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Political Mobilization of Dutch Muslims: Religious Identity Salience, Goal Framing, and Normative Constraints

Karen Phalet* and Gülseli Baysu
University of Leuven

Maykel Verkuyten
Utrecht University

This article addresses the question of when and for what purpose Muslims will act collectively in the political arena. The impact of religious identity salience, goal framing, and normative constraints on political mobilization was examined in two Muslim communities with different group positions in Dutch society. Both Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims expressed their willingness to take normative or nonnormative political action to promote religious (“defend Islam”), ethnic (“help homeland”), or superordinate group goals (“protect human rights”). When their Muslim identity was made salient, Moroccan Muslims were more ready to take normative action to promote religious goals and also more likely to engage in nonnormative action. In contrast, Turkish Muslims were less willing to take action when their Muslim identity was salient, except for superordinate human rights goals. Our findings caution against simplistic assumptions about all Muslims by contextualizing the ways in which religion plays out in the political arena.

The much-publicized Van Gogh murder by a Muslim radical in Amsterdam in 2004 caused a public outcry against Islam and marked a low point in the already tenuous public acceptance of Dutch Muslims. Since the late 1990s, public opinion surveys show widespread resistance against the presence of Muslims in Dutch society, which has become almost consensual in most recent surveys (Phalet & Gijsberts, 2007; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Muslims are singled out by

*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Karen Phalet, Center for Social and Cultural Psychology, University of Leuven, Tiensestraat 102-bus 3727, 3000 Leuven, Belgium [e-mail: Karen.Phalet@psy.kuleuven.be].

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critics of multiculturalism as prototypical outsiders. Islam is presented as incompatible with civic norms and values and as a barrier to sociocultural integration in Dutch society. What are the repercussions of this public climate for the political mobilization of Dutch Muslims? Although the presence of Muslim minorities in many Western societies is highly politicized and conflict ridden (Fleischmann & Phalet, in press), little is known about the group processes connecting the religious identity of Muslims to political action. From the viewpoint of Muslim minorities, their religious group membership offers a group-based perspective that forms the basis of political mobilization (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). This article examines how the religious identities of Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims play out in the political domain.

Of the many social–psychological studies on collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), very few focus on religious groups and on Muslim minorities in particular. The main aim of this research is to investigate the impact of Muslim identity salience on political action tendencies in two Muslim minorities with different group positions in the Dutch intergroup hierarchy. Specifically, the research examines the foregrounding of religious identity in comparison with ethnic identity and in relation to political action. In addition, we ask the question of when Muslim citizens will challenge legal constraints on political action in Dutch society. To this end, we compare the effects of a salient religious identity on normative (i.e., legal) and nonnormative (i.e., illegal) action forms. Finally, we study for what purpose Muslim citizens will mobilize by varying the framing of political action in terms of religious or, alternatively, ethnic or superordinate group goals.

As the Netherlands were pioneering multicultural policies in North-Western Europe in the early 1980s, major immigrant groups, including Moroccan and Turkish immigrants and their offspring, were publicly recognized as ethnic minorities; and special provisions and institutional arrangements were established—including publicly funded Islamic schools and media. More recently, however, the Dutch multicultural experiment has been largely discontinued in favor of more assimilationist public policies. Moroccan and Turkish minority groups share similar histories of labor migration, along with persistent ethnic disadvantage and segregation (Dagevos & Gijsberts, 2007). At the same time, they differ in their group position as Muslim minorities in Dutch society. As the most prototypical Muslim group in the Netherlands, Moroccan Muslims are less accepted and more distrusted than Turkish Muslims (Phalet & Gijsberts, 2007). The claims of Moroccan–Dutch Muslims on equal acceptance as fellow citizens are more strongly rejected and, therefore, they experience most identity threat. Parallel studies of Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims make it possible to assess the impact of different group positions on levels and forms of political action.
Recently, Klein, Spears, and Reicher (2007) introduced the notion of social identity performance, which serves as a heuristic framework for our research. This notion originates in the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) model of deindividuation effects, which emphasizes the communicative dimension of group behavior (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). Similar to sociological and anthropological research traditions which have articulated the performative nature of identity and ethnicity (Verkuyten, 2005), this model posits that social identities depend crucially on acceptance and acknowledgment by relevant others. Since identities are performed in interactions, others’ perceptions and expectations impose constraints, which in turn can shape the situational contents and meanings of social identities. Relevant audiences of social identity performance are in the first place one’s fellow in-group members. Yet also members of other, often more powerful, groups in society can be influential. Taking such a situational perspective on ethnic identity, Noels, Clement, and Leavitt (2010, in press), for instance, show how one’s view of what other in-group and out-group members think of oneself relates to one’s own ethnic identity and experiences of discrimination. In the case of religious identity performance, one’s sense of Muslim identity does not only depend on the acceptance by, and support from, other Muslims as in-group members. It is also enabled or constrained by the way in which Muslims are defined and treated in the wider society. For instance, wearing the headscarf is seen by some Muslims as communicating their religious identity. Yet in some societal contexts the headscarf is publicly disapproved, or even legally banned. From the perspective of religious identity performance, such external constraints on religious group behavior will ultimately shape the meaning of being Muslim. In light of the dual identity of Dutch Muslims as members of their religious community and as citizens (Phalet & Kosic, 2006), the Dutch majority represents a powerful “other.” Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing global “war on terrorism,” extensive media exposure and increased police surveillance of Muslims and their religious activities have dramatically increased the psychological presence and public visibility of Muslim and non-Muslim Dutch audiences.

