepen en individuen ook betekenisvol bleken te zijn: aan de hand van CCS-scores konden we attitudes voorspellen, zoals voorkeur voor mantelzorg versus formele zorg of houding ten opzichte van psychosociale hulpverlening. Maar de schaal voorspelde niet alleen attitudes: we slaagden er zelfs in met CCS stemgedrag te voorspellen. Voor dit onderzoek legden we aan een groep respondenten in Turkije die anderhalf jaar eerder (in maart 2014) al eens CCS hadden ingevuld een vragenlijst voor waarin gevraagd werd op wie ze hadden gestemd bij de parlementsverkiezingen in juni 2015. Onze voorspelling dat een hogere score voor loyaliteit, maar vooral hiërarchie en eer relatief vaak zou samengaan met het stemmen op een conservatieve partij (versus een progressieve partij) werd bevestigd: een score van één punt hoger op ComCol ging gepaard met een meer dan drie keer grotere kans dat iemand op een conservatieve partij had gestemd—een zeer sterk effect dus. Niet alleen is dit een interessante aanvulling

op de verklarende kracht van CCS, maar geeft het ook aan dat de deze culturele verschillen ook op langere termijn gedrag kunnen voorspellen.

Onze studies toonden zodoende aan dat CCS een betrouwbaar en valide meetinstrument is om culturele verschillen mee te beschrijven, zowel tussen landen als tussen (subculturele) gemeenschappen binnen landen. De theoretische bijdrage is niet minder belangwekkend: het definiëren van cultuur in termen van basale groepsdynamische waarden biedt een verklaringsmodel voor allerlei attitudes en gedragingen, zowel binnen als tussen culturele groepen. De waarden voor het samenleven in kleine groepen, in gemeenschappen, vertalen zich namelijk ook naar andere niveaus van samenleven, zoals de maatschappij zelf, zo was gebleken. Het was daarom zeer aannemelijk dat CCS ook andere maatschappelijke attitudes zou voorspellen.

Voor ons volgende onderzoek keken we naar zo'n belangrijke maatschappelijke attitude, namelijk de mate waarin iemand gelooft dat mannen superieur zouden zijn aan vrouwen, dat wil zeggen seksistisch zijn.

Vrouwen hebben overal ter wereld nog steeds een achtergestelde positie, ook in de zogenoemde ontwikkelde wereld, en worden relatief vaak slachtoffer van huiselijk of seksueel geweld. Een nog verergerende factor is dat wanneer vrouwen slachtoffer worden van onrecht of geweld, zij daar vaak zelf -in ieder geval deels- verantwoordelijk voor worden gehouden. Ook dit fenomeen 'Victim Blaming' komt over de hele wereld voor, maar er zijn wel verschillen in de mate en de ernst waarin het voorkomt. Bestaand onderzoek constateert dat er culturele verschillen, zowel tussen als binnen landen, zijn in de mate waarin seksisme en victim blaming voor komt, maar gaat verder niet in op deze verschillen.

Het was onze hypothese dat deze neiging om het slachtoffer de schuld te geven, victim blaming, voorspeld zou kunnen worden met CCS, omdat waarden als hiërarchie en eer worden gebruikt om bestaande (waarde)structuren te beschermen, zoals bijvoorbeeld de patriarchale cultuurnormen die overal ter wereld in meer of minder sterke mate voorkomen. Wanneer leden van de gemeenschap, in dit geval vrouwen, geconfronteerd worden met achterstelling ten gevolge van de heersende waarden, dan worden zij zelf hiervoor verantwoordelijk geacht om de waarden in stand te kunnen houden. De schuld bij het slachtoffer leggen komt, zo voorspelden wij, voort uit de zichzelf in stand houdende culturele waarden, die in essentie als functie hebben om de gemeenschap intact te houden. Door middel van CCS zou zo ook de verscheidenheid van attitudes, zoals seksisme, *binnen* landen en culturen inzichtelijk gemaakt kunnen worden.

