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Research article

The self-regulatory role of anticipated group-based shame and guilt in inhibiting in-group favoritism

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Abstract

In three studies, we examined whether the anticipation of group-based guilt and shame inhibits in-group favoritism. In Studies 1 and 2, anticipated group-based shame negatively predicted in-group favoritism; in neither study did anticipated group-based guilt uniquely predict in-group favoritism. In Study 3, we orthogonally manipulated anticipated group-based shame and guilt. Here, we found that the shame (but not the guilt) manipulation had a significant inhibitory effect on in-group favoritism. Anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) promotes egalitarian intergroup behavior. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Given the countless incidents of group oppression, discrimination, and genocide that have taken place in human history, it would be easy to conclude that group membership promotes selfish, hostile, and immoral behavior. Research with minimal groups showing that merely being categorized into abstract, meaningless groups can evoke in-group favoritism (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971) is widely regarded as supporting this conclusion. In the present paper, we contribute to the small but growing body of literature suggesting that groups are motivated to act morally. We argue that the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions can, under certain conditions, attenuate in-group favoritism.

There is a growing literature on the role of emotions in regulating intergroup behavior (e.g., Devine, Plant, & Buswell, 2000; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2007). Researchers have found that experiencing interpersonal guilt for discriminatory behavior reduces such behaviors in the future (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Devine & Monteith, 1993; Monteith, 1993) and that group-based guilt serves a self-regulatory function (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). Moreover, recent research suggests that anticipated emotions (such as guilt and shame) regulate moral behavior (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2003, 2007). Indeed, recent intergroup research has found that the mere anticipation of aversive group-based emotions is sufficient to inhibit immoral in-group actions (Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013a, 2013b). Although this research is promising, this effect has only been found in situations where the in-group has a secure and superior position in the social hierarchy. The present research enhanced this initial work by assessing the self-

regulatory role of these emotions in general and specifically in the absence of this superiority.

THE EMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGITIMATE IN-GROUP ACTIONS

Guilt and shame about the negative actions or attributes of one's group may be experienced through association with the in-group even in the absence of personal responsibility for these actions or attributes (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). These group-based emotions are evoked when members of an advantaged group believe that their privileged in-group status was achieved through illegitimate actions for which their group is responsible (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2003; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). The in-group members' interpretation of an illegitimate action determines whether group-based guilt or shame is elicited. Although researchers debate whether shame stems from actions implying a global (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) or a specific lapse of one's identity and reputation (e.g., Gausel & Leach, 2011; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012), there is consensus that the focus is on one's identity, rather than the behavior (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Ferguson, Burgman, White, & Eyre, 2007). Similarly, believing that an in-group transgression threatens the in-group's moral identity should evoke group-based shame (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic,

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2008; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). In the case of guilt, people focus on the immoral action rather than the self and feel bad because they committed a transgression ("I did a bad thing;" Niedenthal et al., 1994). Similarly, appraising the in-group as responsible for a controllable immoral action should elicit group-based guilt (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004).

Group-based guilt and shame have aversive consequences for in-group members through the threat that these emotions pose to the group's identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). For these emotions to arise, people must believe that their group was responsible for an immoral action. Accepting this appraisal associates the in-group with a transgression (Doosje et al., 1998). Group-based shame poses an additional threat to social identity because people presumably believe that the transgression tarnishes their image (Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007; Lickel et al., 2005). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) postulates that people are motivated to maintain a positive group identity, and in-group members will therefore try to protect their group's image by means of various "identity management strategies" (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; van Knippenberg, 1989). These strategies serve to defend the in-group's identity by reassigning responsibility for the negative event or legitimizing the in-group's actions. For example, group identity might be protected by externalizing the blame (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Zebel, 2005), dehumanizing the victim (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008), or denying the credibility of the source (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006).

These identity management strategies are post hoc methods of avoiding aversive group-based emotions. In-group members employ these strategies *after* the incident has taken place. Identity management strategies may also be used to avoid these emotions in an anticipatory fashion, *before* an incident has taken place. For example, the use of propaganda to dehumanize an out-group can alleviate the need to act morally towards this group (Bar-Tal, 1990; Staub, 1989), thereby preventing group-based guilt and shame for any future transgressions. People may also use preemptive *prosocial* strategies to avoid these aversive group-based emotions and the threat that they pose to social identity, such as not committing the transgression in the first place (Shepherd et al., 2013a, 2013b). Indeed, the mere anticipation of aversive group-based emotions promotes collective action against a proposed in-group transgression (Shepherd et al., 2013a) and moderates the amount of in-group favoritism exhibited by members of high-status groups in stable hierarchies (Shepherd et al., 2013b). The aversive anticipated group-based emotions signal the threat to social identity that a transgression poses. The desire to avoid such threats motivates group members to inhibit the transgression.

Although this initial research is promising, there are numerous issues that still need to be addressed. For example, to date the inhibitory role of anticipated group-based shame and guilt has only been demonstrated in situations in which the in-group has secure and superior status relative to an out-group. For instance, Shepherd et al. (2013b) found that anticipated group-based emotions only deterred in-group favoritism in stable high-status groups. Although status was not manipulated or measured in

Shepherd et al. (2013a), the fact that the in-group was able to perpetrate an aggressive transgression implies that the status and/or power of the in-group was greater than that of the victim group. The present study therefore extended this earlier research by assessing the self-regulatory role of anticipated group-based emotions in more general situations where the in-group does *not* possess a superior position in the social hierarchy.