The notion of religious identity performance includes not only group behavior that specifically promotes a religious group project (i.e., identity mobilization), but also group behavior that serves primarily to bolster religious group identity (i.e., identity consolidation; Klein et al., 2007). Whereas identity consolidation is conceived as creating the general capacity for group coordination, mobilization directs coordinated action toward specific group goals (Haslam, 2001). In this research, religious identity performance refers to the purposeful political action of Muslim citizens as religious group members with a view to bolstering their religious identity (consolidation) and/or promoting religious group goals in Dutch society (mobilization). For Dutch Muslims, their religious identity is central
to their self-understanding (Verkuyten, 2007). Moreover, these communities are characterized by strong family and ethnic ties, which sustain and transmit religious rules and practices to the next generation (Phalet, Gijsberts, & Hagendoorn, 2008). In the eyes of the Dutch majority, however, the religious way of life of Muslims is commonly seen as incompatible with civic norms and values in Dutch society (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). For Dutch Muslims, therefore, their peripheral status as Muslim citizens in Dutch society poses a threat to their religious identity. More precisely, in light of their dual identity as Muslims and citizens, religious identity threat implies a tension between their subordinate group membership as Muslims and their inclusion as citizens at the superordinate level of the wider society (Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2002; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). It follows from the primary function of identity consolidation that Muslim citizens should be especially motivated to engage in political action when they experience religious identity threat.

**Group Positions**

Although Dutch Muslims are generally devalued and distrusted as the “enemy within,” the distinct group positions of Moroccan and Turkish Muslims imply differential degrees of exposure to religious identity threat. In the Netherlands, Moroccan Muslims are the prime target of anti-Islam feelings. The Turkish group is less devalued than the Moroccan group in the Dutch ethnic hierarchy (Phalet & Gijsberts, 2007). For instance, when using a feeling thermometer to indicate their general feelings toward Turkish–Dutch and Moroccan–Dutch Muslims, Dutch-majority group members evaluated the former group of Muslims more positively than the latter (Verkuyten & Poppe, 2008). From their side, the Turkish–Dutch were found to differentiate and distance themselves from the Moroccan–Dutch; and this tendency toward “horizontal hostility” between Turkish and Moroccan minority groups (White & Langer, 1999) increased with growing opposition against Islam in the Netherlands (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). Compared to the Moroccan–Dutch, therefore, the Turkish–Dutch are a less prototypical and less-devalued Muslim group in Dutch society, which also tends to distinguish itself from other Muslim minorities.

Barreto, Spears, Ellemers, and Shahinper (2003) found that members of a devalued immigrant group were more likely to stress their dual identity as ethnic minority members and citizens when communicating with a majority group (rather than an in-group) audience who questioned or denied their double-identity claims. Interestingly, this audience effect was not found in a less-devalued immigrant group, whose double-identity claims were less contested by the majority group. In a similar vein, Dutch Muslims engaging in political action as Muslim citizens can be seen as publicly asserting their religious and civic membership. To the extent that the self-definition of Turkish–Dutch Muslims as both Muslims and
citizens is less likely to be denied or rejected, they are less exposed to identity threat than Moroccan Muslims. Hence, they should be less motivated to perform their religious identity in the political domain. In contrast, in view of their more peripheral position in the Dutch intergroup system, Moroccan Muslims should be especially motivated to perform their religious identity.

To sum up, our main purpose is to examine whether the distinct group positions of Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims influence when and how they will take political action as Muslim citizens. To this end, two parallel survey studies were conducted with community samples of self-identified Muslims of Moroccan and Turkish immigrant origin in Rotterdam. In the following sections, we derive specific hypotheses about the effects of religious identity salience, goal framing, and normative constraints on political action in both Muslim groups.

Religious Identity Salience

With a view to inducing situational variation in the level of religious identity threat, we manipulate the salience of the religious identity of Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims, relative to their ethnic identities. Minority groups that face high levels of threat should be strongly motivated to act collectively for the purpose of consolidating their threatened group identity (Klein et al., 2007). Consequently, and because of the religious character of identity threat in the Dutch intergroup context, the religious identity salience hypothesis predicts that Moroccan–Dutch Muslims will be especially motivated to act together as Muslim citizens when their religious (rather than ethnic) group identity is made salient. In contrast, Turkish–Dutch Muslims, who experience lower levels of religious identity threat in the Dutch intergroup system, should be less motivated to take action under similar conditions of religious identity salience.

