University of Groningen

Effects of power on negotiations

Fousiani, Kyriaki; Steinel, Wolfgang; Minnigh, Pieter A.

Published in:
International Journal of Conflict Management

DOI:
[10.1108/IJCMA-05-2020-0081](https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCMA-05-2020-0081)
[10.17605/OSF.IO/C5MBV](https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/C5MBV)

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version
Version created as part of publication process; publisher's layout; not normally made publicly available

Publication date:
2021

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Fousiani, K., Steinel, W., & Minnigh, P. A. (2021). Effects of power on negotiations: a comparison of collaborative versus competitive approach. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 32(2).
<https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCMA-05-2020-0081>, <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/C5MBV>

Copyright

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: <https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment>.

Take-down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): <http://www.rug.nl/research/portal>. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.

Effects of Power on Negotiations: A Comparison of Collaborative versus Competitive Approach

Journal:	<i>International Journal of Conflict Management</i>
Manuscript ID	IJCMA-05-2020-0081.R3
Manuscript Type:	Research Paper
Keywords:	Power, Negotiation topic, Collaboration, Competition, Yielding, Threat

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Effects of Power on Negotiations: A Comparison of Collaborative versus
Competitive Approach

Abstract

Purpose: We examined two opposing approaches to the effects of power on negotiation: a “collaborative approach” of power and a “competitive approach” of power. Accordingly, we stated oppositional hypotheses based on each approach. We further investigated the mediating role of the perceived threat of the negotiation, and the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e, topics that touch on one’s power position versus topics that are related to the tasks one needs to perform) in this relationship. Finally, we stated a moderated mediation hypothesis where we expected that the negotiation topic would moderate the indirect effect of power on negotiation strategies.

Methodology: We conducted a vignette study ($N = 279$) and a negotiation game ($N = 138$) where we manipulated power within dyads.

Results: Study 1 showed that powerholders prefer collaborative strategies, whereas powerless negotiators prefer competitive strategies. Perceived threat of the negotiation mediated this effect. Furthermore, both Studies 1 and 2 showed that the negotiation topic moderates the effect of power on negotiation strategies providing further support for the collaborative approach of power. Finally, Study 1 provided partial support for the moderated mediation hypothesis.

Limitations: Both Studies 1 and 2 are experimental studies. A field study should try to replicate these results in the future.

Implications: Our study illuminates the effects of power on negotiation and addresses inconsistent findings in the negotiation literature. The results might be of great importance to large organizations where power asymmetries constitute an integral part of the employee/manager interactions.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Keywords: Power; Negotiation topic; Collaboration; Competition; Yielding; Threat.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

**Effects of Power on Negotiations: A Comparison of Collaborative versus
Competitive Approach**

“Power is my mistress. I have worked too hard at her conquest to allow anyone to take her away from me” (Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769 – 1821).

The role of power in negotiations is determinant. Power exists in all negotiation settings; politics, work, romantic relationships, social interactions. Power is defined as the ability to provide or withhold valued resources or administer punishments (Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; Kipnis, 1972; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959), and as the ability to produce intended effects (see Weber 1946).

Despite the ample research on the effects of power on collaboration versus competition in negotiations (De Dreu and Van Kleef, 2004; Magee *et al.*, 2007; Pinkley *et al.*, 1994), findings are controversial and conclusions inconsistent. Indeed, two opposing directions are identified regarding the negotiating strategies that people adopt in conditions of power asymmetry. On the one hand, there is evidence (mainly from the social psychological literature) that power leads to more competitive behaviors in negotiation merely because powerholders can afford to demand more and concede less (De Dreu, 1995; De Dreu and Van Kleef, 2004; Folger and Skarlicki, 2001; Galinsky *et al.*, 2008; Keltner *et al.*, 2003; Kipnis *et al.*, 1976; Lawler, 1992). On the other hand, research (mainly from the organizational psychological literature) suggests that powerholders are more collaborative towards powerless others because they feel personally responsible for the negotiation outcomes (Chen *et al.*, 2001; Pinkley *et al.*, 1994; Overbeck and Park, 2001, 2006; Overbeck *et al.*, 2006).

In this research, we investigate the oppositional views on power and state two directions of hypotheses: a) Powerful negotiators (as opposed to their powerless counterparts) should deploy stronger competitiveness *versus* b) Powerful (as opposed to powerless) negotiators should

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

deploy stronger collaborative strategies towards their powerless opponents. In order to delineate the psychological mechanisms that drive this effect, we further explore the mediating role of participants' threat of the negotiation. Importantly, we aim to shed light on this debate and reconcile the literature by investigating the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e., a topic that touches on one's power position versus a topic that touches on the tasks that one has to perform) in the relationship between power and negotiation strategies.

Collaborative and competitive negotiation strategies

Two types of negotiation strategies are identified in the literature (Lewicki *et al.*, 2020).

Competitive (or distributive) negotiation is defined as a win-lose negotiation, where parties perceive the negotiation as a fixed-sum and try to maximize their individual gain (Canary, 2003). During a competitive negotiation process, parties use tough strategies such as threats, bluffs, lying, and manipulation. *Collaborative* (or integrative) negotiation is a cooperative phenomenon, aiming at the achievement of win-win outcomes (Putnam, 1990; Raiffa *et al.*, 2007; Steinel and Harinck, in press) through honest and open information exchange, problem-solving, and concern for the opponent (De Dreu, 2004; Goering, 1997; Raiffa *et al.*, 2007; Roloff *et al.*, 2007; Weingart and Olekalns, 2004).

The competitive approach of power

Competitive behavior is rampant among powerholders (Gruenfeld *et al.*, 2008; Kipnis, 1972; Piff, Stancato *et al.*, 2012). A large body of research suggests that power increases the necessity of a tough image and easily escalates into enhanced threat exchange and aggression (Jervis, 1992). The negotiation literature, in particular, postulates that powerful parties, as opposed to powerless ones, have higher aspirations, demand more and concede less (De Dreu, 1995), and are more likely to use competitive strategies such as threats and bluffs to get their way (Lawler, 1992). Eventually, powerful negotiators often end up with a larger share of the pie

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

(Giebels *et al.*, 2000). This happens because powerholders have multiple valuable exchange alternatives available and thus lower concern for their opponent. On the contrary, low power people, being dependent on the other side, value the relationship with the opponent very highly and strive for maintaining it (Murnighan *et al.*, 2004; Stevens and Fiske, 2000; Weber *et al.*, 2005).

In line with these findings, the *behavioral activation/inhibition system theory* (Anderson and Berdahl, 2002; Keltner *et al.*, 2003; see also Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich and Mendes, 2010; Blascovich and Tomaka, 1996) suggests that possessing power makes people feel that their resources approach or exceed the demands of the situation at hand and that they are free from external constraints (Galinsky *et al.*, 2008). Therefore, powerholders notice more opportunities than threats in their environment which motivates them focus on their own goal and reward attainment and construe others through a lens of self-interest (see Keltner *et al.*, 2013).

In contrast, low power activates an alarm system (Smith and Bargh, 2008) and makes people respond with increased threat in their context (Carver and White, 1994; Sassenberg *et al.*, 2012; Scheepers, 2017; Scheepers *et al.*, 2012). Because powerless people perceive more threats, they are more sensitive to the potential constraints of others (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Steele and Aronson, 1995) and they become more attentive to others' interests and goals (Keltner *et al.*, 2013). Interestingly, powerless people often become easier targets of powerholders' aggression and dominance (Sidanius, 1993; Whitney and Smith, 1993).

In line with this theorizing, one would hypothesize that powerholders, who are more self-focused and who have little incentive to strive for joint outcomes (Galinsky *et al.*, 2008) should display stronger competitive and less collaborative strategies towards a low power partner. Instead, low power people who cannot afford to compete with their opponent and who focus

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

much on powerless others' goals, should deploy more collaborative and less competitive strategies.

H1: High as opposed to low power negotiators will display more competitive and less collaborative strategies.

We hypothesize that perceived threat of the negotiation should mediate the relationship between power and negotiation strategy. More specifically, according to the behavioral activation/inhibition system theory (Keltner *et al.*, 2003), perceived threat of the negotiation should be low for powerful negotiators (whose resources are less likely to outweigh demands when negotiating with a low power exchange partner) and high for low power negotiators (who see the demands of the negotiation with a powerful counterpart outweighing resources). Low threat of the negotiation should, in turn, make powerholders prioritize their self-interested goals and engage in more competitive and less collaborative strategies towards their powerless counterparts. In contrast, high threat should make low power negotiators become more attentive to their powerful counterparts' interests and engage in more collaborative and less competitive strategies

H2: Low threat of the negotiation will mediate the effect of high power on negotiation strategies, whereas high threat will mediate the effect of low power on negotiation strategies (*mediation hypothesis*).

The collaborative approach of power

Despite the evidence that powerholders behave in self-interested ways in their interactions with the powerless (Jervis, 1992; Kipnis, 1972), we often observe that in real-life (e.g., within an organization) powerholders deploy increased benevolence and attentiveness towards others, and show concern about others' interests (e.g., Chen *et al.*, 2001; Overbeck and Park, 2001, 2006; Torelli and Shavitt, 2010). Indeed, research shows that rather than being

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

careless or selfish, powerholders often see their power as responsibility towards others and as an inner obligation to take care of things that need to happen (e.g., ensuring that important goals are met; Sassenberg *et al.*, 2012; Sassenberg *et al.*, 2014). Differently put, powerful people internalize the goals that are set with their powerless counterparts, and thus treat others more considerately than selfishly (Chen *et al.*, 2001; De Wit *et al.*, 2017; Gordon and Chen, 2013; Pinkley *et al.*, 1994). Moreover, research on people's *social attention* in organizations (Overbeck and Park, 2006) shows that powerful people are more attentive to powerless people's goals and they are more capable of individuating their powerless targets.

According to the same line of research, powerless people, as opposed to powerful, are more self-focused and inattentive in social interactions with others as they overfocus on how to veil their inferiority and on how to improve their hierarchical position (Earle *et al.*, 1983). Indeed, low power people place much emphasis on gaining a positive image and when comparing themselves with others they try to appear tougher and more competent (Bowden, 2000) which increases their self-focused orientation (Mansell *et al.*, 2003; Steele and Aronson, 1995).

In line with this theorizing, one would expect that powerful, as opposed to powerless negotiators, should be more attentive in their interactions with the powerless and should put more effort into maximizing joint gains. Alternatively put, high power negotiators, as opposed to low power negotiators, have not only stronger motives (i.e., perception of their position as responsibility towards others; De Wit *et al.*, 2017; Sassenberg *et al.*, 2014) but also stronger capability (i.e., social attention and flexibility; Overbeck and Park, 2006) to reach joint outcomes and should thus display stronger collaborative than competitive strategies towards a low power partner. In contrast, low power people who not only see the powerful in an unindividuated way (cf. Overbeck and Park, 2001; Ric, 1997) but are more self-focused in social interactions with the

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

powerful (Overbeck and Park, 2006), should deploy more competitive and less collaborative strategies towards their powerful counterparts.