We verwachtten dus dat "victim blaming" (het slachtoffer de schuld geven) verklaard zou worden door CCS en dat het hierin bovendien op zijn minst vergelijkbaar zou presteren als specifieke meetinstrumenten voor seksisme. Het meest gebruikte concept (en instrument) om seksisme te beschrijven is de Ambivalent Sexism Inventory van Glick en Fiske (Glick & Fiske, 1996). De ASI onderscheidt twee vormen van seksisme, hostile (vijandig) en benevolent (goedaardig) seksisme. Hostile Sexism (HS) beschrijft een vijandige houding waarbij vrouwen als essentieel inferieur en zelfs kwaadwillend worden beschouwd. Benevolent Sexism (BS) is ogenschijnlijk goedaardiger, maar levert net zo goed beperking en achterstelling op, omdat bij deze vorm vrouwen weliswaar als puurder en intrinsiek goed worden beschouwd, maar ook als naïef en zwak, en daarom beschermd zouden moeten worden, ook wanneer ze dat zelf niet zo zien. CCS is ontworpen om basale culturele waarden te meten, maar we verwachtten dat waarden die gemeenschappen reguleren óók de relaties tussen vrouwen en mannen zouden moeten inhouden. Specifiek verwachtten we dat Collectivisme op persoonlijk en gemeenschapsniveau, en dan met name de componenten hiërarchie en eer, de neiging om het vrouwelijke slachtoffer verantwoordelijk te houden zouden voorspellen. We wilden daarnaast ook weten in welke mate de samenleving en de dader zelf verantwoordelijk werden gehouden. We verwachtten hier dat agency, gezien de focus op individuele verantwoordelijkheid en vrijheid, het verantwoordelijk houden van dader en samenleving zou voorspellen. Met de in Hoofdstuk 3 beschreven studies onderzochten we die aannames.

Hiervoor legden we in Turkije 111 mensen één scenario voor over een vrouw die seksueel geweld ervaart, en in India en Mexico in totaal 526 vrouwen en mannen drie scenario's voor waarin sprake was van onrecht, huiselijk geweld en tenslotte seksueel geweld jegens vrouwen. Vervolgens werden de ASI, CCS en een vragenlijst afgenomen, aan de hand waarvan we konden meten wie in welke mate verantwoordelijk werd gehouden voor wat er gebeurde in de scenario's. Uit onze analyses bleek dat respondenten enerzijds de verantwoordelijkheid konden leggen bij de dader en de maatschappij of anderzijds bij de vrouw die zelf het slachtoffer was.

Uit de resultaten bleek dat de CCS-scores aanmerkelijk beter dan de traditionele sexismemaat ASI voorspelde wie men de schuld gaf van sexueel misbruik. Met name het persoonlijk collectivisme (dat wil zeggen de mate waarin men de waarden van loyaliteit, hiërarchie en eer belangrijk vindt, gemeten op het individuele niveau) bleek te voorspellen in hoeverre men het slachtoffer de schuld gaf. Persoonlijke *Agency* bleek daarentegen een 'negatieve voorspeller' te zijn van de mate waarin het slachtoffer de schuld kreeg (dat wil zeggen dat mensen die persoonlijk de waarden van agency sterker onderschreven het slachtoffer juist minder de schuld gaven).

Maar belangrijker was dat hogere scores op persoonlijke *agency* ook voorspelden in welke mate iemand dader en maatschappij de schuld gaf van onrecht en geweld tegen vrouwen. In alle analyses bleek dat zowel vijandig als benevolent seksisme de uitkomsten niet of veel minder sterk voorspelden.

Uit die laatste bevinding komt een belangrijke conclusie: alhoewel CCS geen seksisme meet, maar basale culturele waarden, bleek onze schaal een betere voorspeller van het leggen van de schuld aan het slachtoffer bij onrecht en geweld tegen vrouwen, dan een schaal als ASI, die specifiek ontworpen is om seksisme te meten. Om dit nog verder te bekrachtigen: in de 30 items van de CCS wordt slechts tweemaal het woord 'vrouw' genoemd en tweemaal het woord 'man' (namelijk in de items 'Ik geloof dat mannen meer te vertellen moeten hebben dan vrouwen/In mijn gemeenschap gelooft men dat mannen meer te vertellen moeten hebben dan vrouwen').

Een belangrijke attitude voor hoe mensen de samenleving zien, patriarchie en seksisme in dit geval, kan dus verklaard worden aan de hand van basale waarden ten aanzien van het leven in een gemeenschap. Zou dat ook gelden voor waarden op het macro-niveau? Zouden we ook maatschappelijk en politiek conflict kunnen verklaren aan de hand van basale waarden op het micro-niveau? Dat was in mijn ogen aannemelijk.