To test the impact of religious identity salience in both Muslim groups, a between-subjects priming experiment was conducted in which participants were assigned to situational contexts that accentuated either ethnic or religious categories. In priming religious (or ethnic) identity, our aim was not to decouple religion and ethnicity, since these identity categories are not neatly partitioned in social reality. Rather, making religious (vs. ethnic) identity salient foregrounds religion (vs. ethnicity) in one’s situational sense of self. Our focus on the contextual salience of religious identity complements well-researched explanations of collective action tendencies from stable individual differences in the degree of group identification (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006; Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Simon et al., 1998; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000; Wright & Tropp, 2002). Overall, these studies show that identification predicts collective action tendencies. In the present research context, however, individual differences in degree of identification are less informative. One reason is that within-group variance in religious identification among Dutch Muslims is mostly restricted to the upper end of the
scale, distinguishing (quasi-)total from nontotal Muslim identifiers (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). When religion becomes a major sociopolitical dividing line, as is arguably the case in Dutch society, the importance and impact of intragroup differences in religious group identification tend to decline, relative to the power of the situation to activate religious categories and to define group behavior in religious terms. However, individual differences in Muslim identification also imply differences in the readiness to use and respond to religious cues (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Therefore, we take individual differences in group identification into account. This enables us to separate out a pure context effect of religious identity salience on political activism.

**Goal Framing**

Looking beyond identity consolidation, the religious identity performance of Dutch Muslims may also serve to promote specific group goals in the Dutch intergroup context (Klein et al., 2007). In support of the role of goal framing in identity mobilization, social movement research documents the impact of frame alignment processes on movement participation (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Likewise, the ability of leaders as “entrepreneurs of identity” to create relevant frames, which define self and social reality in a way that supports political action, appears to be decisive for group success in sociopolitical struggles (Klein & Licata, 2003; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). Together, these studies suggest that coordinated action hinges upon the congruence of group goals with a relevant group identity. Therefore, we expect that the specific contents of group goals are a crucial moderator of the connection between group identity and political action. Thus, an identity–goal congruence prediction can be made: the political action tendencies of Muslim citizens will be most pronounced when the specific group goal provides an optimal fit with the salient religious identity. To examine the role of identity–goal congruence, a goal-framing experiment manipulated the purpose of political action by varying the contents of the group goals. Using a between-subjects design, religious group goals (“defend Islam”) are contrasted with ethnic group goals (“help the Turkish or Moroccan homeland”) at the subgroup level and with human rights goals (“protect human rights”) at the superordinate level. The experiment adds to existing research on the association of social identity with collective action, which usually predicts general action tendencies without specifying the purpose of political action (cf. supra).

In combination with the priming experiment, the goal-framing experiment allows more precise predictions as to when and how a salient religious identity enables political action. Jointly, the two between-subjects experiments investigate the mobilizing force of distinct religious, ethnic, and superordinate group goals under conditions of religious identity salience. Specifically, religious and ethnic group goals accentuate distinct categories at the subgroup level, whereas human
rights goals reach beyond ethnic or religious subgroups by focusing on a superordinate category. Both ethnic and religious goals stress in different ways the distinctiveness of Muslim citizens as minority group members, whereas superordinate goals foreground what they have in common with non-Muslim citizens. While human rights goals are also congruent with religious group norms, they differ from religious goals in that they deemphasize the distinctiveness of Muslims in favor of the common humanity of all citizens. From the perspective of identity mobilization, Dutch Muslim citizens might opt to deemphasize distinct and possibly threatening aspects of their religion under conditions of religious identity salience, to gain trust or to avoid opposition from the majority of non-Muslim Dutch citizens (Klein & Licata, 2003).

The experimental design allows us to examine different strategies to achieve identity–goal congruence: Dutch Muslims may mobilize for distinctive religious goals and/or inclusive civic goals when their Muslim identity is made salient. More generally, religious group norms can be, and have been used to mobilize Muslims for very different political projects depending on the sociopolitical context (Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002). As seen from the perspective of identity mobilization, the goal framing of political action takes into account social-reality constraints on identity performance. Since the specific social realities of Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims entail different constraints on the public performance of their Muslim identity, what represents optimal identity–goal congruence under similar conditions of religious identity salience may differ between both groups. Accordingly, we expected that the Moroccan–Dutch Muslims, who face high religious identity threat, will be most motivated to take political action when their Muslim identity is made salient and when the action is framed in terms of distinctive religious goals. In contrast, Turkish–Dutch Muslims whose group position in Dutch society is less peripheral, may be more likely to mobilize when political action is framed in terms of inclusive human rights goals.

Normative Constraints

A final aim of this research is to explore the moderating role of legal constraints on political action in Dutch society. In other words, does religious identity salience increase the willingness of Muslim citizens to take nonnormative (i.e., punishable) action? Documenting the strategic side of identity performance, research on deindividuation has shown that group members take into account the risk of punishment when publicly affirming their group identity in front of powerful groups in society (Reicher & Levine, 1994). At the same time, the need for in-group respect and the presence of in-group support can motivate and empower minority group members to openly challenge the norms of powerful groups (Reicher, Levine, & Gordijn, 1998; Simon & Stürmer, 2003). The double membership of Dutch Muslims as Muslims and citizens implies the psychological presence of
both the Muslim in-group and the Dutch-majority group as relevant audiences. This raises the question of whether and when Muslim citizens will openly challenge Dutch civic norms. To investigate this question, a within-subject design is used, presenting legal and illegal forms of political action in random order to all participants. We expected that Moroccan–Dutch Muslims, who are most exposed to religious identity threat, will be more likely to challenge Dutch civic norms when their Muslim identity is made salient. We did not expect such an effect for Turkish–Dutch Muslims.

