The role of local communities in a global risk landscape

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DOI:
10.33612/diss.131472776

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:
2020

Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database

Citation for published version (APA):

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Chapter 11

What role should Social Impact Assessment play?
Final conclusions and recommendations

Between 1998 and 2017, 4.5 billion people were affected by the direct impacts following the occurrence of natural hazards, of which 2,640,634 were killed (Wallemacq and House, 2018). Over the same time period, the disaster-affected countries reported direct economic losses (in terms of damage to assets and infrastructure) of $2,908 billion (Wallemacq and House, 2018). Disasters, especially climate-related disasters, have become increasingly frequent. Some 91% of all disruptive events recorded in 1998-2017 were climate related disasters (Wallemacq and House, 2018). By 2050 some 40% of the world’s population will be living near water basins that experience severe water stress, particularly in Africa and Asia. For people living in the so-called ‘small island developing states’, future disaster losses represent existential threats (UNISDR, 2015).

Recent reports have described the dramatic effects of climate change all around the globe, including: abnormal weather events such as extreme heat and droughts (e.g. IPCC, 2018); loss of biodiversity (e.g. IPBES, 2019; IPCC, 2019); rising sea level (e.g. Church et al., 2013); negative impacts on human health (e.g. Mora et al., 2017; EASAC, 2019); and climate-induced displacement and migration (e.g. IOM, 2008; Rigaud et al., 2018). All this comprises the global climate crisis (Pelling, 2011; IPCC, 2015, 2018, 2019; IPBES, 2019; UNDRR, 2019), which, together with other global stressors (e.g. globalization and financial crises, resource scarcity, and demographic pressure), constitutes the global risk landscape we all live in.

When these risks turn into disasters, they create devastating impacts on local communities, their wellbeing, and the place where they live, affecting especially the most vulnerable. It has been reported that, in the last two decades, disasters push some 26 million people into poverty every year (Wallemacq and House, 2018; Hallegatte, 2017, 2018). When the economic losses deriving from disasters are expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it becomes evident that most of the overall disasters cost was borne by people living in low income countries. Amongst low income countries, the average annual death toll from disasters is 130 persons per million, seven times more than high income countries (Wallemacq and House, 2018). The inequality in the social, economic and environmental cost of disaster risk and impacts is evident not only between different countries in the world, but also among people within countries, since:

“$1 in losses does not mean the same thing to a rich person and a poor person, and the severity of a $92 billion loss depends on who experiences it. The same loss affects poor and marginalized people far more because their livelihoods depend on fewer assets, their consumption is closer to subsistence levels, they cannot rely on savings to smooth the impacts, their health and education are at greater risk, and they may need more time to recover and reconstruct” (Hallegatte, 2017, p.1).

For more than three decades, recognition of the unbearable human cost of disasters at global and local levels has led the international community to establish the DRR and resilience paradigm that should inform every disaster management and development interventions before and after disasters. The DRR and resilience paradigm advocates building resilience and supporting local communities, regions, and nations to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance local wellbeing and capacities at all levels of society, including at the local community level, to better reduce disaster risks and impacts before and after disasters (UNDRO, 1982; IDNDR, 1994; UNISDR, 2005, 2015).

The United Nations (UN, 2016, GA 71/276, p.22) define resilience as “the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management”. Resilience is the concept that best represent the capacity of systems, including social systems to learn and transform after disturbances. The increasing number of disasters and
economic and social crises that destabilize vulnerable areas has resulted in the concept of resilience gaining currency in the discourses of regional development (OECD, 2011, 2013; McManus et al., 2012; Scott, 2013; Schouten et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2015), disaster risk reduction (Tobin, 1999; Paton and Johnston, 2001; Adger et al., 2005; Norris et al., 2008; Brown and Westaway, 2011), and climate change adaptation (Pelling, 2011; Khailani and Perera, 2013; Arnold et al., 2014; Dale et al., 2015). Policy discourses around the world also reflect this trend (e.g. UNISDR, 2005, 2007; 2015b; Mitchell, 2013; GFDRR, 2014, 2015; EC, 2013, 2014). More recently, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (UNISDR, 2015) further emphasised the need for “investing in the economic, social, health, cultural and educational resilience of persons, communities and countries and the environment” (UNISDR, 2015, p.11).

