University of Groningen

Under what conditions do ethnic minority candidates attract the ethnic minority vote? How neighbourhood and candidate characteristics affected ethnic affinity voting in the Dutch 2017 parliamentary elections

van der Zwan, Roos; Tolsma, Jochem; Lubbers, Marcel

Published in:
Political geography

DOI:
[10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102098](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102098)

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:
2020

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

van der Zwan, R., Tolsma, J., & Lubbers, M. (2020). Under what conditions do ethnic minority candidates attract the ethnic minority vote? How neighbourhood and candidate characteristics affected ethnic affinity voting in the Dutch 2017 parliamentary elections. *Political geography*, 77, [102098].
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102098>

Copyright

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: <https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment>.

Take-down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Under what conditions do ethnic minority candidates attract the ethnic minority vote? How neighbourhood and candidate characteristics affected ethnic affinity voting in the Dutch 2017 parliamentary elections

Roos van der Zwan^{a,*}, Jochem Tolsma^a, Marcel Lubbers^b

^a Department of Sociology, Radboud University Nijmegen, Montessorilaan 3, 6525 HR, Nijmegen, the Netherlands

^b Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute/KNAW/University of Groningen and Department of Sociology, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands

ABSTRACT

Ethnic affinity voting is the term for when political party candidates with an ethnic minority background receive a larger share of the vote in ethnically dense neighbourhoods. This study is one of the first to provide a detailed test for ethnic affinity voting during a national election in an open-list proportional representation system, with the same ballots in every polling station. It tests the conditions under which ethnic affinity voting is greater, studying the proportion of votes for ethnic minority candidates at neighbourhood level in the Netherlands in 2017, when a minority-interest party entered parliament and the traditional ethnic vote for the social democratic party (PvdA) imploded. This study disentangles party and candidate effects and finds evidence for (general and specific) ethnic affinity voting at candidate level. Even though ethnic minority candidates attract fewer votes, they perform better in neighbourhoods where more minorities live, especially when the group size of co-ethnics is larger. Ethnic affinity effects are relatively strong for candidates affiliated with minority-oriented and left-wing parties, and absent or negative for ethnic candidates of right-wing parties. Moreover, whether male or female ethnic candidates are more likely to attract the ethnic vote also depends on the ethnic background and party affiliation of the candidate.

1. Introduction

With a growing ethnic minority electorate, the inclusion of ethnic minority candidates has grown in importance for political parties in Western countries. The expectation that these candidates will win votes among the ethnic minority population has been advanced as one of the main possible motivations (Dancygier, 2017). This is called ethnic affinity voting and implies that political party candidates with an ethnic minority background will receive a larger share of the vote in areas with a larger ethnic minority population (Bird, Jackson, McGregor, Moore, & Stephenson, 2016; Matson, Fine, & Florida, 2006; Mcdermott, 1998). To date, however, ethnic affinity voting has mainly been studied in candidate-centred elections, such as in the US and the UK (Geese, 2018). Research on ethnic affinity voting in national elections in proportional representation (PR)-systems has rarely been carried out. Moreover, the conditions under which ethnic affinity effects are particularly strong may depend on the political party the candidate represents or on characteristics other than the candidate's ethnic background, such as gender (Badas & Stauffer, 2019). This study examines ethnic affinity voting in the Dutch PR system. Our aim is to assess the conditions under which ethnic minority candidates received a larger share of the vote in the

Dutch parliamentary election of 2017.

Evidence for both ethnic and gender affinity effects has been established in earlier studies. However, results are mixed, and often relate to majoritarian systems and (non-partisan) local elections (Barreto, 2007; Bejarano & Segura, 2007; Teney, Jacobs, Rea, & Delwit, 2010), or are based on experimental studies with fictionalised majority and minority candidates (Besco, 2015; Goodyear-Grant; Tolley, 2017; McConaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas, 2010; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Stokes-Brown, 2006). Majoritarian systems are regarded as candidate-centred, in the sense that personal reputation is important for gaining votes. Yet partisanship has been found to overrule affinity effects in majoritarian systems, since a vote for a candidate is a vote for a party (Badas & Stauffer, 2019; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Cutler, 2002). In the Dutch PR system, the focus lies more on parties than on candidates, but at the ballot, voters must choose between different candidates from the same party. This clearly differs from majoritarian systems, non-partisan elections or experimental studies, and whether ethnic affinity effects can be seen in such electoral contexts has yet to be satisfactorily researched (Geese, 2018). In existing studies, whether people vote for a candidate or for the candidate's party often remains implicit (Bird et al., 2016; Matson et al., 2006; Mcdermott, 1998). Our study provides the

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: r.vanderzwan@uva.nl (R. van der Zwan), j.tolsma@ru.nl (J. Tolsma), m.lubbers@nidi.nl (M. Lubbers).

¹ Present address: AIAS-HSI, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, 1018 WV, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

opportunity to disentangle party and candidate effects.

This study makes a contribution to affinity-voting literature in three ways. First, we examine differences in ethnic affinity voting between twelve political parties. Previous research has demonstrated that left-wing parties in particular are successful in attracting the ethnic minority vote (Martin, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Tiberj & Michon, 2013; Van der Zwan, Lubbers, & Eisinga, 2019). Nevertheless, not all ethnic minorities vote for left-wing parties and party preferences vary between ethnic minority groups (Van der Zwan, 2019). Therefore, we move beyond the focus on left-wing parties and study whether ethnic affinity voting is also present for other parties, which almost all include ethnic minority candidates on their candidate lists. Second, we examine the extent of ethnic affinity voting among different ethnic groups. Since political integration varies from one group to another, we will not study general ethnic affinity voting alone (whether minority candidates receive a higher share of the vote in neighbourhoods with a greater proportion of minorities), but also specific co-ethnic affinity voting (whether candidates of a specific ethnic origin receive a higher share of the vote in neighbourhoods where there are relatively more co-ethnics; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004). Our emphasis is on the largest non-Western minority groups in the Netherlands: Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean. Third, in some Western countries, including the Netherlands, ethnic minority women have been well represented on candidate lists. Their nomination is a party strategy to try to maximise representativeness (Bird, 2005; Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Mügge, 2016). This does not necessarily mean, however, that female ethnic minority candidates receive a higher share of the vote than their male counterparts in neighbourhoods with more (co-ethnic) minorities. We study whether a candidate's gender influences ethnic affinity voting.

Ethnic affinity voting is examined here in the party-centred Dutch political context (Carey & Shugart, 1995). The Dutch national election of 2017 provides a particularly interesting context for our study. The Netherlands is known as one of the few countries in which the share of the non-Western ethnic minority electorate is similar to the share of non-Western minority members of Parliament (MPs; Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016; Van der Zwan, Lubbers, & Eisinga, 2019). Moreover, most of the Dutch parties – left wing as well as right wing – have ethnic minority candidates on their candidate list. What is notable about the election of 2017 is the electoral success of new parties that specifically targeted ethnic minority voters (the parties DENK and Artikel 1) and the implosion of the social democrats (PvdA), which has traditionally attracted many ethnic minority votes. The collapse of the social democrats is not unique to the Netherlands; other European countries such as France and Austria have experienced similar crashes. There is, nonetheless, no other European country in which a party aimed at voters with an ethnic minority background has won seats in a national election (yet). Differences in ethnic affinity voting observed in the Netherlands between left-wing parties and minority-oriented parties may become a reality in other European countries as well.

