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Power and threat in intergroup conflict: How emotional and behavioral responses depend on amount and content of threat

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Abstract

We propose that in intergroup conflict *threat content* is important in understanding the reactions of those who experience threats the most: the powerless. Studies 1 and 2 show that powerless groups experience more threat than powerful groups, resulting in the experience of *both* more anger and fear. Threat content determines *which* emotions elicit behavior that adequately deals with the situation. When confronted with a physically threatening outgroup, fear elicits an avoidance reaction in powerless groups (Study 1). When valuable resources are threatened, anger makes powerless group members want to *confront* the outgroup, at least when they strongly identify with their group (Study 2). Study 3 replicates the finding that threat content determines which emotions are functional in directing behavior.

Keywords

intergroup conflict, intergroup emotions, power, threat

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War, terrorism and demonstrations are all examples in which groups are in conflict with each other. Quite often the groups facing each other differ in power. When in conflict, these power differences might influence what kind of behavior groups show. It has been argued that powerful groups tend to react with offensive behavior while powerless groups rather avoid conflicts (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). However, events like the riots in the *banlieues* of Paris or acts of terrorism by Palestinians in Israel are examples of powerless group members confronting powerful groups.

Quite often these forms of conflict behavior are a reaction to perceived provocation by powerful outgroups, and apparently, sometimes the weak hit back. In the present research it is therefore not

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the question *whether* they do this, but *when* and *why* they do so. We propose that emotional and behavioral responses to provocation depend on *amount* and *content* of threat.

Some groups might experience conflict as more threatening than others. A factor that might influence this is group power. In the current paper we propose that powerless groups tend to experience intergroup conflict as more threatening, especially when a powerful outgroup is behaving antagonistically. And that *amount of threat* influences to what extent people experience emotions like anger and fear. Moreover, as conflicts can take different forms, they can also pose different threats. For example, sometimes physical safety is threatened, while at other times economic resources are at stake. As such, in intergroup conflict, *threat content* can clearly differ. This does not mean that in conflict only one type of threat can be present (indeed, in conflict situations different types of threat are often intertwined); however, the point of view we take here is that one type of threat is likely to be perceived as dominant at a certain point in time. In the current paper we propose that this salience of *threat content* is important in understanding the reactions of those who generally experience these threats the most: the powerless.

Power, amount of threat and levels of emotion

One aspect that is likely to determine whether groups perceive a conflict as threatening is group power (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Power is often defined as the ability to control or influence (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Fiske & Depret, 1996; Raven & French, 1958). When defined as such, this implies that even in conflict situations the powerful should be able to exert their power in order to secure victory for their group. As the powerful have the certainty that they can determine conflict outcomes in the long run, they can rise above threats and provocations made by the powerless, and thus are less likely to be affected by it. This is not to say that there are no instances in which powerful groups also feel threatened;

rather the powerful are likely to be threatened by different things, for example, when their power position is under pressure (Hornsey, Spears, Creemers, & Hogg, 2003) or when the possible consequences of an attack are severe (e.g., threat of terrorist attacks). Nevertheless, we believe that in general the experience of high levels of threat resulting from the intergroup conflict is more common among the powerless. Because conflicts are more threatening and self-relevant for low-power groups, they are likely to react more emotionally (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Schaller & Abeyasinghe, 2006). What we argue here is that the experience of threat, due to low group power, results in higher levels of negative emotions, such as anger and fear.

Being powerless, content of threat and experience of discrete emotions

Up to now we haven't discussed which emotions the powerless are likely to experience to a greater extent. As conflicts can take different forms, they are also likely to induce different threats. An analysis of these threats as well as the group's power position might give insight into the type of emotions that members of powerless groups are likely to experience. When a group's physical safety is in danger, fear is likely to be elicited (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), especially when groups are powerless. Further, due to appraisals of illegitimacy that are frequent in conflict situations (i.e., behavior of the opponent is seen as provocative and illegitimate; Otten, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 1995), powerless groups are also likely to experience anger (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). When conflicts take another form and the outgroup forms an obstacle to one's group by, for example, threatening economic resources or property, anger is likely to be elicited; anger is an emotion that people tend to experience when goals are obstructed or when events are inconsistent with one's motives (Roseman, 2001; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). However, powerless groups are also likely to experience fear due to absence of control over the situation (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure,

1989; Mackie et al., 2000). Moreover, threats to economic resources or property might signal threats to future well-being (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), which is likely to instigate fear as well.

Taking both types of conflict as well as the group's power position into account, we therefore predict that in physically threatening conflicts as well as in conflicts in which valuable resources are threatened, group members that experience high amounts of threat due to low group power, will respond with both more anger and more fear than members of groups that feel less threatened, that is, the powerful.

Content of threat and functional behavioral responses

Because anger is related to offensive action and fear is related to avoidance (Frijda et al., 1989; Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993), one can wonder how low-power groups behave when they experience both the "avoidance emotion" fear and the "approach emotion" anger as a consequence of being provoked. What we argue here is that behavioral responses depend on *threat content*. Based on the threat model by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005), we argue that after the experience of different types of threat, some emotions are more likely to elicit certain types of behavior than others. Which emotion that is depends on whether an emotion elicits behavior meant to deal with the problem and threat at hand. Without implying that there is a difference in intensity between the different emotions, one emotion is *functional*, because it elicits behavior that is functional in that situation.

In the current article we distinguish between physical threats and threats directed at valuable resources (obstacle threats). When physically threatened, the most functional reaction is getting into safety. Therefore, fear (and not anger) should result in an avoidance reaction. In the case of an obstacle threat, it is functional to remove the obstacle. As such, anger (and not fear) should be the functional emotion, as this will instigate a behavior directed at removing the obstacle (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). In conflict situations this often means acting in a confronting way,

since it is clear that the outgroup is hostile and not likely to give in.

A probable reason why it is functional to hit back when an outgroup poses an obstacle threat and not when an outgroup poses a physical threat, is that different types of threats cause people to value different things (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). When groups are physically threatened it is likely that they value safety. When valuable resources are at stake, however, these resources become the object of value. The reason why groups avoid in the case of a physical threat and confront in the case of an obstacle threat is because these types of actions are likely to fulfill these different (safety vs. resources) goals (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994).

