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cannot be ruled out by anything that Stanford tells us. It is a *prima facie* plausible hypothesis. But to admit the truth of this weak assertion is to concede all that is needed in order to place the new induction on the same epistemic footing as the pessimistic induction. Recall that the undoing of the pessimistic induction was supposed to be due to the differences in predictive and explanatory power between present and past theories. But it is not uncontested that predictive and explanatory efficacy make a theory any likelier to be true. In fact, the modal anti-realist denies it. Like the exhaustibility of theoretical spaces, the relevance of predictive and explanatory power to theoretical truth is a hypothesis that *may*, for all we know, be true. Stanford tells us that this bare possibility is enough to greatly weaken the force of the pessimistic induction:

[E]ven if we cannot say why just *these* features [i.e. predictive and explanatory power] ensure the truth of the theories that enjoy them ..., we know that such differences sometimes do make a difference to the legitimacy of a proposed inductive projection. So there is at least some justice in the realist's suggestion that these differences should protect our own scientific theories from invidious comparisons with their predecessors. (p. 43–4)

By parity of reasoning, the fact that it may, for all we know, be true that scientific theorizing has been getting ever closer to exhausting all theoretical possibilities is enough to greatly weaken the new induction.

The upshot is that there is as much — or as little — reason to be persuaded by the pessimistic induction as by the new induction. Since they both lead to the same anti-realist conclusion, the new induction does not do any useful work in the realism–anti-realism debate.

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The Inner Life of a Rational Agent. In Defence of Philosophical Behaviourism, by R. Stout. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006. Pp. 221. H/b £60.00.

At the heart of philosophical behaviourism lies the idea that mental states can be reduced to behavioural dispositions. Rowland Stout proposes a rather non-standard version of this view. He defends a normative behaviourism according to which mental states are dispositions to behave rationally. For Stout's proposal to be successful, it must be possible to attribute rational ways

of behaving to an agent without attributing any mental states. It is far from obvious that this can be done.

Stout's book covers a wide range of topics and is of interest not only to philosophers of mind but also to epistemologists and philosophers of action. Stout develops, for instance, a new version of the thesis—perhaps best known from Timothy Williamson's defence of it—that knowledge is a mental state that is distinct from that of belief. Stout also defends an epistemic conception of consciousness. I shall not discuss these topics, but focus instead on the general structure of Stout's behaviourism, on its significance for our understanding of mind and action, and on the key challenge his proposal faces.

Stout argues that mental states are states of people rather than states that are internal to (the minds of) people. Suppose you want an ice cream. Then you are in the state of wanting an ice cream. It would be strange to say that you have a mind that contains as one of its states that of you wanting an ice cream. Stout supports this claim by pointing out that the following argument is fallacious (p. 75, cf. 38): I want an ice cream; therefore I have a desire for an ice cream; therefore there is a desire for an ice cream which I have; therefore there is a desire for an ice cream within me. Stout maintains that the argument involves a fallacy of equivocation due to different meanings of the phrase 'I have'. Stout buttresses his case by presenting an analogous argument that is more clearly fallacious: I owe Jones money; therefore I have a responsibility to pay Jones; therefore there is a responsibility to pay Jones which I have; therefore there is a responsibility to pay Jones within me. The importance of this point becomes apparent once one realizes that the idea that mental states are internal states of people is a core commitment of functionalism, the currently dominant picture of mind. Many contemporary philosophers of mind regard only events as causes, not dispositions. But it is not very plausible to regard mental states as events, especially not if they are not internal occurrences. This makes it problematic to view mental states as causes.

This problem can be resolved by embracing a metaphysically richer conception of causation. Stout distinguishes between input and framework causes in a way that is reminiscent of the distinction that Fred Dretske has drawn between triggering causes and structuring causes. Whereas input causes are events, framework causes are dispositions, powers, or mechanisms. Given such a rich metaphysics, the causal efficacy of mental states can be salvaged by conceptualizing them as framework causes rather than as input causes. Mental states play an active causal role when triggered by input causes. In this way, Stout can coherently combine the claim that mental states cause behaviour with the behaviourist thesis that mental states are dispositions to behave.