This study tests for affinity voting by assessing the relationships between the ethnic group sizes of the neighbourhood in which the polling station is situated, and the proportion of votes each specific candidate received within that polling station. Using this type of aggregated data and looking at these macro-macro relations can result in ecological fallacies (Robinson, 1950; Shaw, 1997). In contrast to earlier studies, however, our macro-level data is very detailed (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2005; Barreto, 2007; Bejarano & Segura, 2007; Landa, Cope-land, & Grofman, 1995; Teney et al., 2010), making ecological fallacies less likely. We used information from 2,121 different polling stations, located in 1,089 different neighbourhoods within 20 of the larger cities in the Netherlands (including Amsterdam and Rotterdam). In the Dutch parliamentary election of 2017, the twelve political parties included in this study nominated 548 individual candidates. In each polling station, voters could select one of these 548 candidates. We are the first to use such fine-grained geographical data and to distinguish general affinity effects from co-ethnic affinity effects.

2. The Dutch political context

The Netherlands has an open-list proportional representation (PR) system that is regarded as one of the most proportional systems in the world (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). Voters are presented with the candidate lists of all parties and from these lists they cast one vote for a single candidate. The Netherlands can be considered to possess a party-oriented electoral system (Carey & Shugart, 1995) and most voters vote for the first candidate on the list, which typically expresses general support for the party. Votes for candidates other than the party leader are assumed to be preference votes and are often used to support a female or an ethnic minority candidate (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). It is relatively uncommon for candidates with a low position on the list to receive enough preference votes to be elected; in 2017, 4 MPs (out of 150) were elected thanks to preference votes. Most parties have ethnic minorities on their list, including ones in a high position. In the parliamentary elections of 2012, for example, 11% of the candidates were from an ethnic minority background (Van der Zwan, Lubbers, & Eisinga, 2019).

The Dutch parliamentary elections of March 2017 were characterised by the emergence of several new political parties and major losses for the social democrats (PvdA). The social democrats (PvdA) reached a historic low, dropping from 38 seats in 2012 to only 9 in 2017. DENK and Artikel 1 were two new parties that focused on racism and discrimination and targeted minority voters in particular. Two former social democratic (PvdA) MPs of Turkish origin founded DENK in 2015. Sylvana Simons, of Surinamese origin, then joined the party. She was already known as a radio and TV presenter but since 2016 has focused on her political career. After an internal conflict within DENK, however, she left and established the party Artikel 1 just a few months before the elections. Her political ambitions received a great deal of media attention, and she has been the object of hate messages and death threats on social media due to her opinions on racism in the Netherlands. Whereas DENK was successful and won three seats during the elections, Artikel 1 did not win any. The party nevertheless won a substantial share of the vote in Amsterdam and won a seat in the Amsterdam municipality elections that followed in 2018. In addition, Forum for Democracy (FvD) entered the elections for the first time, increasing competition on the radical right side of the political spectrum, competing with Wilder's anti-immigrant party (PVV). Yet, Wilder's became the second largest party after Prime Minister Rutte's Liberal Party (VVD).

Another factor important to consider in the Dutch context is how ethnic minority background is conceptualised. The literature contains different views on this, based on both theoretical and practical concerns (for a more elaborate discussion see Bloemraad, 2013). The main focus is on the largest non-Western ethnic minority groups, referred to by some as visible minorities (Bloemraad, 2013). Hence, we concentrate on candidates with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean background. All candidates have Dutch citizenship and belong to the first, second or third generation. Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean minorities are the largest non-Western ethnic minority groups in the Dutch context and are relevant considering their, on average, vulnerable socio-economic position in society. The term 'ethnic minorities' thus refers to persons with a non-Western ethnic minority background.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1. General ethnic affinity voting

The assumption that voters have the tendency to vote for candidates who are similar to themselves, i.e. someone who belongs to the same social group, is referred to as the affinity thesis (Bird et al., 2016; Mcdermott, 1998). This thesis concerns various social groups, but has primarily been researched in relation to gender and ethnic background (Barreto, 2007; Bird et al., 2016; Brians, 2005; Goodyear-Grant; Tolley,

2017; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982). The mechanisms behind gender and ethnic affinity voting largely overlap. A certain similarity between a voter and a candidate, whether in terms of gender or ethnic background, can be a motivation to vote for a specific candidate (Sanbonmatsu, 2016). A shared language, culture or (migration) experience, i.e. a shared identity, may be reasons to vote for someone (Badas & Stauffer, 2019; Barreto, 2007; Bird et al., 2016). Voters may expect that a candidate similar to themselves will have the same interests and will therefore be a good representative (Landa et al., 1995). In that sense, affinity voting is closely related to descriptive representation (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967), where the latter refers to the proportional representation of marginalised groups in society.

Despite the overlap in mechanisms behind gender and ethnic affinity voting, there are also explanations that are specific to ethnic affinity voting. In the Netherlands, ethnic residential segregation is apparent between and within cities, whereas gender residential segregation is virtually absent. The relative group size of ethnic communities in a neighbourhood may affect ethnic affinity voting tendencies. It is also possible that the strength of ethnic affinity voting differs across ethnic groups and for male and female ethnic minority candidates. This is why we examine the conditions under which ethnic affinity effects are particularly strong.

Members of ethnic minority groups will often have had similar experiences of, for example, migration and discrimination. This experience is called linked fate, and may be a reason for ethnic minorities to vote for ethnic minority candidates (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2005; Barreto, 2007; Besco, 2015; Bird et al., 2016; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013; Dawson, 1995). Ethnic affinity voting can be used to strengthen the position of ethnic minorities in society. As has been suggested in earlier research, ethnic affinity voting generally refers to candidates who are easily identifiable as an ethnic minority group member, e.g. for non-Western ethnic minorities (Bird et al., 2016). Formulating a general ethnic affinity hypothesis, we expect that the larger the relative group size of ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood, the larger the proportion of votes an ethnic minority candidate in that neighbourhood will receive (H1).²

The extent to which general ethnic affinity voting effects exist may differ between neighbourhoods. Even though individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are important predictors for political preferences (Adams, Merill, & Grofman, 2005; Downs, 1957; Evans, 2000), the place where one lives also shapes these preferences (David & Van Hamme, 2011; Johnston et al., 2004, 2000; Miller, 1978). There is a long history of electoral geography research on how the neighbourhood affects political preferences (Cho, Gimpel, & Dyck, 2006; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Johnston et al., 2000, 2004). The main thesis in the electoral geography literature is that the larger the proportion of a certain social or ethnic group in a neighbourhood, the greater the impact of this group's political preferences on the political preferences of co-residents. Ethnic minority community groups are more likely to be organised and active in neighbourhoods with a large ethnic minority population. In such neighbourhoods, political preferences may be influenced by mobilisation through social connectedness and ethnic minority networks (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Jacobs & Tillie, 2004). This process is referred to as the mobilisation hypothesis, and this leads to our second hypothesis: we expect to observe an exponential or J-shaped relationship between the relative group size of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood and the vote share of minority candidates (H2).

² Our main focus is on ethnic affinity effects for ethnic minority candidates. Nevertheless, this hypothesis implies that in neighbourhoods with a larger native Dutch population, native Dutch candidates receive a larger share of the vote as well.