Method

Participants

Two parallel studies were conducted in Rotterdam. The studies were introduced as surveys of the experiences and opinions of inhabitants of Rotterdam with regard to cultural diversity and equal opportunities in the city. Participants were visited at home and took part in computer-assisted personal interviews with trained co-ethnic and multilingual interviewers. Questionnaires were bilingual, allowing interviewers to switch between Dutch and Moroccan–Arab or Turkish language screens. Interviewers showed a badge of Utrecht University when introducing the research. Ensuring the ecological validity of the research, the interview situation thus implied the simultaneous psychological presence and mutual visibility of both Muslim and Dutch audiences.

In Study 1, 544 Moroccan–Dutch and in Study 2, 640 Turkish–Dutch adults who self-identified as Muslims (over 98%) were randomly sampled from the commune register of Rotterdam on the basis of ethnic ancestry. Only cases with sufficient nonmissing values were included in the analyses (i.e., 521 in Study 1 and 625 in Study 2). For cases with few missing values, maximum likelihood estimation was used to impute estimates for missing values (Allison, 2001).

Interviews were taken in the language of choice of the participant (9% used mostly Moroccan–Arab, 70% mostly Dutch, and 21% Dutch with oral Berber translation in Study 1; in Study 2, 32% used mostly Turkish and 68% mostly Dutch). About one in two participants were women (42% in both studies). Participants were between 20 and 72 years of age ($M = 32, SD = 10.9$ in Study 1 and $M = 32, SD = 11.3$ in Study 2). A minority (17% in Study 1 and 22% in Study 2) was born in the Netherlands or migrated before the age of six (15% in Study 1 and 13% in Study 2). A total of 47% of the Moroccan–Dutch and 61% of the Turkish–Dutch sample had Dutch citizenship. Most of the foreign nationals (81% and 63%, respectively) intended to apply for citizenship status in the near future. Both groups were similarly low educated: 59% of the Moroccan and 56% of the Turkish sample had only a high school diploma or less.
Materials and Procedure

The dependent measures in both studies were adapted from the Dutch electoral surveys to assess political action tendencies. Participants were told that citizens who do not agree with the way things are going in society, can use several action means to express their opinion or to exert pressure. They were asked to indicate whether they themselves would be willing to take a number of actions on a 3-point scale from (1) certainly not over (2) possibly to (3) certainly. Note that this measure directly asks about behavioral intentions, as distinct from commonly used measures of public support for political action. As part of the measurement of political action tendencies, a goal-framing experiment was introduced. In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to three conditions, so that they indicated their willingness to take action with regard to one out of three goal types. Specifically, political action was framed in terms of either ethnic (“help Morocco or Turkey”; $n = 165$ in Study 1 and 195 in Study 2), or religious (defend Islam; $n = 180$ in Study 1 and 216 in Study 2), or superordinate group goals (protect human rights; $n = 176$ in Study 1 and 214 in Study 2). In each condition, the interviewer read up a short list of legal actions (i.e., sign a petition, donate money, and take part in a demonstration) as well as illegal actions (i.e., use street violence, and damage property), which appeared on the screen in random order to avoid order effects ($\alpha = .73$ in Study 1 and .74 in Study 2). Legal and illegal actions formed two reliable and moderately related factors in confirmatory factor analysis, labeled “normative” and “nonnormative action.” On average, both groups were quite willing to take normative political action ($M = 2.4$, $SD = .59$ in Study 1; $M = 2.11$, $SD = .66$ in Study 2) and rather reluctant to engage in nonnormative action ($M = 1.3$, $SD = .53$; $M = 1.24$, $SD = .49$). Combining goal types as between-subjects variables and action forms as within-subject variables, the assessment of political action distinguishes between (three by two is) six modes of political mobilization. Thus, participants in the ethnic condition of the goal-framing experiment indicated whether they would, for example, donate money or violate private property for the purpose of helping their homeland; participants in the religious condition were asked whether they would donate or violate property to defend Islam; and those in the superordinate condition whether they would donate or violate property to protect human rights.

Immediately preceding the political module of the interview questionnaire, the identity module posed a series of questions about group identity and intergroup relations. In a randomized between-subjects design, about half of the participants ($n = 252$ in Study 1 and 315 in Study 2) answered the same series of questions with reference to their ethnic identity as Moroccans or Turks; the other half ($n = 269$ in Study 1 and 310 in Study 2) answered exactly the same questions with regard to their religious identity as Muslims. As part of the identity module, five items measured (on 5-point scales) participants’ self-identification as Moroccans
or Turks in the ethnic priming condition and as Muslims in the religious priming condition. This measure was included in the analyses to separate out situational variation in ethnic or religious identity salience from individual differences in ethnic or religious self-identification. The five items have been used in previous research with ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (Verkuyten, 2005) and they yielded reliable scales for ethnic ($\alpha = .68$ in Study 1 and $.70$ in Study 2) and religious identification ($\alpha = .81$ in both studies). On average, Moroccan Muslims identified strongly as Moroccans ($M = 3.7$, $SD = .70$) and very strongly as Muslims ($M = 4.0$, $SD = .77$). Similarly, Turkish Muslims identified strongly as Turks ($M = 3.6$, $SD = .76$) and as Muslims ($M = 3.6$, $SD = .89$). Education (0: up to lower secondary level in Morocco or full secondary in the Netherlands; 1: higher levels) and gender (0: women; 1: men) were also included as control variables. Age, migration generation, and citizenship status were not included in the analyses, since they did not affect political action tendencies.