Shepherd et al. (2013a, 2013b) argue that because group-based shame is more closely related to the valence of the in-group's identity or reputation than guilt (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007), it should be a stronger signal of social identity threats. Moreover, shame (but not guilt) is closely associated with the belief that group members are "cut from the same cloth" (Lickel et al., 2004, 2005). Actions that damage social identity are therefore highly detrimental to the image of individual group members. Because of this and the fact that social identity theory suggests that the valence of the in-group's identity is a primary concern for in-group members, Shepherd et al. argued that anticipated group-based shame is more likely than guilt to be a negative predictor of in-group favoritism. In line with this, they found that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) promoted collective action against an impending in-group transgression (Shepherd et al., 2013a) and moderated in-group favoritism in stable high-status groups (Shepherd et al., 2013b). Although this prior research provides indirect support for our identity threat rationale, to date there is no direct support for this. In the final study reported in the present paper, we therefore examined whether the inhibitory effect of anticipated group-based shame on in-group favoritism is mediated by concern for the in-group's social identity.

STUDY 1

In Study 1 we assessed the relationship of anticipated group-based guilt and shame to in-group favoritism. This study used an inter-university intergroup context. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they anticipated feeling group-based guilt and shame if their own university were to discriminate against a rival university. Participants then distributed research funding to anonymous applicants from their own and the rival university. According to university league tables, the rival university was of a similar status to the in-group university. Importantly, the league table position of the universities was not made salient to the participants at any time throughout the study, ensuring that there was not a salient status difference between the two groups.

In this study, we also explore whether social dominance orientation (SDO) might explain the predicted effects. SDO reflects people's tendency to support group hierarchies and to believe that it is legitimate for some groups to dominate others (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). It has been found that SDO is positively related to the justification of immoral in-group actions (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010) and in-group favoritism (Sidanius, Haley, Molina, & Pratto, 2007; but see Reynolds et al., 2007). Thus, people high in SDO might justify in-group favoritism, reducing their likelihood of anticipated group-based shame and increasing their likelihood of exhibiting in-group bias. We therefore measured

SDO in order to check the extent to which the predicted negative relationship between anticipated group-based shame and in-group favoritism, if obtained, was due to this factor.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 68 undergraduate students (53 women and 15 men) participated in this study in exchange for course credit or £3.00 (approximately \$4.80). The age range of respondents was 18–37 years, with a mean age of 20.18 years. The predictor variables were anticipated group-based guilt and shame.¹ The outcome variable was in-group favoritism. This outcome variable was measured using the so called Tajfel matrices (Tajfel et al., 1971). In-group favoritism was measured using the pull score of FAV (maximum differentiation and maximizing in-group profit) against parity (P). The pull score was measured and calculated using the procedure outlined by Bourhis and colleagues (Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994). Pull scores can range from –12 to 12. Greater positive FAV on P values indicate a stronger preference for in-group favoritism over parity, and greater negative values demonstrate stronger out-group favoritism. Values of zero demonstrate that the participant distributed the resources equally between the in-group and the out-group.

Materials and Procedure

Anticipated Group-based Emotions

After giving consent, participants were informed that this research was investigating the attitudes of students at different universities and that a similar study was being conducted at the rival university. This information was included to strengthen the participants' belief that at the end of the study, the resources would be allocated between the in-group and the out-group. Participants were then asked to rate the extent to which they anticipated experiencing group-based guilt and shame if their own university were to discriminate against the rival university. Anticipated group-based guilt and shame were assessed using two scales adapted from Schmader and Lickel (2006). The guilt items were "guilty", "regret", "sorry", and "remorse" ($\alpha = .84$). The shame items were "ashamed", "humiliated", "disgraced", and "embarrassed" ($\alpha = 0.87$). Four positive (or at least non-negative) anticipated group-based emotion items were also rated "unconcerned", "confident", "apathetic", and "indifferent". Participants were asked "If [ingroup] University students were to discriminate against students from the [outgroup] University in some way, to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?"

¹In this study, we manipulated the salience of the anticipated emotions by asking participants in the experimental (but not the control) condition to rate the extent to which they anticipated group-based guilt and shame if the in-group were to discriminate against the out-group. The effects of this manipulation produced a complex pattern of results. In short, people with high (but not low) levels of self-investment exhibited lower in-group favoritism in the salient than the control condition. Space considerations precluded in-depth reporting of these results in this paper. Therefore, we assessed the measured variables for the participants in the experimental condition. We excluded participants in the control condition because they did not rate any anticipated group-based emotions.

All items were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from *not at all* (0) to *extremely intense* (6).

In-group Favoritism

Participants were then informed that the people responsible for conducting this research wanted to know how people thought research funding should be distributed between academics at the in-group and out-group universities. Participants were told that the grants were distributed in the form of credits. The more credits an applicant had, the more money they would receive. Participants were then asked to distribute credits between anonymous academics at the in-group and out-group universities.