The current research

Compared to other threat models like the integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 1996, 2000), the advantage of the model by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) is its focus on behavioral outcomes (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). However, so far the available evidence supporting this model is correlational. Moreover, to our knowledge, no experimental evidence has been reported for the influence of different kinds of threats on behavior or behavioral tendencies. In the current paper we induce and *manipulate* different kinds of threat and show that this can result in different kinds of behavior, thereby demonstrating causal relations between these components.

To sum up, we argue that when two groups differing in power are involved in a conflict, powerless group members generally will experience more threat, and therefore *both* more fear and anger. Moreover, depending on threat content, one of the two emotions is more functional, and will elicit behavior. When powerless groups feel *physically threatened* we expect fear to be the functional emotion that elicits an avoidance reaction, ensuring safety. However, when facing an *obstacle threat*, anger is the functional emotion eliciting a reaction that is directed at removing the obstacles.

We test our ideas in a set of three studies. In Study 1 and Study 2 we vary the amount of threat by manipulating group power, while keeping

threat content constant. In Study 1, we create a situation in which an outgroup poses a *physical threat*, while in Study 2 the outgroup poses an *obstacle threat*. In Study 3 we keep amount of threat constant, while we manipulate *both kinds of threat* in one design. In addition, in Studies 2 and 3 we explore the role of group identification.

Study 1: Physical threat

Method

Participants and design Seventy-eight Dutch students were approached in a park close to university grounds, and were asked to participate in the study. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (low/high power). Five participants were identified as statistical outliers,¹ and were deleted from the dataset (see Chatterjee, Hadi, & Price, 2000). On average, the remaining participants were 22.94 years old ($SD = 2.26$). About half of them (52%) were male.² Participants did not receive a reward for participating.

Procedure and independent variables The study took place in the context of the 2006 world soccer championship in Germany. The study was conducted two days before the match between the Netherlands and Portugal. In order to control for effects of identification/interest in the domain, participants first answered seven questions³ related to the world championship and their interest in soccer (e.g., "How strongly do you see yourself as a fan of the Dutch soccer team?," $\alpha = .88$; Wann & Branscombe, 1993). After this, participants read a vignette in which they were asked to imagine they were in a bar in Germany on the evening of the match between the Netherlands and Portugal, together with two friends. During this evening they were harassed by three aggressive Portuguese soccer fans. By describing that the outgroup behaved in an aggressive way, we created a situation in which the outgroup posed a *physical threat*.

In the *high-power* condition, participants had to imagine that the bar was filled with Dutch soccer fans. In the *low-power* condition they had to imagine that all other customers were fans of the

Portuguese team. In a physical fight the power to determine a positive outcome depends on physical strength, and all things being equal, strength in numbers is a strong indicator of this power (see Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002, for a similar manipulation of power via group size).

Dependent measures After reading the scenario, people answered questions on 7-point scales (1 = absolutely not, 7 = very much). We used the question "How intimidating do you think this situation is?" to measure experienced *threat*. After that, participants indicated to what extent they experienced *fear* (afraid and anxious, $r(73) = .78, p < .001$) and *anger* (angry and furious, $r(73) = .80, p < .001$) due to the actions of the three Portuguese supporters. Subsequently, we asked to what extent they wanted to *avoid* a conflict ("I would move to another spot in the bar" and "I would walk away," $r(73) = .65, p < .001$). Further we used two items to ask to what extent participants would *confront* the outgroup ("I would yell at the Portuguese supporters" and "I would hit or kick the Portuguese supporters," $r(73) = .38, p < .001$). Finally, participants answered three questions to measure whether we manipulated *power* effectively (e.g., "We would feel more powerful than the Portuguese," $\alpha = .79$).

Results

Power An ANOVA with manipulated power (low vs. high) as factor and the power manipulation check as dependent variable showed that participants in the high-power condition ($M = 4.40, SD = 1.30$) felt more powerful than participants in the low-power condition ($M = 3.46, SD = 1.30$), $F(1, 71) = 9.61, p = .003, \eta^2_p = .12$.

Threat An ANOVA with manipulated power as independent variable and experienced threat as dependent variable revealed that people in the low-power condition perceived the situation as more threatening ($M = 5.52, SD = .83$) than people in the high-power condition ($M = 4.54, SD = 1.30$), $F(1, 70) = 13.89, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .17$.

Emotions According to our theoretical rationale it is crucial to distinguish between anger and fear. Therefore, we first conducted a factor analysis on the four emotion items to test whether we were right in assuming that anger and fear are two distinct emotions. We specified that factors with eigenvalue greater than 1 should be retained. A two-factor solution explained 90% of the variance. Since both emotions are negatively valenced, we used an Oblimin rotation, which allows scales to be somewhat correlated. The pattern matrix showed that the two fear items loaded strongly ($> .92$) on the first factor and that the two anger-related items loaded strongly on the second factor ($> .93$). This analysis revealed that the correlation between the two factors was low (.20), indicating that the factors are indeed unrelated. This means that we were successful in creating two scales that measured anger and fear independently.

An ANOVA with manipulated power as independent variable and *fear* as dependent variable showed that people in the low-power condition experienced more fear ($M = 4.51$, $SD = 1.25$) than people in the high-power condition ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.26$), $F(1, 71) = 10.38$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2_p = .13$. Likewise, an ANOVA with manipulated power as the independent variable and *anger* as dependent variable revealed that people in the low-power condition reported more anger ($M = 5.19$, $SD = .90$) than people in the high-power condition ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.25$), $F(1, 71) = 6.37$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2_p = .08$.

Action tendencies We predicted that in situations in which an outgroup poses a physical threat, avoidance (and not confrontation⁴) would be the functional response. The results of an ANOVA with power as independent and tendency to confront as dependent variables were in line with these predictions, $F < 1$. On the other hand, we predicted that low-power groups would have a greater *tendency to avoid* than high-power groups. A similar ANOVA with tendency to avoid as dependent variable showed that this was the case, $F(1, 71) = 8.31$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2_p = .11$, ($M_{\text{low power}} = 5.09$, $SD = 1.35$, $M_{\text{high power}} = 4.08$, $SD = 1.60$).