Hypothesis 1_{alt}: Low as opposed to high power negotiators will display more competitive and less collaborative strategies.

But which psychological mechanisms drive these effects if the collaborative approach of power holds? Opposite to the activation/inhibition system theory (Keltner *et al.*, 2003), which claims that threat increases compliant behavior, the literature on social attention (Overbeck and Park, 2001, 2006; Overbeck *et al.*, 2006) argues that powerless people experience high threat and social anxiety which strengthens their self-interested than other-interested focus (Mansell *et al.*, 2003; Steele and Aronson, 1995). Accordingly, there is research in the context of negotiation in particular, postulating that threat decreases one's willingness to negotiate (Kteily *et al.*, 2013) and increases the use of non-cooperative strategies such as retaliation (Fischer *et al.*, 2010) and cheating (Mead *et al.*, 2009). Indeed, threat prompts a negotiator to become more competitive, which in turn, leads to poorer negotiation outcomes (White *et al.*, 2004) or no agreement at all (Raiffa, 1982). We claim that according to a collaborative approach of power, low power, as opposed to high power negotiators, display more competitive and less cooperative strategies through the experience of increased threat.

Hypothesis 2_{alt}: High threat of negotiation will mediate the effect of low power on negotiation strategies, whereas low threat of the negotiation will mediate the effect of high power on negotiation strategies (*mediation hypothesis*).

Motivation to maintain or change the status quo and negotiation strategies

In this research, in order to illuminate the effects of power on negotiation strategies and reconcile the debate in the literature, we investigate how the content of the negotiation at hand

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

(e.g., the type of interests that are at stake) influences the relationship between power and negotiation strategies.

People hold their powerful positions dear and want to keep them (Fehr *et al.*, 2013; Saguy and Kteily, 2014). Indeed powerholders strive to maintain and reinforce their advantageous positions (see Anderson and Brion, 2014). Accordingly, people’s overall behavior varies as a function of perceived (in)stability of their power (Jordan *et al.*, 2011; Lammers *et al.*, 2008; Magee *et al.*, 2005; Maner *et al.*, 2007; Scheepers *et al.*, 2015). As long as their power is stable, powerholders feel safe and secure. However, as soon as powerholders feel that their power is being removed, they respond with increased threat and anxiety (Wisse *et al.*, 2019). In contrast, perceived power instability elicits challenge in the powerless, for whom there is scope to improve their position (see also Sapolsky, 2005; Scheepers, 2009). Consequently, the effect of power on people’s willingness to negotiate with an opponent depends on whether people perceive their power position as stable or unstable (Kteily *et al.*, 2013; Saguy and Dovidio, 2013; Saguy and Kteily, 2014).

In this study, we investigate how negotiators respond when they engage in disagreements that are *power-related* (i.e., topics that challenge the status quo and imply power instability, e.g., participation of the opponent in decision-making) versus *task-related* (i.e., ordinary topics that are unrelated to one’s power position and maintain the status quo, e.g., how people coordinate their daily activities/tasks). In line with the aforementioned literature, we view power-related disagreements between partners as particularly threatening for powerholders who have something valuable to lose --i.e., their power— (see also Kteily *et al.*, 2013; Wisse *et al.*, 2019). In contrast, task-related disagreements with an opponent should be seen as routine (and thus non-threatening) issues by high power negotiators. The opposite pattern of results is expected to occur when powerless negotiators are faced with power-related versus task-related

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

disagreements. Powerless negotiators, who are already in a disadvantaged position, should view power-related topics as less threatening (i.e., they do not have much to lose) as compared with task-related disagreements, as such disagreements would have a stronger negative impact on their daily lives (i.e., they do have much to lose when they disagree with powerful opponents about task-related issues. For instance, a low-power employee might end up doing tasks that are outside his expertise or comfort zone which might influence his/her work satisfaction).

In line with the above, we hypothesize that the effect of power on negotiation strategy will vary as a function of the negotiation topic (i.e., the type of disagreement) between the opponents. Again, we stated oppositional hypotheses based on the competitive versus collaborative approach of power. In line with the competitive approach and the activation/inhibition system theory (see Anderson and Berdahl, 2002; Keltner *et al.*, 2003) we hypothesized that high power negotiators will display more competitive and less collaborative strategies when negotiating task-related (low threatening), as opposed to power-related (high threatening) topics, because they will see their resources approach or exceed the demands of the situation at hand. In contrast, low power negotiators will deploy more collaborative and less competitive strategies when negotiating task-related (high threatening), as opposed to power-related (low threatening) topics, as negotiating those topics will make them see the demands of the situation as challenging their resources. Moreover, we hypothesize that negotiation topic will moderate the indirect effect of power (through threat) on negotiation strategies. More specifically, we stated the following hypotheses based on the competitive approach of power:

Hypothesis 3: High power negotiators will display more competitive and less collaborative strategies when negotiating task-related, as opposed to power-related topics. In contrast, low power negotiators will display more collaborative and less competitive strategies when negotiating task-related, as opposed to power-related topics (*moderation hypothesis*).

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Hypothesis 4: High power negotiators will display more competitive and less collaborative strategies through the experience of low threat, especially when the negotiation topic is task-related as opposed to power-related. In contrast, low power negotiators will display more collaborative and less competitive strategies through the experience of high threat, especially when the negotiation topic is task-related as opposed to power-related (*moderated mediation hypothesis*).

Oppositional predictions were formulated based on the collaborative approach of power. In line with the literature on power and social attention (Overbeck and Park, 2001, 2006; Overbeck *et al.*, 2006) we hypothesized that when negotiation involves a power-related (and thus more threatening), as opposed to task-related (less threatening) disagreement, high power negotiators should be less attentive to the goals of their powerless opponents and should deploy more competitive and less collaborative strategies. Instead, when negotiation involves a task-related disagreement, powerful negotiators should display more collaborative and less competitive strategies as they could be more flexible and attentive to the interests and goals of their opponents. In contrast, low power negotiators will be more attentive to the goals and interests of the powerful when the negotiation involves power-related (less threatening) as opposed to task-related (more threatening) disagreements and will deploy more collaborative and less competitive strategies when negotiating those topics. Finally, the negotiation topic will moderate the indirect effect of power on negotiation strategies as follows:

Hypothesis 3_{alt}: High power negotiators will display more collaborative and less competitive strategies when negotiating about task-related, as opposed to power-related topics. In contrast, low power negotiators will display more competitive and less collaborative strategies when negotiating about task-related, as opposed to power-related topics (*alternative moderation hypothesis*).

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Hypothesis 4_{alt}: High power negotiators will display more collaborative and less competitive strategies through the experience of low threat, especially when the negotiation topic is task-related as opposed to power-related. In contrast, low power negotiators will display more competitive and less collaborative strategies through the experience of high threat, especially when the negotiation topic is task-related as opposed to power-related (*alternative moderated mediation hypothesis*) (For the hypothesized research model see Figure 1).

Overview of the studies

Two studies were conducted. In Study 1, we manipulated power and negotiation topic via vignettes and measured participants' *intention* to engage in a collaborative/competitive negotiation strategy with their opponent. In Study 2, participants played a negotiation game in dyads. In this study, we assessed participants' self-reported *negotiating strategy* with the Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (De Dreu *et al.*, 2001), and the *negotiation outcome* (i.e., earned points based on joint agreements) they achieved during the negotiation.

Study 1

Methods

Participants

A total of 279 participants (155 females, 123 males, 1 unknown, $M_{age} = 35.46$, $SD = 9.22$) took part in this study. All participants were British. Two hundred sixty-nine participants were non-student participants (employees working at several organizations) and 10 participants were students. According to an a priori power analysis, for our design, 269 participants were required to achieve a medium effect size (Cohen's $f = .25$) and power .80%. Participants were recruited via Prolific academic and were paid £ 0.90 (€1.00) for their participation.

Design, procedure and dependent variables

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

We designed a 2 (power position: high power negotiator against low power counterpart vs. low power negotiator against high power counterpart) x 2 (negotiation topic: power-related vs. task-related) experiment between participants. Participants read a vignette where they were primed with high versus low power and were invited to negotiate with a counterpart with whom they had asymmetrical power (employees were invited to negotiate with managers and managers were invited to negotiate with employees). Participants in the high power condition were assigned to the role of a powerful manager who has the ability to make decisions that affect their employees. Participants in the low power condition were assigned to the role of a powerless employee who has to follow their managers' decisions. Moreover, participants in the power-related condition were invited to negotiate with their opponent a disagreement about power possession in the decision-making processes. In the task-related condition, participants had to negotiate a disagreement regarding the coordination of work activities (see online supplementary material for the complete vignettes). Respondents were assigned randomly to one of the four experimental conditions. All materials were in English. The experiment had a duration of 12 minutes approximately.

Manipulation checks. One item served as a manipulation check for power: "According to the text that you read... You have a powerful position in the company", and one item served as a manipulation check for the negotiation topic: "According to the text that you read... "Your power in decision making may decrease in the future" (1 = *not at all true*, 7 = *absolutely true*).

Negotiation strategy. For the assessment of participants' intention to display collaborative or competitive negotiation strategy we used a 10-item scale based on Wilson and Putnam's (1990) Interaction Goals Questionnaire, and on the classification of integrative and distributive components by Liu and Wilson (2011) (see also De Dreu, 2004, 2006; De Dreu *et al.*, 2001; Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Roloff *et al.*, 2003; Thompson, 1991). The collaborative

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

strategy scale included items such as: “I will try to tell the other party what my priorities are and understand what their priorities are”; “I will try to find a solution that meets both parties’ needs and concerns”. The competitive strategy scale included items such as: “I will try to make sure that the other party does not achieve their goals by the end of the negotiation”; “I will try to make sure that my arguments support my position against the other party’s demands”. Cronbach’s alpha were .75 for the collaborative strategy scale and .81 for the competitive strategy scale. Answers were rated on a 7-point scale (1= *not at all*, 7 = *a lot*).

Perception of the negotiation as a threat. A 5-item scale assessed the perception of negotiation as a threat (e.g., “To what extent do you see this negotiation as a threat?” (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *a lot*; $\alpha = .80$) (see online supplementary material for the complete scales).¹

Results

Correlations between the study variables are presented in Table 1.