The 2030 Agenda explicitly mentions resilience in a variety of its goals and targets, such as SDG1, whose aim is to end poverty in all its forms everywhere, and, more specifically, Target 1.5, which represents the core resilience target, advocating for building “the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations, and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disaster” (UN, GA, A/RES/70/1, p.15). Building sustainable and resilient societies is currently understood as a “multidimensional challenge and a cross-cutting issue that will impact progress towards the SDGs and the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, and it is “central to eliminating poverty, augmenting shared prosperity and leaving no one behind” (UNECOSOC, 2018, p.1).

In this PhD research, it was found that community resilience is the set of the social survival processes that local communities put in action at the cognitive and interactional levels to learn, transform, and address the negative impacts they perceive as common problems in times of crises and disasters. Social resilience is the set of nested, inter-level, cognitive and structural interactions that enable external actors to be sensitive to, and learn from the agency of local community resilience, thus changing or transforming accordingly towards building resilience and social sustainability at all levels of society. Within local communities, however, there are positive and negative social processes and trends: there can be resilience, but there can also be the space for elite capture, rent-seeking, organised crime infiltration, disaster capitalism and corruption to arise even within the same local communities. Counter-productive actions that undermine building resilience at all levels of society can occur both at the local community level and at other levels of social organization. They can be enacted both by members of affected local communities and by external actors (decision-makers, proponents, and investors). The cognitive and interactional ways through which external actors intervene to support local communities to respond to disaster risks and impacts, may reduce, or reproduce (or even exacerbate) local pre-disaster vulnerabilities, inequities and social exclusion, and do have influence on local DRR and resilience outcomes before and after disasters.

The way disaster management and development interventions are carried out can facilitate negative and positive trends in local communities. They can exacerbate social risks (e.g. rent-seeking, elite capture, organised crime infiltration, inequity, social exclusion), pre-disaster vulnerability and disaster risks and impacts, or they can build resilience at all levels of society. If not carefully managed, disaster management and development interventions can create structural failures that produce severe impacts on community wellbeing and community resilience at the cognitive and interactional levels, creating further disasters. They can turn the positive feelings (e.g. empathy), attitudes (e.g. social responsibility and caring), actions and behaviours (i.e. mutual aid and cooperation) into fear and suspicion, rent-seeking and a gold rush, and elite capture, organised crime infiltration and disaster capitalism.
Too often, post-disaster and development interventions result in centralised, top-down approaches to disaster risks and impacts that fail to observe international principles and recommendations, and ultimately result into second disasters. These interventions perpetrate disaster myths, increase local dependency on external support, reproduce or worsen pre-existing inequities, social exclusion, vulnerabilities, violate human rights, create social and environmental impacts, and annihilate resilience at the local community level. Too often, such top-down approaches create windows of opportunities for elite capture, disaster capitalism, organised crime infiltration, and for corruption to flourish at the local, national, and international levels. Inadequate institutional and financial arrangements, and inappropriate management and planning models, all of which constitute the mechanism of the agency of external interventions, lead external actors to poorly acknowledge the social dimensions of disasters and disaster management and development interventions. Driven by such a mechanism, external actors often ignore the social and environmental impacts and human rights issues associated with disasters and with disaster management and development planning, thus failing to enhance inclusive social learning, transformation and resilience at the local community level.

Understanding ‘the mechanism’ through which states conceive, design and implement: (1) institutional strategies; (2) financial strategies; (3) physical planning; (4) community participation; and (5) risk management they use to respond to disaster risks and impacts, reduce local vulnerabilities and enhance local community wellbeing, is crucial to identifying the main constraints in these strategies that need to be overcome in order to enhance DRR and build resilience and social sustainability at all levels of society. In this PhD research, it has been shown that, in times of crises and disasters, states relying on top-down, centralized civil protection systems, such as the Italian state, design and implement institutional and financial strategies that still heavily rely on a strict, military-type, command-and-control approach to resources (e.g. financial resources, natural resources, the built environment and associated land use, environmental, social protection and planning approaches); emergency powers and procedures, state secrecy provisions and derogations; and top-down physical planning. Such military-type, top-down institutional and financial strategies lead to, and are accompanied and reinforced by, a scientific knowledge production process about vulnerabilities, risks and impacts of disasters and local vulnerabilities that is merely techno-scientific and intended to serve only the interests of the civil protection authorities. This scientific knowledge is not intended to be co-produced with local communities, or to be transformative, and fails to enhance inclusive social learning or pursue socially-sustainable transformations to improve DRR and build resilience at all levels of society. Such institutional and financial strategies accompanied by this kind of techno-scientific knowledge, lead to a physical planning approach that is not informed by any adequate risk management or impact assessment approach, does not consider the social dimensions of disaster or of disaster management and development interventions, nor does it consider the environmental and social impacts, nor the environmental and social sustainability of these interventions, nor the human rights that may be violated while conceiving, deciding, designing and implementing disaster management and development.