3.2. Party-dependent ethnic affinity voting

Our third expectation is that ethnic affinity voting differs between parties. Parties have different strategies for the inclusion of ethnic minority candidates, and this may affect ethnic affinity voting. Dancygier (2017) states that parties may opt for a strategy of exclusion, symbolic inclusion or vote-based inclusion. Which strategy they choose depends on the size of the ethnic minority electorate. When it is small, parties lack incentives to nominate ethnic minority candidates and exclusion is more common. When this electorate is larger, symbolic inclusion is a strategy whereby parties can express their inclusive position, and thereby attract both ethnic minority and majority voters that attach value to equal representation. With vote-based inclusion, parties list ethnic minority candidates to attract the ethnic minority vote, because, for instance, the candidates have ties to the ethnic community. Political parties may choose a vote-based inclusion strategy when the ethnic minority electorate is large enough to affect electoral outcomes (Dancygier, 2017). Left-wing parties have traditionally been more supportive of minority rights, have nominated higher numbers of ethnic minority candidates and have enjoyed more success in attracting the ethnic vote than right-wing parties (Martin, 2016; Messina, 2006; Sanders, Heath, Fisher, & Sobolewska, 2014). Even so, right-wing parties nominate ethnic minority candidates as well, which may be a strategy whereby parties can express inclusivity. We expect these candidates to be less successful in attracting the vote of the ethnic minority electorate. If right-wing parties, who are more critical of migration and more demanding with regard to integration, attract ethnic votes, they may likewise attract votes from ethnic minority voters who are more assimilated, and who are more likely to have moved out of neighbourhoods with larger concentrations of co-ethnics than non-assimilated voters with an ethnic minority background. These ethnic minority voters will also be less likely to vote for the ethnic minority candidate affiliated with that party. We therefore expect to find stronger ethnic affinity effects for candidates from left-wing parties than right-wing parties. However, the competition for the ethnic vote has expanded with the emergence of minority-oriented parties in the Netherlands. Candidates of minority-oriented parties (DENK and Artikel 1) have stronger ties to the ethnic minority community and are likely to be more successful in attracting its vote than minority candidates of left-wing parties. Thus, we predict that general ethnic affinity effects will be stronger for minority-oriented parties than for left-wing parties, which in turn will be stronger than for right-wing parties (H3).

3.3. Co-ethnic affinity voting

Considering the differences between ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, we expect ethnic affinity voting to occur particularly within ethnic minority groups. Since the level of integration varies between these groups, the strength of ethnic affinity effects is likely to vary as well (Fisher, Heath, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2015; Leighley, 2001). Research on the political participation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands shows that minorities with a Turkish background are politically the most active, followed by those of Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004). This level of participation can partly be explained by the strength of the ethnic community and ethnic identification (Leighley, 2001; Tillie, 2004). Voters are mobilised through their ethnic community (ethnic minorities and natives alike), which results, among other things, in higher levels of turnout (Fennema & Tillie, 1999). We also expect ethnic group mobilisation to affect ethnic affinity voting, and the candidate's ethnic background to be more important for ethnic minorities with a more cohesive ethnic community than for those with a less cohesive community. In addition to the general ethnic affinity hypothesis, we formulate a co-ethnic affinity hypothesis: the larger the relative group size of co-ethnics in a neighbourhood, the larger the proportion of votes a candidate will receive (H4a), and co-ethnic affinity effects will be

stronger for candidates with a Turkish background than for those with a Moroccan background, and in turn to be stronger for Moroccan candidates than for those with a Surinamese or Antillean background (H4b).

3.4. Gender-dependent ethnic affinity voting

Research on voting for women or ethnic minority women shows mixed results in relation to whether (ethnic minority) women receive a higher or lower share of the vote than (ethnic minority) men (Badas & Stauffer, 2019; Bird et al., 2016; Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Philpot & Walton, 2007). A preference vote for either male or female candidates could result from similar mechanisms to those for an ethnic minority candidate, such as expression of support for a group's marginalised position in society, in the case of women, or the candidates' gender can act as an information cue for voters (Badas & Stauffer, 2019). Supporting male or female candidates can be related to prevalent gender role attitudes, with more conservative and traditional attitudes discouraging a larger role for women in politics (Devroe & Wauters, 2018; Dolan, 2014; Sanbonmatsu, 2016). Previous research has shown that members of some ethnic groups are, on average, more conservative and have more traditional views on gender roles than others (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2009). We anticipate that minorities from more conservative ethnic groups are more likely to vote for male candidates, assuming that members of these groups are more likely to oppose a role for women in politics. In general, minorities with a Turkish or Moroccan background, who are often Muslim, hold more conservative gender role attitudes (Dancygier, 2017; Röder & Mühlau, 2014) than minorities with a Surinamese or Antillean background, whose gender role attitudes are more similar to those of native Dutch (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2009). We hypothesise that: ethnic affinity effects among candidates with a Turkish or Moroccan background will be stronger for men than for women (H5a); and ethnic affinity effects among candidates with a Surinamese/Antillean background will not differ between men and women (H5b).

4. Data and methods

To test our hypotheses, we combined three data sources. First, election results from polling stations were used from the Dutch national parliamentary elections of March 2017 (Kiesraad, 2017). Second, we collected information about the backgrounds of candidates from parties' candidate lists. Finally, we used neighbourhood characteristics from Statistics Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2018c).

Since most ethnic minorities in the Netherlands live in cities, we selected the largest cities for which information on election results was available for individual candidates at polling-station level.³ Data was obtained through the Dutch Electoral Council (Kiesraad, 2017) that identified the number of votes for each candidate on the candidate list in each polling station for twenty cities.⁴

In the Netherlands, all eligible voters receive a postal invitation to vote, which includes their polling card (*stempas*) and the address of the nearest polling station.⁵ People are not obliged to vote in the nearest polling station, but their polling card can only be used in their own municipality. To vote in a different municipality, voters have to go to the effort of requesting what is called a *kiezerspás*. Polling stations at train stations, universities or hospitals are likely to serve voters who live further away, so election results from these were excluded (121) from

our analyses. For all other polling stations it is safe to assume that most votes were cast by voters who were appointed to that specific polling station, or at least, by voters who lived close by and within the same municipality.

4.1. Proportion of votes for candidates

Within each polling station, the proportion of votes for individual candidates was calculated as the number of votes for each one divided by the sum of votes for all candidates in that polling station. This variable ranged from 0 to 0.68, where 0 indicates that the candidate received no votes and where the higher number indicates a larger proportion. The maximum score of 0.68 was reached by Geert Wilders from the anti-immigrant party PVV, who received 68% of the votes in a polling station in the city of Dordrecht.

Thirteen parties won at least one seat in the House of Representatives during the 2017 elections. We excluded from our dataset the vote share of candidates from the two parties that did not field any ethnic minority candidates: the Reformed Political Party (SGP) and the Party for the Animals (PvdD). The party Artikel 1 did not win any seats but was nevertheless included because of its minority-oriented character. In total, we analysed the vote share of candidates belonging to twelve parties, most of which can be placed into known party families. The economic left-wing parties include the Socialist Party (SP), the Green party (GL), the social democratic Labour Party (PvdA), the Elderly party (50Plus), and minority-interest parties Artikel 1 and DENK. The social-liberal Democrats 66 (D66) and the economic right-wing VVD are regarded as liberal parties. There are two Christian parties, the Christian Union (CU) and the more economically and culturally centre-right Christian Democratic (CDA). Finally, we included the anti-immigrant party PVV and the economically and culturally right-wing Forum for Democracy (FvD).

All parties must compile a candidate list, which is published by the Dutch government.⁶ For the twelve parties included, 548 unique candidates were nominated. In total, we analyse election results from 2,121 polling stations located in 1,089 neighbourhoods. Our unit of analysis is the share of votes a specific candidate received in a specific polling station. Our original sample thus includes $(2,121 \times 548 =)$ 1,162,308 observations.

4.2. Candidate characteristics

Some candidates' characteristics can be found on the candidate lists; the lists for the 2017 Dutch parliamentary elections provided information about gender and the list position of the candidate.