Manipulation checks

We analyzed the manipulation checks of power by means of a 2 (power: high vs. low) x 2 (negotiation topic: power-related vs. task-related) univariate ANOVA. The analyses yielded a main effect of the power manipulation on perceived power of participants, $F(1, 275) = 1164.71$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .81$. Participants who were primed with high power perceived their position as more powerful ($M = 6.25$, $SD = 1.10$) as opposed to participants who were primed with low power ($M = 1.53$, $SD = 1.20$). The effect of the negotiation topic on perceived power was non-significant. Also, the interaction between power and topic was non-significant ($F_s < 1$). We also analyzed the manipulation checks of negotiation topic by means of a 2 (power: high / low) x 2

¹ In both Studies 1 and 2 we additionally measured perception of the negotiation as a challenge (i.e., opportunity to achieve important goals; see Scheepers *et al.*, 2012). The reliability of the scale was low and the findings were not consistent throughout our studies. Therefore, for brevity reasons we decided to remove them from the main manuscript.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

(negotiation topic: power-related / task-related) univariate ANOVA. We found a main effect of the negotiation topic manipulation on the perception of the topic as related to power $F(1, 275) = 146.23, p < .001, \eta^2 = .35$. As expected, participants in the power-related ($M = 4.71, SD = 2.21$), as opposed to the task-related condition ($M = 4.66, SD = 2.20$), perceived the negotiation topic as related to a possible power change. The effect of power and the interaction effect between power and topic did not come out significant ($F_s < 1$). It can be concluded that participants perceived the manipulations as intended.

Negotiation strategy

To test the effect of power on negotiation strategies (Hypothesis 1 and its alternative) and the moderating role of the negotiation topic (Hypothesis 3 and its alternative), we submitted participants' scores to a 2 (power: high vs. low) x 2 (negotiation topic: power-related vs. task-related) multivariate ANOVA with negotiation strategies (competitive and collaborative strategy) as dependent variables. The multivariate effect of power on negotiation strategies was significant $F(2, 274) = 8.09, p < .001, \eta^2 = .06$. Accordingly, the univariate effects of power on competitive $F(1, 275) = 16.24, p < .001, \eta^2 = .06$ and collaborative strategies $F(1, 275) = 11.54, p = .001, \eta^2 = .04$ were significant. In line with a collaborative approach (Hypothesis 1_{alt}) results showed that high power as opposed to low power participants reported lower intention to display competition and higher intention to display collaboration. Moreover, the multivariate effect of negotiation topic was significant $F(2, 274) = 3.86, p = .02, \eta^2 = .03$. Accordingly, the univariate effect of negotiation topic on competitive strategy was significant $F(1, 275) = 5.87, p = .02, \eta^2 = .02$, revealing that participants display stronger competitive strategy when negotiating power as opposed to task-related topics (for means and standard deviations see Table 2). The univariate effect of negotiation topic on collaborative strategy was not significant. Unexpectedly, the

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

interaction between power and negotiation topic did not come significant ($F_s < 1$); therefore, Hypothesis 3 and its alternative were not supported.

Perception of the negotiation as a threat

We conducted a 2 (power: high vs. low) x 2 (negotiation topic: power-related vs. task-related) univariate ANOVA with threat as the dependent variable. The effect of power on threat was significant $F(1, 275) = 13.82, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05$. Participants who were primed with low power experienced the negotiation as more threatening as opposed to those primed with high power (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). Finally, the interaction between power and topic on threat perception was significant $F(2, 274) = 4.01, p = .02, \eta^2 = .03$. High power participants reported having experienced increased threat when invited to negotiate a power-related ($M = 4.88, SD = 1.33$) as opposed to task-related topic with their powerless opponent ($M = 4.15, SD = 1.15$), $F(1, 275) = 4.69, p = .03, \eta^2 = .02$. The mean difference for low power negotiators on threat was not significant ($M_{power-related} = 5.09, SD = 1.05, M_{task-related} = 4.99, SD = 1.17$).

Mediation analyses

In order to test the mediating role of threat in the relationship between power and negotiation strategies (Hypothesis 2 and its alternative), we conducted a mediation analysis through bootstrapping (Process analysis, Hayes, 2013) with power as the independent variable (effect-coded -1: high, 1: low power), competitive strategy as the dependent variable, and threat as mediator. The total effect of power on competitive strategy was positive and significant: low power, as opposed to high power participants, displayed stronger competitive strategy. When threat was added as a mediator in the model, the indirect effect was significant but the direct effect was not, resulting in full mediation (see Table 3 for the relevant statistics). In line with a collaborative approach of power (Hypothesis 2_{alt}) threat of negotiation mediated the effect of low

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

power on the use of competitive strategies. Accordingly, we conducted a mediation analysis with power as the independent variable, collaborative strategy as the dependent variable, and threat as mediator. Unexpectedly, the mediating effect of threat in the relationship between power and collaborative strategy did not prove significant (see Table 3 for the relevant statistics).

As a next step, in order to test Hypothesis 4 (the moderated mediation hypothesis) and its alternative, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Process analysis, Hayes, 2013) with power as the independent variable, topic as the moderator, threat as the mediator and competitive strategy as the dependent variable. The indirect effect of power on competitive strategy at values of the topic proved significant. Results showed that the mediated effect of low power on competitive strategy is higher when the negotiation topic is task-related ($b = .15, SE = .05, p < .05, 95\% CI [.01; .21]$) rather than power-related ($b = .04, SE = .04, p > .05, 95\% CI [-.03; .11]$) index of moderated mediation $b = .11, SE = .05, 95\% CI [.01; .22]$. These findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 4_{alt} and show that low power leads to higher threat and, in turn, to competitive negotiation tactics when the negotiation topic is task-related but not when it is power-related (the relevant statistics are illustrated in Figure 2). Finally, we conducted the same moderated mediation analysis with collaborative strategy as the dependent variable. The indirect effect of power (through threat) on collaborative strategy did not vary significantly as a function of the negotiation topic (moderated effect of power when the negotiation topic is power-related: $b = -.002, SE = .008, p < .05, 95\% CI [-.03; .01]$; moderated effect of power when the negotiation topic is task-related: $b = -.009, SE = .02, p > .05, 95\% CI [-.06; .04]$; index of moderated mediation $b = -.007, SE = .18, 95\% CI [-.05; .03]$).

Discussion

We found that individuals with high --as opposed to low-- power displayed decreased intention to compete and increased intention to collaborate with their powerless counterparts.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

These results provide support for Hypothesis 1_{alt} (collaborative approach of power) and oppose Hypothesis 1 (competitive approach of power). Furthermore, perception of the negotiation as a threat mediated the effect of power on competitive strategy. These findings are in line with Hypothesis 2_{alt} (collaborative approach) and oppose Hypothesis 2 (competitive approach). Unexpectedly the interaction effect between power and negotiation topic on negotiation strategy was not significant and thus, we did not find support for Hypothesis 3 or its alternative. However, we did observe that when high-power participants were invited to negotiate power-related (as opposed to task-related) topics with their opponent they indicated having experienced stronger threat. Although we did not state a specific hypothesis about the moderating effect of negotiation topic in the relationship between power and negotiation strategies (instead, threat was only seen as a mediator in this study), still we find this effect noteworthy as it reveals the differential experience of a negotiation based on one's power possession and the negotiation topic at hand. Finally, we found evidence for the moderating role of negotiation topic on the mediated effect of power on competitive strategy; Low power predicted stronger threat and, in turn, competitive intention when the negotiation topic was task as opposed to power-related. These findings provided partial support for Hypothesis 4_{alt} (collaborative approach of power).²

Study 2

Study 1 examined the effects of power on people's intention to collaborate or compete when faced with a power or task-related disagreement with an opponent. Yet evidence on people's intention is not sufficient to make conclusions about the impact of power on actual behavior. Study 2 aims to address this limitation and manipulates power and negotiation topic in

² We also conducted an additional study ($N=277$ participants, 179 females and 98 males, $M_{age}=31.66$, $SD=9.82$) with a similar vignette but with different measures of negotiation strategies (similar with Study 2). The results were largely similar as Study 1. For reasons of brevity, we do not report this study in this article. However, full data are available from the first author upon request.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

a negotiation setting where participants' (self-reported) negotiating behavior (rather than intention) was measured.

In order to elucidate how high and low power negotiators approach situations of conflicting interests we used a different measure for the assessment of competitive and collaborative strategies, based on the *dual conflict management theory* (De Dreu *et al.*, 2001). This theory postulates that conflict management is a function of high or low concern for self, combined with high or low concern for others (Deutsch, 1973). High concern for self and low concern for others results in a preference for *forcing*. High concern for self and others produces a preference for *problem-solving*. Low concern for self and high concern for others results in a preference for *yielding*. Intermediate concern for self, paired to intermediate concern for others results in a preference for *compromising*. Finally, low concern for self and others results in a preference for *avoiding*.

Forcing reflects competition whereas problem-solving reflects collaboration (for a review on negotiation strategies see Lewicki *et al.*, 2020). Having this distinction in mind we stated similar hypotheses with Study 1. Yet, in this research, yielding is of primary importance as it is the only strategy that involves higher concern for the partner than for the self (De Dreu *et al.*, 2001). Based on the aforementioned literature, we stated similar hypotheses with Study 1 for yielding as well. Given that powerholders should perceive task-related (as opposed to power-related) topics as less crucial and less threatening to their position, and powerless negotiators should see task-related (as opposed to power-related) topics as more important and highly threatening, we formulated the following hypotheses. Based on the competitive approach of power and the activation/inhibition theory (see Keltner *et al.*, 2003) we predicted that:

Hypothesis 5a: High power negotiators should yield to a powerless opponent less when the disagreement at hand is task-related rather than power-related. In contrast, low power

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

negotiators should yield to a powerful opponent more when negotiating about task-related as opposed to power-related topics (*moderation hypothesis*).

Hypothesis 5b: Negotiation topic will moderate the indirect effect of power (through threat) on negotiation strategies such that: High power negotiators will yield to their opponent less, through the experience of low threat, especially when the negotiation topic is task-related as opposed to power-related. In contrast, low power negotiators will yield more, through the experience of high threat, especially when the negotiation topic is task-related as opposed to power-related (*moderated mediation hypothesis*).

Alternatively, in line with the collaborative approach of power and the literature on the effects of power on social attention (Overbeck and Park, 2006) people should yield to their opponent more when negotiating a low threatening (and low priority) issue. Our alternative hypotheses 5a and 5b were as follows:

Hypothesis 5a_{alt}: High power negotiators should yield to a powerless opponent more when the disagreement at hand is task-related rather than power-related. In contrast, low power negotiators should yield to a powerful opponent less when negotiating about task-related as opposed to power-related topics (*alternative moderation hypothesis*).

Hypothesis 5b_{alt}: High power negotiators will yield to their opponent more, through the experience of low threat, especially when the negotiation topic is task-related as opposed to power-related. In contrast, low power negotiators will yield to their opponent less, through the experience of high threat, especially when the negotiation topic is task-related as opposed to power-related (*alternative moderated mediation hypothesis*).

No specific hypotheses were stated regarding avoidance and compromise, yet we do report the relevant statistics. Importantly, in this study, participants negotiated in dyads and could earn points based on the agreements they reached with the opponent. Therefore, in addition to

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

the self-reported negotiation strategies, this study measured the outcome (*earned points*) that dyads achieved from the negotiation. Following the same line of reasoning with Hypothesis 3 (based on the competitive approach of power and the activation/inhibition theory; Keltner *et al.*, 2003) and its alternative, 3_{alt} (based on the cooperative approach of power and the literature on the effects of power on social attention; Overbeck and Park, 2006)--we hypothesized that high power and low power negotiators should reach an agreement with one another when that agreement increases their advantage (i.e., they earn more points) in task-related and power-related topics respectively (*Hypothesis 6; competitive approach*) versus when that agreement increases their advantage in power-related and task-related topics respectively (*Hypothesis 6_{alt}; collaborative approach*).