**Data Analysis**

Structural equation modeling was used to estimate causal models with mean structures in multiple groups (Kline, 2005). Separate models were tested for Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims. An integrative four-group model with both priming conditions in both samples was also estimated. However, separate Moroccan and Turkish models were more straightforward, both statistically and interpretively. To test the effects of religious identity salience, ethnic and religious priming conditions were specified as comparison groups: participants who answered the questions with regard to their ethnic identity in group 1, and those who answered the same questions with reference to religion in group 2. The following causal models were estimated simultaneously across priming conditions (see Tables 1 and 2). On the dependent side, normative and nonnormative forms of political action were distinguished. Both action forms were defined at the latent level to correct regression coefficients for unreliability in the dependent measures. On the independent side, the goal framing of political action was specified as fixed effects of two dummy variables for religious and superordinate goal types (vs. ethnic goals as a reference category). In addition, degree of identification was specified at the latent level, measuring ethnic identification in group 1 and religious identification in group 2. Education and gender were added as control variables.

For model modification, comparison, and evaluation, formal indices of global and local fit were complemented with conventional fit indices (Hu & Bentler, 1999): good fit if $\chi^2/df < 2$, the comparative fit index CFI > .90 and the root mean squared error of approximation RMSEA <.05. The $\chi^2$-difference test was used for model comparison: a modified model was selected when setting a parameter

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<tr>
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<th>Ethnic Identity Priming</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slopes for normative action</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.15 (.05)**A</td>
<td>.15 (.05)**A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.37 (.05)**B</td>
<td>.37 (.05)**B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Religious goals</td>
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<td>.16 (.07)*</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human rights goals</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.33 (.08)**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>−.03 (.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Latent means and intercepts</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
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<td>.33 (.08)**</td>
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<td>Normative action</td>
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<td>Nonnormative action</td>
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<td>.14 (.05)**</td>
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</table>

*Note. Same capital letters indicate equality constraints across priming conditions. Effect parameters are unstandardized coefficients \( b \). Standard errors are between parentheses. Model fit: \( \chi^2(155) = 225.25 \); CFI = .96; RMSEA = .03; \( \Delta \chi^2(13) = 18.35 \) (\( p = .15 \)).

* \( p < .05 \); ** \( p < .01 \).

Table 2. Final Causal Model of Political Mobilization for Turkish–Dutch Muslims: Parameter Estimates for Slopes, Intercepts, and Means in Religious (vs. Ethnic) Priming Condition

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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.14 (.06)**A</td>
<td>.14 (.06)**A</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>.29 (.06)**B</td>
<td>13 (.06)*</td>
<td>.25 (.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious goals</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>−.13 (.05)**D</td>
<td>−.13 (.05)**D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights goals</td>
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<td>.1 (0.08)**</td>
<td>−.13 (.05)**D</td>
<td>−.13 (.05)**D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
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<td>.27 (.05)**C</td>
<td>.13 (.04)**E</td>
<td>.13 (.04)**E</td>
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<td><strong>Latent means and intercepts</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
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<td>−.16 (.07)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Normative action</td>
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<td>Nonnormative action</td>
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*Note. Same capital letters indicate equality constraints across priming conditions. Effect parameters are unstandardized coefficients \( b \). Standard errors are between parentheses. Model fit: \( \chi^2(152) = 270.27 \); RMSEA = .04; CFI = .94; \( \Delta \chi^2(17) = 19.26 \) (\( p = .31 \)).

* \( p < .05 \); ** \( p < .01 \).
free (i.e., decrease in $df$) significantly improved local or global model fit, or when constraining a parameter (i.e., increase in $df$) did not affect the fit.

Following a stepwise approach, common measurement models and causal models were specified across priming conditions. Next, increasingly restrictive equality constraints were imposed on (co-)variances, means and intercepts, and slopes in a stepwise fashion. In particular, to test main effects of religious (vs. ethnic) identity priming on political action, equality constraints were imposed on the intercepts of normative and nonnormative action across priming conditions. In addition, to test interactions with goal framing, equality constraints were imposed on the slopes of goal type effects across ethnic and religious priming conditions. In the presence of significant main or interaction effects of priming, equality constraints on intercepts or slopes are rejected on the basis of a significantly worse fit relative to the baseline model ($\Delta \chi^2$ test).

Results and Discussion

Study 1: Moroccan–Dutch Muslims

Because Moroccan–Dutch Muslims face relatively high levels of identity threat, it was expected that under identity-threatening circumstances, they would be motivated to act together as group members and to assert their religious identity in opposition to the dominant majority. Thus, when the situational context makes their threatened Muslim identity salient, we expected more readiness for normative action when religious group goals are involved (identity–goal congruence hypothesis), as well as a generally increased readiness for nonnormative action.