Since the candidates' ethnic background was not apparent on the official list, we gathered this information ourselves: two independent coders used names and photographs to identify non-Western ethnic minority candidates. For all candidates identified as belonging to an ethnic minority (90), an additional search was conducted for more specific information about their ethnic background. This information was gathered online from MPs' biographies and other sources, such as newspaper articles, social media and personal websites. We focused on candidates with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean or other non-Western background, and who were either first-, second- or third-generation immigrants.⁷ This is a common strategy for identifying candidates' ethnic background (e.g. Bird et al., 2016; Mügge, 2016; for a discussion about this methodology, see Bloemraad, 2013; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013). Candidate characteristics can be found in Appendix 1.

³ For some cities, information at polling-station level was not available on the website of the Dutch Electoral Council. In this case, data was obtained via the municipalities.

⁴ The cities included are: 's-Hertogenbosch, Almere, Alphen aan den Rijn, Amersfoort, Amsterdam, Apeldoorn, Arnhem, Dordrecht Eindhoven, Enschede, Groningen, Haarlem, Leiden, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Zaanstad, Zoetermeer and Zwolle.

⁵ In Dordrecht, voters are not assigned a specific polling station.

⁶ The Netherlands has twenty voting districts, which exist mainly for administrative reasons. PvdA, 50Plus, SP and CDA have candidate lists that differ slightly between districts. We did not include these regional candidates.

⁷ The Surinamese/Antillean group includes minorities from Aruba.

4.3. Neighbourhood characteristics

The polling stations were linked to the administratively defined neighbourhood in which they were located. Neighbourhood characteristics (for the year 2017) were retrieved from Statistics Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2018a; 2018b). The total proportion of non-Western ethnic minorities within neighbourhoods (or relative group size) ranged from 0% to 86%. We also included the size of each specific ethnic group in the neighbourhood: Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean and other non-Western background.⁸ Appendix 1 presents a detailed summary of the data. This information concerns ethnic background; we do not know how many of these minorities have Dutch citizenship (and are hence allowed to vote). However, citizenship levels are relatively high for the established minority groups in the Netherlands: 78% of Turks, 86% of Moroccans and 98% of Surinamese/Antillean (own calculations; Statistics Netherlands, 2018a; 2018b).

4.4. Other determinants of ethnic affinity voting

The fact that ethnic minority candidates receive more votes in specific polling stations may simply be the result of differences in party popularity between these stations; we therefore include the main effect of party as well as an interaction term between party and the proportion of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood in our explanatory model. Moreover, votes for the party leader are often considered to be votes for the party, at least in the Dutch electoral system (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). Since some party leaders have an ethnic minority background (this is the case for Artikel 1, DENK and the Green Party (GL)), we take into account whether the candidate is the party leader, thereby even more rigorously disentangling party (leader) effects from ethnic affinity voting.

Additionally, we control for candidate characteristics that are known to increase vote share. First, candidates who were also nominated during the 2012 elections and incumbent MPs could receive a higher share of the vote in 2017 (Aarts, Blais, & Schmitt, 2011; Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Redmond & Regan, 2015). We therefore include a variable to measure whether a candidate is new (reference category), a renominated candidate or an incumbent MP. We also expect the first ethnic minority candidate on the list to receive a higher share of the vote. For each ethnic group we therefore identified the candidate with the highest position on the list. Thus, for each party, the first candidate with a Turkish background was coded as the first ethnic minority candidate, but so too were the first Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean and other non-Western candidates. The variable first ethnic minority candidate on the list did not include party leaders with an ethnic minority background. Since the party leaders of Artikel 1 (Surinamese), DENK (Turkish) and the Green Party (GL; Moroccan) are also the first ethnic minority candidates on the list, we included an additional control variable for these leaders.

Neighbourhood characteristics other than the distribution of ethnic groups may also influence the popularity of parties and candidates with specific characteristics (David & Van Hamme, 2011). Since non-Western

ethnic minorities are more likely to live in neighbourhoods with a lower socioeconomic status, we control for the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood (Cho et al., 2006; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Johnston et al., 2000, 2004). We used the average housing value in 2017 as the indicator for this (Statistics Netherlands, 2018c).

Another neighbourhood characteristic we expect to influence affinity voting is the presence of a mosque in the neighbourhood, which could provide a fertile focus for Muslim candidates' campaigns (Dancygier, 2017). An overview of mosques in the cities included was derived from the website *moskeewijzer.nl*, with which we determined if a mosque was present in the neighbourhood. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of neighbourhood characteristics.

5. Analysis and results

5.1. Analytical strategy

We are interested in the share of the vote for specific ethnic minority candidates. The dependent variable is hence a proportion: the number of votes ('success') for a candidate divided by the total number of votes cast ('trials') in that specific polling station. To analyse this binomial proportion data we use binomial logistic regression. In our data, 69% of the vote was cast for the first candidate on the parties' lists. Even though all candidates received at least one vote in at least one polling station, most candidates did not receive votes in every polling station. In total, for 83.4% of the observations, the dependent variable had the value zero. An initial goodness-of-fit test showed that in a binomial model, the residual deviance is much larger than the residual degrees of freedom, indicating overdispersion (Long & Freese, 2006). To take this overdispersion into account, we use quasi-binomial regression analysis (Crawley, 2013).

An alternative method to analyse our proportion data is via zero-inflated beta regression analysis. In such analysis, the probability that an observation is zero is estimated and, simultaneously, the mean value is estimated for observations that are non-zero, accounting for the skewness among these observations. Thus, as a robustness check, we also estimated zero-inflated beta regression models; results are presented in Appendix 3.

After a presentation of descriptive statistics, we first test the general ethnic affinity hypothesis by including an interaction term between candidates' ethnic background and the proportion of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood to predict candidates' share of the vote (Model 1 in Table 3). In Model 2, we include the quadratic term of minority group size in the neighbourhood and its interaction with candidates' ethnic background to test whether affinity effects are stronger when the relative group size of ethnic minorities is larger, and whether they represent an exponential or J-shaped function. The results of Models 1 and 2 are graphically summarised in Fig. 1. Thereafter, we examine whether ethnic affinity effects differ between political parties by including interactions between party, the ethnic background of candidates and the share of the ethnic minority population in the neighbourhood. The results of this model are summarised in Fig. 2. In Figs. 3 and 4, we summarise specific co-ethnic affinity effects based on the model in which we

Table 1
Descriptive statistics: neighbourhood characteristics (N = 1,089).

	%	Range	Mean	S.D.
% Ethnic minorities		0–86	22.9	17.6
% Turkish minorities		0–37	4.1	5.3
% Moroccan minorities		0–42	4.5	6.3
% Surinamese/Antillean minorities		0–48	6.0	6.4
% Other non-Western minorities		0–47	8.2	5.1
Socio-economic status (x 1000)		53–1608	215.0	106.3
Mosques		0–1		
• No	89.3			
• Yes	10.7			

⁸ Ethnic minorities are generally less likely to vote than the majority population. If turnout rates differ widely from one ethnic minority group to another, our outcomes on affinity voting should be interpreted with caution. We calculated the voter turnout for polling stations by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of voters appointed to that polling station. A Pearson correlation shows that the correlation between turnout and the proportion of Turks in the neighbourhood is -0.20 ; for Moroccans, it is -0.22 ; and for Surinamese/Antilleans, -0.28 . The correlation between turnout and the share of native Dutch in a neighbourhood is 0.31 . This demonstrates that turnout is lower in neighbourhoods with larger ethnic minority populations. However, turnout rates do not differ substantially between ethnic minority groups.

Fig. 1. Predicted probabilities for general ethnic affinity voting.