Methods

Participants

A total of 138 university students (97 females and 41 males, $M_{age} = 22.12$, $SD = 2.94$) took part in a paper-and-pencil study and formed dyads (69 dyads in total) in order to play a negotiation game. As an incentive, four participants gained 50 euro each after a lottery (200 euro in total).

Materials

Two sets of negotiation topics were used. One set of negotiation topics concerned power-related issues and the other set concerned task-related issues (more specifically power-unrelated, social aspects of work). Each set included three topics; hence participants negotiated three power-related and three task-related topics in total. An agreement had to be reached for all six topics. To strengthen our topic manipulation, participants were clearly informed that the first three topics were related to their power and influence, and the other three topics concerned the work and task-related aspects. All six topics can be found in the online supplemental material.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Participants used a payoff schedule similar to the one used in Steinel *et al.* (2007) to indicate their agreement (deal) with the opponent. There were 11 levels of agreement for each topic. The payoff schedules used in the several negotiations differed for employees and managers so that a) partners could not guess each other's points, and b) the points could more realistically illustrate a participant's position in the negotiation. For example, the maximum potential was realized by settling on a 50%-50% weight of vote in decision-making for employees (level 1 on topic 1) and on 100% weight of vote for managers (level 11 on topic 1) (for the complete payoff schedules see online supplementary tables). To emphasize the topic manipulation, the payoff schedules that participants used while negotiating about the power-related topics were presented in a red card and were called "red topics"; instead, the payoff schedules for the task-related topics were presented in a green card and were called "green topics."

Design, procedure and dependent variables

Upon arriving at the laboratory, the members of each dyad were seated at a table opposite each other. Participants were randomly assigned to the role of the manager or the employee. Participants received some written information about their role as manager or employee and a questionnaire including the measures and a payoff schedule. Participants were requested to read the information about their role first, and then fill in the manipulation checks for perceived power.

Afterward, participants were presented with the two sets of topics that they were invited to negotiate with their opponent. After reading each set participants filled in a manipulation check item for the negotiation topic. The manipulation check for the topic was assessed twice; once for each set of topics. Likewise, participants filled in a perceived threat scale twice

During the negotiation, participants used a payoff schedule where they could see the points they would earn depending on the deal they would have on each of the topics. They were

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

instructed to reach an agreement on all six topics within 20 minutes. We counterbalanced the order of the topics such that some dyads were instructed to begin with the power-related topics and continue with the task-related topics or vice versa. In any case, dyads had 10 minutes time to negotiate all power-related topics and 10 minutes to negotiate all task-related topics. We also created a third version where participants were free to choose for themselves the order in which they preferred to negotiate the topics. The order in which participants negotiated the two sets of topics had no significant effect on the results.

Participants, right after finishing with negotiating each set of topics with their partner, filled in the negotiation strategy scale twice; once for each set of negotiation topics.

Measures

Manipulation checks. As a manipulation check for power we used the following items: “According to your role, you are powerful in the company; You are rather powerless in the company; You are dependent on the other negotiator; The other negotiator is dependent on you” ($\alpha = .91$; 1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*). The following item served as a manipulation check item for negotiation topic: “Discussing these three topics challenges the power relation between me and my employee/manager” (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*).

Negotiation strategy was assessed with the 20-item Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (De Dreu *et al.*, 2001; Van de Vliert, 1997). The scale measures forcing, problem-solving, yielding, compromising, and yielding. We adapted the scale to measure self-reported negotiation behavior [e.g., While negotiating these three topics, I did the following... “I pushed my own point of view” (forcing); “I worked out a solution that serves my own as well as other's interests as good as possible” (problem-solving); “I tried to accommodate the other party” (yielding)]. As far as power-related topics are concerned, Cronbach’s alphas for yielding, forcing, problem-solving, compromising, and avoiding were .66, .72, .83, .67, and .74 respectively. As far as task-

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

related topics are concerned, Cronbach's alphas for yielding, forcing, problem-solving, compromising, and avoiding were .70, .73, .75, .75, and .74, respectively.

Perception of the negotiation topic as a threat. For the development of this scale, we used items from the Primary and Secondary Appraisal Scale (PASA; Gaab *et al.*, 2005), which assesses threat, among other constructs. The scale consisted of 5 items ($\alpha = .75$ for power-related topics and $\alpha = .70$ for task-related topics) ("e.g., "Negotiating these topics is a threat for me"; 1 = not at all, 7 = a lot) (see online supplementary materials for the complete scales of the study).

Negotiation outcome (Points earned in the negotiation). We added the points that each member earned on all three power-related and all three task-related topics. The higher the score, the more the points the player earned. The lowest possible score was -4,400 and the highest possible score came to 8,000 (see online supplementary Table 1 for the exact scores of the payoff schedule). Cases where the outcome reported by one negotiator did not match the outcome reported by the opponent (i.e., participants did not reach an agreement) were excluded from further analysis. In this study, a total of 18 mismatched outcomes were observed in 12 different dyads.

Results

Correlations between the study variables are presented in Table 4.

Manipulation checks

We analyzed the manipulation check of power by means of a univariate ANOVA. The analysis yielded a main effect of the power manipulation on the perceived power of negotiators $F(1, 135) = 331.07, p < .001, \eta^2 = .71$. Participants who were primed with high power ($M = 5.80, SD = .67$) perceived their position as more powerful as opposed to participants who were primed with low power ($M = 2.69, SD = 1.24$). The effect of the negotiation topic on perceived power was non-significant. Moreover, we analyzed the manipulation check of topic by means of an

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

ANOVA with repeated measures on the perceived challenge of the power relation between negotiators. The mean difference between the conditions of power-related and task-related topic proved to be significant $F(1, 137) = 46.67, p < .001$. Participants indicated that discussing power-related ($M = 5.10, SD = 1.38$) as opposed to task-related topics ($M = 4.07, SD = 1.62$) challenged the power relation with their opponent to a higher extent. We can conclude that participants perceived our manipulations as intended.

Hypotheses testing

For all variables, we calculated two means for the role, one for employees and one for managers and used power as a within-dyad factor. Likewise, we calculated two means for negotiation topics, one for power-related and one for task-related topics and used topic as a within-dyad factor as well.

Negotiation strategy

To test Hypotheses 1 (main effect of power on negotiation strategies), 3 (moderation effect of negotiation topic on collaboration and competition), 5 (moderation effect of negotiation topic on yielding), and their alternatives, we submitted the data to a 2 (power: low vs. high) x 2 (negotiation topic: power-related vs. task-related) ANOVA with repeated measures. We ran separate analyses for each negotiation strategy (problem-solving, forcing, yielding, compromising, avoiding)³. Unexpectedly none of the main effects on forcing or problem-solving were significant and nor were the interaction effects $F_s < .1$.⁴ Hypotheses 1 and 3 were therefore not supported.

³ Results were not different when running one single ANOVA with repeated measures for all negotiation strategies together. Yet, we deemed more appropriate to present in this section the findings of separate ANOVAs for each negotiation strategy.

⁴ We also coded participants' behavior using a coding scheme (Steinel *et al.*, 2007). However, the factor analysis that followed the coding did not clearly yield a distinct collaborative and a distinct competitive factor. Therefore, we decided to retain this analysis. Full data are available by the first author upon request.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

The main effects of both power and topic on yielding were not significant $F_s < .1$. The interaction, however, between power and topic was significant $F(1, 66) = 17.01, p < .001, \eta^2 = .21$. Managers (high power members) reported having displayed stronger yielding when negotiating task-related as opposed to power-related topics. In contrast, employees (low power members) reported having displayed stronger yielding when negotiating power-related as opposed to task-related topics. These findings supported Hypothesis 5_{alt}. The main effect of power on compromising did not come out significant $F_s < .1$, but the main effect of topic on compromising did $F(1, 66) = 6.89, p = .01, \eta^2 = .10$. Results showed that people compromise more when negotiating task-related as opposed to power-related topics (means and standard deviations in Table 5). The interaction between power and topic was not significant. Finally, neither the main effects of power or negotiation topic nor their interaction on avoiding were significant $F_s < .1$.

Negotiation outcome (earned points)

To test Hypothesis 6 and its alternative, we submitted the data to a 2 (power: low vs. high) x 2 (negotiation topic: power-related vs. task-related) ANOVA with repeated measures. Neither the main effect of power nor the main effect of the topic were significant $F_s < .1$. However, the interaction effect between power and topic was marginally significant $F(1, 49) = 3.77, p = .05, \eta^2 = .07$. Managers reached an agreement with their opponent and earned more points when negotiating power-related topics ($M = 1832.00, SD = 1701.43$) as compared with task-related topics ($M = 1386.00, SD = 1377.22$). In sharp contrast, employees reached an agreement with their opponent and earned more points when negotiating task-related ($M = 2080.00, SD = 1244.58$) as compared with power-related topics ($M = 1762.00, SD = 1720.21$) (see Figure 3). These results provided support for Hypothesis 6_{alt}.

Perception of the negotiation as a threat

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

We submitted the data to a 2 (power: low vs. high) x 2 (negotiation topic: power-related vs. task-related) ANOVA with repeated measures. Neither the main effect of power nor the main effect of topic were significant $F_s < .1$. However, the interaction effect between power and topic proved to be marginally significant $F(1, 67) = 3.82, p = .05, \eta^2 = .05$. Low power negotiators indicated having experienced stronger threat when the negotiation at hand involved task-related as opposed to power-related disagreements with the opponent. The mean difference between power-related and task-related topics was not significant for high power negotiators.

In order to test Hypothesis 2 and its alternative, as a next step, we conducted a mediation analysis through bootstrapping (Process analysis, Hayes, 2013) with power as the independent variable (effect-coded -1: high, 1: low power), yielding as the dependent variable, and threat as mediator. The total effect of power on yielding was not significant. Moreover, given the insignificant effects of power on both forcing and problem solving, we did not further investigate the mediating effect of threat in this relationship. The mediation hypothesis was not supported. Given these findings, we did not perform further analyses to test Hypotheses 4, 5b, and their alternatives (moderated mediation hypotheses).

Discussion

Results did not replicate the findings of Study 1 as we did not find support for Hypotheses 1-3 (and their alternatives). However, in line with Hypothesis 5a_{alt} (collaborative approach of power) Study 2 provided evidence for the moderating role of negotiation topic (power versus task-related) in the effect of power on yielding. Powerholders reported having displayed stronger yielding when negotiating task-related, as opposed to power-related topics. In contrast, low power negotiators reported having displayed stronger yielding when negotiating power-related, as opposed to task-related, topics with their powerful partners. Importantly, Study 2 showed that whether negotiators reach an agreement with their opponent depended on the

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

negotiation topic at hand. Again, in line with the collaborative approach of power (Hypothesis 6_{alt}), joint outcomes (i.e., reaching an agreement) occurred when powerholders earned more points in the power-related topic and when low power negotiators earned more points in the task-related topics. These findings reveal that powerful and powerless negotiators achieve joint outcomes with their counterparts when those outcomes correspond to their differential interests.