Both before and after disasters, such institutional and financial strategies lead to a risk management approach that only considers the social risks that threaten the command-and-control approach. Such risk management only considers those things national and local authorities believe need to be suppressed to maintain control over the situation, including: collective panic, anxiety, hysteria, unjustified alarmism, ‘jackalism’ and other likely deviant behaviours that may arise within affected local communities. It leads civil protection authorities to consider civil protection issues as a matter of paternalistic communication and assistance, and of public control, which, before disasters, requires police action, and after disasters, requires an overwhelming militarization of the affected area.
These institutional and financial strategies, and top-down physical planning and risk management approaches lead to enabling only the local authorities and influential local building firms and professionals. This means that the local political leaders become the civil protection authorities of the disaster area. As the L’Aquila case shows, this mechanism exacerbates local social and environmental risks and impacts, and inhibits a broader constituency of local communities from learning from disasters, and from taking part in post-disaster interventions. Furthermore, there is nothing in this system to prevent the other forms of social risks that truly threaten DRR and resilience at the local community level and other levels of society, such as rent-seeking, elite capture, organised crime infiltration, corruption, inequity, social exclusion, all of which exacerbates local pre-disaster vulnerability and, therefore, disaster risks and impacts.

After Hurricane Katrina (2005), the L’Aquila disaster was the greatest disaster to have ever occurred in a western country in the last 30 years. The L’Aquila disaster is not just an Italian story of corruption and mafia, it reveals much more. With Italy being one of the eight countries in the Group of 8 (G8) and one of the 29 in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the theory and practice applied by the Italian government to disaster management and to national strategic development grew within the traditional para-militaristic NATO approach to reconstruction and development. With the implementation of the European Recovery Fund (i.e. the Marshall Plan), the command-and-control approach was intended to be an effective tool that states should use to manage the emergency loans to spend them efficiently, thus avoiding any delay in the execution of recovery or re-development programs. Around the 1990s, this approach was extended to other domains, including political consultation and decision-making processes, the expropriation of land for large infrastructure projects, civil protection, humanitarian, and peacekeeping operations and associated management of public funds and financial support addressed to implement national or international strategic development interventions, especially in times of economic and financial crisis.

Although there was a switch from civil defence to civil protection arrangements following the paradigm shift from a ‘war approach’ to considering disasters in the context of socially-produced vulnerability, this was not accompanied by any change in the top-down, militaristic command-and-control institutional and financial arrangements and management models that traditionally accompany disaster management (Alexander, 2002). Despite this switch, the fundamental nature of the command-and-control approach that continues to be utilised by civil protection systems has not changed. When such a top-down social protection approach is implemented through traditional, top-down, centralised civil protection systems, it leads, both before and after disaster, to considering local people as disaster victims to protect and as mere spectators of the disaster management carried out (UNDRO, 1982), thus increasing dependency on external assistance (i.e. counterproductive learning), and reproducing (or even worsening) those local social factors and structures which locally contribute to inequity, social exclusion, vulnerability and risk-creation (i.e. counterproductive transformation).

By being still inspired by para-military arrangements, all efforts made by states and civil protection systems fail to pursue inclusive social learning and socially sustainable transformation, or build resilience at all levels of society. As the L’Aquila case shows, the command-and-control institutional and financial arrangements are vulnerable to elite capture, corruption, and organised crime infiltration. Instead of building a glocal culture of resilience, they facilitate a culture of disaster capitalism. Too often, as in the L’Aquila case, these arrangements do not require the conception, decision, design and implementation of disaster management and development interventions to be implemented through a proper recognition of local community needs, desires, capacities, knowledge, narratives, and positive individual and collective feelings (i.e. empathy), attitudes (i.e. social responsibility, caring), actions, and behaviours (i.e. mutual aid and cooperation) that lead people to build resilience at the local community level. Nor do they provide any protocol to, for example: (i) conduct a proper community needs assessment; (ii) manage
disaster rubble; (iii) respect human rights issues that may arise from planned interventions; (iv) assess the environmental and social impacts and the environmental and social sustainability of planned interventions; and (v) recognise and prevent local pre-disaster vulnerability, the root causes of disaster, or other social risks (e.g. rent-seeking, elite capture, organised crime infiltration, disaster capitalism and corruption) from being reproduced or even exacerbated.