In the best fitting measurement model, $\chi^2(74) = 100.90, p = .02$, RMSEA = .03, CFI = .97; $\Delta \chi^2(11) = 12.05, p = .36$, all loadings for ethnic and religious identification were invariant, as well as two out of five intercepts. A negative error covariance was allowed between two indicators of ethnic identification. Mean levels of ethnic and religious identification differed significantly, so that participants were even more strongly identified as Muslims than as Moroccans ($\Delta M = .33, p < .001$). Overall, both normative and nonnormative political action were fully equivalent across priming conditions, whereas the ethnic and religious identification measures were structurally equivalent (Van de Vijver, & Leung, 1997).

The final causal model had a good global fit (see Table 1). All variances could be set equal across experimental conditions, as well as a residual covariance between normative and nonnormative action forms ($r = .39; p < .001$). As a most rigorous test of religious identity salience and identity–goal congruence, intercepts and slopes were set equal across ethnic and religious priming conditions. In line with the expected interaction of identity priming with goal framing, Moroccan–Dutch Muslims were most willing to engage in normative action when their
Muslim identity was made salient and when the action served the cause of Islam. In addition, across priming conditions, more highly educated Moroccans and men were more willing to take normative action than less educated Moroccans and women.

With regard to nonnormative action, we found a significant main effect of religious identity priming. As expected, Moroccan–Dutch Muslims were less reluctant to engage in nonnormative action when their threatened identity as Muslims was made salient. In addition, a negative interaction effect of religious identity priming with degree of identification was also found. Apparently, a quasi-total religious identification protects Moroccan–Dutch Muslims from engaging in violent or disruptive behavior. Overall, the model explained most variance in normative action tendencies ($\eta^2 = .12$ for ethnic and .14 for religious priming). Only in the religious priming condition, the model explained some variance in nonnormative action ($\eta^2 = .10$), thanks to the buffering effect of religious identification. The model did not explain nonnormative action in the ethnic priming condition ($\eta^2 = .01$).

The results of Study 1 show that the willingness of Moroccan–Dutch Muslims to take political action varied depending on the situational salience of their threatened Muslim identity. In the normative domain, the pattern of findings (i.e., invariant intercepts and differential slopes of religious vs. ethnic goal type effects) is in line with the identity–goal congruence hypothesis. Thus, under conditions of religious (vs. ethnic) identity salience, Moroccan–Dutch Muslims are more willing to donate money, sign petitions, or demonstrate for the purpose of defending Islam. This finding supports the explanatory role of the congruence of a salient group identity with a specific political project in predicting when group members will engage in collective action. In the nonnormative domain of political action, a distinct pattern of findings (i.e., differential intercepts and zero slopes of goal type effects) was in accordance with the religious identity salience hypothesis. Thus, Moroccan–Dutch citizens were more willing to take action when their Muslim identity was primed, even when the action involved punishable behavior. As expected from the primary function of identity consolidation, the salience of a threatened religious identity seems to motivate Moroccan–Dutch citizens to publicly assert their Muslim identity. Moreover, the nonnormative nature of political action, like engaging in street violence or violating private property, suggests an increased willingness of Moroccan–Dutch citizens to resist Dutch civic norms when their Muslim identity is made salient. In the absence of framing effects, nonnormative action can be viewed as an undifferentiated reaction to identity threat, which does not articulate a specific political project. Apparently, nonnormative action reflects a general tendency to challenge the Dutch majority by publicly engaging in punishable behavior.

Somewhat surprisingly, these kinds of actions appear to be most likely among Moroccan Dutch with a relatively weak Muslim identification. This result goes
against common findings of a positive association of group identification with political action tendencies. Importantly, it also qualifies popular perceptions of so-called Muslim radicals as particularly prone to using violence. In view of generally high levels of religious identification among Moroccan–Dutch Muslims, one possible explanation is that a quasi-total Muslim identification implies higher levels of conformity to religious group norms, which generally oppose disruptive or violent behavior. Moreover, as quasi-total Muslims are trying to live up to the ideal of a good Muslim, their norm-congruent behavior is supported by fellow believers with whom they form a strong moral community (Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003; Herriot, 2007). Religious identity salience may function as a reminder of religious norms of sociomoral behavior, which preclude nonnormative action regardless of the cause it might serve. Another possibility is that relatively weak Muslim identifiers feel less secure in their religious identity, and hence are less reluctant to engage in nonnormative action when religion is made salient. For them, religious identity salience may induce a need to assert their loyalty as Muslims, even at the risk of incurring legal sanctions. Indeed, the fear of not being accepted or respected by fellow in-group members has been found to motivate the aggressive assertion of an insecure group identity toward the outside world (Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995).

Study 2: Turkish–Dutch Muslims

The results of Study 1 with Moroccan–Dutch Muslims are in line with expectations from religious identity threat. Study 2 replicates the first study with Turkish–Dutch Muslims, who have a less peripheral position in Dutch society. If religious identity threat is indeed driving the political activism of Dutch Muslims, Turkish Muslims should be rather weakly motivated to take action when their Muslim identity is made salient (religious identity salience hypothesis). More specifically, they should be most likely to engage in normative action when superordinate goals emphasize the common cause of all citizens (identity–goal congruence hypothesis).

Study 2 replicates the same partially equivalent measurement model with a good fit: $\chi^2(73) = 117.33, p < .001$, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .94; $\Delta\chi^2(11) = 7.78, p = .73$. Measures of normative and nonnormative political action were fully equivalent, and of ethnic and religious identification were partially equivalent across priming conditions. Different from the previous study, mean levels of ethnic and religious identification did not differ between conditions.