Functionality of emotion We predicted that when an outgroup poses a physical threat, the tendency to avoid should be predicted by fear and not by anger (see Table 1 for correlations between emotions and action tendencies). In terms of mediation models, this means that there should be an indirect path via fear, but not via anger. We used the method by Preacher and Hayes (2008) to test our predictions in a multimediator model. Bootstrapping (5,000 samples) revealed that the indirect effect from power (0 = low, 1 = high) to avoidance via fear was reliable (95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence interval from $-.82$ to $-.02$, $b = -.32$), while this was not the case for the anger path (95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence interval $-.25$, to $.23$, $b = -.01$). The model further showed that powerless groups reported more fear ($b = -.95$, $p = .002$) and anger ($b = -.65$, $p = .01$). However, as expected, fear was a significant predictor of avoidance ($b = .34$, $p = .017$), while anger was not ($b = .02$, *ns*). Furthermore, the direct effect from power on avoidance dropped (from $b = -1.011$, $p = .005$ to $b = -.68$, $p = .075$), when both emotions were included in the model.

Discussion

Taken together, these findings show that powerless groups experience more threat, anger and fear when confronted with a physically threatening outgroup than powerful groups. These emotional responses were accompanied by an avoidance tendency. More important, this avoidance tendency was solely driven by fear, supporting our hypotheses that fear is the functional emotion (instigating an avoidance reaction) when an outgroup poses a physical threat.

Study 2: Obstacle threat

In Study 1 we examined how groups respond when they are confronted with a physical threat. In the second study we examined what happens when an outgroup poses another kind of threat: an obstacle threat. To this end, we created an interactive experiment in which two opinion-based groups are allegedly debating via a computer network. An advantage of this paradigm compared

Table 1. Correlations between emotions and action tendencies in the three studies reported

	Anger	Fear	Confrontation	Avoidance
<i>Study 1</i>				
Anger	—	.214 [†]	.140	-.012
Fear		—	-.303**	.370**
Confrontation			—	-.113
<i>Study 2</i>				
Anger	—	.447**	.312**	.247*
Fear		—	.129	.573**
Confrontation			—	.048
<i>Study 3</i>				
Anger	—	.487*	.285*	.113
Fear		—	-.043	.227*
Confrontation			—	-.397**

Note. [†] $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .001$.

to the paradigm used in Study 1 is that participants actually were in a conflict situation. Within this paradigm, we created a situation in which the outgroup makes it less likely that the ingroup gets access to valued resources. That is, the outgroup forms an obstacle and thereby poses a threat to the ingroup.

As in Study 1, we hypothesized that groups that experience a high amount of threat, due to low group power, would experience more anger and fear than powerful groups who do not experience these high levels of threat. Because the outgroup posed an obstacle threat, we expected that anger (and not fear) should be the functional emotion resulting in a tendency to confront the outgroup.

As argued in the introduction, we reason that in a conflict in which resources are at stake, these resources become the object of value. Valued goals, however, are not the only things that determine whether offensive action is likely; people also take the costs associated with offensive action into account. Acting offensively is costly for powerless groups, since the powerful outgroup might retaliate. These costs normally make offensive action unlikely to happen. However, highly identified people value their group and the group goals more, and as such attach more value to the desired outcome (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). For highly identified group members the value attached to the desired outcome might outweigh the costs that are normally associated with

retaliation. As such, a “cost–benefit approach” can explain why only highly identified group members confront the outgroup when valuable resources are threatened (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

This assumption is also consistent with the intergroup emotions perspective (e.g., Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006; Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003), which also predicts that identification increases the extent to which emotions and accompanying action tendencies are elicited. The extent to which people identify with their ingroup category, for example, influences the extent to which angry feelings are generated when observers perceive harm being done to a member of that ingroup category (Gordijn et al., 2006; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). In Study 2, we therefore wanted to explore the role that identification might play.

In Study 2 we asked participants to indicate whether they were in favor of a community project aimed at creating a parking lot or of a project aimed at care for illegal immigrants, and we formed groups on the basis of these opinions. Therefore, the question was how to measure identification with an opinion-based group. Since people self-categorized, aspects like being happy to belong to the group seemed to be less relevant than the question whether people actually are prepared to do something in line with their opinion. Therefore, we decided to measure to what extent

people were actually willing to do something for their project outside the “lab” as a behavioral component of group identification, which we labeled behavioral commitment.

Method

Participants and design Seventy-seven female students were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (high/low power). Participants received €6 for participating. One participant was excluded from the dataset because she was identified as a statistical outlier⁵ (Chatterjee et al., 2000). The mean age of the remaining participants was 21.35 ($SD = 2.90$).

Procedure and predictor variables On arriving at the lab, participants were seated in separate cubicles behind a computer screen on which all instructions were given. During the experiment, we created an antagonistic intergroup setting in which valuable resources were at stake (obstacle threat).

First, participants *categorized* themselves into one of two groups. To do this, we told them that the experiment was about debating and decision-making via a computer network. The topic of debate would be the allocation of financial support to a community project financed by the city council. There were two projects in the run for financial support; however, the money could be allocated to only one of them. One project was about the construction of parking lots; the other project was about aid for illegal immigrants. Participants then indicated which project they supported⁶ and were assigned to a group of people that shared their opinion. After this, participants wrote two arguments supporting their opinion. These arguments were used in the computerized debate that would determine which project would receive aid.

Power was manipulated by varying the amount of influence that the participants group had during the debate. In the high-power condition participants read that three other people were in favor of the same project as they were, making a

group of four. In the low-power condition people read that one other participant shared their opinion, making a group of two. Group size determined how much power and influence the group had in the debate (two votes vs. four votes), thereby increasing their chances of winning. Due to our power manipulation, the two groups differed in their number of members. We therefore told participants that of each group only two arguments, selected on a random basis, were going to be evaluated.