Social Dominance Orientation

Participants also completed an SDO measure. This was adapted from the SDO6 (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and contained eight items (e.g., "In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups"; $\alpha = 0.83$). Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with each of these items on a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree* and 7 = *strongly agree*). When the participants had completed this scale, they were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Anticipated Group-Based Guilt and Shame

Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test whether anticipated group-based guilt and shame were separate constructs. This analysis was conducted using AMOS 19 (Arbuckle, 2010). The model tests were based on the covariance matrix, and maximum likelihood was used as the method of estimation. The two-factor hypothesized model provided an adequate fit to the data, $\chi^2(19) = 27.65$, $p = .090$. This was confirmed by the other fit indices: goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = 0.91, comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.97, normed fit index (NFI) = 0.91, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.082. The alternative single-factor solution did not fit the data well: $\chi^2(20) = 52.58$, $p < .001$, GFI = 0.83, CFI = 0.89, NFI = 0.84, and RMSEA = 0.156. Importantly, the two-factor solution provided a significantly better fit to the data than the single factor solution, $\chi^2(1) = 24.93$, $p < .001$. We therefore concluded that although anticipated group-based shame and guilt were strongly correlated (Table 1), they were empirically distinct constructs.

The mean levels of anticipated group-based shame ($M = 2.79$, $SD = 1.32$) and guilt ($M = 2.82$, $SD = 1.28$) were significantly greater than zero, $t(67) = 17.44$, $p < .001$ and $t(67) = 18.25$, $p < .001$, respectively. This shows that the intensity of these anticipated emotions was at least moderate.

In-group Favoritism

The pull score of FAV on P was used to measure in-group favoritism. This score ranged from –1 to 12. The mean ($M = 1.72$, $SD = 3.33$) was significantly greater than zero, $t(67) = 4.26$, $p < .001$, indicating that, overall, participants engaged in in-group favoritism. A regression analysis was

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for identification, anticipated emotion and in-group favoritism variables for participants in the emotion-salient condition (Study 1)

	<i>M (SD)</i>	1	2	3	4
1) Anticipated group-based shame	2.79 (1.32)	—			
2) Anticipated group-based guilt	2.82 (1.28)	0.68***	—		
3) SDO	2.41 (0.91)	−0.07	−0.11	—	
4) In-group favoritism (FAV on P)	1.72 (3.33)	−0.31**	−0.20	0.07	—

** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

conducted to assess the relationship of anticipated group-based guilt and shame to in-group favoritism (for descriptive statistics and correlations, see Table 1). Anticipated group-based guilt and shame, together with SDO, were predictor variables, and in-group favoritism was the outcome variable. Anticipated group-based shame negatively predicted in-group favoritism ($\beta = -0.33$, $p = .047$). Anticipated group-based guilt, on the other hand, did not predict in-group favoritism ($\beta = 0.03$, $p = .875$). SDO also failed to predict in-group favoritism ($\beta = 0.05$, $p = .704$).² Importantly, the tolerance value was above 0.20 (0.54), indicating that the results were not biased by multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). These results show that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted in-group favoritism.

Discussion

The aim of Study 1 was to investigate the relationship of anticipated group-based guilt and shame to in-group favoritism. Anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted in-group favoritism, even when controlling for individual differences in SDO. Although Study 1 is promising, it could be argued that the relationship between anticipated group-based shame and in-group favoritism is an artifact of in-group identification. Under certain conditions, high identifiers are more likely than low identifiers to discriminate against an out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; for an overview, see Turner, 1999) and to legitimize an in-group transgression in order to avoid group-based shame (Johns et al., 2005). The self-regulatory role of anticipated group-based shame may therefore be because of the fact that both variables are related to in-group identification. We tested this possibility in Study 2.

STUDY 2

There were two differences between Studies 1 and 2. First, we assessed whether the relationship between anticipated group-based shame and in-group favoritism existed when in-group identification was taken into account. Second, we assessed this relationship in an international context, rather than the inter-university context used in Study 1. Here, the in-group were the English and the out-group were Germans. Once again,

participants first rated the extent to which they anticipated feeling group-based guilt and shame if their group were to discriminate against a rival out-group and then distributed research funding between the two groups. Once again, participants did not receive any information about the status of these two groups at any point of the study.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 64 undergraduate students (59 women and 5 men) took part in this study in exchange for course credit. Participants were aged between 18 and 25 years, with a mean age of 18.84 years ($SD = 1.13$). The predictor variables were anticipated group-based guilt and shame, together with in-group identification.³ The outcome variable was in-group favoritism (as indexed by FAV on P). The procedure for measuring and calculating this pull score was identical to that of Study 1.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were first informed that this study was interested in issues affecting English and German students and that an identical study was being conducted in Germany. This information was intended to strengthen the participant's belief that Germans would also be allocating resources at the end of the study. Participants then completed the in-group identification measure. This was adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995) and contained 5 items (e.g., "The English are an important group to me" and "I identify with other English people"; $\alpha = 0.84$). All items were measured on a 7-point Likert type scale (1 = *strongly disagree* and 7 = *strongly agree*).

Participants then completed the negative anticipated group-based guilt and shame scales. These were identical to those used in Study 1, with the exception of the names of the in-group and the out-group ("English" for the in-group and "Germans" for the out-group). Both scales were reliable (shame, $\alpha = 0.87$; guilt, $\alpha = 0.81$). Participants then completed a series of filler tasks to increase the amount of time between completing the anticipated emotion and in-group favoritism measures. After

²Removing SDO from this analysis did not substantially alter the results ($\beta = -0.33$, $p = 0.046$ for shame and $\beta = 0.02$, $p = 0.901$ for guilt). Moreover, SDO did not interact with shame or guilt to predict in-group favoritism ($\beta = 0.21$, $p = 0.301$ for interaction with shame and $\beta = 0.07$, $p = 0.732$ for interaction with guilt).