Finally, low power negotiators found task-related topics more threatening, as opposed to power-related ones which may reveal how much they value those topics. Yet threat response did not mediate the relationship between power and negotiating behavior.

General Discussion

In two studies, we investigated the effects of power on negotiations. We stated oppositional hypotheses stemming from either a “collaborative” or a “competitive” approach of power. According to a collaborative approach of power and in line with the literature on the effects of power on social attention (Overbeck and Park, 2001, 2006; Overbeck *et al.*, 2006) high as opposed to low power negotiators should, in principle, collaborate with their opponents more through the experience of decreased threat of the negotiation. In contrast, according to a competitive approach of power and in line with the activation/inhibition system theory (Keltner *et al.*, 2003), we hypothesized that powerful as opposed to powerless negotiators should be, in principle, more competitive. This should happen because powerholders experience negotiation with powerless opponents as less threatening, which allows them to become more self-focused and self-interested (De Dreu, 1995). In order to disentangle the relationship between power and negotiating behavior and reconcile this debate, we further examined the moderating role of the negotiation topic at hand (e.g., negotiating disagreements about power-related versus task-related topics). In line with the collaborative approach of power, we hypothesized that the effect of power on negotiation behavior should vary as a function of the negotiation topic such that,

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

powerful, as opposed to powerless negotiators, should be more willing to collaborate with their powerless opponent when the negotiation topic touches on task-related rather than power-related disagreements because these topics do not threaten their position. The opposite pattern of results was hypothesized according to the competitive approach of power.

The results obtained in Study 1 revealed evidence for the collaborative approach of power and provided support for Hypothesis 1_{alt}. High, as opposed to low power negotiators, reported stronger intention to collaborate with their partner and less intention to compete. Furthermore, supporting Hypothesis 2_{alt}, threat response mediated the effect of power on negotiation intention. Findings were in line with prior research showing that possessing low power can be an important source of stress (Chen *et al.*, 2010; Miller and Kaiser, 2001), which leads to poor negotiation outcomes (Raiffa, 1982; White *et al.*, 2004). Finally, we found evidence for the moderating role of negotiation topic in the indirect effect of power on competitive strategy. Again, in line with the collaborative approach of power, results showed that low power predicts stronger threat and, in turn, intention to use competitive strategies when the negotiation topic is task-related (but not when it is power-related). These findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 4_{alt}.

Contrary to Hypothesis 3 and its alternative, in Study 1, the negotiation topic did not moderate the effect of power on negotiation strategies. Although past research has shown that powerholders hold their powerful positions dear (Fehr *et al.*, 2013; Saguy and Kteily, 2014) and are unwilling to engage in a negotiation with a powerless opponent when their position is put in jeopardy (Kteily *et al.*, 2013; Saguy and Dovidio, 2013; Saguy and Kteily, 2014), in this study, negotiating about power-related (as opposed to task-related) topics/disagreements, did not influence powerholders' negotiating intentions. These results might be due to the experimental design of Study 1. Study 1 manipulated negotiation topic with one single topic for the power-

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

related and one single topic for the task-related disagreements. It is possible that the power-related topic that we chose was not perceived as threatening to one's powerful position, and thus, powerholders did not respond competitively when invited to negotiate it.

Study 2 measured negotiating behavior rather than negotiating intentions in a dyadic setting. Unexpectedly, the effects of either power or negotiation topic on collaborative or competitive behavior were not significant. However, in Study 2 we did find significant effects on participants' yielding behavior in line with the collaborative approach of power. More specifically, Study 2 showed that when powerholders negotiate task-related, as opposed to power-related topics with their opponent, they report having displayed stronger yielding (i.e., higher concern for the partner than for the self). In contrast, low power negotiators reported having displayed stronger yielding when having negotiated power-related as opposed to task-related topics. In a similar vein, we found that negotiators reached an agreement with one another when their differential interests were satisfied. More specifically, we showed that high and low power negotiators reached an agreement with one another when they had the chance to earn more points on power-related and task-related topics, respectively. These findings provided support for Hypotheses 5_{alt} and 6_{alt} respectively and are in line with the collaborative approach of power. Moreover, these results shed light on the determinant role of the negotiation topic in the relationship between power and negotiating behavior. More specifically, we showed that powerful people are more susceptible to accommodate their powerless opponents as long as the negotiation topic does not put their powerful position in jeopardy (i.e., negotiating disagreements about task-related issues). Again, these findings point out powerholders' motivation to maintain the status quo and keep their power position intact (Fehr *et al.*, 2013; Kteily *et al.*, 2013; Saguy and Kteily, 2014). On the contrary, low power negotiators who are aware of their power disadvantage (Jost *et al.*, 2004), yield to the demands of the powerful when power-related

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

matters are at stake. However, when negotiation touches on more important (to them) matters, such as task-related issues, concern for the opponent decreases. Overall, findings supported the collaborative approach of power (Chen *et al.*, 2001; Pinkley *et al.*, 1994; Overbeck and Park, 2001, 2006; Overbeck *et al.*, 2006) and showed that powerholders are more attentive to the interests and goals of their low power opponents as soon as their power position is safe and secure. In contrast, low power negotiators care less about the interests of their high power opponents and tend to compete more, unless the disagreements at hand are less crucial to them (e.g., power-related disagreements).

Overall, although Study 2 partly replicated the results of Study 1, some findings did not occur consistently. Specifically, Study 2 did not replicate the main effect of power on negotiation strategies. Moreover, in Study 2, the moderating effect of negotiation topic was only significant for yielding but not for forcing (i.e., competition) or problem-solving (i.e., collaboration). One explanation for the insignificant effects might be that in Study 2, we relied on self-reported measures for the assessment of the competitive and collaborative behavior of participants and not on the observation of participants' actual behavior while negotiating each single topic. An alternative explanation should be the timing we chose to measure participants' self-reported negotiating behavior; Participants filled in the scales twice, once after having negotiated the set of the power-related topics and once after having negotiated the set of task-related topics. It might have been more effective if we had measured or observed participants' behavior separately for each topic they negotiated with their opponent. Finally, although in Study 1 low power negotiators experienced high threat and in turn, competed more when negotiating task-related topics --which is in line with prior research (see Saguy and Dovidio, 2013; Saguy and Kteily, 2014)-- Study 2 did not replicate the moderating role of negotiation topic in the indirect effect of power on negotiation strategies. These inconsistencies may be due to the different methods that

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

were used in Study 2 (negotiation game) compared to Study 1 (vignettes), the different measures that we used for the assessment of negotiation strategies (collaborative and competitive negotiating intentions in Study 1; problem solving and forcing behavior in Study 2), but also due to the limited number of topics that were used for the manipulation of negotiation topic in Study 1. Future research should further investigate these effects.

Limitations and future directions

One limitation of our study is that negotiators' power was consistently manipulated via coercive/rewarding power where the powerless person (in our study, the employee) had to follow their manager. This manipulation may be problematic in the context of negotiations as there seems to be no room for a "follower" to compete with their manager, and this may determine their negotiating strategies. Future research may consider manipulating power via alternative sources, such as legitimate, expert, or referent power (see French and Raven, 1959) but also through the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (Fisher and Ury, 1981), that is the power that negotiators get from the availability of alternatives they have. Moreover, although in Study 1 the majority of participants were employees, in Study 2, participants were university students. A field study, where powerful individuals (e.g., managers in an organization) negotiate with powerless members (e.g., employees), should be conducted for a more accurate investigation of the effects of power on negotiation. Finally, in both studies, we measured perceived threat of the negotiation with self-report scales. We suggest the use of cardiovascular markers for the assessment of threat response (Blascovich and Mendes, 2010; see also Scheepers, 2017). A strength of our research is that we studied both negotiation intention (Studies 1) and self-reported behavior (Study 2) and we present findings from both a vignette and a lab study.

Theoretical and practical implications

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Our study has important theoretical and practical implications. As far as the theoretical implications are concerned, this study illuminates the effects of power on negotiation and addresses inconsistent findings in the negotiation literature (Mannix and Neale, 1993; McAlister *et al.*, 1986; Pinkley *et al.*, 1994). More specifically, our research provides support for the collaborative approach of power and, contrary to the competitive approach, it points out the increased value that powerholders place on their own and their powerless opponents' interests (see Overbeck and Park, 2006). Second, we provide evidence for the mediating processes that underlie these relationships and in line with the collaborative approach of power, we show that threat increases rather than decreases competition of negotiators. Third, this is the first study to investigate the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e., power-related versus task-related) in the relationship between power and negotiation strategies. Specifically, this research clarifies the differential value that power-related and task-related topics have for powerful and powerless negotiators, and shows the determinant role that negotiation topics play in the negotiation strategies that people deploy. Finally, we put forward inconsistencies between the social psychological and the organizational behavior literature on the effects of power on collaboration versus competition. For example, contrary to the prevailing notion from the social psychological literature that power is associated with careless processing and self-interested behavior (Fiske, 1993; Fiske and Dépret, 1996; Goodwin *et al.*, 2000; Keltner *et al.*, 2003), organizational behavioral research argues that powerholders (e.g., leaders) feel a greater sense of responsibility for positive outcomes and thus are more attentive to the goals of their powerless partners (Overbeck and Park, 2001, 2006). Our research involved studies that depict situations occurring in organizational environments (e.g., participants were assigned the role of a manager versus employee) and produced similar findings to those of the organizational behavior research. Future

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

studies should further investigate these inconsistencies in order to illuminate the effects of power in social psychological and organizational behavior research.

As far as the practical implications are concerned, these results may be of great importance to large organizations where power asymmetries constitute an integral part of the employee/manager interactions and may give insights about the antecedents of win-win negotiations. For instance, the findings of this study provide evidence that managers are more willing to collaborate with their employees or even accommodate them when negotiating task-related issues. This is a very important finding as those issues are essential to employees. Accordingly, employees were more prone to accommodate their managers when negotiating power-related topics, which are of primary importance to managers. With these findings in mind, managers and employees can achieve mutual collaboration and joint outcomes at work and improve their relationships. Besides, these findings can be of use to the broader society as asymmetric negotiations are inherent in most interpersonal (e.g., personal relationships), intragroup (e.g., manager – employees), and intergroup relations (e.g., politics and international relationships).