To create a *conflict* in which valuable resources were at stake, we asked participants to write two arguments that were in favor of their opinion. These arguments were used in the debate that consisted of the evaluations of the arguments in two “rounds of debate.” We created valuable resources by telling participants that the group that came up with the best arguments would increase the chances that their project would receive the financial support. In the first evaluation round the argument written by the participant as well as the arguments written by the allegedly other participants appeared one by one on the screen in the following sequence: argument of an ingroup member, argument of an outgroup member, argument written by participant and argument of an outgroup member. Participants rated the quality of each argument on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (excellent) accompanied with a short message (maximum six words).

The total score of a particular argument was determined by the average of the ratings of all six participants. To create a conflict in which the outgroup posed an *obstacle threat* to valuable resources, we programmed the responses of the outgroup to be very negative and unfair. That is, the argument allegedly written by the participant’s ingroup received low evaluations (6.5 and 4.5 out of 10 points), accompanied by negative remarks like “naive and short minded,” while the arguments written by the outgroup were evaluated positively (8.5 out of 10 points), accompanied by positive remarks like “very well written.” Since the group whose arguments received the highest evaluations would win the debate, chances of winning decreased and valuable resources were threatened. A pilot

test ensured that the arguments written by the alleged ingroup and outgroup participants were of comparable quality.

Right before the first evaluation round started we asked participants some questions to check whether they understood the manipulations correctly. After the first round appraisals, emotions, action tendencies as well as identification to one's group were measured on 7-point scales (1 = absolutely not, 7 = very much). At this point participants were still expecting that the second round would follow these questions. After answering the dependent measures, we informed participants that the second round of debate would not take place and participants were thanked and debriefed.

Dependent variables Before the debate started we measured whether we were successful in manipulating power (e.g., "My group has more/less voice in the debate than the other group"). Moreover, we wanted to be sure that conditions also differed in experienced control during the debate. Therefore, experienced control was measured with two items (my group can control/influence the decision-making process), after the first debate round as well. These four items are combined into one *power* scale ($\alpha = .67$).

We used the two following items to measure experienced *threat* ("The way the debate evolves poses a threat to our group" and "I experience the behavior of the other group as intimidating," $r(76) = .42, p < .001$). After that, emotions were measured. People indicated to what extent the behavior of the other group made them experience *anger* (irritated and pissed off, $r(76) = .67, p < .001$), and *fear* (tense and insecure, $r(76) = .59, p < .001$). Action tendencies were measured by indicating to what extent participants had the tendency to *confront* ("get into confrontation with") the other group and to *avoid* ("want to avoid") the other group, should they meet face to face.

Behavioral commitment Five items were used to measure *behavioral commitment*. Participants

indicated to what extent they wanted to do something to help their project (do something after this experiment, sign petition, distribute flyers, demonstrate, become member of a pressure group, $\alpha = .86$). Importantly, there was no effect of the power manipulation on identification, $F < 1$. Therefore we were confident in using identification as a predictor.

Results

Power An ANOVA with power, behavioral commitment (standardized), and the interaction between these two factors as predictors of experienced power revealed a significant main effect of power $F(1, 72) = 54.25, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .43$. Inspection of the means revealed that as expected, people in the high-power condition ($M = 4.74, SD = .92$) felt more powerful than people in the low-power condition ($M = 3.21, SD = .90$). There was no significant interaction, $F_s < 1.18$.

Threat We hypothesized that people would experience the situation as more threatening when their group was powerless compared to powerful. An ANOVA with power, behavioral commitment (standardized) and their interaction revealed a significant main effect of behavioral commitment, $F(1, 72) = 5.95, p < .017, \eta^2_p = .08$, showing that highly committed people (+1 *SD*) felt more threatened ($M = 4.66$) than people who were not highly committed (-1 *SD*) ($M = 4.06$). More importantly, the predicted main effect of power emerged, $F(1, 72) = 15.48, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .18$, showing that members of powerless groups experienced more threat ($M = 4.58, SD = 1.14$) than members of powerful groups ($M = 3.65, SD = 1.08$). There were no other significant effects, $F < 1$.

Emotions As in Study 1, we first conducted a factor analysis on the four emotion items to test whether we were right in assuming that anger and fear are two distinct emotions. The Scree Test hinted at a two-factor solution, and since the second factor had a high eigenvalue as well (.99), we

decided to settle for a two-factor solution, explaining 84% of the variance. We used an Oblimin rotation which revealed that the correlation between the two factors was low (.31). The pattern matrix showed that the two anger items loaded strongly on the first factor ($> .80$). The items “insecure” (.98) and “tense” loaded strongly (.66) on the second factor. Therefore, we created an anger scale and a fear scale.

We predicted that powerless group members should report higher levels of anger and fear. As expected, an ANOVA with power and behavioral commitment (standardized) and the interaction between these two factors as predictors of *fear*, revealed a main effect of power, $F(1, 72) = 5.90$, $p = .018$, $\eta^2_p = .08$. People in the low-power condition reported higher levels of fear ($M = 4.07$, $SD = 1.25$) compared to people in the high-power condition ($M = 3.41$, $SD = 1.13$). There were no other significant effects, $F_s < 1$.

The same ANOVA but now with *anger* as dependent variable showed that there was a main effect of behavioral commitment, $F(1, 72) = 6.31$, $p = .014$, $\eta^2_p = .08$. Calculation of the means revealed that highly committed people (+1 *SD*) felt more angry ($M = 4.36$) than people that were not highly committed (−1 *SD*) ($M = 3.64$). More importantly, we found the predicted main effect of power, $F(1, 72) = 12.41$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2_p = .15$. As expected, people in the low-power condition ($M = 4.47$, $SD = 1.15$) reported more anger than people in the high-power condition ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.38$). There were no other significant effects, $F < 1$.

Action tendencies An ANOVA with power, behavioral commitment (standardized) and their interaction as predictors confirmed that the powerless did not want to *avoid*, all $F_s < 1$. With regard to tendency to confront, however, the same ANOVA showed no main effects of power and commitment, $F_s < 1.8$, but did show a significant interaction, $F(1, 72) = 4.77$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2_p = .06$. Simple slope analysis revealed that there was a significant difference between strongly (+1 *SD*) and weakly committed (−1 *SD*) people in the

low-power condition, $b = 1.18$; $t(72) = 2.38$, $p = .02$. Likewise, for strongly committed people, the difference between the low-power (0) and the high-power (1) condition was significant, $b = 1.08$; $t(72) = 2.29$, $p = .025$. For weakly committed people, on the other hand, there were no differences between the high- and low-power condition, nor was there a difference between strongly and weakly committed people in the high-power condition, $t_s < 1$ (see Figure 1). These findings indicate that strongly committed people in low-power groups have a greater tendency to confront the outgroup.