³Once again, in this study, we manipulated the salience of the anticipated emotions using the sample procedure outlined in Study 1 (Footnote 1). These complex results are not reported in detail in this paper because of space considerations. In short, people with high and low (but not moderate) levels of self-investment exhibited lower in-group favoritism in the salient than in the control condition. The results presented in the succeeding texts are the findings for participants in the experimental condition. Once again, the participants in the control condition were excluded because they did not rate any anticipated group-based emotions.

completing these filler tasks, participants were informed that the funding body responsible for this research was in charge of distributing research grants to academics from across Europe and that because of a large increase in the number of applications from English and German academics, there was a shortage of funding. As a result, this funding body was interested in how people thought that research funding should be distributed between English and German academics. Once again, participants were informed that grants were distributed in the form of credits and that the greater the number of credits that academics have, the more funding they would receive. Participants were then presented with the Tajfel matrices and asked to distribute funding between anonymous English and German academics. When participants had completed the in-group favoritism measure, they were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Identification

The mean level of in-group identification was 5.17 ($SD = 1.12$). This was significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (4), $t(63) = 8.35$, $p < .001$, indicating that the level of in-group identification was moderate to strong.

Anticipated Group-Based Guilt and Shame

Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to assess whether anticipated group-based guilt and shame were separate constructs. This analysis was conducted using AMOS 19 (Arbuckle, 2010) and was based on the covariance matrix. Maximum likelihood was used as the method of estimation. Missing values were estimated using full information maximum likelihood (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). The two-factor solution fitted the data well: $\chi^2(19) = 25.14$, $p = .156$, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.91, and RMSEA = 0.072. By contrast, the single-factor solution did not fit the data well: $\chi^2(20) = 30.34$, $p = .065$, CFI = 0.96, NFI = 0.89, and RMSEA = 0.091. Importantly, the two-factor solution fitted the data significantly better than a single factor solution, $\chi^2(1) = 5.20$, $p = .023$. We therefore concluded that although anticipated group-based guilt and shame were strongly correlated (Table 2), they were empirically separate constructs.

The mean levels of anticipated group-based shame ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 1.33$) and guilt ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 1.09$) were significantly different from zero, $t(63) = 21.64$, $p < .001$ and $t(63) = 26.10$, $p < .001$, respectively. This shows that the intensity of these anticipated group-based emotions was at least moderate.

In-group Favoritism

The pull of FAV on P represented in-group favoritism. The pull score ranged from -5 to 12 , with a mean of 0.92 ($SD = 3.27$). This mean was significantly different from zero, $t(63) = 2.26$, $p = .027$, indicating that, overall, participants engaged in in-group favoritism. A regression analysis was conducted to assess the relationship of anticipated group-based shame and guilt to in-group favoritism (for descriptive statistics and correlations, see Table 2). In this analysis, the anticipated emotions and

in-group identification were predictors, and in-group favoritism was the outcome variable. Anticipated group-based shame negatively predicted in-group favoritism ($\beta = -0.42$, $p = .014$). By contrast, anticipated group-based guilt did not predict in-group favoritism ($\beta = -0.09$, $p = .606$). In-group identification also failed to predict in-group favoritism ($\beta = 0.03$, $p = .822$).⁴ Importantly, these results were not biased by multicollinearity (tolerance = 0.46; Cohen et al., 2003). These results show that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted in-group favoritism.

Discussion

In keeping with the results of Study 1, we found that anticipated group-based shame—but not guilt—negatively predicted in-group favoritism. Importantly, the results of Study 2 show that the negative relation between anticipated group-based shame and in-group favoritism was not because of in-group identification. Identification may not have predicted in-group favoritism because this relationship is only likely to occur in certain conditions (Turner, 1999), and/or we used generic measure of identification rather than a measure that assesses a number of subcomponents of identity (Leach et al., 2008).

Although this research is promising, a limitation is the fact that the anticipated group-based emotions were measured rather than manipulated. Therefore, we cannot assume causality. The aim of Study 3 was to manipulate the anticipated group-based emotions in order to determine their effects on in-group favoritism. We felt that it was important to ensure that any effect of our anticipated group-based shame manipulation would not be because of changes in involvement in the in-group. Previous research has found that in-group members sometimes distance themselves from identity threatened groups in order to protect social identity (Doosje et al., 1995; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). It is possible that manipulating anticipated group-based shame would threaten group identity, causing group members to reduce their commitment to the in-group. This reduced commitment could, in turn, attenuate in-group favoritism. In Study 3 we measured self-stereotyping as a member of the in-group to ensure that this was not the case.

Previous research (Shepherd et al., 2013a, 2013b) has found indirect support for the fact that anticipated group-based shame inhibits transgressions by signaling the social identity threat associated with the action. However, to date there has been no research directly testing this hypothesis. A second aim of Study 3 was to enhance previous research by determining whether the self-regulatory role of anticipated group-based shame was mediated by concerns for the threat that such actions pose for social identity.