Stout maintains that the mental states of an agent are dispositions to act rationally. What distinguishes Stout's behaviourism from interpretationism

as Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett defend it is that, according to Stout, it is possible to make sense of someone's behaviour without attributing mental states to that person. Whereas interpretationists hold that an action is rational only relative to a particular set of mental states, Stout regards the rationality of an action as an objective fact that is independent of the mental states of the agent. He accepts that interpreting behaviour is a matter of explicating its underlying reasons. However, he rejects the idea that reasons are mental states. Instead he defends an externalism about reasons according to which they are facts. On this view, practical rationality does not connect mental states to actions, but instead connects facts to recommendations about what to do.

Suppose you pick a carton of milk from a shelf in a supermarket. On the assumption that you acted rationally, an internalist will say that you wanted milk and that you believed that you could get it by picking a carton of milk from the shelf. In contrast to this, Stout explicates the action without recourse to mental states. He characterizes an agent like you as a system, the input of which is the fact that she/he is in a supermarket doing shopping and needing milk and the output of which is the recommendation that picking a carton of milk from the shelf is the thing to do (p. 99). An agent who acts rationally performs the recommended action. Given this characterization of the agent, we are now in a position to attribute a mental state to him or her. After all, we can conclude that the agent wants milk. Stout maintains, however, that this follows from an interpretation of the agent. The interpretation itself makes no reference to mental states.

I doubt that Stout really succeeds in providing an adequate and genuinely externalist account of rational agency. It is not obvious, for instance, that milk is a need (an *objective* need) of yours rather than a (subjective) desire or mental state. Minor variations of Stout's example pose deeper problems for his proposal. Suppose you are in a supermarket in need of milk, but you have forgotten that you need it; or you give in to your craving, and end up outside the supermarket having spent the money you had on a bar of chocolate rather than a carton of milk. Stout appears to be able to accommodate such cases by virtue of his notion of a version of practical rationality. He maintains that there can be 'quite immoral or absurd versions of practical rationality' (p. 100). It is not clear, however, that it is possible to make sense of this idea in strictly behaviourist terms. Stout is committed to the idea that various versions of practical rationality are in fact physically realized in the 'do-what-is-rational mechanisms' (p. 108) of different agents. Furthermore, he maintains that it should be possible to characterize such mechanisms by and large without recourse to mental states (p. 106). Unfortunately it does not become sufficiently clear how else one would go about characterizing a possibly immoral or absurd do-what-is-rational mechanism.

An example that Stout provides of a version of practical rationality is this: 'According to a Kray twins version of practical rationality, a reason for nailing

someone's head to a table is that the person failed to show due respect, even though in an absolute sense we would want to say that that is not a reason for that action' (pp. 100–1). An internalist can readily make sense of this example. Apparently, the Kray twins accept a norm according to which anyone who fails to show due respect should be severely punished. This makes their behaviour rational, even though from a more objective point of view the punishments are disproportionate, to say the least. Given that he regards the rationality of an action as an objective fact, however, Stout cannot appeal to mental states in order to defend the idea that the Kray twins act rationally in one sense but not in another. The notion of a version of practical rationality provides for an alternative. Different versions of practical rationality govern different agents depending, for instance, on an agent's repertoire of basic activity. It is hard to see, however, how a version of practical rationality can be characterized in more detail without recourse to some system of beliefs and desires. Stout's attempt to do so involves embracing the idea that some versions of practical rationality are less rational than others (he allows for 'a highly irrational way of behaving' to count as the best way to bring about a goal, which seems to imply that there can even be irrational versions of practical rationality (pp. 88, 97–8). The coherence of this idea is questionable.

Stout's externalism about rationality deserves closer scrutiny than I am able to give it here. It may be the most extreme and best-developed version on offer, which by itself makes it rather significant. More generally, Stout convincingly argues that philosophical behaviourism should be taken more seriously than it usually is. The fact that he defends a non-standard version of it, which can be variously characterized as Aristotelian, as normative, and as holist behaviourism, makes his argument rather plausible.

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Appearances of the Good, by Sergio Tenenbaum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. viii + 315. H/b £50.00, \$92.00, P/b £22.99, \$39.99.

In the 'formula of the schools', Kant claims that we desire only what we conceive to be good. It is this thesis that Sergio Tenenbaum sets out to defend in his recent book *Appearances of the Good*. Indeed, he defends the strongest reading of the formula, whereby one's desire for something is to be