Functionality of emotion We argued that when an outgroup poses an obstacle threat, anger should be the functional emotion, eliciting an offensive response, whereas fear should not result in offensive action (see Table 1 for correlations between emotions and action tendencies).⁷ Similar to Study 1, we used the method by Preacher and Hayes (2008) to test our predictions in a multimediator model. Bootstrapping (5,000 samples) supported our hypothesis, by showing that the indirect effect of power (0 = low, 1 = high) to confronting via anger was reliable (95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence interval from $-.80$ to $-.07$, $b = -.33$), while this was not the case for the fear path (95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence interval from $-.21$

Figure 1. Interaction between power and behavioral commitment (Study 2).

to .22, $b = -.01$). In addition, the model showed that powerless groups reported more anger ($b = -.95$, $p = .001$) and fear ($b = -.66$, $p = .02$). Moreover, anger predicted tendency to confront ($b = .35$, $p = .01$), while fear did not ($b = -.02$, ns). Furthermore, the direct effect from power on tendency to confront dropped (from $b = -.32$, ns to $b = -.004$, ns) when both emotions were included in the model.

Discussion

In sum, Study 2 confirmed our predictions regarding an obstacle threat. We showed that powerless groups experienced threat, anger and fear. In addition, mediation analyses revealed that in the case of an obstacle threat, anger—and not fear—is the functional emotion, fueling into conflict behavior. It is important to note, however, that low-power groups only confront outgroups when they feel committed to their group. We assume that this is the case, because for these people their group is so important that the benefits of behaving in a conflicting way outweigh the costs.

In the current study the participant and his/her group members are all direct victims. Therefore, and especially within low-power groups, everybody is affected and thus likely to feel angry and afraid. As such, commitment (a kind of identification) is likely to contribute to these appraisals and feelings, but does not become a prerequisite for emotions to occur. Although the impact of behavioral commitment as the behavioral component of identification on emotions might be rather small, its impact on action tendencies should be much more pronounced, and might even become a prerequisite when groups are powerless. The question is, of course, why is this the case? A reason for this is that engaging in offensive action is likely to be costly, since retaliation by the more powerful outgroup is likely to occur. Because people make cost-benefit analysis to determine whether they will show coercive action (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994), it is quite plausible that for powerless group members this cost-benefit analysis will weigh heavily on the cost side,

making confrontation unlikely. Highly identified or committed group members, however, are likely to value their group and the group goals more (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). As such, identification and commitment add value to the benefit side, and as a result the net outcome of the cost-benefit analysis might favor offensive action. For highly committed or identified people, the group might be so important that they *do* behave offensively to regain access to valuable resources.

Study 3

Up to now, we have looked at the effects of power and threat content within two different and separate designs. In Study 3 we further examine the effects we found for the powerless, by manipulating both kinds of threats in one design, using similar methods to induce the different types of threat. Besides this methodological difference, the study adds to the previous ones by testing whether our findings can be replicated and generalized to other intergroup contexts. We used Iran versus Western Europe as an intergroup setting. Participants read one of two newspaper articles describing that Iran was threatening Europe with either a military attack (physical threat) or with an oil boycott (obstacle threat). The use of newspaper articles offers an advantage over a vignette study, because people do not have to imagine something, but react to a situation that is portrayed as real.

The results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that powerless group members experienced more threat, anger and fear during intergroup conflict. We reasoned that this was due to the fact that powerless groups can exert less control within the conflict situation. In Study 3 we used Iran versus Western Europe as an intergroup setting. Although it might be difficult to portray Western Europe as truly powerless, we told participants that Western Europe could do nothing against the threats made by Iran. As such, we created a situation in which the participant's ingroup was not capable of exerting control.

In Study 2 we already explored the possibility that identification with the group would determine

whether members of low-power groups would respond more aggressively to provocations by an outgroup. In Study 2 we used items that tap into the behavioral expression of identification, since that fitted better with the group context used in that study. In Study 3 the behavioral component of identification (e.g., doing something for your country) almost implies joining the army, which at least for most Dutch students might be a step too far. Therefore, we use a more common measure of identification ("I identify with Western Europe"; e.g., Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1995) in Study 3. A good side effect is that the scale we use in Study 3 makes our work more comparable to other works in the field. Moreover, in Study 3 we measure identification in advance.

We hypothesize that both threat scenarios will induce feelings of anger and fear, but that anger will be the functional emotion instigating a confrontational response when Iran poses an obstacle threat, while fear will be the functional emotion instigating an avoidance reaction when Iran poses a physical threat. Moreover, we expect that in the physical-threat condition, people will show an avoidance reaction. In the obstacle-threat condition, we expect that people will respond with confrontational behavior when they identify strongly with their group.

Method

Participants and design Eighty Dutch people were approached on the street and were asked to participate in the study. They were on average 26.39 years old ($SD = 12.90$), with 63% females. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of an experiment with threat (physical threat vs. obstacle threat) as independent variable and identification (measured) as a moderator. Participants did not receive any reward for participating.

Procedure To induce categorization as a West European, participants received a booklet titled "Reactions of West Europeans on threats from the Middle East." After a brief introduction in

which the procedure of the experiment was explained, participants answered three questions on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) to measure *identification with West Europeans*.⁸ We used the questions "I identify with West Europeans," "I am glad to be a West European," "I feel strong ties with West Europeans" (Doosje et al., 1995) to form a reliable scale, $\alpha = .86$.