Toen in de zomer van 2013 de zogenoemde Gezi-protesten begonnen in Istanbul en al snel escaleerden in massaprotesten in geheel Turkije, was voor ons aannemelijk dat dit conflict verklaard kon worden aan de hand van culturele verschillen. Het land raakte al snel na de escalatie verdeeld in een kamp van voorstanders van de protesten en een kamp van tegenstanders. Die tegenstanders leken het gewelddadige politioptreden jegens demonstranten ook goed te keuren. Het conflict tussen de progressieve demonstranten en een conservatieve overheid was politiek van aard en handelde in essentie om de vraag hoeveel ruimte er nog was voor een moderne en seculiere leefstijl, maar een inhoudelijke analyse van nieuwsberichten en -duidingen liet zien dat voor- en tegenstanders zich (ook) beriepen op verschillende culturele waarden en het andere kamp afkeurden met morele bewoordingen (zie bijvoorbeeld: Odağ, Uluğ & Solak, 2016). Ten slotte was er sprake van hoogoplopende emoties, tegen de demonstraties en tegen het politioptreden. Het was alles overziend aannemelijk dat culturele verschillen en politieke verschillen hier hand in hand gingen.

Wat verwachtten we? In algemene zin dat er significante cultuurverschillen zouden zijn tussen voor- en tegenstanders van het protest en tussen voor- en tegenstanders van het politioptreden. En wat zou de aard zijn van die verschillen? Onze hypothese

was dat Turken die de collectivistische culturele waarden onderschreven van met name hiërarchie en eer de protesten zouden afkeuren en het politieoptreden zouden steunen. Voor agency verwachtten we het tegenovergestelde beeld.

Net zoals bij de studie naar victim blaming vergeleken we CCS met bestaande concepten. De bereidheid om deel te nemen aan collectieve actie, zoals protesten, wordt onder meer voorspeld door identificatie en morele argumenten (Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2012). Met behulp van een internationaal onderzoekspanel, legden we daarom 500 inwoners van Turkije een vragenlijst voor waarin naast de CCS een maat voor politieke voorkeuren was opgenomen en vragen aan de hand waarvan de respondenten konden aangeven hoe ze tegenover de demonstraties stonden en tegenover het overheids- en politieoptreden. Daarnaast konden respondenten aangeven welke emoties ze voelden tegenover beide zaken.

De resultaten waren zoals verwacht: respondenten die aangaven politiek conservatiever te zijn, wezen de Gezi-protesten af en ondersteunden het gewelddadige politieoptreden. Maar met CCS wisten we een link met culturele waarden te leggen. Zoals we hadden voorspeld was er een positieve correlatie tussen conservatisme, gemeenschaps-collectivisme (loyaliteit, hiërarchie en eer op gemeenschapsniveau) en persoonlijk collectivisme (loyaliteit, hiërarchie en eer op individueel niveau). Voor Agency gold het tegenovergestelde, ook weer op beide niveau's. Ook de emoties haat, boosheid, verontwaardiging, verdriet en angst ten opzichte van hetzij de protesten, hetzij de repressie daarvan waren op dezelfde wijze met collectivistische waarden te voorspellen.

Vernieuwend aan de resultaten is dat de CCS-waarden (loyaliteit, hiërarchie en eer tezamen) zowel de politieke oriëntatie, als de emotionele reacties ten aanzien van protest of repressie, als de steun voor protest of repressie in sterke mate kon voorspellen. Dit betekent dat het door ons getoetste model niet alleen laat zien dat er een sterk verband is tussen specifieke politieke standpunten en basale culturele waarden, maar ook dat je met deze benadering niet alleen (steun voor) collectieve actie kan voorspellen, maar ook steun voor de gewelddadige repressie van dit soort actie. Wat hier verrast is dat het ons lukte om met een maat voor heel basale culturele waarden niet alleen te voorspellen wat iemand stemt tijdens verkiezingen (zie Hoofdstuk 2) maar ook welke zijde iemand steunt bij een conflict tussen progressieve demonstranten versus een conservatieve overheid (Hoofdstuk 4).