The final causal model had also a good global fit (see Table 2). All variances could be set equal, as well as the covariance between normative and nonnormative action ($r = .35; p < .001$). As a rigorous test of the role of religious identity salience and identity–goal congruence, equality constraints were imposed on intercepts and slopes across priming conditions. In the normative domain of political
action, Turkish–Dutch Muslims were less willing to mobilize under conditions of religious identity salience. This negative main effect was qualified by the expected interaction of religious identity priming with goal framing. Turkish–Dutch Muslims were generally less mobilized as Muslim citizens, except when political action was framed at the superordinate level of human rights goals. In addition, a negative effect of human rights goals on nonnormative action did not differ between priming conditions. Apparently, superordinate goals also served as a buffer against nonnormative action tendencies. Furthermore, Turkish–Dutch citizens who more strongly identified with their ethnic or religious in-group were more willing to take action, especially in the normative domain. Men mobilized more than women for both normative and nonnormative action. Higher education predicted normative action only. Like the effects of degree of identification, education and gender effects on political mobilization were invariant across priming conditions, except for a differential gender effect on nonnormative action: only Turkish–Dutch women were (even) more unlikely to challenge civic norms when their Muslim identity was made salient. The model explained most variance in normative action ($\eta^2 = .12$ in the ethnic and .16 in the religious priming condition). Effect sizes were smaller for nonnormative action ($\eta^2 = .05$ in the ethnic and .07 in the religious priming condition).

To summarize, Study 2 shows that the contextual salience of a religious (vs. ethnic) group identity affects the willingness of Turkish–Dutch Muslims to take political action. Moreover, in support of the moderating role of goal framing, we find that the impact of a salient religious identity depends on the specific goals of political action. In addition, the impact of religious identity salience was mostly restricted to the normative domain. In comparison with Study 1, the findings in the normative domain (i.e., varying intercepts and varying slopes for a superordinate vs. ethnic goal type effect) suggest a distinct Turkish variant of identity–goal congruence. Generally, Turkish minority members were less likely to take political action when their religious (vs. ethnic) identity was made salient. This result is not due to a lower importance attached to their religious identity, as levels of identification with ethnic and religious group categories were similar. Moreover, individual differences in ethnic and religious group identification were similarly related to political action, so that more highly identified Turkish Muslims were more active regardless of the ethnic or religious contents of identity. To better understand the demobilizing effect of religious identity salience, it is essential to take into account the goal framing of political action. In particular, demobilization was counteracted by a unique mobilizing effect of superordinate human rights goals under the condition of religious identity salience. When expressing their willingness to engage in political action as Muslim citizens, the Turkish–Dutch appear to be especially motivated to promote higher-order human rights goals. Like religious goals, human rights goals make a strong moral appeal that is congruent with religious group norms. At the same time, they differ from religious group
goals because they deemphasize the distinctiveness of Muslims in favor of the common humanity of all citizens. Thus, the framing of political action in terms of human rights goals foregrounds what Muslim citizens have in common with the majority of non-Muslim Dutch citizens. This suggests that Turkish–Dutch Muslims respond to religious identity threat by deemphasizing their distinctiveness as Muslims from the Dutch majority. This is in line with a strategic side of identity mobilization and with the findings of Klein and Licata (2003). In this way, minority groups can try to avoid antagonizing more powerful groups who might otherwise impede group success. In the case of Turkish–Dutch Muslims, religious identity salience may induce a special need to be recognized as a less prototypical subgroup within the wider and generally devalued category of Dutch Muslims. When reminded of their Muslim identity, they may be especially motivated to seek acceptance by the Dutch majority as worthy Muslim citizens, in contrast with Moroccan–Dutch Muslims whose claims to equal acceptance as citizens are less convincing.

Outside the normative domain of political action, our findings (i.e., invariant intercepts and slopes) show that Turkish Muslims were neither more nor less willing to engage in violent or disruptive action when their Muslim identity was made salient. This is in line with the expectation that Turkish–Dutch Muslims will be less motivated to perform their religious identity, because they are less susceptible to religious identity threat. It also turned out that nonnormative protest is especially unlikely when political action is framed in terms of superordinate human rights goals. This finding tallies with our understanding of human rights mobilization among Turkish–Dutch Muslims as oriented toward acceptance by the Dutch-majority group as worthy and law-abiding citizens.

**General Discussion**

Against the backdrop of what some commentators have called an ongoing “Dutch–Muslim cultural war” (Scroggins, 2005), we asked the question of when and for what purpose Dutch Muslims will act together as Muslim citizens. Using the notion of religious identity performance as a heuristic framework (Klein et al., 2007), parallel studies examined political action tendencies among Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims. These groups are differentially devalued in Dutch society, so that Moroccan Muslims face higher levels of identity threat than Turkish Muslims. The studies varied the situational salience of Muslim identity in comparison with an ethnic definition of group identity. In line with the idea of identity consolidation, and in view of the religious nature of identity threat in the Dutch intergroup context, the religious identity salience hypothesis predicted that especially Moroccan–Dutch Muslims would be more willing to act together as Muslim citizens when their threatened religious identity is made salient. Going beyond general measures of collective action tendencies, the research also
examined the role of goal framing in the political mobilization of Muslim identity. The identity–goal congruence hypothesis predicted that Dutch Muslims would be specifically motivated to promote group goals that are congruent with a salient religious identity. Finally, to test the moderating role of normative constraints, the studies included normative and nonnormative action forms.