Second, people read a newspaper article about Iran threatening Western Europe. In the *physical-threat* condition the headline of the article stated "Western Europe powerless when Tehran attacks. Western Europe's physical safety in danger." In the following article it was stressed that Iran threatened Western Europe with a military attack, in the course of which they would fire missiles that could reach countries like the Netherlands, if Europe kept interfering with Iran's nuclear program. The consequences of such an attack were emphasized by stating that this would result in a massive massacre, and that Western Europe's physical safety could not be guaranteed in the case of an Iranian attack. In the *obstacle-threat* condition the headline of the article stated "Western Europe powerless when Tehran turns down the oil tap. Western Europe's economy in danger." In the body of the article it was stressed that Iran threatened to restrict oil export to Western Europe, resulting in a massive oil shortage, if Europe kept intervening with Iran's nuclear program. The consequences of this threat were emphasized by stating that this would lead to an economic crisis, mass lay-offs and food scarcity, and that Western Europe's economic safety could not be guaranteed in the case of an Iranian boycott.

In both articles it was underlined that Western Europe would be powerless, in the sense that they could not exert control, by stating that the Iranian government was supported by 200 million Shia Muslims in the world. Further, it was stressed that the Iranian leaders were capable of forming an army with the most important Arabian countries, which would be unbeatable for Western Europe's peace-oriented army, in the case Western Europe wanted to use military force.

Dependent measures After reading the newspaper article, participants filled in a questionnaire. First we measured to what extent the threat posed by Iran made them feel *angry* (angry, irritated, indignant, $\alpha = .80$) and *afraid* (tense, afraid, distressed, $\alpha = .83$).

After that, we measured what kind of action Western Europe should take according to the participant. We used three items to measure to what extent Western Europe should *confront* Iran (attack Iran, come into conflict with Iran, strife with Iran, $\alpha = .82$). Two items were used to measure to what extent participants wanted to *avoid* a conflict with Iran (avoid and prevent, $r(80) = .67$, $p = .001$).

In the last part of the questionnaire we asked several questions to measure whether our manipulations had worked. First, we measured *general threat* by two items questioning how threatening participants thought Iran would be ("Iran is a danger to Western Europe," and "Iran poses a threat to Western Europe," $r(80) = .87$, $p < .001$). The item "Iran poses a threat to Western Europe's physical safety" was used to measure to what extent participants thought Iran posed a *physical threat* after reading the newspaper article. The item "Iran poses a threat to Western Europe's economy" was used to measure to what extent Iran posed an *obstacle threat*. All measures were taken on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).

Results

Manipulation checks To check whether we were successful in manipulating two different kinds of threat, we ran two ANOVAs, with manipulated threat content and identification (standardized) as factors on the physical-threat and obstacle-threat items. This analysis showed that participants in the obstacle-threat condition indeed experienced more obstacle threat ($M = 4.63$, $SD = 1.53$) than participants in the physical-threat condition ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 1.28$), $F(1, 76) = 7.41$, $p = .008$, $\eta^2_p = .09$. Likewise, participants in the physical-threat condition experienced Iran as marginally more physically threatening ($M = 4.25$, $SD = 1.21$) than participants in the

obstacle-threat condition ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 1.38$), $F(1, 76) = 3.25$, $p = .08$, $\eta^2_p = .04$. There were no other significant effects $F_s < 1$, except for a trend on obstacle threat, $F = 3.73$, $p = .06$, $\eta^2_p = .05$, showing that high identifiers (+1 SD) think that Iran poses a greater threat to Europe's economy ($M = 4.48$) than low identifiers (−1 SD) ($M = 3.88$). Together these results indicated that we were successful in creating two different threat scenarios.

Moreover, we wanted to make sure that the two scenarios did not differ in the *amount* of threat they induced. To test this, we ran an ANOVA on the general threat scale using the same factors as described above. This analysis revealed, as expected, no significant effects, $F_s < 1.18$, indicating that the two scenarios did not differ in the general amount of threat they induced ($M_{\text{physical}} = 4.34$, $SD = 1.22$, $M_{\text{obstacle}} = 3.97$, $SD = 1.27$).

Emotions As in the previous two studies, we first conducted a factor analysis to test whether anger and fear were two distinct emotions. We specified that factors with eigenvalue greater than 1 should be retained. A two-factor solution explained 73% of the variance. We used an Oblimin rotation that revealed a moderate correlation ($r = .46$) between the two factors. Irrespective of this correlation, the pattern matrix showed that the three fear items loaded strongly on the first factor ($> .83$) and that the three anger-related items loaded strongly on the second factor ($> .76$). Thus, the two emotions can be differentiated.

According to our predictions participants should experience *anger* and *fear* in both conditions, therefore no difference between conditions should be found. The same ANOVAs as used before, but now on the emotion measures showed, as expected, that there were no main effects of threat on anger, $F < 2.01$ ($M_{\text{physical threat}} = 4.17$, $SD = 1.13$, $M_{\text{obstacle threat}} = 3.82$, $SD = 1.19$) and fear, $F < 1$ ($M_{\text{physical threat}} = 3.63$, $SD = 1.13$, $M_{\text{obstacle threat}} = 3.77$, $SD = 1.17$), nor were there any effects of identification ($F_s < 1$), or their interactions ($F_s < 2.78$) for anger and ($F < 1$) for fear.

Action tendencies We predicted that physical rather than obstacle threat would result in an avoidance reaction. An ANOVA, with threat content and identification (standardized) as factors on *avoidance*, revealed the expected main effect of threat, $F(1, 76) = 6.84, p = .011, \eta^2_p = .08$, such that participants who read the physical-threat version indicated to a greater extent that they wanted to avoid a conflict with Iran ($M = 4.40, SD = 1.40$) than participants who read the obstacle-threat version ($M = 3.64, SD = 1.26$). There were no effects of identification ($F < 1.49$), or the interaction ($F < 1$).

With respect to obstacle threat, we predicted that people would have the tendency to confront Iran, but only when they identified strongly with West Europeans. The same ANOVA as described above indeed rendered a significant interaction $F(1, 76) = 4.03, p = .05, \eta^2_p = .05$. There were no main effects of threat or identification, $F_s < 1$. Simple slope analysis revealed a significant difference between high (+1 *SD*) and low identifiers (−1 *SD*) in the obstacle-threat condition (0 = physical, 1 = obstacle), $b = .70, t(76) = 2.10, p = .04$, indicating that high identifiers are more willing to confront Iran. Furthermore, high identifiers tended to be somewhat more willing to confront Iran after reading the obstacle-threat article than after reading the physical-threat article, $b = .60, t(76) = 1.73, p = .09$. In the physical-threat condition, however, there were no differences between high and low identifiers, nor was there a difference between conditions when identification was low, both $t_s < 1.12$ (see Figure 2).