Notes: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Fig. 1 shows the predicted probabilities based on Model 1 (dashed line) and 2 (solid line) for ethnic minority candidates that are not the party leader, first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates.

included interaction effects between candidates' specific ethnic background and the share of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood and party. Last, Fig. 5 summarises the effect of candidates' gender on ethnic affinity voting.

In all models, we control for party leader effects, the first ethnic minority candidate on the list, renominated candidates, political party effects and (varying) party popularity across neighbourhoods with different minority populations. In Model 3, in which we examine party-

Fig. 2. Predicted probabilities for party-dependent ethnic affinity voting.

Notes: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Fig. 2 shows the predicted probabilities based on Model 3 (see Table 2.1 in Appendix 2) for ethnic minority candidates that are not the party leader, first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates. The effects for ethnic minority candidates all significantly differ from those of native Dutch candidates.

Fig. 3. Predicted probabilities for co-ethnic affinity voting by party.

Notes: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Fig. 3 shows the predicted probabilities based on Model 4a (see Table 2.2 in Appendix 2) for ethnic minority candidates that are not the party leader, first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates.

dependent ethnic affinity effects, we also control for the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood and the influence of a mosque on ethnic affinity voting by including main effects for these variables and interactions with the political party variable. Controlling for these characteristics shows only minor changes in the ethnic affinity effects and

are therefore not included in the other models. Model 3, including the control effects, can be found in Appendix 2.

Table 2
Ethnic minority candidates on parties' candidate lists (N = 548).

	Dutch		Turkish		Moroccan		Surinamese/Antillean		Other non-Western		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Artikel 1	12	60.0	0	0.0	1	5.0	5	25.0	2	10.0	20	100
CDA	43	96.0	1	2.2	1	2.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	45	100
CU	44	88.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	4.0	4	8.0	50	100
DENK	2	11.1	9	50.0	3	16.7	2	11.1	2	11.1	18	100
D66	42	84.0	1	2.0	5	10.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	50	100
FvD	29	96.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	3.3	0	0.0	30	100
GL	45	90.0	3	6.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	50	100
PvdA	59	78.7	4	5.3	7	9.3	3	4.0	2	2.7	75	100
PVV	49	98.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	50	100
SP	40	90.9	3	6.8	1	2.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	44	100
VVD	77	96.3	1	1.3	2	2.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	80	100
50Plus	35	97.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.8	36	100
Total	477	87.0	22	4.0	21	3.8	15	2.7	13	2.4	548	100

5.2. Descriptive results

Table 2 presents the number of candidates by ethnic group and for each party. Artikel 1, DENK, the Christian Union (CU) and the social democrats (PvdA) have the highest proportion of ethnic minority candidates. Table 2 also shows that not all ethnic groups are represented on the candidate list of all parties. For instance, Artikel 1 has no Turkish candidate and 50Plus only has other non-Western ethnic minority candidates (i.e. no candidates with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean background). It follows that we can only estimate specific co-ethnic affinity effects for the ethnic groups that are represented on a party's candidate list.

Table 2 shows that 13% (71) of candidates had an ethnic minority background in 2017. In total, 59.7% of these candidates were men. Appendix 1 presents an overview of the gender of the candidates by party. Even though most candidates are men, the Socialist Party (SP) only has one female Moroccan minority and no male Moroccan candidates; DENK and the Party for Freedom (PVV) have female Surinamese/Antillean minority candidates, but no male candidates from these

Table 3
Quasi-binomial regression models of candidates' vote share; general ethnic affinity effects.

	Model 1			Model 2		
	B		S.E.	B		S.E.
Ethnic Minority candidate (Dutch = ref.)	-1.398	***	0.014	-1.609	***	0.018
Ethnic Minority candidate x % ethnic minorities in neighbourhood	0.020	***	0.000	0.0390	***	0.001
Ethnic Minority candidate x % ethnic minorities in neighbourhood ²				-0.0003	***	0.000
Control variables						
Party						
- Art 1	-10.320	***	0.049	-10.440	***	0.051
- CDA	-8.181	***	0.015	-8.180	***	0.015
- CU	-9.343	***	0.022	-9.343	***	0.022
- DENK	-9.181	***	0.025	-9.299	***	0.026
- D66	-7.547	***	0.011	-7.546	***	0.011
- FvD	-9.016	***	0.028	-9.016	***	0.028
- GL	-6.879	***	0.013	-6.865	***	0.014
- PvdA	-8.181	***	0.015	-8.185	***	0.015
- PVV	-8.128	***	0.012	-8.128	***	0.012
- SP	-8.416	***	0.014	-8.417	***	0.014
- VVD	-7.397	***	0.010	-7.395	***	0.010
- 50Plus	-9.499	***	0.022	-9.500	***	0.022
% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood for:						
- Art 1	0.033	***	0.001	0.037	***	0.001
- CDA	-0.020	***	0.001	-0.021	***	0.001
- CU	-0.008	***	0.001	-0.008	***	0.001
- DENK	0.031	***	0.001	0.034	***	0.001
- D66	-0.010	***	0.000	-0.010	***	0.000
- FvD	-0.008	***	0.001	-0.008	***	0.001
- GL	-0.013	***	0.000	-0.014	***	0.000
- PvdA	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000
- PVV	0.003	***	0.000	0.003	***	0.000
- SP	0.001	**	0.000	0.001	**	0.000
- VVD	-0.017	***	0.000	-0.017	***	0.000
- 50Plus	0.003	***	0.001	0.003	***	0.001
Party leader	4.845	***	0.008	4.846	***	0.008
First ethnic minority on the list	2.454	***	0.009	2.454	***	0.009
Renominated candidate from 2012 (new candidate = ref.)	0.435	***	0.010	0.435	***	0.010
- Incumbent MP	0.931	***	0.009	0.931	***	0.009
N	1,162,308			1,162,308		

Notes: ***p = 0.000; **p < 0.001; *p < 0.05. p < 0.10.

origins; and the social democrats (PvdA) and 50Plus only have female candidates and no male candidates of other non-Western minority origin.

5.3. Multivariate analysis

Our results show that, on average, ethnic minority candidates receive a lower share of the vote than native Dutch candidates, as indicated by the estimated negative main effect of being an ethnic minority candidate ($b = -1.398$, Model 1, Table 3). The vote share of individual candidates also depends on the party to which they belong. This naturally reflects, in part, differences in party popularity. Our main interest is, however, in the ethnic affinity effect, which is represented by the interaction effect of candidate's ethnic background with the share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood in Model 1. The positive and significant interaction effect ($b = 0.020$, Model 1, Table 3) shows that when the share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood is larger, the likelihood that ethnic minority candidates will receive a greater share of the vote is higher as well. This result supports Hypothesis 1.

To ease interpretation, we graphically summarised the results of Model 1 (and Model 2) in Fig. 1. For Fig. 1, we calculated the predicted probabilities for ethnic minority candidates in neighbourhoods with varying shares of the ethnic minority population, ranging from 0% to 80%. The predicted probabilities refer to the vote share of ethnic minority candidates who were not the party leader, the first ethnic minority candidate on the list, nor renominated candidates or incumbent MPs. As an example, consider the predicted vote share of ethnic minority candidates from DENK in neighbourhoods with no ethnic minority population. The estimated logit is: $1.398 + 9.181 + (0.020 \cdot 0) + (0.031 \cdot 0) = -10.579$ which leads to a predicted vote share of $1/(1 + \exp(-10.579)) = 0.00003$. The logit for ethnic minority candidates from DENK in neighbourhoods with the highest share of ethnic minorities (80%) is: $1.398 + 9.181 + (0.020 \cdot 80) + (0.031 \cdot 80) = -6.482$ which corresponds to a predicted probability of 0.00153. These predicted probabilities seem quite small, but this is not very surprising since we do not focus on party leaders – who receive by far the majority of the vote – and analyse the vote share of 548 candidates.