In the normative domain of political action, we found different variants of identity–goal congruence for Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims. In the Moroccan–Dutch group, the mobilizing effect of religious identity salience was restricted to the promotion of religious group goals. In contrast, it was the promotion of superordinate goals that enabled the Turkish Dutch to mobilize as Muslim citizens. Whereas Moroccan–Dutch Muslims appear to respond to religious identity threat by publicly expressing their special commitment to Islam as a distinctive identity and political project, the less-devalued Turkish–Dutch Muslims respond to religious identity threat by withdrawing from the political scene when they are called upon to defend Islam, or by rallying in support of human rights as a political project that appeals to their more general moral concerns as citizens. In the nonnormative domain, a general mobilizing effect of religious identity salience was found for Moroccan–Dutch Muslims. They were more ready to engage in disruptive action when their Muslim identity was made salient. Since nonnormative mobilization did not depend on goal framing, this finding suggests a general willingness to resist Dutch civic norms as a reaction against religious identity threat. Among Turkish–Dutch Muslims, we did not find a similar spillover effect of religious identity threat into nonnormative action, as salience effects were mostly restricted to the normative domain (except for a differential gender effect). Taken together, the two studies show that different group positions within a larger and generally devalued category of Dutch Muslims affect the willingness of Moroccan and Turkish Muslims to take political action as Muslim citizens. Moreover, both groups tend to support qualitatively different political projects.

Looking beyond distinct patterns of mobilization, the findings demonstrate the impact of a salient Muslim identity on the political mobilization of Dutch Muslims. Importantly, both Moroccan and Turkish Dutch strongly identified as Muslims, so that the average degree of religious identification was equally high or slightly higher relative to the degree of ethnic identification. Over and above very high levels of group identification and public visibility in the Dutch context, however, the relative situational salience of their Muslim identity made a significant difference in the political mobilization of Dutch Muslims. This research goes beyond previous studies of group identification and collective action in a number of ways. First, it identifies more precisely the role of religious identity by varying its contextual salience relative to ethnicity. The priming effects supplement earlier findings relating collective action to individual differences in group identification. As religion is becoming a major sociopolitical divide in many western societies, more situations will make religious identities salient and may thus instigate
political activism even among less strongly identified Muslims. Second, the research demonstrates the interaction of religious identity with specific ethnic, religious, and superordinate group goals by varying the goal framing of political action. Third, the results corroborate a normative distinction between legal and illegal action forms. Most importantly, qualitatively different patterns of religious identity performance among Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims attest to the significance of differential group positions within the wider and generally devalued category of Muslims. While differential group positions are specific in the Dutch context, the research has considerable societal relevance beyond the Dutch case. Importantly, the findings problematize the amalgamation of distinct ethnic minorities and they challenge the commonsense idea of an inherent conflict of Islam with civic norms in liberal democracies.

As this research is covering new empirical ground, our findings lay the ground for further research. The main focus of the present work was on the situational salience of religious identity. Future research should combine a situational approach with more refined measures of individual differences in religious identification. By distinguishing multiple components of identity, and/or by articulating the specific contents of identity at the intersections of religion with ethnicity and citizenship, such measures should throw more light on mixed findings of positive, zero, or negative associations with political action. In addition, future studies should further develop the empirical basis for distinct consolidation and mobilization functions of religious identity performance. Thus, there is room for alternative manipulations or measures of identity threat as a crucial moderator; and there is a need to better understand the impact of mutually visible minority and majority audiences on the dual identity claims of immigrant minorities. Finally, the comparative approach from different group positions of Muslims should be extended beyond the Dutch context. Thus, more research is needed on the political impact of an emerging European Turkish identity as an alternative superordinate category, which is not open to Moroccans as non-European Muslims. Looking beyond Europe, comparative studies in other intergroup settings should contextualize further the various ways in which religion plays out in the political domain, ranging from disruptive or violent protest, over democratic forms of civic engagement, to demobilization or disengagement.

References


KAREN PHALET is a Professor of Social and Cultural Psychology at the Psychology Department, Center for Social and Cultural Psychology (CSCP), University of Leuven, Belgium. She is also a senior research fellow of the European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) at Utrecht University. Her main research interests are in the domains of acculturation, culture and self, intercultural relations, and in the role group processes in explaining inequality and conflict between ethnic or religious minority and majority groups.

GÜLSELI BAYSU is an experienced researcher at the Psychology Department, Center for Social and Cultural Psychology (CSCP), University of Leuven, Belgium. She obtained her PhD in Psychology at Middle East Technical University, Turkey. Her research is concerned with the impact of intergroup relations on
individual outcomes in various domains, ranging from school success to political behavior. Her current research examines the role of segregation, discrimination, social identity, and stereotype threat in minority school careers.

MAYKEL VERKUYTEN is a professor in the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science at the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Utrecht University, The Netherlands. He is also the academic director of the European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) at Utrecht University. His main research interests are in questions on ethnic identity and interethnic relations.