Functionality of emotion Although we didn't expect to find mean differences between the two conditions on anger and fear, we did predict that anger (and not fear) should lead to more offensive action within the obstacle-threat condition, while fear (and not anger) should lead to more avoidance in the physical-threat condition (see Table 1 for correlations between emotions and action tendencies). To test this we looked within the two threat conditions separately. A regression analysis with both anger and fear as

Figure 2. Interaction between type of threat and identification (Study 3).

predictors of tendency to avoid, showed that within the physical-threat condition fear was indeed a marginally predicting tendency to avoid ($\beta = .33, p = .055$), while anger was not ($\beta = -.22, p = .19$). A regression analysis with anger and fear as predictors of tendency to confront showed that within the obstacle-threat condition anger was marginally predicting tendency to confront ($\beta = .35, p = .077$), while fear was not ($\beta = .06, ns$).

Discussion

Taken together, Study 3 thus shows that members of groups that lack control respond differently in intergroup conflict as a function of threat content. Moreover, the study shows that anger is the functional emotion instigating a confrontational response when an outgroup poses an obstacle threat, while fear is the functional emotion instigating an avoidance reaction when an outgroup poses a physical threat. Replicating Study 1, when confronted with a physically threatening outgroup people show avoidance behavior, which seems to be driven by fear. Replicating Study 2, when confronted with a group that poses an obstacle threat people tend to confront the outgroup out of anger, but only when people identify strongly with their group.

In Studies 2 and 3, our identification measures were adapted to the group context we used. To

measure identification with an opinion-based group, we asked whether people were willing to do something that supported their opinion. In Study 3 we used a more common identification scale. Interestingly, both scales resulted in similar outcomes. Next to that, in Study 3 we measured identification in advance, ruling out the possibility that experimental factors influenced identification.

General discussion

In this research we examined when and why powerless groups (or groups that lack control) will confront groups they are in conflict with. Three studies revealed that threat is important in understanding how low-power groups feel and behave. We found that groups that are in conflict with the powerful, experience more threat than groups that are in conflict with the powerless. The experience of threat leads to the experience of *both* anger and fear. However, the type of threat an outgroup poses determines how members of low-power groups behave eventually. When low-power groups are in conflict with a group that poses a physical threat they show avoidance behavior. On the other hand, when these groups are confronted with a group that poses an obstacle threat, people that identify strongly with their group are likely to confront the outgroup. Our studies show the importance of taking group characteristics like power and status into account, as well as type of threat that is experienced, when trying to understand intergroup conflict.

We based our predictions on the sociofunctional threat-based approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). The initial (correlational) evidence supporting this model mainly focused on emotions towards outgroups. In the current research we found that different kinds of threat as described in the model lead to different behavioral tendencies. To our knowledge, we are the first to experimentally show this link between types of threats and behavior. In the current research we provided further support for the model by manipulating different kinds of threat, thereby allowing us to draw causal conclusions about the influence of threat on emotions and behavior. Moreover,

we found evidence that structural relations between groups (e.g., power differences) can influence the perception of threat, and consequently, emotions and behavioral tendencies

Functionality of emotion

In line with Cottrell and Neuberg (2005), we assume that emotions often serve a function. This means that an event elicits specific emotions, because these emotions activate behavior that is functional for dealing with this event. However, what is functional behavior might depend on the behavioral options that people have. For example, in physical conflicts avoidance might not always be possible, and in such situations people might be better off fighting. Nevertheless, this behavior is still likely to stem from a safety motivation, and thus likely to be driven by fear.

In Study 1 mediation analyses showed that fear rather than anger is the functional emotion, instigating an avoidance reaction when a low-power group is facing a physically threatening outgroup. In Study 2 mediation analyses showed that anger rather than fear is the functional emotion, instigating the tendency to confront when powerless groups are facing an obstacle threat. In Study 3 we replicated these findings while manipulating both kinds of threats in one design. Taken together, we show that in intergroup conflicts emotions are instigators of behavior that is functional; what is functional, however, depends on the threat present in the conflict situation.

Maitner, Mackie, and Smith (2006) also argued that intergroup emotions are functional. They reasoned that if intergroup emotions are functional, they should regulate behavior in such a way that successfully implementing an emotional-linked behavioral tendency should discharge the emotion, whereas impeding the behavioral tendency should intensify the emotion. In line with this reasoning they showed, for example, that if an attack on the ingroup produced anger, retaliation increased satisfaction with the ingroup. However, when an attack produced fear, retaliation increased fear. Their findings showed *that*

intergroup emotions regulate intergroup behavior, while our research gives insight in *when* a certain emotion regulates behavior.

Power and emotions in conflict situations

Our three studies show that people can experience different emotions at the same time. Groups low in power can experience strong levels of both fear *and* anger (in conjunction or subsequently) when in conflict with a powerful group. Mackie et al. (2000), however, showed that groups felt more anger and showed more offensive behavior when their group had social support, and thus was somewhat powerful. In their studies, groups were created on the basis of conflicting values (e.g., in favor/not in favor of equal rights for gays). However, while these values are conflicting in nature, the groups that subscribe to these values do not necessarily need to be. In the current research, we were interested in what would happen when groups were directly confronted with the outgroup's hostile intentions, and as such were really in conflict. An important consequence of looking at groups that are in conflict is that group power can actually be used. The presence of a real conflict with an outgroup and the actual possibility of using power might have led to the observed differences. Moreover, it seems that as conflicts intensify and become more hostile, threat content seems to become more important in understanding intergroup behavior.

Indeed, in a scenario study in which Devos et al. (2002) did induce a conflict in which powerless group members were physically threatened, they also found that low-power groups responded with fear and avoidance, and with moderate levels of anger. The authors did not report whether level of anger differed as a function of power(lessness), but it is likely that in their research the same emotional patterns occurred as in our studies.