De conclusie die we aan dit onderzoek konden verbinden was dat het politieke en maatschappelijk conflict dat reden was voor de Gezi-protesten niet los gezien kan worden van onenigheid binnen de Turkse staat over de basale culturele

waarden van een gemeenschap. Dat is enerzijds niet vreemd, want zaken zoals het recht op zelfbeschikking of het eerbiedigen van autoriteit zijn zowel politiek als persoonlijk. Niettemin waren onze bevindingen een duidelijke aanwijzing voor het idee dat culturele verschillen van mening over hoe je met familie en andere nabije anderen hoort om te gaan ten grondslag kunnen liggen aan politieke conflicten op macroniveau. Ook biedt ons onderzoek een bijdrage aan het onderzoeksveld van Collectieve Actie door aan de hand van culturele waarden de steun voor protest én steun voor repressie van protest te voorspellen en verklaren.

Wat zijn de eindconclusies over deze dissertatie? Als ik de onbescheiden conclusie mag trekken dat dit proefschrift een bijdrage aan de wetenschappen heeft geleverd, dan is het belangrijkste inzicht wat mij betreft dat het definiëren en meetbaar maken van cultuur in termen van de basale sociale waarden die nodig zijn om een gemeenschap te kunnen vormen en onderhouden, ons in staat stelt om een breed spectrum aan maatschappelijke attitudes beter te begrijpen en (op zijn minst statistisch) te verklaren. De waarden loyaliteit, hiërarchie, eer en agency blijken niet alleen iets te zeggen over hoe men tegen zaken in de eigen levenssfeer aankijkt. Zulke waarden vertalen zich ook naar algemene attitudes over hoe mannen en vrouwen zich (zouden moeten) verhouden, op welke partij te stemmen en of de politie geweld mag gebruiken tegen demonstranten. De attitudes die ik noem zijn direct door ons onderzocht, maar het is meer dan aannemelijk dat CCS verklaringen biedt voor vele andere zaken in vele andere landen. De kracht van het concept schuilt namelijk in de eenvoud. Tegelijk schuilt daarin wellicht ook de zwakte: CCS legt de nadruk op de meer collectieve waarden, daar waar agency de meer individualistische waarden in zijn eentje moet vertegenwoordigen. In een toekomstige uitbreiding van de schaal zou agency wellicht verder kunnen worden uitgediept. Een logische gedachte daarbij is om een onderscheid te maken tussen individuele verantwoordelijkheid en individuele vrijheid van handelen: het zou kunnen zijn dat daar tussen gemeenschappen een wezenlijk onderscheid ligt. Dat zou betekenen dat er afzonderlijke dimensie zou worden geformuleerd voor wat er van individuen verwacht mag worden. En één voor in hoeverre individuen mogen afwijken en hun eigen weg mogen gaan. Een andere aanbeveling die ik zou willen doen is het aanvullen van items met negatieve formulering. Mijn initiële pogingen daartoe bleven vruchteloos.

Een tweede theoretische en tegelijk praktische implicatie is het idee dat sociale verandering wordt tegengehouden of tenminste vertraagd door waarden waarvan wij veronderstellen dat ze zichzelf in stand houden omdat hun functie is om de gemeenschap bij elkaar te houden. Dit zichzelf in stand houdende mechanisme kan onder meer worden afgeleid uit ons onderzoek naar *victim blaming* (het

beschuldigen van het slachtoffer). Het lijkt erop dat het slachtoffer met name de schuld krijgt wanneer de onderliggende waardestructuren bedreigd worden. De waarden hiërarchie en eer lijken hier een cruciale tol te spelen: zij bewaken de culturele en maatschappelijke status quo. Degene die vanuit bestaande hiërarchische verhoudingen zijn of haar macht misbruikt, wordt als het ware beschermd door deze culturele waarden. Strijd tegen misbruik of sexisme wordt daarmee al snel een strijd tegen cultuur en traditie. Eer speelt een vergelijkbare rol: het afwijzen of niet navolgen van waarden wordt bestraft met op zijn minst het verlagen van de status, maar kan ook al belemmerend werken doordat groepsleden die waarden hebben geïnternaliseerd zich mogelijkerwijs zullen schamen om waarden zelfs ter discussie te stellen. In extreme gevallen kunnen 'overtreders' op grond van eer bestraft worden met verbanning of zelfs (extreem) geweld. Campagnes die als doel hebben om bepaalde schadelijke tradities te veranderen, zouden hierop moeten inspelen om succesvol te kunnen zijn. Dat wil concreet zeggen dat zulke campagnes alleen succesvol kunnen zijn als er niet gestuurd wordt op individuele gedragsverandering, maar op het ter discussie stellen van deze waarden op gemeenschapsniveau: gemeenschapswaarden die oorspronkelijk als functie hadden om gemeenschap bij elkaar te houden, brengen in een moderne samenleving de groep juist gevaar op het moment dat ze botsen met bijvoorbeeld wetgeving.