Conclusions

Taken together, these results provided support for the collaborative, as opposed to the competitive approach of power, and further showed that the effect of power on negotiation largely depends on the negotiation topic at hand. Powerful negotiators display increased concern for a powerless counterpart as long as the negotiation does not touch on power-related matters (and thus safeguards their powerful position). Powerholders, however, show their “obscure side” when the negotiation topic puts their power position in jeopardy. In contrast, low power negotiators deploy more competitiveness towards a powerful opponent, especially when task-related matters are at stake. However, low power negotiators show their “bright side” when

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

confronted with power-related disagreements with their opponents. We conclude that although powerholders are overall more collaborative towards their powerless opponents (rather than the other way around), whether a collaborative or competitive approach of power holds depends at large on whether the negotiation itself challenges *versus* maintains the power position of negotiators.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Conflict of Interest

The Authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Compliance with Ethical Standards:

This research involves human participants. All procedures performed in this study were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.

Data Availability Statement: Data and Online Supplemental Materials are available from the

Open Science Framework at

https://osf.io/c5mbv/?view_only=5731db812e054257a46475f609474994

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

References

Anderson, C. and Berdahl, J. L. (2002), “The experience of power: Examining the effects of power on approach and inhibition tendencies”. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 83, pp. 1362–1377. Doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1362

Anderson, C. and Brion, S. (2014), “Perspectives on power in organizations”. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 1, pp. 67–97. Doi: 10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-031413-091259

Anderson, C. and Galinsky, D.A. (2006), “Power, optimism, and risk-taking”. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 36, pp. 511–536. Doi: 10.1002/ejsp.324

Blascovich, J. (2008), “Challenge and threat”. In A. J. Elliot (Ed.), *Handbook of approach and avoidance motivation*. New York, NY: Psychology Press, pp. 431-445.

Blascovich, J. and Mendes, W. B. (2010), “Social psychophysiology and embodiment”. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (5th Ed.). New York, NY: John Wiley, pp. 194–227.

Blascovich, J. and Tomaka, J. (1996), “The biopsychosocial model of arousal regulation”. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 28, pp. 1-51. Doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60235-X

Bowden, M. (2000), *Black hawk down*. New York: Penguin Books.

Canary, D. J. (2003), “Managing interpersonal conflict: A model of events related to strategic choices”. In J. O. Greene and B. R. Burleson (Eds.) *Handbook of communication and social interaction skills*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 515-550.

Carver, C. S. and White, T. L. (1994), “Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS Scales”. *Journal*

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- of *Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 67, pp. 319-333. Doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.319
- Chen, S., Lee-Chai, A.Y. and Bargh, J. A. (2001), "Relationship orientation as a moderator of the effects of social power". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 80, pp. 173-187. Doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.80.2.173
- De Dreu, C. K. W. (1995), "Coercive power and concession making in bilateral negotiation". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 39, pp. 646-670. Doi: 10.1177/0022002795039004003
- De Dreu, C. K. W. (2004), "Motivation in negotiation: A social psychological analysis". In M. J. Gelfand & J. M. Brett (Eds.) *The handbook of negotiation and culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 114-138.
- De Dreu, C. K. W. (2006), "When too little or too much hurts: Evidence for a curvilinear relationship between task conflict and innovation in teams". *Journal of Management*, Vol. 32, pp. 83-107. Doi: 10.1177/0149206305277795
- De Dreu, C. K. W., Evers, A., Beersma, B., Kluwer, E. S. and Nauta, A. (2001), "A theory-based measure of conflict management strategies in the workplace". *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 22, pp. 645-668. Doi: 10.1002/job.107
- De Dreu, C. K. W. and Van Kleef, G. A. (2004), "The influence of power on the information search, impression formation, and demands in negotiation". *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 40, pp. 303-319. Doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2003.07.004
- Deutsch, M. (1973), "The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive processes". *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 17, pp. 248-248. Doi: 10.1177/000276427301700206
- De Wit, F. D., Scheepers, D. T., Ellemers, N., Sassenberg, K. and Scholl, A. (2017), "Whether power holders construe their power as responsibility or opportunity influences their

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- tendency to take advice from others". *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 38, pp. 923-949. Doi: 10.1002/JOB.2171
- Earle, W. B., Giuliano, T. and Archer, R. L. (1983), "Lonely at the top: The effect of power on information flow in the dyad". *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol. 9, pp. 629-637. Doi: 10.1177/0146167283094012
- Emerson, R. M. (1962), "Power-dependence relations". *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, pp. 31-41. Doi: 10.2307/2089716
- Fehr, E., Herz, H. and Wilkening, T. (2013), "The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power". *American Economic Review*, Vol. 103, pp. 1325-1359. Doi: 10.1257/aer.103.4.1325
- Fischer, P., Haslam, S. A. and Smith, L. (2010), "If you wrong us, shall we not revenge? Social identity salience moderates support for retaliation in response to collective threat". *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, Vol. 14, pp. 143-150. Doi: 10.1037/a0017970
- Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1981), *Getting to YES: Negotiating agreement without giving in*. New York, NY: Penguin.
- Fiske, S. T. (1993), "Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping". *American Psychologist*, Vol. 48, pp. 621-628. Doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.48.6.621
- Fiske, S. T. and Dépret, E. (1996), "Control, interdependence, and power: Understanding social cognition in its social context". *European Review of Social Psychology*, Vol. 7, pp. 31-61. Doi: 10.1080/14792779443000094
- Folger, R. and Skarlicki, D. P. (2001), "Fairness as a dependent variable: Why tough times can lead to bad management". In R. Cropanzano (Ed.), *Series in applied psychology. Justice in the workplace: From theory to practice*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 97-118

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- French, J. R. P. and Raven, B. (1959), "The bases of social power". In D. Cartwright (Ed.), *Studies in social power*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Univer, pp. 150-167.
- Gaab, J., Rohleder, N., Nater, U. M. and Ehlert, U. (2005), "Psychological determinants of the cortisol stress response: The role of anticipatory cognitive appraisal". *Psychoneuroendocrinology*, Vol. 30, pp. 599–610. Doi:10.1016/j.psyneuen.2005.02.001
- Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H., Whitson, J. and Liljenquist, K. A. (2008), "Social power reduces the strength of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and dissonance". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 95, pp. 1450–1466. Doi: 10.1037/a0012633
- Giebels, E., De Dreu, C. K. W. and Van de Vliert, E. (2000), "Interdependence in negotiation: Effects of exit options and social motive on distributive and integrative negotiation". *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 30, pp. 255-272. Doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(200003/04)30:2<255::AID-EJSP991>3.0.CO;2-7
- Goering, E. M. (1997), "Integration versus distribution in contract negotiations: An interaction analysis of strategy use". *The Journal of Business Communication*, Vol. 34, pp. 383-400. Doi: 10.1177/002194369703400404
- Goodwin, S. A., Gubin, A., Fiske, S. T. and Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2000), "Power can bias impression processes: Stereotyping subordinates by default and by design". *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, Vol. 3, pp. 227–256. Doi: 10.1177/1368430200003003001
- Gordon, A. M. and Chen, S. (2014), "The role of sleep in interpersonal conflict: Do sleepless nights mean worse fights?" *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, Vol. 5, pp. 168–175. Doi: 10.1177/1948550613488952

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- Gruenfeld, D. H., Inesi, M.E., Magee, J.C. and Galinsky, A. D. (2008), "Power and the objectification of social targets". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 95, pp. 111-27. Doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.111.
- Guinote, A. (2007), "Power and goal pursuit". *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33, 1076–1087. Doi: 10.1177/0146167207301011
- Hayes, A. F. (2013), "*Methodology in the social sciences. Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach*". New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Jervis, R. (1992), "Political Implications of Loss Aversion". *Political Psychology*, Vol. 13, pp. 187-204. Doi:10.2307/3791678
- Jordan, J., Sivanathan, N. and Galinsky, A. D. (2011), "Something to lose and nothing to gain: The role of stress in the interactive effect of power and stability on risk taking". *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 56, pp. 530–558. Doi: 10.1177/0001839212441928
- Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R. and Nosek, B. A. (2004), "A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo". *Political Psychology*, Vol. 25, pp. 881-919. Doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00402.x
- Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H. and Anderson, C. (2003), "Power, approach, and inhibition". *Psychological Review*, Vol. 110, pp. 265–284. Doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265
- Kipnis, D. (1972), "Does power corrupt"? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 24, pp. 33-41. Doi: 10.1037/h0033390
- Kipnis, D., Castell, J., Gergen, M. and Mauch, D. (1976), "Metamorphic effects of power". *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 61, pp. 127-135. Doi:10.1037/0021-9010.61.2.127

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- Kteily, N., Saguy, T., Sidanius, J. and Taylor, D. M. (2013), "Negotiating power: Agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 105, pp. 978-995. Doi: 10.1037/a0034095
- Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H. and Otten, S. (2008), "Illegitimacy moderates the effects of power on approach". *Psychological Science*, Vol. 19, pp. 558–564. Doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02123.x
- Lawler, E.J. (1992), "Power processes in bargaining". *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. 33, pp. 17-34. Doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1992.tb00361.x
- Lewicki, R. J., Barry, B. and Saunders, D. M. (2020), *Negotiation*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
- Liu, M. and Wilson, S. R. (2011), "The effects of interaction goals on negotiation tactics and outcomes: A dyad-level analysis across two cultures". *Communication Research*, Vol. 38, pp. 248- 277. Doi: 10.1177/0093650210362680
- Magee, J. C., Galinsky, A. D. and Gruenfeld, D. H. (2007), "Power, propensity to negotiate, and moving first in competitive interactions". *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol. 33, pp. 200–212. Doi: 10.1177/0146167206294413
- Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H., Keltner, D. J. and Galinsky, A. D. (2005), "Leadership and the psychology of power", In D. M. Messick & R. M. Kramer (Eds.), *The psychology of leadership*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 275-293.
- Maner, J. K., Gailliot, M. T., Butz, D. A. and Peruche, B. M. (2007), "Power, risk, and the status quo: Does power promote riskier or more conservative decision making"? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol. 33, pp. 451–462. Doi:10.1177/0146167206297405
- Mannix, E. A. and Neale, M. A. (1993), "Power imbalance and the pattern of exchange in dyadic negotiation". *Group Decision and Negotiation*, Vol. 2, pp. 119-133. Doi: 10.1007/BF01884767