When do the weak hit back?

The current research shows that it is not so strange that powerless group members sometimes do not back away from, but rather confront

an outgroup that is threatening them. This is most likely to happen when powerless group members identify strongly with their group and when they feel that it is being denied access to valuable resources. This is not to say that such confrontation goes without fear. However, in this case avoiding the outgroup will not be a functional way to deal with the threat at hand.

The fact that only high identifiers and highly committed people confront an outgroup in case of an obstacle threat can possibly be explained in terms of costs and benefits. According to Tedeschi and Felson (1994), people only engage in coercive behavior when the costs outweigh the benefits. For powerless groups, confronting an outgroup is costly in terms of the behavior itself as well as due to possible retaliation by the outgroup. However, it might be that for high identifiers and highly committed people, the benefits of removing the obstacle outweigh the costs, causing them to confront the outgroup.

In this research, we focused on two types of threat (physical vs. obstacle) as a way to investigate when powerless groups avoid or confront a hostile outgroup. What we found was that groups only confront when it is functional to do so; that is in the case of an obstacle threat. This does not mean that we think that only obstacle threat can induce these feelings and behavior. Threats to group values might induce aggressive behavior as well. A threat to group values elicits the functional emotion disgust which might be accompanied by anger (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Disgust would normally lead to avoidance, but in a conflict situation this might be an extra reason to move against the outgroup. One important way to justify intergroup aggression is dehumanization of the outgroup (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). When one feels disgusted about the outgroup, this might become very easy. Further, we solely focused on threats to economic resources as a form of obstacle threat. There are, however, more ways in which an outgroup can pose an obstacle threat and thereby elicit anger (for an overview see, Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Groups can, for example, pose a threat to personal freedoms and rights or can endanger the functioning

of the ingroup. In these cases the instigated behaviors are also directed at removing obstacles (e.g., reclaiming liberties and restoring ingroup functioning), and thus are likely to result in confrontational behavior as well.

In this article we tried to answer the question "When do the weak hit back?" and we operationalized the weak as groups that are low on the power dimension. Scholars from a social identity perspective might wonder whether similar findings would occur if status rather than power were manipulated. In order to make predictions about this, we first need to look at the differences between power and status. Power is often defined as the ability to control or influence, while status is defined as the social value of a group (Boldry & Gaertner, 2006; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991; see Spears, Greenwood, De Lemus, & Sweetman, 2010, for a discussion of power, status, and how they can be distinguished). Nevertheless, power can serve as a comparison dimension and as such contribute to status differences, while status can serve as a basis for power (Raven & French, 1958). In conflict situations, however, power is likely to be a more relevant comparison dimension than status (Hornsey et al., 2003), because power is an important determinant of victory and defeat (Kamans, Otten, Gordijn, Spears, & Livingstone, 2009). Moreover, power can be used to eliminate threats by the outgroup, while this is less true for status. Therefore, we only expect to find similar findings when status contributes to group power.

Conclusion

In the current article we propose that *threat content* is important in understanding the behavioral reactions of those who experience these threats the most: the powerless. Threat content determines *which* emotions are functional in eliciting behavior that adequately deals with the situation. Offensive action is only likely when it might eliminate the threat. As such, this article shows that the weak only hit back when it is functional to do so.

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Notes

1. Participants were excluded because of deviation on one of the emotion scales, $SD > 2.4$.
2. Because interest in football and hooliganism is more common among men than women, we tested whether participants' gender influenced their reactions. There were no interactions between gender and power on the emotion and action tendency scales. Women did report a bit more fear, $F(1, 69) = 3.76, p = .06, \eta^2_p = .05$ ($M = 4.37, SD = 1.24$), and had a stronger tendency to avoid, $F(1, 69) = 4.49, p = .038, \eta^2_p = .06$ ($M = 5.00, SD = 1.21$) than men ($M_{fear} = 3.67, SD = 1.35; M_{avoid} = 4.12, SD = 1.74$).
3. There were no interactions with the power manipulation, $F_s < 1$. Therefore, the emotional and behavioral reactions were not dependent on identification with the Dutch soccer team. High identifiers (+1 SD) did tend to confront a bit more $F(1, 66) = 13.62, p < .001, h^2_p = .17$ ($M = 2.54$) than low identifiers (-1 SD), ($M = 1.67$). Low identifiers ($M = 4.98$) reported more fear than high identifiers ($M = 4.13$), $F(1, 66) = 5.43, p = .023, \eta^2_p = .08$. They also tended to avoid more ($M = 3.60$) than high identifiers ($M = 2.49$), $F(1, 66) = 13.66, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .17$.
4. As it can be argued that the two forms of confrontation (yelling and hitting/kicking) belong to two different classes of aggression, we tested whether we found a similar pattern of results when we looked at the separate items. An ANOVA with power as predictor of the separate items showed that this was the case, as power did not affect tendency to yell and tendency to beat/kick, both $F_s < 1$.
5. Participant was excluded because of deviating on the confrontation measure, $SD > 2.4$.
6. Twenty-eight participants categorized themselves as members in favor of the city project while 49

categorized themselves as members in favor of the care project. Participants were distributed equally between conditions. Analysis of variance on all the dependent variables revealed no condition $\times$ project choice interaction $F(1, 75) < 1.6$.

7. We further tested whether anger especially mediated the relation between power and tendency to confront when people were committed to their group. A regression analysis with power, commitment high ($+1$ *SD*) and their interaction revealed that power was indeed a significant predictor of tendency to confront, $b = -1.08$, $p = .25$, when people are highly committed, and that anger is a good predictor of tendency to confront as well, $b = .34$, $p = .006$. Also, power was a significant predictor of anger, when people are highly committed, $b = -.89$, $p = .03$. When anger was also entered in the analysis, the effect of power dropped to nonsignificant, $b = -.78$, *ns*. A Sobel Test revealed that this drop was marginally significant, $Z = 1.67$ $p = .09$, indicating that anger at least partially mediates the effects of power on tendency to confront the outgroup when people are highly committed.
8. The questions were embedded in a series of questions related to the importance of Western European safety.

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