To test the second hypothesis, we include an additional interaction between candidates' ethnic minority background and the quadratic term of the share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood. Based on the estimates of Model 2, we once again calculate the predicted probabilities (i.e. the vote share; Fig. 1, solid line). In line with the mobilisation hypothesis, Fig. 1 shows the expected J-shaped relationship between the relative group size of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood and vote share of minority candidates (H2); ethnic affinity effects are most pronounced in neighbourhoods with a sizeable proportion of minorities.

So far, we have estimated the general ethnic affinity effect, assuming it to have the same strength across parties. To examine party-dependent ethnic affinity effects, we included a three-way interaction between candidates with an ethnic minority background, the relative size of the ethnic minority population within a neighbourhood, and party. In Fig. 2 we plotted the predicted probabilities for candidates of parties for which ethnic affinity effects were positive and significant; Model 3, on which these estimates are based, can be found in Table 2.1 in Appendix 2. We find positive and significant ethnic affinity effects for ethnic minority candidates affiliated with Artikel 1, DENK, the social liberals (D66), the social democrats (PvdA), the Green Party (GL), the Socialist Party (SP), and the Cristian Union (CU). In contrast, for candidates of the (centre) right-wing parties (CDA, VVD, PVV, FvD, 50Plus) we find that when the ethnic minority population is larger, ethnic minority candidates receive a smaller share of the vote: a negative ethnic affinity effect. General ethnic affinity effects are strongest for the minority-oriented party DENK, but much weaker for Artikel 1. With the exception for Artikel 1 only, we can support Hypothesis 3 – that general ethnic affinity effects are strongest for candidates affiliated with minority-oriented parties, followed by left-wing and right-wing parties.

Since general ethnic affinity effects were only found for DENK and left-wing parties, we present co-ethnic affinity effects for these parties only. The co-ethnic affinity effects for these parties are summarised in Fig. 3 (see Table 2.2 in Appendix 2 for model estimates). It shows that in neighbourhoods with a larger Turkish population, the proportion of votes for candidates of Turkish origin increases significantly. For candidates with a Moroccan background, we find significant co-ethnic affinity effects for candidates from DENK and the social democrats (PvdA). However, the proportion of votes for candidates of Moroccan origin from the Socialist Party (SP) significantly decreases in neighbourhoods with a larger Moroccan population. Since the Socialist Party (SP) has only one Moroccan-origin candidate, this finding may also be due to characteristics other than ethnic background. For candidates with a Surinamese or Antillean background we find co-ethnic affinity effects for Artikel 1, the Christian Union (CU), DENK and the social democrats (PvdA). Note that the effects are strongest for the party leaders (with predicted probabilities for DENK from 0.007 to 0.520), followed by other candidates from DENK (i.e. predicted probabilities for Moroccan-origin candidates from DENK from 0.000 to 0.034) and generally weakest for candidates from parties in the top row (i.e. predicted probabilities for Turkish-origin candidates from the SP from 0.000 to 0.001). With one exception – Moroccan-origin candidates from the SP – our findings support Hypothesis 4a: that in a neighbourhood with a larger number of co-ethnics, co-ethnic candidates receive a higher share of the vote. As becomes clear from Fig. 3, there is no clear order in the strength of co-ethnic affinity voting effects between the ethnic groups; we do not find corroborative evidence for Hypothesis 4b, that ethnic affinity effects are strongest for candidates with a Turkish background, followed by those with Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean backgrounds.

In addition to the co-ethnic affinity models, we carried out an extra analysis, homing in on the two Dutch parties known to attract the ethnic minority vote, DENK and the social democrats (PvdA). For this analysis, we included co-ethnic affinity effects as well as cross-ethnic affinity effects for candidates of Turkish and Moroccan origin (see Table 2.3 in Appendix 2 for model estimates). Cross-ethnic affinity effects are tested by relating the share of the Turkish minority population to the vote share for Moroccan candidates, and vice versa. Fig. 4a shows the co- and cross-ethnic affinity effects for the first ethnic minority candidates on the list for DENK and the social democrats. Fig. 4b shows the co- and cross-ethnic affinity effects for the party leader of DENK. Cross-ethnic affinity effects (lines with dots) are, in general, much weaker than co-ethnic affinity effects. Moroccan candidates of the PvdA receive an even smaller share of the vote in neighbourhoods with a larger Turkish population. The vote share of Turkish-origin candidates is not greater in neighbourhoods with a larger proportion of Moroccans.

Fig. 4b also makes clear that the (Turkish) party leader of DENK has

an important effect on co-ethnic affinity voting for this party. In neighbourhoods with a larger Turkish population, the party leader of DENK receives a higher share of the vote, but the co-ethnic effect for the other Turkish candidates of DENK is not significant. The outcomes presented in Fig. 4 confirm that – at least for candidates of Turkish and Moroccan origin of DENK and PvdA – minority candidates mainly attract votes from co-ethnics.

Next, we turn to the moderating impact of gender on ethnic affinity effects (Fig. 5; see Table 2.4 in Appendix 2 for model estimates). Fig. 5 shows the strongest effects for candidates from DENK and Artikel 1 (with predicted probabilities up to 0.416), followed by candidates from parties presented in the middle row of the figure; the weakest effects are found for the parties in the top row of Fig. 5 (with predicted probabilities of up to 0.0005). Fig. 5 shows that the ethnic affinity effects are stronger for men than for women with respect to Turkish-origin candidates from the Socialist Party (SP). For Turkish-origin candidates from DENK, the effects are strongest for the male party leader, but for the other Turkish-origin candidates, ethnic affinity effects are significantly stronger among female candidates. Likewise, for Turkish-origin candidates from the Green Party (GL) and the social democrats (PvdA), ethnic affinity effects are even stronger among female than male candidates, although the difference in effect size is not significant. For Moroccan-origin candidates of the social democrats, ethnic affinity effects do not differ between men and women. Thus, we do not find support for Hypothesis 5a, that ethnic affinity effects among candidates with a Turkish or Moroccan background are stronger for men than for women.

Fig. 5 also shows that ethnic affinity effects are stronger for Surinamese/Antillean female candidates than for male candidates from Artikel 1 and the social democrats (PvdA), which is in line with Hypothesis 5b. However, among Surinamese/Antillean candidates from the Christian Union, ethnic affinity effects are significantly stronger for men. Although this does make sense for a religious party, it may in this case also be due to other factors, such as the party's male candidate being higher on the list than the female candidate. The findings do not fully support Hypothesis 5b.

6. Conclusion and discussion

The aim of this study was to test for ethnic affinity effects and the conditions under which these are stronger in an open-list proportional representation system during a national election. Given that the Dutch PR system features ethnic minority candidates on almost every party's candidate list, this gave us the opportunity for a detailed study of ethnic affinity voting. Moreover, the fact that two minority-oriented parties featured in the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2017 provided a unique context to do so.

The current study finds evidence for the ethnic affinity thesis but

Fig. 4a. Predicted probabilities for co-ethnic and cross-ethnic voting.

Fig. 4b. Predicted probabilities for co-ethnic and cross-ethnic voting – party leader effects DENK.