⁴Removing identification from the analysis did not alter the results ($\beta = -0.42$, $p = 0.014$ for shame and $\beta = -0.09$, $p = 0.603$ for guilt). Identification did not interact with either anticipated emotion to predict in-group favoritism ($\beta = 0.12$, $p = 0.488$ for interaction with shame and $\beta = -0.24$, $p = 0.165$ for interaction with guilt).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for anticipated emotion, self-stereotyping and in-group favoritism (FAV on P) variables (Study 2)

	<i>M (SD)</i>	1	2	3	4
1) Anticipated group-based shame	3.60 (1.33)	—			
2) Anticipated group-based guilt	3.57 (1.09)	0.73***	—		
3) In-group identification	5.17 (1.12)	0.08	0.06	—	
4) Ingroup favoritism (FAV on P)	0.92 (3.27)	−0.48***	−0.39**	−0.01	—

** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

STUDY 3

There were four main differences between Studies 2 and 3. First, in Study 3, the in-group were British (rather than English) people; the out-group were again Germans. Second, we measured self-stereotyping as an in-group member, in order to ensure that any effects of anticipated group-based shame on in-group favoritism were not due to this variable. Third, we measured social identity concerns to assess whether it mediated the relationship between anticipated group-based shame and in-group favoritism. Finally, Study 3 assessed the effects of manipulated anticipated group-based shame and guilt on in-group favoritism. This was carried out by manipulating the *salience* of these emotions. This was achieved by asking participants in the emotion-salient condition to rate the extent to which they would feel group-based guilt or shame if their in-group were to discriminate against the out-group *before* completing the in-group favoritism measure (for a similar procedure, see O'Carroll, Foster, McGeechan, Sandford, & Ferguson, 2011; Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Sandberg & Conner, 2009; Shepherd et al., 2013a). In the control condition, participants rated the anticipated emotion(s) *after* the in-group favoritism measure. Anticipated emotions are likely to be more psychologically salient and to have a greater effect on behavior in the emotion-salient condition than in the control condition. As a result, people should discriminate less in the emotion-salient condition than in the control condition. Previous research has found that the effect of this manipulation on intergroup behavior is fully mediated by measures of anticipated group-based emotion (Shepherd et al., 2013a). This suggests that any effect of the salience manipulation on discrimination is likely to be caused by anticipated group-based emotions rather than extraneous variables, such as demand characteristics or interpersonal emotions. We orthogonally manipulated the salience of anticipated group-based guilt and shame in order to assess the effect of each emotion on the behavior of in-group members.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 519 students and members of staff at a university in the UK participated in this study for course credit or entry into a prize draw. Two participants were not British nationals and were therefore removed from the sample. For the remaining participants (125 men, 384 women, and 8 undisclosed), the

mean age was 27.83 years ($SD = 11.86$). The study used a two (shame salient: control versus salient) by two (guilt salient: control versus salient) design. In the shame salient condition, the anticipated group-based shame scale was completed before the in-group favoritism (FAV on P) measure. Similarly, in the guilt salient condition, anticipated group-based guilt was measured before in-group favoritism. In the control conditions, the anticipated emotion scales were measured after in-group favoritism. As in the two previous studies, in-group favoritism (FAV on P) was measured using the Tajfel matrices outlined by Bourhis et al. (1994). We also measured social identity concerns and self-stereotyping.

Materials and Procedure

We first manipulated the salience of anticipated group-based guilt and/or shame. Participants in the shame salience condition completed the anticipated group-based shame scale (in the succeeding texts). Similarly, participants in the guilt salience condition completed the anticipated group-based guilt scale. The anticipated group-based guilt and shame emotion words were identical to those used in the previous studies. Both scales were reliable (shame, $\alpha = 0.90$; guilt, $\alpha = 0.88$). The phrasing of scales was: "If British people were to discriminate against Germans, to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?"

Participants were then informed that an independent funding body gives grants to various countries in order to improve their sports facilities. Because the distribution of these grants could affect a country's performance at sporting events, the researchers were interested in how people thought that these grants should be distributed between Great Britain and Germany. Participants were then asked to distribute funding for sports equipment between Great Britain and Germany. This funding was distributed in the form of credits, with more credits equating to more money, using the FAV on P Tajfel matrices (Bourhis et al., 1994). Once this measure was completed, participants in the control conditions completed the anticipated group-based guilt and/or shame scales. All participants then completed a self-stereotyping measure, adapted from Spears et al. (1997). This scale contained three items (e.g., "I am similar to the average British person"; $\alpha = 0.83$). Participants then rated their social identity concerns on a scale that was adapted from Gausel et al. (2012). This was a three-item scale (e.g., "If British people were to allocate more credits to themselves than German people it would be a 'black mark' on Britain's identity"; $\alpha = 0.89$). Both these scales were rated on a 7-point Likert-type

Table 3. The main and interaction effects of the shame and guilt salient manipulations on the dependent variables (Study 3)