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- Mansell, W., Clark, D. M. and Ehlers, A. (2003), "Internal versus external attention in social anxiety: an investigation using a novel paradigm". *Behaviour Research and Therapy*, Vol. 41, pp. 555–572. Doi: 10.1016/s0005-7967(02)00029-3
- McAlister, L., Bazerman, M. H. and Fader, P. (1986), "Power and goal setting in channel negotiations". *Journal of Marketing Research*, Vol. 23, pp. 228-236. Doi: 10.2307/3151481
- Mead, N. L., Baumeister, R. F., Gino, F., Schweitzer, M. E. and Ariely, D. (2009), "Too tired to tell the truth: Self-control resource depletion and dishonesty". *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 45, pp. 594-597. Doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.02.004
- Miller, C. T. and Kaiser, C. R. (2001), "A theoretical perspective on coping with stigma". *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 57, pp. 73-92. Doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00202
- Murnighan, J. K., Malhotra, D. and Weber, J. M. (2004), "Paradoxes of trust: Empirical and theoretical departures from the traditional model". In R. Kramer & K. Cook (Eds.), *Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions*. New York, NY: Russel Sage Foundation, pp. 293-326.
- Overbeck, J. R. and Park, B. (2001), "When power does not corrupt: Superior individuation processes among powerful perceivers". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 8, pp. 549-565. Doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.549
- Overbeck, J. R. and Park, B. (2006), "Powerful perceivers, powerless objects: Flexibility of power-holders' social attention". *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, Vol. 99, pp. 227-243. Doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.003
- Overbeck, J. R., Tiedens, L. Z. and Brion, S. (2006), "The powerful want to, the powerless have to: Perceived constraint moderates causal attributions". *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 36, pp. 479-496. Doi: 10.1002/ejsp.353.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- Piff, P. K., Stancato, D. M., Côté, S., Mendoza-Denton, R. and Keltner, D. (2012), "Higher social class predicts increased unethical behavior". *PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, Vol. 109, pp. 4086-4091. Doi: 10.1073/pnas.1118373109
- Pinkley, R. L., Neale, M. A. and Bennett, R. J. (1994), "The impact of alternatives to settlement in dyadic negotiation". *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, Vol. 57, pp. 97-116. Doi: 10.1006/obhd.1994.1006
- Pruitt, D. G. and Lewis, S. A. (1975), "Development of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 31, pp. 621-63. Doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.31.4.621
- Putnam L. L. (1990), "Reframing integrative and distributive bargaining: A process perspective". In R. J. Lewicki, B. H. Sheppard, & M. H. Bazerman (Eds.), *Research on negotiation in organizations, JAI series annual*, Greenwich CT: JAI.
- Raiffa, H. (1982), *The art and science of negotiation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/Belknap.
- Raiffa, H., Richardson, J. and Metcalfe, D. (2007), *Negotiation analysis: The science and art of collaborative decision making*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
- Ric, F. (1997), "Effects of control deprivation on subsequent use of stereotypes". *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 137, pp. 333-342. Doi: 10.1080/00224549709595444
- Roloff, M. E., Putnam, L. L. and Anastasiou, L. (2003), "Negotiation skills". In J. O. Greene & B. R. Burleson (Eds.), *Handbook of communication and social interaction skills*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 801-833.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- Saguy, T. and Dovidio, J. F. (2013), "Insecure status relations shape preferences for the content of intergroup contact". *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol. 39, pp. 1030–1042. Doi: 10.1177/0146167213487078
- Saguy, T. and Kteily, N. (2014), "Power, negotiations, and the anticipation of intergroup encounters". *European Review of Social Psychology*, Vol. 25, pp. 107-141. Doi: 10.1080/10463283.2014.957579
- Sapolsky, R. M. (2005), "The influence of social hierarchy on primate health". *Science*, Vol. 308, pp. 648–652. Doi: 10.1126/science.1106477
- Sassenberg, K., Ellemers, N. and Scheepers, D. (2012), "The attraction of social power: The influence of construing power as opportunity versus responsibility". *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 48, pp. 550–555. Doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.11.008
- Sassenberg, K., Ellemers, N., Scheepers, D. and Scholl, A. (2014), "Power corrupts" revisited: The role of construal of power as opportunity or responsibility". In J-W. van Prooijen & P. A. M. van Lange (Eds.), *Power, politics, and paranoia: Why people are suspicious of their leaders*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 73–87
- Scheepers, D. T. (2009), "Turning social identity threat into challenge: Status stability and cardiovascular reactivity during inter-group competition". *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 45, pp. 228-233. Doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2008.09.011
- Scheepers, D. (2017), "Intergroup status differences as challenge or threat: The role of legitimacy". *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, Vol. 20, pp. 75–90. Doi: 10.1177/1368430215595108
- Scheepers, D., De Wit, F., Ellemers, N. and Sassenberg, K. (2012), "Social power makes the heart work more efficiently: Evidence from cardiovascular markers of challenge and

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- threat". *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 48, pp. 371-374. Doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.06.014
- Scheepers, D., Röell, C. and Ellemers, N. (2015), "Unstable power threatens the powerful and challenges the powerless: Evidence from cardiovascular markers of motivation". *Frontiers in Psychology*, Vol. 6, pp. 1-20.
- Sidanius, J. (1993), "The psychology of group conflict and the dynamics of oppression: A social dominance perspective". In S. Iyengar & W. McGuire (Eds.), *Explorations in Political Psychology*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 183 – 219
- Smith, P. K. and Bargh, J. A. (2008), "Nonconscious effects of power on basic approach and avoidance tendencies". *Social Cognition*, 26, 1-24. Doi: 10.1521/soco.2008.26.1.1
- Steele, C. M. and Aronson, J. (1995), "Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 69, pp. 797–811. Doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.69.5.797
- Steinel, W., Abele, A. E. and De Dreu, C. K. W. (2007), "Effects of experience and advice on process and performance in negotiations". *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, , Vol. 10, pp. 533-550. Doi: 10.1177/1368430207081541
- Steinel, W. and Harinck, F. (in press), *Negotiation and Bargaining*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology.
- Stevens, L. E. and Fiske, S. T. (2000), "Motivated impressions of a power-holders: Accuracy under task dependency and misperception under evaluation dependency". *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol. 26, pp. 907–922. Doi: 10.1177/01461672002610002
- Thibaut, J. W. and Kelley, H. H. (1959), *The social psychology of groups*. New York, NY: Wiley.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- Thompson, L. L. (1991), "Information exchange in negotiation". *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol.27, pp. 161-179. Doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(91)90020-7
- Torelli, C. J. and Shavitt, S. (2010), "Culture and concepts of power". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 99, 703–723. Doi: 10.1037/a0019973
- Van de Vliert, E. (1997), *Complex interpersonal conflict behaviour: Theoretical frontiers*. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
- Weber, M. (1947), *The theory of social and economic organization*. (A. M. Henderson & T. Parsons, trans). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, J. M., Malhotra, D. and Murnighan, J. K. (2005), "Normal acts of irrational trust: Motivated attributions and the trust development process". In B. M. Staw & R. M. Kramer (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior. Research in organizational behavior: An annual series of analytical essays and critical reviews*, Vol. 26). US: Elsevier Science/JAI Press, pp. 75-101.
- Weingart, L. and Olekalns, M. (2004), "Communication processes in negotiation". In M. Gelfand & J. Brett (Eds), *Handbook of culture and negotiation*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
- White, J. B., Tynan, R., Galinsky, A. D. and Thompson, L. (2004), "Face threat sensitivity in negotiation: Roadblock to agreement and joint gain". *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, Vol. 94, pp. 102-124. Doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.03.005
- Whitney, I. and Smith, P. K. (1993), "A survey of the nature and extent of bullying in junior/middle and secondary schools". *Educational Research*, Vol. 35, pp. 3–25. Doi: 10.1080/0013188930350101
- Wilson, S. R. and Putnam, L. L. (1990), "Interaction goals in negotiation". In J. A. Anderson (Ed.), *Communication yearbook* Vol. 35, 13. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. pp. 374-406.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Wisse, B., Rus, D., Keller, A. C. and Sleenbos, E. (2019), "Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it: The combined effects of leader fear of losing power and competitive climate on leader self-serving behavior". *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 35, 28, pp. 742-755. Doi: 10.1080/1359432X.2019.1635584

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Figure 1. Hypothesized model based on the collaborative approach of power.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Figure 2. Indirect effect of power (through perception of the negotiation as threat) on competitive negotiation at values of negotiation topic (Study 1).

Notes: $^{**} p < .01$; $^{***} p < .001$. (Power = high power: -1, low power: 1; Negotiation topic = power-related topics: -1, task-related topics: 1).

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Figure 3. Points earned by employees (low power negotiators) and managers (high power negotiators) in the task-related and power-related topic conditions (Study 2).

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Tables

Table 1. Pearson correlation coefficients between study variables (Study 1).

	1	2	3
1. Threat	1	.40***	-.16**
2. Competitive negotiation		1	-.33***
3. Collaborative negotiation			1

** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of the variables for power and negotiation topic conditions (Study 1).

	High power		Low power		Power-related topics		Task-related topics	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Threat	4.52	1.29	5.04	1.11	4.98	1.21	4.56	1.23
Competitive negotiation	3.68	1.33	4.24	.97	4.12	1.19	3.78	1.18
Collaborative negotiation	5.28	1.03	4.89	.87	5.12	.92	5.06	1.03

Note. All ratings were on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = a lot.

Table 3. Mediation results with perception of negotiation as threat as mediator (Study 1).

	Total effect	Direct effect (c')	Unstandardized paths		Indirect effect		
			a	b	Estimate	95% CI lower	95% CI upper
Effect of power on competitive negotiation	.28 (.07)***	.19 (.07)	.26 (.07)***	.35 (.05)***	.09 (.03)	.04	.15
Effect of power on collaborative negotiation	-.06 (.06)	-.05 (.06)	.26 (.07)***	-.02 (.05)	-.006 (.06)	-.04	.02

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses (bootstrap standard errors for the indirect effect estimate); CI: percentile bootstrap confidence interval; paths a and b correspond to the prediction coefficients of the independent variable to the mediator (path a) and of the mediator to the dependent variable (path b); * $p < .01$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

(Power = high power: -1, low power: 1; Negotiation topic = power-related topics: -1, task-related topics: 1

Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients between study variables (Study 2).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Threat	1	.10	-.11	-.06	-.06	.11	-.07
2. Yielding		1	.33***	.33***	-.28***	.25***	-.15*
3. Compromising			1	.60***	-.03	.18***	.07
4. Problem-solving (collaboration)				1	.11	.22***	.13
5. Forcing (competition)					1	.05	.41**
6. Avoiding						1	.06
7. Negotiation outcome							1

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations of the variables for power and negotiation topic conditions (Study 2).

	Employees/ Power-related topics		Employees/ Task-related topics		Managers/ Power-related topics		Managers/ Task-related topics	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Threat	3.47	1.09	3.97	.99	3.43	1.15	3.61	1.14
Yielding	4.92	.96	4.51	1.02	4.75	.89	4.99	.82
Compromising	5.03	1.00	5.13	1.03	4.83	1.05	5.17	.98
Problem-solving (collaboration)	5.17	.90	4.97	.87	5.05	1.14	5.04	.98
Forcing (competition)	4.87	1.03	4.99	.96	4.76	.97	4.66	.93
Avoiding	3.77	1.32	3.68	1.22	3.89	1.07	3.86	.96

Note. All ratings were on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = a lot.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Online Supplementary material

Vignette – Study 1

High power condition: “You work in a large company as a manager. As a manager, you can make certain decisions which affect your employees. Your employees are dependent on you and have to follow your decisions. You, as a manager, can be described as very powerful within the company.”

Low power condition: “You work in a large company as an employee. Your manager can make certain decisions which affect you and the rest of the employees. You are dependent on your manager and have to follow your manager’s decisions. You, as an employee, can be described as very powerless within the company.”