Een vergelijkbare implicatie komt voort uit ons onderzoek naar de rol van culturele waarden bij politiek-maatschappelijke conflict. De belangrijkste implicatie van de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 4 is dat politieke verschillen vaak worden uitgedrukt in ideologische meningsverschillen over met name socio-economische zaken, maar dat daar wellicht meer basale waarden, zoals die uitgedrukt in CCS, aan ten grondslag zouden kunnen liggen. Waarden op het gemeenschapsniveau vertalen zich naar het maatschappelijke en politieke niveau. Politieke marketing zou effectiever kunnen zijn wanneer partijen zulke waarden communiceren, in plaats van voorgenomen beleidsmaatregelen.

Het laatste punt dat gemaakt wordt in (en over) dit proefschrift is dat het de bruikbaarheid van de inter-subjectieve benadering verder aantoonst. Het definiëren en meten van waarden op individueel én gemeenschappelijk niveau levert een beter beeld op van de daadwerkelijke functie van die waarden. Het maakt namelijk beter duidelijk wat het individu denkt dat de groep van haar wil. CCS levert zo een bijdrage aan ons begrip van hoe cultuur ons gedrag maakt en beïnvloedt, van het individuele niveau tot aan het maatschappelijke.

Dit onderzoek begon met de constatering dat sommige migrantengroepen minder gebruik maken van geestelijke gezondheidszorg en psychosociale hulpverlening. Onze indruk was dat er een verklaring gezocht moest worden in de waarden die men nastreefde in het gemeenschappelijk verband van gezin, familie en de families eromheen. Het huidige proefschrift is geboren uit de constatering dat we de instrumenten niet hadden om die hypothese te onderzoeken. Inmiddels zijn die er wel. Dat meetinstrument is uiteindelijk de belangrijkste bijdrage van dit proefschrift.

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Acknowledgments

My most important goal for this dissertation, and this is by no means a coincidence regarding the questions I have studied, was to achieve something no one else in my family has been able to achieve. Not for a lack of effort, but because the circumstances hadn't allowed for it. One of my uncles, Ahmet Aydemir, who sadly passed away in 2015, saw his dissertation in German filology cruelly terminated near its completion by a coup d'état. This was only years after he had been removed from the Military Academy, again shortly before graduating, following an earlier coup d'état. I feel I have been lucky that I had the chance to do my PhD-research. But it wasn't only luck, of course, that gave me this chance. If my parents, Aşur and Esma Akkuş, both of whom had not had the chance to follow secondary education, hadn't emigrated to Europe, or if they hadn't kept supporting me, I'm sure I wouldn't have had this chance. Therefore, and this will have been clear by now, I would not consider a dissertation, or any achievement for that matter, as something individual, but as an outcome of many collective decisions. Any individual honor that may befall me, will fully reflect on those who I am lucky to call my family and community.

At this point it is time to acknowledge the scholarship, support and ultimately friendship I have received from my promotor, Tom and Katherine. How did they end up as my promotor? When I saw that the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) called for proposals for grants to be given to teachers such as myself, I knew I had to take my chance. This meant I needed to find someone who would want to be my promotor. And I could choose anyone I wanted! Jest aside, all of my old professors were already retired, so I had to ask someone who would want to take in an external PhD student, whose research portfolio aligned with my interests and who seemed someone who I would like to work with. Of course I researched the CVs, but I made my choice also on my gut feeling. It must have been a strange experience: I had called the secretariat and asked if I could speak with Tom Postmes. We didn't know each other, but when I explained what I wanted, he was willing to talk to me in person to find out if we could work together. Tom had invited Katherine for that very first meeting and we embarked on the journey that ends here. It was a journey that included hours of conversation that almost miraculously led to some great ideas (in my hardly humble opinion). It also included me practicing clumsily in front of my promotor for presentations, as well as the three of us sneaking outside during a party to smoke a sneaky cigarette. I was like a stranger in a strange land sometimes and Tom and Katherine always helped me feel that I belonged where I was. And I know that it is only this journey that ends here and new journeys may very well start. I had to be autonomous, but I was also supported all the way, helped when I needed help and pushed when I needed to be pushed. I've learned a great deal and felt like being individually tutored sometimes. I genuinely feel empowered and I want to thank you, Katherine, and you, Tom for that.