Notes: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Fig. 4 shows the predicted probabilities for the first ethnic minority on the list and the party leader of DENK based on Models 4b and 4c (see Table 2.3 in Appendix 2).

also, more importantly, that the strength of ethnic affinity effects depends on candidates' party affiliation, ethnic background and gender, and on the composition of the voter's neighbourhood. In line with the general ethnic affinity hypothesis, we thus find that in neighbourhoods with a larger relative group size of ethnic minorities, ethnic minority candidates receive a bigger proportion of the votes. These affinity voting effects are stronger in more ethnically dense neighbourhoods; the relationship between the relative group size of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood and the vote share of minority candidates is J-shaped, which is consistent with the mobilisation hypothesis. Differentiating between parties, we find that ethnic affinity effects are most prominent for candidates affiliated with the minority-oriented DENK and left-wing parties, and weak, absent or even negative for (centre) right-wing parties.

Evidence from this study for the vote for ethnic candidates within left-wing parties provides further support for the importance of ethnic background in the vote choice of ethnic minorities. It may be that minority-oriented and left-wing parties use a vote-based inclusion strategy and are therefore more successful in attracting the ethnic minority vote, whereas right-wing parties mainly use a symbolic inclusion strategy. Moreover, the right-wing parties have ethnic minorities on their candidate lists, but these candidates do not receive a higher share of the vote in neighbourhoods with larger proportions of ethnic minorities. It is possible that right-wing parties nominate candidates with an ethnic minority background mainly to express inclusiveness. In line with their more assimilationist ideological position, their candidates may not have strong ties to their ethnic community (Dancygier, 2017). Our results further suggest that the electoral collapse of the social democrats may indeed be partly due to the loss of ethnic minority voters to minority party DENK in neighbourhoods with a larger Turkish- or Moroccan-origin population; competition between the social democrats and minority-interest party DENK over the ethnic minority vote seems to have been won by the latter, and mainly in neighbourhoods with a high proportion of Turks and Moroccans.

In addition to (party-dependent) general ethnic affinity voting, we examined co-ethnic affinity voting. We find that ethnic minority candidates predominantly receive support in neighbourhoods with a larger concentration of their own ethnic group, even *within* minority-oriented parties; the Turkish party leader of DENK hardly profits from a higher proportion of Moroccans in the neighbourhood, whereas he does from a higher share of Turks.

A candidate's gender influences ethnic affinity voting. Some results, however, were at odds with our expectations. For Turkish-origin candidates, co-ethnic affinity effects are – as expected – stronger for male than for female candidates from the Socialist Party (SP). However, although we found the strongest effect for the male Turkish-origin party leader of DENK, there are stronger ethnic affinity effects for female

DENK candidates than for male. Moreover, co-ethnic effects are stronger for female candidates of Surinamese/Antillean origin, except for candidates affiliated with the Christian Union (CU). Voters for the Christian Party might hold more a more conservative view of gender roles, which may explain why we find stronger ethnic affinity effects for their male candidates.

Our study is not without limitations. First, we used aggregated voting data and it is important to bear in mind that this does not reflect individual voting behaviour; it does not give any information about the extent to which voters with a native background voted for an ethnic minority to express a preference. However, our data is still very fine-grained; the vote share of individual candidates at small-scale polling-station level shows clear patterns of co-ethnic affinity voting. Second, the neighbourhood data from Statistics Netherlands did not provide us with information about the proportion of the ethnic minority population that is eligible to vote. To vote in national elections in the Netherlands, you must have Dutch citizenship and be over 18. Not all ethnic minorities have Dutch nationality, and these groups have a larger proportion of under-18s than the native Dutch population. The share of eligible voters is thus probably lower in minority groups, and this implies that, if anything, we likely underestimated ethnic affinity effects. And although we found support for the mobilisation thesis, we cannot rule out an alternative explanation: namely, that due to selective residential mobility, minorities in ethnically dense neighbourhoods may have different characteristics to minorities in other neighbourhoods. If, for example, minorities in ethnically dense neighbourhoods are less integrated (or assimilated), this is also likely to lead to stronger affinity voting.

Further research should be undertaken to investigate whether ethnic affinity effects in national elections exist in other Western European countries – with either a closed-list or open-list-PR-system – and under which conditions, ideally with individual-level data. This study has shown the relevance of examining whether ethnic affinity voting varies between parties and ethnic groups. Survey data with information about voters' candidate preferences could provide more definitive evidence about the mechanisms behind ethnic affinity voting. Such data could explore why ethnic minorities vote for a co-ethnic candidate, and the role ethnic identification and ethnic communities play in that choice. However, since ethnic minorities are often underrepresented in surveys, especially those less well integrated, the value of aggregated election data should not be underestimated.

Our research has given strong evidence for co-ethnic ethnic affinity voting. With the rise of the minority-oriented party DENK, we find that party-dependent ethnic affinity voting appears to be particularly strong. For the social democrats (PvdA), which traditionally attracted the ethnic minority vote in the past, ethnic affinity effects are considerably smaller. This in itself warrants further investigation of voting trends for these

Fig. 5. Predicted probabilities for gender-dependent co-ethnic affinity voting by party.

Notes: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Fig. 5 shows the predicted probabilities based on Model 5 (see Table 2.4 in Appendix 2) for ethnic minority candidates that are not the party leader, first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates.

parties and low-aggregate voting outcomes studies. With the collapse of many social-democratic parties, we can expect that new minority-oriented parties will become successful in other European countries as well.

Funding

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Declaration of competing interest

None.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Niels Spierings and Kristof Jacobs for

providing us with information about the candidates for the Dutch national level election of 2017 and Lucas Schokker for his assistance with the coding of the candidate lists.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102098>.