Overall, the command-and-control approach to resources (e.g. financial resources, natural resources, the built environment and associated land use, environmental, social protection and planning approaches), the use of disaster myths, emergency powers and procedures, and top-down physical planning provide some national and local leaders with emergency powers, but, however, resoundingly fail to: understand risk in all its multiple dimensions (key priority 1, see Chapter 5); strengthen governance towards better DRR and resilience outcomes, (key priority 2, see Chapter 6); facilitate the efficacy of investments in disaster risk reduction for resilience (key priority 3, see Chapter 7); or enhance disaster preparedness for effective response, and to build back better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction (key priority 4, see Chapter 8).

Extrapolating from the L’Aquila situation, top-down civil protection systems tend to: (1) understand disaster risks only in terms of the likelihood of the hazard, while considering the assessment and reduction of local vulnerabilities irrelevant for a proper disaster risk assessment and the sharing of the knowledge concerning risk as a source of collective anxiety and alarmism that need to be controlled or avoided; (2) build a command-and-control governance of resources through emergency powers, state secrecy provisions and derogations all of which undermine strengthening of the local governance towards better DRR and resilience outcomes; (3) facilitate and protect rent-seeking, elite capture and disaster capitalism, rather than efficient investment to enhance DRR and resilience; (4) worsen local inequity and social exclusion, exacerbating pre-disaster vulnerability and associated disaster risks and impacts, instead than building back better more sustainable and resilient societies.

Extrapolating from the L’Aquila situation, it is clear that socially-sustainable transformations are required in the way disaster management and strategic national development interventions are conceived, decided, designed and realised, especially in the institutional and financial strategies, physical planning, risk management and community participation approaches the states use to orient the implementation of planned interventions in times of crises and disasters. In order to fully accomplish their declared commitment to the Key Priority Areas of investment and intervention recommended by the United Nations, states should: (1) overcome the constraints of a techno-scientific knowledge and understand that risks have social dimensions and can be reduced only if local vulnerabilities and social risks and the root causes of disasters are reduced too (key priority 1, Chapter 5); (2) build inclusive and socially sustainable governance of disaster management and development at all levels of social organization, avoiding the adoption of a military-type command-and-control approach to resources and the use of emergency powers (key priority 2, Chapter 6); (3) design and implement effective financial strategies through which orienting investments to strengthen community resilience (social learning and transformation), rather than disaster capitalism and corruption (key priority 3, Chapter 7); (4) design and implement physical planning and risk management approaches that would prevent environmental and social impacts, respect human rights, foster inclusive social learning and socially-sustainable transformations and build resilience, rather than facilitating rent-seeking, elite capture, and organized crime infiltration or creating second disasters (key priority 4, Chapter 8).

On the other hand, to enable the various United Nations principles and declarations about DRR and resilience to be more effectively respected and implemented in practice, the international community must pay more attention to the mechanism by which states conceive, decide, design and implement disaster management interventions. The Key priority Areas of investment and intervention recommended by the United Nations, together with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the New Urban Agenda and the 2030 Agenda, are solid
Building governance to achieve shared social development outcomes requires sharing and strengthening empathy, caring and social responsibility among all actors towards the most vulnerable and those over-exposed to risks and impacts. It also requires enacting effective social and institutional learning processes that can help all actors to cooperate to collectively learn from past failures and transform towards better outcomes in the future. Enhancing DRR and resilience at all levels of society requires a closer link between knowledge and action, which demands that scientific practices become more oriented towards the societal arenas in which sustainability problems, including disaster risks and impacts, are tackled. Understanding knowledge through the concept of ‘knowledge systems’ helps in visualising how Science can support societies to address sustainability. By being problems that affect societies at all levels, sustainability issues (including DRR and resilience) require learning processes where the more the members of society are included within the knowledge system, the more people can better know, act and learn towards achieving desired social development outcomes and building resilience and social sustainability at all levels of society. The common purpose of achieving social development outcomes, including enhanced DRR and resilience, demands opening-up knowledge systems at all levels of society to allow a broader constituency to participate in the processes of knowledge production, the implementation of actions (i.e. prevention, mitigation, monitoring and enhancement), and in learning and transformation. Ensuring that knowledge systems are open means enabling all members of society, especially the most vulnerable, to participate in better knowing, acting, and in learning from actions and transform towards better outcomes in the future. To effectively engage local communities within the governance of disaster management and development, and of knowledge production processes, the DRR and resilience paradigm demands a paradigm shift from protecting vulnerable, affected communities to engaging and empowering their capacities to learn and transform; and thus from centralized, civil protection systems to inclusive, decentralized community empowerment systems capable of orienting investments and interventions towards reducing local vulnerabilities, and environmental and social risks and impacts; enabling and empowering social learning and socially-sustainable transformations; and building resilience at all levels of society before and after disasters.