	Shame salient	Guilt salient	Interaction
Shame	$F(1, 512)=4.11, p=.043, \eta_p^2=0.01$	$F(1, 512)=0.77, p=.381, \eta_p^2<0.01$	$F(1, 512)=0.45, p=.501, \eta_p^2<0.01$
Guilt	$F(1, 512)=0.06, p=.800, \eta_p^2<0.01$	$F(1, 512)=1.14, p=.286, \eta_p^2<0.01$	$F(1, 512)=0.90, p=.342, \eta_p^2<0.01$
Identity	$F(1, 504)=0.60, p=.438, \eta_p^2<0.01$	$F(1, 504)=0.19, p=.663, \eta_p^2<0.01$	$F(1, 504)=1.40, p=.238, \eta_p^2<0.01$
FAV on P	$F(1, 512)=4.34, p=.038, \eta_p^2=0.01$	$F(1, 512)=1.30, p=.254, \eta_p^2<0.01$	$F(1, 512)=0.91, p=.341, \eta_p^2<0.01$
Self-stereotyping	$F(1, 510)=0.03, p=.867, \eta_p^2<0.01$	$F(1, 510)=0.01, p=.911, \eta_p^2<0.01$	$F(1, 510)=0.01, p=.919, \eta_p^2<0.01$

response (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree). Once this was completed, participants were debriefed and thanked.

Results

The in-group favoritism (FAV on P) scores ranged from -12 to 12, with a mean of 0.81 ($SD=2.92$). This mean was significantly different from zero, $t(515)=6.31, p<.001$, indicating that overall participants displayed in-group favoritism.

Analysis of variance

A two (shame salient: control versus salient) by two (guilt salient: control versus salient) analysis of variance was performed on the in-group favoritism (FAV on P), anticipated group-based shame and guilt, social identity concern, and self-stereotyping variables (Table 3). The shame salience manipulation had a significant effect on anticipated group-based shame and in-group favoritism.⁵ People anticipated group-based shame to a greater extent in the shame salience condition ($M=4.58, SD=1.20$) than in the control condition ($M=4.36, SD=1.29$). Moreover, in-group favoritism was significantly lower in the shame salient ($M=0.55, SD=2.23$) than in the control condition ($M=1.07, SD=3.45$; Figure 1). Surprisingly, the shame salience manipulation did not have a significant effect on social identity concerns. As expected, the shame salience manipulation did not have a significant effect on anticipated group-based guilt. Interestingly, the main effect of guilt salience and its interaction with shame salience did not have a significant effect on any of the variables. These results reflect the fact that increasing the salience of anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) lowered in-group favoritism.

The main and interaction effects of shame and guilt salience manipulations did not have a significant effect on self-stereotyping (Table 3). Moreover, the effect of shame salience on anticipated group-based shame and in-group favoritism remained significant after controlling for self-stereotyping (ps 0.05). These results show that the effect of shame salience

Figure 1. The effect of the shame and guilt salience manipulations on in-group favoritism (pull of FAV on MJP) in Study 3. Error bars = $\pm 1SE$

was unlikely to be because of people distancing themselves from the in-group.

Indirect Effects

We hypothesized that the effect of anticipated group-based shame on in-group favoritism would be mediated by social identity concerns. Although the shame salience manipulation did not predict social identity concerns, it did predict the measured anticipated group-based shame variable, which in turn predicted social identity concerns (Table 4). It is therefore possible that the shame salience manipulation predicted the measured anticipated group-based shame variable and that the relationship between this measured variable and FAV on P was mediated by social identity concerns, an indirect effect with multiple sequential intervening variables. Shame salience affected FAV on P first via anticipated group-based shame then via social identity concerns. We tested this possibility by adapting the regression approach described by Baron and Kenny (1986). In this model, we also controlled for the measured anticipated group-based guilt variable to ensure that "guilt-free shame" was being assessed (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992).

Shame salience predicted FAV on P (Tables 3, 4, and 5), fulfilling the first criterion for an indirect effect. Shame salience also predicted anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt), fulfilling the second criterion. After controlling for anticipated group-based shame and guilt, the direct effect of shame salience on FAV on P became marginally significant (Model 2, Table 5). Anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted FAV on P, implying that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) partially mediated the effect of shame salience on FAV on P. After controlling for social identity concerns, the relationship between anticipated group-

⁵Further analysis revealed that the type of recruitment strategy (prize draw versus course credits) interacted with shame salience to have a marginally significant effect on FAV on P, $F(1, 508)=3.18, p=.075, \eta_p^2=0.01$. This was because of the shame salience manipulation having a greater effect on in-group favoritism for participants who completed the study for course credit than entry into a prize draw. The prize draw participants were recruited using an advertisement on an electronic noticeboard that appeared when they logged on to a university computer. These participants are more likely to have logged onto the computer in order to complete another task than a psychology study. As a result, they may have paid less attention to the study, thereby reducing the strength of the salience manipulation.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for anticipated emotion, self-stereotyping, social identity concerns, and in-group favoritism (FAV on P) variables (Study 3)

	<i>M (SD)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
1) Shame salience	—	—					
2) Anticipated group-based shame	4.47 (1.25)	0.09*	—				
3) Anticipated group-based guilt	4.16 (1.35)	−0.01	0.77***	—			
4) Social identity concern	4.22 (1.51)	−0.04	0.34***	0.27***	—		
5) Self-stereotyping	3.96 (1.05)	0.01	0.01	0.03	−0.04	—	
6) Ingroup favoritism (FAV on P)	0.81 (2.92)	−0.09*	−0.19***	−0.15**	−0.26***	0.07	—

Note: Differences between the beta values in Tables 4 and 5 are due to pairwise deletion being used in Table 4 and listwise deletion being used in Table 5.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 5. Indirect effect tests for the relationship of shame salience on in-group favoritism (Study 3)