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Curriculum Vitae

Birol Akkuş was born on the 2nd of April in 1971, as the firstborn child of Aşur and Esma Akkuş, in the Dutch province town of Hengelo. Aşur Akkuş, who himself was born in the Turkish province town of Erzincan, was recruited as a 'guest worker' and had moved to Hengelo in 1963. As his stay proved less temporary than anticipated, his then wife Esma, also from Erzincan, followed him to the Netherlands in 1969. They would proceed to have one other child, their daughter Nesrin, and both still live in Hengelo and sometimes in Erzincan, enjoying their well-earned retirement.

Birol finished the Bataafse Kamp Gymnasium in 1990 and although he had been planning to study medicine up to this point in his life, he decided he couldn't deal with blood and viscera. In a surprise move he went on to study Economics at the University of Groningen for two fruitless years. After admitting to himself that no good would come from studying something out of stubbornness that clearly wasn't his passion, he switched to Psychology at the same university in 1992. This proved a more fruitful choice. After his Propedeutic diploma, which he received after one year, he chose to continue his study in part-time.

While also working in various odd jobs, ranging from assembling printers, being an attendant at the Groninger Museum to programming websites in the early days of the Internet revolution, he also managed to switch back and forth between neurobiopsychology, functional theory and almost every other discipline in Psychology. Ultimately he chose to finish his Master's with a double major in Individual Differences & Personality and Social Psychology.

By that time, in 2003, he was already living together with Elnie Werksma, without whom he would have probably still been switching back and forth between all of the fields he finds interesting. Because Birol Akkuş was, is and will always be interested in many, many things. Pub quiz teams need not look further.

Birol prides himself with the fact that he has never been unemployed, not even for a day. Although his initial attempt to get funding to finance his own study into the cultural determinants of individual differences in intelligence failed, he did acquire a research assignment at what was then called Landelijk Bureau voor Racismebestrijding (now Art.1), i.e. the National Anti-Racism Bureau. This first assignment resulted in his first publication, *God zegene de greep!*, in which he described the difficulties that founders of mandirs and mosques faced.

Self-employed in his research bureau, aptly called *Birol Akkus, Onderzoek & Advies*, he continued to research such themes as honor-related domestic violence, alcohol and

substance abuse among minority youths and cognitive biases among journalists, for governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations. He also gave seminars about these and other themes, to professionals and students. A special highlight was the mentoring scheme he led commissioned by the Samenwerkende Turkse Organisaties (the Co-operating Turkish Organisations), in which politicians, such as current Dutch PM Mark Rutte, mentored Turkish-Dutch students for a year.

In 2008, Birol was approached by the Saxion Hogescholen for a position as lecturer in Psychology. Now, 13 years later, Birol still fulfills this role (although heavily augmented) with great pleasure. His passion is the classical auditorium lecture, *het hoorcollege*, which he has found he enjoys more than anything. But when the chance came to pursue his wish to finally do his PhD, by virtue of a NWO grant, he knew he couldn't let it pass. He contacted Tom Postmes and Katherine Stroebe, of his Alma Mater, in 2011 to submit a research proposal together, for the *Promotiebeurs voor Leraren* (dissertation grant for teachers). The result, you hold in your (virtual) hands.

His PhD research has enabled him to study the role of culture in many aspects of life, ranging from micro-level group dynamics to macro-level political attitudes. It also enabled him to visit conferences in Mexico, Canada, Japan, Spain, Belgium and even in the Netherlands, to study culture in participatory observation. Birol greatly enjoyed the opportunities to present his findings to scholars and fellow researchers, and to meet with many great minds and generally cool people. He considers this aspect of academia, the coming together of peers to present and discuss their work, a most important contribution to his research and to his personal development.

Birol is proud of his Alevi heritage and equally proud of his two children, Cem and Ana. He speaks Dutch, English, Turkish, German (relatively) fluently, and by virtue of his talents for productive procrastination also knows a little about football (as an avid fan of Liverpool FC), literature, music, politics, cinema, programming and technology.