Recent advances in disaster and development studies have emphasized the need for SIA to accompany post-disaster interventions (Benson and Twigg, 2007; Jah et al., 2010), in order to “understand the social and economic context, incorporate the perspectives and interests of those whom the project is intended to assist, anticipate the project’s social impacts (both positive and negative), and prepare to mitigate them, when necessary” (Jah et al., 2010, p.74). However, until now, little attempt has been made by international and national disaster and development agencies, governments, or other public and private organizations to adopt the Social Impact Assessment philosophy and process and apply its methodology in any planned intervention both before and after disasters. The SIA community has also made little effort to extend the theoretical and practical domain of SIA from being a regulatory or techno-scientific assessment tool for large scale projects, especially deployed in the extractive industry sector, to being a process of enhancing social development outcomes and of empowering local communities for building community resilience and achieving the SDGs.

SIA has traditionally developed as a tool to manage the intended and unintended social impacts of development projects. Despite evolutionary progresses in thinking and practice, too often SIA keeps being considered as only a sub-field of environmental impact assessment (EIA), resulting in its being merely an add-on to pre-determined projects (O’Faircheallaigh, 2009; Suopajärvi, 2009).
Traditional understandings and practices of SIA still are ingrained within the institutional environmental licensing procedures and arrangements, or within top-down social protection measures, which too often are focused only on post-hoc remedies, such as job creation, compensation, or grievance procedures strategies (Aucamp and Lombard, 2018). This undermines the potential of SIA to be an effective process capable of orienting the decision, conception, design and implementation of any disaster management and development policy, plan, and project towards positive social development outcomes before any intervention gets conceived, designed, funded and implemented in the field (Aucamp and Lombard, 2018). Although there have been advances in the SIA field in the conceptualization of social changes and impacts and of the multiple dimensions of local community wellbeing (Slootweg et al., 2001; Vanclay, 2002; Smyth and Vanclay, 2017), still little is said about how SIA can enhance prevention (DRR), or about how SIA can develop effective tools and processes to reduce local vulnerabilities and social risks, enhance resilience and prevent negative social risks and impacts in advance.

The current understanding of SIA emphasises the need to see SIA not only as a mitigation approach to the impacts of development, but also as an enhancement strategy that can support development policies, plans, programs, and projects to better achieve social development outcomes and the SDGs. Current advances in SIA are: human rights impact assessment (Götzmann et al., 2016; van der Ploeg and Vanclay, 2017, 2018); Free, Prior and Informed Consent (Vanclay and Esteves, 2011; Hanna and Vanclay, 2016); community-based agreement making and deliberative democracy (Nish and Bice, 2011; Hartz-Karp and Pope, 2011); social license to operate (Dare et al., 2014; Bice and Moffat, 2014; Jijelava and Vanclay, 2014 and 2017); and risk assessment and resilience (Mahmoudi et al., 2013; Esteves et al., 2017; Imperiale and Vanclay, 2016a , 2016b). However, how to build a socially sustainable governance and orient such SIA advances towards reducing local vulnerabilities, risks, impacts and the root causes of disaster, enhancing inclusive learning and socially sustainable transformation, and building resilient landscapes and communities, must be further explored. The 2030 Agenda, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the New Urban Agenda, and the key priorities areas of investment and intervention recommended by the United Nations in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, they all require understanding of resilience and how it can be strengthened at the local community level and be built at all levels of society. However, there is still lack of conceptualization of resilience and how it comes into action at the local community level and other levels of society, and lack of investigation on effective methodologies that would be able to strengthen resilience at the local community level and build it at all levels of society, thus better aligning human efforts to the international paradigm of DRR and resilience and the 2030 Agenda (Berkes and Ross, 2016).