Model		R^2	R^2 change	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
1	Constant	0.01*		1.12	0.18	
	Shame salient			−0.55	0.26	−0.10*
2	Constant	0.05***	0.04***	3.22	0.49	
	Shame salient			−0.46	0.25	−0.08 [†]
	Anticipated group-based shame			−0.44	0.16	−0.19**
	Anticipated group-based guilt			−0.05	0.15	−0.02
3	Constant	0.09***	0.04***	4.23	0.52	
	Shame salient			−0.55	0.25	−0.10*
	Anticipated group-based shame			−0.26	0.16	−0.11 [†]
	Anticipated group-based guilt			−0.04	0.14	−0.02
	Identity threat concerns			−0.42	0.09	−0.22***

[†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

based shame and FAV on P became marginally significant (Model 3, Table 5). Social identity concerns negatively predicted FAV on P, suggesting that this variable partially mediated the relationship between the measured anticipated group-based shame variable and FAV on P. Importantly, multicollinearity was not an issue in this analysis (tolerance = 0.39; Cohen et al., 2003).

The significance of the indirect pathway from shame salience to FAV on P via anticipated group-based shame and social identity threats was assessed using 95% confidence intervals, calculated using 5000 bootstrap resamples (Hayes, 2013). Anticipated group-based guilt was also entered into this model to ensure that this emotion was not responsible for the hypothesized effects. The analysis assessed numerous indirect effects from shame salience to FAV on P via anticipated group-based shame, guilt, and/or identity threat (Table 6). However, the only significant indirect effect was from shame salience to FAV on P via first anticipated group-based shame then identity threat concerns, as indicated by the fact that 95% confidence intervals did not include zero (Table 6). This reflects the fact that the shame salience manipulation predicted anticipated group-based shame, which in turn predicted social identity concerns, which in turn negatively predicted in-group favoritism.

Discussion

The aim of Study 3 was to extend Studies 1 and 2 by determining whether manipulating anticipated group-based shame lowered

in-group favoritism. We found that increasing the salience of anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) lowered the amount of in-group favoritism exhibited by group members. This effect remained significant after controlling for self-stereotyping as an in-group member. We also found an indirect effect from shame salience to in-group favoritism via anticipated group-based shame and social identity concerns. This study therefore extended previous research (Shepherd et al., 2013a, 2013b) by demonstrating that anticipated group-based shame negatively predicts transgressions via social identity concerns. Although the results of the study are positive, the shame salience manipulation remained a significant predictor of in-group favoritism after controlling for the intervening variables. This is likely to reflect the fact that we manipulated the salience of anticipated group-based shame, whereas the intervening variable measured the intensity of shame and social identity concerns. The direct effect may have been nonsignificant if we measured the salience of these variables rather than the intensity.

It could be argued that the effects of our salience manipulation were due to increasing the salience of discrimination, rather than the anticipated emotions. Simply mentioning the word 'discrimination' may have resulted in a reduction in in-group favoritism. However, if this alternative hypothesis was correct, increasing the salience of anticipated group-based shame or guilt should have resulted in lower in-group favoritism, because discrimination would have been equally salient in both of these conditions. The fact that the guilt salience manipulation did not have a significant effect on

Table 6. Confidence intervals for indirect effects (Study 3)

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI
Total	−0.005	0.09	−0.20	0.17
Shame salient → shame → FAV on P	−0.056	0.06	−0.22	0.01
Shame salient → shame → guilt → FAV on P	−0.007	0.03	−0.09	0.04
Shame salient → shame → identity → FAV on P	−0.037	0.02	−0.10	−0.004
Shame salient → shame → guilt → identity → FAV on P	−0.001	0.01	−0.02	0.01
Shame salient → guilt → FAV on P	0.009	0.04	−0.06	0.09
Shame salient → guilt → identity → FAV on P	0.002	0.01	−0.01	0.02
Shame salient → identity → FAV on P	0.085	0.06	−0.1	0.22

Note: *b* = unstandardized coefficient; *SE* = standard error; CI = confidence intervals.

in-group favoritism suggests that this alternative hypothesis cannot account for these findings.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The aim of these three studies was to assess the inhibitory role of anticipated group-based guilt and shame on in-group favoritism. In all three studies, we found that the measured (Studies 1 and 2) and manipulated (Study 3) anticipated group-based shame variables resulted in a lower level of in-group favoritism. Moreover, in none of the three studies did we find that anticipated group-based guilt predicted in-group favoritism. In line with previous research (Shepherd et al., 2013a, 2013b), we argue that because shame is more closely associated to social identity than is guilt (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2007) and because maintaining a positive social identity is a primary concern for group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), anticipated group-based shame should be more likely to lower in-group favoritism than guilt. Moreover, anticipated group-based shame may be especially likely to predict the actions of individual group members because shame (unlike guilt) is closely associated with the belief that group members are “cut from the same cloth” (Lickel et al., 2004, 2005). As such, actions that damage the in-group’s image strongly affect the image of individual group members. The present research extended previous research (Shepherd et al., 2013a, 2013b) by demonstrating the role of social identity concerns. The present studies also add to this research by demonstrating that superior status is not required for anticipated group-based shame to inhibit in-group favoritism.