References

- Aarts, K., Blais, A., & Schmitt, H. (2011). *Political leaders and democratic elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Abrajano, M. A., & Alvarez, R. M. (2005). A natural experiment of race-based and issue voting: The 2001 city of Los Angeles elections. *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(2), 203–218.
- Adams, J. F., Merrill, S., & Grofman, B. (2005). *A unified theory of party competition: A cross-national analysis integrating spatial and behavioral factors*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Andeweg, R. B., & Irwin, G. A. (2009). *Governance and politics of The Netherlands* (3th ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Arends-Tóth, J., & Van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2009). Cultural differences in family, marital, and gender-role values among immigrants and majority members in The Netherlands. *International Journal of Psychology*, 44(3), 161–169.
- Badas, A., & Stauffer, K. E. (2019). Voting for women in nonpartisan and partisan elections. *Electoral Studies*, 57, 245–255.
- Barreto, M. A. (2007). Si Se puede! Latino candidates and the mobilization of latino voters. *American Political Science Review*, 101(03), 425–441.
- Bejarano, C., & Segura, G. M. (2007). What goes around comes around. Race, blowback, and the Louisiana elections of 2002 and 2003. *Political Research*, 60(2), 328–337.
- Besco, R. (2015). Rainbow coalitions or inter-minority conflict? Racial affinity and diverse minority voters. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 48(02), 305–328.
- Bird, K. (2005). The political representation of visible minorities in electoral democracies: A comparison of France, Denmark, and Canada. *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, 11(4), 425–465.
- Bird, K., Jackson, S. D., McGregor, R. M., Moore, A. A., & Stephenson, L. B. (2016). Sex (and ethnicity) in the city: Affinity voting in the 2014 Toronto mayoral election. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 49(2), 359–383.
- Bloemraad, I. (2013). Accessing the corridors of power: Puzzles and pathways to understanding minority representation. *West European Politics*, 36(3), 652–670.
- Bloemraad, I., & Schönwälder, K. (2013). Immigrant and ethnic minority representation in Europe: Conceptual challenges and theoretical approaches. *West European Politics*, 36(3), 564–579.
- Brians, C. L. (2005). Women for women? Gender and party bias in voting for female candidates. *American Politics Research*, 33(3), 357–375.
- Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14(4), 417–439.
- Celis, K., & Erzeel, S. (2017). The complementarity advantage: Parties, representativeness and newcomers' access to power. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70(1), 43–61.
- Cho, W. K. T., Gimpel, J. G., & Dyck, J. J. (2006). Residential concentration, political socialization, and voter turnout. *The Journal of Politics*, 68(1), 156–167.
- Crawley, M. J. (2013). *The R book*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Cutler, F. (2002). The simplest shortcut of all: Sociodemographic characteristics and electoral choice. *The Journal of Politics*, 64(2), 466–490.
- Dancygier, R. (2017). *Dilemmas of inclusion. Muslims in European politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- David, Q., & Van Hamme, G. (2011). Pillars and electoral behavior in Belgium: The neighborhood effect revisited. *Political Geography*, 30(5), 250–262.
- Dawson, M. C. (1995). *Behind the mule*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Devroe, R., & Wauters, B. (2018). Political gender stereotypes in a list-PR system with a high share of women MPs: Competent men versus leftist women? *Political Research Quarterly*, 71(4), 788–800.
- Dolan, K. (2014). Gender stereotypes, candidate evaluations, and voting for women candidates: What really matters? *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(1), 96–107.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper and Collinn.
- Evans, G. (2000). The continued significance of class voting. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3(1), 401–417.
- Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (1999). Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: Civic communities and ethnic networks. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 25(4), 703–726.
- Fieldhouse, E., & Cutts, D. (2008). Diversity, density and turnout: The effect of neighbourhood ethno-religious composition on voter turnout in Britain. *Political Geography*, 27(5), 530–548.
- Fisher, S. D., Heath, A., Sanders, D., & Sobolewska, M. (2015). Candidate ethnicity and vote choice in Britain. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(04), 883–905.
- Gallagher, M., & Marsh, M. (1988). *Candidate selection in comparative perspective: The secret garden of politics*. SAGE Publications.
- Geese, L. (2018). Do immigrant-origin candidates attract immigrant-origin voters in party-centred electoral systems? Evidence from Germany. *Acta Politica*, 1–20.
- Goodyear-Grant, E., & Tolley, E. (2017). Voting for one's own: Racial group identification and candidate preferences. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 1–17.
- Jacobs, D., & Tillie, J. (2004). Introduction: Social capital and political integration of migrants. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30(3), 419–427.
- Johnston, R., Jones, K., Sarker, R., Propper, C., Burgess, S., & Bolster, A. (2004). Party support and the neighbourhood effect: Spatial polarisation of the British electorate, 1991–2001. *Political Geography*, 23(4), 367–402.
- Johnston, R., Pattie, C., Dorling, D., MacAllister, I., Tunstall, H., & Rossiter, D. (2000). The neighbourhood effect and voting in England and Wales: Real or imagined? *British Elections and Parties Review*, 10, 47–63.
- Kiesraad. (2017). *Verkiezingsuitslag tweede kamer 2017*. Retrieved from: <https://data.ovrhheid.nl/data/dataset/verkiezingsuitslag-tweede-kamer-2017>.
- Landa, J., Copeland, M., & Grofman, B. (1995). Ethnic voting patterns: A case study of metropolitan Toronto. *Political Geography*, 14(5), 435–449.
- Leighley, J. E. (2001). *Strenght in numbers?* Princeton University Press.
- Long, J. S., & Freese, J. (2006). *Regression models for categorical dependent variables using Stata*. Stata Press.
- Mansbridge, J. (1999). Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A contingent "yes.". *The Journal of Politics*, 61(3), 628–657.
- Martin, N. (2016). Do ethnic minority candidates mobilize ethnic minority voters? Evidence from the 2010 United Kingdom general election. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 69(3), 159–180.
- Matson, M., Fine, T. S., & Florida, C. (2006). Ballot cues in low-information elections. *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*, 6(1), 49–72.
- McConaughy, C. M., White, I. K., Leal, D. L., & Casellas, J. P. (2010). A latino on the ballot: Explaining coethnic voting among latinos and the response of white Americans. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(4), 1199–1211.
- Mcdermott, M. L. (1998). Race and gender cues in low-information elections. *Political Research Quarterly*, 51(4), 895–918.
- Messina, A. M. (2006). The political incorporation of immigrants in Europe: Trends and implications. In A. M. Messina, & G. Lahav (Eds.), *The migration reader: Exploring politics and policies*. Boulder: Lybbe Renier, 470–193.
- Miller, W. L. (1978). Social choice and party choice in England: A new analysis. *British Journal of Political Science*, 8(3), 257–284.
- Mügge, L. (2016). Intersectionality, recruitment and selection: Ethnic minority candidates in Dutch parties. *Parliamentary Affairs*, (69), 512–530.
- Phillips, A. (1995). *The politics of presence: The political representation of gender, ethnicity, and race*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Philpot, T. S., & Walton, H. (2007). One of our Own: Black female candidates and the voter who support them. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), 49–62.
- Pitkin, H. (1967). *The concept of representation*. University of California Press.
- Redmond, P., & Regan, J. (2015). Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system: A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 38, 244–256.
- Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological correlations and the behavior of individuals. *American Sociological Review*, 15(3), 351–357.
- Röder, A., & Mühlau, P. (2014). Are they acculturating? Europe's immigrants and gender egalitarianism. *Social Forces*, 92(3), 899–928.
- Sanbonmatsu, K. (2016). Gender stereotypes and vote choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1), 20–34.
- Sanders, D., Heath, A., Fisher, S. D., & Sobolewska, M. (2014). The calculus of ethnic minority voting in Britain. *Political Studies*, 62(2), 230–251.
- Shaw, D. R. (1997). Estimating racially polarized voting: A view from the states. *Political Research Quarterly*, 50(1), 49–74.
- Sigelman, L., & Sigelman, C. K. (1982). Sexism, racism, and ageism in voting Behavior: An experimental analysis. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 45(4), 263–269.
- Sobolewska, M. (2013). Party strategies and the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities: The 2010 British general election. *West European Politics*, 36(3), 615–633.
- Statistics Netherlands. (2018a). *Bevolking: generatie, geslacht, leeftijd en migratieachtergrond, 1 januari*. Retrieved from <https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/37325/table?ts=1542877039472>.
- Statistics Netherlands. (2018b). *Bevolking: geslacht, leeftijd en nationaliteit op 1 januari*. Retrieved from <https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/03743/table?ts=1542905489523>.
- Statistics Netherlands. (2018c). *Wijk- en Buurtkaart 2017*. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek: Den Haag/Heerlen.
- Stokes-Brown, A. K. (2006). Latino vote choice. *American Politics Research*, 34(5), 627–652.
- Teney, C., Jacobs, D., Rea, A., & Delwit, P. (2010). Ethnic voting in Brussels: Voting patterns among ethnic minorities in Brussels (Belgium) during the 2006 local elections. *Acta Politica*, 45(3).
- Tiberj, V., & Michon, L. (2013). Two-tier pluralism in "Colour-blind" France. *West European Politics*, 36(3), 580–596.
- Tillie, J. (2004). Social capital of organisations and their members: Explaining the political integration of immigrants in Amsterdam. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30(3), 529–541.
- Van der Zwan, R. (2019). *Voting preferences among ethnic minorities: The role of ethnic identification and ethnic minority representation. The political representation of ethnic minorities and their vote choice*. PhD dissertation.
- Van der Zwan, R., Lubbers, M., & Eisinga, R. (2019). The political representation of ethnic minorities in The Netherlands: Ethnic minority candidates and the role of party characteristics. *Acta Politica*, 54(2), 245–267.
- Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Andeweg, R. B. (2012). Tweede orde personalisering: Voorkeursstemmen in Nederland. *Res Publica*, 54(2), 163–191.