The conceptualisation of the cognitive and interactional dimensions of resilience at the local community level and other levels of society; of the counterproductive actions to avoid (i.e. counterproductive learning, counterproductive transformation and the mechanism of disaster capitalism); and of the SIA Framework for Action provided in this PhD thesis have the potential to enhance understanding of resilience in society and how to enhance inclusive social learning, empower socially sustainable transformations and build resilience at multiple levels of social organization. The SIA Framework for Action is oriented to co-produce transformative knowledge about local vulnerabilities, risks, impacts and the root causes to reduce, and about the desired social development outcomes to achieve together with the affected local communities. It can be used to recognise local community needs and desires and engage and strengthen the positive individual and collective feelings, attitudes, knowledge narratives actions and behaviours local people develop to build resilience at the local community level in times of crises and disasters.

The SIA Framework for Action can also enact effective community engagement strategies that orient local communities towards building a common vision about: the multiple dimensions of
community wellbeing that need to be enhanced; the local vulnerabilities, risks and root causes of
disasters that need to be reduced; and the capacities that need to be strengthened. All this
contributes to enhancing inclusive social learning and building socially sustainable
transformations, resilience and a glocal culture of resilience at all levels of society.

Through the SIA Framework for Action, SIA will become an effective process that would lead
external actors to co-conceive, co-decide, co-design and co-implement any planned intervention
to build resilience at all levels of society before and after disasters. To be effective, SIA and the
SIA Framework for Action should lead the building of sustainable knowledge systems that orient
the governance of disaster management and development interventions, before and after disasters.
To create such sustainable knowledge systems, the paradigm shift evoked by the DRR and
resilience paradigm from managing disasters to reducing the risks of disasters should be fully
implemented in practice. This paradigm shift should lead development and impact assessment
fields to a similar paradigm shift from managing the impacts to reducing the risks from any
planned intervention. This paradigm shift should be accompanied by a cultural revolution from
the mythology of command-and-control to social learning and transformation, and from a top-
down social protection culture, to a glocal culture of resilience. The greater focus on the risks of
development, rather than on its impacts, would thus pursue the states to carefully know how to
reduce these risks, enhance social learning from past failures and transformation towards
sustainability, and achieve desired development outcomes beforehand any planned intervention
is conceived, decided, designed and implemented.

To realise all this, several crucial shifts are required in the way states typically conceive their
institutional and financial strategies, and in the physical planning, risk management and
community participation approaches through which they orient planned interventions before and
after disasters. A crucial shift should be fostered in the institutional strategy from a command-
and-control approach to a coordination-and-comanagement approach to resources; from
facilitating rent-seeking and elite capture to pursuing equity, mutual aid and cooperation in the
financial strategy; from typical top-down planning to socially sustainable planning capable to
prevent environmental and social impacts, respect human rights and build resilience; and from a
top-down civil protection culture to a glocal culture of resilience that will foster transformative
and co-produced knowledge, inclusive social learning and socially sustainable transformations in
risk management, physical planning and in community participation approaches of every planned
interventions. Overall, the DRR and resilience paradigm requires a crucial paradigm shift from
considering vulnerable, affected communities unable to learn and act, to considering them as
people who have individual and collective needs, feelings, desires, attitudes, capacities,
knowledge, believes, values, and narratives; and from protecting them to empowering their
capacities to learn and transform. Overall a crucial shift is needed from centralised civil protection
systems to more inclusive and decentralised community empowerment systems.

Community resilience outcomes (i.e. equity, participation, social inclusion, mutual aid,
cooperation, disaster risk reduction, social sustainability and community wellbeing) should
become the principles, means and outcomes by which the institutional and financial strategies,
physical planning, risk management and community participation approach are designed and
implemented in order to empower local communities and build resilience at all levels of society.
In this way, community empowerment systems would: enhance empathy, caring, social
responsibility for and respect and recognition of the most vulnerable and those most in danger
rather than only of the elite; enable the building of mutual aid and cooperation rather than rent-
seeking and elite capture; and facilitate equity, social inclusion, cohesion, and awareness for
community wellbeing and social sustainability rather than rent-seeking, elite capture, organised
crime infiltration and corruption. All this would help external actors and local communities build
a glocal culture of resilience rather than a culture of disaster capitalism, and transform affected
landscapes into landscapes of affect, rather than carcasses to exploit.
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