There is an apparent discrepancy between this work and research by Tangney and colleagues (Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), who argue that guilt is the more functional of the two emotions. Indeed, Tangney and Dearing (2002) conclude their chapter on moral emotions by stating that “guilt is good; shame is bad” (p. 136). It should be noted that recent research has found that guilt can be maladaptive (Bastian, Jetten, & Fasoli, 2011; De Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009) and that shame can promote prosocial behavior (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Gausel et al., 2012). The results of Tangney and colleagues may reflect the fact that they measured guilt-proneness and shame-proneness, rather than the actual emotions

(De Hooge et al., 2008). In line with this, Tibbetts (1997) found that criminal behavior was positively related to shame-proneness but negatively related to anticipated shame. Gausel and colleagues (Gausel & Leach, 2011; Gausel et al., 2012) argue that measures of shame-proneness may actually measure feelings of rejection and inferiority, rather than shame, and that the former emotions promote immoral behavior. Moreover, they suggest that shame is likely to promote moral behavior after controlling for inferiority and rejection. Our findings therefore support and extend the recent developments in the emotion literature by demonstrating that anticipated group-based shame promotes moral intergroup behavior.

Previous research has suggested that the anticipation of aversive emotions (such as guilt and shame) is believed to motivate individuals to act morally (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007). Our research extends this hypothesis by demonstrating that anticipated group-based shame motivates group members to act morally. A growing body of research has shown that morality is a key component of a group’s identity (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Scheepers, Spears, Manstead, & Doosje, 2009). In line with previous research (Shepherd et al., 2013a, 2013b), we argue that anticipated group-based shame serves the self-regulatory function of helping group members to maintain their desired moral social identity. Anticipated group-based shame can therefore be regarded as acting as a “moral barometer” (Tangney et al., 2007), promoting ethical behavior on the part of group members. Recently, Pagliaro and colleagues (Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011) have proposed that the anticipation of receiving respect from other in-group members promotes moral intergroup behavior. Although other-praising emotions are likely to promote moral behavior, an internal system is also required; otherwise, people would constantly change their behavior to suit the views of the group members that are present at a given time (Bandura, 2001). We therefore argue that our proposed self-regulatory system acts in parallel with the one proposed by Pagliaro et al.

It would nevertheless be naive to assume that the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions will prevent a group from performing any immoral actions. As with interpersonal emotions, there are likely to be occasions when the anticipation of group-based emotions does not preclude illegitimate and/or immoral behavior. People must anticipate these emotions in the first place in order for them to prevent a proposed transgression. Even when the emotional consequences of a group’s actions are considered, other variables, such as the legitimization of the immoral action (Branscombe & Miron,

2004), may influence the extent to which this affects behavior. For example, previous research has found that people with high self-investment in the group are likely to justify a transgression when it may be used to eliminate a threat posed by an out-group (Shepherd et al., 2013a). Similarly, anticipated group-based shame is only likely to lower in-group bias in non-threatening circumstances (Shepherd et al., 2013b). Although the behavior of group members is constrained by anticipated group-based emotions, they still have the potential to act immorally when the influence of these emotions is offset by legitimizing strategies.

An alternative explanation for our findings is that the effects may be due to the anticipation of generalized negative affect, rather than specific emotions. Increasing the salience of anticipated emotions may have led participants to associate in-group favoritism with negative arousal, resulting in less in-group favoritism. However, if it was the anticipation of negative affect that lowered in-group favoritism, both anticipated group-based shame and anticipated group-based guilt should have predicted in-group favoritism. Similarly, in Study 3, both the shame and guilt salience manipulations should have had a significant effect on in-group favoritism. The fact that only anticipated group-based shame inhibited in-group favoritism suggests that the results were due to specific emotions rather than negative affect in general.

It is worth considering some of the limitations of the present research. First, although participants were more likely to exhibit in-group favoritism than egalitarian behavior in all three studies, levels of favoritism were low in absolute terms. This is likely to reflect the fact that the studies were conducted in contexts where the out-group did not pose an instrumental or symbolic threat to the in-group, thereby reducing the need to exhibit in-group favoritism. This does, however, raise the question of whether the inhibitory effect of anticipated group-based shame would be found in threatening intergroup contexts. Other research suggests that such inhibitory effects are unlikely in such contexts (Shepherd et al., 2013b).

Second, the effect sizes in Study 3 were relatively low. This is probably because of the fact that we used a subtle manipulation. We simply asked participants in the experimental conditions to complete some additional anticipated emotion items. Third, because the dependent variables were hypothetical, there is the issue of whether such effects would be observed in real-world scenarios. Also, given the hypothetical nature of the dependent variables, it is possible that the observed effects were due to demand characteristics. We reject these arguments on two grounds. First, the results concur with other anticipated group-based emotion research in which real-world issues were at stake (Shepherd et al., 2013a), suggesting that the present results would be applicable to real-world events. Second, if the results were due to demand characteristics, we would expect both anticipated group-based guilt and shame to lower in-group favoritism, because both emotions signal an imminent transgression; yet the effects were specific to group-based shame.

To conclude, in three studies we found that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) inhibited in-group favoritism. This research extends the intergroup and emotion literature by showing that merely anticipating group-based emotions has the potential to regulate the behavior of group members and lower in-group favoritism. In line with recent developments in the interpersonal literature, we conclude that the

anticipation of group-based shame serves the function of promoting moral intergroup behavior, helping to protect in-group identity.

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