Power-related topic: “Your employees (managers) have signaled several times their disagreement with the power that managers have (employees are sometimes given) in decision making. They insist that employees should be able to influence the final decisions on important matters as well (managers should be the only ones who influence the final decisions on important matters...) The Chief Executive Officer of the company wants this issue to be addressed. He invites you and the other managers (employees) in your division to negotiate with your employees (managers) and address this issue...”.

Task-related topic: “Your employees (managers) have signaled several times their disagreement with how managers (employees) coordinate their monthly activities as this affects their performance. They insist that managers (employees) should coordinate their activities more effectively... The Chief Executive Officer of the company wants this issue to be addressed. He invites you and the other managers (employees) in your division to negotiate with your employees (managers) and address this issue...”.

Measures

Competitive and collaborative negotiation intention (Study 1)

In this negotiation...

- 1) I will try to find out what are the main concerns and priorities of both parties. (integrative)
- 2) I will try to make sure that the other party will not achieve their goals by the end of the negotiation. (distributive)
- 3) Whenever possible, I will use threats in order to make the other party accept my terms. (distributive)
- 4) A strategy that I might try to use in order to defend my goals is bluffing. (distributive)
- 5) I will try to make fewer concessions than the other party. (distributive)
- 6) I will try to make sure that my arguments support my position against the other party’s demands. (distributive)
- 7) I will try to tell the other party, what are my first priorities and understand what are their first priorities. (integrative)
- 8) I believe that the other party is trying to mislead me. (distributive)

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- 9) I will try to find a solution that meets both parties' needs and concerns. (integrative)
- 10) I will try to suggest creative offers which combine the viewpoints of both parties. (integrative)

(1 = absolutely disagree, 7 = absolutely agree)

The Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (Study 2)
(De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001).

While negotiating these three topics, I did the following:

Yielding

- 1) I gave in to the wishes of the other party.
- *2) I concurred with the other party.
- 3) I tried to accommodate the other party.
- 4) I adapted to the other side's goals and interests.

Compromising

- 5) I tried to realize a middle-of-the-road solution.
- 6) I emphasized that we have to find a compromise solution.
- 7) I insisted we both give in a little.
- 8) I strived whenever possible towards a fifty-fifty compromise.

Forcing (competition)

- 9) I pushed my own point of view.
- 10) I searched for gains.
- 11) I fought for a good outcome for myself.
- 12) I did everything to win.

Problem-solving (collaboration)

- 13) I examined issues until I found a solution that really satisfied the other party and me.
- 14) I stood for my own and other's goals and interests.
- 15) I examined ideas from both sides to find a mutually optimal solution.
- 16) I worked out a solution that served my own as well as other's interests as good as possible.

Avoiding

- 17) I avoided a confrontation about our differences.
- 18) I avoided differences of opinion as much as possible.
- 19) I tried to make differences loom less severe.
- 20) I tried to avoid a confrontation with the other side.

(1 = not at all, 7 = a lot).

* This item of the yielding sub-scale was removed from in Study 2 as it lowered the reliability of the scale significantly.

Perception of the negotiation as a threat (Study 1)

- 1) To what extent do you find the issue that has occurred threatening to your position?

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- 2) To what extent do you see this negotiation as a threat?
- 3) To what extent do you find the issue that has occurred threatening?
- 4) This negotiation is against my interests.
- 5) This negotiation may result in a loss of my privileges in the company.

Perception of the negotiation as a threat (Study 2)

- 1) Negotiating these topics is a threat to me.
- 2) I find negotiating these topics unpleasant.
- 3) I do not feel worried because these topics do not represent any threat to my interests. (score-reversed)
- 4) Negotiating these topics gives me stress.
- 5) Negotiating these topics is against my interests.

(1 = not at all, 7 = a lot)

Negotiation game (Study 2)

Negotiation topics:

Power-related topics:

Three topics you negotiate about relate to power and influence in the company.

- Topic Power-1: Employees' and managers' vote in the decision-making has different power/weight.
 - *You disagree with one another on how much your vote should weight in the decision-making for important affairs.*
- Topic Power-2: Manager's power in blocking (vetoing) decisions that he/she does not approve.
 - *You disagree with one another on how much power the manager should have in cancelling decisions that he/she does not approve (exercising veto power)*
- Topic Power-3: Employees and managers have different power in deciding which topics should be included in important decision-making meetings.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

- *You disagree with one another on how much power each of you should have in selecting the topics to be discussed in important meetings.*

Task-related topics (Topics related to social aspects of work):

Three other topics you negotiate about are about social aspects of the work, and relate less to power and influence in the company.

- Topic Task-1: You need to submit the deliverables of a project on which both employees and managers have been working jointly.
 - *You disagree with one another on the deadlines that are set for the deliverables.*
- Topic Task-2: In the Netherlands there are different kind of holidays (national holidays, public holidays etc.) and each company has their own policy regarding holidays.
 - *You disagree with one another on whether working on a holiday should be paid extra on the daily payment.*
- Topic Task-3: In the Netherlands companies have different policies regarding working on the weekends.
 - *You disagree with one another on whether working on the weekends should be applied in the company.*

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Table 1. Payoff schedule for employees for power-related topics (*Study 2*).

Topic 1: weight of your vote in the decision-making			Topic 2: power in blocking (vetoing) decisions			Topic 3: selecting the topics to be discussed in important meetings		
If you agree on...		...you earn	If the manager's veto power decreases by ...		...you earn	If you agree on...		...you earn
1	You 50%; Manager 50%	2400	1	20%	2400	1	You 50%; Manager 50%	2400
2	You 45%; Manager 55%	2000	2	18%	2100	2	You 45%; Manager 55%	2000
3	You 40%; Manager 60%	1600	3	16%	1800	3	You 40%; Manager 60%	1600
4	You 35%; Manager 65%	1200	4	14%	1500	4	You 35%; Manager 65%	1200
5	You 30%; Manager 70%	800	5	12%	1200	5	You 30%; Manager 70%	800
6	You 25%; Manager 75%	400	6	10%	900	6	You 25%; Manager 75%	400
7	You 20%; Manager 80%	0	7	8%	600	7	You 20%; Manager 80%	0
8	You 15%; Manager 85%	-600	8	6%	300	8	You 15%; Manager 85%	-400
9	You 10%; Manager 90%	-1200	9	4%	0	9	You 10%; Manager 90%	-800
10	You 5%; Manager 95%	-1800	10	2%	-200	10	You 5%; Manager 95%	-1200
11	You 0%; Manager 100%	-2400	11	0%	-400	11	You 0%; Manager 100%	-1600
↑ <i>If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.</i>			↑ <i>If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.</i>			↑ <i>If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.</i>		

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Payoff schedule for managers for power-related topics.

Topic 1: weight of your vote in the decision-making			Topic 2: power in blocking (vetoing) decisions			Topic 3: selecting the topics to be discussed in important meetings		
If you agree on...		...you earn	If your veto power decreases by ...		...you earn	If you agree on...		...you earn
1	Employee 50%; You 50%	-400	1	20%	-2400	1	Employee 50%; You 50%	-1600
2	Employee 45%; You 55%	-200	2	18%	-1800	2	Employee 45%; You 55%	-1200
3	Employee 40%; You 60%	0	3	16%	-1200	3	Employee 40%; You 60%	-800
4	Employee 35%; You 65%	300	4	14%	-600	4	Employee 35%; You 65%	-400
5	Employee 30%; You 70%	600	5	12%	0	5	Employee 30%; You 70%	0
6	Employee 25%; You 75%	900	6	10%	400	6	Employee 25%; You 75%	400
7	Employee 20%; You 80%	1200	7	8%	800	7	Employee 20%; You 80%	800
8	Employee 15%; You 85%	1500	8	6%	1200	8	Employee 15%; You 85%	1200
9	Employee 10%; You 90%	1800	9	4%	1600	9	Employee 10%; You 90%	1600
10	Employee 5%; You 95%	2100	10	2%	2000	10	Employee 5%; You 95%	2000
11	Employee 0%; You 100%	2400	11	0%	2400	11	Employee 0%; You 100%	2400
↑ If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.			↑ If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.			↑ If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.		

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Payoff schedules for employees for task-related topics.

Topic 4: deadlines that are set for the deliverables		
If deadlines get shortened...		...you earn
1	5 days	2400
2	6 days	2100
3	7 days	1800
4	8 days	1500
5	9 days	1200
6	10 days	900
7	11 days	600
8	12 days	300
9	13 days	0
10	14 days	-200
11	15 days	-400
↑ If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.		

Topic 5: extra payment for working on a holiday		
If working on a holiday gets paid...		...you earn
1	100% extra on the daily payment	2400
2	90% extra on the daily payment	2000
3	70% extra on the daily payment	1600
4	80% extra on the daily payment	1200
5	60% extra on the daily payment	800
6	50% extra on the daily payment	400
7	40% extra on the daily payment	0
8	30% extra on the daily payment	-600
9	20% extra on the daily payment	-1200
10	10% extra on the daily payment	-1800
11	0% extra on the daily payment	-2400
↑ If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.		

Topic 6: working in the weekends		
If you work in the company...		...you earn
1	0 weekends yearly	2400
2	3 weekends yearly	2000
3	6 weekends yearly	1600
4	9 weekends yearly	1200
5	12 weekends yearly	800
6	15 weekends yearly	400
7	18 weekends yearly	0
8	21 weekends yearly	-400
9	24 weekends yearly	-800
10	27 weekends yearly	-1200
11	30 weekends yearly	-1600
↑ If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.		

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Payoff schedules for managers for task-related topics.

Topic 4: deadlines that are set for the deliverables			Topic 5: extra payment for working on a holiday			Topic 6: working in the weekends		
If deadlines get shortened...		...you earn	If the employee receives for working on a holiday...		...you earn	If the employee works in the company...		...you earn
1	5 days	-2400	1	100% extra on the daily payment	-400	1	0 weekends yearly	-1600
2	6 days	-1800	2	90% extra on the daily payment	-200	2	3 weekends yearly	-1200
3	7 days	-1200	3	70% extra on the daily payment	0	3	6 weekends yearly	-800
4	8 days	-600	4	80% extra on the daily payment	300	4	9 weekends yearly	-400
5	9 days	0	5	60% extra on the daily payment	600	5	12 weekends yearly	0
6	10 days	400	6	50% extra on the daily payment	900	6	15 weekends yearly	400
7	11 days	800	7	40% extra on the daily payment	1200	7	18 weekends yearly	800
8	12 days	1200	8	30% extra on the daily payment	1500	8	21 weekends yearly	1200
9	13 days	1600	9	20% extra on the daily payment	1800	9	24 weekends yearly	1600
10	14 days	2000	10	10% extra on the daily payment	2100	10	27 weekends yearly	2000
11	15 days	2400	11	0% extra on the daily payment	2400	11	30 weekends yearly	2400
↑ If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.			↑ If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.			↑ If you reach an agreement on this topic, please mark the level that you agreed on.		

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

International Journal of Conflict Management